Truth tried: or, animadversions on a treatise published by the Right Honorable Robert Lord Brook, entituled, The Nature of Truth, its vnion and vnity with the soule. Which (saith he) is one in its essence, faculties, acts; one with truth. By I. W.

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Title
Truth tried: or, animadversions on a treatise published by the Right Honorable Robert Lord Brook, entituled, The Nature of Truth, its vnion and vnity with the soule. Which (saith he) is one in its essence, faculties, acts; one with truth. By I. W.
Author
Wallis, John, 1616-1703.
Publication
London :: Printed by Richard Bishop, for Samuel Gellibrand at the Signe of the Brazen Serpent in Pauls Church-yard,
1643.
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Subject terms
Brooke, Robert Greville, -- Baron, 1607-1643. -- Nature of truth.
Truth -- Early works to 1800.
Cite this Item
"Truth tried: or, animadversions on a treatise published by the Right Honorable Robert Lord Brook, entituled, The Nature of Truth, its vnion and vnity with the soule. Which (saith he) is one in its essence, faculties, acts; one with truth. By I. W." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A97067.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed May 28, 2024.

Pages

CHAP. IV. Whether the Ʋnderstanding, faculty may not be the Reci∣pient of Truth.

IN the 4. Chapter he proceeds, further to shew, That the Ʋnderstan∣ding cannot •••• this Recipient. And if he speak of such a Recipiency as where the Recipient and the Receptum be the same; his Adversaries, that say, Truth and the Understanding to be distinct, will contend for this as well as He: For neither will They say, datur Intellectu se esse Rationem, nor datur Rationi ut sit Intellectus. But if he speak of the Re∣ipiency of a Subject, I see not from what hath yet been said, why the Understanding (if distinct) may not be the Subject of Reason; why they may not say, Datur Intellectui Habere Rationem: Since it is gran∣ted in Logik, That one Accident may be the immediate Subject, though not the Ʋltimate Subject of another. And so, if any will have the Soul the Intellect, and Truth or Reason, to be tria distincta: They must say, The Intellect is the immediate Subject of Reason, and the Soule the Ʋl∣timate. And then call the Understanding either a Quality, a Faculty, or Virtus quâ, it is no great matter; (we will not contend with his Lordship for the name.) For Virtus quâ i but a Faculty, and a Faculty, (or po••••••tia naturalis) is the second species of Quality.

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