Truth tried: or, animadversions on a treatise published by the Right Honorable Robert Lord Brook, entituled, The Nature of Truth, its vnion and vnity with the soule. Which (saith he) is one in its essence, faculties, acts; one with truth. By I. W.

Propositio. 3. Chap. 8. 9▪

He returns next, to his former discourse; And what he had said of the Light of Reason, he saith also of the Light of Knowledge, both Ha∣bituall and Actuall. Hee allows not that Habits, either Infused or Acquisite, are any thing new brought into the Soule, but only former principles enlightened: And therefore rejecting Aristotle's rasatabula, he imbraceth Plato's Reminiscentia, Which may be thus expressed; He supposeth the Soule to be as a Table, wherein be many rare lineaments, and lively colours described, but hanging in the dark they appeare not till such time as they be illustrated by some advenient Light; which Light doth not bring with it any new colours, or more lineaments, but only illustrateth those that were formerly there but appeared not: Whereas Aristotle rightly supposeth it as a Table prepared, void of any, yet capable of all; Or rather as a Glasse, which having of it selfe none of those Colours, is yet fit to receive and reflect all those Rays or visi∣ble Species, which from the adjacent Objects fall upon it.

And indeed, as for Historicall Knowledge, I suppose, his Lordship himselfe, if he well consider of it, will not affirm that to have any Idea's originally in the Soule: It being utterly impossible by discourse to find out a by-past History, without Historicall Relation. And if there may be new Idea's of Historicall truths imprinted in the Soule which were not there before, why not also of Discu••sive Knowledge.

But his Lordship stays not here, dissenting from us in the Nature of Habits, whether they be new Idea's, or the illustration of former Idea's▪ but in effect, he takes away all Habits wholly. Telling us, that we Seem only by frequent acts to help the Soule, and create new Ha∣bits, but that indeed all actings are but new discoveries.

Now this is not to establish Plato's Reminiscentia; but to take away all Memory whatsoever. How can we be said to remember? how is one said to be learned, another ignorant? what is the benefit of study, and of experience? if former acts doe not at all help future acts, but only seem so to doe▪ How comes it to passe, that wee are able out of our own me∣mories to furnish our selves with Historicall truths formerly heard or read, without a second relation, which at the first wee could not doe? if our former acts doe not at all help latter acts, but all things be new discoveries.