Truth tried: or, animadversions on a treatise published by the Right Honorable Robert Lord Brook, entituled, The Nature of Truth, its vnion and vnity with the soule. Which (saith he) is one in its essence, faculties, acts; one with truth. By I. W.

CHAP. VIII. The Nature of Habits Whether they be one with Truth or the Soules Essence.

IN the eighth Chapter, he speaks somewhat concerning the nature of Habits. And this is to be adjoyned to the end of the 5. Chapter: the 6. and 7. Chapters, (wherein he inferres a Corollary, concerning the Essence of All things▪ That it is One, That it is Ʋnity;) being inserted as a Parenthesis. He had in the fifth Chapter affirmed That the Soul is nothing but Truth; Yet (saith he) while I affirm, that the Soule is no∣thing but this Truth, I doe not refuse the doctrine of Habits, either Infused or Acquisite.

But before I proceed, It is not amisse to give notice of a different ac∣ceptation of Truth here, from that before. He spake before of the Truth or Light of Reason, which he contended, to be One with the Soul, and not a distinct Faculty. This Light was an Innate or Connate Light, which hath its Originall and its Period with the Soule: For when the Soule begins, the Light of Reason begins, and this Light of Rea∣son is no sooner extinct, then when the Soule shall cease to be. But the Light of Habituall Knowledge, (whether Infused or Acquisite,) is not an Innate Light, but an Advenient Light; subsequent to the Soules first Existence, and really separable from it. Yet may it be Antecedent to another degree of Advenient Light, viz. Actuall Knowledge, which may proceed from Habituall.

This Advenient Light of Habituall knowledge differs from Innate Light of Reason; as a Habit in the first species of Quality, from Natu∣ralis potentia, or a Faculty, in the second species. And so, howsoever it may be true, That a Faculty or Naturall Power, may be so farre the Same with the Soule, as that it differ only ratione ratiocinatâ; Yet in a Habit, we must of necessity grant a distinction ex parte rei. For where there may be a Reall Separation (and not onely Mentall) there must needs be granted a Distinction in re. Now that in all Habits there may be a reall Separation, is apparent: For (though, it may be, some Ha∣bits acquired or infused cannot be lost when they are once had, as Grace, &c. yet) before the acquisition or infusion of such Habits, the Soule was actually without them. Indeed it is true, That these Ha∣bits cannot subsist without the Soule; and therefore they may not be imagined to be Really distinct, as res & res; yet because the Soule may exist without these; therefore they must have a Modall

distinction in re, as res & modus. Thus the Roundnesse of a piece of Coyn, though, when it is, it is the same Thing with the Sil∣ver, not being a Thing added, but only a Modification, a moulding or fashioning of the Former thing; yet must it be Distinct from the essence of the Silver, though not a Thing distinct: Otherwise when this Silver looseth its Roundnesse, it should loose its Essence and become somwhat else; whereas the Silver in this form, is not really distinct from it selfe in another forme, but the same Metall, the same Silver.

There being then this difference between a Habite and a Faculty: Though Reason should be One with the soule without so much as a Mo∣dall distinction; yet follows it not, that a Habit hath the same Reall Identity, but that it may be distinguished ex parte rei.

Habits he distinguisheth into Infused and Acquisite. When the soul (saith he) by vertue of its Being is cleare in such a Truth; it is said to be an Infused habit: when by frequent action, such a Truth is Connaturall to the Soule, it may be stiled an Habit Acquisite, though &c.

Whether or no this be the genuine distinction between an Acquisite and Infused Habit, it is not materiall strictly to examine. If the soule by its Essence be cleare in such a Truth; that is, be ready to act accor∣ding to such a Truth: I should call this a Faculty or Naturall power, ra∣ther then an Habit. Thus Gravity in a Stone, whereby it is naturally prone to descend, I should not call an Habit, but a Faculty. (Though Heavinesse, in another relation, be neither a Faculty nor an Habit, but qualitas Patibilis. And so perhaps may Knowledge, as it is an accidentall Form informing the soule, be referred to the same species of Quality, though it can hardly be called by that Name: For a Habit quatenus sic, is so called, not with any relation to the Subject, but in relation to Acts, which slow from it, or are produced by it.)

This Pronenesse or Aptnesse for operation which is in any thing im∣mediatly from its Essence, is a naturall Power or Faculty; And a Habit, is a further Readinesse, and Pliablenesse, or Facility of working accor∣ding to this Faculty: A Habit therefore alwayes presupposeth a Faculty, as being but a Facilitation of it. And when as by Reason a man hath an Ability to understand: by Habituall Knowledge, he hath a Readinesse to understand.

Now this Readinesse or Facility, if it proceed from Often Acting; so that from the iterating of former Acts it becomes more prone either to continue or repeate those Acts; It is an Acquisite Habit: (Somewhat of this may be seene in Naturall things; A Wheele being once in mo∣tion,

it will by a smaller force be Continued, then at first Begun; yea for a while persist without help.) If this Facility proceed from some Ac∣cidentall Form produced in it by an Externall Agent, it is an Infused Ha∣bit: The difference between an Infused and an Acquisit being no other but only in respect of the Efficient. Thus the Knowledge of divers Tongues and the Ability to speak them, which was in some of the Apo∣stles by immediate Infusion, was an Infused Habit; whereas in others (as in Paul) it was Acquisite; differing from the other, not in Form, but in the Efficient.

A Habit therefore, whether Infused or Acquisite, being but a Faci∣litation of the Faculty, cannot be a Thing distinct from that Faculty, but only a Modus of it, which hath not in it selfe a Positive Absolute Being of its own; but is a Modification of another Being: And its Physicall Being, Existentia Rei, must be the same with the Being of that, which is thus Modificated; For it is not ipsum Existens, but Modus Existendi: And this Manner of Existing hath not an Existence of its own, distinct from the Existence of that which doth exist in this man∣ner: Yet its Formall and Metaphysicall Being is distinct. Yea and its Physicall Existence, such as it is capable of, that is, Existentia Modi; for not being Res, but Modus rei, we must not expect that it should have any Existence of its own besides the Existence of a Modus: and this Existentia Modi is the actuall Modificating of the Thing Existing after this Manner. The which Existence though it be not Existentia Rei, yet it is a Reall Existence, (existentia in re) and not Mentall: For the thing existent is not only supposed to exist in this manner, but indeed doth so, thus ordered, thus modificated: and therefore that Modus doth actually, & really modificate, and is not only supposed so to doe.

But if you will not admit (with Scotus) of any Modus entis, as a Medium between Ens & Non-ens, Res et Nihil, a Thing and Nothing; you must then say, it is Res: for Nothing I am sure it cannot be: For doubtlesse there is some difference more then Imaginary between Knowledge and Ignorance, between a Square stone and a Round stone, between Silver Stamped and the same Smooth and Plain. This diffe∣rence I should call Modall, accounting the Roundnesse &c. not Res but Modus Rei; affirming, that when Wax &c. is put out of one form or fashion into another, thereis no new Thing propounded; but that which before was, is now otherwise ordered.

And thus it is most true which his Lordship speaks, That Habituall Knowledge, is nothing but Light more or lesse glorious; It is Reason clea∣red;

It's only Facultas facilitata, or facultatis Facilitas: And to this Fa∣cility or Readinesse to operate, I cannot allow a Physicall existence of its own; as neither to any Habit whatsoever, as being but Modi and not Entia; It's not a Being, but a Manner of Being; not Ens but aliquid Entis. And I should easily be perswaded to grant the same concerning all Accidents whatsoever, which have long since been called Entis En∣tia: And however an Accident hath been accounted to be Res, and so to have Existentiam Rei; yet not Subsistentiam Rei: Though it have an Existence of its own, yet its Subsistence is no other but Subsisten∣tia Subjecti.

Yet I cannot with his Lordship subscribe to the Platonists, to make Knowledge nothing but a Remembrance. (As if there were naturally in our Understanding, the Pictures or Pourtraictures of all Truths, but so obscured and covered as it were with dust, that these glorious Colours doe not appear, till such time as they be rubbed and washed over anew.) I approve rather of Aristotle's Rasa Tabula, (then Plato's Remi∣niscentia) making the Understanding, of it selfe, to have no such Idea or Picture at all, but capable of all. Or thus (I know not how it can be better expressed;) The Understanding is not as a Table, wherein the Kings Picture is pourtrayed in lively colours, but (hanging in the dark) it appears not, that there are any such Lineaments, till it be En∣lightened with the Sunne, and then it presents us with a Fair Descrip∣tion: But rather as a Glasse which is able to Receive and Reflect what∣soever Colours fall upon it, though (before) it had none of them.

For I demand, What Principle is there implanted in nature to en∣form me, Whether there ever were such a City as Troy? Whether it were so destroyed? Whether this or that were Plato's or Aristotle's Opinion? What Principle to enform, that it rained yesterday & is faire to day? Certainly, matters of Fact have not such Idea's implanted in Nature; for then might they by Discourse be known to have been or not to have been, without the help either of Sense or Information. And if Historicall Knowledge may be acquired without any fore-implan∣ted Idea's of those Truths so known; why also may not Discursive Truth be also Known without a Reminiscentia, or a Review of Forgot∣ten o•• Obscure Principles?

Next he tells us, That wee may Seem by frequent actings to help the Soule, and so to create Acquisite Habits; whereas indeed it is not so, but all Actings are only new Discoveries.

But how this can stand with his former doctrine of Reminiscentia, I

doe not see: For this takes away not only Plato's Reminiscentia, but all Remembrance whatsoever. If all Actings be new Discoveries, How and When can wee be said to Remember?

But is it soe? doe Former Actings no way help our Subsequent Acts? I•• so, how can a Learned Schollar be said to Know more then an Ignorant Peasant? For the one is as capable of a new discovery as the other, i•• his former acts make no preparation or fitnesse for future acts. How comes it to passe, that Learned men shall apprehend those Truths at the first relation, which another cannot without much adoe be brought to conceive? Nay why should an Artist be more skilfull in his Trade then another? Why may not an Infant new born plead his cause as well as the best experienced Lawyer? Certainly, if former acts doe not indeed produce an Habituall Knowledge (but only seem to doe) in the one which is not in the other, the one may as well act as the other, for there is the same Reasonable Soule in a Child, which is in him afterwards.

The difference surely must proceed from hence, That the Former Actings have produced a Facility and Readinesse for Future Acts: that so, what was before more Difficult, becomes now Facile.

Nay more, That which before was utterly Impossible, becoms now both Feazi••le and Easie. All the most refined Wits in the world joyning their acutest Discoveries, their strongest Iudgements together, are not able without the help of Historicall Relation, ever to know such a thing as the Destruction of Troy: Yet when this, or the like, hath been either Seen by our selves, or Related to us, it is then easie to tell afterwards, what wee have seen, what we have heard, without a second view or a new relation. Now if the former Actings, do no•• way prepare for a future Act; why might not the First discovery have been made by our own light of Reason, without an Externall supply, from our Senses, or from Information, as well as the Second?

Philosophers (saith he) affirm this boldly of the Ʋnreasonable Creature, ••teributing it to an Instinct or new Influence▪ Why then may we not conclud•• the same of Man?

That Philosophers attribute much to Instinct in Unreasonable Crea∣tures, I grant: But that by an Instinct, they meant a new Influence, I was not aware. Certainly Memory hath been accounted one of the Sensus ••nt••rni, and soe belonging to the Sensitive Soule, and therefore not to be denied to Brutes: And doubtlesse daily experiments put it out of question, That Brute Creatures make use of Memory, and by former

acts, are fitted for following acts; not doing all from a new Instinct.

I am called in the next place, to search out the difference between Reason and Faith. They differ (saith he) only in Degrees, not in Nature: For if Soule, Ʋnderstanding, Habits be all the same, then neither doe Reason and Faith differ.

I grant that there is the same ground, why wee should make Reason and Faith the Same; that there is to make the Faculty and the Habit the Same. Reason is a Faculty, Faith a Habit: Now a Faculty and a Habit, I have before sayd not to be res & res, but res & modus. Their Physicall Difference therefore (I mean, if you consider Faith and Rea∣son in the same man) is but Modall.

But it doth not follow from hence, That they differ not in Nature. For though an Habit have not Entitatem Rei, distinct from the Faculty; yet it hath Entitatem Modi; so that the Habit is not a Faculty, nei∣ther is the Faculty an Habit.

To enquire of a Physicall Identity, and of a Metaphysicall or For∣mall Identity, are quaere's farre distinct. The Faith of Peter is Really and Physically distinct from the Faith of Paul; and yet their Metaphysicall Formall nature is exactly the Same. Again, all the Modall Beings in the same subject, though their Essence and Nature be never so distinct (v. g. Duration, Augmentation, Situation &c, in the same man) be Really the same; (for neither of them, being Modi, have any Entitatem Rei, beside the Entity of their common Subject, and so cannot make a Reall distinction, because there is not res & res:) Yet each Modus hath a distinct Formall nature of its own: The nature of a Figure, is not the nature of a Habit, though both in the same Subject.

But yet, though it doe not follow from that Reall Identity between Res & Modus, that the Nature of Reason and the Nature of Faith be the same: Yet if he change but the terms, and say (in stead of Reason) that Knowledge and Faith are the same in nature, I will not contend: So that he mean Faith as it is an Act or Habit of the Ʋnderstanding, and not of the Will. For so, Faith is an Assent to a Truth reveiled: & the same individuall Assent to the same Truth, may be both Cognitio Scientiae, and Cognitio Fidei▪ I will instance in the Creation of the world: By Faith we know that the worlds were made, and Assent to it: And by naturall Demonstrations it may be proved, that the world was made; and these also are sufficient to perswade assent. Now we from both grounds (joyntly) assent to this Proposition, That the world was made. The which Assent in respect of the one Ground (propter eviden∣tiam

rei) is an assent of Science or Naturall Knowledge; in regard of the other Ground (Propter authoritatem dicentis) is an assent of Faith, or Supernaturall and reveiled Knowledge. The assent of Science, and of Faith, differ not in their Form, but in their Efficient.

But if he speak of Saving Faith (quatenus Salvifica) as it doth Save: so it is an act of the Will, and not of the Understanding; and therefore differs from Knowledge.

But, to conclude this: If we speak of a Physicall difference or distin∣ction, Then all the Modi that belong to the same Thing, can admit of no more then a Modall distinction: because having no other Entita∣tem Rei, but that of the common Subiect, their Entitas Rei must be Common; there cannot be Res & Res: the difference must be either tanquam Res & Modus, or tanquam Modus & Modus: And here is no consideration of the Nature of these Modi. In distinct Things; The Modi are Really distinct and not Modally though these Modi be exact∣ly of the same nature; as the Roundnesse of severall Circles; For they not having Entitatem Rei besides the Entity of their Subjects; their Subjects being really distinct, they must be really distinct also.

(Thus in the present case, The Faith of Peter is really distinct from the Faith of Paul: But Faith in Peter from Reason in Peter is only Mo∣dally distinct, tanquam Res & Modus; (viz. If you make Reason to be Res, or a Faculty Really distinct from the soule:) and the Habit of Faith in Peter will be distinct from all other Habits in Peter (v. g. from the Habit of Knowledge) tanquam Modus & Modus.)

But if wee speak, not of a Physicall, but of a Metaphysicall Diffe∣rence; Here it little avails to enquire of their Physicall Difference, or Identity. For those things that are really distinct, as two Souls, may yet agree in the same Specificall Nature: and those which are not really distinct (as severall Modi of the same Thing) may have their Formall Specificall differences.

Again, though it be granted that Naturall Knowledge (attained by by the use of Reason, without a supernaturall Revelation) be of the same Nature with Faith; Yet doth it not presently follow, That their diffe∣rence is Graduall, and the one but a greater Degree of the same Light: For Skill in Musick and Skill in Metalls or Mineralls, are both Naturall Habits; yet the Skill of a Musician, and the Skill of a Chy∣mist are not the Same (though of the same nature;) neither yet is their difference Graduall; For the one is not the way to attain the other and the other a Perfection of that former. And moreover a man

may be skilfull in either of them without a knowledge of the other, whereas a Greater Degree of Knowledge in the same Kind cannot be without the Lesser.

That which follows, concerning Falling from Grace, and the Free∣dome of the Will, (as also what proceeds, How farre we do acti agere, that is, How farre, and In what manner, the First cause doth concurre with the Second in its Operations) require a larger discourse for the deciding of them, then to be toucht at in transitu, and by the way. I shall therefore say onely this (and so passe them over;) Liberty and Servitude are opposit; and both are Relative terms. He that is Free from the Dominion of one Master, may be a Servant, a Slave, to ano∣ther. Thus the Will, though it be Free from any Naturall Necessity, either from within, or without; so that it be neither determined by an inward Principle, as meer Naturall Agents are; neither can have ei∣ther Compulsion, or Necessity, imposed upon it by the command of a∣nother Creature: Yet is it not Free from the Command and Power of God, by whose Absolute Decree it is determined. We must not so farre affect to be Liberi, that we become Sacrilegi; we must not vindicate our Liberty by committing Sacriledge, exempting our selves from be∣ing under the Power of a Deity.

If I were now to examine the nature of Freedome, wherein it con∣sists: I might perhaps place it in a Spontaneity, that it acts without re∣luctancy, Sponte agit: Were it not that even Naturall Agents (as a Stone falling) have such a free action, without Constraint, without Reluctancie.

Or it might be placed perhaps in a Reflection upon its own Act; whereby it doth not onely Agere, yea and Sponte (or volens) agere, without a Nolition, a Renitentia; But also Vult agere: Whereas a Naturall agent, though perhaps Sponte or Volens agit, yet you cannot say Vult agere, because there is not a Reflection whereby it Willeth its Action. That which hinders me from placing it in this, is, Because I allow not any reflex act of Willing in God, besides that direct act of Working, who is yet a most Free Agent. For (beside other reasons, that if need were, might be produced) it stands not with Gods Simplicity, to admit distinct acts in God, whereof one should be the Object of another. Now what strength there is in this, to hinder the placing of Free∣dome in this Reflex act, I propose to be considered, rather then Af∣firm.

But I rather place the nature of the Wills Liberty, in a Freedome

from Servitude, that it is not under the command of any Creature, or a Naturall Determination of its own. And therfore though it be free from such servitude as a Naturall agent, or such as may be Forced, is subject to; yet it is not free from Gods Command; Nor (perhaps) from the dictate of Reason neither, Or, if it be, yet is not this its Freedome, but its Weaknesse.

And this is not far distant from the received opinion, which makes it consist in Indifferentiâ. For the Will can agere vel non agere notwith∣standing anything to the contrary from the Creature; but it cannot age∣re vel non agere notwithstanding the Decree of God; and therfore is not Free from that Determination. And whereas other things are from God determined mediante causa secundâ, the Will is Immediately deter∣mined a causa primâ.

And therefore what he cites out of Rutterfort, That granting all things to be under an absolute Decree, it is fond to aske, Whether the Free Crea∣ture remain indifferent to doe or not to doe; I willingly assent unto. But you must consider withall, that This Freedome neither the Angels have, nor had Adam in his Innocencie.

And therefore, when Divines tell us, that by the Fall we have lost our Liberty, or Freedome of Will, in Spirituall things, which yet we retain in Morall and Civill Actions; I desire that they would more punctually set down, What the Liberty is, which we retain in Natu∣rall things, but want in Spirituall; What Liberty that is, which the Angels have, and Man once had, but hath now lost: And not speak of such a Liberty as neither Man or Angel ever had, nor is it possible for any Creature to have; Nay not for God himselfe, For God having once decreed, cannot with his Truth revoke it, nor is indifferent to exe∣cute it or not; But, as They say of Jupiter, which make Him to be the Author of their Stoicall unavoidable Fate (understanding it cum grano salis) He once Commanded, and ever after Obeyed.

There follows in the next place, an Objection, How it comes to passe, if Faith and Knowledge be One, that some who have more Knowledge have lesse Faith.

I need not recite his Lordships Answer, I will only propose my own. If there be meant a Physicall Identity, whereby two Modi of the same Thing doe subsist by the subsistence of their common Subject, it is not hard to determine: For two Modifications of the same Thing may yet be independent of each other: And therefore it is not requisite they should be both in the same measure, or degree.

2. If by Knowledge be meant an assent to Naturall truths, and by Faith, an assent to Supernaturall truths; neither is here any difficulty: For the Knowledge of one thing is not inconsistent with the Ignorance of ano∣ther thing.

3. ••f Knowledge and Faith be considered in relation to the same Object, Spirituall truths, or Saving truth, and Faith be taken for an Intel∣lectuall assent to them: Then is it not true, that there is in any (if you speak adid••m▪ more Knowledge and lesse Faith; what any Knows to be Thus, he cannot Beleeve to be Otherwise. For the Understanding is not a Free faculty, that it can either Accept or Reject a reveiled Truth.

4. If by Faith be meant, not an Assent in the Ʋnderstanding to the Truth Known, but a Consent in the Will, an imbracing of it (which is the Iustifying act of Faith:) Neither is this difficulty much greater then the former▪ For the too too frequent sinnes, even in Gods children, a∣gainst light, makes it over manifest, That the Action of the Will doth not always follow the Knowledge of the Understanding.

And yet if this too cleare experience be not able to prove it, but that you still lay all the blame upon the Understanding, as not being cleare enough in its Apprehensions, or not sufficiently Peremptory in its Di∣ctates; and so excuse the Will of all Remissenesse: I demand then, what disability there is in the Will of Man since the fall more then in the confirmed Angels and Saints in Heaven? I cannot think but that the Image of God, by the Fall, is defaced in the Will as well as in the Understanding; and yet if the Will doe never disobey the Light of Reason, which is its sole (immediate) Guide, I see not wherein this disability doth appear.

I grant that the Will doth always Follow the Understanding, that is, it never goes before it, or without it; it goes never but where the Under∣standing hath led the way, in discovering some Good, (more or lesse,) something Desirable. For the Will is Caeca potentia▪ and Knows of no∣thing desirable, but what the Understanding discovers. And Knowing nothing, can Desire nothing; Ignoti nulla Cupido.

But yet I grant not that Proposition in this sense, The will Allwayes follows the Understanding; that is, It never stays behind. For to Omit what the Understanding commands, requires not a discovery of some other Good, but only an Impotency, a Backwardnesse, or Re∣misnesse to doe its Duty. To goe without direction, requires a Positive Cause, because it is a Positive Act; But Not to goe when it is directed, may proceed from a Negative Cause (Negatio Causae,) because it is a

Negative Act, or a Not-doing. A lame man doth not runne, when he knows, that he ought to runne; yet here is no need of a Positive Cause to stay him, but his Impotency (a Negative cause) sufficeth.

And thus farre do I admit that distinction of Libertas Contrarietatis, and Libertas Contradictionis, though in that way in which it is ordi∣narily made use of, I doe wholly reject it. There is not in the Will an Indifferency to choose Good or to choose Evill; neither yet to Choose good, or Reject good (velle & nolle;) both which they call Libertas Contrietatis. For the Understanding doth not shew any Amiable∣nesse or Lovelynesse in Evill; nor any Odiousnesse in Good (quatenus sic;) and therefore the Will cannot Desire Evill, nor Reject Good (Nolle, or Ʋelle non.) For Bonitas is Objectum formale Appetitûs; and Malum is the formall Object of Nolition. Now the Soule cannot velle quatenus bonum, that in which no Good is apprehended; nor nolle quatenus ma∣lum (that is, velle ut non sit) that wherein it apprehends no Evill. But for the other kinde of Indifferency, (which they call Libertas Contra∣dictionis,) to Will good, or Not Will it; to Nill Evill, or Not to Nill it; This I acknowledge to be in the Will. For that by reason of its Imbecil∣lity, it is not so ready to execute its Functions as it ought to be.

But yet I do not conceive the Liberty of the Will to consist in this; Or, that this is any Perfection to the Will, To be able to Suspend its Act, notwithstanding the Understandings direction to the contrary. (For this the Angells Confirmed cannot doe, nor the Saints Glorified; for if their Will could act contrary to their Understanding, then could they Sinne; And yet these Agents are no lesse Free, then Man is: Yea God, who is the most absolutely-Free Agent, yet cannot Will or Decree that which is contrary to his Sapience, (intellectus divinus;) his Will never thwarts his Wisdome.) But I conceive it to be an Imperfection or Weaknesse in mans Will; which, Before the Fall, was not so Stable, but that it might Fall; and is Now become so Weak, that it is Ʋnable to Staud.

The common Opinion is, That, If the Will cannot disobey the Iudge∣ment of the Understanding, then is it not a Free faculty but all its acti∣ons are determined by the Understanding, while It dictates, that this or that is to be done or omitted; and so Freedome should be placed in the Ʋnderstanding and not in the Will. I may adde, (to help their cause for∣ward) that there may seem to be no Freedome at all: For the Will is determined by the dictate of the Ʋnderstanding, and therefore in it is no freedom, no Election; and the Ʋnderstanding (by generall con∣sent) is not Free, to judge this or that as it pleaseth, but must assent or

dissent according to its Light: so that Here will be no Freedom nei∣ther. For this reason they say, That the Will is not necessitated to fol∣low the dictate of Reason; but when the Understanding hath declared what it can, it is yet in the power of the Will to Choose.

But then, least they should fall upon another rock, viz. That, if the Will may reject the Understandings advice; then may it desire that which the Understanding affirms to be Evill; contrary to that Prin∣ciple, That Good is the only Object of Desire: To avoid that danger, they have found out this distinction of Libertas Contrarietatis and liber∣tas Contradictionis, which they apply thus; The Will hath power indeed to disobey that which the Understanding propoundeth: But yet not so, as if, of two Objects, whereof the Understanding Allows of one, and Disallows of the other, it were free notwithstanding to imbrace Either; But when an Object is commended by the Understanding, though the Will cannot Elect its Contrary, yet it may not-elect this, it may choose whether or no it will Imbrace it. And thus they think the whole matter is salved.

This Answer may seem plausible, and hath past for current: But yet (with their leaves) the Wound, though perhaps skinned over, is not so easily Healed. For if they may not admit the Liberty of Contrariety: they may not (in my judgement) admit the Other. For when the Un∣derstanding commends an Object to the Will, as that which Ought to be Desired, here are two opposite terms, to Imbrace, or not Imbrate; (age∣re, suspendere:) The Understanding saith, Agendum est, it Ought to be Imbraced; The Will chooseth rather not to Imbrace it, but to Suspend its Act. The Understanding adviseth One extream; the Will chooseth the Other extream. The Understanding saith, It is Good to Act, and (consequently) it is Ill to Omit, to suspend; the Will notwithstanding chooseth to Suspend (which the Understanding affirms to be Evill,) ra∣ther then to Act, which the Understanding commends as Good. Thus that libertas Contradictionis, appears upon triall to include also a liberty of Contrariety: and if it may Not-choose the term commended, then it may choose the term Forbidden, yea it must choose it, where the terms are Contradictory without a Medium.

All that can be said to help it, will be this; Willing and Suspending are indeed Opposite Terms; and therefore when the Understanding ad∣viseth to Will, if the Will do [Velle] suspendere, it chooseth the term Op∣posite, and (consequently) that which is proposed as Evill; But (they may say perhaps) the Will doth only Suspendere, and not Velle suspen∣dere;

and so this Suspending is not an Object of Choice, but only the Absence or Negation of an Act; and therefore though it doe ire in con∣trarias partes, yet it doth not contrariam partem Eligere, it doth not Choose, or Elect, the Opposite term, because there is no positive Act of Election or Willing exercised about it.

And this answer I confesse may seem to weaken the Objection im∣mediatly foregoing; for thus the Will is not made to Choose an Oppo∣s••te term; But then let them consider, how this Answer will stand with their Opinion: They tell us first that the Freedom of the Will is mani∣fested in Suspending when the Understanding commands to Act; and yet when it doth Suspend, they say this Suspension is not an object of Choice or Election; and (consequently) there is no Liberty exercised.

If they think thus to evade, in saying, That this Liberty is exercised, not in Suspe••ding when it might Act, because There is no Election, & therefore no Freedom exercised; But in Acting, when as it might have Suspended. I answer, That neither will this serve the turn. For as Sus∣pension is not Objectum Volitionis, an Object of Choice; so neither is Acting an Object of choice. And as we say not Volo Suspendere, or Volo Non-velle, so neither do we say volo Velle: For by the same reason that any may say Volo Velle, he may say also volo non Velle. So that Willing can no more be said to be an object of Choice, then Suspending.

Their Libertas Contradictionis therefore must either be also ibertas Contrarietatis, and so by themselves rejected: or else it will be no exer∣cise, no manifestation, of Liberty, and therefore uselesse for their purpose.

I admit (as I said before) the distinction in this sense; That the Will, though it cannot Elect a Contrary object, ye•• it may Not-Elect This. And thus there is no Action (of Choice or Desire) in the Will, but tending to some Good that the Understanding proposeth; For what is not Known cannot be Desired: But yet there may be a negligent Omission or Suspension, when it ought to Act Which I do not account ••o be the Liberty, or Perfection of the Will, (for Angells &c. have it not,) but an Imperfection and Weaknesse. Neither do I say, that the Will doth Voluntarily Suspend, or Velle suspendere, without direction, (for that were a Positive Act;) but (either by Negligence, or Weak∣nesse,) doth Not-Will. For which there is no•• requisite a Positive cause, but a Negative, or the Want of a Cause.

You will say, If this be so, then will there be only a sinfull Omission •••• the Will, and not a sinfull Commission: For Sinne of Commission

(doing or Willing that which ought not) is Positive, and therefore cannot proceed from the Will, when the Understanding dictates to the contrary. Whereas the Will doth as often fail in Choosing a wrong object, which the Understanding acknowledgeth to be Evill; as in Not Choosing a Good Object.

I answer, it is true, the Will doth often choose what it ought not: And yet I affirm, that the Wills Errour is onely Negative and not Po∣sitive; It is Omissive only, in not-obeying some directions of the Un∣derstanding. I shall make it cleer by an Instance. Pleasure and Vertue may be Competitors, and Rivalls (as it were) both courting the Will; (As in an Act Pleasant, but Sinnefull.) The Understanding proposeth Pleasure as quid bonum, 'tis Good, 'tis Desirable; It proposeth Vertue as quid melius, 'Tis Better, 'tis more desirable. Now the Will perhaps follows the first direction; it imbraceth Pleasure as being Good, and so Desirable; (for Bonum Jucundum is Desirable as well as Bonum Hone∣stum:) But the second Precept, or Direction rather, whereby Vertue is proposed as Better, and therefore should countermand the form••••, this it hears not, it follows not.

If you say, the Understanding doth indeed discover some Good (though a lesse Good) in the Object; yet this is not to be accounted the Understandings Practicall Direction (dictamen:) But, that the Under∣standing having examined the Good and the Evill that is in every Act, and comparing them together; upon this Comparison, as it observes the Good or Evill to be more, so it prescribes, to Doe, or Not to Doe, H•••• age, or Hoc non age: And if the Will doe Act, when the Understan∣ding Forbids, it must be said to perform a Positive Act without di∣rection.

I answer▪ I admit not the Understandings dictate to be Imperative, but onely Declarative: It onely informs, This is Good, This is Evill; but Commands not, Doe this, or Omit it. But the Will upon propo∣sall of Good, Embraceth it; upon proposall of Evill, it Rejects it: Yet not so, but that, by Negligence, it may Not-embrace Good, and not∣reject Evill. And thus the proposall of Pleasure, as Good; is as truely declarative as the other; and this the Will follows: But a further de∣claration, whereby it declares, that although Pleasure be Good, yet it is Evill to embrace this Good, because there is a greater Evill annexed; This direction, by omission, it imbraceth not. And this I conceive to be the true nature of the Acts of the Will and Understanding.

If you would have the Will and the Understanding to be the Same,

(and therefore think these distinctions superfluous,) understand by the Intellect, Anima Intelligens; by the Will, Anima Volens, or Anima quatenus Volens, and then you are pleased.

And thus you see, How there may be more Knowledge (even of Spiri∣tuall and Saving Truths) and yet l••sse Faith: Because there may be ••n Asse••t, a Beleeving, in the Understanding, (which is Knowledge, or Historicall Faith;) without a Fiduciall Trust, a Reliance, and resting upon it; which is the Justifying Faith, or the Justifying Act of Faith. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 yea, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, without 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

5. But if you speak of a Knowledge peculiar to Gods children, wherof others partake not; Such a Knowledge of God wherby no man knows him but he that hath him; That Knowledge which is Life everlasting: This Knowledge, and Faith, always go together; the more there is of One, the more also of the Other. A Speculative Knowledge, where∣by we assent to the Truth reveiled, is found even in the Devils, and that in as large and ample measure (I suppose) as in the Saints on Earth: For I cannot be perswaded, but the Devils (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) being Knowing Spirits, doe Know and Assent to the Truth of every Proposition that a Child of God knows. But there is an Experimentall Knowledge distinct from the former, Knowledge of another nature, whereby we Know, what we know, in another Manner: We do not only Know that it is so, but we Tast and See it to be so.

A Blind man Knows perhaps that the Sun shines, but he doth not S•••• it: I Know that at Midnight the Sunne shines to our Antipodes, but I doe not See it shine to them: I Know that at such a time there is such an I ••lipse visible to such a part of the World, yet doe I not See the Eclipse. The Confectioner that provides a Banquet Knows that this or that dish is Sweet, but they only Tast the Sweetnesse that eat of it. A wicked man may Know that God is good, (as a blind man knows that the Sun shines, by the report of others; or as an Astronomer knows of an Eclipse before it come, by Calculation, or rationall Discourse and Illa∣tion;) ••ut he S••es it no••, he Tasts it not. Now we read of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, H••b. 5. 14. som that have their Senses exercised to discern of good and evill; there is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Phil. 1. 9. a kind of spiritu∣all Sense, whereby we do 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, super••a S••pere, Relish those things that are above.

And where there is this spirituall Tast, this Experimentall Know∣ledge; there must needs be Faith also▪ For Truths thus cleerly, and Sensibly (as it wer••) rev••iled to the Soul, it seems no•• to be in the power

of the Will to reject: No more then it is in the power of the Eare not to be pleased with harmonious Musick; or in the power of the Palat, not to be delighted with the Sweetnesse of a Tast.

And thus I suppose it may appear, How far, and From what Ground there may be Knowledge without Faith.

That God is all mercy and sweetnesse to the Divels, is no Article of my faith, Those miserable creatures, saith he, cannot consent to it. No more can I: And yet I deny not, that Mercy and Justice are One thing in God. Gods Simple Essence is the same with both; yet are not They so properly the same with each other. The Torment of the Devils proceeds from that Divine Essence which is Love; (as likewise the Mercies of Gods Children proceed from that Divine Essence which is Justice: for the Justice of God is equally himselfe as is his Love:) Yet may we not say, the Torments of those are an effect of Love, no more then that the Mercies of these are the effects of Anger; yet Both are the effects of that Simple Essence, which is Both. It is a far different thing therefore, to say, A Loving God doth notwithstanding Punish; and to say, A Loving God doth therefore Punish: Punishment and Revenge are sufficiently consistent with Love; but not the immediate ef∣fects of Love. Thus we say, Musicus Aedificat; yet not his skill in Musick, but his skill in Architecture, is exercised in Building.

The Love of God (as likewise his Anger, Justice, Power, &c.) is (I confesse) the Divine Essence; we allow no Accidents in God at all: quicquid est in Deo, est Deus. But I ask, Whether he think this Attri∣bute Love (and so of the rest) to be an Adequate expression of that whole Essence? If so, then is it all one to say, God Loves his Children, and, God is Angry with his children, or God Hates them: If not, then is it only inadaequatus conceptus, and there remains somewhat to be expres∣sed by other Attributes, which is not expressed in this. The Attributes of God therefore (as likewise it is in other inadaequati conceptus) may be all affirmed of the same Simple Essence; but not (Mutually) of each other: And the Effects of each may be said to be the Effects of the same Essence; but not (Promiscuously) of every Attribute: (unlesse we take them Materialiter, not Formaliter:) And consequently, the ruine (of the damned) is not (as he affirms) an effect of infinite sweetnesse (though of that (Essence) which i••, Infinite Sweetnesse;) nor is God, (in this) mercifull to them.

Again, What we Know, we are, (saith he:) I assume; Sed deum scimus, Ergo Dii sumus.