against his will, but it was partly with his will, and partly against his will.
We doe a thing Spontè, we doe a thing invitè, and we doe a thing non invitè. We doe a thing Spontè, when we are altogether willing to it; we doe a thing invitè, when it is partly with our will, and partly against our will; we doe a thing non invitè, quando procedit ex ignorantia comitante; as when Mutius Scaevola killed another in [Simile.] stead of Porcenna, and when it was told him that he had missed the King, and killed another, he was sory that he had not killed the King; this action was neither done Spontè, nor invitè, but non invitè; but when a man kil∣leth in suddaine passion, and after that his passions and perturbations are setled, he is sory that he hath done such a thing, and is grieved that primus impetus non est in sua potestate, then he doth it invitè.
There is a twofold concupiscence, an antecedent concupiscence, and a consequent concupiscence; the antecedent concupiscence is that, when the passion preventeth the will, and moveth it; but the consequent concupiscence is that, when the will willingly work∣eth, and stirreth up the passion, that it may execute the sinne more readily; when passion preventeth the will, then it extenuateth the sinne, but when the will stirreth up the passion, then it augmenteth the sinne.
Againe, we must make a difference betwixt these two, to doe a thing ex ira, and to doe a thing iratus; when a man doth a thing ex irâ, anger is onely the cause of it, and it repenteth him of it afterward that he hath done it; but when he doth a thing iratus, it doth not proceed principally from his anger, but from some o∣ther bad disposition, and hardly such a man repenteth him of his fact.
Lastly, there is a difference betwixt eligere and prae∣eligere; eligere is to follow sense and appetite, but prae∣eligere