Truth tried: or, animadversions on a treatise published by the Right Honorable Robert Lord Brook, entituled, The Nature of Truth, its vnion and vnity with the soule. Which (saith he) is one in its essence, faculties, acts; one with truth. By I. W.

THE CONTENTS of the ensuing Chapters.

The Preface.

• DIvers acceptations of Truth. pag. 1.
• Logicall and Morall Truth, their nature, and diffe∣rence. ibid
• Whether breach of Promise be formally a Ly. 3.
• Metaphysical Truth. 4.
• Veritas Essendi & Cognoscendi, or Cognoscibility. ibid
• None of these are Truth or Light as here taken. 5.
• The Object not Identically the same with the Faculty. ibid
• By Truth or Light is meant the Light of Reason. 7. 9. 27. 63.

Chap. 1.

• A double Notion of Truth. 8.
• His first Position, that Truth in the first Notion is the Understanding in its Essence, the Argument because both, a Ray of Divinity cousidered 9.

Chap. 2.

• A second Argument from the three Requisites to eve∣ry Being, a Fountain imparting, a Chanel receiving, and Wa••ers imparted, considered; and Where wee may find these in the Vnderstanding, if a Faculty 12.
• Whence Ignorance, and Errour in the Vnderstanding. 13.
• Reason and the Vnderstanding, ratio & facultas ratioci∣nand••, all one. 1••.
• ...

• The efficient of Accidents. 14.
• What is the Recipient of Truth. 15.
• How Reason in the ••nderstanding, ••an make the Soule Rati••∣nal, and give it an Essentiall Difference from the Irrationall. ib.
• Whether the Qualities be Formae ••ementorum. 17.
• The Efficient or Fountain whence Reason comes to the Soule; Internall, Externall, from the Soule it selfe, from the Parent, from God. 18.
• Whether the Recipient of Truth must be Truth. 21.
• Whether Light passe from the Vnderstanding to the Soule; from the Vnderstanding to the Will; and how the Soule acts by its Faculties. 22.

Chap 3.

• How these are found if the Understanding be Truth. 24.
• How every thing is its own Recipient. ibid
• To receive a Being, and to receive a Forme Do Esse, & do Habere; differ. ibid

Chap. 4.

• Whether the Vnderstanding-Faculty may not be the Recipient of Truth. 26.

Chap. 5.

• A second Assertion (or the first improved) that both Truth, and the Vnderstanding, be the same also with the Soule, considered. 27.

Chap. 6.

• A Corollary, that All things are this One Truth, consi∣dered. 28.
• Whether a consequent of the former Assertions. ibid
• Whether true in it selfe, viz. whether all things One. 32. 5.
• Whether Physically, Integrally, Specifically; one Thing, one Whole, of one Kind. 32.
• How all from one Fountain. 34.
• Simplicity in God hinders not Variety in the Creatures. 28. 34
• Vnity in God equivalent to an infinite Variety. ibid
• ...

• Whether the Divine Attributes be distinct ratione ratiocina∣t••. 35.
• Whether all Beings be Homogeneall; of the same specificall nature, only gradually distinct. 36.
• How all received in the same manner. 37.
• Whether Number be Reall. ibid

Chap. 7.

• A farther Corollary, that Unity is the Essence of all things, considered. 38.
• Whether Vnity be the Essence of God. ibid
• Whether Infinitenesse or Vnity in God be first. 39.
• Whether Vnity be the Essence of Created Beings. ibid
• How the Commandements are comprised in Love: and Mo∣rall Vertues concatenate in Prudence. ibid
• Whether Quantity may be divided in semper divisibilia. 40.
• Vnity as opposed to Multitude, is purely Negative. 43.
• Yet, not Imaginary. 44.
• Negatio realis & negatio rationis. ibid
• Ens Rationis & Negatio rationis. 45.

Chap. 8.

• The nature of Habits. A third Assertion, that Habits al∣so are the same with the Soules Essence, considered. 46.
• Faculties and Habits how they differ, and how distinct from the Soule. ibid
• Habits Infused and Acquisite. 47.
• Plato's Reminiscentia, and Aristotles Rasa Tabula, compa∣red. 49.
• Whether former acts do help subsequent acts or only Seeme to doe. ibid
• Whether Reason and Faith differ only in degrees. 51.
• The Liberty of the Will, wherein it consists. 53. 55.
• Why some of more Knowledge have lesse Faith. 54.
• Whether the Will always follow the Vnderstanding, and how. 55.
• ...

• Libertas Contrarietatis & Contradictionis. 56
• It is no perfection to the Will, to be able to disobey Reason. ib.
• How all sinfull acts may be called Omissive. 58.
• The Vnderstandings dictates are Declarative, not Impera∣tive. 59.
• Speculative & experimental Knowledge. 60
• This latter the Will cannot reject. ibid.
• Whether God be all Mercy to the Divels. 6••.
• How Mercy and Iustice are One in God. ibid.

Chap. 9.

• How Knowledge and Affection differ. 62.
• Whether Knowledge extinguish Affection. ibid.
• Why some of lesse knowledge have larger affections. ibid.
• How far we may admit, Reason, the Vnderstanding, the Soule, its Habits, and Actions to be the same. 63.

Chap. 10.

• A fourth Assertion, that the Operations are the Soules Essence, considered. 64.
• How the Soule is Actus 64. Severall acceptions of Actus. 65.
• An materia individuetur a formâ. 66.
• Whether the Act or the Power be first, in order, dignity, and nature. 67.
• How Omnis virtus consist it in actione. ibid.
• The difference between actus primus & secundus, ibid.

Chap. 11.

• An Objection against his last Assertion, Whether the acti∣ons being divers, there be not so many soules, considered, and Whether Time and P••ace be onely imaginary. 69.
• Distinction of Operations proceeds not from Time and place. ibid.
• Whether all the Soules Actions be One. 70
• How all things are present to ••od. 71
• How permanency in God may consist with succession in the creature. 72
• ...

• Whether Good and Evill may be in the same act. 72
• Whether contradictions may be conscistent. ibid.
• Whether Copernicus opinion be confused by sense. 73

Chap. 12.

• Another Objection against the same Assertion, concerning Falshood in the Soules Operations; Whether it cease to be, when it ceaseth to act Truth, considered. 75
• Whether it cease to be, when it ceaseth to act. ibid.
• Whether succession of moments be onely imaginary. ibid.
• Whether all acts be the same. 76
• Whether it cease to be when it acts Falshood. 78
• Whether the reality of the Object be requisite to make the act reall. ibid.
• Distinction of Metaphysicall Goodnesse and Truth, from Mo∣rall and Logicall Goodnesse and Truth. 79
• Whether Evill be meerly privative. ibid.
• Whether any individuall action be indifferent. 82
• Whether Falshood be meerly privative. 83
• How Ens & Verum convertuntur. ibid.
• The difference between Ensrationis and Error intellectus. 84
• Whether Pain be meerly privative. 86
• Whether better to be miserable, then not to Be. ibid.
• Whether God be the author of Falshood, or Evill. 88
• Relations, how produced. ibid.

Chap. 13.

• Corollaries or generall Consequents from his whole Assertion, (That all things are One Truth:) Whether usefull in Pra∣cticalls. 89

Chap. 14.

• Whether Knowledge and Sciences receive benefit from this Assertion. 91
• Curiosity in searching, blamed. 92

Chap. 15.

• Whether confusion in the knowledge of Causes be re∣dressed by this Unity. 92.

Chap. 16.

• Whether divisions in other parts of Learning be redressed by it. 93.
• Wherein the nature of Faith consists. 94
• And Bellarmines Dilemma avoided. 95
• Whether Faith save onely declarative. ibid.
• Whether we be saved, even in the Execution of the Decree, without Faith. ibid.
• Scientia simplicis intelligentiae and scientia Visionis. 96.
• Whether God Will doe what ever he Can doe. ibid.

Chap. 17.

• Of curiosity in the search of causes, with a close of all. 97

The Post-script.

• A Breviate of the whole Discourse. 100