Truth tried: or, animadversions on a treatise published by the Right Honorable Robert Lord Brook, entituled, The Nature of Truth, its vnion and vnity with the soule. Which (saith he) is one in its essence, faculties, acts; one with truth. By I. W.

TRUTH TRIED: OR, Animadversions on a Treatise, entituled, The Nature of Truth.

SIR,

I Have, according to your desire, perused that Treatise concerning The Nature of Truth. (The which how farre it serves to the expounding the 24. Chapter of Math. I examine not.) One thing that may make it seem somewhat dark, is, that his Lord∣ship speaking of a matter somewhat unusuall, is for∣ced to use such Metaphors, for want of native words, which may somwhat obscure it: And his Lordship was the lesse carefull to avoid it, because they being with himselfe of frequent use, and sufficiently understood by him to whom hee wrote, there was the lesse feare of being not understood, or mis-understood: And so the lesse need to prevent it, by seeking for such words as might better sute with an ordinary Reader.

Before I proceed to state the Question, Whether Truth and the Soule be One; It is very requisite to search, in what sense his Lordship understands Truth; that through the ambiguous sense, and divers acceptations of the word, we be not confounded in the progresse.

Truth in Logick, is when the Proposition agrees with the Thing; and Falsehood, when they disagree.

Truth in Ethicks, is when our Words and Actions agree with our Mind; and is opposed to a Lye, to Hypocrisie.

And Truth in these acceptations is nothing else but an Agreement or ••onformity of a Type with its Prototype, Archetypi & Ectypi; of a Transcript with its Originall▪ of an Idea, or thing representing, with that represented; Signi & Signati.

Thus in Logick, Vox est signum rei, or Imago r••i. If therefore we have that expressed in Words, to which in the order of Things there is nothing agreeing; it is a False Copy, or rather no Copy, being drawn according to no Pattern. If that be, which is affirmed to be; it is True, because they are a Copy or Representation of the Things so being.

As it is in words, so it is also in Apprehensions, in conceptibus; If our mind conceive a thing to be, which is not, or to be otherwise then it is, this is a False Apprehension, because the Idea in our under∣standing is not a true representation of the Thing.

In Ethicks, our words are to be compared with another Copy; because (thus•• they are not the representation of the Things (immedi∣ately) but the representation of our Thoughts, or Intentions: There∣fore, if our Words do truly expresse or represent what we Think; It is morally True, that is, it is not a Lye, because they agree with this Copy; but yet they may be Logically False, as not being a true ex∣pression of the Thing. If the Idea in our apprehension agree with the Things, so that we conceive a ••ight of them; and our Word▪ be a true representation of this Idea; they do truly also represent the Things: There is both v••ritas Logica, and veritas Moralis If wee conceive a right of things, and our words expresse otherwise then we think; this Proposition is both wayes false; for it neither agrees with the thing, nor with our judgement: But our Judgement is Logically true▪ because the Idea in our mind is a true expression of the thing. If we conceive amisse, and yet ••ffirm as the thing is (if we affirm snow to be white, which we conceive to be black,) our Proposition is Logically true, but Morally false; and our conceptus is also Logically false. If lastly, wee conceive amisse, and speak otherwise then wee conceive, and yet diverse from what wee ought both to think and speak (as if we conceive snow to be bl••••k, and affirm it to be red:) our Idea or Conceptus is Logically false, our Proposition Logically false, and Morally false.

Thus i•• one▪ intending upon a Signet to grave the Kings▪ Image, mi••••••th of the true proportion, and with this Signet maketh impres∣sion in Wax▪ the wax cont••••nes a true representation of the Seale▪

but not the true Image of the King; whereas, if the Signet had been truly graven, and then impression made in the wax; the wax had truly represented both the one and the other. Thus is it in Morall and Logicall Truth.

Accordingly, one making a Promise with intention to perform it, yet afterward breaks it; this Promise is Morally true, because it is a true representation of his Intentions; but it is not Logically true, as not being a representation of his future Actions. And in his sub∣sequent Actions there is also a kind of Morall falshood; because they are not conformable to his promise, by which they should bee regulated. Or you may say, his Promise was (Morally) a True ex∣pression of his Intention; but his Intention was (Logically) False, as not agreeing with the Thing, because he intended that which was not Futurum Whereas, if he had promised, with a purpose to breake it, his Promise had been Morally False, but his Intention Logically True▪ If, intending to break it, he yet perform it, his Intention is Logically false, and his Promise Morally false, though Logically true. And thus Breach of Promise will come under the nature of Injury, or Injustice; but not under the nature of a Lye, except it were made to deceive; because it is the true expression of the Intenti∣on, which is the immediate rule of Veracity or Morall truth.

Thus Hypocrisie, or Dissimulation, is a branch of Morall False∣hood; because Actio and Gest••s, are Index animi, as well as Words.

And this I conceive to be the Nature of, and Difference between Logicall and Morall Truth.

There is yet another Truth, and you may call it a Physicall Truth, •• Formall or Essentiall Truth: Thus that which hath the Essentialls of a Man, is verè Homo; so an Infant is a true Man. Thus we say, a true Church, true Faith, true Grace, true Gold, (not counterfeit:) thus a Syllogisme in a right form, is a true Syllogisme, though the Propositions be false. And the like.

(But mistake me not; by Morall Truth, or Naturall Truth, &c. I understand not, Truths about Naturall things, or Morall things, (though the words be oft-times so taken:) For I am not now di∣stributing Truth into its severall Species, or severall Parts; but am shewing the Ambiguity of the Word, and so distinguishing it into its severall Acceptations. Thus Morall or Ethicall Truth, is that Acceptation of Truth that is usuall in Ethicks: Logicall

Truth, is that Accep••ation of ••••uth, which is used in Logick, &c.)

But •• ••••pp••••••, we •••••• y••t ••••rre from that Acc••pt••tion of Truth, in which •••••• Lo••••▪ speaketh: I will therefore come somewhat ne••rer. •••••• •••• the Logicall and Morall •…•…ptat••••n •••• Truth, we have a Metap••ysicall acc••ptat•…•… ••••s and V••rum are ••ermini conv••r••i∣b••les. And Truth is taken in •••••••• such acc••ptation, when it is divided into veri••••s Essendi and Cognosc••ndi.

Veritas Essend••, or the truth of Being, is that per quam res ver•• ••st: And thus Ens & Verum conver••untur. Quic ••uid est, ver•• est▪ For except it have a Reall and True Being (and not a Supposed Being) it is not ••ind••••d) a Being, but is Su••••os••d ••o be.

Veritas ••ognosce••di is that per quam res ver•• Cognoscitur. And thus also Ens & Verum conver••u••t••r: For whatsoev••r is, may b••e ••n••wn to be. This Veritas i•• nothing ••lse but Cognoscibilitas: Th••re∣••ore Veritas, as it is Affectio Entis, is d••fin••d by some to be Conveni∣e••••ia r••i, seu Co••formit••s rei, ••um I••tell••ct••; (••ive humano ••ive di∣••••••••.) Thus Truth in the Things and Knowledge in the Understanding have ••elation to each other as Objectum a•••• P••tentia. As Colour in the Object to Sight in the Eye.

Colour, as it is inherent in a Body, makes it to be Coloured (cor∣••us coloratum:) The same Colour, as it stands in relation to the Eye, makes it to be Visible (corpus visibil••.) Thus Essence, or Being, as it is in the ••hing, constitutes it in the nature of a Thing, or a Being: And the sa••e ••••••••nce in the thing, as it hath relation to the Understan∣ding, makes it ••ognos••ibile. ••n the first sense it is Veritas Essendi▪ in the second it is Veritas Cognos••end••. (Where t••e cons••••uction will be somewhat hard, exc••••t you give Philosophers leave to use the G••∣••••••d in a Possive signification, which amongst pure ••rammaria••s is more ra••••ly ••••und.) For by the s••me E••se••c•• by which it is Ens, by the same it is Cognoscibile; That Being by which it is, by the same it ••••y be ••••own to be: As by the same Colour, by which the object is Color••tum, it is also Visibile.

And this •• conceive to be the right acceptation of Metaphysicall Truth, or Truth as it is taken in Metaphysicks for an Affection of Being: not being a Thing Really di••••inc•• for that thing, that truly is, and may be truly known to be; But (as they call it) Modus Entis.

And now we be come somwhat n••e••er that acceptation of Truth wherein his Lo••••▪ takes it; though (if I mistake him not) that sense wherein he useth it, is somewhat distinct from all these: For whether

you consider the Truth of ••eing, or the Truth of Knowledge▪ they are in themselves really the Same, and the same ••l•••• really with that Ens, t•••••• Being, which tru••y Is, and is truly K••o••n •••• be: which thing 〈…〉〈…〉 a being, and as truly Cognos••••ble, when there is no Under∣standing present to take notice of it, as when it is actually Under∣s••••••d. ••••••e a•• an Object is ••••uly Col••u••ed, and truly Visible, even then when ••••••re is no ••ye present to behold it. And therefore this truth cannot be One with the Understanding▪ because it may be then and there where the Understanding is not.

Again, Truth being (as I said) One with the Thing known, if it •••• also One with the Understanding, or the Soule; the Understan∣ding or Soule knowing shall be One with the Thing understood: A S••one and the Soule shall be one Individuall Being: For how can Truth be the same with the Stone, and the same with the Soul, except the Soul and the Stone be the same.

Object. But you will say thi•• is that he contends for, not only, that Truth understood is one with the Soul; but that both the Thing un∣derstood, and the Sou•• understanding, are this Truth.

Answ. 1. To proceed therefore. If the Stone understood, and the Soule understanding, be the Same; then when began this Unity, •••••••• Identy? Were they the Same before the Stone was actually understood? Or did they then contract this Unity, when first the Soul did actually Know it?

Why they should be the same, Before the act of Knowing; there 〈…〉〈…〉 no more reason, then why one ••••••ne should be the same with •…•…ne; ••••y one man should be the same with another man: And so Peter or Paul might be ••s truly said to b••••ray Christ, as Ju∣••••••, if Peter and Judas be one and the same.

And if they should ••••••n ••••ntr•••••• a•• Unity, (and not before when the Understanding ••o••h ••••••s•• Actually understand it; we must ta••e •••••••• saying, Intell••ct••s i••••ellig••••do ••m••••a ••it ••mn••a▪ in a more gr••••••e 〈…〉〈…〉 it w•••• m••••••••. A••••, •••• ••y j••••••emen••, it i•• utt••••ly im∣possible, for that which hath •••••••• been Al••ud •••• be made Idem; ••s also for that which is O••••, to ••e made A••••ud a s••ips••. I say, •••• i•• im∣possible for two things to be made one ••nd the s••me, by a Re••ll I∣dentitie.

'Tis true, Two things may be so united as to be made One Ag∣grega••um; as the Body and the soul make one M••n, the Divi••••••y and Humanity of Christ make ••n•• Person: But that two things can

become the same; that the Soule is the Body, and the Body the Soule; that the Humanity of Christ is his Divinity, and his Divinity his Humanity; I conceive not onely false, but impossible. The Hand and the Foot (with the rest of the members) make one Body; but neither the Hand is the Foot, nor is the Foot the Hand, but really distinct.

Answ. 2. But further, as it is hard to shew, when this neer kin∣dred either of Affinity, or Consanguinity; this Union either of Iden∣tity, or of Identification, had its first Originall: So, if there be any such Ʋnion, (either con••ate or contracted) between the Soul and a Stone: Then will not onely One but All Soules (at least, all soules actually understanding and apprehending it) be the same with this Stone. And these Soules, being one and the same with this one indi∣viduall stone, they will be one and the same with each other.

Thus we shall have but one Soule informing all Bodies; not by a Pythagoricall Metempsychosis▪ by translating of soules from one body to another, but as A••••mus Averroisticus, one soule extended through the whole Universe, informing so many men as there be bodies, wherof every man is partaker tanquam communis aur••: Nay neerer, for of the Ayr each takes a part; but as for this Soul, each Is, each Hath this Soule entire.

Neither doth it inferre onely an Identity of Soules, but an Identi∣ty of Objects also: For all▪ Objects being apprehended by one Soul, they become all One with it: And being all one with the same nume∣ricall Soule, they must be also One with each other.

So that all Soules will thus be One, all Objects will be but One, and this One Object one and the same with that One Soule; and all the World but Ʋnum Ens, whose every parcell is alteri ••dem; the same with each other.

Object. You'l say, All this is no more then he contends for; to make Truth▪ One with the Soule; and that all things that are, are nothing but this One Truth.

Answ. If this be his opinion, To prove an Identity of all crea∣tures, because their Being, from whence proceeds their Cognoscibi∣lity, is all One with the Soule, or Understanding: His Lord▪ must give me leave to dissent from him, if for no other reason, yet because ••e dissents from himselfe: For if his Argument be good, That all things are One with the Soul, because Truth or Cognoscibility, (which differs not really from their Essence) being the Object of

the Soules Operation, must also be One with the Soule; It will fol∣low also, that God is likewise One and the Same with the Soul, be∣cause He also is Cognoscibilis, and may be known by the Soul: And also, that all things else are one with God, because they are al known by Him. And so he falls upon the first of those Errours, which he mentions in the ••nd of his Prooemium, immediately before the first Chapter; which is, by mounting too high in the exal••ing of Truth, to confound the Creator with the Creature▪ by making her God. Neither doth it onely make Truth to be one with God; but even all things else, being one with Truth, to be One with God.

Again, if so, how is it that in the end of his 3. Chapter, concerning the Body and the Soule he tells us, not that they are the Same, or that the Body is the Soul, but as husband and wife each bringeth his part to∣wards the making up of the Compositum. At least M••. Sadler is mis∣taken as well as I, (who is presumed at least to understand his Lor••▪ mind, su••••••ciently,) who ••ells us in his Epistle, that Corporall Ʋnion •••• materialls is sometimes [Miscalled] Identity, which is at best but a ••••ld touch in a point or two.

But I suppose there may be another acception of Truth, which may better sute with (at least the first part of) his Lordships dis∣course. You may call it Veritas Cognoscendi, as well as the former, bu•• in a different sense. There Knowledge was taken in a Passive ••••••se, and Truth was that which makes the thing Cognoscib••le, or fit to be understood: Here you must take it in an Active sense; and so Veritas Cognoscendi, or the Truth of Knowledge, will bee that which makes the understanding Cognoscitivum, or fit to con¦ce••ve and apprehend that Cognosc••••li••y which is in the Obj••ct. And thu•• Truth will be that ••rinciple, whereby the Soule is able to •…•…hend or conceive that which may be known.

Veritas Cognoscendi in the former sense, and that in this sense, are both Principia cognoscendi, Principles of knowledge, but in a severall way. (You may distinguish them, if you please, thus; Truth of knowing, and Truth of being known, and veritas cognosce••di may be 〈…〉〈…〉 both) They differ as Colour in the Object, from the power of seeing in the Eye: The former makes the Object Visible, and fit to be perceived; the other makes the Eye Visive, and fit to discern it. If the first were wanting, Vision would be hindered, because there is nothing Visible: (Hence it is that the Ayr, and Spirituall substanc•••• are not seen even by the s••arp••st sight.) If the latter be wanting▪ ••••••

sight is hindered from a desect in the Organ: (Thus▪ the most per∣sp••••••ous Colou••s are not discerned by a blind Eye; whereas the ••ame Colours are in themselves sufficiently Visible, and actually Dis∣cerned by others▪) Thus Veritas cognoscendi, in the former sense, makes the Object to be Cognoscible; Truth, in the latter sense, gives the Un∣derstanding, or Soule, ability to know it.

Now if you call the Power of se••ing, which is in the Eye, by the name of ••••••ate light (••o dis••••••gu••sh i•• from Light either in the Ob∣ject, or in the Medium:) You may also call Reason, which is this principle of knowing in the Soule, or Understanding, by the name of innate Truth, or Light.

And this signification of Truth I conceive to be most sutable to his Lor••▪ meaning. (But Verum, or Truth, in this sense, is not con∣vertible with Ens: For though all Beings have in them Truth, wherby they may be Known, yet all have not this Truth, or Power to Know.)

And thus if you understand it, it will not seem so strange a Pa∣radox, ••o 〈…〉〈…〉 th•••• Reason (which he calle••h Truth) is all one with the Ʋnderstanding; and that the Ʋnderstanding is not distinct from the Soule. For this will be granted by all those, which affirm that Potenti•• non real••ter distinguuntur ab Animâ; that the Powers or Faculties of the Soule, are not really distinct from the Soule it selfe: And these a••e 〈…〉〈…〉 I mistake not) the greater part of ••ound Phi∣losophers. And ••••us his Lor••▪ opinion is but the same with theirs in other words. (Yet may we ••••••ll speak distinctly of these severall Facul••ies; as w•• do of the Wisdom of God, the Power of God, the Will of God, &c. which are as en••••rely one with God, as these Fa∣culties can be with the Soule.) And thus much for explaining the state of the 〈…〉〈…〉. •• proceed next to examine the Grounds of this his Lor••▪ opinion.

CHAP. ••. Whether the Ʋnderstanding, and Truth understood, be One.

IN his first Chapter he tells us, That Truth (that is Reason) is enthron▪d in the Ʋnderstanding; and there appears under a dou∣ble Notion Th•••••• •••• the Fountain or Ground-work (which is Reason it self,) We call it (saith he) the form or substance. And then those

workings which breathe from thence (the Streams issuing from it) viz. the Operations and exercise of Reason, the effects of a reasonable soule. (We call them usually, actus primus, and actus secundus.)

The first of these he begins with, proving it to be the Ʋnderstanding in its Essence: (The second he proceeds to in the tenth Chapter.) His Argument is this, What is the Ʋnderstanding other then a Ray of the Divine Nature, warming and enlivening the Creature, con∣forming it to the likenesse of the Creator? And is not Truth the same?

If you take Truth in any other acceptation beside that last men∣tioned, I see not how the Argument will hold: For if you take it either for the Truth of Being, or the Truth of Knowing (in the com∣mon acceptation;) for that Essence, whereby every Creature both is and may be known to be: It may be granted, that the understan∣ding is one of those Rays of the Divine Nature, somewhat of that Excellency implanted in Man, of that Image of God whereby Man is conformed to the likenesse of the Creator: It will be granted also, That the Essence or Truth of every Creature, whereby it Is or is Known to be, is a Ray proceeding from the same Center, (though to another point of the Circumference,) a Stream issuing forth from the same Foun∣taine of Being; and carryes some weak Resemblance, some Sparkling of that Primitive Light, or Truth, that Originall Essence which is in God; (For thus every Creature hath somthing of God in it, Re∣fert quaelibet herba Deum.) Yet will it not follow from hence, That this communicated Ray of Being is the same with the Understanding. For the Argument will prove erroneous, as being Affirmative in the second Figure, in which no Affirmative Proposition can be concluded: And the Consequence will be the same with this, [What is the Body of Man but a materiall substance? And is not a Stone the same?] Which you would hardly admit as a sufficient argument to prove our Body to be a Stone.

If you take Truth for Reason, the Argument will admit of a reducti∣on into an exact Form, thus, [That Ray of the Divine Nature, which doth (solely, or principally) expresse Gods Image in Man, is the Ʋn∣derstanding; but Truth or Reason is this divine Ray; Therefore Truth (that is Reason) is the Ʋnderstanding.]

And this Argument will hold good, if we grant the Soule to be the immediate worker in rationall Operations, without an intervenient Fa∣cultie: But (otherwise) those that are of the contrary Opinion would

deny (or distinguish) the Major, and say, That this divine Ray, this Image of God, consists not wholly in the Understanding by it selfe, but in the Soule or Understanding, accompanied with its severall Fa∣culties and ••perations.

And indeed it cannot be denyed, but that the Operations of the Soule do containe part of this Divine Image, ••s well as the Soule in its Es∣sence; and yet They are the Soules (immediate) Progeny, and are not immediately produced by God.

Now what others admit concerning the Operations, They will a••∣••••rm concerning the Faculties; That they are but parcels of this Ray or Divine Image, That they are but lesser Rivulets derived from the greater stream▪ or branches annexed to it.

Now from hence, [That the Soule in its Essence, together with the se∣verall Faculties and Operations wherewith it is endowed, doth make up the chiefest part of Gods Image in Man] to prove, [That every part of this Image are the same with each other▪] and so [the Faculties to be the same with the Soule;] is that which they will not allow.

And to presume, or take for granted, That this Image of God con∣sists but in One single Ray; i•• but petere principium, it being no lesse hard to prove, then that the Faculties and the Soule are One; That Truth (or Reason) is One and the S••••e with the Understanding, or Reasonable Soule.

They would say rather, That the Soule is One of those Bra••••he••, which (issuing from the same Root of Being in God, from whence all other Created Beings doe arise) divides it selfe into severall Twigs. And we have no way to convince them of falshood in this particular, till we have first proved the Soule and its Faculties to be one Simple o•• Single Essence.

The prosecution or explication of his Lor••▪. Argument doth no way oppose this acceptation of Truth which I have given, but confirms it; which (if I rightly understand it) may be thus explained; That Truth (Reason) is Light, none will d••ny▪ (by Light understand, that internall Principle whereby the Soule can See o•• Know, which is so called by a Metaphor drawn from the Innate light, (we call it potentia visiva) whereby the Eye is enabled to See:) That Light (this power or prin∣ciple of Knowing or Reasoning) i•• a reasonable creature i•• the Fo••n∣tai•• of Life, i•• ma••••f••s••: (by Life understand the Life of the Soule, if I may so speak, That which specificates the rationall Soule, and makes i•• 〈…〉〈…〉) For •••••• •••••••• of a reasonable Soul, (that which makes it to

be Reasonable) is Light, (that principle whereby it know•• and under∣stands:) And therefore when the Soule informeth, or giveth life to A∣nimal rationale, (making it Rationall) it inableth the Creature to work according to that Light, (according to this principle of Knowing: that is, It inableth the Reasonable Creature to Know or Understand, &c.) Thus whilst Life (that which makes a reasonable creature to be Rea∣sonable) and Light (this power of Knowing) is Truth (or Reason; And Truth (or Reason) is Conformity to God (or Gods Image in us:) And the Ʋnderstanding also, as we yet discourse of it, is this Light (this principle of Reasoning) to the Soule; The Ʋnderstanding and Truth (or Reason) can be but One.

The whole Argument i•• briefly thus; [the Image of God in us, is our Understanding; and this Image or divine Radius, consists in Rea∣son (which he calls Truth;) therefore Truth or Reason is our Under∣standing.] His minor (that this Ray or Beam of Divinity in us, is Truth or Reason) is thus proved; [Because Reason in us is •• derivative Beam, a sparkling, of that primitive Light (or Wisdome) which is in God:] And so That which enlightens us, and inables us to Know, or Understand, according to our measure (that which furnisheth Ʋs with Knowledge) is a representation of Gods Sapience or Wisdome where∣by He is said to Know. Now, [that Truth or Reason (which is all one) is this derivative Beam of Light, wherby we are able to Know;] and [That this ability to Know or Understand, is that which makes u•• to be Reasonable,] is manifest. Wherefore he concludes, That, whilst ••ur Life (or Rationality) consists in Light, (that is, in an Ability to know and understand) and this Ability consists in Truth (or Reason) which is a conformity to God (as being a Stream issuing from his Ocean of Wisdom;) And whilst (as Reason is this abilit•• of knowing, so) the Ʋnderstanding also is this Light (this Ability or power of Knowing;) The Ʋnderstanding and Truth (that is, Reason) must be all One.

Those, who deny his Conclusion, would answer, That both Reason and the Ʋnderstanding, doe inable the Soule to Know, or Understand, but in a severall way, as distinct principles (and therefore are not the same:) The one Instrumentally or Ministerially; The other, by using this as its Minister. Thus Fire, by its Heat, burns; a Stone, by its Heavinesse, descends; Glasse, by its L••vity or smoothnesse, re∣••••ecteth; and the like.

If you say, the Weight of the Stone, or Smoothnesse of the Glasse, are not Things distinct from the Stone and Glasse, but rather Modifications

of these Things; I contend not: For neither doe I hold the Un∣derstanding, or any other of the Soules Faculties, to be a Thing distinct from the Soule; but, at the most, only an accidentall Modification of it, not Really distinct from it: Yea rather, That it is the Soule it self, quatenus intelligens, (as the Power of God, is God himself quatenus po∣tens) admitting no other but a distinction of Reason.

CHAP. II. A second Argument (from the three Requisites to every Being) examined.

IN the second Chapter, he proposeth first the Opinion of those that stile the Understanding a Faculty, whereby the Soule receiveth or en∣tertaineth Truth, and Acteth accordingly.

But here his Lordship (if I mistake not) varieth from his former ac∣ceptation of Truth; Comparing it not to the Innate Light, or power of Seeing, in the Eye; but to the Advenient Light, which streames to it through the Ayr, bringing with it the Idea, or visible Species, of the Object seen. For, soon after, he calls it, those sweet beams of Light which beat upon us continually; which cannot be meant of any innate Light, but of an advenient Light.

And thus I see no inconvenience at all, to say, That the Soule, or Understanding, by its Innate Light, of Reason, (which whether you say to be distinct from the Soule, or not, it is not much materiall) doth daily receive or entertain new Truths, or new Representations of that Truth of Being which is really existent in Things; either by a reiterate actuall understanding of those things which it had formerly under∣stood, or by a new apprehension of somwhat whereof before it was ig∣norant. Like as the Eye by its innate Power of Seeing, discerns new Species (conveyed to it by advenient Light) either from Objects for∣merly seen, or now first represented.

Next he lays down three Requisites to the constitution of every Being. A Fountaine commu••icating; a Channell entertaining; and Waters im∣parted. (Conferen••, Collatum, Recipiens.) And he asks Where we shall find these three, if the Ʋnderstanding be a Faculty.

I answer. If you speak of Advenient light (last mentioned) which is a Representative Truth, or an Idea of that R••all Truth which is in the Things Known; I say, the Reall Truth (or Veritas Ess••ndi) sends

forth this Representative Truth, or Idea, which is conveyed by a De∣ferent Light (either of Discourse, or Information, or the like) till it come to the Ʋnderstanding, where it is received and entertained by the Innate Light (or Truth) of Reason. Like as the Inherent light of Co∣lour in the Object sends forth a Representative light of visible Species, which is conveyed by a Deferent light in the Ayr, till it come to the Eye, where it is entertained by the Innate light, which is the faculty of Seeing.

And, as the Remotenesse, or Obscurity of the Object; the Dark∣nesse of the Medium; or the Weaknesse of the Faculty, may hinder Sight, so that we see not at all, or not perfectly: In like manner the Distance of the Object, as in things quite out of our reach; or the Ob∣scurity of them, which send forth no Species, or manifestation of their essence towards us; our imperfect Discourse, or insufficient Information, which is as a dark Medium; and lastly, the weaknesse of our Ap∣prehension; doe cause Ignorance in the Understanding, which is answe∣rable to not-seeing in the Eye.

Again, as in Ignorance so in Errour. A reflection of a false Light upon the Object, casting a false seeming colour, which may be mistaken for the true colour of it; an indisposed Medium, as when we see through Red glasse, &c. and a distempered Organ, by reason of some vitious hu∣mours accidentall in the Eye, &c. may cause a mistake and Errour in Sight: So here, when there is a False Light upon the Object, as when we conceive that to be the effect of one thing, which indeed proceeds from some other cause, fallacia non causae pro causâ, or the like; a false Dis∣course or Inference, or a false Relation, which is as a stained Medium; or a distempered Ʋnderstanding, by reason of Passion, of l••sa Phantasia, or the like; may cause an Erroneous Judgement, apprehending things to be otherwise then inde••d they are.

And thus I have shewed not onely those three requisites which his Lordship requires, but some others besides them; supposing in the mean time the Ʋnderstanding to be a Faculty; and taking Truth for those sweet B••ams of Light, which beat upon us; Advenient Light.

If you take Truth for Reason; and withall suppose Reason to be di∣stinct from the Ʋnderstanding, and ••t also from the Soule. You may say, The Understanding is the Recip••ent; Reason the thing Received in it; and that Then and from Those, when and from whence it received its Essence, to which Reason is a conna••e and appendent Faculty; That is, either from God, by immediate Creation, which many think;

or from the Parents, by Propagation, which others▪ ••old.

But I suppose there be few or none, that hold, Reason to be distinct from the Ʋnderstanding, and That also from the Soule. For when they speak of Reason, as a faculty of the Understanding; by Ʋnderstanding they mean, the Soule it selfe, quatenus intelligens, being considered a•• the Subject of Reason: And when they speak of the Ʋnderstanding •••• a faculty, whereby the Soule is able to conceive and judge of Truth; Then they take the Ʋnderstanding to be the same with Reason.

I should rather say, That Reason, and the Ʋnderstanding (as it de∣notes a Faculty) are two words Synonima, denoting the same Faculty or Power of Knowing and Judging. Which Faculty I would not grant to be another Thing from the Soule-Knowing, or the Soule-Un∣derstanding but a Modus▪ As neither doe I allow to Any Naturall-Power, or Faculty, (which they make the second Species of Quality) any other Being then the Being of a Modus, and not the being of •• Thing.

And thus we may safely say, the Soule receives the Faculty of Rea∣son or Understanding; Thence, from whence it receives its Being: (as a Stone receives its Heavinesse from that which Produceth it:) That which gave it to Bee gave it to be Thus.

Sometimes indeed Accidents are not received from that which pro∣duceth the Substance, but from some other Efficient; as the Smooth∣nesse of Marble proceeds not from the Producer, but from the Poli∣sher: And yet I hold not, the Smoothnesse to be One Thing, and the Marble to be another Thing▪ but the Marble to be a Thing, and the Smoothnesse to be Modus. And thus it must be granted in Acqui••••te Habits; where the Giver and Receiver are the Same, and the Thing Received Modally, but not really, distinct from either.

But for Faculties, or Naturall-Powers; If you look for an Externall Efficient or Giver, it will be the same that produceth the Substance; But if you be contented with an Efficient per Emanationem, Thus they are said to flow or arise from the Form, or Substance. And then the Giver and Receiver is the Same; (for the Form which i•• the Subject Receiving, is also per emanation••m Effectiva, from whence it ariseth as an Essentiall Consequent:) and if you say the Faculty Received is not so much as Modally distinguisht from it but onely ratione 〈…〉〈…〉; I contend not. But so much▪ distinction at least, I suppose, we must al∣low it.

Having thus answered his Lordships Qu re, I proceed to answer

his Objections. If the Ʋnderstanding (saith he) be the Recipient, then the Light (of Reason) which differenceth us from the Vegetative and Sensitive creatures, lieth in the Ʋnderstanding, and not in the Soul: And so the Soul is either not enlightened at all, but only a Theca to the In∣tellect; or else there be two Enlightened (rationall) Beings in •••••• Reasona∣ble creature.

For answer, First, I suppose (as I said before) that there are few, if any, that will affirm, the Soul, the Understanding, and Reason, to be Three things: But they will either say, Reason Is the Understanding, and not in the Understanding: or else, Reason is in the Understanding, which Understanding is the Soul, considered only under this Notion▪ quatenus Intelligens, as it is the Subject of Reason. And thus the diffi∣culty appears not; For the Light which differenceth us from Unreason∣able creatures, whether you call it Reason, or call it the Understanding▪ is seated in the Soule, and so denominates it Intelligent or Ʋnder∣standing.

But secondly, we want not a Recipient for Truth though the Soul be not it, It may be the Understanding.

Yet thirdly, though the Soul be not the Immediate Subject, it may yet be the Ʋltimate, which is more then a Theca.

Object. But you will reply, However it be so, that wee make this Light to be inherent in the Soul; yet it is not sufficient to make an Es∣sentiall difference between the Reasonable and Unreasonable Soul. For though Reason be in the Soul, except it also Be the Soul, it makes the difference but Accidentall; For thus the Reasonable and Unreaso∣nable Soul will not differ in their Essence, but only in their Adjuncts.

Answ. To this I answer▪ First, this is a new difficulty not arising out of his Lordships argument: For though this Light (of Reason) be an Accident, yet this hinders not but that there may be his three Requisites: For an Accident may be truly received, in the Subject, from the Producer.

And yet (secondly) This, though a Faculty of the Soul, and not the Soul it self, makes notwithstanding a Noble difference between a Ra∣tionall and Irrationall Soul; so that the Soul loseth not its dignity▪ neither becomes a bare Theca to the Understanding or Reason: And is su••••iciently dignified to have such a Divine faculty in it, and of it, by which it produceth it operations, which the Irrationall Soul hath no••. We account those S••ones precious, that have in them some rare Ver∣tues: And why not the Soul, indued with so Divine a Faculty?

Especially (which is the third thing I reply) since it is so in the Soule, that is also of the Soul. The Honey which Samson found in the dead Li∣ons carkas••, proceeded not from it, but was only accidentally or casually in it. A Knife touched with a Loadstone will take up a Needle, or the like; but this attractive Vertue is not from It self, but from the Loadstone: And you may call the Knife, if you please, a Theca or Receptacle of this Vertue▪ and say, it hath no other then a Relative Excellencie, as it is the Receptacle of an Excellent Vertue; (though indeed to be the Subject of Inhesion, is more then a Theca, or a bare Receptacle.) But in the Loadstone it is otherwise, For there the Attractive Vertue is not onely in it, but of it, or from it selfe: It is so received in it, that it ••••owes from it, it is sui partus. Thus in the Soule, though Reason be a Faculty of the Soul, yet is it such a Faculty as floweth from it; and so the Soule not only its Receptacle, but also its Originall. Thus is Light In the Sunne, and From the Sunne, it is not received aliunde. And it is a Reall Excellencie in the Sunne, and not onely Relative, to be the Author and Originall of that which enlightens the whole World. And it is a Re∣all Excellencie in the Soule (and more then the Excellencie of a Theca) to have from it selfe, from its owne Essence, such a Faculty whereby it is able to Know and Understand.

But you will say still, However Reason may thus dignifie and di∣stinguish it from Irrationall Beings; Yet this is but an Accidentall Dignity, an Accidentall Distinction, no•• Essentiall; as consisting in that which is in the Soule, but distinct from it. Therefore

Fourthly, Reason in the Soule, is not onely an Accidentall, but an Essentiall Perfection, an Essentiall Consequent flowing immediately from the Essence of the Soul, as an inseparable endowment: And so may make an Essentiall difference; (it is Essentiall to the Soule that Reason should arise from it.) And thus that which is distinct from a thing, may yet be Essentiall to it, viz. Essentiale Consequens, though not Essentiale Constituens.

But fifthly, (which I conceive to be of the greatest force) though Reason, or the Understanding (as a Faculty) be only Essentiale Con∣sequens▪ and so, in its Formality, makes onely an Externall difference (aposteriori;) Yet it points out unto us an Essentiale Constituens, an Essentiall Ingredient (as I may so call it) from whence this Consequent doth arise. Which is somwhat in the Essence of the Soule: Whereof we can take no other notice then from its Operations▪ (And this An∣swer holds good, though you suppose Reason to be distinct from the

Understanding, and Both from the Soule: For so, that Essence (from whence the Understanding flows, together with its Immediate and Re∣mote Issue, viz. Reason and its Operations) will make this Essentiall Difference between the Rationall and Irrationall Soul.)

Thus they say, prim•• Qualitates are not Formae Elementorum, but That from whence these first Qualities do Essentially flow. And though the Qualities make but an Accidentall difference between them, yet the Substantiall Forms from whence the Qualities do arise make an Essentiall difference. (So here: The Rationall Soule is such a Substance as is able to give rise to such Faculties, which the Irrationall Soule is not.)

If you ask What this Substantiall Form is? You know the ordinary answer; Dic formam lapidi•• & eris mihi magnus Apollo. (It is a hard thing, by his own confession, to find out the Form of any Being, much more to discover the Being of a Form, pag. 32.) Tell me the Being of Any thing, and I will tell you the Being of This. If I ask What the Soule is? (which to be we are sure:) You will say perhaps, a Spirituall Substance: And that is all you can say, for the Essence of it. But if I ask, what it is To be Spirituall? what, To be a Substance? I suppose you cannot tell me otherwise, then by Negations, or Effects. And (thus) they will do in the Elementall Forms; They are not these Qualities, but something from whence they arise. (And so for the substance of the Soule, It is not these Faculties but the Originall of them.)

If you will say, There is no such Something, as this substantiall Form of the Elements; because we cannot tell you what this Something is.

(To omit, that by the same reason you might banish all Being, be∣cause none can tell you, what Being is: For if you say (and that is all you can say) that Being is a Ray communicated from the Originall Entity in God: This tells us at the most, but whence it is, not what it is.)

I say, If you deny, that there be any other Forms of the Elements (beside their Qualities) whereby they differ one from another; Then need we look no further: For then these Faculties, though but Acci∣dents, may be sufficient to make an Essentiall difference in the Rationall Soule from the Irrationall.

But further, If you can perswade them, that the Essence or Form of the Elements, and their Accidents or Prime Qualities, are the same: I doubt not, but then they will as easily grant, the Soul and its Faculties to be the same also.

And thus I have answered according to their opinion that hold the Soul and its Faculties distinct: And have shewed, that we are not so farre to seek for a Recipient of Reason, or Truth, as his Lordship might imagine. And indeed there is nothing more difficult in this particular, then in all Accidents whatsoever; their Subject is their Recipient, and so is the Subject of Truth, or Reason, Its Recipient.

But there is another kind of Recipiency (which I shall touch in the next Chapter) which (if I mistake not) will cut the sinews of this Ar∣gument, and leave it of no force.

But in the mean time (having found a Recipient) we must seek for a Fountaine, from whence this Light of Reason, or Truth, is derived. For that is his Lordships next demand; Who is it that communicateth this Light?

For the answering of this, I shall first propound another Qu••re of the same nature, and then apply mine answer joyntly to both. I ask therefore first, whether Fire (supposing it to be an Element) be not the true Recipient of Heat? and the Loadstone the true Recipient of the Attractive virtue that is in it? and the Sunne, the true Recipient of Light? If so, then I demand, From whence they are received? What is the Fountain from which they are communicated?

If you speak of an Internall Fountain, from whence they flow by an Essentiall Emanation; The Recipient and the Fountain will be the same. And so, if you say the Body of the Sunne, of the Fire, of the Loadstone, be the immediate Recipients of their Light, Heat, and Vir∣tue; Then must I say, That these severall Bodies are the severall Foun∣tains from whence (respectively) those Qualities do proceed. If you s••y, That these Qualities are Received (subje••tantur) immediately, in the Form or Essence of these bodies, and not in the entire Substance; I must say also, They do arise from these Forms, and flow from them by an Essentiall Emanation. And the Definitive Resolution of this Quare depends upon the determination of that Question in Philosophy, whe∣ther Accidents be subjected immediately in the Form, or in the Comp••si∣tum: and (consequently) whether they flow from the Form imme∣diately, or jointly from Matter and Form together. Which questions it is not materiall for me to determine; for take which side you please, I shall soon finde both the Fountain and a Recipient.

If you look for an Externall, Physicall Fountain, or Efficient; we must say, That the same Fountain from whence they have their Essence, from the same do they receive with their Essence their Inseparable Ac∣cidents,

or Essentiall Consequents, by a Comproduction. Thus the Sunne received its inherent Light by Creation, together with its Essence, from God: For in the Creation of the Substance, the Accidents are also Con∣created. So Fire produced by a naturall Agent, receives its Heat com∣produced, or congenerated, and conferred upon it together with its Essence from the same Efficient.

Now in any of these ways, it will not be hard to find a Fountain of Truth, an Originall from whence the Light of Reason or Truth may be conferred; Though we hold the Understanding and the Soule to be distinct.

If you ask an Internall Fountain; It will be answered, That Reason▪ or the Faculty of Understanding, flows from the Essence of the Soule, as an Essentiall Consequent; and is received and inherent in the Soule▪ (For I think not fitting to say, that it is inherent in the whole Reaso∣nable Creature (jointly) consisting of Body and Soule; because it remains in the Soule separate, without the Body.) Or (if you look at them as Three things) then Reason must be said to flow from the Ʋn∣derstanding, and It from the Soule; and to be received, by Inherence, in the Understanding, as That also is received in the Soule.

If you enquire for an Externall Efficient; So the Faculties are ei∣ther Concreated with the Soule by God; or else comproduced by the Parents by Propagation. And so we want not a Fountain, from whence Reason may be communicated.

I proceed to his Lordships prosecution of this Quaere. This Light (of Truth or Reason) must be conveyed (saith he) to the Ʋnderstanding, from the Soule, from some other Creature, or from God himselfe; but neither of these▪ ways; therefore not all.

I see not why Any or All of these Fountains may not be admitted to be the Source of Reason, in a severall way.

First, why may not the Soule be the Fountain of Reason or the under∣ding Faculty; as well as the Essence of Fire is the Fountain of its Heat, and the Essence of the Magnet the Fountain of its Virtue? not by Physicall Production, but by Essentiall Emanation? Indeed, I like not to say, The Soule communicates Reason to the Understanding, (as to a Third thing;) For I have said before, the Recipient and the Fountain in this way of conveyance, viz. per emanation••m, are the Same: like as in I••manent acts, the Agent and the Patient are the same. But I say, That Reason or the understanding Faculty, which the Soule as Recipi∣ent entertains In it selfe; it hath also From itself, as being the Fountain.

(But if you take the Understanding as a third thing from both; then the Soul must not be said to be the Immediate Fountain, but the Under∣standing must be said to be the (Immediate) both Source and Chanell.)

And thus his Lordships reason troubleth me not, viz. If the Soul com∣municate Light, then Hath it Light already, and so this Faculty, the Ʋnder∣standing, is in vain. I say, the Soule hath This Light, which both flows from the Soule as an Essentiall Consequent, and is Inherent in the Soule as an Inseparable Accident.

Next, why may not the Soule, or Ʋnderstanding (whether you will) receive this Light of Reason from another Creature? I mean, from the Parent, by Procreation; producing both its Essence, and Adjuncts, as well Essentiall as Accidentall, together▪ not by Essentiall Emanation, as before, but by Physicall Production?

To the Reason annexed, viz. That if a Creature produce a Faculty in the Soule or Ʋnderstanding that Creature must produce it by an interveni∣ent Faculty, and That faculty must be produced by another Faculty, and s•• in infinitum; I answer, The faculty of Reason (together with the Soul) was produced by the Parent (according to this supposition,) and that by an Intervenient Faculty, viz. the Generative Faculty in the Parent•• And yet shall we not proceed in infinitum, For This generative faculty was produced by Another, and That again by Another, ascending still upwards till we come to the Generative Faculty of Adam, which was immediately produced of God, without an intervenient Faculty▪ either by Concreation with the Soule; or by Infusion, when he pronounced that blessing Increase and multiply.

Lastly, why may not this and other Faculties be produced in the Soule and with the Soule, by immediate creation, from God? I mean, if Soules be daily created, as most suppose; Or, if not, yet at least the Faculties in Adams Soule might be by God Created or Concreated with it, notwithstanding that they be distinct.

But you aske, Why then did not God immediately and intrinsecally com∣municate this to the Soule it selfe, rather then as a Faculty, or by a Fa∣culty? If he did not, it was because he Would not; and we cannot give account of this will. God might have created immediately all Man∣kind, as he did the Angels; yet we see he pleased rather, that they should be produced by Generation, one from another: But who can give us any other account of this his pleasure, save onely his Will? So neither, why Reason should be an Accidentall Faculty, rather then M••d•••• Substan••i••li••; that is, why he should produce it mediante animâ,

rather then by himself immediately, together with it: he might do either.

But, in generall, By what means soever (saith he) Truth (or Reason) be conv••yed; if the Ʋnderstanding do at all, receive Truth, then it is Truth▪ For God doth not communicate Light, but to Light.

If he mean, God gives Lucem non nisi Lucido; or Lumen non nisi Lu∣minoso; I grant it, saking the words i•• sensu composito, but not insensu diviso. (And so God gives not Animam nisi Animato, nor Rationem nisi Rationali) That is, God gives not Light but to that which is Light (••. Lucide or Illuminate,) viz. when that Light is bestowed: But in s••nsu diviso, That this was (before) Lucid, it is not to be admitted. Light communicated to the Ayr, makes it Illuminate, but finds it not so. God inspires not a Soule, but into a Living-creature: And so breathing in∣to Adam the breath of Life, he made him a Living-creature; but found him (his body) Inanimate, a ••ump of Earth. So here; God gives not the Light of Reason, but to that which is Light, or Inlightned, viz. Then Inlightned when this Light of Reason is bestowed.

But if by this, God gives not Light but to Light, he means, Lucem non dat nisi Luci, or Lumen non nisi Lumini; I cannot admit it, either in sensu composito, or in diviso. When the Sunne imparts Light (Lumen) to the Ayr; the Ayr is Illuminate or Enlightned: But, that the Ayr is Lumen, I must never grant, till we cease to hold, Lumen non est Corpus. So if God communicate to the Soule or Understanding the Light of Reason; the Soule or Understanding becomes thereby Illuminate or Enlightned with Reason: But, that the Soule or Understanding, is this Light, this Reason; follows no more then if you would say, That Wa∣ter is Heat when it grows Hot; The Ayr is Light (Lumen,) when it is Enlightned; A Body becomes a Colour when it is Coloured; Any Sub∣stance whatsoever is metamorphised into an Accident, when (as a Sub∣ject) it Receives that Accident; or That the Body of Adam, formed out of the Dust, was made a Soule, when it received a Soule inspired.

That which is annexed as a proof; Because Quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis, (together with the illustrations following;) proves no more but this, Whatsoever is conferred▪ is no further forth confer∣red, then as the Subject is capable of, and actually doth receive it. And this we grant, That the Soule or Understanding, upon which the Light of Reason is conferred; is a fit Subject to receive or entertaine Reason, and is actually indued with Reason. And so I admit that which he cites of Dr. Twisse, Neither a quality permanent, nor an act immanent unlesse they be made INHERENT IN the Soule, (observe the phrase) and

the latter also produced by it, can be said to be given to the Soule. Hee saith, It is Inherent in the Soule, not that it is the Soule.

Lastly, How passeth (saith he) this Light from the Ʋnderstanding to the Soule? there being as vast a distance between It and the Soule, as be∣tween It and the will, (supposing them distinct Faculties) whence grow those inextricable disputes, How the Will is made to Understand, what the Un∣derstanding judgeth fit to be Willed.

But here his Lordship varies somewhat the state of the Question in altering the acceptation of the word Truth, from truth understanding, to truth understood, and instead of innate truth of Reason, speaks of the advenient truth, which is a Conceptus or Idea framed to represent the truth of Being in the Object. For we cannot conceive Reason, which is now looked upon as a permanent Faculty, to be transient from one subject to another.

But Truth Ʋnderstood, how it may be conveyed from the Under∣standing to the Soul; I shall Then perhaps better tell when he shews me, How the Visible Species are conveyed from the Organ to the Soul, or Faculty, seeing. That the Organ receives species, he will not deny; for else the Soul might as well see, when the Eye is out: That the Soul also (by the Organ) doth apprehend these Species, must likewise bee yeelded; else why should not the Eye of a dead man see? That the Soule and the Organ are distinct, must needs be granted; for we see them really separated by death, whereas nothing can be separated from it selfe: And when I am informed, How the Soule and the Organ, being distinct, are conjoyned in Seeing; I shall better be able to resolve, How the Soule and the Faculty, though distinct, may joyntly Ʋnderstand.

Till then, it might suffice, in generall to say, That, As by the Organ the Soule S••••th, so by Reason or the Understanding-faculty, the Soule Knows and Understandeth: (only allowing such disproportion as must be allowed between a Materiall and Immateriall instrument.) And it seems to be no more vast distance between a Faculty and the Soule, then is between an Organ and the Soule. So that if by Visible Species in the Organ, the Soule may see; why not by Intellectuall Species in the Un∣derstanding (though a Faculty) may the Soule Ʋnderstand?

But, because I love not to answer a difficulty only by opposing an∣other; you may resolve it thus. We are not to conceive, there is any such vast Gulfe between the Soule and the Understanding (though a Faculty) as that Truth should need a Ferry-boat to wa••t it over: For as the Eye doth not first see, and then Inform the Soule or Visive Fa∣culty,

what it hath seene; but the Organ and the Faculty joyntly con∣curre to the Act of Seeing: So neither doth the Understanding first Receive and Entertain Truth, and afterward inform the Soule, what it hath Understood: But the Soule with and by this Faculty of Reason or Understanding, doth Know and Understand; Both concurring to the same Act. (Thus a Stone, by its Heavinesse, descends; Fire, by its Heat, warms; by its Light▪ shines; Glasse, by its Smoothnesse, re∣flects light; a Knife, by a communicated Faculty from the Magnet, draws iron: And yet (in some of these at least) you must of necessity grant a distinction ex parte rei.)

There is indeed sometimes a Reflex act of the Soule, whereby it Knows▪ what is Ʋnderstood: But we must not think, that it is an act of the Soules Essence, surveying or taking account of the Ʋnderstanding Faculty, what it hath done; But the Soule, by this understanding Fa∣culty, reflects upon a former Act, which It selfe by the same Faculty had formerly performed.

The Gulfe is likewise fordable between the Ʋnderstanding and the Will, though they be distinct faculties. Not as if the Will by an act of Knowledge should Understand what the Intellect doth dictate: But the Soule, which by its faculty of Understanding Knows, doth by its Wil∣ling faculty Command, and by its Loco-motive Execute. So that nei∣ther the Will Knows what the Ʋnderstanding Judgeth, nor the Inferiour Faculties what the Will Commands; But the Soule by severall Facul∣ties executes severall Functions. Thus when the Soule by the Eye dis∣covers a danger imminent, by the Hand it endeavours to divert it: And yet there is no Messenger dispatcht between, to inform the Hand, what the Eye hath seen; notwithstanding that the Hand and the Eye are Really distinct, yea Locally distant.

As for mine own Opinion, I could easily grant, The distinction of the Faculties, from the Soule, and among themselves, to be neither Re∣all, nor a parte rei. And concerning the first, I am sufficiently confi∣dent: But for the second, whether the Distinction be Modall (i. à parte Rei) or meerly Rationall (rationis rati••cina••••,) I do yet desire a convincing Demonstration to determine.

CHAP. III. The same Argument further prosecuted and examined, in this and the ensuing Chapters.

IN the next Chapter he shewes, That if we make the Ʋnderstanding and Truth to be One, (which I suppose will be easily granted; there being but few or none which make the Soule, the Understanding, and Reason (that is, Truth) to be Three distinct things:) then will it be easie to find these three Requisites: For thus Light or Truth is Dispensed; By the Father of Light; and hath for its Recipient, the whole Reasonable crea∣ture, consisting of Body and Soule. All which I admit, (as likewise will those that be his greatest adversaries:) onely with this Proviso, That he make the entire Reasonable creature to be subjectum Denominationis, and not subjectum Inhaesionis, to Reason or Truth.

Next, he spends some time to clear this, How the whole Reasonable Creature can be said to be the Recipient; which labour, in my judge∣ment, might have been spared: For I cannot see any reason to fear, but that it will as easily be granted, that the Reasonable Creature may be the Subject of Reason; as that the Ayr illuminate is the subject of Light: without any fear of Identity in the Thing Received with the Re∣cipient.

But it seems his Lordship speaks of another kind of Recipiency beside the Recipiency of a Subject: Such a kind of Recipiency as where the Recipiens and Receptum be the same. No Being (saith he) but it is the thing Receiving and Received: For consider any Individuall Being you please, Vegetative or Rationall, or what you will; Who is it that entertain∣eth this Being, but the Being it selfe which is entertained? Who is it that receiveth from the Womb of Eternity that reasonable creature, but the creature received?

You may distinguish them thus, The Recipiency of a Being, and the Recipiency of a Form: And so, the Fountain or Efficient, dat Esse, and dat Habere. In the first kind of Giving and Receiving, the Recipient and the thing Received must of necessity be the same; Thus the Efficient or Producer of Light, dat Lucido ESSE Lucidum, dat Luci Esse Lucem, not dat Lucido esse Lucem. But in the second it is otherwise, not dat Lu∣cido HABERE Lucidum, nor Luci HABERE Lucem, but Lucido Ha∣bere Lucem. Thus the Efficient or Fountain of Reason, dat Rational•• Esse Rationalem, Habere Rationem.

(But how his Marginall note stands good, viz. That in all things the Agent and the Patient must be One, because The thing Receiving and Received are One, I cannot conceive; For thus he makes God and the Reasonable creature to be One: For, if I mistake no••, the Fountain or Efficient is the Agent, and the Recipient the Patient.)

And indeed he must of necessity admit this distinction of Recipiency: For otherwise his Fundamentall Axiom would have failed. For if we allow no Recipiency, but the Recipiency of a Subject, whereby it re∣ceives or entertains a▪ Form▪ It will not be Universall•• true, That to the constitution of every Being, there must be the three Requisites for∣merly mentioned. For Substantiae non sunt in subjecte; Compleat Sub∣stances are not communicated or imparted To a Subject Receiving (a••d so would want a Recipient,) but are onely made to Be, and to be the Subject Receiving other things.

But •• desire his Lordship to consider, Whether, admitting such a Reception, wherein every thing is its own Recipient; he do not lay o∣pen so wide a gap, that his adversaries may make an Escape; and Him∣selfe break that Net wherein his Adversary should have been taken? Whether, in answering an Objection, he doe not overthrow his prin∣cipall Argument? For how easie is it to say, That Truth, though it be neither Soule, Intellect, nor Reason; Yet it is a Faculty (or what you will) Proceeding from God, and its own Recipient. And so, though they imagine an hundred Faculties in the Soule, one dependent upon ano∣ther; yet they shall never be put to a straight to find either a Fountain or a Recipient: For God, of necessity, must be the Fountain of all Be∣ing whatsoever (either mediatè or immediatè;) And that Being what∣soever it is, shall be its own Recipient. Therfore the Soule (in this sense) hath not the Body for its Recipient; neither did God communicate or bestow a living Soule upon Adam's earthly Body, when he breathed into it the breath of Life: But he gave To the Soule, to Be a Soul. Nei∣ther is the Soule a Recipient to the Understanding, Nor It to Reason, no•• any of these to Truth, (if they be distinct things:) But each of these their own Recipient. Neither (lastly) is the entire Reasonable Creature a Recipient of Truth or Reason (as he would have it) But Truth is its own Recipient. And then must he hold his hand from Con∣cluding as he doth in the Close of this Chapter, That the totum existens consisting of Matter and Form: the Reasonable creature, is the Recipient of this Truth: Except he will say, Veritas est Animal rationale, & A∣nimal rationale est Veritas▪

But how, the Ignorance of this Point should give the ground to that Question, whether the Soule or the Body be Contentum; (which he admonisheth us of) I cannot see. For though it be granted, that Eve∣ry thing be its own Contentum; yet this difficulty remaineth as firm as before. For, Is not Water its own Contentum: Is not the Vessell also its own Contentum? Yet he will not deny, but that (in another sense) the Water is contained in the Vessell; nor can he say, That the Vessell is contained in the Water: So though the Soule and Body be either of them their own Contentum and Recipient (quia datur Animae▪ ut sit Ani∣••a; datur Corpori, ut sit Corpus:) Yet that the one may not be Locu••▪ and the other Locatum; one the Subject, and the other an Ad∣junct (which is the meaning of that Question) will not from hence appear.

CHAP. IV. Whether the Ʋnderstanding, faculty may not be the Reci∣pient of Truth.

IN the 4. Chapter he proceeds, further to shew, That the Ʋnderstan∣ding cannot •••• this Recipient. And if he speak of such a Recipiency as where the Recipient and the Receptum be the same; his Adversaries, that say, Truth and the Understanding to be distinct, will contend for this as well as He: For neither will They say, datur Intellectu•• se esse Rationem, nor datur Rationi ut sit Intellectus. But if he speak of the Re∣••ipiency of a Subject, I see not from what hath yet been said, why the Understanding (if distinct) may not be the Subject of Reason; why they may not say, Datur Intellectui Habere Rationem: Since it is gran∣ted in Logi••k, That one Accident may be the immediate Subject, though not the Ʋltimate Subject of another. And so, if any will have the Soul the Intellect, and Truth or Reason, to be tria distincta: They must say, The Intellect is the immediate Subject of Reason, and the Soule the Ʋl∣timate. And then call the Understanding either a Quality, a Faculty, or Virtus quâ, it is no great matter; (we will not contend with his Lordship for the name.) For Virtus quâ i•• but a Faculty, and a Faculty, (or po••••••tia naturalis) is the second species of Quality.

CHAP. V. Whether the Soule and Truth in the Soule, be one.

THe like Answer must be given to that in the 5. Chapter, Whether the Soule (without an intervenient Faculty) may not be the Reci∣pient of Truth? For we cannot say, Datur Animae ut sit Ve∣ritas; except we agree to make the Soule and Reason one: But we may say Datur Animae ut sit Subjectum veritatis, or Subjectum Rationis, though we ••old them distinct. As may appeare at large by what I have said upon the second Chapter.

That which is further added in this Chapter, whether as a Su••sive to inforce this, or as a New Argument▪ viz. That our Soule resembles God, who is Ʋnus & simplex actus, and therefore it selfe must be simple in its Operations▪ and we must not expect first an Essence, and then a Faculty whereby it worketh, &c. may as well be urged, to prove, That our Soule and Body are the same, because Man was made after Gods Image, who is ••nus & simplex, not consisting of Parts. Or (if you instance particu∣larly in the Soule) It may as well follow, That we know not one thing (successively) After another, nor (discursively) By another; but by One entire Act like God, because the Soule bears the Image of God, and Ʋnitas (which I grant not) is formalis ratio Dei.

That which is lastly added, concerning a Resemblance of the Tri∣nity, in Truth thus understood: Is no way peculiar to this acceptati∣on of Truth; But holds as well in every degree of Being whatsoever. All Entity or Being, As it lieth involved in the Originall▪ Fountain of Being, which is Gods Essence, may represent patrem intelligentem; As it descends from above, filium intellectum; As it is received in the Creature, and maketh it to Be, spiritum dilectum.

And thus I have surveyed his Lordships reasons to prove, the Soule and Truth to be One. Understanding by Truth, or Light, the Light of Reason; which is the Originall or actus ••rimus, from whence Rationall Operations doe proceed; And therefore must needs be the first of those Nations of Truth laid down in his first Chapter.

And, that it cannot be any other acceptation of Truth, that is here meant, is very apparent; If we look upon the other acceptations of Truth; which we shall find to be no way consonant either with his Me∣thod or his Arguments. For if you consider of Truth understood, or the Idea of Truth entertained in the Mind by actuall Apprehension; This will have no Being, either in the Understanding, or elsewhere, till such

time as the Understanding it selfe frames this Conceptus: But (as ye••) we have nothing to doe with the Operations of the ••••tellect▪ (For he proceeds not to consider the Operations or Effects of the Reasonable Soule, till he come to the 10. Chapter▪) But with something ante••••∣dent them, which is the Fountain from whence these Operations doe proceed; which can be no other but Reason. Yea, himselfe affirms it in this 5. Chapter, pag. 23.) And likewise that acceptation of Truth, for the Truth either of Being, or of Cognoscibility, in the Object hath no conjunction with the Understanding, till it be actually understood: And, even Then, we cannot make it to be One with the Understanding, except we make those things to be One, which have neither coexistence of Place, nor coexistence of Time; For those things may be under∣stood, which were many thousand Yeares past, and many thousand Miles distant.

CHAP. VI. Whether all things bee this one Truth.

IN the next place he proceeds to a Consequent or Corollary, arising out of his former Thesis, viz. That All things, are this One Truth.

I confesse, I was at a stand a great while, and could not imagine any shew of Consequence between these propositions: If Truth or Reason, be the same with the Soule or Ʋnderstanding; then is it also the same with All things else. Why so. This Argument (saith he) will presse all things that are.

This Argument? which Argument? Doth he mean that argument which was last propounded, towards the end of the fifth chapter, [That because God is one simple act; therefore, not only the Soule and its Faculties must be One, but even All Creatures must be One, because there is in All somewhat of Gods Image, whose Essence is Ʋnity?] If this be his Argument, I shall content my self with a bare deniall of the Consequence, till I see some shew of proofe. For, That Unity is Gods Essence, is (in my judgement) grossely false▪ Or, were it true, yet, That because God is One, therefore the Creatures must also All be One; hath no strength: For this Ʋnity in God is equivalent to an infinite Mul∣tiplicity. And, That One simple Efficient, may not produce distinct Ef∣fects, seems to me a Paradox.

Or is it his second Argument, propounded in the second chapter, and prosecuted in those that follow; [That, to the constitution of every Creature there must be a Being communicated, a Fountain from whence,

and a Recipient to which; the which Recipient must be the same with the Being received?] From hence perhaps he might prove, That every thing is the same with its own Being: But That very thing should be the same with each other, or the same with reason, or the understanding; follows not.

Is it then his first Argument, propounded towards the end of the first chapter? Which perhaps his Lordship lookes at as the principall Argu∣ment; and at all that follows, only as a Prosecution of that; (Though his Marginall notes, and the Titles of Chapters (which I question whether or noe they be of his Lordships doing) point out to us distinct Arguments, in the beginning of the second, and in the end of the fifth chapter.)

The Argument was this, The Ʋnderstanding is nothing but a Ray of the Divine Nature, &c. And is not Truth the same? which I under∣stood, as you may see, thus, [The Understanding is Gods Image in Man, And this Image consists in Truth, or the Light of Reason; there∣fore Truth, or Reason, is the Understanding.] And thus the Syllo∣gisme will be true in the first figure, if you transpose the Premises and convert the Conclusion. Or thus, [The Image of God in Man is the Understanding; And this Image is Truth▪ therefore (some) Truth is the Understanding:] And thus it will be true in the third figure. And beside these two forms, •• see not how that Argument can be reduced to a true Syllogisme. Now chuse you which form you please; yet how •••• should follow from hence, [That All things else are this One Truth,] I do not yet perceive.

It may be his Lordship would have his Argument thus ordered (in the second figure) [The Understanding is a Ray of Divinity; And Truth also is a Ray of Divinity: therefore Truth is the Understanding, or Truth and the Understanding are One.] And if this be the form of his argument; I will easily grant, that it presseth all things that are, as much as this. For, is not this Syllogisme in the same form, [The bles∣sed Angels are Spirituall Substances; And the damned Spirits are Spi∣rituall substances; Therefore the damned Spirits are blessed Angels, and the blessed Angels damned Spirits?] Then which Consequent, scarce any thing could be lesse probable. And thus indeed he may prove all things that are to be One Truth, one Understanding, yea one Stone, or what you will: For take any two Beings whatsoever, and they will both be sound to be Rays of Divinity, because both proceed from the ••ame Originall and Fountain of Being in the Divine Essence; and

therefore (according to this Argument) they will be both One.

But his Argument thus ordered, will prove but a plaine Fallacy, offending against the Laws of the second figure, wherein no affirma∣tive proposition can be concluded.

The most that he can prove from hence will be this, That there is some common Praedicate, which may be affirmed of Both; and so That there is some General Nature in which they both agree. And this I am confident there is none will ever deny that grants but this proposition, Quicquid est, est E••s, That All Beings, whatsoever agree in the generall nature of a Being. For then they may all be the Subjects of the common Prae∣diate Ens.

But this is farre enough from proving, All things to be One and the Same. For to assume [That whatsoever things agree in a Ʋniversall Nature, are also the same Numericall and Individuall Existence;] is such a proposition as Logick will not admit of.

Yea, though his Argument should proceed thus, [The Specificall Es∣sence of the Understanding, consists in this, that it is a Ray of the Di∣vine Nature; And the Specificall Essence, as well of Truth, as of all Beings whatsoever, is the Same, viz. That it is a Ray of the Divine Na∣ture; And therefore all things whatsoever agree in the same specificall Essence;) And (consequently) all things whatsoever, having the same specificall Essence with each other, must also be One and the Same with each other.] I say, though his Argument proceeded thus, yet would it little availe to prove All things to be One and the same. For, besides, that the Specificall Essence of the Understanding (and so of other things) consisteth not in being a Ray of Divinity; Besides this, I say, although they had all the same Specificall Essence; Yet doth it not fol∣low that they must be all One and the Same. For are there not many Individualls under the same Species, whereof One is not the Other? Doth not the Soule of Peter and the Soule of Judas agree in all the ••ame Specificall and Essentiall Praedicates, whilst notwithstanding it may be truly said, that the Soule of Peter is not the Soule of Judas, and again, that the Soule of Judas is not the soule of Peter? What Essen∣tiall difference is there beeween water in the Baltick Sea, and that in the Mediterran••an, ••ince they are both but Integrall Parts of the same Homogeneall Ocean? Yet how true it is withall, That the Baltick Sea▪ is not the Mediterranean Sea; and That the Water which is now in the Baltick, is distinct from that which at the same time is in the Me∣diterranean Sea? Two drops of Water taken out of the same spoon∣full, be they in their Essentialls never so Consonant, in their Accidents

never so Like; Yet we may truly say This is not the Other, nor the Other This. How then can it follow, That Truth is One with the Under∣standing, and That All things are this One Truth, Because all Being is but a Ray of Divinity.

It follows indeed, That if all Things have the same Specificall Es∣sence, then are they all, Things of the same nature; (but that they are all the Same Thing, it follows not.)

Thus much therefore I suppose will be granted him by all, That All things are of the Same (at least Genericall) nature, because all things have a Being; And, When he hath proved their Specificall essence to be the same, It will be granted also, That they are all, Things of the same Specificall nature; and (if you will) That All Being falls under the same Praedicament▪ (Though yet a Predicamentall distinction be not always a Reall distinction; no, not a par••e rei.)

But is this all he seeks to prove? I supposed he had laboured to shew That the Light of Truth or Reason was not onely of the same nature with the Understanding, but That it was the Ʋnderstanding. Other∣wise he proves lesse then his greatest Adversaries would have granted him. For those that contend for the greatest Distinction between the Soule and its Faculties, doe not yet maintain a more Reall or Physicall distinction between them, then is between One Soule and another, which yet agree in the same Essentiall Praedicates. And if you allow them the same distance between the Soul and the Understanding, which is between the Soule and a Stone, yea between two Soules, They will tell you it is more then they desire: For they will grant that the Soule with all its Faculties, and the Body with all its Members, do constitute the same Suppositum; which is a more Physicall, a more Reall Union, then is between two Soules, though agreeing in every Essentiall Prae∣dicate.

But (if I mistake not) that which he was about to prove, was, not that the Understanding is of the same Nature with Truth, but that it is Truth. His supposition in the first words of the ••. Chap▪ is, If the Intellect, the Soul, Light, and Truth are all but One, &c. Not, A like, or of the same na∣ture. And p. 22. If you make the Ʋnderstanding▪ the Soule, Light, Truth One, then are you delivered out of these streights, &c. And pag. 10. If the Ʋnderstanding be enricht with Truth, then is it, it selfe that Truth, that Light; Thus he frequently calls them One and the same▪ Now To be, •••• selfe that Truth▪ and To be of the same nature with Truth, is far diffe∣rent. And if he prove no other but a Logicall Union, That Truth and

the Understanding are of the same (Genericall or Specificall) nature; we may y••t safely deny a Physicall or Reall Union or Identity; and say, Truth is not the Ʋnderstanding, nor is the Understanding Truth, (though of the same nature with Truth) as well as say, This drop of water is not the Other drop, though This and the Other be of the same nature. Neither can the same Argument (taken in the same sense, with∣out Equivocation and Ambiguity) possibly prove a Physicall and Reall Identity between the Soule and its Faculties; and also a Logicall or Specificall Identity between It and all things else. It is impossible by the same argument to prove, The Soul and its Faculties to be One Thing, and, The Soule with All things else to be Things of the same Nature: These to be T••lta, and Those to be Id••m.

But to omit the consequence and dependance of This, upon that which went before: I will examine it as an entire proposition by it selfe, Whether All things are One?

And if so, Then must it be either thus understood, That All things are One and the Same by a Physicall Identity; This is the Other, and the Other is This; Bucephalus is Alexander, and Alexander is Buce∣phalus: and (by the same reason) the Bread in the Lords Supper is the Body of Christ, and the Body of Christ is this Bread, by Consubstan∣tion. In which sense it seems so impossible, that (in my judgement) it needs no Refutation.

Or thus, That all things are One and the Same by an Integrall Iden∣tity; that is, They be all Parts of the same Whole: all Members of the same Integrum, the same Aggregatum. And in this sense it is True in∣deed, but there is nothing New in it, nothing Strange: For who ever denied, that All things, as parts, as members, do constitute the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, One Ʋniverse? That the whole Aggregatum, the whole Heap or Mul∣titude of Creatures do make One World?

Or (lastly) thus, That All things whatsoever are One, by a Logicall Identity, as being all of the same Nature. And if he speak of a Gene∣ricall Nature, this will be as easily granted as the former: For none de∣ny, that all things agree in the Genericall Universall nature of a Being: And whether Ens be Genus Ʋnivocum, or Gen•••• Anagolum, yet it is predicated or affirmed of All Beings; Only that which He calls Truth, Others call Being, both meaning no other then the Formalis ratio Entis, propter quam dicitur Esse.

Put if he speak of a Specifical•• Nature, wherein he would have all things to agree; making the Universe to be One Homogeneall Body,

(which ••e seems to mean here; though he meant, I suppose, a Physicall Unity, when he said, The Soule and Truth w••re One:) Then are we to enquire, whether those things which agree in a Universall Genericall Nature, may not admit of a Specificall difference? And for This, it will not be sufficient to prove That every Being is a Ray of Divinity issuing from the Center of Being in God, or That the Essence and Form of every particular thing is a Roy of Divinity: Except it be proved▪ That every Being is This Ray, that it is such a Ray.

If therefore all those Rays that have issued forth of that Center of infinite Being, If the Streams derived from this Fountain be exactly of the same nature, without any Specificall difference; Then is it because God could not send forth Distinct and Different Rays, or because he would not. If we make God an Agent so Uniform, as that we will admit no possible Variety, not so much as in the Object, or Manner of his Actions; what difference is there between the most Determinate Naturall Agent, and God the most absolutely Free Agent? if in his operations we admit not of this choice, to work Thus rather then Th••••? But if he could work in severall manners, by communicating Rays of divers natures, but would not; how then hath he manif••sted 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the exceeding great Var••••••y of his Wisdom and Power? For there cannot be so much as an Accidentall Variety in the Creatures, except there be somewhat Reall produced in the One which is not in the other; which cannot be, if all Being, all Entity whatsoever be ex∣actly of the same Specificall nature.

I grant therefore, an Integrall Unity; whereby all things are parts of the same Aggregatum, the same World: I grant likewise a Genericall Unity▪ whereby all things agree in the generall nature of a Being: But if he cont••nd further for an Identicall or an Hom••geneall Unity (wher∣by each is other, or of the same Particular nature, without any other then a Graduall difference;) I must deny both. And Mr. Sadler (his Lordships Champion) denies it with me: For so he, Corporall Ʋnion in materials which •••• [mis••••ll] 〈…〉〈…〉 Identity, i•• at best but a ••old touch in •• point or ••••o, •• most disdainfull ••mbrace (at 〈…〉〈…〉 dista••••••) of those Beings which hav•• much 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, but lit••l•• 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. If the Unity of all things be Identicall, how is i•• [miscalled] Identity▪ If Homogeneall, how is there much 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and ••••t little 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉▪

His Lordships Reasons to perswade this Identity▪ come next to be ex∣amined▪ Why (saith he) may it not be so▪ since •• All Being is derived from the same Ʋn••f••r•• Fo••••tai••; since ² All i•• the same in nature (〈…〉〈…〉) a

Beam of that excellent Light; And▪ All entertained in the same manner by every Individuall Existence, viz. By a Similitude and Ʋnion of nature▪

If his Lordship speak of a Physicall Identity, It is easie to say, This Soule is not the Other Soule▪ This drop of water is not the Other drop▪ though both produced by the same Uniform Agent, and in the same manner: This Beam of Light is not the other Beam, though both shining forth from the ••ame Sunne: Because One (uniform) Agent may produce Two Effects.

If he speak of a Likenesse in Nature, It will be said, That the same Agent may produce not only Two effects, but Ʋnlike effects. e. g. The same Sunne produceth Heat and Light. Here these severall Beings are ¹ derived from the same Fountain the Sunne, which hath either Vir∣tually or Formally both▪ Heat and Light; They are ² both Beam•• is∣suing in the same manner from their Fountain; and ³ Their Essence is in the same manner received, viz. by being what they are, and Informing a Subject recipient: Yet can I not think that Light, and Heat are either the Same Thing, or of the same (specificall) Nature: (However some fondly dream that Light and Heat are the same:) For then whatsoever is H••t, must also be Light (Lucide▪) which holds not in scalding Lead: and whatsoever is Light, must also▪ even in the same degree▪ be H••t, which holds not in Snow, which is Lucide; nor in Ice, which being transparent ••i•• also Illuminate.

Object. If you object a Disparity in the Example, because Light and Heat, though they both proceed from the Sunne, yet the one from the Sunnes Heat, the other from the Sunnes Light, and that therefore their Fountain is not the same; whereas in Gods Essence being absolutely Simple in it selfe, and Ʋniform in its operations, we may not imagine severall Fountains from whence severall Streams may proceed.

Answ. I answer, That Gods Essence, however Simple, is yet equi∣valent to an infinite Variety: And though we cannot in God suppose to be Light distinct from Heat, and Heat from Light; yet Gods simple Essence hath virtually both Heat and Light, and all things possible. His Essence therefore being equivalent both to Heat and Light▪ why may it not produce Heat in one thing, and Light in another thing, and so severall Beings in severall Creatures?

(Except you will suppose, that Gods Essence, being Equivalent to, and Productiv•• of, all Essences possible▪ must of necessity exercise all this Equivalency in the production of every Being, and actuate all his Efficacy in every Product, and so agere ad extr••m••m virium, which

in a Voluntary agent is not Necessary; in an Infinite agent is Impos∣sible.)

All the Radii or Semidiameters of a Circle proceed from the same C••••t••r, but they tend not all to the s••me point of the Circumference: But the same indivisible Center, which lyes equally opposite to every point of the Circumference, As it i•• supposed to lye opposite to one point, it sends ••orth One Radius to it, As it lyes opposite to another point, it sends forth Another Radius to that other point, Though the Center remain indivisibly the same. Thus Gods simple Essence quatenus productiv•• Angeli, or, as it virtually contains the Essence of an An∣gel, may produce that Essence: And the same simple divine Es∣sence, as it contains virtually the Essence of a Stone, may produce a Stone.

And if you say, as Dr. Ames concerning the Divine Attributes, That these two considerations Esse productivum Angeli, and esse pro∣ductivum Lapidis, be distinct ratione ratioc••••atâ, perhaps there will be no great errour; although his Lordship admit not of Dr. Ames his opinion; p. 23. For 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Esse productivum Angeli, or posse producere An∣gelum is not the same with posse producere Lapidem. For although it be the same simple Essence of God whereby he is able to do both, yet this hindreth not but that this simple Essence may be by us apprehended per i••ad••quat••s conceptus, which is no other but distincti•• rationis ratiocinat••. The same Center considered as it is the beginning of One Radius, is di∣stinct ratione ratiocinatâ from it self considered as the beginning of A∣nother Radius. And so the divine Essence, quatenus productiva Angeli, may perhaps be distinct, ratione ratiocinatâ, from itselfe quatenus produ∣ctiva lapidis, without any violation to its Simplicity. They are onely inadaequati conceptus ejusdem simplicis essentiae; and a Metaphysicall Abstraction may be sufficiently consistent with a Physicall Simplicity of Essence.

Thus therefore may it appeare, how the Unity or Simplicity of the Fountain, hinders not but that the Streams may admit of Specificall and Essentiall distinctions.

But he saith secondly, All Being is also of the same nature, viz. a Beam of that excellent Light. Therefore what? Is therefore all Being the Same? How? Physically the same, (as if that Soule which is of the Same Nature with another▪ must needs be that other Soul;) or Me∣taphysically, Logically, the same; that is, of the same Nature? If he mean, the first; I see not how it follows. If the second; His Antece∣dent

and Consequent is the ••ame; and so he Assumes what was to be proved.

But for the proposition it selfe, All Being, saith he, is of the same na∣ture, s••il. a Beam of that excellent▪ Light. And this I grant; All Being is of the same (Genericall) nature; All Being is a Stream communica∣ted from the Fountain of Being, All Being is a Beam, &c. But (Speci∣fically▪) All is not Such a Beam.

If his Lordship yet contend, That this Being is also Specifically the Same, only with a Graduall Distinction.

I desire, first, to know Whence the great Variety in the Creature doth proceed, if all Being be absolutely Homogeneall? Adde Water to Water, and it remains Water still; In a greater Quantity indeed, but yet without any alteration at all in its Essence, it is still but Water. Adde Heat to Heat, it remains Heat still; In a more intense degree indeed, but yet it changeth not its nature: Increase its Intension as long as you will, yet you shall never make this Color to become Color. A Deaf man though he See never so acutely, it will not help his Hearing.

Repl. If he urge, That the ••ame Light proceeding through divers Mediums is stained with divers Colours; and why may not therefore this Beam of Essence, though Homogeneall, being received by divers Creatures, appear in a diverse Form?

Answ. I answer, the Variety of those appearing Colours proceeds from the Variety of the Medium: But here can be no Variety in the Recipient at all: For if there be no Recipient but the Being Received, then will the Medium be every way as Uniform as this Light or Es∣sence received, and so cannot cause this Variety. It must be therefore Various in it self, or else it cannot be Variegated in the Recipient.

Secondly, If all Beings be but Gradually distinct: I demand Whe∣ther the Essence of a Man, or the Essence of a Magnet be the more Intense degree? If the Magnets Essence be the higher degree of Light, Why hath not the Magnet the use of Reason? If Mans Essence be the higher degree, Why hath not Man the Loadstones Magnetick faculty? For if there be onely a bare Graduall distinction in their Essence: then the Inferiour Essence is actually included in the Superiour, with an addition of somwhat more: And if included, whence comes it to passe that it cannot operate?

Again If the Body and the Soule be absolutely of the same nature ••which they must be, if Being admit onely of a graduall distinction▪) Then the Essence of the Soule (being the superiour degree) includes in

it the Essence of the Body, and somewhat more▪ Therefore is it able to operate according to that Essence, and to do of it selfe, whatsoever the Body can doe. If so, then how comes it to passe, that the Soule needs the service of the Body? Why may not the Soule separate, perform all Corporeall Operation••, since it hath in it Corporeall Essence, and somewhat more. (Yea, why may not the Soule see, when the Eye is put out?) For the adding of Another degree hinders not the Operation of the Former degree, but rather perfects it. Yea what need is there of the Body▪ at all? Non bellè quaeda•• faci•••• d••o, sufficit unus Huic op••ri; as his Lordship saith, out of Martiall.

To his third consideration, I must answer accordingly as to the se∣cond; All Being is received in the same manner by every Individuall Ex∣istence: That is, Every Creature receives its Being, by being What it is: A Stone and a Plant receive their severall Beings, by being (severally) what they are. But come to particulars, and the case is altered: A Stone receives its Being, by being a Stone; and a Plant receives its Being, by being a Plant.

That which followeth in the ensuing part of this Chapter (besides what I have already touched by the way) I passe over as being Expli∣catory, rather then Probatory. Onely thus much; The doctrine of the Platonists, reducing all Being to Number, must either be taken in a Metaphoricall, Analogicall sense, or not taken at all. And being so, it availeth little to prove either a Physicall or Specificall Identity of Being.

Whence they had this doctrine, I inquire not, as not belonging to the present matter in hand.

Neither will I stand to debate the controversie, concerning the Na∣ture of Number▪ whether it be a Reall, or Rationall Being; Which •• conceive to have as much Reality as a Relation hath, and no more; that is, hath Fundamentum i•• re, but in its Formality, it is onely ••••li•…•… the birth of Reason. And when I am convinced, that Paternity, or ••i∣liation, are Essentiall to Humanity; that Fatherhood, or So••ship doe constitute Manhood▪ or Humane nature; I shall also grant, that 〈…〉〈…〉 est Prin••ipi•••• Essend••▪ rather then Consequent Essentians. But, not to pro∣judge the discourse of the next chapter, (wherein Ʋnity is made to be the Essence of All things, yea of God himselfe) I proceed rather to con∣sider the large 〈…〉〈…〉 of Unity there exprest.

CHAP. VII. Whether Ʋnity be All in all things, or, the Essence of all things.

ANd there we have it first proposed to consideration, Whether Ʋnity be not in nature so glorious, and of that dignity, that it is able to in∣form a Being, Yea, to be the Essentiall Form of all things? It is prosecu∣ted in the severall kinds of Beings. Ʋncreated, and Created, whether Spirituall, Morall, Physicall, or Mathematicall. In all these, saith he, you shall find Ʋnity as it were the Form of their Being.

And first, Whether Ʋnity be not All in God? (The Humility and Re∣verence, which his Lordship useth in proposing of it, may be a fit pat∣tern for all to imitate, in all approaches to a Deity; Not onely in du∣ties of Worship, but even in Scholastick Discourses. And so neither to be peremptory in affirming, nor rash in censuring: Since the vast dis∣proportion between an infinite Object, and a finite Faculty, subjects our Understanding both to Ignorance and Errour; Suntque oculit te∣nebrae per tantum lumen.) There is (saith he) but One God; And more there could not be, since there cannot be Two Infinites, two Eternities; Nei∣ther could this One be otherwise, for then were he not Infinite. Ʋnity then being so inseparable, as without which God could not be what he is, May it not be said to be Co-essentiall to him? And if of his Essence, then is it in him All; for Gods Essence is All in God.

The Objection which his Lordship moves, viz. That there is the same reason for all other divine Attributes, they being all Essentiall to God, as well as Ʋnity: Will bring the Question to this Issue, Whether of these Attributes may be supposed in nature to be First? (For that every of them should be the formalis ratio of a simple Essence is Im∣possible:) And so, whether Infinity, &c. do arise from Ʋnity, or Ʋnity from thence?

I should rather say, That neither of these, or any other divine Attri∣bute, may be said to be formalis ratio, or the Essentiall form of the Deity; but somewhat else, in it selfe Simple, and yet comprehending all these: Which because we cannot apprehend at One Discovery, we are fain to take severall Views of it per inadaequatos conceptus.

But if we must needs seek for a Seniority in Gods Attributes; I sup∣pose, I might derive as clear a Pedigree of them from his Infinitnesse, from his Perfection, from his Absolutenesse or Independency; as can be shew∣ed either from his Ʋnity, or from his Verity.

But not to be too extravagant, it shall be sufficient for the present to sh••w, whether his Infinitenesse flow from his Ʋnity, or his Ʋnity from his Infinitenesse? whether he must needs be Infinite, because he is One; or One because he is Infinite?

If we say, God must needs be One, because he is Infinite; his Lord∣ship will not only assent, but furnish us with a Reason, Because (saith he) there cannot be Two Infinites.

But if otherwise we say, That God must of necessity be Infinite, be∣cause he is One; It is not so easily proved, since there is but One Sunne, and yet that One Sunne not Infinite. How then can we say, That God is Essentially Infinite, or That Infinitenesse is Essentiall to him: If the Formalis ratio, the Essentiall Form of Divinity, may consist without Infinitenesse? Sed 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

To his instances in Created Spirituall Beings. That all the Comman∣dements are comprised in Love, shews That there is somewhat Generall, that is common to them all; or rather Love (as likewise Obedience, and the like) is a Collective word, and an Integrum, whereof all those are Parts: But that Ʋnity is either the Generall form of All the Comman∣dements, or the Particular of Any, it shews not. The like may be said of the Saints which agree in the Common nature of Saint ship, and do joyntly make up the Body mysticall, whereof Christ is Head. Yea of all Creatures, They all agree in the common nature of a Being, and They all make up one Ʋniverse; yet is not Ʋnity either the Generall of all, or Particular form of any Creature.

The Morall Virtues are said to be conjoyned or concatenate, because they all proceed from one Fountain, viz. The absolute Subordination of the Will and Affections to the Understanding: which Subordi∣nation they call Prudence, (and is of the same extent in Morality, that Obedience is in Divinity) whereof all the morall Virtues are but Inte∣grall parts. (But I had rather apply Prudence to the Understanding only; as that whereby it is able to judge in all Practicall things, what is fit to be done; And the universall Conformity of the Will to this universall Rule of Reason, I should call Justitia Vniversali••, Univer∣sall Justice.)

And thus I understand that Axiom, That morall Virtues are concate∣nate in Prudence: Because where there is this universall Subjection of the Will to Reason, there will be an observance of it in all particulars. But if the rules of some Virtues are observed, and not the rules of others; there this observance is not a Virtuous action, as not proceeding

from the subordination of the Will to Reason, (which would have as well prevailed in others also) but from some other Principle.

Now this shews perhaps, That the Morall Virtues are Ʋnited in One generall Essence: But how appears it, That this Essence is Ʋnity?

Physicall Beings, as Water-drops (and other Connaturalls, either of the Same, or Concordant Species; as the Loadstone and Iron) desire to preserve their Union and Neighbourhood one with another: But let us consider the ground; Do they desire to preserve their Essence that they may be One, that is, United or Joyned together; or do they desire Ʋnion and Conjunction, that they may preserve their Essence? This latter I suppose; And therefore a drop of water doth not desire to Bee, to the end that it may be Conjoyned with the rest, but desires to be Conjoyned for its Preservation, lest it should cease to be. But how doth this prove its Essence to be Ʋnity?

In summe, All those instances in Nature (which doubtlesse are very many) whereby it may appear that all things naturally do desire Ʋnity (or Conjunction rather) either for Conservation, or for Consummation of their naturall Perfection; That by Unity their Vigour is encreased, quia vi•• unita fortior, and the like; will shew no more but this, That Unity is a Perfection of Being, not a Principle of Being; or That Things of the like nature conjoyned together are able mutually to help each other in their Conservation or Operation. But what is there in all this to perswade us, that Unity is their Essence?

As for the Mathematicall Unity of Harmony, Proportion &c. It being only Relative (for they denote but the Relation of one thing to another) can conferre nothing to the constitution of an Absolute Essence, as of Sounds, &c.

But how this should any way conferre to the deciding of that que∣stion, whether Quantity be divisibilis in semper divisibilia: seems to me a greater mystery, then this Mystery that is to be cleared. For as long as Mathematicall Demonstrations shall be thought worthy of credit, it shall Never be granted, that Continuum constat ex indivisibilibus. And however some Naturalists, that know little what belongs to the na∣ture of Quantity, make much adoe to the contrary, and therby bewray their grosse Ignorance in these things; Yet I am confident, that not any One Mathematician (deliberately, and in a Mathematicall way) either ever did, or ever will assent to them. And I cannot without In∣dignation (or Pity rather) read sometimes how fondly and vainly some (otherwise) able Schollars think to shift off Mathematicall Arguments

in this and the like cases; which will not be so easily baffled by an empty Verball Distinction, as some of their Idle Fallacies may. And if I make it not evident (to those that are acquainted with Mathemati∣call terms) that a Continuum consists not of Indivisible Points, by as certain and infallible Mathematicall Demonstrations, as That 2. and 2. make 4. I will hereafter turn Sceptick, and affirm confidently That we are sure of nothing.

If a Line consist of Indivisible points, each Point is supposed to be Minimum possibile, by those that doe maintain it; (or else how are they Indivisible.) Then must all Points be Equall; (for if they be Unequall, they cannot all be minima.) Then no Two Lines can possibly be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Incommensurable; (for if all Lines doe consist of Points whereof each is equall to other, then are all lines whatsoe∣ver measurable by this common measure of a Point; qu•• aliquoties ap∣plicata, & hanc & illam commensurabit. Contrary to what hath been often demonstrated Mathematically, That some Lines are absolutely Incommensurable with some other, admitting of no common measure, (as for Example, the Diameter and the Latus of a Quadrate, (whose Proportion therfore cannot be expressed by Rationall Numbers. Now that two Contradictory Propositions should be true by Mathematicall Demonstration, is utterly impossible.

Thousands of the like Demonstrations might be brought to prove it; As, that from hence, All Angles may be demonstrated to be Equall; The same Line, to be Shorter, to be Longer then it selfe, to be equall to two or more conjoyned, and yet to be shorter then either; Yea, all Lines to be equall, All Circles of the same bignesse, The Equinoctiall Circle to be no bigger then a Ciphar, All Motions to be of the same swiftnesse, All Bodies of the same weight, and of the same bignesse: And yet in the meane time All these to be unequall, in Length, Weight, Swiftnesse, &c. And infinite the like absurdities; as might be shewed, if this were the Question I had in hand. Take an instance or two.

Let two Circles be described upon the same Center, of what great∣nesse you please; Let a Thread be fastned at the common Center, and so extended that it cut the Circumference of both Circles; Thus ex∣tended, the one end being fastned at the Center, let the other end be moved round: Now while this Thread passeth over one Point in the Greater Circle, I demand how much it passeth over in the Lesser? Lesse then a Point it cannot be, because ex hypothesi, a Point is Minimum

possibile; For every Point therefore that it passeth over in the Greater Circle, it passeth over a Point answerable in the Lesser Circle; There be therefore as many points in the Lesser as are in the Greater Circle; and these Points being all Equall, because every one is Minimum possibile, the Lesser Circle must needs be equall to the Greater Circle, because it consists of as many Points; and by the same reason, All Circles Equall.

Now the Thread thus moving, move it never so Slowly, it passeth over a Point in a Moment; and move it never so Swiftly, it passeth but a Point in a Moment: And therefore all Motions are alike Swift, as passing over equall distances in equall time.

Again, Let two Lines concurring in the same Point make an Angle, (of what greatnesse you please;) their Two next Points, joyning upon this common Point of concurrence, will terminate a Basis of Two Points, (not more, for then the Subtendent would be equall to both the Crura.) The two Third points will terminate a Line somewhat longer then the other, and therefore at least of Three points; and so on, for every point added to the Crura, (be the angle greater or lesse) you must adde one point to the length of the Basis, subtendent to that angle (and more then One it cannot be, for then the increase of the Basis will be equall to the encrease of both the Crura:) Whence it will come to passe That all Angles (at an equall distance from the point of concurrence) will have their Subtendents equall (the Basis or Subtendent being thus measured by the length of the Crura, or lines containing the angle••) Wherefore themselves also must be equall.

Now also it is sufficiently apparent to a Mathematician, that upon all liues whatsoever, you may erect (as from a Basis) lines of the same length containing an Angle; and therefore (both the Angle and the Basis being measured onely by the length of the Crura) not onely all Angles may be equall, but also all Lines, (as being Subtendents to e∣quall angles at the same distance.) I need not adde more demonstra∣tions to shew the Impossibility of that Opinion which makes every Continuum to consist ex indivisibilibus.

It is certain then, that Continuum non Constat ex Indivisibilibus: But, how this doctrine of Ʋnity serves either to confirm the truth, or to clear the doubts; I see not.

But to return. His Lordship hath been copious to shew some Ʋnion, ••ome Relation, of One thing to, or with Another, in the severall kinds of Being. From whence he is ready to infer, That the Essence of all things

is One, that it is Ʋnity. But be it granted, That there be divers particu∣lar Species under the same Genericall nature; (as when all particular acts of duty are comprised in One generall name of Love, or Obedience:) Be it so, That many Effects may proceed from the same Cause; (as all virtuous acts from the subordination of the Will to Reason:) That there be many Combinations of Beings or Persons, Naturall, Voluntary▪ O••conomicall, Politicall, Logicall, &c. whence may arise One Aggrega∣tum, One Praedicament, one City, or Kingdome, one World: Be there S••pernaturall or Spirituall Societies, One Church, Paroch••all, Natio∣nall, O••cumenicall, Visible, Invisible, one mysticall Body: Be there also in Lines, Bodies, Sounds, &c. (besides their Absolute Affections, Length, Bignesse, Lowdnesse, &c.) some mutuall Relations of Proportion, Harmony, Discord, &c. Be there in Physicall Bodies, a desire of Union or Conjunction in One to another; Yet will not this prove, That all things have One Nature, One Essence; much lesse, That this Essence is Ʋnity. If Iron desire Union, (or conjunction rather) with the Load∣stone, doth this prove their Specificall Essence to be One? Or (if it doe) doth it pro••e▪ that this One Essence is Ʋnity? And so of the rest.

All that can arise from hence, is, That God hath so ordered the seve∣rall Natures of particular Creatures, as that his Wisdome doth not on∣ly appear in their Absolute and Simple natures; but hath also put Rela∣tive or Respective natures in them, whereby his Wisdome may ap∣pear in their mutuall Oppositions, Conjunctions, Similitude, Dissimi∣litude, Sympathy, Antipathy, Help, and Hinderance of one thing to another; whereby not onely Every thing (Severally) in its Absolute nature doth set forth Gods glory, but also All things (joyntly) doe 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and work together in their respective Relations, as well for the good of those that love God, as for their mutuall advancing of Gods glory. All which may be, though neither Ʋnity, nor any One specificall Being, be the formalis ratio, the essentiall form of all things; but each species have a severall kind of Being.

For my own judgement; I am as confident, that Ʋnity is Nothing; as his Lordship is, That it is All things. 'Tis a meer rationall, nominall Notion, that hath no more Reality in it, then Darknesse, then non esse. Yea, to be One, is a pure Negative Proposition; and what Reality you can allow to a Negation, so much you may allow to Ʋnity.

It is true, Ʋnus, as it is opposed to Nullus, is Affirmative, and is the same with Aliquis, or Nonnullus: But if it signifie the same with Ʋnicus, and be opposed to Multitude, (according as we now take it,) it is a meer Negation, and no more.

Which to make clear, observe but this Syllogisme, [Whatsoever is in England, is in Europe; But in England there is Rex Ʋnicus, One only King; Therfore in Europe there is Rex Ʋnicus; but One King.] Where you shall find no fault in the Syllogisme, save that the Minor is Ne∣gative in the first figure. Whence it is apparent, That Ʋnity, as it is opposed to Multitude, is a meer Negative term.

There is One Sunne; but is this Ʋnity Essentiall to it? Whether ano∣ther Sunne be, or be not; it nothing concerns the Essence of this Sun, but onely grounds an externall Relation, which is yet but Relati•• rationis.

Was not the Essence of Adam the Same, and he Equally a Man, before the production of Eve, while he was Ʋnicus; and after both the Production of Eve, and the Generation of sonnes and daughters, when he ceased to be Ʋnicus, there being more beside him? Was there any Detraction, or Addition of Essence, or any Reality, that concerned Adams person, at such time as his children were born? or would there have been afterwards, if all except Adam had been swept away?

Nay when two Drops of Water are separated, or conjoyned, is there any Essentiall or Reall Mutation in either?

Surely, if Ʋnity may come, and goe, without any Reall Alteration; then is Ʋnity so farre from being Essentiall to all things, that it is not so much as Reall.

Object▪ You will say; But God is indeed One, Ʋnus et Ʋnicus; and not onely supposed to be One: Therefore his Unity must needs be Reall, and not Imaginary.

Answ. I grant it; But what then? must therefore Unity be Positive or Reall? The Ayr, in the night time, is indeed Dark, and not onely ••••••posed to be Dark; Will you therefore infer that Darknesse hath a Reall, a Positive Being, and is not a privation of Light? When the Moon is eclipsed, it doth Really and Indeed want the Illumination of the Sun-beams, and is not onely supposed to want them; but you will not, I suppose, say that this Want of Light, hath a Reall Essence. So here▪ God is indeed One, and not only imagined so to be, yet hath not Ʋnity ••ny Entity or Positive Being in it.

There is Negatio Realis, and Negatio Rationis; a Reall absence and a Supposed absence. Of the one you may truly frame a Negative Propo∣sition▪ of the other you cannot; there may be indeed in the Under∣standing concerning thi••, Negatio actus, (which is all one with Ab∣straction)

but not actus negationis, actus negativus. When the Ayr, in the Night time, is Dark; there is a Reall Absence of Light: when, in the Day time, I conceive of the Ayr according to its Essence, or according to some other Qualities, not at all regarding its being Light; this is Nega∣tio Rationis, or negatio Abstractionis, there is only a supposed Absence of Light, but indeed a (reall) Presence.

Yea, ipsum Non-esse, is a Reall Praedication though it be not a reall Praedicate (Like as Mendacium esse Falsum, is a Truth:) Therefore when I say, Centaurus non est; I do not Forge this Proposition, or sup∣pose a non-entity in a Centaure where indeed there is none, but I affirm that non-entity to be, which is; for a Centaure, Is non-ens, and not on∣ly Supposed to be Non-ens. And of Negations, or Privations, That is onely Negatio Rationis, when by Abstraction Things are supposed to be separate, which are indeed conjoyned: Other Negations though they have not realiter Esse, yet they have realiter Non-esse; their non-entity is not Imaginary. (I speak of Negatio Physica, not Negatio Logica; for a Logicall Negation, that is, a Negative Enunciation, is as Reall as an Affirmation.) A supposed Being is Ens rationis, and a supposed Absence is Negatio rationis.

Negations and Privations are Non-Entia, and not Entia Rationis; for they have not in themselves so much as Esse Cognitum, which is re∣quisite to Ens Rationis; And when as sometimes a Negation is said to be Ens Rationis▪ it is not to be understood of its internall Entity, for so Darknesse in it selfe doth not include esse cognitum, but when the Un∣derstanding considers of a Negation, and so makes it Objectum Cogni∣tionis, then of a Non-ens it becomes Ens Rationis. But then (I say) it is ••••trationis, not Negatio rationis.

Yet all this hinders not but that Ʋnity, and all other Negations, may have a kind of Reality, as it is opposed to a Fiction. And therfore the Ayr •••• really Dark, God is really Ʋnicus, and not onely supposed so to be: And yet Darknesse and Unity are not in themselves Reall, but Negative term▪

I purposely passe over severall particulars, (as well in this Chapter, as in others) which his Lordship lights upon by the way; to avoid te∣diousnesse: and look principally at those things, to which his Lord∣ships aim doth especially tend.

CHAP. VIII. The Nature of Habits Whether they be one with Truth or the Soules Essence.

IN the eighth Chapter, he speaks somewhat concerning the nature of Habits. And this is to be adjoyned to the end of the 5. Chapter: the 6. and 7. Chapters, (wherein he inferres a Corollary, concerning the Essence of All things▪ That it is One, That it is Ʋnity;) being inserted as a Parenthesis. He had in the fifth Chapter affirmed That the Soul is nothing but Truth; Yet (saith he) while I affirm, that the Soule is no∣thing but this Truth, I doe not refuse the doctrine of Habits, either Infused or Acquisite.

But before I proceed, It is not amisse to give notice of a different ac∣ceptation of Truth here, from that before. He spake before of the Truth or Light of Reason, which he contended, to be One with the Soul, and not a distinct Faculty. This Light was an Innate or Connate Light, which hath its Originall and its Period with the Soule: For when the Soule begins, the Light of Reason begins, and this Light of Rea∣son is no sooner extinct, then when the Soule shall cease to be. But the Light of Habituall Knowledge, (whether Infused or Acquisite,) is not an Innate Light, but an Advenient Light; subsequent to the Soules first Existence, and really separable from it. Yet may it be Antecedent to another degree of Advenient Light, viz. Actuall Knowledge, which may proceed from Habituall.

This Advenient Light of Habituall knowledge differs from Innate Light of Reason; as a Habit in the first species of Quality, from Natu∣ralis potentia, or a Faculty, in the second species. And so, howsoever it may be true, That a Faculty or Naturall Power, may be so farre the Same with the Soule, as that it differ only ratione ratiocinatâ; Yet in a Habit, we must of necessity grant a distinction ex parte rei. For where there may be a Reall Separation (and not onely Mentall) there must needs be granted a Distinction in re. Now that in all Habits there may be a reall Separation, is apparent: For (though, it may be, some Ha∣bits acquired or infused cannot be lost when they are once had, as Grace, &c. yet) before the acquisition or infusion of such Habits, the Soule was actually without them. Indeed it is true, That these Ha∣bits cannot subsist without the Soule; and therefore they may not be imagined to be Really distinct, as res & res; yet because the Soule may exist without these; therefore they must have a Modall

distinction in re, as res & modus. Thus the Roundnesse of a piece of Coyn, though, when it is, it is the same Thing with the Sil∣ver, not being a Thing added, but only a Modification, a moulding or fashioning of the Former thing; yet must it be Distinct from the essence of the Silver, though not a Thing distinct: Otherwise when this Silver looseth its Roundnesse, it should loose its Essence and become somwhat else; whereas the Silver in this form, is not really distinct from it selfe in another forme, but the same Metall, the same Silver.

There being then this difference between a Habite and a Faculty: Though Reason should be One with the soule without so much as a Mo∣dall distinction; yet follows it not, that a Habit hath the same Reall Identity, but that it may be distinguished ex parte rei.

Habits he distinguisheth into Infused and Acquisite. When the soul (saith he) by vertue of its Being is cleare in such a Truth; it is said to be an Infused habit: when by frequent action, such a Truth is Connaturall to the Soule, it may be stiled an Habit Acquisite, though &c.

Whether or no this be the genuine distinction between an Acquisite and Infused Habit, it is not materiall strictly to examine. If the soule by its Essence be cleare in such a Truth; that is, be ready to act accor∣ding to such a Truth: I should call this a Faculty or Naturall power, ra∣ther then an Habit. Thus Gravity in a Stone, whereby it is naturally prone to descend, I should not call an Habit, but a Faculty. (Though Heavinesse, in another relation, be neither a Faculty nor an Habit, but qualitas Patibilis. And so perhaps may Knowledge, as it is an accidentall Form informing the soule, be referred to the same species of Quality, though it can hardly be called by that Name: For a Habit quatenus sic, is so called, not with any relation to the Subject, but in relation to Acts, which slow from it, or are produced by it.)

This Pronenesse or Aptnesse for operation which is in any thing im∣mediatly from its Essence, is a naturall Power or Faculty; And a Habit, is a further Readinesse, and Pliablenesse, or Facility of working accor∣ding to this Faculty: A Habit therefore alwayes presupposeth a Faculty, as being but a Facilitation of it. And when as by Reason a man hath an Ability to understand: by Habituall Knowledge, he hath a Readinesse to understand.

Now this Readinesse or Facility, if it proceed from Often Acting; so that from the iterating of former Acts it becomes more prone either to continue or repeate those Acts; It is an Acquisite Habit: (Somewhat of this may be seene in Naturall things; A Wheele being once in mo∣tion,

it will by a smaller force be Continued, then at first Begun; yea for a while persist without help.) If this Facility proceed from some Ac∣cidentall Form produced in it by an Externall Agent, it is an Infused Ha∣bit: The difference between an Infused and an Acquisit being no other but only in respect of the Efficient. Thus the Knowledge of divers Tongues and the Ability to speak them, which was in some of the Apo∣stles by immediate Infusion, was an Infused Habit; whereas in others (as in Paul) it was Acquisite; differing from the other, not in Form, but in the Efficient.

A Habit therefore, whether Infused or Acquisite, being but a Faci∣litation of the Faculty, cannot be a Thing distinct from that Faculty, but only a Modus of it, which hath not in it selfe a Positive Absolute Being of its own; but is a Modification of another Being: And its Physicall Being, Existentia Rei, must be the same with the Being of that, which is thus Modificated; For it is not ipsum Existens, but Modus Existendi: And this Manner of Existing hath not an Existence of its own, distinct from the Existence of that which doth exist in this man∣ner: Yet its Formall and Metaphysicall Being is distinct. Yea and its Physicall Existence, such as it is capable of, that is, Existentia Modi; for not being Res, but Modus rei, we must not expect that it should have any Existence of its own besides the Existence of a Modus: and this Existentia Modi is the actuall Modificating of the Thing Existing after this Manner. The which Existence though it be not Existentia Rei, yet it is a Reall Existence, (existentia in re) and not Mentall: For the thing existent is not only supposed to exist in this manner, but indeed doth so, thus ordered, thus modificated: and therefore that Modus doth actually, & really modificate, and is not only supposed so to doe.

But if you will not admit (with Scotus) of any Modus entis, as a Medium between Ens & Non-ens, Res et Nihil, a Thing and Nothing; you must then say, it is Res: for Nothing I am sure it cannot be: For doubtlesse there is some difference more then Imaginary between Knowledge and Ignorance, between a Square stone and a Round stone, between Silver Stamped and the same Smooth and Plain. This diffe∣rence I should call Modall, accounting the Roundnesse &c. not Res but Modus Rei; affirming, that when Wax &c. is put out of one form or fashion into another, thereis no new Thing propounded; but that which before was, is now otherwise ordered.

And thus it is most true which his Lordship speaks, That Habituall Knowledge, is nothing but Light more or lesse glorious; It is Reason clea∣red;

It's only Facultas facilitata, or facultatis Facilitas: And to this Fa∣cility or Readinesse to operate, I cannot allow a Physicall existence of its own; as neither to any Habit whatsoever, as being but Modi and not Entia; It's not a Being, but a Manner of Being; not Ens but aliquid Entis. And I should easily be perswaded to grant the same concerning all Accidents whatsoever, which have long since been called Entis En∣tia: And however an Accident hath been accounted to be Res, and so to have Existentiam Rei; yet not Subsistentiam Rei: Though it have an Existence of its own, yet its Subsistence is no other but Subsisten∣tia Subjecti.

Yet I cannot with his Lordship subscribe to the Platonists, to make Knowledge nothing but a Remembrance. (As if there were naturally in our Understanding, the Pictures or Pourtraictures of all Truths, but so obscured and covered as it were with dust, that these glorious Colours doe not appear, till such time as they be rubbed and washed over anew.) I approve rather of Aristotle's Rasa Tabula, (then Plato's Remi∣niscentia) making the Understanding, of it selfe, to have no such Idea or Picture at all, but capable of all. Or thus (I know not how it can be better expressed;) The Understanding is not as a Table, wherein the Kings Picture is pourtrayed in lively colours, but (hanging in the dark) it appears not, that there are any such Lineaments, till it be En∣lightened with the Sunne, and then it presents us with a Fair Descrip∣tion: But rather as a Glasse which is able to Receive and Reflect what∣soever Colours fall upon it, though (before) it had none of them.

For I demand, What Principle is there implanted in nature to en∣form me, Whether there ever were such a City as Troy? Whether it were so destroyed? Whether this or that were Plato's or Aristotle's Opinion? What Principle to enform, that it rained yesterday & is faire to day? Certainly, matters of Fact have not such Idea's implanted in Nature; for then might they by Discourse be known to have been or not to have been, without the help either of Sense or Information. And if Historicall Knowledge may be acquired without any fore-implan∣ted Idea's of those Truths so known; why also may not Discursive Truth be also Known without a Reminiscentia, or a Review of Forgot∣ten o•• Obscure Principles?

Next he tells us, That wee may Seem by frequent actings to help the Soule, and so to create Acquisite Habits; whereas indeed it is not so, but all Actings are only new Discoveries.

But how this can stand with his former doctrine of Reminiscentia, I

doe not see: For this takes away not only Plato's Reminiscentia, but all Remembrance whatsoever. If all Actings be new Discoveries, How and When can wee be said to Remember?

But is it soe? doe Former Actings no way help our Subsequent Acts? I•• so, how can a Learned Schollar be said to Know more then an Ignorant Peasant? For the one is as capable of a new discovery as the other, i•• his former acts make no preparation or fitnesse for future acts. How comes it to passe, that Learned men shall apprehend those Truths at the first relation, which another cannot without much adoe be brought to conceive? Nay why should an Artist be more skilfull in his Trade then another? Why may not an Infant new born plead his cause as well as the best experienced Lawyer? Certainly, if former acts doe not indeed produce an Habituall Knowledge (but only seem to doe) in the one which is not in the other, the one may as well act as the other, for there is the same Reasonable Soule in a Child, which is in him afterwards.

The difference surely must proceed from hence, That the Former Actings have produced a Facility and Readinesse for Future Acts: that so, what was before more Difficult, becomes now Facile.

Nay more, That which before was utterly Impossible, becoms now both Feazi••le and Easie. All the most refined Wits in the world joyning their acutest Discoveries, their strongest Iudgements together, are not able without the help of Historicall Relation, ever to know such a thing as the Destruction of Troy: Yet when this, or the like, hath been either Seen by our selves, or Related to us, it is then easie to tell afterwards, what wee have seen, what we have heard, without a second view or a new relation. Now if the former Actings, do no•• way prepare for a future Act; why might not the First discovery have been made by our own light of Reason, without an Externall supply, from our Senses, or from Information, as well as the Second?

Philosophers (saith he) affirm this boldly of the Ʋnreasonable Creature, ••teributing it to an Instinct or new Influence▪ Why then may we not conclud•• the same of Man?

That Philosophers attribute much to Instinct in Unreasonable Crea∣tures, I grant: But that by an Instinct, they meant a new Influence, I was not aware. Certainly Memory hath been accounted one of the Sensus ••nt••rni, and soe belonging to the Sensitive Soule, and therefore not to be denied to Brutes: And doubtlesse daily experiments put it out of question, That Brute Creatures make use of Memory, and by former

acts, are fitted for following acts; not doing all from a new Instinct.

I am called in the next place, to search out the difference between Reason and Faith. They differ (saith he) only in Degrees, not in Nature: For if Soule, Ʋnderstanding, Habits be all the same, then neither doe Reason and Faith differ.

I grant that there is the same ground, why wee should make Reason and Faith the Same; that there is to make the Faculty and the Habit the Same. Reason is a Faculty, Faith a Habit: Now a Faculty and a Habit, I have before sayd not to be res & res, but res & modus. Their Physicall Difference therefore (I mean, if you consider Faith and Rea∣son in the same man) is but Modall.

But it doth not follow from hence, That they differ not in Nature. For though an Habit have not Entitatem Rei, distinct from the Faculty; yet it hath Entitatem Modi; so that the Habit is not a Faculty, nei∣ther is the Faculty an Habit.

To enquire of a Physicall Identity, and of a Metaphysicall or For∣mall Identity, are quaere's farre distinct. The Faith of Peter is Really and Physically distinct from the Faith of Paul; and yet their Metaphysicall Formall nature is exactly the Same. Again, all the Modall Beings in the same subject, though their Essence and Nature be never so distinct (v. g. Duration, Augmentation, Situation &c, in the same man) be Really the same; (for neither of them, being Modi, have any Entitatem Rei, beside the Entity of their common Subject, and so cannot make a Reall distinction, because there is not res & res:) Yet each Modus hath a distinct Formall nature of its own: The nature of a Figure, is not the nature of a Habit, though both in the same Subject.

But yet, though it doe not follow from that Reall Identity between Res & Modus, that the Nature of Reason and the Nature of Faith be the same: Yet if he change but the terms, and say (in stead of Reason) that Knowledge and Faith are the same in nature, I will not contend: So that he mean Faith as it is an Act or Habit of the Ʋnderstanding, and not of the Will. For so, Faith is an Assent to a Truth reveiled: & the same individuall Assent to the same Truth, may be both Cognitio Scientiae, and Cognitio Fidei▪ I will instance in the Creation of the world: By Faith we know that the worlds were made, and Assent to it: And by naturall Demonstrations it may be proved, that the world was made; and these also are sufficient to perswade assent. Now we from both grounds (joyntly) assent to this Proposition, That the world was made. The which Assent in respect of the one Ground (propter eviden∣tiam

rei) is an assent of Science or Naturall Knowledge; in regard of the other Ground (Propter authoritatem dicentis) is an assent of Faith, or Supernaturall and reveiled Knowledge. The assent of Science, and of Faith, differ not in their Form, but in their Efficient.

But if he speak of Saving Faith (quatenus Salvifica) as it doth Save: so it is an act of the Will, and not of the Understanding; and therefore differs from Knowledge.

But, to conclude this: If we speak of a Physicall difference or distin∣ction, Then all the Modi that belong to the same Thing, can admit of no more then a Modall distinction: because having no other Entita∣tem Rei, but that of the common Subiect, their Entitas Rei must be Common; there cannot be Res & Res: the difference must be either tanquam Res & Modus, or tanquam Modus & Modus: And here is no consideration of the Nature of these Modi. In distinct Things; The Modi are Really distinct and not Modally though these Modi be exact∣ly of the same nature; as the Roundnesse of severall Circles; For they not having Entitatem Rei besides the Entity of their Subjects; their Subjects being really distinct, they must be really distinct also.

(Thus in the present case, The Faith of Peter is really distinct from the Faith of Paul: But Faith in Peter from Reason in Peter is only Mo∣dally distinct, tanquam Res & Modus; (viz. If you make Reason to be Res, or a Faculty Really distinct from the soule:) and the Habit of Faith in Peter will be distinct from all other Habits in Peter (v. g. from the Habit of Knowledge) tanquam Modus & Modus.)

But if wee speak, not of a Physicall, but of a Metaphysicall Diffe∣rence; Here it little avails to enquire of their Physicall Difference, or Identity. For those things that are really distinct, as two Souls, may yet agree in the same Specificall Nature: and those which are not really distinct (as severall Modi of the same Thing) may have their Formall Specificall differences.

Again, though it be granted that Naturall Knowledge (attained by by the use of Reason, without a supernaturall Revelation) be of the same Nature with Faith; Yet doth it not presently follow, That their diffe∣rence is Graduall, and the one but a greater Degree of the same Light: For Skill in Musick and Skill in Metalls or Mineralls, are both Naturall Habits; yet the Skill of a Musician, and the Skill of a Chy∣mist are not the Same (though of the same nature;) neither yet is their difference Graduall; For the one is not the way to attain the other and the other a Perfection of that former. And moreover a man

may be skilfull in either of them without a knowledge of the other, whereas a Greater Degree of Knowledge in the same Kind cannot be without the Lesser.

That which follows, concerning Falling from Grace, and the Free∣dome of the Will, (as also what proceeds, How farre we do acti agere, that is, How farre, and In what manner, the First cause doth concurre with the Second in its Operations) require a larger discourse for the deciding of them, then to be toucht at in transitu, and by the way. I shall therefore say onely this (and so passe them over;) Liberty and Servitude are opposit; and both are Relative terms. He that is Free from the Dominion of one Master, may be a Servant, a Slave, to ano∣ther. Thus the Will, though it be Free from any Naturall Necessity, either from within, or without; so that it be neither determined by an inward Principle, as meer Naturall Agents are; neither can have ei∣ther Compulsion, or Necessity, imposed upon it by the command of a∣nother Creature: Yet is it not Free from the Command and Power of God, by whose Absolute Decree it is determined. We must not so farre affect to be Liberi, that we become Sacrilegi; we must not vindicate our Liberty by committing Sacriledge, exempting our selves from be∣ing under the Power of a Deity.

If I were now to examine the nature of Freedome, wherein it con∣sists: I might perhaps place it in a Spontaneity, that it acts without re∣luctancy, Sponte agit: Were it not that even Naturall Agents (as a Stone falling) have such a free action, without Constraint, without Reluctancie.

Or it might be placed perhaps in a Reflection upon its own Act; whereby it doth not onely Agere, yea and Sponte (or volens) agere, without a Nolition, a Renitentia; But also Vult agere: Whereas a Naturall agent, though perhaps Sponte or Volens agit, yet you cannot say Vult agere, because there is not a Reflection whereby it Willeth its Action. That which hinders me from placing it in this, is, Because I allow not any reflex act of Willing in God, besides that direct act of Working, who is yet a most Free Agent. For (beside other reasons, that if need were, might be produced) it stands not with Gods Simplicity, to admit distinct acts in God, whereof one should be the Object of another. Now what strength there is in this, to hinder the placing of Free∣dome in this Reflex act, I propose to be considered, rather then Af∣firm.

But I rather place the nature of the Wills Liberty, in a Freedome

from Servitude, that it is not under the command of any Creature, or a Naturall Determination of its own. And therfore though it be free from such servitude as a Naturall agent, or such as may be Forced, is subject to; yet it is not free from Gods Command; Nor (perhaps) from the dictate of Reason neither, Or, if it be, yet is not this its Freedome, but its Weaknesse.

And this is not far distant from the received opinion, which makes it consist in Indifferentiâ. For the Will can agere vel non agere notwith∣standing anything to the contrary from the Creature; but it cannot age∣re vel non agere notwithstanding the Decree of God; and therfore is not Free from that Determination. And whereas other things are from God determined mediante causa secundâ, the Will is Immediately deter∣mined a causa primâ.

And therefore what he cites out of Rutterfort, That granting all things to be under an absolute Decree, it is fond to aske, Whether the Free Crea∣ture remain indifferent to doe or not to doe; I willingly assent unto. But you must consider withall, that This Freedome neither the Angels have, nor had Adam in his Innocencie.

And therefore, when Divines tell us, that by the Fall we have lost our Liberty, or Freedome of Will, in Spirituall things, which yet we retain in Morall and Civill Actions; I desire that they would more punctually set down, What the Liberty is, which we retain in Natu∣rall things, but want in Spirituall; What Liberty that is, which the Angels have, and Man once had, but hath now lost: And not speak of such a Liberty as neither Man or Angel ever had, nor is it possible for any Creature to have; Nay not for God himselfe, For God having once decreed, cannot with his Truth revoke it, nor is indifferent to exe∣cute it or not; But, as They say of Jupiter, which make Him to be the Author of their Stoicall unavoidable Fate (understanding it cum grano salis) He once Commanded, and ever after Obeyed.

There follows in the next place, an Objection, How it comes to passe, if Faith and Knowledge be One, that some who have more Knowledge have lesse Faith.

I need not recite his Lordships Answer, I will only propose my own. If there be meant a Physicall Identity, whereby two Modi of the same Thing doe subsist by the subsistence of their common Subject, it is not hard to determine: For two Modifications of the same Thing may yet be independent of each other: And therefore it is not requisite they should be both in the same measure, or degree.

2. If by Knowledge be meant an assent to Naturall truths, and by Faith, an assent to Supernaturall truths; neither is here any difficulty: For the Knowledge of one thing is not inconsistent with the Ignorance of ano∣ther thing.

3. ••f Knowledge and Faith be considered in relation to the same Object, Spirituall truths, or Saving truth, and Faith be taken for an Intel∣lectuall assent to them: Then is it not true, that there is in any (if you speak adid••m▪ more Knowledge and lesse Faith; what any Knows to be Thus, he cannot Beleeve to be Otherwise. For the Understanding is not a Free faculty, that it can either Accept or Reject a reveiled Truth.

4. If by Faith be meant, not an Assent in the Ʋnderstanding to the Truth Known, but a Consent in the Will, an imbracing of it (which is the Iustifying act of Faith:) Neither is this difficulty much greater then the former▪ For the too too frequent sinnes, even in Gods children, a∣gainst light, makes it over manifest, That the Action of the Will doth not always follow the Knowledge of the Understanding.

And yet if this too cleare experience be not able to prove it, but that you still lay all the blame upon the Understanding, as not being cleare enough in its Apprehensions, or not sufficiently Peremptory in its Di∣ctates; and so excuse the Will of all Remissenesse: I demand then, what disability there is in the Will of Man since the fall more then in the confirmed Angels and Saints in Heaven? I cannot think but that the Image of God, by the Fall, is defaced in the Will as well as in the Understanding; and yet if the Will doe never disobey the Light of Reason, which is its sole (immediate) Guide, I see not wherein this disability doth appear.

I grant that the Will doth always Follow the Understanding, that is, it never goes before it, or without it; it goes never but where the Under∣standing hath led the way, in discovering some Good, (more or lesse,) something Desirable. For the Will is Caeca potentia▪ and Knows of no∣thing desirable, but what the Understanding discovers. And Knowing nothing, can Desire nothing; Ignoti nulla Cupido.

But yet I grant not that Proposition in this sense, The will Allwayes follows the Understanding; that is, It never stays behind. For to Omit what the Understanding commands, requires not a discovery of some other Good, but only an Impotency, a Backwardnesse, or Re∣misnesse to doe its Duty. To goe without direction, requires a Positive Cause, because it is a Positive Act; But Not to goe when it is directed, may proceed from a Negative Cause (Negatio Causae,) because it is a

Negative Act, or a Not-doing. A lame man doth not runne, when he knows, that he ought to runne; yet here is no need of a Positive Cause to stay him, but his Impotency (a Negative cause) sufficeth.

And thus farre do I admit that distinction of Libertas Contrarietatis, and Libertas Contradictionis, though in that way in which it is ordi∣narily made use of, I doe wholly reject it. There is not in the Will an Indifferency to choose Good or to choose Evill; neither yet to Choose good, or Reject good (velle & nolle;) both which they call Libertas Contrietatis. For the Understanding doth not shew any Amiable∣nesse or Lovelynesse in Evill; nor any Odiousnesse in Good (quatenus sic;) and therefore the Will cannot Desire Evill, nor Reject Good (Nolle, or Ʋelle non.) For Bonitas is Objectum formale Appetitûs; and Malum is the formall Object of Nolition. Now the Soule cannot velle quatenus bonum, that in which no Good is apprehended; nor nolle quatenus ma∣lum (that is, velle ut non sit) that wherein it apprehends no Evill. But for the other kinde of Indifferency, (which they call Libertas Contra∣dictionis,) to Will good, or Not Will it; to Nill Evill, or Not to Nill it; This I acknowledge to be in the Will. For that by reason of its Imbecil∣lity, it is not so ready to execute its Functions as it ought to be.

But yet I do not conceive the Liberty of the Will to consist in this; Or, that this is any Perfection to the Will, To be able to Suspend its Act, notwithstanding the Understandings direction to the contrary. (For this the Angells Confirmed cannot doe, nor the Saints Glorified; for if their Will could act contrary to their Understanding, then could they Sinne; And yet these Agents are no lesse Free, then Man is: Yea God, who is the most absolutely-Free Agent, yet cannot Will or Decree that which is contrary to his Sapience, (intellectus divinus;) his Will never thwarts his Wisdome.) But I conceive it to be an Imperfection or Weaknesse in mans Will; which, Before the Fall, was not so Stable, but that it might Fall; and is Now become so Weak, that it is Ʋnable to Staud.

The common Opinion is, That, If the Will cannot disobey the Iudge∣ment of the Understanding, then is it not a Free faculty but all its acti∣ons are determined by the Understanding, while It dictates, that this or that is to be done or omitted; and so Freedome should be placed in the Ʋnderstanding and not in the Will. I may adde, (to help their cause for∣ward) that there may seem to be no Freedome at all: For the Will is determined by the dictate of the Ʋnderstanding, and therefore in it is no freedom, no Election; and the Ʋnderstanding (by generall con∣sent) is not Free, to judge this or that as it pleaseth, but must assent or

dissent according to its Light: so that Here will be no Freedom nei∣ther. For this reason they say, That the Will is not necessitated to fol∣low the dictate of Reason; but when the Understanding hath declared what it can, it is yet in the power of the Will to Choose.

But then, least they should fall upon another rock, viz. That, if the Will may reject the Understandings advice; then may it desire that which the Understanding affirms to be Evill; contrary to that Prin∣ciple, That Good is the only Object of Desire: To avoid that danger, they have found out this distinction of Libertas Contrarietatis and liber∣tas Contradictionis, which they apply thus; The Will hath power indeed to disobey that which the Understanding propoundeth: But yet not so, as if, of two Objects, whereof the Understanding Allows of one, and Disallows of the other, it were free notwithstanding to imbrace Either; But when an Object is commended by the Understanding, though the Will cannot Elect its Contrary, yet it may not-elect this, it may choose whether or no it will Imbrace it. And thus they think the whole matter is salved.

This Answer may seem plausible, and hath past for current: But yet (with their leaves) the Wound, though perhaps skinned over, is not so easily Healed. For if they may not admit the Liberty of Contrariety: they may not (in my judgement) admit the Other. For when the Un∣derstanding commends an Object to the Will, as that which Ought to be Desired, here are two opposite terms, to Imbrace, or not Imbrate; (age∣re, suspendere:) The Understanding saith, Agendum est, it Ought to be Imbraced; The Will chooseth rather not to Imbrace it, but to Suspend its Act. The Understanding adviseth One extream; the Will chooseth the Other extream. The Understanding saith, It is Good to Act, and (consequently) it is Ill to Omit, to suspend; the Will notwithstanding chooseth to Suspend (which the Understanding affirms to be Evill,) ra∣ther then to Act, which the Understanding commends as Good. Thus that libertas Contradictionis, appears upon triall to include also a liberty of Contrariety: and if it may Not-choose the term commended, then it may choose the term Forbidden, yea it must choose it, where the terms are Contradictory without a Medium.

All that can be said to help it, will be this; Willing and Suspending are indeed Opposite Terms; and therefore when the Understanding ad∣viseth to Will, if the Will do [Velle] suspendere, it chooseth the term Op∣posite, and (consequently) that which is proposed as Evill; But (they may say perhaps) the Will doth only Suspendere, and not Velle suspen∣dere;

and so this Suspending is not an Object of Choice, but only the Absence or Negation of an Act; and therefore though it doe ire in con∣trarias partes, yet it doth not contrariam partem Eligere, it doth not Choose, or Elect, the Opposite term, because there is no positive Act of Election or Willing exercised about it.

And this answer I confesse may seem to weaken the Objection im∣mediatly foregoing; for thus the Will is not made to Choose an Oppo∣s••te term; But then let them consider, how this Answer will stand with their Opinion: They tell us first that the Freedom of the Will is mani∣fested in Suspending when the Understanding commands to Act; and yet when it doth Suspend, they say this Suspension is not an object of Choice or Election; and (consequently) there is no Liberty exercised.

If they think thus to evade, in saying, That this Liberty is exercised, not in Suspe••ding when it might Act, because There is no Election, & therefore no Freedom exercised; But in Acting, when as it might have Suspended. I answer, That neither will this serve the turn. For as Sus∣pension is not Objectum Volitionis, an Object of Choice; so neither is Acting an Object of choice. And as we say not Volo Suspendere, or Volo Non-velle, so neither do we say volo Velle: For by the same reason that any may say Volo Velle, he may say also volo non Velle. So that Willing can no more be said to be an object of Choice, then Suspending.

Their Libertas Contradictionis therefore must either be also ibertas Contrarietatis, and so by themselves rejected: or else it will be no exer∣cise, no manifestation, of Liberty, and therefore uselesse for their purpose.

I admit (as I said before) the distinction in this sense; That the Will, though it cannot Elect a Contrary object, ye•• it may Not-Elect This. And thus there is no Action (of Choice or Desire) in the Will, but tending to some Good that the Understanding proposeth; For what is not Known cannot be Desired: But yet there may be a negligent Omission or Suspension, when it ought to Act Which I do not account ••o be the Liberty, or Perfection of the Will, (for Angells &c. have it not,) but an Imperfection and Weaknesse. Neither do I say, that the Will doth Voluntarily Suspend, or Velle suspendere, without direction, (for that were a Positive Act;) but (either by Negligence, or Weak∣nesse,) doth Not-Will. For which there is no•• requisite a Positive cause, but a Negative, or the Want of a Cause.

You will say, If this be so, then will there be only a sinfull Omission •••• the Will, and not a sinfull Commission: For Sinne of Commission

(doing or Willing that which ought not) is Positive, and therefore cannot proceed from the Will, when the Understanding dictates to the contrary. Whereas the Will doth as often fail in Choosing a wrong object, which the Understanding acknowledgeth to be Evill; as in Not Choosing a Good Object.

I answer, it is true, the Will doth often choose what it ought not: And yet I affirm, that the Wills Errour is onely Negative and not Po∣sitive; It is Omissive only, in not-obeying some directions of the Un∣derstanding. I shall make it cleer by an Instance. Pleasure and Vertue may be Competitors, and Rivalls (as it were) both courting the Will; (As in an Act Pleasant, but Sinnefull.) The Understanding proposeth Pleasure as quid bonum, 'tis Good, 'tis Desirable; It proposeth Vertue as quid melius, 'Tis Better, 'tis more desirable. Now the Will perhaps follows the first direction; it imbraceth Pleasure as being Good, and so Desirable; (for Bonum Jucundum is Desirable as well as Bonum Hone∣stum:) But the second Precept, or Direction rather, whereby Vertue is proposed as Better, and therefore should countermand the form••••, this it hears not, it follows not.

If you say, the Understanding doth indeed discover some Good (though a lesse Good) in the Object; yet this is not to be accounted the Understandings Practicall Direction (dictamen:) But, that the Under∣standing having examined the Good and the Evill that is in every Act, and comparing them together; upon this Comparison, as it observes the Good or Evill to be more, so it prescribes, to Doe, or Not to Doe, H•••• age, or Hoc non age: And if the Will doe Act, when the Understan∣ding Forbids, it must be said to perform a Positive Act without di∣rection.

I answer▪ I admit not the Understandings dictate to be Imperative, but onely Declarative: It onely informs, This is Good, This is Evill; but Commands not, Doe this, or Omit it. But the Will upon propo∣sall of Good, Embraceth it; upon proposall of Evill, it Rejects it: Yet not so, but that, by Negligence, it may Not-embrace Good, and not∣reject Evill. And thus the proposall of Pleasure, as Good; is as truely declarative as the other; and this the Will follows: But a further de∣claration, whereby it declares, that although Pleasure be Good, yet it is Evill to embrace this Good, because there is a greater Evill annexed; This direction, by omission, it imbraceth not. And this I conceive to be the true nature of the Acts of the Will and Understanding.

If you would have the Will and the Understanding to be the Same,

(and therefore think these distinctions superfluous,) understand by the Intellect, Anima Intelligens; by the Will, Anima Volens, or Anima quatenus Volens, and then you are pleased.

And thus you see, How there may be more Knowledge (even of Spiri∣tuall and Saving Truths) and yet l••sse Faith: Because there may be ••n Asse••t, a Beleeving, in the Understanding, (which is Knowledge, or Historicall Faith;) without a Fiduciall Trust, a Reliance, and resting upon it; which is the Justifying Faith, or the Justifying Act of Faith. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 yea, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, without 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

5. But if you speak of a Knowledge peculiar to Gods children, wherof others partake not; Such a Knowledge of God wherby no man knows him but he that hath him; That Knowledge which is Life everlasting: This Knowledge, and Faith, always go together; the more there is of One, the more also of the Other. A Speculative Knowledge, where∣by we assent to the Truth reveiled, is found even in the Devils, and that in as large and ample measure (I suppose) as in the Saints on Earth: For I cannot be perswaded, but the Devils (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) being Knowing Spirits, doe Know and Assent to the Truth of every Proposition that a Child of God knows. But there is an Experimentall Knowledge distinct from the former, Knowledge of another nature, whereby we Know, what we know, in another Manner: We do not only Know that it is so, but we Tast and See it to be so.

A Blind man Knows perhaps that the Sun shines, but he doth not S•••• it: I Know that at Midnight the Sunne shines to our Antipodes, but I doe not See it shine to them: I Know that at such a time there is such an I ••lipse visible to such a part of the World, yet doe I not See the Eclipse. The Confectioner that provides a Banquet Knows that this or that dish is Sweet, but they only Tast the Sweetnesse that eat of it. A wicked man may Know that God is good, (as a blind man knows that the Sun shines, by the report of others; or as an Astronomer knows of an Eclipse before it come, by Calculation, or rationall Discourse and Illa∣tion;) ••ut he S••es it no••, he Tasts it not. Now we read of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, H••b. 5. 14. som that have their Senses exercised to discern of good and evill; there is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Phil. 1. 9. a kind of spiritu∣all Sense, whereby we do 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, super••a S••pere, Relish those things that are above.

And where there is this spirituall Tast, this Experimentall Know∣ledge; there must needs be Faith also▪ For Truths thus cleerly, and Sensibly (as it wer••) rev••iled to the Soul, it seems no•• to be in the power

of the Will to reject: No more then it is in the power of the Eare not to be pleased with harmonious Musick; or in the power of the Palat, not to be delighted with the Sweetnesse of a Tast.

And thus I suppose it may appear, How far, and From what Ground there may be Knowledge without Faith.

That God is all mercy and sweetnesse to the Divels, is no Article of my faith, Those miserable creatures, saith he, cannot consent to it. No more can I: And yet I deny not, that Mercy and Justice are One thing in God. Gods Simple Essence is the same with both; yet are not They so properly the same with each other. The Torment of the Devils proceeds from that Divine Essence which is Love; (as likewise the Mercies of Gods Children proceed from that Divine Essence which is Justice: for the Justice of God is equally himselfe as is his Love:) Yet may we not say, the Torments of those are an effect of Love, no more then that the Mercies of these are the effects of Anger; yet Both are the effects of that Simple Essence, which is Both. It is a far different thing therefore, to say, A Loving God doth notwithstanding Punish; and to say, A Loving God doth therefore Punish: Punishment and Revenge are sufficiently consistent with Love; but not the immediate ef∣fects of Love. Thus we say, Musicus Aedificat; yet not his skill in Musick, but his skill in Architecture, is exercised in Building.

The Love of God (as likewise his Anger, Justice, Power, &c.) is (I confesse) the Divine Essence; we allow no Accidents in God at all: quicquid est in Deo, est Deus. But I ask, Whether he think this Attri∣bute Love (and so of the rest) to be an Adequate expression of that whole Essence? If so, then is it all one to say, God Loves his Children, and, God is Angry with his children, or God Hates them: If not, then is it only inadaequatus conceptus, and there remains somewhat to be expres∣sed by other Attributes, which is not expressed in this. The Attributes of God therefore (as likewise it is in other inadaequati conceptus) may be all affirmed of the same Simple Essence; but not (Mutually) of each other: And the Effects of each may be said to be the Effects of the same Essence; but not (Promiscuously) of every Attribute: (unlesse we take them Materialiter, not Formaliter:) And consequently, the ruine (of the damned) is not (as he affirms) an effect of infinite sweetnesse (though of that (Essence) which i••, Infinite Sweetnesse;) nor is God, (in this) mercifull to them.

Again, What we Know, we are, (saith he:) I assume; Sed deum scimus, Ergo Dii sumus.

CHAP. IX. How Knowledge and Affection differ.

FRom what hath been spoken in the former Chapter, without ad∣ding any more, may appear what is to be said concerning his Ninth Chapter: How it comes to passe that some of mean Knowledge have Large Affections. For a Speculative Knowledge doth not alwayes Breed Affection, (because the Will doth not alwayes follow the Un∣derstanding,) though neither doth it Extinguish it.

It is true, there is an Affection, which is rather a Blazing (then a Warming, Enlivening) Love, (as the Fools Mirth like the crackling of Thorns;) Which ariseth either from a False Apprehension, or else from the Novelty, rather then the sweetnesse, of the Object, (as the Smell of Flowers at the first approach doth most Affect the Sense, though they be as Sweet afterwards;) And This perhaps may vanish, at the presence of a more Clear or more Continued Light. But the true Warmth of Zeal is not extinguished by the Light of Knowledge, (though Specula∣tive,) but feeds upon it as Fewell: And the greater Growth there is in (especially Experimentall) Knowledge, the greater is the Strength of Affection from it: And, thus, they that Know most (experimentally) do alwayes Love most: Knowledge and Affection go together.

Yet are we not forced from hence to grant, that Knowledge and Affection are the Same: Betwixt which I must needs allow the same difference (be it more or lesse, that is, Reall, or Modall) which is be∣tween the Ʋnderstanding and the Will: Knowledge is not Affection, and Affection is not Knowledge.

And that Objection which his Lordship from hence makes to him∣selfe, That (since men of Largest Affections, doe not alwayes Know most of God, but some of Weaker Affections may Know More;) it might appear from hence, That all Being is not One, differing onely in Degrees; but that there are even different Natures, amongst which one may Excell, while the other is Deprest: This Objection, I say, i•• of that force, that I see not how all which his Lordship brings, can take it away.

The large Encomiums, which he brings for Affectionate Knowledge, preferring it before Speculative, (which he prosecutes very Piously, very Judiciously, very Affectionately;) though it prove, That Affectio∣nate Knowledge is the more Excellent; Yet doth it not shew That Spe∣culative Knowledge is Nothing; or That the Measure of Affection al∣wayes

follows the Measure of Speculative Knowledge: One of which he ought to have proved, if he conclude that Knowledge and Affection are the Same. A man may truly Know, that Sugar is Sweet, though he neither Tast its Sweetnesse, nor be Delighted or Pleased with that Tast. And a Christian is sometimes to live by Faith and not by Sense; That is, he is to Trust, and Rest upon the Speculative Knowledge of Gods Goodnesse, and his own Interest in it; even then when for the present he wants the Sense of it. He may Know and Beleeve that the Lord is Good, though he doe not Tast and See it. I will wait upon God (saith Isay) which hath Hid his Face from the House Israel. He that walketh in darknesse, and Sees no Light, must yet Trust in the Name of the Lord, &c.

And thus much for the first Notion of Truth, or Reason, as it is the groundwork of Rationall Operations. In which, thus far I may go along with his Lordship, That Reason is but the Soul Intelligent; That Intelle∣c••u••ll Habits are but Reason advanced; As likewise That its Operations are but Reason actuated. The first, distinguished from the Soule at least rati∣o••e ratiocinatâ: the two last, Modaliter. If he mean no more, I wish his expressions had been clearer: For then the Notions are not new, but the Words. If he do aliquid grandius moliri; I either Understand him not; o•• cannot Assent to him.

But you will tell me perhaps, that I am mistaken all this while; His Lordsh••p by Truth intends not Reason, as I take it; For the very Title of his first Chapter, calls it Truth Ʋnderstood, and this cannot be Rea∣son, for Reason is not that which is understood, but that whereby we un∣derstand.

It is true, it do••h so: But (shall I speak it once for all?) the Titles of his ••hapters, and his Marginall Notes, do so often clash with the Text, that I cannot beleeve they were done by the same Pen. I•• i•• like his Lordship, writing it but as a Letter to a private Friend, by whom i•• i•• since published, did not at first distinguish it into chapters, and give it that Analysis that now appears; and since its first writing, as the Epistle tels us not having so much as perused it, it is not like he hath added them since; But the Publisher (as in the like cases is frequent in Treatis••s of all sorts) not to trouble his Lordship with so small a matter, did it hi••∣self. Who ever did it, it is like (as else where, so here) he either did not Apprehend, or not Attend punctually▪ his Lordships meaning. For it is clear enough, if we attend it, that that which he there contends to b•• the s••me with the Ʋnderstanding, cannot be Truth understood; but the Rise

or Groundwork from whence all actions and sayings, the Effects of a Reaso∣nab••e Soule, breathe forth. It had been more agreeable to his Lord∣ships mind, to have said, Intellectus and Principium Intelligendi are the same; and not, that the Ʋnderstanding▪ and Truth-understood, are one▪ And so his Lordships method will be Exact, making the Soule or Un∣derstanding▪ One with its Faculties, chap. 1. with its Habits, chap. 8. with its Operations, chap. 10. Whereas, how the Object of all these, should come first, and be that from whence all these breathe forth, appears not.

CHAP. X. Whether the Operations of the Soule be the Soules Essence.

HAving done (in the former chapters) with the first Notion of Truth, as it is the Fountain or Source of Knowing, as well Na∣turall as Habituall. In this tenth Chapter, he comes to the second Con∣sideration, or Notion of Truth; denoting the Streams proceeding from this Fountaine: The Actions, and Effects of a Reasonable Soule. Indea∣vouring to prove, The particular and various Workings of the Soule, in Conclusions, simple Apprehensions, Negations, and Affirmations &c. to be all One and the Same, both with each other, and with the Soule. The Foun∣tain and the Stream (saith he) make but One River: I adde, The Root and the Branches make but one Tree. Yet the Root is not a Branch, neither are the Branches the Root.

To prove this, he compares the Nature of the Soule or Ʋnderstanding (For, saith he, we have proved them both one) with their Irradiations and Actings. His Argument tends to this effect: The Souls Essence, saith he, is no other thing then Activity (Actus) and therefore must be either Potentia agendi, or ipsa Actio; Actus Primus, or Actus secundus. And if it be Actus, either Primus or Secundus, ▪which he conceives to differ only in Time) it must be still in work, and Is no longer then it Acts: Which Act can be no other but a Work of Reason; else how can it consti••ute a Ra∣tionall Soule? And if so, then how doth it differ f••om Thought or Ratio∣cina••ion? The Operations therefore of the Soule (Conclusions, Sayings, Actions) are the Being, the Form of the Soule.

Are they so? But, I suppose, the Soule at some times produceth no (Rationall) Act at all, (as in sleep: Doth it then cease to be a Rationall Soule, when it ceaseth to produce Rationall Operations? (For when its

Essence ceaseth, It selfe ceaseth to Bee. Doth a Stone cease to be Hea∣vy, when it ceaseth to Fall downwards? I think not.

But I will consider the Argument distinctly. He hath proved (he saith) that the Soule and the Ʋnderstanding are both One. This, though I would not stick to grant, Yet (as I have formerly said) I see not any Argument, in his foregoing discourse, to prove That the Soule and Ʋn∣derstanding are all One; but what will be of equall force to prove, The Soule and the Body to be all One. And if he will allow between the Soule, the Understanding, and its Operations, a distinction as Reall, a•• Essentiall, as there is between the Body and the Soule; I am confi∣dent there is no rationall Man that will desire more.

The Nature or Being of the Soule (saith he) is nothing but Activity. That the Soule is Actus, is confessed, I grant, by all: But whether Activity may be taken in the same sense, I question. This Actus (saith he) whether Primus or Secundus (which differ but in Time, and so differ not at all, because Time is nothing) c•••• be no other but a Work of Reason: And so the Soules Operation will be its Form and Essence. That Actus primus and actus secundus, (Gravity and Descension) differ only in Time, I grant not: For this is not a Distribution of Actus into its Species; but a Distinction of an Ambiguous term. Actus in the first sense signifies Actuality (not Action) and it is opposed somtimes to Potentia ad Esse, somtimes to Potentia ad Formam; siue sit forma Substantialis, siue Acci∣dentalis, (but never to Potentia ad Operari;) And thus Actus is no other but that Essence, per quam res aut actu-Est, aut est actu-Tale. Actus in the second sense signifies, not Actuality, but Action, or Opera∣in; and is opposed to Potentia ad Operari.

I say therefore, the Essenc•• or Nature of the Soule or Understanding is Actus; It is Actus Primus; It is that whereby the Soule & actu Est, & est Hoc, or est Tale (viz. in genere substantiae,) Such a Being, Such a substance. Its Faculties (if distinct) are also Actus, (yet not Actions:) Which you may say to be Actus secundi (as some doe) because they are a secondary actuality, whereby the Soule becoms, not a Being, or Such a Be∣ing; but a Being So qualified, So adorned: Or rather I should say they be Actus Primi, because (though Accidentall, yet) they are not Opera∣tions (which I conceive to be the truest meaning of Actus secundus, though I confesse some attribute it to all Accidents,) but Forms; Ope∣rative indeed, but not Operations.

If you aske What is the Form of this Activity (or Actuality rather) of this Actus primus which is the Soules Essence, If it be not Rationall

Workings? (Which is all one as if you should ask What is the Essence of an Essence? and againe, What is the Essence of That Essence? in infi∣nitum. I answer, The Form of this Actus is It selfe, Its Essence. What can be the Form of Rationality, but ipsa Rationalitas? Humanitas you may say is Forma Hominis; but will you ask again, What is that which is forma Humanitatis? If you do we must answer still, that it is Huma∣nitas, and stay there. Except you would have us invent one Abstract upon the neck of another, and say Humanitatitudo. And thus I think somebody hath been trying practises; For if you ask what is the Form of Honorificum, or Honorificabile, they can tell you It is Honorificabilitas, or Honorificabilitudo; and aske again what shall be Forma Honorifi∣cabilitudinis, they will tell you, It is Honorificabilitudinitas.) I say, we must not enquire for the Form of a Form, or the Essence of an Essence: For every thing hath its Essence (positive) and its Hae••ciety, not from any other thing, but from It selfe; Though it may have an Externall, a Relative, or Accidentall denomination from some Adjunct.

(And therefore to say, Materiae individuatur a Formâ, as though the Matter of a dead Corps, were not the same matter that was in the living Man, is a doctrine which I could never digest. For so all Generation, will become Creation; For if it be the Form which makes this Matter to be This, then cannot one Form succeed another in the same Matter: be∣cause if the Form precedent gave it its Individuation, and made it to be this, and not other matter; when this Form is abolished, the Matter which is joyned with the succedent Form will not be This, but Other matter: If This Form make it to be This Matter, then Another Form will make it to be Other Matter. And if so, then is both Matter and Form produced de novo; which must needs be Creation, because it is not made of any thing prae-existent, nothing remaining of what be∣fore was.)

Hee proceeds thus, If the Form of this Activity (Actus) be not th••se Reasonable Workings; then must it be either of a baser allay, or of a higher stamp.

For answer, I will but demand in generall, which his Lordship judg∣eth to be most E••cellent, the End, or the Mean••? That which is willed, not for its own sake, but for somwhat else, seems to be of lesse worth then That for whose sake it is desired: And yet the Mean••, being the Ends Efficient, how can it be Inferiour? I say therefore that A••••us primus is the Efficient of Actus secundus; and This the (partiall) End of the other: And leave it to his Lordships consideration, Whe∣ther he will esteem thee more Noble.

Hee tells us soon after, That if we distinguish between the Act and the Power, the Act must ever be first in Order, Dignity, and Nature.

But (under his Lordships favour) I conceive that the Act is first neither in Order, in Dignity, nor in Nature. The Cause is before the Effect, in Excellency, because Causa (aequivoca) est Nobilior Effecto; for nothing can produce an Effect more noble then it selfe. ² In Nature, Causa est prior Effecto; For that is defined to be Naturâ prius, A qu•• non redit essendi consequutio; Now I demand, Whether of these two may be without the Other? The Act, or the Power? And ³ in Order: For he speaks I suppose either of the Order of Production, or the Order of Intention; If he speak of the first; The Order of Production, is Ordo naturae Generantis, and so that which is first in Nature, must be also first in Order: If he speak of the Order of Intention; then the End (if it be the Sole end) may seem to be preferred before the means; But this is a Morall Excellency, and a Morall Order; not a Naturall or Phy∣sicall Excellency, such as we are now speaking of. But I demand with∣all, Whether Action be the sole End of the Soule? that is, Whether the Soule in its Essence might not be produced either for its Own Excellency or for the Excellency of some Other end beside the Excellency of its Operation or Actus Secundus? And if so, then can it not be concluded That even its Morall Excellency, in genere Finis, is inferiour to the Ex∣cellency of its Operation.

But his Lordship admits not at all of this distinction between actus primus and actus secundus; so as that actus primus should be the Being or Substance, and actus secundus the Product. But why? They forget, saith he, that Omnis Virtus consistit in Actione.

Nay we Forget it not, but we Deny it. For if you speak of Morall Virtue, est virtus tacuisse, &c. but▪ To hold ones peace, is no Action: If he speak of Physicall Virtue or Excellency, of naturall Perfection; then doe I deny, that all Naturall Exc••llency consists in Action; for the Es∣sence it selfe is Bonum Physicum: But if he speak of Physicall Efficiency, then I grant, that Virtus Efficientis, or Efficientis Efficientia, consistit in Actione; The Efficacy, or Efficiency of a Thing consists in its Operation: But what then? May not an Essence Be without Action, because it cannot Act without Action? Must its Essence be Action, because its Efficacy is Action? In ordinary Philosophy, operatio Sequitur esse, Operation Proceeds from the Essence, and not Constitutes it.

But, saith he; What is this their Actus primus? What is the Form of it? (I have said, Its Own Essence; It is It selfe its Own Form, and the

Form or Essence of the Soule: We must not enquire for the Essence of an Essence, nor for the Essence of a thing out of It selfe:) What is with them, the Form of a Reasonable Soule? Is it not Reason? (Yes it is) And this Reason i•• not Potentia Ratiocinandi, But Ratio: (he meaneth, I suppose Ratiocinatio, rather then Ratio; for Ratio and Potentia ratioci∣nandi are all one:) For if you distinguish between the Act and the Power the Act must ever be first, in Order, Dignity, and Nature: (But this I grant not.) So then, what is the Form of this primus Actus? is it not some Act? (Yes, but not an Action or Operation.) If it be, then must it exist, else you allow it but a bare Notionall Being; And if it exist, mu••t it not be that which you call actus secundus? I answer, It is Actus, (ali∣quid actu) but not an Action; It Exists also, and yet is not Actus Se∣cundus, but the Form from whence actus secundus flows.

He proceeds; If it be not an Act (or action) then is it nothing else but a Power or Faculty depending upon somewhat else (viz upon the Soule;) and if this be the nature of the First, what shall the second Being (which is its Effect, and so Lower) be but a Notion. (Yet he said even now, that the Act is before the Power in Order, Dignity, and Nature▪ and yet the Act is the Power'•• Effect: How then ••oth he now affirm, that the Effect is somewhat Lower then the First Being?) I answer, It is not an Action; neither yet is it a Distinct (dependent) Faculty, (if we make the Soule and the Facul••y to be the same;) but the Souls Essence. But yet though we should admit Reason to be a distinct Facul••y, (as s••me doe) and so, not to be the Soules actus primus, but actus afficiens: Yet doth, it not follow that the Operation must be onely a Notion. Heavi∣nesse is not the Stones Essence, but an Accidentall Form, a Power or Fa∣culty of Gravitation; yet is not its Descension onely Imaginary but Re∣all. Heat in water is not its Essence, but a separabl•• Accident; yet its Calefaction, it Heating or Scalding, is not meerly Notionall, but Reall. So might it be here: there may be (notwithstanding this Ar∣gument) a Faculty or Accidentall Form in the Soule, which may be an Actus Primus in respect of its Operations, (though, no•• actus primo∣primu•• which is the Soules ••ssence,) from whence those Operations, or Actus Secundi may proceed, which ye•• might be Reall, and not Imaginary.

•••• he had (as he speaks) set that distinction of Substance and Accident▪ (which he seems to challenge as an aged Imposture) upon the Rack; I would willingly▪ have examined its forc'd confession.

•••• the mean time, I see not from what ground ••e can strongly con∣clude,

That this Activity (as he speaks,) this Actus primus, consists in Action; or That It and actus secundus are the s••me; and both One with Truth.

You will ask me, What distinction therefore will I allow between actus primus and secundus; between the Agent and its Action? I an∣swer, The One is Res, the Other is Modus; and so the distinction is Modall: Neither more nor lesse distinction will I admit of. And so doing, I dissent not from the Opinion of others: For (as I remember) Suarez (not to instance in others) makes Action to be a Modus; And though he make a Transient Action to be Modus Patientis, (in which I assent not to him;) yet an Immanent Act (such as are Rationall O∣perations) is with Him, Modus Agentis.

CHAP. XI. Whether Time and Place be onely Imaginary.

IN the next Chapter, we are called to consider of the nature of Time and Place: which his Lordship occasionally falls upon, by reason of an Obiection, That lays so strong a siege to his Opinion, that I doubt hi•• Lordships Answer will hardly raise it. It ariseth from hence;

There a••e in the Soule various Operations and Workings, distinct in Time, and distinct in Place: which Distinction, though it may have an externall denomination in respect of Time and Place; yet ariseth not from thence, but is Internall or Intrinsecall to the Operations them∣se••ves; This Operation is not the Other, and the Other is not This. And thi•• distinction would remain though the distinct Operations were performed in the same Time, in the same Place: Cas••r and Pompey were not the same man, though Contemporary. The Water which to day runs down a River, is not the same water with that which yesterd••y ran in the same Place, the same Channell. Two Angels, though coexistent at th•• s••me Time in the same Place▪ the same part of the Ayr, are not yet the same Angel. Thus Nutrition, and Volition, or Intellection, though at the same Time, performed by the same Soule resident i•• the same Body, are yet distinct Acts. And on the contrary, a man remains the same man to Day, that he was Yesterd••y; at This place, that he was ••t Another place; though both Time and Place be altered.

Now there being in the Soule various Actings, distinct both in Time and Place (though they receive not their distinction from either are there not then so many severall Soules▪ (viz. if the Operations be the Souls Essence?) This is the Objection.

His Lordship supposing all the Difference between these Acts to a∣rise from Time and Place, thinks that if he prove Time and Place to be Nothing, then these Acts will not be Distinct, but the same,; and so may constitute the same Soule.

But, whether Place and Time be any thing or nothing, whether they alter any thing or nothing in this point; Yet sure we are that This Man is not the Other Man. This Soule not Another Soule, This Action is not the Other Action: And so the difficulty remains as hard; there will be various Operations still.

He brings severall Simile's to illustrate it. Complexion Lineaments, Harmony, though they be in themselves Diverse, yet they make up One pleasing Being, which we call Beauty. A Flame arising from divers Thorns is but One Flame. A Stream supplied from severall Springs, is but One Stream. I may adde, Many Members make up One Body; Many Creatures One World. (Yet still One Member is not the Other; The water received from One Spring, is not the same water which came from the Other Spring, though both runne in the same Channell.)

But will he say, So is it in our case? That (in the same manner) seve∣rall Acts doe constitute One Soule? Are these Actions its Integrall Parts, as the Members are of the Body; and severall Waters of One Stream? &c. Are they a Piece of the Whole and make up the totum Com∣positum? Then is the Soule Divisible; Then doth it lose some part of it selfe, and becomes maimed at the cessation of every Action.

But he makes not the Soule perhaps to be constituted of these Acti∣ons, as so many Integrall Parts; But, saith he, The Soule is One Act, distinguished to our Notton by severall apparitions.

If so, then his Simile's drawn from Integrall Parts constituting the whole Compositum, will not hold.

But (secondly) I deny that all these Operations are but one Action in various Shapes. They are all Actions of the same Soule, but they are not all the same Action. The Soule, If you will may be called, One Soule under Various Shapes; But these Various Shapes cannot be said to be One Shape. Like as Wax fashioned successively in several Moulds, is the same Wax in severall Figures; but that these are all the Same Figure, we can∣not say. Actions performed by the same Soule, are all Modi of the Same Thing, of the same Soule; but they are not all the same Modus. This is not the Other.

And this we may hold, whatever become of Time and Place for this Distinction ariseth not from Them. A man is the same Man to day, that

he was Yesterday, though the Time be not the same. He is the same Man at York, that he was at London, though the Place be not the same. Time and Place doe neither make the Same to be Two, nor Two to be the Same; One to be Two, nor Two to be One: Yet what hinders but that Things and Actions may have an Intrinsicall Difference one from another.

These various Beings, therfore, not being Differenced by these Circum∣stances of Time and Place, (th••ugh Different in both,) It is lesse mate∣riall for me to enquire What they are? or Whether they be some thing or nothing? Only I desire to know, wherein the strength of that Argu∣ment consists, which is by us so often urged against Papists and Luthe∣rans, concerning their Transubstantiation, and Consubstantiation; viz. How Christs body can be at the Same Time in Severall Places? For, that i•• might be successively in all these Places at severall Times, we de∣ny not: Now, if at Severall Times it may be in divers Places; why may it not be so, at the Same Time, if Time and Place be Nothing? Againe, Severall Places at the same Time may contein severall Bodies (v. g Bread, and Christs Body;) now why may not the Same place con••••ine them, if Place be nothing? Why not Together, as well as Successively, if Time be nothing?

All actions, saith he are Nothing if Time be Anything; Because the Time allotted for every Action, be it never so short, may be divided into severall parts, many subdivisions of Time. True. But is there not t••e same Reason of Actions that is of Time? are not they divisible into as many parts, whereof every parcell answers to a portion of that Time? There is the same reason in every Continuum, be it Magnitude, Distance Time, Place, Duration, Motion, Action, or whatever: They are all equally divisible in semper divisibilia. If it be Actio Instantanea, it is dis∣patched in an Instant, not in Time: If it be Actus Continuus, it is capable of as many divisions as is that Time in which it is performed.

This not being well weighed saith he, hath raised that Question, [How God should see All things?] If in their Existences▪ then they are Coeternall with him: If only in their Causes, then are they not Present. Which difficul∣ty, he supposeth, is dissolved, by making Time to be Nothing, and Al things to be exi••••ent, in their Beings, with God from all Eternity. (Which of how dangerous a consequence it may prove his Lordship is not aware.)

That God befo••e the worlds Creation, did co-exist to this Instant; I doe confidently affirm; Y••t, that all things present, d••d exist before they were produced, I cannot assent; which I doubt not but to recon∣cile,

(if I were now discussing that question ex professo, and not glan∣cing at it in transitu) allowing notwithstanding to Time and Place, their due reality; not making Temporall and Locall difference to be only Imaginary.

As likewise, How Permane••cy in God may consist with Succession in the Creature; and How Acts (of Creation, Preservation, Redemp∣tion, Decree, the Execution of that Decree) may be Eternall, as they pr••ceed from God, though in the Creature recipiantur in Tempore▪ In Place we make no scruple of it, to affirm that anima est tota in toto & t••ta in qualibet parte, that the Whole Soule may be present to one Point, or part of the Body, without ceasing to be Wholly present to another part; (Or, if possibly in the Soul, and Created Spirituall substances, it may be questioned; yet doubtlesse, in God himselfe, it must needs be granted, that he is Ʋbique Totus:) Now, if it be not repugnant to be coexistent to one Point of Place, without ceasing to coexist to another point though Distant; Why not to one Point of Time, without cea∣sing to be present to another, though Successive?

The next Objection, Concerning the nature of Evill, is of lesse force against his Tenet. For, That Good and Evill may coexist in One entire Act; That there may be some Degrees of Goodnesse in an Action, and yet not that Perfection of Goodnesse, that ought to be; may as well be granted, as That the Twilight hath not [So much] Light, and [So much] positive darknesse, but that it hath not so [Much] Light as the Midday. But yet in the mean time it may be doubted, whether the Nature of Evill be meerly Privative. It is true indeed, The nature of (Moral) Evill is a Non-conformity (or Difformity rather) to Gods Law: But why may not this non-conformity arise ex praesentiâ non debiti, as well as ex ab∣sentiâ debiti, or ex defectu debiti inesse? May not a Line disagree from its measure, by being too Long, as well as by being too Short? The not distinguishing between bonum Metaphysicum, and bonum Morale, may perhaps have caused some errour in this assertion. But I stand not now to decide it: You shall find more of it in the next chapter.

But that which is assumed as a ground of this Assertion, is farre more improbable then the Assertion it selfe. viz. That Contradictions may be simul, semel, & eodem respectu, in the same Subject.

What necessity his Lordship had to embrace this opinion of Anaxa∣goras, Democritus &c. (as he saith,) against Aristotle; I do not discern. Neither can I see, wherein this co-existence of Contradictions doth ap∣peare. For the Presence of an Inferiour Degree, and the Negation of a

Farther Degree, are no Contradictions, because they are not ad idem. And such a Coexistence Aristotle and his followers will not deny; Else how can they speak of Qualitates Remissae? Nay more, They will grant an Inferiour Degree, to consist, not only with the Negation of a Farther Degree, but even with the Presence of its Contrary; For they deny not but that there may be Contrary qualities in the same Subject in Remissis gradibus, (as Heat and Cold in warm water, though not in gradibus Intensis.

But if Anaxagoras, or any other, will contend, That perfect Con∣tradictions may ••t and together, That the Presence of an inferiour degree, may stand with the Absence or Negation of the Same degree; It will be in vain to dispute against it. For when I have proved it to be False, they will grant it is so, and affirm withall, That notwithstanding its Falshood, yet may it also be True, because Contradictions are not Incon∣sistent. (Another adversary perhaps would deale more sharply with his Lordship upon this point: I passe it.)

He proceeds to shew by divers similitudes, How the same thing may take divers shapes in our Apprehension; And consequently, that the se∣verall Apparitions of Truth do not forthwith evince the Variety of Truth. All which we deny not, For otherwise we cannot acknowledge that there is any distinctio Rationis; Rationall distinctions being no o∣ther but inadaequati conceptus ejusdem rei. That there is therefore a Ratio∣nall Distinction, we deny not; But that there is Only a Rationall Di∣stinction, and not also a Reall distinction; this is that we deny. Some things we acknowledge to be only Ratione distincta, but Other things we contend to have a Reall distinction. Which must be overthrown be∣fore he can conclude, that all the actions of reason which seem severall, are but on••, a fixt intire Ʋnity.

He toucheth lastly, upon Copernicus his Opinion, Which, he saith, hath been confuted these many yeares by the three leading Senses. (And yet his margent saith, that sense is confuted by Him.) For we [See] the circum∣volutions of the Heavens: we [Feel] our selves upon a stable Foundation; We [Heare] not from the Volutations of the Earth such a black Cant as her heavy rowlings would rumble forth.

But (not to dispute the truth of Copernicus his Opinion) I think I may affirm that Neither of these Testimonies of Sense do any way contra∣dict his Assertion. For, first, I deny that we [See] the Revolution of the Heavens. We discern indeed, (and that Truly,) that the Starres at se∣verall times have severall Positions in respect of our Horizon; (and this

is all:) But whether this diversity of Position arise from the Motion of the One, or the Other, or Both, our Sight determins not; Affirming only That there is such a diverse Positure. ² Our sense of [Feeling] assures us of thus much, That the Earth is such a Foundation as upon which we rest; and, that we remain in the same Positure in respect of the Earth and the Air circumstant; Which may be as well if all jointly Move together, as if all jointly stand still. A man in a Ship under Hatches up∣on a smooth water, supposeth himselfe to sit fast upon his Seat, (and he doth so;) and he seeth all things about him to remain at the same Di∣stance, in the same Positure, discerning no alteration: Yet this hinders not but that He and They may be joyntly moved Together, without being thrown from off his seat, upon which he may sit as firm as if he were on shore. And ³ for the sense of [Hearing,] I see no reason, why it should be more blamed for not hearing the sound of the Earths Voluta∣tion; then for not hearing the Pythagorian Harmony. If the vast Cele∣stiall Spheres, whose almost every Starre doth farre exceed the Terre∣striall Globe, be whirled about with such a silent motion, as that the quickest Eare cannot discern it; Why may not the Earth, a farrelesser body, passe as quietly, without such a dismall Cant, such an hideous Noise, as his Lordship doth suppose? For Noise doth not arise meerly from Motion; but from the Crossing or Thwarting of severall motions, from the Clashing and Collision of one Body against another, by reason that the One (standing) interrupts the Other in its Motion, or Both mo∣ving according to severall motions do mutually hinder each others pro∣gresse: Whereas, if all moved the same Way, with the same Speed, (as is supposed in the Motion of the Earth, and the things adjoyning) there would be no such Clashing, or Interruption of one another, and (con∣sequently) no Noise.

The Senses Testimony therefore doth not contradict the Opinion of Copernicus, The Eye tells us, that the Starres and We are at severall times in severall Positures, but, whether it proceed from Their motion or from Ours, it affirmeth not. Our Feeling informs us, that we are not tossed from Place to Place, that is, from one part of the Earths Su∣perficies to another, but remain upon the same part of its Surface: But whether we jointly move together, or jointly rest immovable, it de∣termins not. The Eare can tell us, That it hears no Noise, (for how can it since there is none?) But it doth not say, There is no Motion. These Witnesses therefore can testifie nothing in this cause; Except we should suborn them, and put that into their Mouths, which is not

within their Knowledge, Or falsify the Records, by supposing them to say That, which they say not.

CHAP. XII. Concerning Falshood in the Soules operations. Whether it cease to Bee, when it c••aseth to Act Truth.

IN the twelfth Chapter, he comes to another Objection If Actings of Truth, be Truth, (that is, if Rationall Operations be the Soule, the Soules Essence) then when the Soule Acteth not Truth, it ceaseth to Bee: and so when it entertaineth or pronounceth a False Position, the Soule is no more it selfe.

This Objection I conceive to have two branches; For the Soule may cease to act Truth, either by Not acting at all, or by acting Falsly. For whether it act Not, or act Falsly, it ceaseth to act Truth; and therefore (if acting of Truth be its Essence) it ceaseth to Bee.

His first Answer may be equally applied to both; That, granting the Soule when it acts upon Falshood, to be as when it acteth not, and so is not; Yet shall we advance nothing, till we prove the Succession of Moments to be Reall and not Imaginary. Where he presupposeth, that when it Acteth not, then it Is not; and, though the same be granted in a False acting, yet neither That, nor This, will prove of any force, since Suc∣cession of Moments is onely Imaginary.

The ground of this Reply, I conceive to be this; If there be not any Reall Succession, If there be no prius and posterius Indeed, but be onely supposed so to be by our Imagination; Then any One Act of the Soule, is able to give it a co-existence to all Eternity: (according to what he affirmed in the former Chapter.) For of this One Act, being Reall, it cannot be affirmed, That it Was but Is not, or it Is but hath not-been; but if it at all Be, it must Be alwayes; Because, if Succession be onely Ima∣ginary, then to Be and to Have been is all one; then there was not a time when it Was not, neither will there be a time when it Shall Not be.

But if the Issue of the Question depend upon this, Whether Successi∣on be Reall, or Imaginary; I doubt not but this might be soon de∣cided.

Therefore First, I ask, Whether there be not the same reason for Suc∣cession in Time, that is for Extension in Place? Whether there may be Pars extra Partem, Punctum extra Punctum, though not Momentum

extra Momentum; or there be the same reason of Both, and Both be Imaginary? If there be in Both the same reason, (which I suppose he he will affirm;) Then must every Being have a Coexistence to all Places, as well as a Coexistence to all Times; It must have an Ʋbiquity as well as a Perpetuity. Then is it in vain to dispute Whether Christs Body be Really present in the Sacrament, Whether Peter were ever at Rome, &c. If every Body, every Thing▪ be every where. For if diffe∣rence of Place be nothing, then that which hath a reall existence in any place, hath a reall existence in all places; because This place and all o∣ther places have only an Imaginary Difference, and are indeed all one.

Secondly, If one action give the Soule a Coexistence to all ••ternity, then what doth the Second and Subsequent Acts produce? do they give it a new Being, a new Eternity?

Answ. You will say (I suppose) that there is not a Second Act, an Other Act, but all Acts are One Act: And this One act, which appears to our imagination to be First and Second, &c. gives the Soule One Essence, One Eternity.

Repl. If so, then what is the difference between an Act of Sinning, and a Course of Sinning? What is the difference between the Once committing of a sinful Act, and the Oft Reiterating of it? Between Da∣vids One Act of Adultery, and the lascivious persons Constant Practise? Why are we exhorted to Cease from evill; if every Act be Eternall, and whatsoever succeeds can be but the Same? He that stole, let him steal no more: To what end serves this counsell, if there be no other Act fea∣zible, but what Is already, and That to remain for ever?

Answ. 2. If you would say, That the same Act is again Reiterated▪ Rep. I ask, if the Iteration be somwhat more then the first Commission? If not, then to commit it Once, and to Iterate it often, is all One: If it be som∣what more, then is it either a Reall addition, or Imaginary: If Ima∣ginary, then are we where we were before; If it be Reall, then why may there not be a reall act distinct from the former, as well as a reall Commission (of the Same act) distinct from the former? Thus you see if Time be Nothing, If Succession be only Imaginary; then is it all one to commit Many sinnes, and to commit One Sinne.

Thirdly, if Succession and Difference of Moments be onely Imagi∣nary, if all Duration be Eternall, all Simultaneous; Then what is the difference between the long life of the Aged, and the few days of him that dy••th in his Youth? For the Reall Existence of One as well as the Other is equally Eternall; Since the Length and the Shortnesse of Time

is but Imaginary, all Duration being indeed Simultaneous. Thus the youngest Child (if he do but Think so) hath lived as long as the most Aged.

Again, 4. If Succession and Difference of Time be only imaginary; Then why do I not N••w know, that which I shall know To morrow? What hinders but that every man should be praescius futuri? I shall Know it to Morrow, because I shall See it; but why should I not Now both Know it and See it as well as to Morrow, since it is Now as really present as it will be Then? Why do we dispute concerning matters of Fact; as whether Peter were at Rome, and the like? Can we not see whether he be there or not? For if he were there, then he Is there: since Then and Now are all one: And if he Be there, why do not I see him there? For I am as really there as he is: For if I be any where, then am I There, since There and Here are al one; Time and Place making only an Imaginary (and not Reall) difference.

Ans. If you say, Things that seem to be Future, are even Now as really Present as they shall be Hereafter, but they appear not to be present, and therefore are not now Known and Seen, (like Colours in the dark;) But when they shall receive a new Luster, they shall both Appear to be, and be Seen to be.

Rep. I reply, If they shall appear, then they Doe appear; because Then and Now are all one. Again, If there be Apparet and Apparuit, why not Est and Erit? If there be a prius and posterius in Appearing why not in Being? Or ³ I ask, whether Appearing and not-Appea∣ring be a Reall or onely Imaginary difference? If a Reall diffe∣rence, then will there be somewhat Reall Then, which is not Now; and consequently all Reality will not be Simultaneous, there will be some∣what Reall afterwards which before was not: If Appearing, be onely Imaginary; what shall I have to help my knowledge Then, which I have not Now?

Ans. 2. If you say, Things Future are both now Present, & we Know them so to be, but do not Seem to know them, or Seem, not to Know them:

Repl. Then I reply as before, If we Shall Seem to know them, we Doe Seem to know them; because Then and Now are all one.

So that if Succession of Time be only Imaginary; Then do we al∣ready know, whatsoever we shall know, (whereas Christ himselfe In∣creased in wisdom, Luk. 2.) And the Fore-Knowledge of things to come, would not be such a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as might distinguish between the True and False Gods.

And thus (if I mistake not) I have sufficiently shewed (though much more might have been added) that there is a Reall Succession, a Reall Priority of Duration, and not onely Imaginary. And therefore (not∣withstanding his first answer) the Soule must really cease to Be, when it ceaseth to Work, or to work Truth; if these Workings of truth be the Soules Essence: And the soule must be (during that Cessation, or Errour) as truly Non Ens, as before its first Production; for the pre∣cedent and subsequent workings cannot (Then) give it an Existence, as not (Then) being.

His second answer, to the Objection propounded in the beginning of this Chapter, toucheth not at all the first Branch of it, wherein it is objected, That if particular Actings of Truth, be Truth, or the Soules Essence, How is it that the Understanding should not cease to Be, when it ceaseth to Work; (for this in his first Answer he seemed to grant:) But it is applyed to the second Branch of it, viz. That If particular Actings of Truth be Truth, or the Soules Essence, then the Soule enter∣taining a False position should be no more it selfe. To which he answers, By denying that the Soule doth at all act upon Falshood: and that upon this ground, Because Falshood is not a Reall Being upon which the Soule can work. For its nature being Privative, and no Reall Being, how can the Soule or Truth work upon Nothing?

I might answer here, That it is not requisite to the Soules Act, that its Object should have a Reall being: (As appears by the Soules appre∣hending Ens rationis; which Apprehension is a positive Act, and yet hath no Reall Object.) For the Object of Intellection, is not Reale, but Cognoscibile. And therefore, That Falshood wanteth a reall being, is not inough to shew, that the Understanding cannot work upon it.

And this (in effect) he granteth soon after. For, it being Objected, that the Soule while it pronounceth a False position, doth Really act, (verè agere; He replyes, That there are in this Action two things, a Think∣ing, and a So-thinking. To think is a positive Action, a good Action, But the formalis ratio of So-thinking lyeth in Thinking an Errour, which is Nothing; and so a Not-thinking. When (mistaking) a man catcheth at a shadow; In catching he doth truly Act; But to Catch a Shaddow, is to catch nothing; Now to catch nothing, and not to catch; to act nothing, and not to act, is all one. So to Think is Reall, but to Think Amisse is No∣thing, and all one with Not-thinking.

He grants therefore, that the Soule pronouncing or Understanding a False position, or thinking Amisse, doth really Think, really Act: Now I ask, while it doth really Think, What doth it think? What doth

it Act? (or Ʋpon what rather?) Certainly it must either be Falshood▪ or No••hing: (For what else it should be, neither doth his Lordship shew, nor can I imagine) If it Act upon Falshood▪ the false position; then may Falshood be the Object of a Reall act; If it act upon Nothing, then what hinders, but that Falshood▪ although it be Nothing, may yet be the Object of this Act?

Object. But he will say, If the Soule do act upon Falshood, then must it become Falshood, that is, a Vanity, a Ly, a Nothing: For I conceive (••aith he) the Agent it selfe, together with the Subject acted upon (the Ob∣ject) to be One in the Act.

Ans••. But this supposition must I deny; For if so, Then when the Soule acteth upon God (by Knowing, Loving, &c) then doth it become God: And if so, why doth his Lordship (at the end of his Preamble) blame those for mounting too high, who, confounding the Creator with the Creature, make her to be God?

But for the better clearing of this whole discourse, concerning Fals∣hood and Errour in the Souls working; I shall desire you to take notice of a Distinction, which all Know, and yet but few Think of, when they have occasion to use it. The non attendency whereof, hath pro∣duced much Obscurity, much Errour, and inextricable perplexities con∣cerning this and the like Subjects. It is, to distinguish between Verum Metaphysicum▪ and Verum Logicum; between Bonum Metaphysicum, and Bonum Morale: To distinguish, I say, Metaphysicall Truth and Goodnesse, from Morall and Logicall Goodnesse and Truth: To di∣stinguish the Truth of Being from the Truth of a Proposition; the Good∣nesse of Being, from the Goodnesse of an Action.

Now this being premised, let us examine the truth of some Tenents which are allmost generally received by all.

1 The nature of Evill, say they, is Privative, not Positive; Evill is Nothing. And why? Because Ens & Bonum convertuntur, and there∣fore Malum must needs be Non-Ens; now Non-Ens is Nothing.

Be it so; Evill is Nothing. But what Evill do they mean? Evill in Metaphysicks▪ or Evill in Ethicks? Goodnesse, in Metaphysicks, is no other th••n Entity, (for none ever acknowledged a greater distinction between Ens & Bonum then a distinction of Reason,) and therefore Ma∣lum (in Metaphysicks) must be Non Ens. But will they say that Mo∣rall Evill is so too? If they do, then must they say also, that bonum Mo∣rale is convertible with Ens; (otherwise their Argument will not hold:) that All Being is Honesty, or Morall Goodnesse; and all Morall Good∣nesse

is Being or Entity. I ask therefore, whether morall Goodnesse, or Honesty, ••e the Essence, the Entity of a Stone? If not, then is not every Being, Bonum Morale▪ I ask again, Whether Silence be not Morally Good, at such a time as when a man ought to hold his peace? Yet to •• Silent, or not to speak, hath no Metaphysicall goodnesse, no goodnesse of Being, for it is a mee•• Negation. There may be therefore Morall good∣nesse, where there is no Metaphysicall goodnesse, no positive Being; and there may be Metaphysicall goodnesse, goodnesse of Being, without Morall goodnesse or Goodnesse of Honesty. Now if Malum Metaphy∣sicum, a Negation, a Non-Ens, may be Bonum Morale, what shall be the Malum Morale opposite to this Bonum? shall that be also a Non-En•••• If it be, then how can it be contrary to the other? Since that Nothing cannot be opposite to Nothing, but Something to Something, or Some∣thing to Nothing.

I say therefore, that Metaphysicall Evill, is meerly Privative, as be∣ing opposite to the Goodnesse of Being; and it is no other but Non-En∣tity▪ But Morall Evill is every way as Positive as is Morall Good.

For what is the nature of Morall Good, or Evill? is it not, a Confor∣mity, or a Difformity to a Morall Precept? Then the Goodnesse or Evill of it is not in the Being of the Action, but in the so Being; It lies not in the Positive or Absolute Entity of the Action, but in the Relative nature. Morall Goodnesse therefore, and Morall Evill, have not an Absolute Essence, but a Relative; An Agreeing, or Disagreeing; a Likenesse, or Unlikenesse, to its Rule. Now if Likenesse be a Reall Relation; why may not Ʋnlikenesse be also a relation Reall? If Simile be Reall, why not Dissimile? If the One be Positive, why not the Other?

Object. They will say perhaps, That the nature of Morall Evill, is not a Difformity but a non-Conformity, to its Rule; not to be (positively) Ʋnlike, but only Not to be Like.

Answ. If so, then not to be is a Sinne; for not to Bee, includes not to be Like, or not to be Obedient. If the blessed Angels had never been Crea∣ted, they had been eo ipso Sinfull: For if they had never Been, they must of necessity Not be Obedient; (though not Disobedient;) For how can they be Obedient, if not at all Being?

A Stone must then be Sinfull, when it doth not-understand the Nature of God, as a man doth and ought to do; For though it be not Disobe∣dient to the precept of Knowledge, (because this precept was not made to a Stone but to Man,) Yet you cannot say that it is Obedient, and ther∣fore

must of necessity be not-Ob••dient, or not-be Obedient; wherefore if a bare not-obedience, or a not conformity to the command be a Sinne, then doth a Stone Sinne. Scire Deum is morally Good, and therefore (if morall Evill be only an Absence of Good) since there is not in a Stone this Scire Deum, how can it be but that a Stone must sinne?

God commanded Moses to go down into Egipt, &c. and Aaron to offer Sacrifice: Doe I Sinne therefore when I doe not-obey this com∣mand made to them? How is it possible that I can obey the command for Moses his Journey, or Aaron's sacrificing; for My going is not Moses his going, nor is my sacrificing, Aaron's Sacrificing; Yet doe I not sinne in not-obeying.

When Moses made the Brazen Serpent, he did not (in that) obey the precept of going into Egipt, (for to go into Egipt, and to make the Serpent, is not the same,) Yet was it not Sinfull to make the Brazen Serpent, though it were-not an Obedience to that Command, for neither was it a Disobedience; for that Precept, did neither injoyn nor forbid it.

Thus every Action, though never so Good, will be a Sinne; For there is in the most perfect Act, a not-Obeying of many precepts, (yea of all precepts, except that which injoyns this Action,) though there be not perhaps a Disobedience of any.

The nature of Sinne therefore, or Morall Evill, is not barely a Not-Obeying▪ but a Disobeying; It is not a Not-Conformity, but a Difformity, a Crossing or Thwarting of some Command. Therefore the Stone sins not, because there is no Disobedience in its not-Knowing, because it was not Commanded; Moses his making the brazen Serpent, was not a Breach of his former Injunction, although not an Obeying of it; for in his Commission to go into Egipt, his making the brazen Serpent was neither Forbidden nor Commanded. The Act of one Morall Virtue, is not an offence against the rest; for it is no Breach of their Rules, though it be not an Observance of them: It is Praeter, but not Contra.

Ans. 2. But if I should say on the contrary, That the nature of Morall Good, were not a Conformity, or positive Likenesse; but only a not-Difformity, a not-Disagreeing, or not crossing its Rule; Might not this be said with as good probability as the other? You would think it strange perhaps, that Evill should be Positive, and Good Negative: But (if I m••stake not) there is more truth in this, then is in the other. For a bare not-agreeing doth not make an action Sinfull, but a not-disagreeing d••th make it Lawfull, and so Morally Good; For where there is no

Law, there is no Sinne. If I walk for my refreshing in one part of the Garden to day, and in another to morrow; or in that other to day, & in this to morrow; I sinne not in either: Not because I have a Command to walk in this first, or in the other part first: But because neither is Forbidden, therefore is neither Ʋnlawfull. I ask therfore, whether the Lawfullnesse of this Action, in walking first in this part of the garden and not in the other part, doe depend upon its Conformity to some Rule, or its not-disagreeing from any? Now, what is the Lawfullnesse of an Action, but its Morall Goodnesse?

Ans. 3 Yet Thirdly, I affirm not the nature of morall Good or Evill to be Negative, but both equally Positive; If by Good, you understand, That which Ought to be, not, That which May be. And therefore I make three sorts of Morall Beings; Bonum, Malum, Indifferens▪ Good, which must be done; Indifferent, which may be done; Evill, which may-not be done. The first, Commanded; the last, Forbidden; the other, of a midle nature, neither Commanded, nor Forbidden; which being Indifferent, is often called Good, but never Evill. The first consists, in a Conformity to its Rule; the last, in a Difformity; the other in a bare not∣disagreeing. The first and last are of a Positive nature; the other of a Negative. (And yet sometimes this Positivenesse, whether in Good or Evill, is rather Positivum Logicum (the Praedicat of a Positive or Affir∣mative Proposition,) then Positivum Reale. For an Omission, Negatio act••s, may be Good or Evill: which having in it selfe no reall Being, cannot be the Subject of a reall Relation.)

Yet doth not this contradict their Opinion who affirm, That non da∣tur actio Indifferens in individuo. For by Good and Evill, they mean Licitum & Illicitum, Lawfull and Unlawfull; including under the name of Good, or Lawfull, not only that which Ought to be done, but whatsoever May be done; as when (in civill matters) we say, it is Law∣full for me to give such a portion of my Estate to such a Man, not be∣cause the Law of the Kingdom Injoins me so to doe; but because it doth not Inhibite me. And thus Licitum will be a Negative term, and Illi∣citum a Positive, (though by the Grammaticall Notation it might seem contrary;) for Illicitum affirms, that there is a Law to the Contrary; Licitum denies only that there is such a Law to Forbid it, but whether there be any to Command it, it affirms not.

And thus much concerning the nature of Evill. (Wherein if I may seem prolix, it being but a Digression in this place: Yet because I was called to it in the former chapter, where his Lordship gave me occasion

to handle it; I thought it more fit to referre the discussing of it to this place, where I meet with more questions of the like nature.)

2. Now, as it is in Good and Evil, so also in Truth and Falshood. Falshood, saith he, is a Vanity, a Lye, a Nothing And why so? Because Ens & Verum convertuntur, and therefore Falsum must be non-Ens.

To this I say, as to the former; Truth of Being, or Metaphysicall Truth, is Positive, and of the same extent or latitude with Entity, or Being. And this Truth I have formerly said to be Cognoscibility, ma∣king Verum in this Metaphysicall acceptation to be all one with In∣telligibile.

I affirm also, that Ens & Verum (or Intelligibile) convertuntur. And (consequently) according to the manner of Being, must be the manner of Intellection. That which hath a reall Being (as Ens Reale) may be Known to Be; that which hath an apparent, or supposed Being, may be Supposed to Be.

I affirm likewise, that Falshood in this sense cannot be understood, or that the Soule cannot act upon (Metaphysicall) Falshood: For how can that be Known, which is not Cognoscible; or Understood, which is not Intelligible?

But, When I affirm, that Verum and Ens are Convertible; I restrain it not to Reall Entity; For there may be Esse Cognitum, where there is not Esse Reale: But I proportion its Cognoscibility to its Being; and therefore if it have not a Reall Being, but only Imaginary; it may be Supposed, but cannot be Known, to be.

Neither yet doe I So proportion the reality of Intellection, to the re∣ality of the Object, as if when there is no Reall Object, there could be no Reall Act: For it is Cognoscibile that is convertible with Ens, and hath its reality proportionable to the reality of Being; not Cognos••iti∣vum. The Understanding, whether it Know to be, or Suppose to be, doth yet Really Act; And his Lordship also granteth, that when the Un∣derstanding doth act Amisse, it doth yet Really Act; The Opining, or Thinking, (saith he) is a good Act. But where the Object is not Reall, there the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Cognosc••, cannot be Reall; for how can a reall Relation be founded in a Non-Entity? Yet the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Cognoscere is Reall; for the Re∣ality of ••t, depends not upon the reality of the Object, but upon the reality of the Act. That therefore which is so understood, is the Sup∣posed Object of a Reall Act.

But now Logicall Truth, the Truth of a Proposition, which is oppo∣sed to Falshood, ••o Errour, hath nothing to do with the Reality either of

the Object or of the Act; For a True Proposition may be framed con∣cerning an Imaginary Object (as when we affirm a Chimaera to be Ens Rationis, or only Imaginary▪) And an Act Metaphysically True (a Reall act) may be Logically False.

Logicall Truth and Falshood (like as Morall Good and Evill) have not an Absolute Being, but Relative. They consist not in the Being or Not-Being of the Act; (For when the Understanding doth act Falsly it doth verè Agere, though not agere Verè; it is verè Actus, though not Verus Actus:) but in the Agreeing, or Disagreeing with the Ob∣ject. For when the Intellect doth Understand, it frames an Idea, a pi∣cture, or representation of the Thing understood▪ which Picture, or Idea, is a Reall Picture, (it hath the Truth of Being) whether it have the Truth of Representation or not; that is, whether it be Like or Un∣like, whether it Agree or Disagree, with the copy or object which it represents. A Picture in a Painters Shop is truly a Picture, it hath reall Colours and Lineaments; But perhaps it is a False Picture, it represents not that Visage by which it was drawn. When the Understanding conceives an Ens rationis, the Idea or Conceptus is not this Imaginary Being, (for this Conception is as Reall as the Conception of a Reall Ens,) But the supposed Object of this Conception; there being indeed no such thing as this Conceptus doth represent. When a Painter describes in a Table some Antick Shapes or strange Chimaera's; his Description, his Draught, is not a Fiction, but as Reall as the true Pourtraicture of a living Man: But that which by this description is represented, that is the Fiction, there being no such Antick Forms, no such Chimaera's, as he expresseth. When the Understanding draws a Reall Picture, a reall I∣dea or Conceptus, without a Copy, without a Pattern; it is Ens rationis: When, indeavouring to imitate a Copy, to represent the nature of things, the Truth of Being; it yet misseth of it, not making its Picture agreeable to its Pattern; this is a False Apprehension. And this is the difference between Ens rationis, and Error Intellectûs: Both in the mean time being reall Acts.

The Logicall Truth and Falshood of a Conception or Proposition, are but Relations of Likenesse or Unlikenesse, Conformity or Diffor∣mity, in the Act to its Object; and are both founded in the Reality of the Action, or its Truth of Being: And are both equally Reall, equally Positive▪ For Falshood is not a meer not-Conformity, or not-expressing of things existent; But a Difformity, a Crossing or Thwarting of them. For else, when a man ceaseth to Think or Speak of this or that Truth, he

there by Erres, and Lyes: For when he Thinks not at all, he cannot think Conformably; when he Speaks not at all, he cannot speak Con∣formally, either to the Existence of Things, or to his own Opinion of them. Yea every Proposition, every Thought will have so many Fals∣hoods in it, as there be other Truths which it doth not expresse: For if the not-expressing of a Truth, be Falshood: then to affirm that the Sunne shines, is a Falshood, because it doth not expresse the Fires hea••, or the Charcoals burning: And thus that proposition which expres∣seth not every Truth, is a False Proposition; yea contains Infinite Falshoods, opposite to the Infinit number of True Propositions possible.

Object. If you say (to avoid this) that it is not the not-expressing of One Truth, the not-conformity to One Existence, that makes a Propo∣sition False; but the not-expressing of Any Truth: whereas the Con∣formity to, and the Expressing of any Truth, makes the Proposition or Conception True:

Ans. I answer first, that this is contrary to the generall Propositi∣on, which affirms, that Perfectio oritur ex Integris, Imperfectio verò ex Particulari defectu: Which is applyed to severall kinds of Imperfecti∣on; That Action is Good, whose every Circumstance is rightly or∣dered; That Proposition True▪ whose every Branch doth agree with the Thing, &c. Wheras One Bad circumstance, One false branch makes the Action bad, the Proposition False. The contrary to which must have been affirmed, if the expressing of One Truth, make the Proposition True; and the concurrent not-expressing, or not-Conformity to All Truths be requisite to make it False.

2. Again, If there be requisite a not-expressing of Any Truth to make it False; then must this (and the like propositions) be True, if I affirm Virgil & Homer to be Greek Poets, If I affirm a Stone to be a Reasonable Creature: For it expresseth One Truth, viz▪ that it is a Creature although it be not Reasonable, (as likewise the One was a Gre••k Poet, though not the other:) and the not-expressing of a further Truth, doth not hin∣der its expressing of This. Then must that Action be Good whose One Circumstance is Good; If the Intention be right, though the Formality of the Action be never so unlawfull, yet will not the Act be Blamable.

Logicall Falshood therfore is as positive, as Logicall Truth; the one consisting in a positive Conformity, the other in a positive Difformity to the Things. Yea, of the two, the nature of Truth is rather Negative, thē the nature of Falshood; For a not-conformity makes not a Proposition False; but the not-difformity makes it True. For that is a True proposition that is not Opposite to Any Truth▪ though it do not Expresse All Truths.

Neither can there be a Medium between Truth and Falshood, as there is between Good and Evill; For though there may be an Indifferent Action, which is neither Good (positively) nor Evill; yet is there not an Indifferent Proposition which is neither True nor False. Truth and Falshood in Propositions, are opposed as Lawfulnesse and Ʋnlawfulnesse in Actions, (whereof Lawfulnesse, as I have said, is Negative;) rather then as Good and Evill, Laudabile & Vituperabile.

Yet if we desire a Medium, I can shew you one; But then it must not be Actus, but Negatio Actûs. And that is, in Abstraction; when the Understanding conceives of one Thing, without considering of a∣nother▪ for then it doth neither Affirm, nor Deny, and so that Concep∣tion is (thus farre) neither True nor False; as likewise the Proposition expressing this Thought. When I conceive of the Ayr, not regarding whether it be Light or Dark; of a Man not considering whether he be Learned or Ignorant: This Abstracting, or considering the Ayr without considering Light in it; considering Aristotle to have been a Man, not considering withall that he was Learned; is neither True nor False: According to that, Abstrahentis non est Mendacium: wher∣as if I affirm the Ayr (in the day time) to be without Light, or Ari∣stotle without Learning; the proposition is False.

Falshood and Truth therefore being Relations, equally Reall, equally Positive▪ the Understanding may be said as well to Act Falshood, as to act Truth, while it produceth that Absolute Act, in which these Rela∣tions are founded. Otherwise▪ what will be the difference between Ig∣norance and Errour, between Silence and a Lye?

3. There is yet another Question, to which by his Lor••. I am invited; The same (saith he) may be said of Pain; which he conceiveth cannot act upon the Soule, nor the Soule upon it; because it is but a bare Privation. And therefore subscribes to the Opinion of Dr. TWISSE, (whom if Anagrams may be credited, you may stile WISEST;) that it is better to be in perpetuall Pain, then not to be at all; Because if Pain be a bare Privation, then is Any Being more desirable, then for fear of a Pri∣vation (a Nothing) to become no Being. His ground you may easily perceive; Because if Misery be but a Privation of Happinesse; then is it better to have the Goodnesse of Being, without the Goodnesse of Happinesse, then to want both the one and the other.

But I cannot with his Lordship (saving always the deserved respect due to that Reverend Divine) subscribe to the Opinion of Dr. Twisse in this particular. For (beside that thus Paena Damni, and paena Sensus

will be all One) I conceive Pain to be as reall as Pleasure. Motion hath been accounted by all (if I mistake not) to be Positive, and Rest (quies) to be only Privative, Negatio Motûs. Now in my Opinion, Ease, and Pain or Torment, are opposite in the same manner that Rest and Motion. And so I conceive Pain or Torment (whether you speak of dolor Corporis, or dolor Animi; the Griefe of mind, or bodily Pain) to be Reall; the Negation whereof is called Ease; and its Contrary, Pleasure or Delight.

Neither doth it at all trouble me, that Ens & Bonum convertuntur; that all reall Entity, hath a reall Goodnesse, or the goodnesse of Being: For nothing hinders but that Bonum Metaphysicum, may be Malum Physicum▪ that which is Reall may notwithstanding be Inconvenient; that which is, in se Bonum, may not-be Bonum huic, whether you speak of bonum Jucundum or bonum Ʋtile.

Goodnesse of Being (Metaphysicall goodnesse) is but a common Sub∣ject capable either of (Physicall) Good or Evill; (like as the same Reall Action may be Morally Good or Evill.) And according as the Physi∣call Good, or Evill (annexed to Being Metaphysically Good) doth ex∣ceed, so is that Being Desirable, or not Desirable. Otherwise, How could it be better for that man (which betrayed our Saviour) that he had ne∣ver been born?

I urge not the judgement of Sense in this particular; because his Lord∣ship appeals from Sense to Reason: I shall therefore examine what Rea∣son can alledge, why credit should not be given to the judgement of Sense. For, ••having a Judgement confessed in the Court of Sense; I must suppose▪ it to be in force, till such time as I see it revoked by Rea∣son: And when Reason hath reversed it, I will grant the former Sen∣tence to be Voyd.

Object. You will say Being, though Miserable, hath some Good∣nesse: whereas Not-Being hath none: and therefore Being, though with Misery, is more desirable.

Ans. I reply, Misery hath much Evill, not-Being hath none: Ther∣fore Misery is more to be Shunned then not to Be.

But if this satisfie not; I desire to know whether there be not the same strength of Reason in This Argument, that is in Theirs. viz: A Sinfull Act hath in it the Goodnesse of Being; and its Sinfullnesse i•• only a Pri∣vation of further Goodnesse, the goodnesse of Conformity to Gods Law. Therefore, it is better to Sinne then not to Act; to commit a Sinne then not to commit it: For if I Sinne, I produce ••ome Good; because

it is a reall Action, and so hath the Goodnesse of Being; But in not∣acting, not-committing, I produce no Goodnesse at all. Therefore it is better to Sinne, then not to Sinne: because Acting, though Sinfull, hath Some good, but Not-acting hath None.

Now if this Argument do not hold good to prove it Better to Sinne (be the Sinne as great as can be possible) then not to Act, not to Sinne: Then must I needs think that their Argument, being exactly in the same form, is of as little force, to prove Misery (though never so great) to be better then not-Being.

But let us heare his Lordship plead at Reasons Barre, for the revoking that Sentence which hath past in the Court of Sense. Reason telleth us (saith he) that Paine must be Somthing, or Nothing: If Nothing, then it is but a Privation; ••f Something, then must it be Good or Evill; If Good, it cannot hurt us; If Evill, it is either a Nominall Evill, or Reall▪ If Na∣med an Evill and is not, it will not be disputed; but if it be a Reall Evill, then is it Nothing▪ for Evill is only a Privation of Good.

I answer to this discourse; That Paine is Somthing, It is Evill, It is a Reall Evill, (Malum Physicum.) And this Reall Evill is also Posi••ve, and not a bare Privation of Good: For I conceive not a Stone to be in Pain, though it have not Pleasure, (bonum Jucundum;) nor to be Greived, though it do not Rejoyce.

There is one great rubbe that yet remains against what I have said, concerning these three last mentioned Questions; which I have refer∣red to the End, that so once mentioning might suffice, without parti∣cular repetition in the discussing of each Question. And it is this.

If Falshood and Evill, whether Morall or Physicall, have a Being, (if it be Reall) then must we with the Manichees make two Sources of Being; or else God must be the Author of it, which none will affirm.

For answer to this, I intend not ex professo to handle at large that question, Whether, and In what Sense, God may be called the Author of Sinne, of Evill, of Falshood. For, if I durst to encounter that difficul∣ty, which hath troubled able Divines; yet would it be too tedious to insert here, especially when I have allready transgrest with over much prolixity. Only thus.

All Relations, you know, have their Originall, not from any peculiar Act whereby they are produced, distinct from that Act by which is produced that in which they are grounded; But arise and flow from that Absolute Being, upon which they depend, per nudam Resulta••tiam, by a Resultation from it, without a new intermediate Act. The Father

doth not by One act beget his Sonne, and by Another act (He, or his Sonne) produce Filiation: But the terminirelationis being once produ∣ced, the Relation doth unavoidably follow: Two white things being produced, it is impossible (etiam per divinam potentiam) but that they must (in this) be Like.

Now Falshood and Truth, Good and Evill, being (as I have said) Relations; and consequently having no other Production, but their Resultance from their Foundation; I leave it to others to judge, How farre God doth concurre with the operation of the Creature in produ∣cing that Act, which is Good or Evill, True or False; and How farre the Efficient of this Act may be affirmed the Cause of that Relation which doth result from it.

CHAP. XIII. The Consequents of this Assertion, that All things are one Truth. Whether usefull in Practicalls.

I Have now done with his Lordships Thesis layd downe in the full extent in the severall branches of it. The Chapters ensuing are but a declaration of the Consequents, the Ʋsefullnesse of this Position. Which, saith he, if we consider, viz. That all things are but one Ema∣nation from divine power; It would make our lives more cheerfull, more Christian, both in the Practicall and Theoreticall part.

That all things are but one Emanation, if he speak of unum per aggre∣gationem, I grant; and so I suppose will all else. God alone hath his Be∣ing of Himselfe, and gives Being to all his Creatures: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. And whatsoever Being they have, it is only a communication of that Being which he hath in him selfe. But that the Parts of this One Aggregatum are not Really distinct from each other; hath not yet been so clearly proved as to convince mee.

His Arguments, if they prove any thing, will prove, That God can∣not produce Creatures really distinct. For if it be enough to prove, All things that now are to be really the same, Because the Fountain of them all is God; the thing Communicated, their own Essence; and the Re∣cipient, Themselves; (because the Essence produced, receiveth of God 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Esse:) Then is it impossible for God to produce any thing that shall not be the same with these: For whatsoever can be possibly produced, If God be the Author of it, Then must Hee be the Fountain, and It selfe the Recipient, receiving from God 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Esse.

This being premised, I ask, Whether this One Emanation which his Lordship seeks to establish, be Really distinct from God or no? If not, then must not his Lordship blame those that confound the Creator with th•• Creature, making It to be God. But if this one Emanation be distinct Really, If this Fountain have sent forth One Stream really distinct from it selfe, What hinders but that it may send forth More Streams? Hath God (like Isaack) but One Blessing? Or Can he produce more but Will not? If he Can; then is it Possible that Two Emanations, Two Creatures, may be really distinct, though receiving their Essence from the same Fountain. And if Any Creatures may be possibly distinct from other, Why not These Creatures that now are? there being no more to be alledged for their Ʋnity, then for the Unity of all Possible. Gods 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, his Power also, and the Emanation of it, is So Uni∣form, as that it is equivalent to an Infinite Variety.

He proceeds to this purpose. In the Practick part of our Lives (saith he) If we knew that all things were One, with what Cheerfullnesse, what Courage, should we undertake any Action, any Difficulty; Knowing The distinction of Misery and Happynesse, to have no Being but in the Brain; That Misery is Nothing, and cannot hurt us, That every thing is Good, and Good to mee, Because I and It are Beings and so Good, And these two Goods falling under no other difference but of Degrees, Good and Good must needs agree, that which is Good is Good to Mee: Yea how void of Envy at anothers good, and of thoughts of Revenging Injuries; Since I have a Pro∣priety, a Possession of that which is Anothers, hee and I being One; In∣juries are Nothing and cannot hurt; Good things, though anothers, doe serve me.

That all things are one; That the difference between Happinesse and Misery is only in the Brain; That Misery, That Injuries, are Nothing and▪ cannot hurt; That whatsoever is Good must be Good to Mee; and (which is the ground of it) That Good and Good, Ens & Ens, admit of no difference but of Degrees: I have allready denied. I will only adde, That by this discourse you prove the Devills as happy as the blessed Angels: And if it be a Good Consequent of this Position. That it will make us no•• be afraid of Misery and Danger: I am sure it is as Bad a Consequent, That it will make us not afraid of Sinning. The Devills are Beings, and therefore Good; Every thing that is, is Good, and Good to them, For both They and It being Good, and admitting of no difference but of Degrees, Good and Good cannot but agree, and so, be Good to them: The Happi∣nesse of the blessed Angells doth serve Them, since (as his Lordship

speaks) it is not onely 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, They have a Propriety in it: Their own Misery and Torment is nothing, and cannot hurt them; And (which is the onely difference which you can imagine) if they Think otherwise (I use still his Lordships expression) this must be a Lye, and cannot hurt. And if this be Hell; who will be afraid to Sinne?

My judgement cannot assent to make the Torments of the damned, onely Imaginary; To make Hell a Fansie. Yea to affirm, That it is Good to sinne, Because the Act of sinning is a Reall Good; and its E∣vill, only Imaginary, a Lye, and cannot hurt.

CHAP. XIV. Whether Knowledge and Sciences receive benefit from this Assertion.

HE proceeds to shew the Usefulnesse of Unity in Theory; and com∣plains, that Learning is broken into so many Sciences: wishing that it were all like the Chain fastened to Jupiters Throne, All of a piece. And indeed I wish as heartily as his Lordship, (whether All things be One Emanation, or Many) that Comenius his designe, (of which his Lord∣ship speaks) of reducing all into one, might proceed: Of reducing, I say, all Knowledge into a Body, all Sciences into one System; (for This is it Comenius designes; he never fancied his Lordships Unity.) And great pity it is, that so worthy a design is not prosecuted at a publike charge, that such a shining Light should be extinct for want of Oyl; if there may be hopes of effecting it.

He shews what a Multitude of Inquiries we must needs make for the perfecting of Knowledge, whilst we acknowledge a distinction in Things; which labour might be much contracted, If we could be con∣tent to see all things to be but One, bearing onely different Shapes. But though this were allowed; Yet must we then, either look at all things with a Confused Eye; or else shall be as much troubled in taking no∣tice of Different Shapes, as we are now in observing Different Things.

He reckons up many doubts, as not yet determined, concerning the Existence of Beings; What things there are, and What they are; Qu••∣nam sunt, & Qualia (vel Quid) sunt. But I see not how his doctrine, of Ʋnity in all things, will resolve any of these. For granting all things to be One, Yet how shall I know, whether there be an Ʋnicorn••, a Phoenix a Mermaid, or Ebur F••••••il••? Whether the Philosophers Stone, or a

Perpetuall Motion, be possibile? Whether Dictamnum be a Soveraign Balm? Whether Tobacco be hot or cold? What are the degrees of Heat or Cold in this or that Simple? If then this Opinion serve no way to in∣form us concerning these Questions wherein we doubt; How can he commend this opinion, as Usefull, from the manifestion of our Igno∣rance in these particulars? If he would exhort us, not to enquire; this he may doe though they may be Many; If he would have us search, whether or no there be these severall Shapes, How doth their common Ʋnity help forward the Enquiry? You see (saith he) in what a Maz•• you are Meandred, if you admit of any Division. I wish we could see how to help it, by allowing his Ʋnity.

Yet notwithstanding their multitude) he accounts the knowledge of Existences, and the Being of things, to be Necessary; although those things are all of one Nature, variegated only in our apprehension. (But for ought I see, it is as little labour for us to find, that there are so many Things, as for his Lordship to find out so many Shapes.) But to enquire the Cau∣ses of these Beings, is (in his Lordships opinion) to become Majestatis rei▪ for prying into th••se Arcana Imperii.

In my judgement, there may be as great a Vanity and Emptinesse in the curious enquiry after the Being of Things, as in the too nice search of their Causes. Vain Philosophy may be as well in the Histori∣call as in the Discursive part. A modest inquiry both into the Beings, and into the Causes of Things, is both Lawfull and Commendable; a nice Curiosity is blamable in Either: It will prove but Vanity, if not Vexation; Weaving a Spiders Web, if not Hatching a Cockatrices Egge. T••las quasdam doctrinae pariunt, t••nuitate fili operisque Admira∣biles, sed quoad usum Frivolas & Inanes. Bacon. L••ke a Razor of too keen an edge; As Seneca speaks of Chrysippus, Magnum ••••hercle vi∣rum, sed cujus acumen nimis Tenue retunditur, & in se saepe replicatur▪ etiam cùm agere aliquid videtur, Pungit, non Perforat.

CHAP. XV. Whether confusion in the knowledge of Causes be redressed by this Ʋnity.

OF Causes▪ he tells us) there are Two lye open to our view, The Ʋniversall Efficient of all things, God; and the Materia prima, 〈…〉〈…〉 common Essence; Other Causes (saith he) are better known by Name

then in the Natures of them; (as Efficient, Finall, Materiall, For∣mall, &c.)

We are ignorant, I grant, in the particular causes of divers things; and therefore when we have no other but those two Generals, we must rest there. But if the other appear and Shew themselves; we need not shut our Eyes for fear of Seeing them. It is not like to cost us so dear as Ovid's, or Act••on's sight, or as those that saw Medusa's Head.

Till Numeri Platonici (saith he) cease to be a Proverb, in vain shall any undertake to teach him How and Whence it is, that the various Rowlings of the Tongue should send forth so many articulate Voices, and so many severall Languages.

We say already, That the different Articulation of Sounds, ariseth from the diverse Figuration of the Organs. If his Numeri Platonici can give us a better account, I would be glad to heare it.

Till then, he will give no credence to any who promiseth an account of the Estuation of the Sea; Whether from the Moon, &c.

That Numeri Platonici will furnish us with a better reason; I will then beleeve, when I see it. In the mean time I see nothing to hinder us from an Enquiry after a Physicall cause. And I doubt his Lordship will have a hard task to give a reason in Numbers, why the Sea ebbes and ••lows.

CHA••. XVI. Whether divisions in other parts of Learning be remedied by it.

NExt he shews us many doubts in Morall Philosophy, as well as those precedent in Naturall Philosophy. But I doe not see that his Lordships Position will help to clear any one of them whatsoever.

Whether the Ʋnderstanding and the Will be Really the same, or di∣stinct, is nether Materiall nor Determinable, in Morall Phylosophy: It belongs only to Naturall Philosophy, viz. to that part of Physicks that treats de Animâ.

How the Will may somtimes omit the prosecution of the Understan∣dings direction; I have already shewed, without making the Will an Ʋnderstanding.

He glanceth at Aristotle's maintaining the Eternity of the World a∣gainst Hermes, Orpheus, Anaxagoras, &c. For my own part, I would

be thankfull to him, that would solidly demonstrate the Worlds Crea∣tion from principles in Nature, and make it appear from Naturall Light, that the World could not have been from Eternity. For though I deny not, but that there may be in Nature, Demonstrative Arguments; yet I confesse, I have not as yet seen those (and yet I have examined many) that have given me so full satisfaction as I desire concernng an absolute Impossibility; but that I have seen (at least seemed to see) some just exception.

But if his Lordships Opinion be True, I shall have more cause to doubt then I have formerly had. For if all things did exist in their Be∣ings with God, ab omni aeterno; and their Temporall Existence be onely Imaginary, to our apprehension: (as his Lordship affirms in his 11. Chapter, pag. 99.) I cannot imagine any hinderance at all, Why that which did really exist from all Eternity, might not be without a beginning; Why that which Was ab aeterno, might not (though it did not) ab aeterno Appear to be, and be Apprehended. I will not therefore blame A∣ristotle for maintaining the Worlds Eternity as a disputable Probleme, till I see some Light which might have convinced him, whilst he en∣joyed not the benefit of Revealed Light; at least, till this opinion of his Lordship be rejected.

In the next place, I grant to his Lordship that there are doubts also in Metaphysicks, in Logick, in Mathematicks. But I perceive not how this opinion dissolves them.

There be doubts also in Divinity, (though I do not see how this doth clear them▪) Whether Faith, or Repentance be precedent: Whether Faith be a particular application of Christ to my selfe: or only a bare spirituall beliefe, that Christ is the Sonne of God.

I as••ent not, to place (the Saving Act of) Faith, either with Mr. Cotton, (as his Lordship cites him) in the laying hold of, or assenting to that Promise, That, Hee that beleeveth that Christ is the Sonne of God, shall be saved; Nor yet in a Particular application of Christ to my selfe in Assurance, or a beleeving that Christ is mine: (For though these also be acts of Saving Faith, yet they are not the Saving Act of Faith.) But I choose rather to place it in an act of the Will, rather then in either of these fore-named acts of the Ʋnderstanding. It is an Accepting of Christ offered, rather then an Assenting to a Proposition affirmed. To as many as [Received] him, &c. that is, to them that Beleeve in his name, Joh. 1. God makes an offer of Christ to all, (else should not Reprobates be condemned for not ac∣cepting

of him; as neither the Devils are, because he was not offered to them) Whosoever Will, let him come, and Take of the water of Life freely Rev. 22. 17. Whereupon the Beleeving Soule replies, I will, and so Takes him. When a Guift is Offered to mee; That which makes it to be Mine, is my Acceptation, my Taking it; Not the Knowing that it is Offered; nor the Knowing that it is Mine; For the one of these precedeth, the other followeth, the appropriating it to my selfe.

If you call this Taking of Christ, (or consenting that Christ shall be my Saviour▪ a Depending, a Resting, or Relying upon Christ for Salva∣tion; (if you speak of an Act of the Will:) It is all One. For, Taking of Christ to be my Saviour, and Committing my selfe to Christ to be Saved, is the same: Both of them being but a Consenting to this Covenant▪ I will be your God, and you shall be my people; I will be thy Father, and Thou shalt be my Sonne.

And if you make this the Saving act of Faith; then will Repentance (so farre as it is distinct from Faith) be a Consequent of it. Confidence also or Assurance that Christ is mine ariseth from it: For Christ must first be Ours, before we can Know him so to be.

Then also that, Whether Faith be a beleeving that I am Saved; (he meanes, in statu salutis.) or a depending upon God for Salvation, (to be put into such a Condition of Salvation,) will be easily resolved, and Bel∣larmins Dilemma soon answered. viz. If Beliefe be to Beleeve that I am saved, (that Christ is mine,) then was▪ I saved without Faith: If it be, to beleeve that God will give me Grace to be saved, then do I beleeve before▪ I have Grace, before I have Faith. I say, It is easily answered, by ma∣king the Saving act of Faith, an Acceptance or Taking of Christ: For although the Guift be mine, before I Know; or am Assured, that it is mine; Yet is not the Guift mine, before my Accepting of it, but by my Acceptance it becomes Mine.

If (with Mr. Cotton) we should make Faith to save us, only Decla∣rativè (which wee must by no means admit;) Then, Why is it said, that we are saved by Faith, and not by Works? Why do we allow, that Faith doth concurrere effica••iter ad salutem, but deny the same to Works? Seeing that Good Works do save us Declarativè, as well as Faith.

That we are saved not only in the eternall Decree without faith, but even in the Execution, is strange Divinity. For if without Faith, then with∣out Christ; for Christ is no further Ours, then apprehended by Faith. As for the Eternall Decree (of Election, he meanes,) it is true, we are not▪ through Faith, Elected to Salvation; but we are Elected, to Salvation

through Faith. Faith is not the Cause of the Decree, but Faith is de∣creed to be the Cause of Salvation.

To that Question, whether there be a prescript Form of Church-Go∣vernment, I shall say nothing; For it being a Question maintained both wayes, I will not oppose either of them, unlesse I had leisure, to confirm what I say, to prosecute what I affirm. Only to his Argu∣ment I may lay an exception. Church-government, (which he presu∣meth to be enjoined in the second Commandement,) is not of the na∣ture of Morall Precepts, because not of Perpetuall Continuance: (For such a prescript Form, as by which the Church since Christ should be governed, had not its beginning till since Christ: And therfore not commanded in the second Commandement any otherwise then by Consequence; (as particular temporary duties are.) However, it is like, Church Government is not more expresly commanded in the se∣cond Commandement, then Civill Government in the fift; and yet none ever inferred from thence, a prescript Form of Civill Government. If he ask therfore, Doe they leave us any latitude in any other Commande∣ments? I say, Yes: and I instance in That. He must search for a Pre∣scription, in the Evangelists, and Apostles writings, if he would find it, not in the second Commandement.

(Only, by the way, I wish his Lordship would do us the favour, from his doctrine of Ʋnity, (which he makes the Salve to cure all Con∣troversies,) to demonstrate to us, Whether there be a Prescript Form, and What it is. And I should then judge his Opinion well worth imbracing, though for nothing else. Wherein yet I shall wish him to beware, that he say not of this as of the division of Quantity, pag. 42. that all must at last be reduced to an Ʋnity; Nor, as pag. 98. that it is divisibilis in infi∣nitum. Lest we establish Episcopacy▪ (which himselfe likes not;) or be∣come Independent; which others like as ill.)

The distinction between Scientia simplicis Intelligentiae, and Scientia Visionis, if it be taken only for distinctio rationis (and I suppose none ever tooke it otherwise) may well enough be admitted. By the One, God knows the Nature of All things Possible: By the Other he Sees, that These things Are. The Object of the One, is All things Possible, all things Intelligible: the Object of the Other is only, Things Existent, either past, present, or to come

But (saith his Lordship) If Gods Power, and Will be all one; If God be p••r•••• Actus and not Potentia; Then all things that ever Shall be, Were ab aeterno under •• Decree; and so what God Could doe, he Did doe, and

Can doe no more. (Hee had said before, pag. 99. That all things did exist [in their Beings] ab omni aeterno; And are they now but under •• Decree?) But for answer.

I grant, that God cannot doe, what he hath not decreed; for then were his Decree either Void, or Imperfect: And, supposing such a Decree, the Power of God is limited by his Will. But a Conditionall, and Hypotheticall Impossibility, doth not inferre an Absolute Impossibility And therefore we affirm, that Deus Potest ea quae non Vult. He Can doe More then he Will, (in sensu diviso, not in sensu Composito.) God is able (saith Christ) of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham; Yet he doth not. Knowest thou not that I can pray to my Father, and he will send ••e more then twelve Legions of Angels? But neither did Christ pray, nor the Father send them. The God which wee serve is [Able] to deliver us (said the three men in Daniell;) yet they were not certain that he Would doe it.

And if Media Scientia, (wherby God is supposed to know an Hy∣potheticall Proposition; as That the men of Keilah would deliver up David, if he stayed there) had no other hinderance but this; It might well enough be admitted.

CHAP. 17. Concerning Curiosity in the search of Causes. With a Close of all.

ANd now he returns again to his former complaint, of too much curiosity in the search of Causes. There is (he grants) a secondary intermediate Being, which we may call a Cause; Which doth precede and produce another: The Observation of which, saith he, is very ••itting, so that wee search, and puzle not our selves with the grounds and reasons of this precedency. As, to observe, That Fire, applied to combustible matter, will burn it: Without inquiring How the Fire doth work upon the Wood, &c.

He would have us therefore observe What is the Cause of this Effect, and What is the Effect of this Cause; without any curious search How this Cause comes to produce such an Effect. There is no Gene∣rall Rule, can be prescribed in this case; Sometimes it is needlesse to inquire so much as, By what Cause this or that was produced: Some∣times again it is usefull to Know, not only What did produce it, but also How it did produce it. Thus farre I allow, Curiosity in searching Trifles,

also How it did produce it. Thus farre I allow, Curiosity in searching Trifles, hinders the finding of more solid and profitable Truths; fo•• (as he speaks) Intus existens prohibet alienum.

What his Lordship hath, concerning the Holinesse of Time and Place, I assent to; That they are not capable of any other Sancti∣fication, then a holinesse of Separation, a Relative Holynesse: And the contrary Opinion is disclaimed, by him on whom his Lordship fa∣stens it.

That the Heart also should be always in such a holy frame, as that it be fit for a Sabbaths imployment, fit for a Sacrament; I hold for an an undoubted Truth. Yet are we not always to be imployed in such services of Gods Worship; For even Adam in Paradise had a Parti∣cular calling, besides his Generall calling; and the exercise thereof, being done in obedience to Gods command, was no doubt pleasing and acceptable ••o God. Nor can I assent that All things are Ordinan∣ces, though in All things we should acknowledge God.

The rest of the Chapter is but a Recapitulation of his Position, and its Consequents; which needs no further consideration, besides what I have already given you in the Examination of those severall Parti∣culars. I need not make answer to the Conclusion, having already de∣livered my judgement concerning the Premises. But leave it to ano∣ther to passe Censure.

And thus, (Sir) I have finished that Task, which at your request I have undertaken: Which, beyond my expectation, is grown into a farre larger body then I intended. You expect not Accuratenesse, in that which is drawn up in so short a time: Nor the Judgement of Au∣thors in these Points; for that was not the task imposed, to give you account of Others opinions, but of mine own. I have therefore spared the labour of turning over any other books, save his Lordships own; nor have made any farther use of any, then as my present memory did supply▪ I may seem too prolix perhaps in some Digressions, prosecuting somewhat largely occasionall questions, lighted on by the way: But if I have discovered any Truth, though with some breach of Method; If (with Samson) I can impart to my friends some Honey, though I step a little out of the way to fetch it; If, (as he found that Honey in the conquered Lion, which yet was not of it, but only accidentally there, so) I in the examining the main question, have withall cleared

some doubts, which though not directly contained in it, were yet occasioned by it; I hope a small errour in Methode will be passed over.

Sir, I am sorry it so falls out, that the first occasion, wherein I should have to doe with so Noble a Lord, should be by way of Encounter. But being partly injoyned by your request, which is to me a Com∣mand, (whom therefore it concerns, to excuse my presumption to his Lordship;) and having also so fair an Invitation in Mr. Sadlers Epistle prefixed to his Lordships Treatise; as being that, then which nothing could be more gratefull to this Noble Lord; I have adventured to commit this, with my selfe, to be at your service.

J. W.

A Postscript.

SIR,

I Sent you (a while since) certain Animadversions upon my Lord Brook's Treatise concerning the Nature of Truth. Which (briefly) tend to this purpose.

By Truth, or Light, his Lordship understands, that Light whereby the Soule and Understanding is able to See or Understand: Which can be no other then the Light of Reason. Which he considereth first in It selfe, then in its Ope∣rations: that is Truth in the Fountain, this in the Streams; (that the Spring, this the Off-spring.)

Propositio 1. Arg. 1. Chap. 1.

Which Truth or Light (of Reason) he contends to be the same with the Understanding, Because the Understanding in Man is that Ray of the Divine Nature, enlivening the Creature, or making it Rationall, whereby it is conformed to the Creator, who is the Primitive Light, or Fountain of Knowledge. Now that which doth thus enform Animal Rationale, enlivening it, or making it Rationall, is Rea∣son; And therefore Reason (which he calls Truth) is the same with the Understanding.

But this (if I mistake not) none will deny; for Reason and the Un∣derstanding-faculty are all one, Ratio and facuitas Ratiocinandi is the same. 'Tis true, they say sometimes, that Reason is in the Understan∣ding, or that the Understanding is indued with Reason: But then by Ʋnderstanding, they doe not mean, the Understanding-Faculty, but the Soule it selfe quatenus intelligens. And so this proposition, Intel∣lectus est Subjectum Rationis, is the same with this Anima intelligens est Subjectum Intellectûs. Anima, Intellectus, and Ratio, are not Three.

Arg. 2. Chap. 2, 3 4.

His second Argument to prove it is drawn from hence, That there is required to the constitution of every Being, an Essence received▪ a Foun∣tain imparting, and a Channel receiving. The which Channel or Recipi∣ent must be the same with the Essence received; because every thing is the Recipient of its own Essence; nothing can receive the Essence of a Stone, but by being a Stone, for to be Stone, and to have the Essence of a Stone, is all one. Therefore the Understanding being the Recipi∣ent of Truth, must needs be Truth, that is, Reason.

Propositio 2. Chap. 5.

Which Truth, or Reason, Whether it be in the Understanding, or be the Understanding; yet it cannot make the Soule to be Rationall, un∣lesse it be also in the Soule: For how can Reason make the Soule Reasonable, if it be not in ••t, but in somewhat else. And if it be in the Soule, then must i•• be the Soule: Because to be in the Soule, and to be the Soule i•• all one; every thing being its own Recipien••. Thus Truth, or Light (of Reason) will be the same with the Un∣derstanding; And both That and This the same with the Soule.

But I hope his Lordship will not deny, but that there is another kind of Receiving▪ beside that Receiving that he speaks of. (They tell us in Logick of ••cto modi habendi; and there are as many manners of Re∣ceiving, as there are of Having.) To receive the Essence of a Man, and to be a Man, is all one; To have the Essence of Money, and to be Money, is all one; But yet, I hope, a Man may receive Money, without being coined, and made Money. To receive the Essence of Water, and to be made Water; to receive the Essence of a Vessell, and to be a Vessell, is all one; yet a Vessell may contein Water, without being made Water. Thus a Substance may receive an Accident, a Subject may receive a Form, without being made that Accident, that Form. Thus datur Animae esse Animam datur Rationi esse Rationem, (each being its own Recipient:) But withall datur Animae Habere Ra∣tionem, though the Soule be not Reason, nor Reason (in this sense) its own Recipient.

If there be any strength in this Argument, it lies in this, That if Rea∣son (or Truth) be only in the Soule as an Accident, and not the Soules Essence, then it cannot make an Essentiall Difference between the Ra∣tionall and Irrationall Soule.

And to this we must answer, (if we maintain Reason, and the rest of the Faculties, to be distinct from ••he Soul) That it is not the Faculties, it is not Reason, that makes the Essentiall Difference; but the Substance or Essence of the Soule from whence these Faculties proceed as Essentiall Consequents. Like as it is not Heat, and Cold, and the rest of the primae Qualitates, which make the Essentiall difference be∣tween one Element and another; but that Essence or Form, from whence these Qualities doe proceed.

Corollarium. 1. Chap. 6.

From hence he proceeds to a further Corollary, That not only the Soule, but All things else, are also the same with Truth. But why so? Because every thing is its own Recipient? If it be; it doth not follow that every thing is the Recipient of Truth. If every thing be the Reci∣pient of its own Essence, must therfore this Essence needs be Truth? If his Lordship had well considered, that Truth, as he hath formerly spoken of it, is but the same with that which others call Reason; he would scarce have made this Consequence, unlesse he could think to perswade us, that all things whatsoever are Reasonable Creatures▪ There is therefore too great an hiatus, to make this proposition, a Co∣rollary of the former.

But indeed his Lordship is by this time fallen off from his former acceptation of Truth. For having (as he supposeth) proved Reason to be the Soules Essence, the Soules Entity; he begins to take that word (which formerly signified Reason,) to signify Entity, or Being: So that Truth now, must be the same with Entitas. And the Emphasis of this last assertion lies in this, not that the Essence of all things is Truth, or Entity, (for that were no great news,) but that the Essence of all things is this One Truth: meaning, that all Entity is Homogeneall and of the same nature.

He was proving before, that Truth or Reason was the same thing with the Soule: He hence infers, not that all things are the same thing; (for I cannot understand him to speak so harshly, as that one drop of water were the same drop with another drop of water, though Homo∣geneall; that the Soule of Peter is the Soule of Judas, though of the same Species;) but that they are alike things, or things of the same nature.

The Consequence, (that all things must be of the same Species, be∣cause the Soule and its Faculties are the same Thing) will not hold.

The thing it selfe, hath only this ground (so farre as I can discover,) Because all Being proceeding from God, who is in his actions Uni∣form, must therfore be Alike: For the same Agent, acting in the same Manner, cannot but produce like Effects. But this Uniformity in God' is Equivalent to an infinite Variety; and God can by one act in it selfe simple, produce effects variously distinct▪ And if his Lordship grant, that this Uniformity hinders not but that God may produce various Shapes, I see not why he may not produce various Species.

Corollarium. 2. Chap. 7.

But from hence he draws a further consequent. He is not contented to say, that the nature of all things is One, but that it is Ʋnity. And heer is as great an hiatus as the former. The Essence of all Soules is One and the same; but that this One Essence is Unity, I have not formerly heard, nor doe yet beleeve. And I am so farre from thinking that Ʋnity is the Essence of All things, that I esteeme it selfe to be Nothing. Unity, is but a Negative term, a Negation. Ʋnus indeed, as it is opposite to Nullus, is positive, and is the same with Nonnullus, or Aliquis: But Ʋnus, or Ʋnicus as it is opposed to Multitude, (and so we now take it) is Negative. Else, where is the fault in this Syllogisme? Quod est in Angliâ, est in Europâ; Sed Rex Ʋnicus est in Angliâ; Ergo Rex Ʋnicus (veltantùm Ʋnus) est in Europâ.

Propositio. 3. Chap. 8. 9▪

He returns next, to his former discourse; And what he had said of the Light of Reason, he saith also of the Light of Knowledge, both Ha∣bituall and Actuall. Hee allows not that Habits, either Infused or Acquisite, are any thing new brought into the Soule, but only former principles enlightened: And therefore rejecting Aristotle's rasatabula, he imbraceth Plato's Reminiscentia, Which may be thus expressed; He supposeth the Soule to be as a Table, wherein be many rare lineaments, and lively colours described, but hanging in the dark they appeare not till such time as they be illustrated by some advenient Light; which Light doth not bring with it any new colours, or more lineaments, but only illustrateth those that were formerly there but appeared not: Whereas Aristotle rightly supposeth it as a Table prepared, void of any, yet capable of all; Or rather as a Glasse, which having of it selfe none of those Colours, is yet fit to receive and reflect all those Rays or visi∣ble Species, which from the adjacent Objects fall upon it.

And indeed, as for Historicall Knowledge, I suppose, his Lordship himselfe, if he well consider of it, will not affirm that to have any Idea's originally in the Soule: It being utterly impossible by discourse to find out a by-past History, without Historicall Relation. And if there may be new Idea's of Historicall truths imprinted in the Soule which were not there before, why not also of Discu••sive Knowledge.

But his Lordship stays not here, dissenting from us in the Nature of Habits, whether they be new Idea's, or the illustration of former Idea's▪ but in effect, he takes away all Habits wholly. Telling us, that we Seem only by frequent acts to help the Soule, and create new Ha∣bits, but that indeed all actings are but new discoveries.

Now this is not to establish Plato's Reminiscentia; but to take away all Memory whatsoever. How can we be said to remember? how is one said to be learned, another ignorant? what is the benefit of study, and of experience? if former acts doe not at all help future acts, but only seem so to doe▪ How comes it to passe, that wee are able out of our own me∣mories to furnish our selves with Historicall truths formerly heard or read, without a second relation, which at the first wee could not doe? if our former acts doe not at all help latter acts, but all things be new discoveries.

Proposition. 4. Chap. 10.

And what hath been said of Naturall and Habituall light of Reason and Habituall Knowledge, he now affirms of Actuall Knowledge. The severall Operations of the Soule, in apprehensions, affirmations, nega∣tions, &c. the severall Actings of Truth, are also the Souls Essence. And why? but because the Soule is Actus primus, and therefore its Essence must be Action; This Action likewise must Exist; which what else can it be but Rationall workings? and so the same with Actus Se∣cundus.

But his Lordship is much mistaken to think that actus primus is La∣tine for Action. Actus is of as large an extent as Potentia: Now there is potentia ad Esse, and potentia ad Formam, as well as potentia ad O∣perari. When Ens in potentiâ becoms Ens Actu, when that which was possible, is actually produced; its own Essence o•• Being is that Actus, which makes it Ens Actu, which was before Ens in Potentiâ: and this we call actus Entitativus, and it is better translated Actuality, then ei∣ther Action, or Activity. Again the Matter is capable of this or that Form, which we call potentia ad Formam (substantialem;) whereby it

is potentiâ tale (in genere substanti••;) as materia putris is in potentiâ ad formam vermis: Now when this Form whereof it is capable is actual∣ly introduced, that which was before potentià tale, becoms now actu tale (in genere substantiae;) and this Form is called actus Substantialis▪ (but not Actio Substantialis,) or actus primus; and (thus) the Soule is Actus. Again, a Substance of this or that Species, constituted by this or that form, is capable of this or that Accident, and is therefore potentiâ talis, accidentaliter; or in potentiâ ad hanc formam ac••identalem; as Water is potentiâ calida, when Heat is produced, it becoms Actu ca∣lida, and the Heat is this Actus whereby it is actu talis; and it is actus primus accidentalis, (though perhaps some would call it actus secundus: Yet none call it Actio) This actus acciden alis, or forma accidentalis, if it be Operative, stands in a double relation; to its Subject, and so it is actus informans; and to its Operation, and so it is actus operativus (but not Operatio) and belongs either to the first, or the second species of Quality, it is either a Habit or a Faculty; this, if you please, you may call Activity, though not Action▪ Now a Subject indued with this actus operativus is in potentiâ ad operandum: When this power is reduced into act, it is actu operans; and this actus whereby it doth actu operari, is properly Actus secundus, Actio, or Operatio, and belongs to the Praedi∣cament of Action. But such an Actus the Soule is not, and therefore its Operations cannot be its Essence.

Objectio. 1. Chap. 11.

But now least by making the Soules Operations to be the Soules Es∣sence, he should make so many Soules as there be Acts; (which is in∣deed a good Consequence;) he is put upon another invention, to make all these operations to be but One; the second action is but the same with the former: (So that with him, one sinfull Act is all one with a continued Course of sinning.) And therefore tells us, that actions per∣formed in distinct Times and Places are not therefore distinct actions, because Time and Place are Nothing, but meerly imaginary.

But this p••aister is not large enough to cover the sore; For, it is true indeed, different actions may receive an externall denomination from difference in Time and Place, but they receive not their difference from hence, but from themselves: Time and Place can neither make diffe∣rent things to be the same, nor the same to be different. A man is the same to day that he was yesterday, the same at London that he was at York▪ yet both Time and Place be different: Againe, two Angels be∣ing

at the same time coexistent in the same place are not therefore the same Angel. So that whether time and place be any thing or nothing, yet this Man is not the other Man, this Action is not the other Action.

But if difference of Time and Place be only imaginary; then why do we deny to the Papists, that Christs Body is corporeally present in the Sacrament? since if it be any where, it must be every where, all places being indeed the same, admitting onely of an imaginary diffe∣rence. Why doe we cry down the Lutheran Consubstantiation, as ab∣surd? for if severall bodies may be in severall places, then may they be in the same place, if difference of Place be only imaginary: If the same body may be at severall times in severall places, why not at the same time? since difference of Time is only imaginary.

Object. 2. Chap. 12.

There is another Objection as strong as this former: If Acting Truth be the Soules Essence, then what becomes of the Soule when it doth either not Act, or act Falsely?

To the first he applyes his former remedy; Any one act is able to give the Soule a Being at all times; for succession of moments being onely imaginary, that which at all is, must be alwayes, and whatsoe∣ver hath at all a Being, is indeed coexistent to all Eternity; succession, beginning, and ending being onely imaginary: (So that a Childe that is new born, had lived as long as the most aged, if he could but think so.

And as for the other, he denyes that the Soul can at all act Falshood, because Falshood is onely Privative, it is Nothing▪ now to act no∣thing and not to act is all one.

Which he affirms likewise of Evill, and of Pain; And tells us, with Dr. Twisse, that it is better to be Miserable, then not to be: Which is grounded upon this, that Evill is only a privation of Good, and there∣fore to have the goodnesse Being without the goodnesse of Happinesse, is better then to want both the one and the other.

But withall I wish them to consider, whether the same Argument do not prove, that it was better for David to commit adultery, then not to commit it; For the substance of the act, in its Physicall Essence, was positive, and therefore Good; the fault was only the want of a further good, to wit, the goodnesse of conformity to Gods will; now to pro∣duce

the goodnesse of an Act, without the goodnesse of Conformity, is better then to produce neither the one nor the other.

Corollaria. Chap. 13. &c.

This is his Lordships Opinion. Which he commends to us as usefull to make our Christian life more cheerefull both in the Theoreticall and Practick part. For if we knew, that All things are one, what need we feare either difficulty or danger? knowing, That Misery is nothing and cannot hurt us, and hath no Being but only in the the Brain; That whatsoever is, is Good, and good to Me, Because both I and It are Be∣ings, and so Good; And these two Goods falling under no other dif∣ference but of degrees, Good and Good must needs agree, that which is Good is Good to Me. Yea, how void of Envy at anothers good, and thoughts of Revenging injuries? since that I have a Propriety, a Possession, in that which is anothers, hee and I being One: Injuries are nothing and cannot hurt; Good things, though anothers, doe serve me.

But to this Good Consequent of his Lordships Tenet, I can op∣pose another every way as Bad: For as it would make us not afraid of Misery, so withall, not afraid to Sinne. It proposeth such an Impu∣nity to Sinning, as that it makes the Devils as happy as the blessed An∣gels. For thus we might argue; The Devils are Beings, and therefore Good, because Ens & Bonum convertuntur: Every thing that is, is Good, and Good to ••hem; for both They and It being good, and Good admitting of no other difference but of degrees, Good and Good must needs agree, and so be good to them: The happinesse of the An∣gels doth serve Them, since (as his Lordship speaks) it is not onely 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, They have a propriety in it; all things being One. Their own Misery and Torment is nothing▪ and cannot hurt: And (which is the only difference can be imagined) if they Think other∣wise, (I use still his Lordships expression) this must be a Lye, and can∣not hurt. And if this be Hell, who will be afraid to Sinne?

My judgement cannot assent, to make the Torments of the damned only Imaginary, to make Hell a Fancy; yea, to affirm, that it is good to Sinne, because the act of sinne is really Good, and the Evill of it is on∣ly Imaginary, a Vanity, a Nothing, and cannot hurt.

As for the Theoreticall part; it is confessed, that there be many doubts in Naturall Philosophy, concerning the Being, the Nature, the

Causes of things; There be doubts also in Morall Philosophy, in Meta∣physicks, in Mathematicks, in Divinity: But in telling us this, his Lordship advanceth nothing for the commendation of his new inven∣tion; except he could shew us how this Tenet will resolve them.

And thus Sir, I have given you a short account of the chief things in his Lordships Treatise, and my Reply, so farre as concerns the state of the main Question controverted: Wherein you may take a briefe Survey of what is there more largely prosecuted. Which may give some Light for the better discovering the principall intent of his Lord∣ships Tenet; and may be a guide in your pe••using the larger Discourse that you loose not your selfe in the prolixity of the prosecution, and the variety of digressions. When I first undertook the Taske, I intended no more in all, then some such briefe notes as these, to satisfie your de∣sire: But being once entred I have not alwayes the command of my own pen; variety of matter carrying me beyond my intended bounds. The faults if you will be pleased to pardon, and to accept the rest, I shall commit the whole to be as I am, that is

Yours to command,
J. W.

Aprill. 10. 1641.

FINIS.