Truth tried: or, animadversions on a treatise published by the Right Honorable Robert Lord Brook, entituled, The Nature of Truth, its vnion and vnity with the soule. Which (saith he) is one in its essence, faculties, acts; one with truth. By I. W.

CHAP. II. A second Argument (from the three Requisites to every Being) examined.

IN the second Chapter, he proposeth first the Opinion of those that stile the Understanding a Faculty, whereby the Soule receiveth or en∣tertaineth Truth, and Acteth accordingly.

But here his Lordship (if I mistake not) varieth from his former ac∣ceptation of Truth; Comparing it not to the Innate Light, or power of Seeing, in the Eye; but to the Advenient Light, which streames to it through the Ayr, bringing with it the Idea, or visible Species, of the Object seen. For, soon after, he calls it, those sweet beams of Light which beat upon us continually; which cannot be meant of any innate Light, but of an advenient Light.

And thus I see no inconvenience at all, to say, That the Soule, or Understanding, by its Innate Light, of Reason, (which whether you say to be distinct from the Soule, or not, it is not much materiall) doth daily receive or entertain new Truths, or new Representations of that Truth of Being which is really existent in Things; either by a reiterate actuall understanding of those things which it had formerly under∣stood, or by a new apprehension of somwhat whereof before it was ig∣norant. Like as the Eye by its innate Power of Seeing, discerns new Species (conveyed to it by advenient Light) either from Objects for∣merly seen, or now first represented.

Next he lays down three Requisites to the constitution of every Being. A Fountaine commu••icating; a Channell entertaining; and Waters im∣parted. (Conferen••, Collatum, Recipiens.) And he asks Where we shall find these three, if the Ʋnderstanding be a Faculty.

I answer. If you speak of Advenient light (last mentioned) which is a Representative Truth, or an Idea of that R••all Truth which is in the Things Known; I say, the Reall Truth (or Veritas Ess••ndi) sends

forth this Representative Truth, or Idea, which is conveyed by a De∣ferent Light (either of Discourse, or Information, or the like) till it come to the Ʋnderstanding, where it is received and entertained by the Innate Light (or Truth) of Reason. Like as the Inherent light of Co∣lour in the Object sends forth a Representative light of visible Species, which is conveyed by a Deferent light in the Ayr, till it come to the Eye, where it is entertained by the Innate light, which is the faculty of Seeing.

And, as the Remotenesse, or Obscurity of the Object; the Dark∣nesse of the Medium; or the Weaknesse of the Faculty, may hinder Sight, so that we see not at all, or not perfectly: In like manner the Distance of the Object, as in things quite out of our reach; or the Ob∣scurity of them, which send forth no Species, or manifestation of their essence towards us; our imperfect Discourse, or insufficient Information, which is as a dark Medium; and lastly, the weaknesse of our Ap∣prehension; doe cause Ignorance in the Understanding, which is answe∣rable to not-seeing in the Eye.

Again, as in Ignorance so in Errour. A reflection of a false Light upon the Object, casting a false seeming colour, which may be mistaken for the true colour of it; an indisposed Medium, as when we see through Red glasse, &c. and a distempered Organ, by reason of some vitious hu∣mours accidentall in the Eye, &c. may cause a mistake and Errour in Sight: So here, when there is a False Light upon the Object, as when we conceive that to be the effect of one thing, which indeed proceeds from some other cause, fallacia non causae pro causâ, or the like; a false Dis∣course or Inference, or a false Relation, which is as a stained Medium; or a distempered Ʋnderstanding, by reason of Passion, of l••sa Phantasia, or the like; may cause an Erroneous Judgement, apprehending things to be otherwise then inde••d they are.

And thus I have shewed not onely those three requisites which his Lordship requires, but some others besides them; supposing in the mean time the Ʋnderstanding to be a Faculty; and taking Truth for those sweet B••ams of Light, which beat upon us; Advenient Light.

If you take Truth for Reason; and withall suppose Reason to be di∣stinct from the Ʋnderstanding, and ••t also from the Soule. You may say, The Understanding is the Recip••ent; Reason the thing Received in it; and that Then and from Those, when and from whence it received its Essence, to which Reason is a conna••e and appendent Faculty; That is, either from God, by immediate Creation, which many think;

or from the Parents, by Propagation, which others▪ ••old.

But I suppose there be few or none, that hold, Reason to be distinct from the Ʋnderstanding, and That also from the Soule. For when they speak of Reason, as a faculty of the Understanding; by Ʋnderstanding they mean, the Soule it selfe, quatenus intelligens, being considered a•• the Subject of Reason: And when they speak of the Ʋnderstanding •••• a faculty, whereby the Soule is able to conceive and judge of Truth; Then they take the Ʋnderstanding to be the same with Reason.

I should rather say, That Reason, and the Ʋnderstanding (as it de∣notes a Faculty) are two words Synonima, denoting the same Faculty or Power of Knowing and Judging. Which Faculty I would not grant to be another Thing from the Soule-Knowing, or the Soule-Un∣derstanding but a Modus▪ As neither doe I allow to Any Naturall-Power, or Faculty, (which they make the second Species of Quality) any other Being then the Being of a Modus, and not the being of •• Thing.

And thus we may safely say, the Soule receives the Faculty of Rea∣son or Understanding; Thence, from whence it receives its Being: (as a Stone receives its Heavinesse from that which Produceth it:) That which gave it to Bee gave it to be Thus.

Sometimes indeed Accidents are not received from that which pro∣duceth the Substance, but from some other Efficient; as the Smooth∣nesse of Marble proceeds not from the Producer, but from the Poli∣sher: And yet I hold not, the Smoothnesse to be One Thing, and the Marble to be another Thing▪ but the Marble to be a Thing, and the Smoothnesse to be Modus. And thus it must be granted in Acqui••••te Habits; where the Giver and Receiver are the Same, and the Thing Received Modally, but not really, distinct from either.

But for Faculties, or Naturall-Powers; If you look for an Externall Efficient or Giver, it will be the same that produceth the Substance; But if you be contented with an Efficient per Emanationem, Thus they are said to flow or arise from the Form, or Substance. And then the Giver and Receiver is the Same; (for the Form which i•• the Subject Receiving, is also per emanation••m Effectiva, from whence it ariseth as an Essentiall Consequent:) and if you say the Faculty Received is not so much as Modally distinguisht from it but onely ratione 〈…〉〈…〉; I contend not. But so much▪ distinction at least, I suppose, we must al∣low it.

Having thus answered his Lordships Qu re, I proceed to answer

his Objections. If the Ʋnderstanding (saith he) be the Recipient, then the Light (of Reason) which differenceth us from the Vegetative and Sensitive creatures, lieth in the Ʋnderstanding, and not in the Soul: And so the Soul is either not enlightened at all, but only a Theca to the In∣tellect; or else there be two Enlightened (rationall) Beings in •••••• Reasona∣ble creature.

For answer, First, I suppose (as I said before) that there are few, if any, that will affirm, the Soul, the Understanding, and Reason, to be Three things: But they will either say, Reason Is the Understanding, and not in the Understanding: or else, Reason is in the Understanding, which Understanding is the Soul, considered only under this Notion▪ quatenus Intelligens, as it is the Subject of Reason. And thus the diffi∣culty appears not; For the Light which differenceth us from Unreason∣able creatures, whether you call it Reason, or call it the Understanding▪ is seated in the Soule, and so denominates it Intelligent or Ʋnder∣standing.

But secondly, we want not a Recipient for Truth though the Soul be not it, It may be the Understanding.

Yet thirdly, though the Soul be not the Immediate Subject, it may yet be the Ʋltimate, which is more then a Theca.

Object. But you will reply, However it be so, that wee make this Light to be inherent in the Soul; yet it is not sufficient to make an Es∣sentiall difference between the Reasonable and Unreasonable Soul. For though Reason be in the Soul, except it also Be the Soul, it makes the difference but Accidentall; For thus the Reasonable and Unreaso∣nable Soul will not differ in their Essence, but only in their Adjuncts.

Answ. To this I answer▪ First, this is a new difficulty not arising out of his Lordships argument: For though this Light (of Reason) be an Accident, yet this hinders not but that there may be his three Requisites: For an Accident may be truly received, in the Subject, from the Producer.

And yet (secondly) This, though a Faculty of the Soul, and not the Soul it self, makes notwithstanding a Noble difference between a Ra∣tionall and Irrationall Soul; so that the Soul loseth not its dignity▪ neither becomes a bare Theca to the Understanding or Reason: And is su••••iciently dignified to have such a Divine faculty in it, and of it, by which it produceth it operations, which the Irrationall Soul hath no••. We account those S••ones precious, that have in them some rare Ver∣tues: And why not the Soul, indued with so Divine a Faculty?

Especially (which is the third thing I reply) since it is so in the Soule, that is also of the Soul. The Honey which Samson found in the dead Li∣ons carkas••, proceeded not from it, but was only accidentally or casually in it. A Knife touched with a Loadstone will take up a Needle, or the like; but this attractive Vertue is not from It self, but from the Loadstone: And you may call the Knife, if you please, a Theca or Receptacle of this Vertue▪ and say, it hath no other then a Relative Excellencie, as it is the Receptacle of an Excellent Vertue; (though indeed to be the Subject of Inhesion, is more then a Theca, or a bare Receptacle.) But in the Loadstone it is otherwise, For there the Attractive Vertue is not onely in it, but of it, or from it selfe: It is so received in it, that it ••••owes from it, it is sui partus. Thus in the Soule, though Reason be a Faculty of the Soul, yet is it such a Faculty as floweth from it; and so the Soule not only its Receptacle, but also its Originall. Thus is Light In the Sunne, and From the Sunne, it is not received aliunde. And it is a Reall Excellencie in the Sunne, and not onely Relative, to be the Author and Originall of that which enlightens the whole World. And it is a Re∣all Excellencie in the Soule (and more then the Excellencie of a Theca) to have from it selfe, from its owne Essence, such a Faculty whereby it is able to Know and Understand.

But you will say still, However Reason may thus dignifie and di∣stinguish it from Irrationall Beings; Yet this is but an Accidentall Dignity, an Accidentall Distinction, no•• Essentiall; as consisting in that which is in the Soule, but distinct from it. Therefore

Fourthly, Reason in the Soule, is not onely an Accidentall, but an Essentiall Perfection, an Essentiall Consequent flowing immediately from the Essence of the Soul, as an inseparable endowment: And so may make an Essentiall difference; (it is Essentiall to the Soule that Reason should arise from it.) And thus that which is distinct from a thing, may yet be Essentiall to it, viz. Essentiale Consequens, though not Essentiale Constituens.

But fifthly, (which I conceive to be of the greatest force) though Reason, or the Understanding (as a Faculty) be only Essentiale Con∣sequens▪ and so, in its Formality, makes onely an Externall difference (aposteriori;) Yet it points out unto us an Essentiale Constituens, an Essentiall Ingredient (as I may so call it) from whence this Consequent doth arise. Which is somwhat in the Essence of the Soule: Whereof we can take no other notice then from its Operations▪ (And this An∣swer holds good, though you suppose Reason to be distinct from the

Understanding, and Both from the Soule: For so, that Essence (from whence the Understanding flows, together with its Immediate and Re∣mote Issue, viz. Reason and its Operations) will make this Essentiall Difference between the Rationall and Irrationall Soul.)

Thus they say, prim•• Qualitates are not Formae Elementorum, but That from whence these first Qualities do Essentially flow. And though the Qualities make but an Accidentall difference between them, yet the Substantiall Forms from whence the Qualities do arise make an Essentiall difference. (So here: The Rationall Soule is such a Substance as is able to give rise to such Faculties, which the Irrationall Soule is not.)

If you ask What this Substantiall Form is? You know the ordinary answer; Dic formam lapidi•• & eris mihi magnus Apollo. (It is a hard thing, by his own confession, to find out the Form of any Being, much more to discover the Being of a Form, pag. 32.) Tell me the Being of Any thing, and I will tell you the Being of This. If I ask What the Soule is? (which to be we are sure:) You will say perhaps, a Spirituall Substance: And that is all you can say, for the Essence of it. But if I ask, what it is To be Spirituall? what, To be a Substance? I suppose you cannot tell me otherwise, then by Negations, or Effects. And (thus) they will do in the Elementall Forms; They are not these Qualities, but something from whence they arise. (And so for the substance of the Soule, It is not these Faculties but the Originall of them.)

If you will say, There is no such Something, as this substantiall Form of the Elements; because we cannot tell you what this Something is.

(To omit, that by the same reason you might banish all Being, be∣cause none can tell you, what Being is: For if you say (and that is all you can say) that Being is a Ray communicated from the Originall Entity in God: This tells us at the most, but whence it is, not what it is.)

I say, If you deny, that there be any other Forms of the Elements (beside their Qualities) whereby they differ one from another; Then need we look no further: For then these Faculties, though but Acci∣dents, may be sufficient to make an Essentiall difference in the Rationall Soule from the Irrationall.

But further, If you can perswade them, that the Essence or Form of the Elements, and their Accidents or Prime Qualities, are the same: I doubt not, but then they will as easily grant, the Soul and its Faculties to be the same also.

And thus I have answered according to their opinion that hold the Soul and its Faculties distinct: And have shewed, that we are not so farre to seek for a Recipient of Reason, or Truth, as his Lordship might imagine. And indeed there is nothing more difficult in this particular, then in all Accidents whatsoever; their Subject is their Recipient, and so is the Subject of Truth, or Reason, Its Recipient.

But there is another kind of Recipiency (which I shall touch in the next Chapter) which (if I mistake not) will cut the sinews of this Ar∣gument, and leave it of no force.

But in the mean time (having found a Recipient) we must seek for a Fountaine, from whence this Light of Reason, or Truth, is derived. For that is his Lordships next demand; Who is it that communicateth this Light?

For the answering of this, I shall first propound another Qu••re of the same nature, and then apply mine answer joyntly to both. I ask therefore first, whether Fire (supposing it to be an Element) be not the true Recipient of Heat? and the Loadstone the true Recipient of the Attractive virtue that is in it? and the Sunne, the true Recipient of Light? If so, then I demand, From whence they are received? What is the Fountain from which they are communicated?

If you speak of an Internall Fountain, from whence they flow by an Essentiall Emanation; The Recipient and the Fountain will be the same. And so, if you say the Body of the Sunne, of the Fire, of the Loadstone, be the immediate Recipients of their Light, Heat, and Vir∣tue; Then must I say, That these severall Bodies are the severall Foun∣tains from whence (respectively) those Qualities do proceed. If you s••y, That these Qualities are Received (subje••tantur) immediately, in the Form or Essence of these bodies, and not in the entire Substance; I must say also, They do arise from these Forms, and flow from them by an Essentiall Emanation. And the Definitive Resolution of this Quare depends upon the determination of that Question in Philosophy, whe∣ther Accidents be subjected immediately in the Form, or in the Comp••si∣tum: and (consequently) whether they flow from the Form imme∣diately, or jointly from Matter and Form together. Which questions it is not materiall for me to determine; for take which side you please, I shall soon finde both the Fountain and a Recipient.

If you look for an Externall, Physicall Fountain, or Efficient; we must say, That the same Fountain from whence they have their Essence, from the same do they receive with their Essence their Inseparable Ac∣cidents,

or Essentiall Consequents, by a Comproduction. Thus the Sunne received its inherent Light by Creation, together with its Essence, from God: For in the Creation of the Substance, the Accidents are also Con∣created. So Fire produced by a naturall Agent, receives its Heat com∣produced, or congenerated, and conferred upon it together with its Essence from the same Efficient.

Now in any of these ways, it will not be hard to find a Fountain of Truth, an Originall from whence the Light of Reason or Truth may be conferred; Though we hold the Understanding and the Soule to be distinct.

If you ask an Internall Fountain; It will be answered, That Reason▪ or the Faculty of Understanding, flows from the Essence of the Soule, as an Essentiall Consequent; and is received and inherent in the Soule▪ (For I think not fitting to say, that it is inherent in the whole Reaso∣nable Creature (jointly) consisting of Body and Soule; because it remains in the Soule separate, without the Body.) Or (if you look at them as Three things) then Reason must be said to flow from the Ʋn∣derstanding, and It from the Soule; and to be received, by Inherence, in the Understanding, as That also is received in the Soule.

If you enquire for an Externall Efficient; So the Faculties are ei∣ther Concreated with the Soule by God; or else comproduced by the Parents by Propagation. And so we want not a Fountain, from whence Reason may be communicated.

I proceed to his Lordships prosecution of this Quaere. This Light (of Truth or Reason) must be conveyed (saith he) to the Ʋnderstanding, from the Soule, from some other Creature, or from God himselfe; but neither of these▪ ways; therefore not all.

I see not why Any or All of these Fountains may not be admitted to be the Source of Reason, in a severall way.

First, why may not the Soule be the Fountain of Reason or the under∣ding Faculty; as well as the Essence of Fire is the Fountain of its Heat, and the Essence of the Magnet the Fountain of its Virtue? not by Physicall Production, but by Essentiall Emanation? Indeed, I like not to say, The Soule communicates Reason to the Understanding, (as to a Third thing;) For I have said before, the Recipient and the Fountain in this way of conveyance, viz. per emanation••m, are the Same: like as in I••manent acts, the Agent and the Patient are the same. But I say, That Reason or the understanding Faculty, which the Soule as Recipi∣ent entertains In it selfe; it hath also From itself, as being the Fountain.

(But if you take the Understanding as a third thing from both; then the Soul must not be said to be the Immediate Fountain, but the Under∣standing must be said to be the (Immediate) both Source and Chanell.)

And thus his Lordships reason troubleth me not, viz. If the Soul com∣municate Light, then Hath it Light already, and so this Faculty, the Ʋnder∣standing, is in vain. I say, the Soule hath This Light, which both flows from the Soule as an Essentiall Consequent, and is Inherent in the Soule as an Inseparable Accident.

Next, why may not the Soule, or Ʋnderstanding (whether you will) receive this Light of Reason from another Creature? I mean, from the Parent, by Procreation; producing both its Essence, and Adjuncts, as well Essentiall as Accidentall, together▪ not by Essentiall Emanation, as before, but by Physicall Production?

To the Reason annexed, viz. That if a Creature produce a Faculty in the Soule or Ʋnderstanding that Creature must produce it by an interveni∣ent Faculty, and That faculty must be produced by another Faculty, and s•• in infinitum; I answer, The faculty of Reason (together with the Soul) was produced by the Parent (according to this supposition,) and that by an Intervenient Faculty, viz. the Generative Faculty in the Parent•• And yet shall we not proceed in infinitum, For This generative faculty was produced by Another, and That again by Another, ascending still upwards till we come to the Generative Faculty of Adam, which was immediately produced of God, without an intervenient Faculty▪ either by Concreation with the Soule; or by Infusion, when he pronounced that blessing Increase and multiply.

Lastly, why may not this and other Faculties be produced in the Soule and with the Soule, by immediate creation, from God? I mean, if Soules be daily created, as most suppose; Or, if not, yet at least the Faculties in Adams Soule might be by God Created or Concreated with it, notwithstanding that they be distinct.

But you aske, Why then did not God immediately and intrinsecally com∣municate this to the Soule it selfe, rather then as a Faculty, or by a Fa∣culty? If he did not, it was because he Would not; and we cannot give account of this will. God might have created immediately all Man∣kind, as he did the Angels; yet we see he pleased rather, that they should be produced by Generation, one from another: But who can give us any other account of this his pleasure, save onely his Will? So neither, why Reason should be an Accidentall Faculty, rather then M••d•••• Substan••i••li••; that is, why he should produce it mediante animâ,

rather then by himself immediately, together with it: he might do either.

But, in generall, By what means soever (saith he) Truth (or Reason) be conv••yed; if the Ʋnderstanding do at all, receive Truth, then it is Truth▪ For God doth not communicate Light, but to Light.

If he mean, God gives Lucem non nisi Lucido; or Lumen non nisi Lu∣minoso; I grant it, saking the words i•• sensu composito, but not insensu diviso. (And so God gives not Animam nisi Animato, nor Rationem nisi Rationali) That is, God gives not Light but to that which is Light (••. Lucide or Illuminate,) viz. when that Light is bestowed: But in s••nsu diviso, That this was (before) Lucid, it is not to be admitted. Light communicated to the Ayr, makes it Illuminate, but finds it not so. God inspires not a Soule, but into a Living-creature: And so breathing in∣to Adam the breath of Life, he made him a Living-creature; but found him (his body) Inanimate, a ••ump of Earth. So here; God gives not the Light of Reason, but to that which is Light, or Inlightned, viz. Then Inlightned when this Light of Reason is bestowed.

But if by this, God gives not Light but to Light, he means, Lucem non dat nisi Luci, or Lumen non nisi Lumini; I cannot admit it, either in sensu composito, or in diviso. When the Sunne imparts Light (Lumen) to the Ayr; the Ayr is Illuminate or Enlightned: But, that the Ayr is Lumen, I must never grant, till we cease to hold, Lumen non est Corpus. So if God communicate to the Soule or Understanding the Light of Reason; the Soule or Understanding becomes thereby Illuminate or Enlightned with Reason: But, that the Soule or Understanding, is this Light, this Reason; follows no more then if you would say, That Wa∣ter is Heat when it grows Hot; The Ayr is Light (Lumen,) when it is Enlightned; A Body becomes a Colour when it is Coloured; Any Sub∣stance whatsoever is metamorphised into an Accident, when (as a Sub∣ject) it Receives that Accident; or That the Body of Adam, formed out of the Dust, was made a Soule, when it received a Soule inspired.

That which is annexed as a proof; Because Quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis, (together with the illustrations following;) proves no more but this, Whatsoever is conferred▪ is no further forth confer∣red, then as the Subject is capable of, and actually doth receive it. And this we grant, That the Soule or Understanding, upon which the Light of Reason is conferred; is a fit Subject to receive or entertaine Reason, and is actually indued with Reason. And so I admit that which he cites of Dr. Twisse, Neither a quality permanent, nor an act immanent unlesse they be made INHERENT IN the Soule, (observe the phrase) and

the latter also produced by it, can be said to be given to the Soule. Hee saith, It is Inherent in the Soule, not that it is the Soule.

Lastly, How passeth (saith he) this Light from the Ʋnderstanding to the Soule? there being as vast a distance between It and the Soule, as be∣tween It and the will, (supposing them distinct Faculties) whence grow those inextricable disputes, How the Will is made to Understand, what the Un∣derstanding judgeth fit to be Willed.

But here his Lordship varies somewhat the state of the Question in altering the acceptation of the word Truth, from truth understanding, to truth understood, and instead of innate truth of Reason, speaks of the advenient truth, which is a Conceptus or Idea framed to represent the truth of Being in the Object. For we cannot conceive Reason, which is now looked upon as a permanent Faculty, to be transient from one subject to another.

But Truth Ʋnderstood, how it may be conveyed from the Under∣standing to the Soul; I shall Then perhaps better tell when he shews me, How the Visible Species are conveyed from the Organ to the Soul, or Faculty, seeing. That the Organ receives species, he will not deny; for else the Soul might as well see, when the Eye is out: That the Soul also (by the Organ) doth apprehend these Species, must likewise bee yeelded; else why should not the Eye of a dead man see? That the Soule and the Organ are distinct, must needs be granted; for we see them really separated by death, whereas nothing can be separated from it selfe: And when I am informed, How the Soule and the Organ, being distinct, are conjoyned in Seeing; I shall better be able to resolve, How the Soule and the Faculty, though distinct, may joyntly Ʋnderstand.

Till then, it might suffice, in generall to say, That, As by the Organ the Soule S••••th, so by Reason or the Understanding-faculty, the Soule Knows and Understandeth: (only allowing such disproportion as must be allowed between a Materiall and Immateriall instrument.) And it seems to be no more vast distance between a Faculty and the Soule, then is between an Organ and the Soule. So that if by Visible Species in the Organ, the Soule may see; why not by Intellectuall Species in the Un∣derstanding (though a Faculty) may the Soule Ʋnderstand?

But, because I love not to answer a difficulty only by opposing an∣other; you may resolve it thus. We are not to conceive, there is any such vast Gulfe between the Soule and the Understanding (though a Faculty) as that Truth should need a Ferry-boat to wa••t it over: For as the Eye doth not first see, and then Inform the Soule or Visive Fa∣culty,

what it hath seene; but the Organ and the Faculty joyntly con∣curre to the Act of Seeing: So neither doth the Understanding first Receive and Entertain Truth, and afterward inform the Soule, what it hath Understood: But the Soule with and by this Faculty of Reason or Understanding, doth Know and Understand; Both concurring to the same Act. (Thus a Stone, by its Heavinesse, descends; Fire, by its Heat, warms; by its Light▪ shines; Glasse, by its Smoothnesse, re∣flects light; a Knife, by a communicated Faculty from the Magnet, draws iron: And yet (in some of these at least) you must of necessity grant a distinction ex parte rei.)

There is indeed sometimes a Reflex act of the Soule, whereby it Knows▪ what is Ʋnderstood: But we must not think, that it is an act of the Soules Essence, surveying or taking account of the Ʋnderstanding Faculty, what it hath done; But the Soule, by this understanding Fa∣culty, reflects upon a former Act, which It selfe by the same Faculty had formerly performed.

The Gulfe is likewise fordable between the Ʋnderstanding and the Will, though they be distinct faculties. Not as if the Will by an act of Knowledge should Understand what the Intellect doth dictate: But the Soule, which by its faculty of Understanding Knows, doth by its Wil∣ling faculty Command, and by its Loco-motive Execute. So that nei∣ther the Will Knows what the Ʋnderstanding Judgeth, nor the Inferiour Faculties what the Will Commands; But the Soule by severall Facul∣ties executes severall Functions. Thus when the Soule by the Eye dis∣covers a danger imminent, by the Hand it endeavours to divert it: And yet there is no Messenger dispatcht between, to inform the Hand, what the Eye hath seen; notwithstanding that the Hand and the Eye are Really distinct, yea Locally distant.

As for mine own Opinion, I could easily grant, The distinction of the Faculties, from the Soule, and among themselves, to be neither Re∣all, nor a parte rei. And concerning the first, I am sufficiently confi∣dent: But for the second, whether the Distinction be Modall (i. à parte Rei) or meerly Rationall (rationis rati••cina••••,) I do yet desire a convincing Demonstration to determine.