Truth tried: or, animadversions on a treatise published by the Right Honorable Robert Lord Brook, entituled, The Nature of Truth, its vnion and vnity with the soule. Which (saith he) is one in its essence, faculties, acts; one with truth. By I. W.

CHAP. ••. Whether the Ʋnderstanding, and Truth understood, be One.

IN his first Chapter he tells us, That Truth (that is Reason) is enthron▪d in the Ʋnderstanding; and there appears under a dou∣ble Notion Th•••••• •••• the Fountain or Ground-work (which is Reason it self,) We call it (saith he) the form or substance. And then those

workings which breathe from thence (the Streams issuing from it) viz. the Operations and exercise of Reason, the effects of a reasonable soule. (We call them usually, actus primus, and actus secundus.)

The first of these he begins with, proving it to be the Ʋnderstanding in its Essence: (The second he proceeds to in the tenth Chapter.) His Argument is this, What is the Ʋnderstanding other then a Ray of the Divine Nature, warming and enlivening the Creature, con∣forming it to the likenesse of the Creator? And is not Truth the same?

If you take Truth in any other acceptation beside that last men∣tioned, I see not how the Argument will hold: For if you take it either for the Truth of Being, or the Truth of Knowing (in the com∣mon acceptation;) for that Essence, whereby every Creature both is and may be known to be: It may be granted, that the understan∣ding is one of those Rays of the Divine Nature, somewhat of that Excellency implanted in Man, of that Image of God whereby Man is conformed to the likenesse of the Creator: It will be granted also, That the Essence or Truth of every Creature, whereby it Is or is Known to be, is a Ray proceeding from the same Center, (though to another point of the Circumference,) a Stream issuing forth from the same Foun∣taine of Being; and carryes some weak Resemblance, some Sparkling of that Primitive Light, or Truth, that Originall Essence which is in God; (For thus every Creature hath somthing of God in it, Re∣fert quaelibet herba Deum.) Yet will it not follow from hence, That this communicated Ray of Being is the same with the Understanding. For the Argument will prove erroneous, as being Affirmative in the second Figure, in which no Affirmative Proposition can be concluded: And the Consequence will be the same with this, [What is the Body of Man but a materiall substance? And is not a Stone the same?] Which you would hardly admit as a sufficient argument to prove our Body to be a Stone.

If you take Truth for Reason, the Argument will admit of a reducti∣on into an exact Form, thus, [That Ray of the Divine Nature, which doth (solely, or principally) expresse Gods Image in Man, is the Ʋn∣derstanding; but Truth or Reason is this divine Ray; Therefore Truth (that is Reason) is the Ʋnderstanding.]

And this Argument will hold good, if we grant the Soule to be the immediate worker in rationall Operations, without an intervenient Fa∣cultie: But (otherwise) those that are of the contrary Opinion would

deny (or distinguish) the Major, and say, That this divine Ray, this Image of God, consists not wholly in the Understanding by it selfe, but in the Soule or Understanding, accompanied with its severall Fa∣culties and ••perations.

And indeed it cannot be denyed, but that the Operations of the Soule do containe part of this Divine Image, ••s well as the Soule in its Es∣sence; and yet They are the Soules (immediate) Progeny, and are not immediately produced by God.

Now what others admit concerning the Operations, They will a••∣••••rm concerning the Faculties; That they are but parcels of this Ray or Divine Image, That they are but lesser Rivulets derived from the greater stream▪ or branches annexed to it.

Now from hence, [That the Soule in its Essence, together with the se∣verall Faculties and Operations wherewith it is endowed, doth make up the chiefest part of Gods Image in Man] to prove, [That every part of this Image are the same with each other▪] and so [the Faculties to be the same with the Soule;] is that which they will not allow.

And to presume, or take for granted, That this Image of God con∣sists but in One single Ray; i•• but petere principium, it being no lesse hard to prove, then that the Faculties and the Soule are One; That Truth (or Reason) is One and the S••••e with the Understanding, or Reasonable Soule.

They would say rather, That the Soule is One of those Bra••••he••, which (issuing from the same Root of Being in God, from whence all other Created Beings doe arise) divides it selfe into severall Twigs. And we have no way to convince them of falshood in this particular, till we have first proved the Soule and its Faculties to be one Simple o•• Single Essence.

The prosecution or explication of his Lor••▪. Argument doth no way oppose this acceptation of Truth which I have given, but confirms it; which (if I rightly understand it) may be thus explained; That Truth (Reason) is Light, none will d••ny▪ (by Light understand, that internall Principle whereby the Soule can See o•• Know, which is so called by a Metaphor drawn from the Innate light, (we call it potentia visiva) whereby the Eye is enabled to See:) That Light (this power or prin∣ciple of Knowing or Reasoning) i•• a reasonable creature i•• the Fo••n∣tai•• of Life, i•• ma••••f••s••: (by Life understand the Life of the Soule, if I may so speak, That which specificates the rationall Soule, and makes i•• 〈…〉〈…〉) For •••••• •••••••• of a reasonable Soul, (that which makes it to

be Reasonable) is Light, (that principle whereby it know•• and under∣stands:) And therefore when the Soule informeth, or giveth life to A∣nimal rationale, (making it Rationall) it inableth the Creature to work according to that Light, (according to this principle of Knowing: that is, It inableth the Reasonable Creature to Know or Understand, &c.) Thus whilst Life (that which makes a reasonable creature to be Rea∣sonable) and Light (this power of Knowing) is Truth (or Reason; And Truth (or Reason) is Conformity to God (or Gods Image in us:) And the Ʋnderstanding also, as we yet discourse of it, is this Light (this principle of Reasoning) to the Soule; The Ʋnderstanding and Truth (or Reason) can be but One.

The whole Argument i•• briefly thus; [the Image of God in us, is our Understanding; and this Image or divine Radius, consists in Rea∣son (which he calls Truth;) therefore Truth or Reason is our Under∣standing.] His minor (that this Ray or Beam of Divinity in us, is Truth or Reason) is thus proved; [Because Reason in us is •• derivative Beam, a sparkling, of that primitive Light (or Wisdome) which is in God:] And so That which enlightens us, and inables us to Know, or Understand, according to our measure (that which furnisheth Ʋs with Knowledge) is a representation of Gods Sapience or Wisdome where∣by He is said to Know. Now, [that Truth or Reason (which is all one) is this derivative Beam of Light, wherby we are able to Know;] and [That this ability to Know or Understand, is that which makes u•• to be Reasonable,] is manifest. Wherefore he concludes, That, whilst ••ur Life (or Rationality) consists in Light, (that is, in an Ability to know and understand) and this Ability consists in Truth (or Reason) which is a conformity to God (as being a Stream issuing from his Ocean of Wisdom;) And whilst (as Reason is this abilit•• of knowing, so) the Ʋnderstanding also is this Light (this Ability or power of Knowing;) The Ʋnderstanding and Truth (that is, Reason) must be all One.

Those, who deny his Conclusion, would answer, That both Reason and the Ʋnderstanding, doe inable the Soule to Know, or Understand, but in a severall way, as distinct principles (and therefore are not the same:) The one Instrumentally or Ministerially; The other, by using this as its Minister. Thus Fire, by its Heat, burns; a Stone, by its Heavinesse, descends; Glasse, by its L••vity or smoothnesse, re∣••••ecteth; and the like.

If you say, the Weight of the Stone, or Smoothnesse of the Glasse, are not Things distinct from the Stone and Glasse, but rather Modifications

of these Things; I contend not: For neither doe I hold the Un∣derstanding, or any other of the Soules Faculties, to be a Thing distinct from the Soule; but, at the most, only an accidentall Modification of it, not Really distinct from it: Yea rather, That it is the Soule it self, quatenus intelligens, (as the Power of God, is God himself quatenus po∣tens) admitting no other but a distinction of Reason.