The anatomy of Arminianisme: or The opening of the controuersies lately handled in the Low-Countryes, concerning the doctrine of prouidence, of predestination, of the death of Christ, of nature and grace. By Peter Moulin, pastor of the church at Paris. Carefully translated out of the originall Latine copy

CHAP. XXXII.

Of Free-will: The opinions of the parties.

I. HOw much that purity and integrity in which man was at the first created, is deformed by sinne, and how the image of Sathan is drawne ouer the image of God, we haue taught, Chap. 7. Yet a liberty from constraint, and physicall necessity hath remained to the will: for if the will could be compelled, it were not voluntas, a will, but noluntas, a nill & vnwillingnes. Or if by an externall principle, by a naturall and im∣mutable law, it should be necessarily determined to one thing; it were not a will, but either a violent im∣pulsion, or a naturall inclination and propension, de∣stitute of knowledge and iudgement, such as is the inclination of all heauy things to the center of the world. For seeing there are three kindes of liberty; the first is from constraint, and physicall or naturall necessitie; the second from sinne; the third from misery: Man, while he is in this present life, shall ne∣uer be fully free from sinne and misery; but to these two liberties he shall come in the life to come: The liberty from constraint and physicall necessity is es∣sentiall to the will, and inseperable from it.

II. The seate of this liberty, is in the will; because it hath gotten the dominion, concerning voluntary actions: For although the will in particular actions

doth follow the perswasion of the vnderstanding, yet the vnderstanding doth not iudge nor deliberate, vn∣lesse it be commanded by the will; for the dominion whereof man doth apply himselfe to deliberation and searching out of the truth: After the same manner that a blinde Master doth in euery thing obey his ser∣uant, leading him and perswading him; which ser∣uant, notwithstanding, doth it that he may obey his Master, who will haue himselfe led, and admonished by him.

But seeing the Scripture saith, that man is the ser∣uant of sinne, Rom 6.17. and sould vnder sinne, Rom. 7.14. And dead in sinne, Ephes. 2.1.5. and Colos. 2.13. it is worth the labour, to know how farre this liberty of mans will doth extend it selfe, as well vnder the estate of sinne, and before regeneration, as vnder the estate of grace and regeneration.

III. The will is the reasonable appetite, which of his owne nature, is alwaies carried to good, whether it be good truely, or in appearance: for it is impossi∣ble that one should desire euill, as it is euill, and not vnder the respect of good.

IV. The liberty of the will, whereby it may will something, or not will it, is called the liberty of con∣tradiction; but the liberty whereby it may will some. thing, or the contrary of it, is called the liberty of contrariety.

V. Now there are onely two things, which wee can will, for we either will the end, or the meanes to the end; the first whereof, is called by Aristotle, Ethi. 3. cap. 4. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the will; the other, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the choise. Wee doe absolutely desire the end, wee choose the

meanes. And if any one doth absolutely, and with∣out deliberation will some meanes to obtaine the end, he doth will that meanes, not simply as a meanes, but as the end; & that he might obtain that, he doth choose other meanes: Now in choosing, the will doth follow the iudgement of the practicall vnderstanding; vn∣lesse when the vehement and inordinate actions ouer-ruling, doe darken reason, or doe resist the iudge∣ment of it. * 1.1

VI. We call that vnvoluntary, which is not onely strained, and to which we are compel••ed by force, but also that which is done by ignorance.

VII. That which is voluntary, diffreth from that which is spontaneus, and done of its owne accord, be∣cause that which is spontaneus, doth extend it selfe further then that which is voluntary: for euery thing which is voluntary is spontaneus, but not contrari∣ly: For euen cattell are m••ued of their owne accord, and they haue their spontaneus appetites and inclina∣tions; but those are done voluntarily, which are done with some knowledge and reason: whether the rea∣son be right, or onely haue a shew of right and truth.

VIII. * 1.2 And of those things that are done volun∣tarily, some are more voluntary then others: For there are some things which one doth 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, wil∣ling and nilling, and slowly, as loath to doe them; as when the sicke man stretcheth forth his arme to be cut off, that the Gangrene might grow no further; or as when the Merchant casts his goods into the sea, with his owne hands: which actions are yet more willingly done, because they are done for their good: For the lesse euill by, which men come to a greater

good doth put on the forme of good.

IX. We all doe necessarily will the last & chiefe end, to wit, felicity; neither doth the desiring of the last end fall into deliberation: For no man can procure from himselfe, that he should will himselfe to be miserable: But yet we will that end freely, because we doe will it without constraint, and with knowledge and iudge∣ment; whence it commeth to passe that this desiring is not onely spontaneus, but also voluntary, and there∣fore free.

X. Furthermore, there are many kindes of hu∣mane actions: For some are meerely naturall, as the contrary motion of the Arteries, and beating of the pulse, the digestion of nourishment, &c. Which be∣cause they are not in our power, nor at mans pleasure, the will is neyther occupied about them, nor doe they fall within the compasse of Election or delibe∣ration.

XI. Some actions are partly naturall, and part∣ly voluntarie, as to eate, to walke, &c. Which al∣though they be naturall, yet they are gouerned by the will. In these actions the will is free, vnlesse when some externall force compels, or some vnauoidable necessity doth vrge, men being vnwilling.

XII. There are also some actions that are ciuill, as to sell, to buy, to bargaine, to play, to build, to paint: In these things the will of man is free, and doth freely incline it selfe to one or other: For hee that doth these things at the command of another, yet is willing to obey him that commandeth, and therefore is driuen to doe it, not onely by anothers will, but also by his owne. Of this liberty the Apostle

speaketh, Corinth. 7.37. He that standeth stedfast in his heart, hauing no necessity, but hath power ouer his owne will, & hath so decreed in his heart, that he will keep his virgin, doth well: For in this place the Apostle vnderstandeth, by that which is done well, not that which is done agreeable to Gods law, but that which is done prudently, and fitly, to the present time and pur∣pose.

XIII. Also in actions that are ciuilly honest, the will of man is moued by its owne pleasure, as when a heathen man helpes vp him that is fallen, or sheweth the way to him that is out of it.

XIV. The like liberty is in the obseruation of Ecclesiasticall pollicy, and in those workes comman∣ded by the law of God, which doe belong to an out∣ward operation; for the most wicked men, doe per∣forme holy rites and religious ceremonies, doe bestow almes, doe heare and reade the word of God.

XV. But especially in euill actions man is free. For hee is not onely of his owne accord carried to sinne, but also of two or more euills, most freely hee doth choose eyther, and doth voluntarily apply him∣selfe to that, to which his minde leads him. Wherefore seeing man, that is naturally euill, is gouerned by his owne euill will, and that one is for that cause said to be free, because he doth what he listeth, it is manifest, that man is therefore the seruant of sinne, because he is in subiection to his owne will, and because he doth sinne voluntarily and freely, and that man is therefore a seruant because he is free.

XVI. They that say that an vnregenerate man by this seruitude & naturall deprauation doth necessarily

sin, ought not to be reprehended; for an vnregenerate man must needes sin: Thus the diuels doe necessarily sinne, but yet freely; for they sinne being not con∣strained, nor determined and appointed to any one thing onely, by any outward cause forcing them: But they are led by their owne motion, by their ingrafted wickednesse, and with their knowledge; after the same manner that the Saints that are glorified, are ne∣cessarily and immutably good, but yet voluntarily and freely: For it is not credible, that the Saints haue lost their liberty by their glorification. There is a kinde of necessity which is voluntary; neither is li∣berty contrary to necessity, but to constraint and seruitude. Wherefore Saint Austin, Enchirid. Chap. * 1.3 105. & ciuitat. lib. 22. Cap. vlt. doth teach, that by the necessity of not sinning, which shall be in the Saints, their free-will shall be rather increased and confirmed then diminished. What is more free then God? And yet he is necessarily good and doth good things: For as Thomas saith, Tom 8. De libro arbitrio. Quest. 24. Art. 3. It is no part of free-will, to be able to choose euill. The same man doth in many places say, that constraint, and not necessity, is contrary to the liberty of the will, but especially in the same Tome, Quest. 10. De process. diuin. personarū. Art. 2.

XVII. There are moreouer, habits and actions, that is, vertues and workes, which doe helpe forward to saluation, and which are proper to the faithfull. Such as are the true knowledge and feruent loue of God, saith and repentance, and holy actions flowing from these vertues. In and about these things, the will of a man that is vnregenerate, and standing in his

pure and meere naturals is not free; here is no free∣will of man, no inclination, no disposition: Surely it had beene a very hard thing to finde in Paul, raging against the Church, and in the theefe, crucified for his robberies, whom Christ conuerted in the very agony of his death, any dispositions or preparations to re∣pentance.

XVIII. I doe not deny, but that there are memorized many things of heathen men, which were done honestly, and profitably for ciuill society, for concord, and for the defence of their countrie: But seeing, Without faith we cannot please God, Heb. 11.6. And seeing that that action alone is acceptable to God, which is done with Faith (for, Whatsoe∣uer is done without faith is sinne, Rom. 14.23.) and which is referred to the glory of God, as the Apostle commandeth, 1. Cor. 10.31. It is plaine, that those honest deedes of the heathen were not without fault, and that they could not come to saluation by such ci∣uill vertues, nor that any one could by them be dis∣posed to faith or true repentance. The right outward duties of ciuill vertues, are of one sort, the duties of faith and Christian piety are of another sort. And tru∣ly in my iudgement, the heathen iudge, who in gi∣uing sentence, and in diuiding possessions doth iudge equally and well, is no more iust before the tribunall of God, then the theeues who equally and iustly di∣uide the pray among themselues: For whosoeuer doth want faith in Christ, is not the Sonne of God, and therefore cannot be an heire and iust possessor of worldly goods, although he excell in ciuill vertues. For a kinde of doubtfull light, and some seedes of

equity are left in man for ciuill society: And they to whom the light of the Gospell doth shine, if they giue themselues ouer to vices should be confounded with shame, being vrged by these examples.

XIX. But after God hath enlightned the minde of any one with his light, and hath touched his heart with repentance, and hath wrought in him faith in Christ, then the will of man beginneth to moue it selfe willingly and freely to holy actions, to which it is not forced by phisicall or naturall necessity, but it is so turned by a milde and effectuall, eyther perswa∣sion or influence, that the will may freely and wil∣lingly follow God calling: For otherwise that were not a good worke, whereunto one should be drawne by constraint, or should be compelled by a naturall necessity. He that doth good vnwillingly, doth wic∣kedly: Such a man is sufficiently rewarded, if God pardon his obedience; for although God hate euill, yet he will not therefore compell to good: Because a good worke is not good, but when it is volun∣tarily.

XX. And although man is freely moued to the workes of piety, yet the whole praise of the good worke is due to God, who worketh in vs to will, and to doe, of his good pleasure, Phil 2. So, although the in∣fant in the mothers wombe doth moue it selfe, and doth helpe forward his owne natiuity, yet it hath that power of mouing from God: Therefore, euen as if any one doth ascribe the whole praise of the forming of the infant, the generation and birth of it to God alone, he doth not thereby hinder the birth of the infant, or diminish the vigour of it: So he that doth

ascribe to God the whole praise of our regeneration and holy actions, doth not thereby hinder the endea∣uour of good workes, nor weaken the will of man, or binde it with the bonds of naturall necessity.

XXI. Here therefore a distinction is to be vsed: For if it be spoken of the beginning of conuersion, and of the first entrance of regeneration and faith, that is, of the procuring or forming of faith and re∣pentance in our soules, wee contend that free-will doth nothing here, and that our soules in the very be∣ginnings are, not onely meerely passiue, but also that they doe with their greatest endeauour resist the worke of God, forming in vs the rudiments and draughts of the new man, so that man in this case is not free, vnlesse it be to resist God. But after rege∣neration begunne, and after God hath giuen to man a heart of flesh for his heart of stone, then man doth freely moue himselfe to those workes which are ac∣ceptable to God. And as there are secret, but yet certaine increasings of regeneration, so this liberty doth increase by little and little, fainting euery day with the resistance of our lusts. By this meanes mans will doth cooperate and worke together with God, yet so, that whatsoeuer good is done, is due to God alone: No otherwise, then as when a scriuener doth guide the shaking hand of the childe, and doth at the first frame it to make letters; the childe indeede doth indeauour to forme the letters, and doth striue with all his power, yet the right forming of the letters is not to be ascribed to the childe, but to the scriue∣ner: This example seemeth to me to be most fit, because it teacheth that God doth not onely worke

with our will (as the Semipelagian Synergists, or main∣tainers of our cooperation with God, of this our age, would haue it) but also that God doth worke by our wills, and doth bend them by an effectuall motion, which motion after what manner, and how farre man may resist, shall hereafter be taught.

XXII. Wee therefore say that the act of belee∣uing and repenting, is so farre the act of man, in as much as man himselfe beleeueth and repenteth, and not God; and in as much as no man beleeueth and repenteth, but he doth it willingly. But we say, that the grace of God alone, doth create and giue the first being to faith in vs, and that it is the gift of God, and by the power of the regenerating spirit, that wee doe willingly and freely beleeue and repent. For the question is not who beleeueth, whether man or God; but what doth bring forth faith in man, and whether it be in the power of free-will, helped with grace, to beleeue or not to beleeue, and to vse grace or not to vse it.

XXIII. From this doctrine (the foundations and proofes whereof shall be brought out of the ho∣ly Scripture in the next chapter) Arminius, and his Sectaries doe infinitely and exceedingly differ: For, they are of opinion, that an vnregenerate man hath power of beleeuing and repenting. The Arminian conferrers at the Hage, Page 272. doe affirme, that conuersion doth goe before faith, and that man doth helpe somewhat to his owne conuersion before hee hath faith. And turning ouer the writings of these Sectaries, I finde that they determine, that by the corruption of nature, mans vnderstanding is darke∣ned,

and his affections are depraued; but I no where finde in their writings, that his will is of its owne na∣ture depr••ued, and prone to sinne: But they attri∣bute to it, pronenesse eyther to good or euill, and an equall in••anation to either part: Wherefore in the regeneration of a man, they will indeede haue his vn∣derstanding to be enlightned vnresistably, and his af∣fections to be drawn (for so they speake) but they say, that the will keepes her owne liberty of beleeuing, or not beleeuing, of repenting, or not repenting. And they will not haue the viuification and reuiuing of the will in our regeneration, to consist in this, that of being naturally euill, it is made good by the infusion of some vertue, but that by the illumination of the vnderstanding, the amend••ment of the affections the will is made able to put forth that faculty of willing or nil∣ling, which is ingrafied in it. This the Arminians of the conferrence at the Hage teach, Page 25. And al∣so the same men, a little after, say these words: In our spirituall death, the spirituall gifts are not properly sepera∣ted from the will of man, because they were neuer engraf∣ted in it. Surely those men are of opinion, that the will of Adam, before his fall, was not furnished with righteousnesse and holinesse: For it cannot be denyed but that these vertues are spirituall gifts; which certainely is a prodigious and monstrous diuinity.

XXIV. The same men doe affirme, that suffi∣cient grace is giuen to all men, euen to vnregenerate and heathen men, to whom the name of Christ hath not come, whereby they may obtaine faith, if they will: And that an vnregenerate man is not altogether

dead in sinne, * 1.4 but that there are in him reliques and remainds of spirituall life, and power of fulfilling the law of nature: for they thinke that God doth ex∣act and require nothing from man, to the performing whereof hee would not giue him sufficient power: otherwise (say they) God should gather, where hee hath not scattered: They say therefore, that God is bound to giue to all men the power of fulfilling that which he commandeth, and of beleeuing in Christ.

XXV. Notable are the words of Arminius, pa. 244. against Perkins. Doest thou (saith he) deny that free-will is flexible and pliant to either part? I adde further, and that also without grace: for it is flexible of its owne na∣ture, and as it is addicted to euill in the state of sinne, so it is capable of good, which capablenesse, grace doth not giue it, for it is in it by nature. Hee therefore doth differ from himselfe, when hee addes, that free will is not bowed to good, without the grace of God. For how doe these things stand together? that free-will is flexible to good, without grace; and yet it is not bowed to good without grace? In vaine is that power which is neuer brought into act: For whence doth hee ga∣ther that that thing may be done, which he himselfe knoweth neuer was done, nor neuer shall be. Hither∣to pertaineth that which he saith, pag. 257. To be able to beleeue is in nature, to beleeue is of grace: therefore to be able to beleeue is not of grace. There is indeede naturally in man a possibility of hauing or receiuing faith; but it is not in him by nature to be able to be∣leeue; for these things doe very much differ. The first notes the susceptability and possibility of receiuing faith: the other signisieth the actiue power and faculty

of beleeuing, which surely is not in man by nature, but is onely from grace.

XXVI. Arnoldus, pag. 271. layeth this to our charge, as a very great errour, that we say that the regenerate man cannot doe any good, vnlesse hee be moued by grace. Truely a great crime, and that which is common to vs with the Apostle, who doth pro∣nounce, that we are not sufficient of our selues to thinke any thing, as of our selues, but all our sufficiency is of God. 2 Cor. 3.5. The same Arnoldus, pag. 447. doth make the vse of grace subiect to mans will: It is determined, saith he, that the vse of grace is subiect to mans will, that man may vse it, or not vse it, according to his naturall liberty: And a little after he doth confesse, that the effect of the mercy of God, was made by Arminius to be in the power of man, but such a man as is already strengthened with grace. To vse which grace, or not to vse it; to beleeue, or not to beleeue, he thinkes is in the power of mans free∣will. Finally, the Arminians will haue the efficacy, that is, the efficiency and working power of it, to de∣pend on free-will. Arnoldus against Bogermannus, pag. 263. and 274. All the operations of grace, which God doth vse, to worke our conuersion being granted, yet the conuersion it selfe doth remaine so free in our power, that we may not be conuerted, that is, that we may con∣uert, or not conuert our selues. Greuinchouius, pag. 198. I say, that the sffect of grace, after the ordinary and vsuall rule, doth depend on some act of free will, as on a fore∣going con••ition, without which, it is not. The same man, pag. 203. and 204. doth say, that there c••n no other common cause be guten of the whole (why this grace should be••essectuall, rather in Paul or Peter then in another) then

the liberty of the will. Perkins said; As there can no good either be, or be done, vnlesse God doth it; so there can no euill be auoided, vnlesse God hinder it. This true and holy sentence, Arminius carpeth at and doth depraue. pag. 113, and for the words, can be auoided, he puts, is auoided: for he saith, that there is in all men power of doing good, and auoiding euill, and that a man may auoide euill, and abstaine from sinne, although God doth not hold him from it; but that the act it selfe, is partly from grace, and partly from free-will, which as it pleaseth, doth either admit, or refuse grace. Here the words of Arnoldus, pag. 381. The good vsing of free∣will, is principally from grace, but yet so, that man himselfe doth vse well his owne free-will: and the liberty of vsing, or not vsing grace is left to him. For these sectaries are of opinion, that the power of beleeuing is vnresistably giuen to all, and that the act of beleeuing is so helped by grace, that it is left to mans free-will to beleeue in act, or not to beleeue, & to vse grace either well or ill.

XXVII. And they deny that faith is from grace alone, but that it is partly from grace, and partly from free-will. Greuinchouius, pag. 208. and 210. It is mani∣fest, that free-will and grace are together causes in part: And pag. 211. We ioyne grace and free-will together, as causes in part: He must so speake, who saith that Electi∣on is for faith fore-seen: For God would be very vnfit∣ly said to fore-see that which he alone is to do; for this is not to fore-see, but to decree: Hitherto also pertai∣neth that conditional decree of sauing men, if they shal beleeue; for by this it is placed in the power of man to beleeue: For this were a foolish decree; I will saue him, if I shall giue him faith. Arminius against Perkins, pa. 223.

and 224. saith, that the totall cause why one beleeueth, and another not, is the will of God, and the free-will of man. Arnoldus, pag. 228. saith, that Arminius gaue the chiefe part of the working of faith, to grace. viz. because in the working of faith, he will haue free-will to haue a part; which part, that it is not the least, yea, that it is the greatest, in the sence of the sectaries (although they would make another shew) Arminius, and after him Arnoldus, pag. 125. doth sufficiently acknowledge: We deny (saith he) that this difference of calling grace, is not placed so much in mans free-will, as in the will of God. And truely in the conuersion of man, free-will must haue the chiefe part, if it be true that the Armi∣nians contend for, to wit, that the efficiency and work∣ing power of grace, doth depend on free-will, and that the right vse of grace is made subiect to mans will. And that which Arnoldus saith, pag. 444. That God doth so worke in man, that in the meane while man is not wanting to himselfe, he can conuert himselfe. And Greuin∣chouius against Ames, pag. 205. Grace doth not deter∣mine and conclude, vnlesse free-will worke with it: in which respect and manner, what if we should say, that the efficacy of grace, doth after a certaine manner depend vp∣on free-will, as concerning the euent? If therefore the efficacy of grace, as concerning the euent, that is, the effect, doth depend on mans free-will; it must needes be, that free-will hath farre the greater part in our conuersion and regeneration. The same man, pa. 214. In comparing betweene themselues, * 1.5 the effectuall helpe of God, and the insluence of free-will, there is no priority be∣tweene them both. And seeing it is in the power of free∣will, so to vse grace that he may beleeue, and obtaine

faith, we being by faith the sonnes of God, Gal 3.26. It appeareth (if we may credit Arminius) that to be made the sonnes of God, is a thing proper to free-will, and although it cannot be done without the helpe of grace, yet the effect doth depend on mans will: So that God is willingly indebted to man; for hee is be∣holding to free-will that he hath sonnes.

XXVIII. This is the malicious and blacke iuyce of the fish Loligo; and this is their most pestilent do∣ctrine: of which, what is to be iudged it is easie to coniecture by those speeches which euery where meet vs in the bookes of these sectaries. That Lydia opened her owne heart, when yet, as Luke witnesseth, Act. 16.14. God opened the heart of Lydia: And that a man doth separate himselfe, although Saint Paul saith, who seperates thee? 1 Cor. 4.7. And that an vnregenerate man is not altogether dead in sinne: and that God doth giue man power of beleeuing, if he himselfe will: when yet God giueth both to will, and to doe, Phil. 2.13. And that sufficient grace which is giuen to all men, yea, to the reprobates, doth take away the im∣potency, and doth stablish the liberty of free-will; as Arminius against Perkins, pag. 245. and 246. teacheth. Let vs heare the proud words of Greuinchouius, p. 253. I separate my selfe: for when I might resist God and his predetermination; yet I haue not resisted, and therefore why may it not be lawfull for me to boast in that, as of my owne? For that I was able, it was of God shewing mercy, but that I was willing, when I might haue beene vnwilling, it was my owne power. It is a venter, but this little worme will swell so big, that he will breake. O it is the part of a magnanimious & great minded man, to be vnwilling

to owe too much to God, and not to be ouerchar∣ged with his benefits. Those things which the same author saith, pag. 279. sauour of no lesse pride: You will say that in this manner of working, God doth after a certaine manner, depend on the will of man: I grant it, as concerning the act of free determination. Indeede this one thing was wanting, to the very height of pride, that God should be said to depend on man.

XXIX. There meete vs in the writings of these innouators, some places, in which they say, that man in his corrupted state was altogether dead, and that of himselfe, he can neither thinke, nor will, nor doe, any thing that is good. But these things are said but for a colour, and that they might deceiue the vnwary rea∣der: For they say, that a man is able to doe no good without grace; but by this grace, they vnderstand vniuersall grace, which is common to all men, and sufficient grace, which is giuen, euen to them to whom Christ was made knowne, and which doth extend it selfe as farre as nature: They say indeede, that grace is the cause of beleeuing, but they neuer adde, that it is the cause alone. The Arminian conferrers at the Hage, in the third and fourth Articles, doe so speake as if they were of the same opinion with vs: For there they professe, that man hath not saning faith from him∣selfe; and that the grace of God is the beginning, the pro∣ceeding, and the finishing of all good, and that all good actions are to be ascribed to the grace of God in Christ: But the subtle men, when they say that a man hath not faith from himselfe, they vnderstand, that he hath it not from himselfe alone: And when they say, that euery good worke is to be ascribed to grace, they are

very wary, least they should say to grace alone. Then also in the word grace, they lay a snare, and being the Apes of the Pelagians, they faigne a certaine grace, which is common to all, which doth extend it selfe as farre as nature: Also they distinguish grace from the vse of grace; for indeede, they will haue grace to be from God, but the vse of grace to be in the power of mans free-will: With the like craft, they say, that the power of beleeuing is from grace: for they pre∣sently draw backe what they haue reached forth, while they say, that to beleeue it selfe, is of mans free∣will; and that grace is giuen to man to beleeue, if he will. But whensoeuer they will haue a kinde of speci∣all grace to come to that generall grace, they make the vse of this speciall grace to depend on free-will; and they roundly, and without any circumstances affirme, that the efficiency, and working power of grace, doth depend vpon it.

We shall also see, that by that vniuersall and suffici∣ent grace, common to all men, is vnderstood naturall gifts, & notions that are naturally engrafted, and that they cloath nature with the goodly name of grace; (which thing also Pelagius did:) Which thing, when they doe with their greatest cunning, yet their dissem∣bling is neuer so wary, but that their Pelagian eares and errour doe appeare: and although they doe imi∣tate the speech of truth, yet their vizard doth of∣ten fall from them vnawares; and their vlcers be∣ing pressed, doe presently cast forth stinking cor∣ruption.

XXX. Yet Vorstius here doth differ from his Ma∣ster: For when Arminius saith, that no man is con∣uerted,

and doth beleeue in act, by that vniuer sall grace alone, which is common euen to the reprobates, but that there is also some speciall grace required: Vorstius on the contrary side, doth affirme. Collat. cum Piscat. pag. 57. that some are conuerted by vniuersall grace (which he calleth the lesser mercy) that is, without spe∣ciall grace, which he calleth grace more then suffici∣ent, and super abounding helpe: Therefore if this man be beleeued, some men come to saluation by that grace alone which is common to all heathen men.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Arist. Eth. 3. c. 3. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.2

  Arist. Eth 3.1. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.3

  August. lib. 22. de ciuit. Cap. 30. Nec ideo libertō arbitrium non habebunt quia peccata eos dele∣ctare non pote∣runt, &c. En∣chirid. cap. 105. Multo liberius•• erit arbitrium quod omnino non poterit seruire peccato.
• * 1.4

  Arnold. p 403. Home corruptus potestlumine na∣tura recte vti: et habet aliquas reliquias vite spiritualis.
• * 1.5

  Arnold pa. 234. & 235.