Peripateticall institutions. In the way of that eminent person and excellent philosopher Sr. Kenelm Digby. The theoricall part. Also a theologicall appendix of the beginning of the world. / By Thomas White Gent.

LESSON VII.

Of the mutation of the Individuali∣ty in the severall kinds of Bo∣dies.

1. ANd, hence, 'tis evident that, a Thing being chang'd but acci∣dentally, the Individuality is not chang'd; because that's taken direct∣ly under the notion of Thing or Body; which is the last that's destroy'd in the thing, as 'tis the last that's made.

2. For, since change is made by locall motion, and that's divisible without end; if, upon every accidentall variation, the Substance should be chang'd, substantiall transmutation would be continually suc∣cessive, and would not subsist but in moti∣on, that is, so, that one part would not be whilst another is; and consequently, the notion of a Substance would never be nor its Being be Indivisible; nor would there be any Thing by whose mediation Ac∣cidents might subsist; to conclude, there would be nothing in Nature, the constan∣cy

and firmnesse of Substance being once taken away.

3. Among the Elements 'tis plain, the Notion of the Individuum is chang'd by mere division; so that, any whatever least particle being taken away or added, the notion of the Individuum is chang'd: But, the quality of Rarity or Density being chang'd, the notion of the Individuum is not, therefore, altered.

4. For, since the mutation according to Rarity and Density is a continuall one, that is, divisible without end; there would be an infinite succession of Individuums: But, it appears to the Considerer, that it happens not so in division; whose Motion though it be continuall, yet the being divi∣ded follows indivisibly. Besides, if, both by division and change of rarity, the quid∣ditative notion of an Element should be varied, there would be no accidentall change in the Elements.

5. Of Mixtums, the manner is partly the same, partly different: for, if a dissolution intervene between the heterogeneall parts which essentially constitute a Mixtum, there will be a change, not of the Individu∣um, but of the Genericall notion; but, if any parts of the same temperament be ei∣ther

added or taken away, the Individuall notion is accounted chang'd.

6. But, the Unity of an Animal is not prejudic'd by the withdrawing of neither similary nor dissimilary parts; but only of those, wherein the prime force of its In∣strumentality precisely consists: and, that being maim'd, it suffers a Genericall change.

7. For, since the divisibility of the E∣lements is, precisely, into the parts of a Magnitude; out of that division, by the course of nature, a variation in the Sub∣stances must necessarily follow.

8. As also, since the composition of A∣nimals clearly aym's, by a certain Way, at a certain End; a substantiall variatio in them must only depend upon the change of the adequate complexion necessary to the End of the composition.

9. Lastly, Mixtums; since their notion is constituted betwixt both these; as 'tis aggregated of similary parts and has a conformity with the Elements, so far, it follows, they must be subject to their way of change; but, as 'tis compoun∣ded of dissimilar parts, yet cohering in Proportion not Order, so far 'tis chang'd by the change of the Propor∣tion

without any respect to the Order.

10. You'l object; Since every Accident concurs to the designation of the Sub∣stance; upon any Accident's being chang'd, the ultimate substantiall difference must be altered: especially, since a Substance is defin'd to be nothing but A certain Re∣sultance from Accidents.

11. 'Tis answer'd, that, as, 'tis evident, Plurality is, so, nothing else but division ended, as, notwithstanding, not every part of the division changes Unity, but only the Figure: so, it happens in Rarefaction, that 'tis indeed the production of a new Element, when 'tis perfected; yet, every part of rarefaction does not partially change the Substance of an Element.

12. Now, rarefaction and condensation is perfected, when 'tis become such, that the former degree cannot be restor'd to the Thing that's rarifi'd or condens'd, out of the precise nature of Common causes; but ther's need of a speciall cause for this effect: for, 'tis plain, that, otherwise, it is not, in respect of the world, a new Thing or part; since, by the very common con∣stitution of the world, 'twill return to its former nature.

13. Much more, in the destruction of

an Animal, every alteration is, so, a way to its destruction, as, notwithstanding, eve∣ry part does not partially change the very Substance of the Animal.

14. Hence, 'tis collected, how ther's made an Augmentation of the same numeri∣call Animal, through the whole course of its life; and how, many of its members being cut off, the same still numericall A∣nimal remains: For, it being said, that the Substantiall notion of an Animal is to be rated from its prime Passion, and that That is the Love of Food, that is, of preserving it self; moreover, that an Animal being once made, the identity is not chang'd, un∣lesse the quality of its first operation be chang'd, according to the order of nature; it follows, that an Animal is not chang'd substantially, as long as the love of preser∣ving it self remains in it.

15. But, the cutting off of members, clearly, does not take away this dispositi∣on; and, the change which is made by the digesting Food into it self is mean't to continue the Animal: 'tis clear, therefore, neither of these destroy the bounds of na∣ture, which, we have said, are the Ends and determiners of Substance; & consequent∣ly, the nature of Individuation remains firm.

16. Now, why an Animal, remaining the same in Substance, should not be rarefi'd although more quantity come to it: the reason is plain; because, the Substance of an Animal is, of it self, indifferent to many Magnitudes, that is, to be lesse and bigger, and that which it receives is deriv'd to it by the destruction of other bodies; so that materia prima (which is a capacity of quantity) has that comparison to the aug∣mented Animal, that is, is a Capacity of as much quantity in the Animal, as it was be∣fore in many Things: whence, it comes to passe, that in the Animal, the quantity and substance retain the same proportion to the Standard or universall substance, which before they had to it in the Animal and its food.

17. It appears, again, out of what has been said, how the Suppositum may be said to have more in it then the Nature; though these are, indeed, one and the very same thing: For, the Nature speaks the com∣plexion of Accidents, precisely as 'tis a complexion; and so makes an Instrument of the operation intended by nature: and the notion of this is one and determind; and ther's nothing in it but essentially and formally.

18. But, the Suppositum is the thing which the Nature constitutes: whence, be∣cause it so explicates the nature, as that, besides, it includes confusedly other noti∣ons; as also, because the nature is a com∣plexion of many, the natures of every one must needs be conjoyn'd with this Nature or Substance: it comes to passe, that all the Accidents, according to their particu∣lar natures, are in the Suppositum; and con∣sequently, that there is more in the Suppo∣situm, then in the Nature.