Truth tried: or, animadversions on a treatise published by the Right Honorable Robert Lord Brook, entituled, The Nature of Truth, its vnion and vnity with the soule. Which (saith he) is one in its essence, faculties, acts; one with truth. By I. W.

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Title
Truth tried: or, animadversions on a treatise published by the Right Honorable Robert Lord Brook, entituled, The Nature of Truth, its vnion and vnity with the soule. Which (saith he) is one in its essence, faculties, acts; one with truth. By I. W.
Author
Wallis, John, 1616-1703.
Publication
London :: Printed by Richard Bishop, for Samuel Gellibrand at the Signe of the Brazen Serpent in Pauls Church-yard,
1643.
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Subject terms
Brooke, Robert Greville, -- Baron, 1607-1643. -- Nature of truth.
Truth -- Early works to 1800.
Link to this Item
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A97067.0001.001
Cite this Item
"Truth tried: or, animadversions on a treatise published by the Right Honorable Robert Lord Brook, entituled, The Nature of Truth, its vnion and vnity with the soule. Which (saith he) is one in its essence, faculties, acts; one with truth. By I. W." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A97067.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed August 31, 2024.

Pages

Proposition. 4. Chap. 10.

And what hath been said of Naturall and Habituall light of Reason and Habituall Knowledge, he now affirms of Actuall Knowledge. The severall Operations of the Soule, in apprehensions, affirmations, nega∣tions, &c. the severall Actings of Truth, are also the Souls Essence. And why? but because the Soule is Actus primus, and therefore its Essence must be Action; This Action likewise must Exist; which what else can it be but Rationall workings? and so the same with Actus Se∣cundus.

But his Lordship is much mistaken to think that actus primus is La∣tine for Action. Actus is of as large an extent as Potentia: Now there is potentia ad Esse, and potentia ad Formam, as well as potentia ad O∣perari. When Ens in potentiâ becoms Ens Actu, when that which was possible, is actually produced; its own Essence o Being is that Actus, which makes it Ens Actu, which was before Ens in Potentiâ: and this we call actus Entitativus, and it is better translated Actuality, then ei∣ther Action, or Activity. Again the Matter is capable of this or that Form, which we call potentia ad Formam (substantialem;) whereby it

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is potentiâ tale (in genere substanti;) as materia putris is in potentiâ ad formam vermis: Now when this Form whereof it is capable is actual∣ly introduced, that which was before potentià tale, becoms now actu tale (in genere substantiae;) and this Form is called actus Substantialis▪ (but not Actio Substantialis,) or actus primus; and (thus) the Soule is Actus. Again, a Substance of this or that Species, constituted by this or that form, is capable of this or that Accident, and is therefore potentiâ talis, accidentaliter; or in potentiâ ad hanc formam acidentalem; as Water is potentiâ calida, when Heat is produced, it becoms Actu ca∣lida, and the Heat is this Actus whereby it is actu talis; and it is actus primus accidentalis, (though perhaps some would call it actus secundus: Yet none call it Actio) This actus acciden alis, or forma accidentalis, if it be Operative, stands in a double relation; to its Subject, and so it is actus informans; and to its Operation, and so it is actus operativus (but not Operatio) and belongs either to the first, or the second species of Quality, it is either a Habit or a Faculty; this, if you please, you may call Activity, though not Action▪ Now a Subject indued with this actus operativus is in potentiâ ad operandum: When this power is reduced into act, it is actu operans; and this actus whereby it doth actu operari, is properly Actus secundus, Actio, or Operatio, and belongs to the Praedi∣cament of Action. But such an Actus the Soule is not, and therefore its Operations cannot be its Essence.

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