Truth tried: or, animadversions on a treatise published by the Right Honorable Robert Lord Brook, entituled, The Nature of Truth, its vnion and vnity with the soule. Which (saith he) is one in its essence, faculties, acts; one with truth. By I. W.

CHAP. VI. Whether all things bee this one Truth.

IN the next place he proceeds to a Consequent or Corollary, arising out of his former Thesis, viz. That All things, are this One Truth.

I confesse, I was at a stand a great while, and could not imagine any shew of Consequence between these propositions: If Truth or Reason, be the same with the Soule or Ʋnderstanding; then is it also the same with All things else. Why so. This Argument (saith he) will presse all things that are.

This Argument? which Argument? Doth he mean that argument which was last propounded, towards the end of the fifth chapter, [That because God is one simple act; therefore, not only the Soule and its Faculties must be One, but even All Creatures must be One, because there is in All somewhat of Gods Image, whose Essence is Ʋnity?] If this be his Argument, I shall content my self with a bare deniall of the Consequence, till I see some shew of proofe. For, That Unity is Gods Essence, is (in my judgement) grossely false▪ Or, were it true, yet, That because God is One, therefore the Creatures must also All be One; hath no strength: For this Ʋnity in God is equivalent to an infinite Mul∣tiplicity. And, That One simple Efficient, may not produce distinct Ef∣fects, seems to me a Paradox.

Or is it his second Argument, propounded in the second chapter, and prosecuted in those that follow; [That, to the constitution of every Creature there must be a Being communicated, a Fountain from whence,

and a Recipient to which; the which Recipient must be the same with the Being received?] From hence perhaps he might prove, That every thing is the same with its own Being: But That very thing should be the same with each other, or the same with reason, or the understanding; follows not.

Is it then his first Argument, propounded towards the end of the first chapter? Which perhaps his Lordship lookes at as the principall Argu∣ment; and at all that follows, only as a Prosecution of that; (Though his Marginall notes, and the Titles of Chapters (which I question whether or noe they be of his Lordships doing) point out to us distinct Arguments, in the beginning of the second, and in the end of the fifth chapter.)

The Argument was this, The Ʋnderstanding is nothing but a Ray of the Divine Nature, &c. And is not Truth the same? which I under∣stood, as you may see, thus, [The Understanding is Gods Image in Man, And this Image consists in Truth, or the Light of Reason; there∣fore Truth, or Reason, is the Understanding.] And thus the Syllo∣gisme will be true in the first figure, if you transpose the Premises and convert the Conclusion. Or thus, [The Image of God in Man is the Understanding; And this Image is Truth▪ therefore (some) Truth is the Understanding:] And thus it will be true in the third figure. And beside these two forms, •• see not how that Argument can be reduced to a true Syllogisme. Now chuse you which form you please; yet how •••• should follow from hence, [That All things else are this One Truth,] I do not yet perceive.

It may be his Lordship would have his Argument thus ordered (in the second figure) [The Understanding is a Ray of Divinity; And Truth also is a Ray of Divinity: therefore Truth is the Understanding, or Truth and the Understanding are One.] And if this be the form of his argument; I will easily grant, that it presseth all things that are, as much as this. For, is not this Syllogisme in the same form, [The bles∣sed Angels are Spirituall Substances; And the damned Spirits are Spi∣rituall substances; Therefore the damned Spirits are blessed Angels, and the blessed Angels damned Spirits?] Then which Consequent, scarce any thing could be lesse probable. And thus indeed he may prove all things that are to be One Truth, one Understanding, yea one Stone, or what you will: For take any two Beings whatsoever, and they will both be sound to be Rays of Divinity, because both proceed from the ••ame Originall and Fountain of Being in the Divine Essence; and

therefore (according to this Argument) they will be both One.

But his Argument thus ordered, will prove but a plaine Fallacy, offending against the Laws of the second figure, wherein no affirma∣tive proposition can be concluded.

The most that he can prove from hence will be this, That there is some common Praedicate, which may be affirmed of Both; and so That there is some General Nature in which they both agree. And this I am confident there is none will ever deny that grants but this proposition, Quicquid est, est E••s, That All Beings, whatsoever agree in the generall nature of a Being. For then they may all be the Subjects of the common Prae∣diate Ens.

But this is farre enough from proving, All things to be One and the Same. For to assume [That whatsoever things agree in a Ʋniversall Nature, are also the same Numericall and Individuall Existence;] is such a proposition as Logick will not admit of.

Yea, though his Argument should proceed thus, [The Specificall Es∣sence of the Understanding, consists in this, that it is a Ray of the Di∣vine Nature; And the Specificall Essence, as well of Truth, as of all Beings whatsoever, is the Same, viz. That it is a Ray of the Divine Na∣ture; And therefore all things whatsoever agree in the same specificall Essence;) And (consequently) all things whatsoever, having the same specificall Essence with each other, must also be One and the Same with each other.] I say, though his Argument proceeded thus, yet would it little availe to prove All things to be One and the same. For, besides, that the Specificall Essence of the Understanding (and so of other things) consisteth not in being a Ray of Divinity; Besides this, I say, although they had all the same Specificall Essence; Yet doth it not fol∣low that they must be all One and the Same. For are there not many Individualls under the same Species, whereof One is not the Other? Doth not the Soule of Peter and the Soule of Judas agree in all the ••ame Specificall and Essentiall Praedicates, whilst notwithstanding it may be truly said, that the Soule of Peter is not the Soule of Judas, and again, that the Soule of Judas is not the soule of Peter? What Essen∣tiall difference is there beeween water in the Baltick Sea, and that in the Mediterran••an, ••ince they are both but Integrall Parts of the same Homogeneall Ocean? Yet how true it is withall, That the Baltick Sea▪ is not the Mediterranean Sea; and That the Water which is now in the Baltick, is distinct from that which at the same time is in the Me∣diterranean Sea? Two drops of Water taken out of the same spoon∣full, be they in their Essentialls never so Consonant, in their Accidents

never so Like; Yet we may truly say This is not the Other, nor the Other This. How then can it follow, That Truth is One with the Under∣standing, and That All things are this One Truth, Because all Being is but a Ray of Divinity.

It follows indeed, That if all Things have the same Specificall Es∣sence, then are they all, Things of the same nature; (but that they are all the Same Thing, it follows not.)

Thus much therefore I suppose will be granted him by all, That All things are of the Same (at least Genericall) nature, because all things have a Being; And, When he hath proved their Specificall essence to be the same, It will be granted also, That they are all, Things of the same Specificall nature; and (if you will) That All Being falls under the same Praedicament▪ (Though yet a Predicamentall distinction be not always a Reall distinction; no, not a par••e rei.)

But is this all he seeks to prove? I supposed he had laboured to shew That the Light of Truth or Reason was not onely of the same nature with the Understanding, but That it was the Ʋnderstanding. Other∣wise he proves lesse then his greatest Adversaries would have granted him. For those that contend for the greatest Distinction between the Soule and its Faculties, doe not yet maintain a more Reall or Physicall distinction between them, then is between One Soule and another, which yet agree in the same Essentiall Praedicates. And if you allow them the same distance between the Soul and the Understanding, which is between the Soule and a Stone, yea between two Soules, They will tell you it is more then they desire: For they will grant that the Soule with all its Faculties, and the Body with all its Members, do constitute the same Suppositum; which is a more Physicall, a more Reall Union, then is between two Soules, though agreeing in every Essentiall Prae∣dicate.

But (if I mistake not) that which he was about to prove, was, not that the Understanding is of the same Nature with Truth, but that it is Truth. His supposition in the first words of the ••. Chap▪ is, If the Intellect, the Soul, Light, and Truth are all but One, &c. Not, A like, or of the same na∣ture. And p. 22. If you make the Ʋnderstanding▪ the Soule, Light, Truth One, then are you delivered out of these streights, &c. And pag. 10. If the Ʋnderstanding be enricht with Truth, then is it, it selfe that Truth, that Light; Thus he frequently calls them One and the same▪ Now To be, •••• selfe that Truth▪ and To be of the same nature with Truth, is far diffe∣rent. And if he prove no other but a Logicall Union, That Truth and

the Understanding are of the same (Genericall or Specificall) nature; we may y••t safely deny a Physicall or Reall Union or Identity; and say, Truth is not the Ʋnderstanding, nor is the Understanding Truth, (though of the same nature with Truth) as well as say, This drop of water is not the Other drop, though This and the Other be of the same nature. Neither can the same Argument (taken in the same sense, with∣out Equivocation and Ambiguity) possibly prove a Physicall and Reall Identity between the Soule and its Faculties; and also a Logicall or Specificall Identity between It and all things else. It is impossible by the same argument to prove, The Soul and its Faculties to be One Thing, and, The Soule with All things else to be Things of the same Nature: These to be T••lta, and Those to be Id••m.

But to omit the consequence and dependance of This, upon that which went before: I will examine it as an entire proposition by it selfe, Whether All things are One?

And if so, Then must it be either thus understood, That All things are One and the Same by a Physicall Identity; This is the Other, and the Other is This; Bucephalus is Alexander, and Alexander is Buce∣phalus: and (by the same reason) the Bread in the Lords Supper is the Body of Christ, and the Body of Christ is this Bread, by Consubstan∣tion. In which sense it seems so impossible, that (in my judgement) it needs no Refutation.

Or thus, That all things are One and the Same by an Integrall Iden∣tity; that is, They be all Parts of the same Whole: all Members of the same Integrum, the same Aggregatum. And in this sense it is True in∣deed, but there is nothing New in it, nothing Strange: For who ever denied, that All things, as parts, as members, do constitute the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, One Ʋniverse? That the whole Aggregatum, the whole Heap or Mul∣titude of Creatures do make One World?

Or (lastly) thus, That All things whatsoever are One, by a Logicall Identity, as being all of the same Nature. And if he speak of a Gene∣ricall Nature, this will be as easily granted as the former: For none de∣ny, that all things agree in the Genericall Universall nature of a Being: And whether Ens be Genus Ʋnivocum, or Gen•••• Anagolum, yet it is predicated or affirmed of All Beings; Only that which He calls Truth, Others call Being, both meaning no other then the Formalis ratio Entis, propter quam dicitur Esse.

Put if he speak of a Specifical•• Nature, wherein he would have all things to agree; making the Universe to be One Homogeneall Body,

(which ••e seems to mean here; though he meant, I suppose, a Physicall Unity, when he said, The Soule and Truth w••re One:) Then are we to enquire, whether those things which agree in a Universall Genericall Nature, may not admit of a Specificall difference? And for This, it will not be sufficient to prove That every Being is a Ray of Divinity issuing from the Center of Being in God, or That the Essence and Form of every particular thing is a Roy of Divinity: Except it be proved▪ That every Being is This Ray, that it is such a Ray.

If therefore all those Rays that have issued forth of that Center of infinite Being, If the Streams derived from this Fountain be exactly of the same nature, without any Specificall difference; Then is it because God could not send forth Distinct and Different Rays, or because he would not. If we make God an Agent so Uniform, as that we will admit no possible Variety, not so much as in the Object, or Manner of his Actions; what difference is there between the most Determinate Naturall Agent, and God the most absolutely Free Agent? if in his operations we admit not of this choice, to work Thus rather then Th••••? But if he could work in severall manners, by communicating Rays of divers natures, but would not; how then hath he manif••sted 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the exceeding great Var••••••y of his Wisdom and Power? For there cannot be so much as an Accidentall Variety in the Creatures, except there be somewhat Reall produced in the One which is not in the other; which cannot be, if all Being, all Entity whatsoever be ex∣actly of the same Specificall nature.

I grant therefore, an Integrall Unity; whereby all things are parts of the same Aggregatum, the same World: I grant likewise a Genericall Unity▪ whereby all things agree in the generall nature of a Being: But if he cont••nd further for an Identicall or an Hom••geneall Unity (wher∣by each is other, or of the same Particular nature, without any other then a Graduall difference;) I must deny both. And Mr. Sadler (his Lordships Champion) denies it with me: For so he, Corporall Ʋnion in materials which •••• [mis••••ll] 〈…〉〈…〉 Identity, i•• at best but a ••old touch in •• point or ••••o, •• most disdainfull ••mbrace (at 〈…〉〈…〉 dista••••••) of those Beings which hav•• much 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, but lit••l•• 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. If the Unity of all things be Identicall, how is i•• [miscalled] Identity▪ If Homogeneall, how is there much 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and ••••t little 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉▪

His Lordships Reasons to perswade this Identity▪ come next to be ex∣amined▪ Why (saith he) may it not be so▪ since •• All Being is derived from the same Ʋn••f••r•• Fo••••tai••; since ² All i•• the same in nature (〈…〉〈…〉) a

Beam of that excellent Light; And▪ All entertained in the same manner by every Individuall Existence, viz. By a Similitude and Ʋnion of nature▪

If his Lordship speak of a Physicall Identity, It is easie to say, This Soule is not the Other Soule▪ This drop of water is not the Other drop▪ though both produced by the same Uniform Agent, and in the same manner: This Beam of Light is not the other Beam, though both shining forth from the ••ame Sunne: Because One (uniform) Agent may produce Two Effects.

If he speak of a Likenesse in Nature, It will be said, That the same Agent may produce not only Two effects, but Ʋnlike effects. e. g. The same Sunne produceth Heat and Light. Here these severall Beings are ¹ derived from the same Fountain the Sunne, which hath either Vir∣tually or Formally both▪ Heat and Light; They are ² both Beam•• is∣suing in the same manner from their Fountain; and ³ Their Essence is in the same manner received, viz. by being what they are, and Informing a Subject recipient: Yet can I not think that Light, and Heat are either the Same Thing, or of the same (specificall) Nature: (However some fondly dream that Light and Heat are the same:) For then whatsoever is H••t, must also be Light (Lucide▪) which holds not in scalding Lead: and whatsoever is Light, must also▪ even in the same degree▪ be H••t, which holds not in Snow, which is Lucide; nor in Ice, which being transparent ••i•• also Illuminate.

Object. If you object a Disparity in the Example, because Light and Heat, though they both proceed from the Sunne, yet the one from the Sunnes Heat, the other from the Sunnes Light, and that therefore their Fountain is not the same; whereas in Gods Essence being absolutely Simple in it selfe, and Ʋniform in its operations, we may not imagine severall Fountains from whence severall Streams may proceed.

Answ. I answer, That Gods Essence, however Simple, is yet equi∣valent to an infinite Variety: And though we cannot in God suppose to be Light distinct from Heat, and Heat from Light; yet Gods simple Essence hath virtually both Heat and Light, and all things possible. His Essence therefore being equivalent both to Heat and Light▪ why may it not produce Heat in one thing, and Light in another thing, and so severall Beings in severall Creatures?

(Except you will suppose, that Gods Essence, being Equivalent to, and Productiv•• of, all Essences possible▪ must of necessity exercise all this Equivalency in the production of every Being, and actuate all his Efficacy in every Product, and so agere ad extr••m••m virium, which

in a Voluntary agent is not Necessary; in an Infinite agent is Impos∣sible.)

All the Radii or Semidiameters of a Circle proceed from the same C••••t••r, but they tend not all to the s••me point of the Circumference: But the same indivisible Center, which lyes equally opposite to every point of the Circumference, As it i•• supposed to lye opposite to one point, it sends ••orth One Radius to it, As it lyes opposite to another point, it sends forth Another Radius to that other point, Though the Center remain indivisibly the same. Thus Gods simple Essence quatenus productiv•• Angeli, or, as it virtually contains the Essence of an An∣gel, may produce that Essence: And the same simple divine Es∣sence, as it contains virtually the Essence of a Stone, may produce a Stone.

And if you say, as Dr. Ames concerning the Divine Attributes, That these two considerations Esse productivum Angeli, and esse pro∣ductivum Lapidis, be distinct ratione ratioc••••atâ, perhaps there will be no great errour; although his Lordship admit not of Dr. Ames his opinion; p. 23. For 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Esse productivum Angeli, or posse producere An∣gelum is not the same with posse producere Lapidem. For although it be the same simple Essence of God whereby he is able to do both, yet this hindreth not but that this simple Essence may be by us apprehended per i••ad••quat••s conceptus, which is no other but distincti•• rationis ratiocinat••. The same Center considered as it is the beginning of One Radius, is di∣stinct ratione ratiocinatâ from it self considered as the beginning of A∣nother Radius. And so the divine Essence, quatenus productiva Angeli, may perhaps be distinct, ratione ratiocinatâ, from itselfe quatenus produ∣ctiva lapidis, without any violation to its Simplicity. They are onely inadaequati conceptus ejusdem simplicis essentiae; and a Metaphysicall Abstraction may be sufficiently consistent with a Physicall Simplicity of Essence.

Thus therefore may it appeare, how the Unity or Simplicity of the Fountain, hinders not but that the Streams may admit of Specificall and Essentiall distinctions.

But he saith secondly, All Being is also of the same nature, viz. a Beam of that excellent Light. Therefore what? Is therefore all Being the Same? How? Physically the same, (as if that Soule which is of the Same Nature with another▪ must needs be that other Soul;) or Me∣taphysically, Logically, the same; that is, of the same Nature? If he mean, the first; I see not how it follows. If the second; His Antece∣dent

and Consequent is the ••ame; and so he Assumes what was to be proved.

But for the proposition it selfe, All Being, saith he, is of the same na∣ture, s••il. a Beam of that excellent▪ Light. And this I grant; All Being is of the same (Genericall) nature; All Being is a Stream communica∣ted from the Fountain of Being, All Being is a Beam, &c. But (Speci∣fically▪) All is not Such a Beam.

If his Lordship yet contend, That this Being is also Specifically the Same, only with a Graduall Distinction.

I desire, first, to know Whence the great Variety in the Creature doth proceed, if all Being be absolutely Homogeneall? Adde Water to Water, and it remains Water still; In a greater Quantity indeed, but yet without any alteration at all in its Essence, it is still but Water. Adde Heat to Heat, it remains Heat still; In a more intense degree indeed, but yet it changeth not its nature: Increase its Intension as long as you will, yet you shall never make this Color to become Color. A Deaf man though he See never so acutely, it will not help his Hearing.

Repl. If he urge, That the ••ame Light proceeding through divers Mediums is stained with divers Colours; and why may not therefore this Beam of Essence, though Homogeneall, being received by divers Creatures, appear in a diverse Form?

Answ. I answer, the Variety of those appearing Colours proceeds from the Variety of the Medium: But here can be no Variety in the Recipient at all: For if there be no Recipient but the Being Received, then will the Medium be every way as Uniform as this Light or Es∣sence received, and so cannot cause this Variety. It must be therefore Various in it self, or else it cannot be Variegated in the Recipient.

Secondly, If all Beings be but Gradually distinct: I demand Whe∣ther the Essence of a Man, or the Essence of a Magnet be the more Intense degree? If the Magnets Essence be the higher degree of Light, Why hath not the Magnet the use of Reason? If Mans Essence be the higher degree, Why hath not Man the Loadstones Magnetick faculty? For if there be onely a bare Graduall distinction in their Essence: then the Inferiour Essence is actually included in the Superiour, with an addition of somwhat more: And if included, whence comes it to passe that it cannot operate?

Again If the Body and the Soule be absolutely of the same nature ••which they must be, if Being admit onely of a graduall distinction▪) Then the Essence of the Soule (being the superiour degree) includes in

it the Essence of the Body, and somewhat more▪ Therefore is it able to operate according to that Essence, and to do of it selfe, whatsoever the Body can doe. If so, then how comes it to passe, that the Soule needs the service of the Body? Why may not the Soule separate, perform all Corporeall Operation••, since it hath in it Corporeall Essence, and somewhat more. (Yea, why may not the Soule see, when the Eye is put out?) For the adding of Another degree hinders not the Operation of the Former degree, but rather perfects it. Yea what need is there of the Body▪ at all? Non bellè quaeda•• faci•••• d••o, sufficit unus Huic op••ri; as his Lordship saith, out of Martiall.

To his third consideration, I must answer accordingly as to the se∣cond; All Being is received in the same manner by every Individuall Ex∣istence: That is, Every Creature receives its Being, by being What it is: A Stone and a Plant receive their severall Beings, by being (severally) what they are. But come to particulars, and the case is altered: A Stone receives its Being, by being a Stone; and a Plant receives its Being, by being a Plant.

That which followeth in the ensuing part of this Chapter (besides what I have already touched by the way) I passe over as being Expli∣catory, rather then Probatory. Onely thus much; The doctrine of the Platonists, reducing all Being to Number, must either be taken in a Metaphoricall, Analogicall sense, or not taken at all. And being so, it availeth little to prove either a Physicall or Specificall Identity of Being.

Whence they had this doctrine, I inquire not, as not belonging to the present matter in hand.

Neither will I stand to debate the controversie, concerning the Na∣ture of Number▪ whether it be a Reall, or Rationall Being; Which •• conceive to have as much Reality as a Relation hath, and no more; that is, hath Fundamentum i•• re, but in its Formality, it is onely ••••li•…•… the birth of Reason. And when I am convinced, that Paternity, or ••i∣liation, are Essentiall to Humanity; that Fatherhood, or So••ship doe constitute Manhood▪ or Humane nature; I shall also grant, that 〈…〉〈…〉 est Prin••ipi•••• Essend••▪ rather then Consequent Essentians. But, not to pro∣judge the discourse of the next chapter, (wherein Ʋnity is made to be the Essence of All things, yea of God himselfe) I proceed rather to con∣sider the large 〈…〉〈…〉 of Unity there exprest.