Truth tried: or, animadversions on a treatise published by the Right Honorable Robert Lord Brook, entituled, The Nature of Truth, its vnion and vnity with the soule. Which (saith he) is one in its essence, faculties, acts; one with truth. By I. W.

CHAP. IX. How Knowledge and Affection differ.

FRom what hath been spoken in the former Chapter, without ad∣ding any more, may appear what is to be said concerning his Ninth Chapter: How it comes to passe that some of mean Knowledge have Large Affections. For a Speculative Knowledge doth not alwayes Breed Affection, (because the Will doth not alwayes follow the Un∣derstanding,) though neither doth it Extinguish it.

It is true, there is an Affection, which is rather a Blazing (then a Warming, Enlivening) Love, (as the Fools Mirth like the crackling of Thorns;) Which ariseth either from a False Apprehension, or else from the Novelty, rather then the sweetnesse, of the Object, (as the Smell of Flowers at the first approach doth most Affect the Sense, though they be as Sweet afterwards;) And This perhaps may vanish, at the presence of a more Clear or more Continued Light. But the true Warmth of Zeal is not extinguished by the Light of Knowledge, (though Specula∣tive,) but feeds upon it as Fewell: And the greater Growth there is in (especially Experimentall) Knowledge, the greater is the Strength of Affection from it: And, thus, they that Know most (experimentally) do alwayes Love most: Knowledge and Affection go together.

Yet are we not forced from hence to grant, that Knowledge and Affection are the Same: Betwixt which I must needs allow the same difference (be it more or lesse, that is, Reall, or Modall) which is be∣tween the Ʋnderstanding and the Will: Knowledge is not Affection, and Affection is not Knowledge.

And that Objection which his Lordship from hence makes to him∣selfe, That (since men of Largest Affections, doe not alwayes Know most of God, but some of Weaker Affections may Know More;) it might appear from hence, That all Being is not One, differing onely in Degrees; but that there are even different Natures, amongst which one may Excell, while the other is Deprest: This Objection, I say, i•• of that force, that I see not how all which his Lordship brings, can take it away.

The large Encomiums, which he brings for Affectionate Knowledge, preferring it before Speculative, (which he prosecutes very Piously, very Judiciously, very Affectionately;) though it prove, That Affectio∣nate Knowledge is the more Excellent; Yet doth it not shew That Spe∣culative Knowledge is Nothing; or That the Measure of Affection al∣wayes

follows the Measure of Speculative Knowledge: One of which he ought to have proved, if he conclude that Knowledge and Affection are the Same. A man may truly Know, that Sugar is Sweet, though he neither Tast its Sweetnesse, nor be Delighted or Pleased with that Tast. And a Christian is sometimes to live by Faith and not by Sense; That is, he is to Trust, and Rest upon the Speculative Knowledge of Gods Goodnesse, and his own Interest in it; even then when for the present he wants the Sense of it. He may Know and Beleeve that the Lord is Good, though he doe not Tast and See it. I will wait upon God (saith Isay) which hath Hid his Face from the House Israel. He that walketh in darknesse, and Sees no Light, must yet Trust in the Name of the Lord, &c.

And thus much for the first Notion of Truth, or Reason, as it is the groundwork of Rationall Operations. In which, thus far I may go along with his Lordship, That Reason is but the Soul Intelligent; That Intelle∣c••u••ll Habits are but Reason advanced; As likewise That its Operations are but Reason actuated. The first, distinguished from the Soule at least rati∣o••e ratiocinatâ: the two last, Modaliter. If he mean no more, I wish his expressions had been clearer: For then the Notions are not new, but the Words. If he do aliquid grandius moliri; I either Understand him not; o•• cannot Assent to him.

But you will tell me perhaps, that I am mistaken all this while; His Lordsh••p by Truth intends not Reason, as I take it; For the very Title of his first Chapter, calls it Truth Ʋnderstood, and this cannot be Rea∣son, for Reason is not that which is understood, but that whereby we un∣derstand.

It is true, it do••h so: But (shall I speak it once for all?) the Titles of his ••hapters, and his Marginall Notes, do so often clash with the Text, that I cannot beleeve they were done by the same Pen. I•• i•• like his Lordship, writing it but as a Letter to a private Friend, by whom i•• i•• since published, did not at first distinguish it into chapters, and give it that Analysis that now appears; and since its first writing, as the Epistle tels us not having so much as perused it, it is not like he hath added them since; But the Publisher (as in the like cases is frequent in Treatis••s of all sorts) not to trouble his Lordship with so small a matter, did it hi••∣self. Who ever did it, it is like (as else where, so here) he either did not Apprehend, or not Attend punctually▪ his Lordships meaning. For it is clear enough, if we attend it, that that which he there contends to b•• the s••me with the Ʋnderstanding, cannot be Truth understood; but the Rise

or Groundwork from whence all actions and sayings, the Effects of a Reaso∣nab••e Soule, breathe forth. It had been more agreeable to his Lord∣ships mind, to have said, Intellectus and Principium Intelligendi are the same; and not, that the Ʋnderstanding▪ and Truth-understood, are one▪ And so his Lordships method will be Exact, making the Soule or Un∣derstanding▪ One with its Faculties, chap. 1. with its Habits, chap. 8. with its Operations, chap. 10. Whereas, how the Object of all these, should come first, and be that from whence all these breathe forth, appears not.