The first part of the disquisition of truth, concerning political affaires Handled in two seuerall sections. The first whereof (by way of certaine questions probleme-wise propounded and answered) consisteth of foureteene chapters. Written by Henry Wright.

SECT. I. CHAP. IIII.

Of a Kingdome: How it may be got, how kept, how it may be increased, how it may be made lasting or durable: And lastly, how it may bee lost, or o∣uer-throwne by hatred, con∣tempt, &c.

1

It may be demanded, by what wayes and meanes a∣ny Principalitie may be gotten, or conquered.

IS it to be atchieued by a for∣raigne Armes, as it happened to Alexander, when hee had ouer-throwne Darius at Ar∣bella? For after that victory, he neuer vsed in the full con∣quest of Asia, or other king∣domes, any other but for∣raigne forces, for the most part. Or is it rather to be gotten by an home-bred Army, seconded by the vertue and the manhood of the Leaders, and Captaines, as it fell to the lot of b Cyrus, Romulus,

and Theseus? Or may it bee attained by forraigne force also, seconded by Fortunes fauours, as it happened to Francis Sfortia, and Borgia Caesar? Or may it bee gotten by the putting in practise of some notorious and desperate designe, as it hap∣pened to Agathocles? Or may it be compassed by the fauour of the Citizens, as Nabides got his do∣minion?

2

In the next place it may bee demanded, how any Principality being once gotten, may be safely kept.

MAy this be effected if the Prince proue indu∣strious, and accomodate himselfe to make and take aduantage of such accidents and occasi∣ons as time will continually affoord him, and in all other things to imitate and follow the steps of his Auncestors? Or may it be effected, if he neuer giue any offence to those, whose helpe he vsed in getting his dominion, but satisfie them accor∣ding to their desires and hopes (if it be possible) as they haue conceiued of their owne worths? Or may he this way rather attaine therunto, if finding treason intended against him, he should most se∣uerely punish it, for terrour to the rest? Or may it this way be effected, if vpon the obtaining of his dominion, he c destroy all the bloud Royall, issues and allies, of the former Prince, and then obserue the Countrey customes without changing their lawes? Or may this rather bee effected, if hee that hath once gotten the soueraignty, remoue his seat

thither, and make his continuall residence in his new dominion? Or may this yet rather bee effe∣cted, if the Prince send Colonies into his new∣gotten kingdome, or maintaine garrisons both of horse and foote, in the frontier townes? Or may hee better bring this to passe, if (after conquest made) dealing courteously with them, hee retire himselfe, and accept of an annuall pension, in the name of a tribute, leauing onely some small com∣pany behinde him, rather to nourish and encrease his subiects good opinion of him, then for any o∣ther end or purpose? or may he effect this the bet∣ter, if he altogether should change their lawes and customes, and translate them to other remote pla∣ces in the same kingdome, then those which be∣fore they inhabited? or may this rather be the way to purchase the fauour and good opinion of the Senators, or commons, hauing them alwayes ad∣dicted to his fortunes, taking vpon him valiantly and couragiously to defend those of his par∣tie, against the other faction? or were not this the better course, to stand vpon his owne guard, hauing an army euer in a readinesse to chasten his subiects if they should rebel? Or finally, what if the d Conquerour should dispoyle the conquered of their weapons, and other meanes of defence or offence?

3

It may further be demanded, how a new got King∣dome may be enlarged?

SHall this be attained vnto, if the e Conquerour

shew himselfe milde & gentle to his new subiects, thereby to allure the hearts of the neighbour bor∣derers, to take a liking of his manner of gouern∣ment? Or may it rather be effected, if f a great ma∣ny of wise and warlike Princes do stil succeed one another in the selfe-same gouernement? Or may this be better done, if the conqueror haue a great care that Military discipline be alwaies vsed within his territories? Or should he rather go this way to worke, to g demolish the walles of the neighbour Cities, and cause the inhabitants to remoue their dwellings into his territories? Or shall he friend∣ly inuite all strangers to come into his domini∣ons, giuing them letters of safe conduct, and secu∣ring them of their dwelling safely vnder his pro∣tection? Or shall he combine with diuers neigh∣bouring Cities, ioyning themselues with them as associats, so as the name of the Empire and go∣uernment, as likewise the authoritie of leuying of warre, may euer remaine with him, and bee pro∣per vnto him? Or shall he make those whom hee hath conquered to h become vassals and slaues vn∣to him? Or might this be effected, if certaine Ci∣ties making i league among themselues, that they will all be gouerned, and with equall digni∣ties, and respect, should draw in other Cities to affect that kind of gouernment, and so to ioyne in the same league and amitie with them?

4

It may further be demanded, which might bee the best way to make a state durable and lasting?

SHall this be brought to passe, if by lawes it bee prouided for, vnder paine Capitall, that k no man should affect the Gouernement? Or may it better bee effected, if the Prince being strong of himselfe, shall yet giue testimony to his neighbour Princes, that hee is not ambitious, nor seeketh by leuying of Armes, to enlarge his Dominions to any of their detriments? Or shall hee doe it yet the better, if by idlenesse, and vaine pleasures hee suffer not the mindes of his subiects to bee corrupted, or that they should grow too much effeminate?

5

Considering that Kingdomes are strengthened as well by awfull Armes, as bright shining Ver∣tue, it may bee demanded, by what kinde of force a Kingdome may best bee preserued, and made durable.

SHall it bee made firme and stable by hauing an Armie euer in a readinesse, rather to of∣fend then defend, according to the counsell of the Emperour Seuerus; which he gaue to his sons, l Agree among your selues, enrich the Souldier, and contemne all others? Or shall this bee the better way to make it stable, if the Prince m build many Forts, Towers, Citadels, Sconces, &c. within his Territories?

6

Seeing that hatred once conceiued against a Prince by his subiects, is the next way to bereaue him of his Crowne, it may bee demanded, how the

Prince may run into such hatred, and what meanes hee might best vse to auoid it?

MAy hee runne into this hatred by his owne n boundlesse ambition, seeking to bring in∣to bondage, and the great desires of his Cittizens to continue free? Or may hee come hated of his Subiects, by reason of o the iniuries hee hath of∣fered them, either in seeking their liues, touching their honours, or preying vpon them for their ri∣ches? Or rather may it this way come to passe that hee be hated, for that he hath p giuen cause to the Subiects to feare him, least he do them a mis∣chiefe? For, to feare, desire of reuenge is a per∣petuall companion. And this prouerbe is most true, whom a man feareth, him hee hateth; whom he hateth, he would gladly bee rid of? Or may this bee the reason hee runneth into such hatred, for that hee is q vitious; as cruell, couetous, sacrili∣gious, &c.

7

It may bee further demanded, how the inflicting of seuere punishments vpon offenders, may bee freed from hatred?

SHall the Prince free himselfe there-from, if hee bee r slow to punish delinquents, and thereby giue testimony to the world, that his intent is ra∣ther to heale, and bind vp a soare, then to launch and make it bleed by the arme of Iustice? Or shall hee this way free himselfe, if hee neuer punish,

but s when the safety of the Common wealth cal∣leth vpon him so to do, or at least his Subiects be so perswaded? Or shall hee this way rather bee freed, if hee t neuer exact to take punishment of delinquents in an angry moode? Or may he this way auoide his Subiects hatred, if hee u shew no•• any signes of reioycing, when hee inflicteth pu∣nishment vpon offendours, as though he thirsted after bloud, or were delighted with the shedding of it? Or rather may this be his way, that when many haue offended, hee do not x now and then call them to account, as hee listeth, holding them in a perpetuall feare, but take his aduantage against all, and punish all forthwith? Or rather by this way may he be freed therefrom, by not deui∣sing any new kind of punishments, but inflicting those which haue beene in vse, according to old and ancient custome of the Country? Or may he this way likewise free himselfe, if hee be very sparing in punishing of delinquents, and when he doth it, hee might bee thought to command it to bee inflicted against his will, but neuer to bee a spectator thereof? Or finally, may hee thus free himselfe there-from, if to please his subiects, hee diuert the force of his fury another way, y cau∣sing such as haue beene his counsellours, and per∣swaders to wrong the Common-wealth, to taste the cup of his choler, by inflicting seuere pu∣nishments vpon them, or deliuering them into the peoples hands to be tormented?

8

It may further be demanded how a Prince may free himselfe of that hatred which hee hath purchased, by vexing his Subiects with Impositions, Taxes, Tallages, &c. which are commonly grieuous to them to beare?

MAy this be done if the Prince perswade the people z that if they will liue in peace and out of danger, that it is altogether necessary they indure such impositions, which if they should not, it were impossible for them to liue in safety, or the State to bee durable? For a peace is not purchased but by Armes, nor Armes maintained but by Souldiers well paid, nor can the Souldier be paid without leuying of Subsidies? Or shall the Prince free himselfe, if hee command the ga∣therers of such Impositions, that they b neither by force, nor fraude, exact more of the Subiect, then anciently hath beene accustomed to be paid? Or shall hee rather this way auoide their hatred, if sparingly, as iust occasion inforceth him, hee im∣pend and lay out such treasure, as hath beene leui∣ed by Subsidies, that his Subiects may see and perceiue, that hee is but a Steward, for the good of the Common-wealth, and no riotous spender, or exhauster of the treasure so gathered: or that he hath any desire to conuert any of it, to his owne vse, or ends? Or shall hee thus rather free him∣selfe, by taking of a course, that c iust and vni∣forme contribution be made according to euery

mans ability, neuer by fauour sparing one man, that the burthen may lye the heauier vpon ano∣ther mans shoulders?

9

It may further be demanded, how, and by what meanes, a great and potent Subiect, may auoide and shunne, the hatred of his Prince?

MAy this be effected, if this great Noble man make himselfe first odious to the people? Or shall hee better effect it, if hee shew himselfe ve∣ry dutifull and obsequious to his Prince, praising all his good deeds, and sayings, and craftily dissembling whatsoeuer is bad in him? Or shall hee attaine therevnto, if hee d neuer proiect to make himselfe great, strengthen himselfe with friends, or seeke to bee maister of greater riches, then is conuenient for his estate? Or if fortune haue east all these things vpon him, that hee ac∣knowledge continually, that hee hath receiued, gained, and gotten them, by the grace and fauour of his Prince, whose they are, whensoeuer he shall please to make vse of them? Or shall hee this way auoide his Princes displeasure, if he haue a speci∣all care to e attempt or do nothing, without con∣sulting with, or obtaining the consent of his Prince, though otherwise hee were assured that hee could preuaile in his attempts, and that it would turne to the good of his Country? Or shall hee this way shunne it, if being for a certaine time made Deputy, Lieutenant General, or raised

and euected to any other speciall place and dig∣nity, he f forth-with at the end, and expiration of his time resigne his office to his Princes hands, and in no wise seeme to be desirous that it be pro∣longed, or continued vnto him, least hee should seeme to be sick of the swelling humours of Ambi∣tion? Or may hee this way auoide it, if hauing wonne, and prouing victor in diuers battels, hee impute the glory of his Conquests to the good fortune of his Prince, desiring that the victori∣ous Army may now bee led by some other, whom the Prince shall thinke good of, and retiring, put himselfe into his Princes protection, carrying himselfe in a moderate fashion, as free from pride and ambition? By this onely meanes a great Ge∣nerall, though suspected and feared of his Prince, may so mollifie and lenifie his minde, that hee shall haue no cause to thinke ill of him, but shall make to himselfe great and apparant reasons to re∣ward him for his good seruices.

10

It may further bee demanded, why euery King∣dome is so fickle and vnstable?

IS it because that euery g Principality is the ob∣iect of Fortune, who can neuer be daunted, but challengeth the like priuiledge against Empires, as Emperours. Or may this bee the reason rather, because it is exposed to such, and so many hatreds, as the Tragicall h Poet sung, The Maker of the world coupled these two together; Hatred and a

Kingdome. Or may this be the cause, for that it is subiect to so many h treasons, treacheries, &c. for there bee very many in a Kingdome which bee naught and vnfaithfull, few good?

11

To the same purpose it may bee demanded, why among the Grecians and Romanes, i a Kingdom was so hatefull for the most part?

DId this come to passe by reason of the k man∣ners, and crooked dispositions of their Prin∣ces, who being (for the most part) licentiously gi∣uen, thought it was a great pledge of their King∣dome, and badge of their Royaltie, that it was law∣full for them to do that which no body else might? Or being selfe-wild, or proud, l accounted it no lesse dishonour vnto them, to be drawne to yeeld to any thing (though neuer so iust) against their wils, then to be vanquished in battell? Or is not the fault so much in the dispositions & wils of kings, as in the harsh m natures of the Subiects, being stub∣borne, refractary, and hardly wonne to yeeld due obedience? For no man willingly, would draw in another mans yoake.

12

Seeing that authority is as it were the n spirit by which euery Common-wealth is gouerned, being flatly opposed to contempt, which may bee called the o bane and destruction of all Kingdomes, it may be demanded, how a Prince may behaue him∣selfe, that hee neither fall into contempt amongst his owne Subiects, or forraigne States?

SHall he effect this, if the p fashion of his go∣uernement proue not too remisse, and gentle, whereby he may be thought to be negligent in or∣dering affaires of State? Or shall hee performe it the rather, if hee q shew no leuity in the forme of his gouernment, but constantly gouerne, accor∣ding to the Lawes and Decrees of the Common∣wealth? Or shall he effect this likewise, if he shew himselfe firme in his purposes, constant in his pro∣mises, and that hee hath no r notable touch of mu∣tability in his disposition? Or shall hee bring this to passe, if (curiously) pondering things past, ex∣pending, and well weighing things present, and prouidently fore-seeing things to come, hee doe timously consult, and determine, to bestow ho∣nours on s such men, as for their worth haue de∣serued; not vpon euery fawning and obsequious fauourite, or such as can purchase them with mo∣ney? Or may hee doe this the better, if Fortune proue a mother vnto him, and not a step-dame? Or shall he finally effect this likewise, if he first t re∣presse his owne lusts, and inordinate affections, giuing thereby his Subiects examples to follow him in the like, and causing Forreigners to admire him therefore?

13

It may be further demanded how an Empire, or Kingdome may be finally lost?

COmmeth it thus to passe, by a kind of a u fatall necessity, when this or that State hath come

〈2 pages missing〉〈2 pages missing〉

Notes

• a

  Quintus Cur∣tius. lib. 6.
• b

  Xenophon.
• c

  The barba∣rous and in∣humane pra∣ctise of the Turkes at e∣uery change of Prince.
• d

  This did Crae∣sus among the Lidians, as Po∣lib. reporteth.
• e

  This was the practise of the Romans in sen∣ding their Pre∣tors.
• f

  This fell out in the Macedu∣nian Monar∣chie.
• g

  This & such like practises were the Ro∣manes.
• h

  Thus dealt the Spartans, Venetians and Florentius with them whom they conque∣red.
• i

  The practise of the Switzers at this day.
• k

  All these things were fore-seene by Lycurgus, the Laced. emonian Law-giuer.
• l

  Sic habetur a∣pud Dionem in vita eius.
• m

  So did the Florentines to keepe Pisa and Francis Sforeia to conserue Millaine, but not to much purpose.
• n

  Mach. de Re∣pub. lib. 2.
• o

  Mach. de Re∣pub. lib. 3. cap. 6.
• p

  Cic. Phillip. 2.
• q

  Tholoz. de Re∣pub. lib. 22.
• r

  Sen. de Clem.
• s

  Sen. de Clem.
• t

  Cic. 2. de Offic.
• u

  Sen. 1. de Clem.
• x

  Tacit. Agric.
• y

  Tacit. 13. Annal.
• z

  Tacit. 13. An∣nal.
• a

  Tacit. 4. hist.
• b

  Idem. Ibid.
• c

  Plin. Paneg.
• d

  This was the practise of An∣tipater, one of Alexanders Captaines, as Q. Curt. repor∣teth.
• e

  This was the practise of Io∣ab, Dauids Ge∣nerall.
• f

  The praictse of Antipater and Lucius Lu∣cullus.
• g

  Sen. Oedip. Idem. etiam Ep. xcij.
• h

  Senec. Theb.
• h

  Attius.
• i

  Senec. Theb.
• k

  Idem Agam.
• l

  Idem in Hip∣polito.
• m

  Solust. ad Cae∣sarem.
• n

  Cicero pro Cluent.
• o

  Arist. 5. Posit.
• p

  Tacit. 11. hist.
• q

  Idem Ibidem.
• r

  Idem Ibidem.
• s

  Idem Ibidem.
• t

  Tacit. 15. An∣nal.
• u

  Tholoz. lib. 22 de repub.