Truth tried: or, animadversions on a treatise published by the Right Honorable Robert Lord Brook, entituled, The Nature of Truth, its vnion and vnity with the soule. Which (saith he) is one in its essence, faculties, acts; one with truth. By I. W.

CHAP. XIII. The Consequents of this Assertion, that All things are one Truth. Whether usefull in Practicalls.

I Have now done with his Lordships Thesis layd downe in the full extent in the severall branches of it. The Chapters ensuing are but a declaration of the Consequents, the Ʋsefullnesse of this Position. Which, saith he, if we consider, viz. That all things are but one Ema∣nation from divine power; It would make our lives more cheerfull, more Christian, both in the Practicall and Theoreticall part.

That all things are but one Emanation, if he speak of unum per aggre∣gationem, I grant; and so I suppose will all else. God alone hath his Be∣ing of Himselfe, and gives Being to all his Creatures: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. And whatsoever Being they have, it is only a communication of that Being which he hath in him selfe. But that the Parts of this One Aggregatum are not Really distinct from each other; hath not yet been so clearly proved as to convince mee.

His Arguments, if they prove any thing, will prove, That God can∣not produce Creatures really distinct. For if it be enough to prove, All things that now are to be really the same, Because the Fountain of them all is God; the thing Communicated, their own Essence; and the Re∣cipient, Themselves; (because the Essence produced, receiveth of God 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Esse:) Then is it impossible for God to produce any thing that shall not be the same with these: For whatsoever can be possibly produced, If God be the Author of it, Then must Hee be the Fountain, and It selfe the Recipient, receiving from God 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Esse.

This being premised, I ask, Whether this One Emanation which his Lordship seeks to establish, be Really distinct from God or no? If not, then must not his Lordship blame those that confound the Creator with th•• Creature, making It to be God. But if this one Emanation be distinct Really, If this Fountain have sent forth One Stream really distinct from it selfe, What hinders but that it may send forth More Streams? Hath God (like Isaack) but One Blessing? Or Can he produce more but Will not? If he Can; then is it Possible that Two Emanations, Two Creatures, may be really distinct, though receiving their Essence from the same Fountain. And if Any Creatures may be possibly distinct from other, Why not These Creatures that now are? there being no more to be alledged for their Ʋnity, then for the Unity of all Possible. Gods 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, his Power also, and the Emanation of it, is So Uni∣form, as that it is equivalent to an Infinite Variety.

He proceeds to this purpose. In the Practick part of our Lives (saith he) If we knew that all things were One, with what Cheerfullnesse, what Courage, should we undertake any Action, any Difficulty; Knowing The distinction of Misery and Happynesse, to have no Being but in the Brain; That Misery is Nothing, and cannot hurt us, That every thing is Good, and Good to mee, Because I and It are Beings and so Good, And these two Goods falling under no other difference but of Degrees, Good and Good must needs agree, that which is Good is Good to Mee: Yea how void of Envy at anothers good, and of thoughts of Revenging Injuries; Since I have a Pro∣priety, a Possession of that which is Anothers, hee and I being One; In∣juries are Nothing and cannot hurt; Good things, though anothers, doe serve me.

That all things are one; That the difference between Happinesse and Misery is only in the Brain; That Misery, That Injuries, are Nothing and▪ cannot hurt; That whatsoever is Good must be Good to Mee; and (which is the ground of it) That Good and Good, Ens & Ens, admit of no difference but of Degrees: I have allready denied. I will only adde, That by this discourse you prove the Devills as happy as the blessed Angels: And if it be a Good Consequent of this Position. That it will make us no•• be afraid of Misery and Danger: I am sure it is as Bad a Consequent, That it will make us not afraid of Sinning. The Devills are Beings, and therefore Good; Every thing that is, is Good, and Good to them, For both They and It being Good, and admitting of no difference but of Degrees, Good and Good cannot but agree, and so, be Good to them: The Happi∣nesse of the blessed Angells doth serve Them, since (as his Lordship

speaks) it is not onely 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, They have a Propriety in it: Their own Misery and Torment is nothing, and cannot hurt them; And (which is the onely difference which you can imagine) if they Think otherwise (I use still his Lordships expression) this must be a Lye, and cannot hurt. And if this be Hell; who will be afraid to Sinne?

My judgement cannot assent to make the Torments of the damned, onely Imaginary; To make Hell a Fansie. Yea to affirm, That it is Good to sinne, Because the Act of sinning is a Reall Good; and its E∣vill, only Imaginary, a Lye, and cannot hurt.