CHAP. IV. Whether the Ʋnderstanding, faculty may not be the Reci∣pient of Truth.
IN the 4. Chapter he proceeds, further to shew, That the Ʋnderstan∣ding cannot •••• this Recipient. And if he speak of such a Recipiency as where the Recipient and the Receptum be the same; his Adversaries, that say, Truth and the Understanding to be distinct, will contend for this as well as He: For neither will They say, datur Intellectu•• se esse Rationem, nor datur Rationi ut sit Intellectus. But if he speak of the Re∣••ipiency of a Subject, I see not from what hath yet been said, why the Understanding (if distinct) may not be the Subject of Reason; why they may not say, Datur Intellectui Habere Rationem: Since it is gran∣ted in Logi••k, That one Accident may be the immediate Subject, though not the Ʋltimate Subject of another. And so, if any will have the Soul the Intellect, and Truth or Reason, to be tria distincta: They must say, The Intellect is the immediate Subject of Reason, and the Soule the Ʋl∣timate. And then call the Understanding either a Quality, a Faculty, or Virtus quâ, it is no great matter; (we will not contend with his Lordship for the name.) For Virtus quâ i•• but a Faculty, and a Faculty, (or po••••••tia naturalis) is the second species of Quality.