Horæ subseciuæ observations and discourses.

Of Ambition.

IT is an vnlimited desire, neuer satisfied. A continuall proiect∣ing without stop. An vndefati∣gable search of those things wee wish for, though want not. No contentment in a present state, though fortunate, and prospe∣rous.

An Ambitious man is in a kinde of continuall perambulation, or perpetuall courting of aduance∣ment, not respecting the meanes, Bribery, Flattery, Humility, Popu∣laritie, seeming Seueritie or Austere∣nesse. Any of which, so they con∣ferre, and conduce to his owne ends, whether for Titles, or Pre∣eminence, or Estimation, shall bee disguises good enough for

the present occasion.

The Scripture saith, Quise exal∣tat, humiliabitur. Whosoeuer exalts himselfe, shall be humbled. Not hee that is worthily exalted by others, and whose merits bee the cause of his rising, but he that will Ambiti∣ously exalt himselfe, hee shall bee abased.

That disposition, which is natu∣rally infected, with this Leprosie (which is a spreading disease) can not foresee the ineuitable dangers and euents, that be incident there∣vnto. Phauorinus speaking of these kinde of men, said they were ey∣ther ridiculous, or hatefull, or mi∣serable. Aspiring ambitiously to places beyond their worth, makes them scorned: obtaining, hated: and missing of their hopes, wret∣ched.

If the current of their Ambition bee once stopped, like an impetu∣ous torrent, it beates and breakes the bankes, growes dangerous, and many times causes inundations. Therfore Princes respects, if they be fixed vpon such natures, are ty∣ed not only to a continuation, but an addition of fauors; for the least surcease makes declination in ser∣uice. So that these dispositions should bee auoyded: if discouered, sequestred from imployment, as pernicious and incendiary.

Ambition was the first temptation by which the Diuell wrought vp∣on our first Parents, to encite them to a desire of knowing good and euill equally with God.

It is a strange insinuating affec∣tion, for whosoeuer is once there∣with possessed, neither Reason, nor

Impediment, nor Impossibility can stay his extrauagant desires. For though Nabuchadnezzar enioyed all greatnesse possibly incident to man, yet his Ambition stopt not, he would be worshipped as God. It was not Vertue nor Reason that counselled Sylla and Marius, Pom∣pey and Caesar, to enterprise their domestique warres, but a disordi∣nate loue of flattering Ambition; being in their owne opinions not great enough, which caused the ruine both of themselues & Coun∣trey. And as this was theirs, so it is the generall and principall motiue to all seditious, and trecherous at∣tempts. But these men whilst they tosse all, bee themselues most sha∣ken, and inwardly feele the torture of this pernicious fury, wherewith they haue offended others. There∣fore

it is Apocrypha to thinke that any man can become truely happy by the way of an other mans mis∣fortune, if for his owne particular hee be the contriuer.

When Ambition seazeth vpon a man, peraduenture his first ayme will be but vpon designes within his reach, or fit for his capacity, which if obtained, is the way to conduct him to higher cogitati∣ons, and so by degrees, from step to step, the more Ambition is fed, the more appetite it hath.

It is in a kinde the Ape or imita∣ter of Charity, saith a Father; for Charity endures all things for Eter∣nall, Ambition for Transitory happi∣nesse. That is liberall to the poore, this to the rich. The one suffers for Verity, the other for Vanity. So they both beleeue all things, and

hope for all things, but in a diffe∣rent kinde.

I cannot more fitly resemble an Ambitious man, then to one that should haue a fancy, to take a iour∣ney East-ward, to the place where the Sun seems in rising to touch & to be ioyned to the earth, in hope to arriue within the reach of the same, alwayes going forward, but not comming neerer to his desire; still progressiue, neuer at an end, being impossible to finish it, but the fur∣ther that he goes, the more earnest he is and impatient of protraction, and delayes. So that I may con∣clude such natures to be punished with Tantalus torture, of whom it is said, that that he desired, euer see∣med to bee neere him, yet neuer within his command.

Some haue similized these kind

of men with the Camelion. As that hath nothing in the body besides the lungs: so the badge of Ambiti∣on, is only windy, and boysterous ostentation.

It is a dangerous thing for men to loue too much, or thinke too well of themselues. The selfe-louer is the Arch-flatterer. Wisdome and caution may auoid the insinuatiōs of other men, but when a man be∣gins to admire and applaud him∣selfe, there is no defence. Therefore this partiall estimation, or false glasse of a mans owne worth and merit, is the true cause of Ambition. In, or by this wee looke vpon our selues with our owne eyes, which are so quick-sighted in discerning and reading the infirmities of o∣thers, that they turne dimme when they reflect vpon our selues, accor∣ding

to the Scripture. A moate is easily spyed in the eye of our neigh∣bour, but a beame in our owne is hardly visible.

Next to this Idolizing of a mans selfe, I cannot seuer it from the company of Enuy. For as the nature of Ambition is to commiserate our selues, for that wee seemingly want or desire: so when wee see ano∣ther man possessed of that, that our endeuours aspired vnto, present∣ly Enuy breaks forth, priuately ma∣ligning, publikely detracting what we can, both from his person, and actions.

Againe, if a Vacancie should hap∣pen of that place, wherevpon our whole course hath beene bent, then if another step betwixt vs, and home, Ambition changes into a malicious, and violent hatred a∣gainst

him that possesseth against his friends that opposed vs, and a∣gainst the giuer, that conferred, or bestowed it. And then vpon this we grow auerse, and sullen in all our actions, and venter vpon any mischiefe of the highest degree, or largest extent.

Besides these, it is impossible for an Ambitious man to iudge, and estimate the parts, and qualities of another, in respect of his owne: for his opinionated sufficiency makes him vndervalue, and his malice, to vndermine euery man besides, and either to find, or out of his malignity to faine whatsoeuer is done contrary, or vnknowing to him, to be deficient.

But if it happen (as it doth rare∣ly) that their owne consciences conuince them of another mans

desert and merit, presently they suspect opposition in their great∣nesse, and that their eminency may be eclipsed. Wherefore they striue and straine by all possible inuenti∣ons to put disgraces vpon his per∣son and parts, thereby to hinder his rising. For whilst he is out of im∣ployment, finding that he cannot so publikely expresse his worth, they still labour to keep him in ob∣scurity, to the end that themselues may seeme and appeare more glo∣rious.

But if this emulation happen be∣twixt them and one of as publike note, or equall estimation with themselues, then in all ioynt acti∣ons and consultations, they will endeuour to take from him, and adde as much to themselues in the opinion of the world, as either in∣dustry

or Art can deuise. Which kind of contention is pernici∣ous to all well-ordred Common∣wealths. For when euery one seeks to be principall, or to engrosse all within his owne Circumference, and to compasse the rest with sub∣iection, or affects to make himselfe the encreasing figure, whilst the rest serue but for supplyes, faction in businesse, confusion in directi∣ons, do necessarily follow.

And what be these men that so extremely affect Superiority, and Primacy in all affaires? Do they good to the Publike, or is their ser∣uice equiualent to their prefer∣ment? Do they shew by their acti∣ons that this was the principal mo∣tiue that caused them to desire greatnesse? No. For an Ambitious man, so soone as he is aduanced, re∣members

no more the duty, but the precedency of his place.

Some of this sort that thinke themselues most cunning in their trade, will not plainly professe Am∣bition, but maske, or shadow it with other colours, whereby they hope they may more safely passe, vndescried, vndiscouered. They will propound their owne merit and ability, or defect in others, and protest they haue no particular ends, but publike reformation; for which only cause, they are content to deuote, and enthrall themselues; when the truth is, the spurre that pricks them forward to these de∣signes, is glory, and command a∣boue others.

Therfore there is no way to keepe this desire concealed, but vt∣terly to extinguish it.

If we doe but view these men that haue their desires, and enioy their wishes, certainly we should not think it so glorious, and happy a thing, as it is giuen out for. Vexati∣on, and trouble continually attend it. And besides they bee not much more burthensome to o∣thers, then grieuous to themselues. Long to continue at the height, is seldome seene. Extraordinary fa∣uours be vncertaine, and slippe∣ry. Retire they cannot without staggering, nor descend, if not precipitately. Light burdens bee easily taken on, or cast off, without feeling; but if wee bee ouer-loaden, wee seldome faile but fall or sinke. And no man proceeds so happily, but sometimes hee is crost, the tra∣uels and wayes of this life be so

mixt and confused. Therefore Am∣bitious men had need prefixe a cer∣taine limit to their increase, and not to attend the retyring of For∣tune.

To affect superiority aboue o∣thers, when a mans desire is pre∣dominant ouer his reason, argues distemper and weakenesse.

Some great men that haue, or haue had great Offices, complaine of the paines and vexation they suffer, or haue suffered, with the weight & burthen of their charge, being worn in yeeres, and decayed both in spirit and strength. If there∣fore according to this they would, or could haue beene content to withdraw, or retire themselues, in respect of weaknesse and debility, from Publique affayres, it would haue expressed an excellent tem∣per,

and moderation. But few such voluntaries bee found. The traines of Ambition, Profit, and Pompe, de∣taine them, and whilest they say they hate the trouble, they shew by continuing, that they adore the glory, and gaine that fol∣lowes it.

But lest we may confound Am∣bitious, with worthy desires, take these few differences, or distincti∣ons. For the desire of glory in it selfe is not ill, but it is the excesse, or defect that makes it so. The meane betweene both cannot be exprest in one word, yet is commendable and allowed for a Vertue. So saith Aristotle, Laudatur habitus qui mo∣dum adhibet in expectanda gloria, eti∣amsi uacet nomine. Shewing the af∣fecting of glory to be matter both of Vertue, and Vice, according as

it is gouerned, as well as any other passion of the minde.

The vndergoing, or vnderta∣king of Publique businesse, so it be more for the generall good, then a mans priuate respect, is euer pro∣fitable to the Common-wealth; but to affect it too much in any kind whatsoeuer, is alwayes taken in the worst sense.

For men of place, or Fauorites to bee zealous in the streame, or generall course of businesse, is commendable, but to be violent, or singular, in the particulars, vn∣sufferably dangerous.

To desire precedency aboue o∣thers in respect of ones seruice, or merit, is a good emulation. Nam honos alit artes, omnes{que} incenduntur ad studia gloria, saith Cicero. For ad∣uancement nourisheth Learning,

and all men are enflamed to study, by the hope of honour and glory subsequent. But to aspire vnto it without either, intolerable Arro∣gance.

To bee hunting after all prefer∣ment, to follow euery shadow, shewes a man to be inconstant, and expresseth leuity: but to refuse Ho∣nor when it is offered, which as Se∣neca saith, is Fructus verae virtutis honestissimus, the honestest reward of Vertue, argues Pusillanimity.

If a man seeke or labour to at∣taine fauour, and preferment, with this onely intention, that by that way, he may haue better meanes to doe good, to reduce ill Custome, to the most ancient, and commen∣dable formes, and to amend brea∣ches, or intrusions, or decayes, with particular respect to this,

without the least tincture of vaine-glory, or any other selfe-desire, this kinde of Ambition I admit as a Ver∣tue, and in this case, I allow it to be generous.

Our first thoughts should be to make our selues worthy to receiue dignity, and employment; these∣cond, that the world should haue a good estimation, and opinion of our merit; and (that which ge∣nerally with others is the first) with vs should be the third, fruiti∣on of that wee thinke our selues able to discharge, and the world thinkes vs worthy to enioy, and not that which our priuat respects, and particular Ambition makes vs forward to desire. According to Pliny in an Epistle: Omnia metir •• dig∣nitate malim quam ambitione.

Scientia quae est remota à iustitia,

calliditas potius quam sapientia est appellanda, saith Plato. Knowledge separated from that which is vp∣right, is rather called craft, then wisedome. So a mind that is pre∣pared and ready for any great acti∣on, neuer so worthy, or full of hazzard, if the inducement to this be onely his owne particular ends, or profit, and not the publike, or common good, this certainly is better termed in him impudent and rash Ambition, then either Va∣lor, or Vertue.

To conclude, men that haue good aymes and ends in aspiring, are not so expressely Votaries to the Publique, as that they bee se∣cluded (by honest and iust wayes, free from scandall, importunitie, vexation, and tax) euen by the meanes of the present fauour, and

place they enioy, to raise or en∣crease their Fortune••, to honor and aduance their Posteritie, so it bee done with moderation, and modestie.