Truth tried: or, animadversions on a treatise published by the Right Honorable Robert Lord Brook, entituled, The Nature of Truth, its vnion and vnity with the soule. Which (saith he) is one in its essence, faculties, acts; one with truth. By I. W.

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Title
Truth tried: or, animadversions on a treatise published by the Right Honorable Robert Lord Brook, entituled, The Nature of Truth, its vnion and vnity with the soule. Which (saith he) is one in its essence, faculties, acts; one with truth. By I. W.
Author
Wallis, John, 1616-1703.
Publication
London :: Printed by Richard Bishop, for Samuel Gellibrand at the Signe of the Brazen Serpent in Pauls Church-yard,
1643.
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Subject terms
Brooke, Robert Greville, -- Baron, 1607-1643. -- Nature of truth.
Truth -- Early works to 1800.
Cite this Item
"Truth tried: or, animadversions on a treatise published by the Right Honorable Robert Lord Brook, entituled, The Nature of Truth, its vnion and vnity with the soule. Which (saith he) is one in its essence, faculties, acts; one with truth. By I. W." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A97067.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed May 28, 2024.

Pages

Propositio 2. Chap. 5.

Which Truth, or Reason, Whether it be in the Understanding, or be the Understanding; yet it cannot make the Soule to be Rationall, un∣lesse it be also in the Soule: For how can Reason make the Soule Reasonable, if it be not in t, but in somewhat else. And if it be in the Soule, then must i be the Soule: Because to be in the Soule, and to be the Soule i all one; every thing being its own Recipien. Thus Truth, or Light (of Reason) will be the same with the Un∣derstanding; And both That and This the same with the Soule.

But I hope his Lordship will not deny, but that there is another kind of Receiving▪ beside that Receiving that he speaks of. (They tell us in Logick of cto modi habendi; and there are as many manners of Re∣ceiving, as there are of Having.) To receive the Essence of a Man, and to be a Man, is all one; To have the Essence of Money, and to be Money, is all one; But yet, I hope, a Man may receive Money, without being coined, and made Money. To receive the Essence of Water, and to be made Water; to receive the Essence of a Vessell, and to be a Vessell, is all one; yet a Vessell may contein Water, without being made Water. Thus a Substance may receive an Accident, a Subject may receive a Form, without being made that Accident, that Form. Thus datur Animae esse Animam datur Rationi esse Rationem, (each being its own Recipient:) But withall datur Animae Habere Ra∣tionem, though the Soule be not Reason, nor Reason (in this sense) its own Recipient.

If there be any strength in this Argument, it lies in this, That if Rea∣son (or Truth) be only in the Soule as an Accident, and not the Soules Essence, then it cannot make an Essentiall Difference between the Ra∣tionall and Irrationall Soule.

Page 102

And to this we must answer, (if we maintain Reason, and the rest of the Faculties, to be distinct from he Soul) That it is not the Faculties, it is not Reason, that makes the Essentiall Difference; but the Substance or Essence of the Soule from whence these Faculties proceed as Essentiall Consequents. Like as it is not Heat, and Cold, and the rest of the primae Qualitates, which make the Essentiall difference be∣tween one Element and another; but that Essence or Form, from whence these Qualities doe proceed.

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