Truth tried: or, animadversions on a treatise published by the Right Honorable Robert Lord Brook, entituled, The Nature of Truth, its vnion and vnity with the soule. Which (saith he) is one in its essence, faculties, acts; one with truth. By I. W.

SIR,

I Have, according to your desire, perused that Treatise concerning The Nature of Truth. (The which how farre it serves to the expounding the 24. Chapter of Math. I examine not.) One thing that may make it seem somewhat dark, is, that his Lord∣ship speaking of a matter somewhat unusuall, is for∣ced to use such Metaphors, for want of native words, which may somwhat obscure it: And his Lordship was the lesse carefull to avoid it, because they being with himselfe of frequent use, and sufficiently understood by him to whom hee wrote, there was the lesse feare of being not understood, or mis-understood: And so the lesse need to prevent it, by seeking for such words as might better sute with an ordinary Reader.

Before I proceed to state the Question, Whether Truth and the Soule be One; It is very requisite to search, in what sense his Lordship understands Truth; that through the ambiguous sense, and divers acceptations of the word, we be not confounded in the progresse.

Truth in Logick, is when the Proposition agrees with the Thing; and Falsehood, when they disagree.

Truth in Ethicks, is when our Words and Actions agree with our Mind; and is opposed to a Lye, to Hypocrisie.

And Truth in these acceptations is nothing else but an Agreement or ••onformity of a Type with its Prototype, Archetypi & Ectypi; of a Transcript with its Originall▪ of an Idea, or thing representing, with that represented; Signi & Signati.

Thus in Logick, Vox est signum rei, or Imago r••i. If therefore we have that expressed in Words, to which in the order of Things there is nothing agreeing; it is a False Copy, or rather no Copy, being drawn according to no Pattern. If that be, which is affirmed to be; it is True, because they are a Copy or Representation of the Things so being.

As it is in words, so it is also in Apprehensions, in conceptibus; If our mind conceive a thing to be, which is not, or to be otherwise then it is, this is a False Apprehension, because the Idea in our under∣standing is not a true representation of the Thing.

In Ethicks, our words are to be compared with another Copy; because (thus•• they are not the representation of the Things (immedi∣ately) but the representation of our Thoughts, or Intentions: There∣fore, if our Words do truly expresse or represent what we Think; It is morally True, that is, it is not a Lye, because they agree with this Copy; but yet they may be Logically False, as not being a true ex∣pression of the Thing. If the Idea in our apprehension agree with the Things, so that we conceive a ••ight of them; and our Word▪ be a true representation of this Idea; they do truly also represent the Things: There is both v••ritas Logica, and veritas Moralis If wee conceive a right of things, and our words expresse otherwise then we think; this Proposition is both wayes false; for it neither agrees with the thing, nor with our judgement: But our Judgement is Logically true▪ because the Idea in our mind is a true expression of the thing. If we conceive amisse, and yet ••ffirm as the thing is (if we affirm snow to be white, which we conceive to be black,) our Proposition is Logically true, but Morally false; and our conceptus is also Logically false. If lastly, wee conceive amisse, and speak otherwise then wee conceive, and yet diverse from what wee ought both to think and speak (as if we conceive snow to be bl••••k, and affirm it to be red:) our Idea or Conceptus is Logically false, our Proposition Logically false, and Morally false.

Thus i•• one▪ intending upon a Signet to grave the Kings▪ Image, mi••••••th of the true proportion, and with this Signet maketh impres∣sion in Wax▪ the wax cont••••nes a true representation of the Seale▪

but not the true Image of the King; whereas, if the Signet had been truly graven, and then impression made in the wax; the wax had truly represented both the one and the other. Thus is it in Morall and Logicall Truth.

Accordingly, one making a Promise with intention to perform it, yet afterward breaks it; this Promise is Morally true, because it is a true representation of his Intentions; but it is not Logically true, as not being a representation of his future Actions. And in his sub∣sequent Actions there is also a kind of Morall falshood; because they are not conformable to his promise, by which they should bee regulated. Or you may say, his Promise was (Morally) a True ex∣pression of his Intention; but his Intention was (Logically) False, as not agreeing with the Thing, because he intended that which was not Futurum Whereas, if he had promised, with a purpose to breake it, his Promise had been Morally False, but his Intention Logically True▪ If, intending to break it, he yet perform it, his Intention is Logically false, and his Promise Morally false, though Logically true. And thus Breach of Promise will come under the nature of Injury, or Injustice; but not under the nature of a Lye, except it were made to deceive; because it is the true expression of the Intenti∣on, which is the immediate rule of Veracity or Morall truth.

Thus Hypocrisie, or Dissimulation, is a branch of Morall False∣hood; because Actio and Gest••s, are Index animi, as well as Words.

And this I conceive to be the Nature of, and Difference between Logicall and Morall Truth.

There is yet another Truth, and you may call it a Physicall Truth, •• Formall or Essentiall Truth: Thus that which hath the Essentialls of a Man, is verè Homo; so an Infant is a true Man. Thus we say, a true Church, true Faith, true Grace, true Gold, (not counterfeit:) thus a Syllogisme in a right form, is a true Syllogisme, though the Propositions be false. And the like.

(But mistake me not; by Morall Truth, or Naturall Truth, &c. I understand not, Truths about Naturall things, or Morall things, (though the words be oft-times so taken:) For I am not now di∣stributing Truth into its severall Species, or severall Parts; but am shewing the Ambiguity of the Word, and so distinguishing it into its severall Acceptations. Thus Morall or Ethicall Truth, is that Acceptation of Truth that is usuall in Ethicks: Logicall

Truth, is that Accep••ation of ••••uth, which is used in Logick, &c.)

But •• ••••pp••••••, we •••••• y••t ••••rre from that Acc••pt••tion of Truth, in which •••••• Lo••••▪ speaketh: I will therefore come somewhat ne••rer. •••••• •••• the Logicall and Morall •…•…ptat••••n •••• Truth, we have a Metap••ysicall acc••ptat•…•… ••••s and V••rum are ••ermini conv••r••i∣b••les. And Truth is taken in •••••••• such acc••ptation, when it is divided into veri••••s Essendi and Cognosc••ndi.

Veritas Essend••, or the truth of Being, is that per quam res ver•• ••st: And thus Ens & Verum conver••untur. Quic ••uid est, ver•• est▪ For except it have a Reall and True Being (and not a Supposed Being) it is not ••ind••••d) a Being, but is Su••••os••d ••o be.

Veritas ••ognosce••di is that per quam res ver•• Cognoscitur. And thus also Ens & Verum conver••u••t••r: For whatsoev••r is, may b••e ••n••wn to be. This Veritas i•• nothing ••lse but Cognoscibilitas: Th••re∣••ore Veritas, as it is Affectio Entis, is d••fin••d by some to be Conveni∣e••••ia r••i, seu Co••formit••s rei, ••um I••tell••ct••; (••ive humano ••ive di∣••••••••.) Thus Truth in the Things and Knowledge in the Understanding have ••elation to each other as Objectum a•••• P••tentia. As Colour in the Object to Sight in the Eye.

Colour, as it is inherent in a Body, makes it to be Coloured (cor∣••us coloratum:) The same Colour, as it stands in relation to the Eye, makes it to be Visible (corpus visibil••.) Thus Essence, or Being, as it is in the ••hing, constitutes it in the nature of a Thing, or a Being: And the sa••e ••••••••nce in the thing, as it hath relation to the Understan∣ding, makes it ••ognos••ibile. ••n the first sense it is Veritas Essendi▪ in the second it is Veritas Cognos••end••. (Where t••e cons••••uction will be somewhat hard, exc••••t you give Philosophers leave to use the G••∣••••••d in a Possive signification, which amongst pure ••rammaria••s is more ra••••ly ••••und.) For by the s••me E••se••c•• by which it is Ens, by the same it is Cognoscibile; That Being by which it is, by the same it ••••y be ••••own to be: As by the same Colour, by which the object is Color••tum, it is also Visibile.

And this •• conceive to be the right acceptation of Metaphysicall Truth, or Truth as it is taken in Metaphysicks for an Affection of Being: not being a Thing Really di••••inc•• for that thing, that truly is, and may be truly known to be; But (as they call it) Modus Entis.

And now we be come somwhat n••e••er that acceptation of Truth wherein his Lo••••▪ takes it; though (if I mistake him not) that sense wherein he useth it, is somewhat distinct from all these: For whether

you consider the Truth of ••eing, or the Truth of Knowledge▪ they are in themselves really the Same, and the same ••l•••• really with that Ens, t•••••• Being, which tru••y Is, and is truly K••o••n •••• be: which thing 〈…〉〈…〉 a being, and as truly Cognos••••ble, when there is no Under∣standing present to take notice of it, as when it is actually Under∣s••••••d. ••••••e a•• an Object is ••••uly Col••u••ed, and truly Visible, even then when ••••••re is no ••ye present to behold it. And therefore this truth cannot be One with the Understanding▪ because it may be then and there where the Understanding is not.

Again, Truth being (as I said) One with the Thing known, if it •••• also One with the Understanding, or the Soule; the Understan∣ding or Soule knowing shall be One with the Thing understood: A S••one and the Soule shall be one Individuall Being: For how can Truth be the same with the Stone, and the same with the Soul, except the Soul and the Stone be the same.

Object. But you will say thi•• is that he contends for, not only, that Truth understood is one with the Soul; but that both the Thing un∣derstood, and the Sou•• understanding, are this Truth.

Answ. 1. To proceed therefore. If the Stone understood, and the Soule understanding, be the Same; then when began this Unity, •••••••• Identy? Were they the Same before the Stone was actually understood? Or did they then contract this Unity, when first the Soul did actually Know it?

Why they should be the same, Before the act of Knowing; there 〈…〉〈…〉 no more reason, then why one ••••••ne should be the same with •…•…ne; ••••y one man should be the same with another man: And so Peter or Paul might be ••s truly said to b••••ray Christ, as Ju∣••••••, if Peter and Judas be one and the same.

And if they should ••••••n ••••ntr•••••• a•• Unity, (and not before when the Understanding ••o••h ••••••s•• Actually understand it; we must ta••e •••••••• saying, Intell••ct••s i••••ellig••••do ••m••••a ••it ••mn••a▪ in a more gr••••••e 〈…〉〈…〉 it w•••• m••••••••. A••••, •••• ••y j••••••emen••, it i•• utt••••ly im∣possible, for that which hath •••••••• been Al••ud •••• be made Idem; ••s also for that which is O••••, to ••e made A••••ud a s••ips••. I say, •••• i•• im∣possible for two things to be made one ••nd the s••me, by a Re••ll I∣dentitie.

'Tis true, Two things may be so united as to be made One Ag∣grega••um; as the Body and the soul make one M••n, the Divi••••••y and Humanity of Christ make ••n•• Person: But that two things can

become the same; that the Soule is the Body, and the Body the Soule; that the Humanity of Christ is his Divinity, and his Divinity his Humanity; I conceive not onely false, but impossible. The Hand and the Foot (with the rest of the members) make one Body; but neither the Hand is the Foot, nor is the Foot the Hand, but really distinct.

Answ. 2. But further, as it is hard to shew, when this neer kin∣dred either of Affinity, or Consanguinity; this Union either of Iden∣tity, or of Identification, had its first Originall: So, if there be any such Ʋnion, (either con••ate or contracted) between the Soul and a Stone: Then will not onely One but All Soules (at least, all soules actually understanding and apprehending it) be the same with this Stone. And these Soules, being one and the same with this one indi∣viduall stone, they will be one and the same with each other.

Thus we shall have but one Soule informing all Bodies; not by a Pythagoricall Metempsychosis▪ by translating of soules from one body to another, but as A••••mus Averroisticus, one soule extended through the whole Universe, informing so many men as there be bodies, wherof every man is partaker tanquam communis aur••: Nay neerer, for of the Ayr each takes a part; but as for this Soul, each Is, each Hath this Soule entire.

Neither doth it inferre onely an Identity of Soules, but an Identi∣ty of Objects also: For all▪ Objects being apprehended by one Soul, they become all One with it: And being all one with the same nume∣ricall Soule, they must be also One with each other.

So that all Soules will thus be One, all Objects will be but One, and this One Object one and the same with that One Soule; and all the World but Ʋnum Ens, whose every parcell is alteri ••dem; the same with each other.

Object. You'l say, All this is no more then he contends for; to make Truth▪ One with the Soule; and that all things that are, are nothing but this One Truth.

Answ. If this be his opinion, To prove an Identity of all crea∣tures, because their Being, from whence proceeds their Cognoscibi∣lity, is all One with the Soule, or Understanding: His Lord▪ must give me leave to dissent from him, if for no other reason, yet because ••e dissents from himselfe: For if his Argument be good, That all things are One with the Soul, because Truth or Cognoscibility, (which differs not really from their Essence) being the Object of

the Soules Operation, must also be One with the Soule; It will fol∣low also, that God is likewise One and the Same with the Soul, be∣cause He also is Cognoscibilis, and may be known by the Soul: And also, that all things else are one with God, because they are al known by Him. And so he falls upon the first of those Errours, which he mentions in the ••nd of his Prooemium, immediately before the first Chapter; which is, by mounting too high in the exal••ing of Truth, to confound the Creator with the Creature▪ by making her God. Neither doth it onely make Truth to be one with God; but even all things else, being one with Truth, to be One with God.

Again, if so, how is it that in the end of his 3. Chapter, concerning the Body and the Soule he tells us, not that they are the Same, or that the Body is the Soul, but as husband and wife each bringeth his part to∣wards the making up of the Compositum. At least M••. Sadler is mis∣taken as well as I, (who is presumed at least to understand his Lor••▪ mind, su••••••ciently,) who ••ells us in his Epistle, that Corporall Ʋnion •••• materialls is sometimes [Miscalled] Identity, which is at best but a ••••ld touch in a point or two.

But I suppose there may be another acception of Truth, which may better sute with (at least the first part of) his Lordships dis∣course. You may call it Veritas Cognoscendi, as well as the former, bu•• in a different sense. There Knowledge was taken in a Passive ••••••se, and Truth was that which makes the thing Cognoscib••le, or fit to be understood: Here you must take it in an Active sense; and so Veritas Cognoscendi, or the Truth of Knowledge, will bee that which makes the understanding Cognoscitivum, or fit to con¦ce••ve and apprehend that Cognosc••••li••y which is in the Obj••ct. And thu•• Truth will be that ••rinciple, whereby the Soule is able to •…•…hend or conceive that which may be known.

Veritas Cognoscendi in the former sense, and that in this sense, are both Principia cognoscendi, Principles of knowledge, but in a severall way. (You may distinguish them, if you please, thus; Truth of knowing, and Truth of being known, and veritas cognosce••di may be 〈…〉〈…〉 both) They differ as Colour in the Object, from the power of seeing in the Eye: The former makes the Object Visible, and fit to be perceived; the other makes the Eye Visive, and fit to discern it. If the first were wanting, Vision would be hindered, because there is nothing Visible: (Hence it is that the Ayr, and Spirituall substanc•••• are not seen even by the s••arp••st sight.) If the latter be wanting▪ ••••••

sight is hindered from a desect in the Organ: (Thus▪ the most per∣sp••••••ous Colou••s are not discerned by a blind Eye; whereas the ••ame Colours are in themselves sufficiently Visible, and actually Dis∣cerned by others▪) Thus Veritas cognoscendi, in the former sense, makes the Object to be Cognoscible; Truth, in the latter sense, gives the Un∣derstanding, or Soule, ability to know it.

Now if you call the Power of se••ing, which is in the Eye, by the name of ••••••ate light (••o dis••••••gu••sh i•• from Light either in the Ob∣ject, or in the Medium:) You may also call Reason, which is this principle of knowing in the Soule, or Understanding, by the name of innate Truth, or Light.

And this signification of Truth I conceive to be most sutable to his Lor••▪ meaning. (But Verum, or Truth, in this sense, is not con∣vertible with Ens: For though all Beings have in them Truth, wherby they may be Known, yet all have not this Truth, or Power to Know.)

And thus if you understand it, it will not seem so strange a Pa∣radox, ••o 〈…〉〈…〉 th•••• Reason (which he calle••h Truth) is all one with the Ʋnderstanding; and that the Ʋnderstanding is not distinct from the Soule. For this will be granted by all those, which affirm that Potenti•• non real••ter distinguuntur ab Animâ; that the Powers or Faculties of the Soule, are not really distinct from the Soule it selfe: And these a••e 〈…〉〈…〉 I mistake not) the greater part of ••ound Phi∣losophers. And ••••us his Lor••▪ opinion is but the same with theirs in other words. (Yet may we ••••••ll speak distinctly of these severall Facul••ies; as w•• do of the Wisdom of God, the Power of God, the Will of God, &c. which are as en••••rely one with God, as these Fa∣culties can be with the Soule.) And thus much for explaining the state of the 〈…〉〈…〉. •• proceed next to examine the Grounds of this his Lor••▪ opinion.