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CHAP. IX. How Knowledge and Affection differ.
FRom what hath been spoken in the former Chapter, without ad∣ding any more, may appear what is to be said concerning his Ninth Chapter: How it comes to passe that some of mean Knowledge have Large Affections. For a Speculative Knowledge doth not alwayes Breed Affection, (because the Will doth not alwayes follow the Un∣derstanding,) though neither doth it Extinguish it.
It is true, there is an Affection, which is rather a Blazing (then a Warming, Enlivening) Love, (as the Fools Mirth like the crackling of Thorns;) Which ariseth either from a False Apprehension, or else from the Novelty, rather then the sweetnesse, of the Object, (as the Smell of Flowers at the first approach doth most Affect the Sense, though they be as Sweet afterwards;) And This perhaps may vanish, at the presence of a more Clear or more Continued Light. But the true Warmth of Zeal is not extinguished by the Light of Knowledge, (though Specula∣tive,) but feeds upon it as Fewell: And the greater Growth there is in (especially Experimentall) Knowledge, the greater is the Strength of Affection from it: And, thus, they that Know most (experimentally) do alwayes Love most: Knowledge and Affection go together.
Yet are we not forced from hence to grant, that Knowledge and Affection are the Same: Betwixt which I must needs allow the same difference (be it more or lesse, that is, Reall, or Modall) which is be∣tween the Ʋnderstanding and the Will: Knowledge is not Affection, and Affection is not Knowledge.
And that Objection which his Lordship from hence makes to him∣selfe, That (since men of Largest Affections, doe not alwayes Know most of God, but some of Weaker Affections may Know More;) it might appear from hence, That all Being is not One, differing onely in Degrees; but that there are even different Natures, amongst which one may Excell, while the other is Deprest: This Objection, I say, i•• of that force, that I see not how all which his Lordship brings, can take it away.
The large Encomiums, which he brings for Affectionate Knowledge, preferring it before Speculative, (which he prosecutes very Piously, very Judiciously, very Affectionately;) though it prove, That Affectio∣nate Knowledge is the more Excellent; Yet doth it not shew That Spe∣culative Knowledge is Nothing; or That the Measure of Affection al∣wayes