Corollarium. 1. Chap. 6.
From hence he proceeds to a further Corollary, That not only the Soule, but All things else, are also the same with Truth. But why so? Because every thing is its own Recipient? If it be; it doth not follow that every thing is the Recipient of Truth. If every thing be the Reci∣pient of its own Essence, must therfore this Essence needs be Truth? If his Lordship had well considered, that Truth, as he hath formerly spoken of it, is but the same with that which others call Reason; he would scarce have made this Consequence, unlesse he could think to perswade us, that all things whatsoever are Reasonable Creatures▪ There is therefore too great an hiatus, to make this proposition, a Co∣rollary of the former.
But indeed his Lordship is by this time fallen off from his former acceptation of Truth. For having (as he supposeth) proved Reason to be the Soules Essence, the Soules Entity; he begins to take that word (which formerly signified Reason,) to signify Entity, or Being: So that Truth now, must be the same with Entitas. And the Emphasis of this last assertion lies in this, not that the Essence of all things is Truth, or Entity, (for that were no great news,) but that the Essence of all things is this One Truth: meaning, that all Entity is Homogeneall and of the same nature.
He was proving before, that Truth or Reason was the same thing with the Soule: He hence infers, not that all things are the same thing; (for I cannot understand him to speak so harshly, as that one drop of water were the same drop with another drop of water, though Homo∣geneall; that the Soule of Peter is the Soule of Judas, though of the same Species;) but that they are alike things, or things of the same nature.
The Consequence, (that all things must be of the same Species, be∣cause the Soule and its Faculties are the same Thing) will not hold.