The first part of the disquisition of truth, concerning political affaires Handled in two seuerall sections. The first whereof (by way of certaine questions probleme-wise propounded and answered) consisteth of foureteene chapters. Written by Henry Wright.

SECT. I. CHAP. III.

Of the Prince, Court, and Cour∣tiers, &c.

1

It may bee demanded why priuate men, can neuer well and rightly iudge of the affaires of Princes?

IS it because they exactly a know not the matters of State, the ends of Princes, or how farre this, or that bu∣sinesse, effected, or neg∣lected, doth concerne them? Or may this rather bee the reason that b forasmuch as the counsels, purposes, and designes of Princes, differ so farre from the drifts and courses of pri∣uate men, it is impossible that the selfe-same pro∣iects should be auaileable to them both? For it (most what) so falleth out, that although matters of State, determinations of businesses, and the commodities or discommodities which may be

expected to arise thereof, should be knowne as well to priuate men, as to Princes themselues, their applications, censures, and iudgements, notwithstanding touching the premisses, would be diuers, as their first ends and intentions were, which they had propounded to themselues.

2

In the next place it may bee demanded, where∣fore, as wee commonly reade in Histories, as out of Tacitus and others, that that man, whose aide and helpe a Prince hath made vse of bring him to the Crowne, within a while after is neither liked nor loued of that Prince, but either is fed with the smoake of innouation, or made shorter by the head?

IS it because that some Princes being naturally suspicious, do esteeme the faith of those to be fickle to them, which they haue proued to haue beene to the damage of others? Or is not that the reason, but this rather, that the very sight of them whose helpe they haue vsed to their rising, groweth idious vnto them, for that it seemeth to vp-braide them with the basenesse of their for∣mer meane fortunes? Or may it not be so neither, but for that it is c grieuous vnto some Princes to remember that they owe any thing, or that they are any waies beholding to their Subiects?

3

It may further bee demanded, how that Prince, who hath bereaued another of his Kingdome,

might behaue himselfe to enioy his new-got Empire with safety?

SShall hee effect this, if hee d affect him whom he hath so spoyled, with new fauours and be∣nefites, endeuouring thereby to reconcile him, and binde him fast vnto him? But it is to bee fea∣red, that old iniuries will hardly bee forgotten, by collating and bestowing of new benefites vp∣on the wronged, especially if the greatnesse of the iniuries, exceede the rate of the benefites, as it falleth out commonly in the case of Kingdomes. Or shall he bring this about the rather, if he e mur∣ther, and kill, all those whom he imagineth to stand in his way, or whom hee standeth in doubt of, least in time they may become his enemies? But if he take these courses, he must needs fall in∣to some great mischiefe; for he shall ingulfe him∣selfe in the vast Ocean of the peoples hatred, and thereby weaken his owne power against the time he should haue most occasion to vse it.

4

It may further bee demanded, why it so much im∣porteth Princes, and great men, to be cautelous that they do not iniury, or reproach any man?

IS it for that hee who is wronged of those who are in f eminent place, and authority, perceiuing himselfe to bee daily and hourely shot at, and no∣ted for the same, grieueth the more therat, and so sets vp his rest to take a sharp reuenge? Or ought

they to be cautelous for this cause likewise, g least if the wronged hauing formerly retained vnto them, or made any dependency vpon them, shold vpon any trust committed vnto him, pay them home, in neglecting, or vtterly ouerthrowing their chiefest businesses?

5

It may further be demanded, why it greatly impor∣teth a Prince, to bee Vertuous, Honourable of his word, iust, and of good Example among all men, as well Forreigners, as Domestiques?

IS it for that he may be thought vnfit h to gouern, who is not better euery way then those who are to bee gouerned? Or is it not for that cause onely, but for that i his good name and fame likewise at home, and abroad is greatly blemished and stai∣ned, if the course of his life and dealings bee not currant? Or ought hee to bee such an one for the better stablishing of his Kingdome also? k For where there is no shame, care of doing of Iustice, Sanctity, Piety, & keeping of promise, thatkingdom must needs bee vnstable, and the State tottering.

6

It may be the same purpose further demanded, why a Prince ought to be iust, to make speciall reckoning of the administration thereof equally to his Sub∣iects, ey, to do iustice vpon himselfe, if hee desire to be held for a good Prince?

IS it for that l a Lawlesse Principallity, and loose gouernement is yrksome to euery one (especial∣ly

of the better sort) so that they do not delight, or haue any desire to liue vnder it? Or is it for that the constant and strict obseruation, and admini∣stration of Iustice, doth stablish and strengthen a Kingdome, as the m Oratour well perceiued, who said that Iustice and Equity were the true conseruators of Common-wealthes and Cities? Or is it not onely for that iustice doth stablish a Kingdome, but for that it doth truely make a king∣dome to be a Kingdome, giuing vnto it his very essence and being, whereby it is, that which it is? For take away Iustice, and what are Kingdomes but great Robberies? as well said the n learned Diuine.

8

It may further be demanded, why many Princes are very fearefull, suspicious, and iealous of their estates?

IS it because that o Kingdomes are commonly subiect to treacheries? Or is this rather the rea∣son, for that the p nature of most Princes is prone to feare, and be iealous of their Estates? as well said the Poet, q Kingdomes and Mariages brooke no riuals.

9

It may further bee demanded, wherefore all credit, countenance, honors, and authority in Court, are for the most part slippery, and not to be trusted vnto?

HAppeneth it thus by reason of the Fates vn∣certainty (as it pleaseth the r Historian to set

downe) who auerreth, that Court-fauours, euen by decree of the destinies, are not alwaies lasting? Or might this rather be the reason, for that s Cour∣tiers credites are (commonly) vpheld by others, and not by their owne strengths? Or not so nei∣ther, but for that these things thus fall out through the fault of the Princes, their Maisters, whom they serue, whose wils and pleasures as they are t vehement for the time, so they are very changeable, and oftentimes contrary to them∣selues?

10

Seeing that the u Court is so slippery a place, that a man shall hardly get fast footing: It may fitly bee demanded, by what Compasse a Courtier should saile, that hee may bee without all dan∣ger of shipwracke, whereby either his life may bee hazarded, his goods diminished, or his ho∣nour blemished?

SHall he attaine vnto those ends, if he show him∣selfe dutifull, obsequious, and respectiue of his Prince, as it pleased the x Historian to affirme? For by how much the seruant in the iudgement of his Maister, shall bee held more desirous and ready to please him, then another shall; by so much the more hee shall bee aduanced to ho∣nours and riches? Or may hee compasse his de∣sires the better, if he be y seruiceable likewise, and not like the moathes, and caterpillars of the Court? Or may hee rather further his intents,

if he be bold spirited also? For shamefastnesse is an ill seruitour in a Princes Palace, as well said the z Poet. Or shall he be cautelous likewise, ta∣king heed that whatsoeuer he well doth or perfor∣meth, he do it as a though he seemed not to do it, and without boasting or bragging? Or (to auoid enuy) shall he learne to b dissemble, cloake, and obscure his owne vertues, and proper gifts? Or shall hee, being any wayes aduanced by his Prin∣ces fauours, like the Moone, c acknowledge (of∣tentimes) that he hath receiued all the light of his glory, and grace of his rising, from that Sunne his maister? Or shall hee striue and endeuour to be∣come very d patient, and e extreame wary like∣wise? He must be very patient, that he may beare iniuries the better, & not flie out, or run into pas∣sion vpon euery crosse he shall meet withall, or such distastes as shall be giuen him. He must bee cautelous, least he be taken in the traps of his fai∣ned friends, or secret, or open professed enemies.

11

It may further be demanded, why it is better to liue with, and serue a prudent and wise Prince, then a foolish?

IS it because that a f foolish Prince being (for the most part) very suspitious, thinketh that e∣uery of his seruants goeth about to deceiue him, which to an Honest minde must needes be a great errosiue? Or is it for that a g foolish Prince not vnderstanding his owne affaires, cannot make

difference of good seruice from bad, whereupon it commeth to passe, that his loue is turned into hatred, and his hatred into loue in a moment? Or is it not for these reasons onely, but for this like∣wise, that h those seruants which liue vnder a wise Prince, haue moe meanes affoorded them to re∣taine their maisters fauour, if they once haue had it, or to recouer it if they haue lost it, then it is possible they can haue, who liue vnder an Ideot, or foolish Prince? For no man almost dealeth in any thing with the Prince himselfe, but with his i seruants, whom he changeth as often as he put∣teth on a cleane shirt.

12

To the same purpose it may further be demanded wherefore (notwithstanding) many Courtiers haue rather chosen to liue in the Courts of some great Prince, though a foole, then in the Palace of a lesse potent Prince, though neuer so wise.

IS it because that k it is true libertie (as some sup∣pose) to liue vnder the command of a potent Prince? Or is it rather, as others affirme, for that l the seruitors seruices are graced and beautified by the greatnesse and super-eminent dignitie of their maisters?

13

Seeing that none are borne Artists it may be de∣manded, what manner of Courtier is to be deemed and esteemed to be the better Crafts-maister in ma∣naging affaires of State?

IS he the man who is m furnished with the know∣ledge of diuers tongues, well seene in Histories of the lawes of his owne and other Countries, that is religious, hath a quicke wit, a ripe iudge∣ment, a fluent tongue, a graue stile, & is an excel∣lent pen-man? Or is he rather to be so accounted, who is n smooth-tongued; gorgeously apparrel∣led, a great feast-maker, an artificiall cosouner, a deepe dissembler, a whoore-maister, tale-bearer, flatterer, a priuy-whisperer, and one that is giuen to all kinde of villanie?

14

It may further be demanded, what might bee the best meanes wherby Princes may free themselues, from being abused by flatterie?

MAy they effect this if they beware and take heed that they o grow not into contempt with their people? Or shall they bring their pur∣pose better about, if they sit often in counsell, and touching those things which they propound to be consulted vpon, doe shew themselues p patient in hearing the truth, that their people may vnder∣stand that they will not be offended, if they freely speake their mindes, and confidently deliuer that which is true? Or may this likewise further their intents, if vpon the q perceiuing and finding out of some or other, who for some sinister respects (though towards themselues) haue held their peace, or forborne to speake the truth, they do ei∣ther shew themselues to be greatly offended with them, or seuerely punish them?

Notes

• a

  Guicchardine.
• b

  Idem.
• c

  Philipus Co∣minaeus.
• d

  This was the errour of Ser∣uius Tullius King of the Romanes, whō Tarquinius Su∣perbus slew.
• e

  This was the practise of Se∣limus, the Tur∣kish Emperor, who being but a yonger bro∣ther, poysoned Baiazet his fa∣ther, made a∣way Corcut and Acomat his two brethren, &c. So dealt Rich. the 3. with his two nephewes the sonnes of Edward the 4. with the Duke of Buckingham likewise, and others.
• f

  Philipus Co∣minaeus.
• g

  Cominaeus.
• h

  Xenophon in Paedia Cyri.
• i

  Sen. 1. de Cle∣mentia.
• k

  Sen. Thiest.
• l

  Plato in Polit.
• m

  Cic. Parad.
• n

  August. de Ciuil. Dei lib. 4.
• o

  Attius.
• p

  Sen. Oedip.
• q

  Sen. in Agam.
• r

  Tacit. 3. An∣nalium.
• s

  Tacit. 17. An∣nalium.
• t

  Salust. Iu∣gurth.
• u

  Sen. in Hip∣polito.
• x

  Tacit. 1. An∣nal.
• y

  The saying of Constantine the Great.
• z

  Sen. in Hippol.
• a

  Velleius. 11.
• b

  Tacit. 16. An∣nal.
• c

  Tacit in Agric
• d

  Sen. 11. de ira.
• e

  Sen. Hippolit.
• f

  Philip. Comi∣naeus. lib. 4.
• g

  Idem ibidem.
• h

  Phil. Com. lib. 4.
• i

  This was wel seene in the Duke of little Brittaine, who vsed onely Pe∣ter Landoys.
• k

  Lucas de Pen∣na.
• l

  Egisippus cum alijs, vt refert Guic.
• m

  Guicchard.
• n

  Guic. & Tacit 3. Annal.
• o

  Tholoz. de Re∣pub. lib. 22. cap. 8
• p

  Plut. Apotheg.
• q

  Machiauel his doctrine in his Prince. Cap. 23.