Truth tried: or, animadversions on a treatise published by the Right Honorable Robert Lord Brook, entituled, The Nature of Truth, its vnion and vnity with the soule. Which (saith he) is one in its essence, faculties, acts; one with truth. By I. W.

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Title
Truth tried: or, animadversions on a treatise published by the Right Honorable Robert Lord Brook, entituled, The Nature of Truth, its vnion and vnity with the soule. Which (saith he) is one in its essence, faculties, acts; one with truth. By I. W.
Author
Wallis, John, 1616-1703.
Publication
London :: Printed by Richard Bishop, for Samuel Gellibrand at the Signe of the Brazen Serpent in Pauls Church-yard,
1643.
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Subject terms
Brooke, Robert Greville, -- Baron, 1607-1643. -- Nature of truth.
Truth -- Early works to 1800.
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"Truth tried: or, animadversions on a treatise published by the Right Honorable Robert Lord Brook, entituled, The Nature of Truth, its vnion and vnity with the soule. Which (saith he) is one in its essence, faculties, acts; one with truth. By I. W." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A97067.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed May 28, 2024.

Pages

CHAP. XIV. Whether Knowledge and Sciences receive benefit from this Assertion.

HE proceeds to shew the Usefulnesse of Unity in Theory; and com∣plains, that Learning is broken into so many Sciences: wishing that it were all like the Chain fastened to Jupiters Throne, All of a piece. And indeed I wish as heartily as his Lordship, (whether All things be One Emanation, or Many) that Comenius his designe, (of which his Lord∣ship speaks) of reducing all into one, might proceed: Of reducing, I say, all Knowledge into a Body, all Sciences into one System; (for This is it Comenius designes; he never fancied his Lordships Unity.) And great pity it is, that so worthy a design is not prosecuted at a publike charge, that such a shining Light should be extinct for want of Oyl; if there may be hopes of effecting it.

He shews what a Multitude of Inquiries we must needs make for the perfecting of Knowledge, whilst we acknowledge a distinction in Things; which labour might be much contracted, If we could be con∣tent to see all things to be but One, bearing onely different Shapes. But though this were allowed; Yet must we then, either look at all things with a Confused Eye; or else shall be as much troubled in taking no∣tice of Different Shapes, as we are now in observing Different Things.

He reckons up many doubts, as not yet determined, concerning the Existence of Beings; What things there are, and What they are; Qu∣nam sunt, & Qualia (vel Quid) sunt. But I see not how his doctrine, of Ʋnity in all things, will resolve any of these. For granting all things to be One, Yet how shall I know, whether there be an Ʋnicorn, a Phoenix a Mermaid, or Ebur F••••••il? Whether the Philosophers Stone, or a

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Perpetuall Motion, be possibile? Whether Dictamnum be a Soveraign Balm? Whether Tobacco be hot or cold? What are the degrees of Heat or Cold in this or that Simple? If then this Opinion serve no way to in∣form us concerning these Questions wherein we doubt; How can he commend this opinion, as Usefull, from the manifestion of our Igno∣rance in these particulars? If he would exhort us, not to enquire; this he may doe though they may be Many; If he would have us search, whether or no there be these severall Shapes, How doth their common Ʋnity help forward the Enquiry? You see (saith he) in what a Maz you are Meandred, if you admit of any Division. I wish we could see how to help it, by allowing his Ʋnity.

Yet notwithstanding their multitude) he accounts the knowledge of Existences, and the Being of things, to be Necessary; although those things are all of one Nature, variegated only in our apprehension. (But for ought I see, it is as little labour for us to find, that there are so many Things, as for his Lordship to find out so many Shapes.) But to enquire the Cau∣ses of these Beings, is (in his Lordships opinion) to become Majestatis rei▪ for prying into thse Arcana Imperii.

In my judgement, there may be as great a Vanity and Emptinesse in the curious enquiry after the Being of Things, as in the too nice search of their Causes. Vain Philosophy may be as well in the Histori∣call as in the Discursive part. A modest inquiry both into the Beings, and into the Causes of Things, is both Lawfull and Commendable; a nice Curiosity is blamable in Either: It will prove but Vanity, if not Vexation; Weaving a Spiders Web, if not Hatching a Cockatrices Egge. Tlas quasdam doctrinae pariunt, tnuitate fili operisque Admira∣biles, sed quoad usum Frivolas & Inanes. Bacon. Lke a Razor of too keen an edge; As Seneca speaks of Chrysippus, Magnum ••••hercle vi∣rum, sed cujus acumen nimis Tenue retunditur, & in se saepe replicatur▪ etiam cùm agere aliquid videtur, Pungit, non Perforat.

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