Peripateticall institutions. In the way of that eminent person and excellent philosopher Sr. Kenelm Digby. The theoricall part. Also a theologicall appendix of the beginning of the world. / By Thomas White Gent.

Peripateticall INSTITUTIONS. Fourth Book.

Containing that part of METAPHYSICK, which explicates the Essentiall Notions of BODIES.

LESSON I.

Of the divisibility of Substance, in∣to Formall parts.

1.SInce water is, mani∣festly, lesse divisi∣ble then Aire; and yet they are but one, Quantitatively: if they are more then one according to their Substance, there must, of necessity, be a reall composition of Quantity to Substance; since Unity and Plurality are not distinct from the thing whose they are.

2. But, if they are not two Substances; since there cannot be a different proporti∣on of the same thing to it fels, & yet the pro∣portion of Quantity to the Substance in Aire is greater then in Water; it must needs be, again, that ther's a reall composition of Quantity to Substance and, therefore, a Divisibility.

3. Whence, tis inferr'd, that Substance, as tis condistinct from Quantity, is indi∣visible; since Quantity is divisibility.

4. As also, that the Notions of Rarity and Density consist in the proportion of the Quantity to the Substance whose it is: since rare bodies are more and dense less divi∣sible.

5. You'l object, Such as are one in Quan∣tity are one in Substance, too: But, the whole world is one in Quantity; & that rigorously, since, there are no Parts actually in a Magnitude: Therefore, either Quantity is a distinct thing from Substance, or else all Bodily Substance will be but one thing, really and materially, whatever may be imagined of an Intellectuall distinction between them.

6. Tis answered, 'Tis a false assumption, to say, those things which are one in Quan∣tity

are one in their Substances, too. To that which is objected, That all things would be really and materially one; Tis an∣swer'd, Either 'tis but the same which we call to be One quantitatively, and then 'twould be shew'd what inconvenience would follow, that consequence being ad∣mitted: or else, that term, really and ma∣terially, would be explicated; for the Argu∣ers seem to insinuate that it signifies, ab∣stracting from our Notions, that is, they would be one in no kind of unity whereof we have any Notion.

7. All things, therefore, according to that unity which follows the notion of Quantity, (and that is accidentall,) are one: but, according to their Substances, and that unity which follows the notion of Substance, they are many.

8. It follows, from what has been said, As oft as any division is made, the Sub∣stance it self is chang'd, which is subjected to the Quantity, according to the intrin∣secalls of Substance, as 'tis condistinguish't against Quantity: For, Division being that whereby more are made of one; and, they not being made more according to the proper unity of Quantity; this plurality must, of necessity, be in the Substance as

'tis condistinguish't against Quantity; wherefore, the Unity, too, which is de∣stroy'd, was in the Substance, as condistin∣guish't from the Quantity: since, there∣fore, Vnity superadds nothing to Entity, but a negative notion of indivision; it comes to passe, that a change cannot be made in the unity without a change in the Entity, and consequently, that the Entity is chang'd.

9. But, the Entity is not so chang'd, that two Entities should be made out of nothing; but out of one that existed before: otherwise, there would not have been made a division. There was, therefore, a power or possibility in the Substance, to be many; as, in many, ther's a possibility to be made one again.

10. The Substance, therefore, is chang'd, in some respect; and remains in the many, according to some part of its power: wherefore, 'tis divided according to its own proprieties; and, there is, in Substances, divisible according to Quan∣tity, another proper divisibility, into the Power by which it can be what it is, and the Act by which it is what it is; or, into the Matter remaining and the Form chang'd.

11. Yet, the parts of the Substance,

and the Quantity it self with the Sub∣stance against which 'tis condivided, are not actually in their compounds, before di∣vision: for, 'tis plain that, if they are in act, one of them, before division, is not an∣other; they are, therefore, many, nor can be divided, that is, made many.

12. Out of what has been said, 'tis evi∣dent, that this Formall divisibility has not the true nature of divisibility, that is, 'tis lesse then the divisibility of a Magnitude into its parts: For, a Magnitude is divi∣ded into parts, whereof every one exists after the division, by their proper existen∣ces; but, one, at least of these parts exists no longer, and that which remains exists, not alone, but commonly with some other, instead of the part it has lost.

LESSON II.

Of the Formall parts of Substance, in particular.

1. HEnce it follows that, because a change, according to the parts of the Substance, changes the Substance it self; the parts are parts of

the Substance, as it is such: wherefore, neither part is a Substance; since a part cannot be the whole: But, to be a Sub∣stance is, To have a nature capable of exi∣stence: therefore, neither part, separate∣ly, is, by its nature, capable of a Being: and, any Agent to give a Being to either part, separately, must first change its na∣ture, that it may be capable of Being; for, to exist, cannot agree to that, in which there is not a power of receiving ex∣istence.

2. And, after the same manner, must it be said of Quantity and all other Acci∣dents, whose notion is wholy without, and not comprehended in the notion of Sub∣stance; and consequently, their notion is lesse fit and apt for existence.

3. You'l say, if these things are true, it implyes a contradiction that any Accident should exist out of its own Subject; the contrary whereof is a matter of Faith.

4. 'Tis answer'd, ther's neither Autho∣rity nor Demonstration, in Theologie, which convinces that an Accident may be preserv'd out of a Subject; as, 'tis plain, to those that look more attentively into it.

5. But, on the contrary, 'tis evident a

Whole cannot be, without its Parts in po∣tentiâ or power, therefore a Substance can∣not be without Quantity, which is its parts in potentiâ; nor can a Magnitude be, with∣out its Quantity's having a determinate proportion to its Substance, that is, with∣out Rarity and Density; again, Rare and Dense diversly mingled, import all the rest of Corporeall Qualityes: 'Tis evident, therefore, that Accidents cannot be with∣out a Substance.

6. Farther, 'tis plain, the division of Substance is into a pure Power and a sub∣stantiall Form, or, that which makes it be a Substance: For, since, by the division of a Substance into its parts, the Substance is chang'd; it must needs be, that the Part which is lost gives the being a Substance to the Whole, since, that being withdrawn, the notion of Substance is taken away; and that the remaining Part is a pure Power; for, since 'tis a power to the notion that's chang'd, and that is the first of all others, 'tis clear, in the remaining part ther's no notion, and therefore, that 'tis a pure Pow∣er or possibility.

7. Whence, again, 'tis clear, ther's a greater unity of the parts of a Substance, then of Substance to Quantity: since,

Quantity and Substance are, intellectual∣ly, distinct; but, of the Matter and Form of compounds, ther's but one only notion together.

8. You'l say, 'Tis impossible to con∣ceive that Matter, of it self, has no notion; for, it would not be cognoscible. 'Tis an∣swer'd; Since, to be capable of being some∣thing neither is, in that kind whereof 'tis capable of being, nor yet is wholly estran∣ged from that kind: so, that which is a capacity to the first kind, that is, to Sub∣stance and Being, neither has it that first notion, and yet 'tis not altogether estran∣ged from it; but, 'tis a certain degree to participate Being it self, by the mediation of another.

9. Now the ratio or notion in a thing is That, by which its nature is fitted to the Understanding, or the Understandable∣nesse of a thing, or the quiddity, the what∣nesse and, consequently, that, whereby a thing is made to Be: The Form, there∣fore, primarily, is the Cause, or the where∣by the Being is had.

10. Whence, 'tis evidenc'd, there can∣not be more Substantiall Forms, in the same Thing: nor subordinate ones; be∣cause, since the first Form gives the Being,

the second must needs be adventitious to what has a Being, and not give it, but be an Accident: nor coordinate ones; since they have each their own notions and, consequently, constitute more Beings.

11. 'Tis plain, too, that the Matter has a Being through the Form, and cannot be sustain'd otherwise then by the Form; since, of it self, it has not a capacity to Be.

LESSON III.

Of the Vnity and distinction of Bo∣dies in common.

1. IT follows, from what has been said, that there is some plurality of Forms in nature, before all Division: For, since Division is made, by the interposition of one body, between the sides or parts of another, there must necessarily be, before division, a body to be the Divider and an∣other that may be Divided; which, being they are not more then one, through any former division, (since, this is suppos'd to be the first,) this plurality must of neces∣sity proceed out of the very nature and notion of the Things.

2. And, since Essence is nothing but that whereby a Thing is; such Things must be, essentially, distinct: Since, there∣fore, to divide belongs to dense, to be di∣vided to rare; those things that are natu∣rally rare and dense must be essentially di∣stinct.

3. Since, therefore, such things are transmutable among themselves, and ade∣quately divide the Universe; the Matter of rare and dense things must be the same, and consequently, that of the whole Uni∣verse.

4. The same is deduc'd out of the very notion of Matter; which, being a power to the notion of a Thing, is also a power or possibility to the notion of One: since, therefore, a Multitude consists but of U∣nities; before unity, neither distinction nor multitude can be understood: There can, therefore, be no multiplicity of mat∣ter; wherefore, that of all nature is but One.

5. Hence, then, those Questions are superfluous, Whether one Form can be the same in divers Matters? and again, Whether many Forms in one Matter? Since, if it be ask'd, of the proper unity of Matter, that of all Forms is the same; if,

of the individuall unity, that the matter attains by its conjunction with a Form, as it does its very Being.

6. From what has been said, 'tis clear, that every body, that is, every Compound of act and power is a Magnitude: For, since ther's but one possible First matter, and that subject to Quantity; the Com∣pounds of it, too, must of necessity be sub∣ject to Quantity.

7. Hence, again, it follows, that no bo∣dy moves, unlesse, in some manner, it be chang'd first: For since a Bulk excludes another out of its place, by this, that it intrudes it self into the other's place, be∣cause two cannot be together in the same place; unlesse it become greater then its own place or leave it, it cannot exclude an∣other: 'Tis manifest, therefore, that it must be altered first, according to one of these mutations, if it become a Mover of another.

8. Hence, again, 'tis collected that a Body is, essentially, an Instrument: For, since a Body has two properties, to be mov'd and to move; and, to be mov'd apper∣tains to it, out of its power and the noti∣on of Matter; 'tis clear, the essentiall no∣tion of it is to be taken from its vertue of

moving, by which it expresses act, and which follows the nature of a body in respect as it actually is: Since, therefore▪ a body does not move, but in as much as 'tis mov'd; clearly, according to its essentiall notion, 'tis an Instrument of its mover or applyer.

9. A BODY, therefore, is a Thing in Na∣ture, or, A certain part of the Vniverse; provi∣ded by the Authour of Nature, to produce a cer∣tain determinate Motion, when 'tis apply'd.

10. Whence, three notions, or man∣ners of defining a naturall Ens or Thing, are discover'd: A Metaphysicall one, which is deduc'd adequately under the notion of Being, and 'tis, A thing which has an existence spread into many potentiall parts, that is, a Thing in or of such parts: A Naturall or Physicall one, which, by Sen∣sible Qualities, expounds the notion of those parts and, consequently, of the Thing: And lastly, a Morall one, as it were, which collects the same from the End, that is, from the quality of its Moti∣on; for, the Metaphysicall notion, pro∣perly, regards only its capacity of Exi∣stence.

11. And, he that has any one of these three notions, even by that, has all: for, the Sensible Qualities impart both a

capacity of Existence and a power for A∣ction.

12. Whence, too, it appears, that one Body can have but one primary Operati∣on: for, since the sensible qualities give both the power of working and the capaci∣ty of existence, and they, in the same part of Matter, are the same; either they con∣spire to one operation, or not: if not, neither will it be one body, but many: if they conspire, there is, then, one primary operation of such a body; which could not be produc'd, either by another dispo∣sition, nor together with any other dispo∣sition then that. A naturall Body, there∣fore, is that One Thing whose Operation is One.

LESSON IV.

Of the essentiall unity and distin∣ction of the Elements and mixt bodies.

1. SInce 'tis said above, that ther's but one possible Substantiall Matter, and Quantity is known to be infinite in power;

the power of Matter, too, to Quantity must needs be infinite: Since, therefore, actu∣ally, Quantity is but finite; the Composit or compound must needs be, in some mea∣sure, dense.

2. And, if whole Nature were uniform, it must be establisht in a certain degree of Density and Rarity, springing from the proportion of Matter to this Quantity: but, the speciall and particular bodies which are in the Universe, as it is now fra∣med, participate, out of this universall proportion, some more some lesse of Den∣sity and Rarity.

3. Since, therefore, the notions of Density and Rarity are the first differences of Magnitudes: those bodies, which first and least of all exceed the nature of Body in common, will be distinguish't by these differences, that some exist in denser parts, others in rarer; which, in our Phy∣sicks, we have said, are the Elements.

4. Since, therefore, the operations of rare and dense bodies, as such, are to di∣vide and be divided; and this last is passi∣on, out of which the essentiall notion is not deduc'd; it comes to passe, that all the Elements receive their differences, ac∣cording to their power of dividing: and

since, to divide is a kind of simple action; they are distinguish't by no other diffe∣rences then of more and lesse, that is, of velocity and slownesse.

5. Among the Elements, therefore, those which are fram'd by nature to divide more swiftly must be more perfect; and those are they which are more subtile: wherefore, since the greatest force of di∣viding agrees to Fire, that must be the no∣blest; next to which must be Aire, then Wa∣ter, then Earth.

6. Which last, though, by its Bulk and density, it may seem more apt to divide, and has, as it were, in the first place, the nature of divisive: yet, by reason of the grossenesse of its parts, in naturall action, it can doe the very least of them all; and consequently, 'tis the vilest and most beg∣garly Instrument.

7. It appears farther that, since a body is, essentially, an Instrument for a determi∣nate motion; and there must needs be some least degree of rarity and density; and the littlenesse in bulk hinders both the divisive power and divisibility: there may be suppos'd, in every Element, parts so little, that, according to the order of the Universe, they may neither have a ca∣pacity

of dividing others, nor of being divided by others; and so, there may not be in them the essentiall notion of an Element, nor of any other naturall body.

8. Again, since all bodies are Conjoin'd; it appears, that such minutest particles never exist, but in composition with others: nay, when ever two or more Elements are joyn'd, it must needs be that their ex∣tremes may be suppos'd in so little a quan∣tity, that one cannot operate without the other.

9. There must needs, therefore, in nature, out of the pure conjunction of the Elements, be a notion of a certain body, whose parts cannot act at all separately, but, in conjunction they may: that is, some body essentially distinct from the E∣lements, and yet, made out of their con∣junction; that is, a body whose essence is to be a Mixtum or mixt body.

10. But, since, in bodies, universally, Unity and Magnitude are consider'd: 'tis plain, the differences of those bodies are collected out of three respects; the speci∣ficall difference of the Elements, that is, the degrees of Density and Rarity; the

Multitude of parts of the same notion; and their Bulk.

11. A Mixtum, therefore, is a body of certain parts, of divers degrees of rarity and density, in a certain number and bulk compacted among themselves, ordain'd by nature for a de∣terminate Motion. Moreover, 'tis evident, that the qualities of the Elements exist re∣fracted and mutually abated in mixt bo∣dies; since, the very least must needs sim∣ply differ in degrees of rare and dense, and these degrees, by reason of the compositi∣on, must needs hinder one another.

12. And yet, that no substantiall Form of any Element is found in a Mixtum: since, a Form constitutes a Thing, and a Thing is ordain'd for Motion; but, Mo∣tion is of the whole, not of the severall parts.

13. Out of what has been said, 'tis evi∣dent, that the operation of a Mixtum is a certain Division qualifi'd by the nature of the parts of the Mixtum: which nature, the better 'tis, that is, the more serviceable for the best works of nature, so much the nobler is the Mixtum, essentially.

14. Again, if the whole mixture of the Elements be shut up into so little a part, that one part cannot, separated from ano∣ther,

have its proper effect; then the Mix∣tum is simply one and primely mixt: but, if the mixture be extended so amply, that many parts may act, asunder, according to the divers parts of the temperament; then, 'tis not a Mixtum, but a Demixtum or Decompositum, that is, one made up of ma∣ny Mixtum's; as we see in Metalls and o∣ther Mines, as Coal, &c. where many Mix∣tum's are joyn'd together, which are apt to be separated by fire or other arti∣fice.

LESSON V.

Of the Essence of Animals, and of the Soul.

1. BUt because, among Mixtum's, some are solid and consistent, others fluid; and of these, by the course of nature, the conditions and tempera∣ments are different and, in some sort, op∣posite: there must, of necessity, out of the conjunction of these, rise a middle temper, which cannot but be fit for some certain motions.

2. And, because all things, with us

here, are beset with heat; the solid parts cannot be kept moist, that is, mixt throughly with actuall moisture, unlesse there be some continuall cause or Foun∣tain, out of which the moisture, so consu∣mable and subject to be wasted by the pow∣er of heat, may be perpetually supply'd.

3. Now, that Fountain may be sup∣pos'd within and intrinsecall to the Mix∣tum, or else conjoyn'd, that is, in a body joyn'd to it: But, if it be this later way, 'tis plain, that watred Mixtum is not, of its mere self, constantly what it is, but through its situation or conjunction to another, from which, if it be separated, it perishes.

4. But, that which is watred the former way has, within it self, what is necessary to keep it still a constant Instrument in na∣ture, of that operation which 'tis fram'd to undertake: and, consequently, it has one Form, from that one Operation 'tis ordain'd to, and that one Order of parts conform'd to such an operation.

5. And, because we find these in all and only Animals: an Animal is evidently counted to be One naturall Thing having one Form.

6. You'l say, if the severall similary

parts of an Animal, subsisting in their pro∣per forms, were connected; they'd have the same effect as they have now in the A∣nimal: ther's no need, therefore, of the particular form of an Animal.

7. 'Tis answer'd, Ther's no particular nature in any similary part of an Animal, which is common to that part alive and dead, as if there could be some form, as it were, indifferent; but, the nature of a li∣ving part is contrary to the nature of a dead part: Now, naturall Things are naturall parts of the world, unerringly flowing from the ESSENTIFICALL IDEA'S; and, there∣fore, they receive essentiall notions, ac∣cording to the Order they have in the U∣niverse.

8. But, because the parts of an Animal are so fram'd, that one should water, that is, alter or move another; 'tis plain that, of necessity, they must be of severall con∣ditions and figures: wherefore, the com∣plex of them is an Organicall bodie, having within it self Life, that is, a power of mo∣ving it self; and, its Form is the Act of such a body, that is, a Soul.

9. But, since the notion of a Soul re∣quires that the parts of its subject, whose orm it is, be some Movers others Moved;

'tis clear, that it does not inform each of the parts, or, is not in every part, as 'tis usu∣ally said, and as it happens in Elementary forms; but, that 'tis only in the whole and, immediately, the Form of the Whole.

10. Notwithstanding, the parts have not, therefore, partiall or particular Forms: because they are not actually in the whole, nor have, actually, any nature by which they could subsist out of the whole; as appears, in that, being but divided, they presently die.

11. Hence, 'tis collected, wherein con∣sists the Metaphysicall notion of an Animal: viz. that, 'Tis a Thing of many parts, order'd a∣mong themselves, as to Action; that is, where∣of some are active upon others, and the rest are passive from them.

12. To which the Morall definition ad∣joyn's, that 'Tis an Instrument for Action, that is, for that operation or motion to which they apply themselves; such as is locall motion, which all participate.

13. And, the Physicall definition consi∣ders that many Mixtum's are contain'd in an Animal, as also Organicall parts, that is, parts woven and compos'd of many Mixtum's; and so conjoin'd, that the libertie of each is not taken away, but that they are active upon

one another, as if they were distinct Things.

14. And, since, from the presence of an Object, an impression is made upon an A∣nimall; whence it begins to act about that which is without, so as is convenient for the nature it self of the Animall; yet, this impression is, such as makes no sensi∣ble change in the Animall: we apprehend the Object to be in the Animall, as neither perfecting nor hurting it, but indifferent∣ly, and purely As another thing; and this we call Knowing: and, that the Animall o∣perates out of it self, as it were, what is convenient for it, supposing this know∣ledge; and this we call working out of know∣ledge.

15. Again, because it appears, by our Physicks, that the proper motions of an A∣nimall derive their Origin from the Heart, which directs the Spirits into the nerves that are necessary for all kinds of motion; and that this Impulse is call'd Passion; moreover, that all Passions depend and e∣merge from LOVE and, in an Animall rightly dispos'd, are subject and confor∣mable to love: It follows, that Its prime Love, or, the prosecution of its chiefly be∣loved is that Passion or Motion or Action, to which the fabrick and compagination

of an Animall is immediately order'd; and consequently, that Animals, by these, excell one another.

16. Now, the prime pursuit of an Ani∣mall is after Food; and Food is what is con∣formable to the quality of a body, and preserves and causes a right disposition: Since, therefore, an Animall agrees with o∣ther bodies in being an Instrument, to be apply'd by another, and an Instrument is, in so much, more perfect, as it can per∣form, more easily and more efficaciously, more or more Noble works; that Animall will be better then the rest, which is more easily applyable, and to more things: for commonly, the more noble operation consists of the more parts, and what's ap∣ply'd more easily operates more efficaci∣ously.

17. The Food, therefore, of that Ani∣mall is best, which renders it of a calm Fan∣cy and of an Appetite the most indifferent; which, commonly, follow one another: and, that Animall is the best, which is pri∣marily affected to such Food.

LESSON VI.

Of the Chief Animal and the essen∣tiall distinction of Bodies.

1. OUt of what has been said, it may be convinc'd, if some Animal can be apply'd to one or more determinate operations, and another to whatever, without any term or limitation; this later kind has so great an eminency a∣bove the former, that they are not of the same Order: wherefore, It will be the no∣blest, and something above the Order of the rest.

2. 'Tis plain, too, that nothing greater can be imagin'd, in the notion of an Ani∣mal; no, nor of a Body: For, if a Bodie be an Instrument applyable to a determinate action, an Instrument to all extends to both the noblest and the most: Where∣fore, nothing can be conceiv'd higher in the notion either of a Body or an Ani∣mall.

3. Since, therefore, in our Physicks, it appears, that a Man, even in his Body, is pro∣vided

to do any thing whatever; 'tis plain, that a Man is the prime both of Bodies and Animals; and something beyond them.

4. It appears out of what has been said, that there cannot be any other differences of Bodies, which are not comprehended in the fore-mentioned. For, the Elements, dif∣fering in Rarity and Density, divide Body, precisely, as it speaks Quantity united to Substance: The nature of Mixtum's, which consist in the Number and Proportion of rare and dense bodies, follows that divisibility of quantity, whereby bodies have num∣ber and proportion: And, the Site and Or∣der of Parts we chiefly see in Animals, whose members can act one upon another: Last∣ly, the Infinitude of Quantity shew's it self in Man, in that he is ordinable, after a sort, to infinite things.

5. Again, since Quantity is divisibility into parts, those are distinct either in Num∣ber, as it were, and Site only; and bodies divisible into such parts are the Elements: or, they differ in Nature; and such are the parts of Mixtum's: or, lastly, they are parts which, in the Thing it self, are, as it were, certain Things exercising their own proper operations; such are the Members of Ani∣mals; the complex of which, if it makes a

body orderable to all possible Action, it constitutes a Man.

6. Again, the division which a body makes is, either simply dividing more and lesse; and, by this, the Elements are di∣stinguish't: or, 'tis a modify'd division, by which certain bodies, with a certain quali∣fication, are distinguish't; and this is the proper division of Mixt bodies, by which their so many effects are produc'd: or 'tis an abstractive division, that is, which, of it self, has no effect, but is a way and instru∣ment to another division; and such is the motion of Animals; which, if it be in a certain determinate manner and number, constitutes the other Animals, if indetermi∣nately and with infinite variety, belongs to Man.

7. And, that these differences are essen∣tiall, appears from hence, that they, of themselves, divide and include the notion and end of a Thing consisting of parts, that is, of Body or bodily Substance; as cloven-footednesse includes pedality, and the being divided into three or four Toes includes cloven-footednesse: for, no difference, of any of these above-mentioned kinds, can be understood without the notion of a Thing consisting of parts; nor, be ap∣apply'd

to any other common notion, un∣lesse accidentally.

8. Nor, is it lesse apparent, that these essentiall differences are the very Accidents, that is, the very complexion or clinging to∣gether of rare and dense parts: which is call'd Substantiall or essentiall, in as much as it furnishes the body for its prime and chief operation; and as, saving the order to the chief operation, 'tis mutable, so far 'tis some of the Accidents: For, since the parts are not actually in a formall Com∣pound; 'tis clear, that whatever is in the Compound cannot be this and that, seve∣rall and distinct Things.

9. A transmutation, therefore, is acci∣dentall only or more then accidentall, in as much as 'tis greater or lesse, or, as it ex∣tends to severall notions.

10. Hence, again, 'tis evident, that Ge∣nericall unity, though it be founded in na∣ture (as appears out of what has been said): yet 'tis not truly any other then Mentall (that is, by being in the under∣standing) as to the effect of unity; though the similitude in which 'tis founded be re∣all.

11. And that the ultimate essentiall u∣nity, which they term Specificall, and ima∣gine

common, is no other then the very Individuall unity: For, since all difference consists of the collection of rare and dense, and all operation follows the same differences in the very instant of the birth or first being of every thing, when the In∣dividuation is determin'd; it must needs be, that whatever Accidents there are, in the thing once made, either fit or avert it from the primary operation, to which 'tis ordain'd: Since, therefore, every change in the Form makes an essentiall difference, and all variety in respect of the primary o∣peration is a change in the Form, 'tis plain that every Accident concurs to an essenti∣all change; and (which was intended) that Numericall difference, which is the ul∣timate and compleat proportion of a Thing to its operation, is essentiall.

12. Wherefore, since, from the high∣est ratio or notion of a Thing consisting of parts, one may descend, by numberlesse de∣grees, to whatever Individuall; Generi∣call degrees will be without any known number, but the specificall will be no other then that of an Individuum.

LESSON VII.

Of the mutation of the Individuali∣ty in the severall kinds of Bo∣dies.

1. ANd, hence, 'tis evident that, a Thing being chang'd but acci∣dentally, the Individuality is not chang'd; because that's taken direct∣ly under the notion of Thing or Body; which is the last that's destroy'd in the thing, as 'tis the last that's made.

2. For, since change is made by locall motion, and that's divisible without end; if, upon every accidentall variation, the Substance should be chang'd, substantiall transmutation would be continually suc∣cessive, and would not subsist but in moti∣on, that is, so, that one part would not be whilst another is; and consequently, the notion of a Substance would never be nor its Being be Indivisible; nor would there be any Thing by whose mediation Ac∣cidents might subsist; to conclude, there would be nothing in Nature, the constan∣cy

and firmnesse of Substance being once taken away.

3. Among the Elements 'tis plain, the Notion of the Individuum is chang'd by mere division; so that, any whatever least particle being taken away or added, the notion of the Individuum is chang'd: But, the quality of Rarity or Density being chang'd, the notion of the Individuum is not, therefore, altered.

4. For, since the mutation according to Rarity and Density is a continuall one, that is, divisible without end; there would be an infinite succession of Individuums: But, it appears to the Considerer, that it happens not so in division; whose Motion though it be continuall, yet the being divi∣ded follows indivisibly. Besides, if, both by division and change of rarity, the quid∣ditative notion of an Element should be varied, there would be no accidentall change in the Elements.

5. Of Mixtums, the manner is partly the same, partly different: for, if a dissolution intervene between the heterogeneall parts which essentially constitute a Mixtum, there will be a change, not of the Individu∣um, but of the Genericall notion; but, if any parts of the same temperament be ei∣ther

added or taken away, the Individuall notion is accounted chang'd.

6. But, the Unity of an Animal is not prejudic'd by the withdrawing of neither similary nor dissimilary parts; but only of those, wherein the prime force of its In∣strumentality precisely consists: and, that being maim'd, it suffers a Genericall change.

7. For, since the divisibility of the E∣lements is, precisely, into the parts of a Magnitude; out of that division, by the course of nature, a variation in the Sub∣stances must necessarily follow.

8. As also, since the composition of A∣nimals clearly aym's, by a certain Way, at a certain End; a substantiall variatio in them must only depend upon the change of the adequate complexion necessary to the End of the composition.

9. Lastly, Mixtums; since their notion is constituted betwixt both these; as 'tis aggregated of similary parts and has a conformity with the Elements, so far, it follows, they must be subject to their way of change; but, as 'tis compoun∣ded of dissimilar parts, yet cohering in Proportion not Order, so far 'tis chang'd by the change of the Propor∣tion

without any respect to the Order.

10. You'l object; Since every Accident concurs to the designation of the Sub∣stance; upon any Accident's being chang'd, the ultimate substantiall difference must be altered: especially, since a Substance is defin'd to be nothing but A certain Re∣sultance from Accidents.

11. 'Tis answer'd, that, as, 'tis evident, Plurality is, so, nothing else but division ended, as, notwithstanding, not every part of the division changes Unity, but only the Figure: so, it happens in Rarefaction, that 'tis indeed the production of a new Element, when 'tis perfected; yet, every part of rarefaction does not partially change the Substance of an Element.

12. Now, rarefaction and condensation is perfected, when 'tis become such, that the former degree cannot be restor'd to the Thing that's rarifi'd or condens'd, out of the precise nature of Common causes; but ther's need of a speciall cause for this effect: for, 'tis plain, that, otherwise, it is not, in respect of the world, a new Thing or part; since, by the very common con∣stitution of the world, 'twill return to its former nature.

13. Much more, in the destruction of

an Animal, every alteration is, so, a way to its destruction, as, notwithstanding, eve∣ry part does not partially change the very Substance of the Animal.

14. Hence, 'tis collected, how ther's made an Augmentation of the same numeri∣call Animal, through the whole course of its life; and how, many of its members being cut off, the same still numericall A∣nimal remains: For, it being said, that the Substantiall notion of an Animal is to be rated from its prime Passion, and that That is the Love of Food, that is, of preserving it self; moreover, that an Animal being once made, the identity is not chang'd, un∣lesse the quality of its first operation be chang'd, according to the order of nature; it follows, that an Animal is not chang'd substantially, as long as the love of preser∣ving it self remains in it.

15. But, the cutting off of members, clearly, does not take away this dispositi∣on; and, the change which is made by the digesting Food into it self is mean't to continue the Animal: 'tis clear, therefore, neither of these destroy the bounds of na∣ture, which, we have said, are the Ends and determiners of Substance; & consequent∣ly, the nature of Individuation remains firm.

16. Now, why an Animal, remaining the same in Substance, should not be rarefi'd although more quantity come to it: the reason is plain; because, the Substance of an Animal is, of it self, indifferent to many Magnitudes, that is, to be lesse and bigger, and that which it receives is deriv'd to it by the destruction of other bodies; so that materia prima (which is a capacity of quantity) has that comparison to the aug∣mented Animal, that is, is a Capacity of as much quantity in the Animal, as it was be∣fore in many Things: whence, it comes to passe, that in the Animal, the quantity and substance retain the same proportion to the Standard or universall substance, which before they had to it in the Animal and its food.

17. It appears, again, out of what has been said, how the Suppositum may be said to have more in it then the Nature; though these are, indeed, one and the very same thing: For, the Nature speaks the com∣plexion of Accidents, precisely as 'tis a complexion; and so makes an Instrument of the operation intended by nature: and the notion of this is one and determind; and ther's nothing in it but essentially and formally.

18. But, the Suppositum is the thing which the Nature constitutes: whence, be∣cause it so explicates the nature, as that, besides, it includes confusedly other noti∣ons; as also, because the nature is a com∣plexion of many, the natures of every one must needs be conjoyn'd with this Nature or Substance: it comes to passe, that all the Accidents, according to their particu∣lar natures, are in the Suppositum; and con∣sequently, that there is more in the Suppo∣situm, then in the Nature.

LESSON VIII.

Of the proper Action of the Chief Animal.

1. IT appears, farther, that, since an A∣nimal is governd by Passion; and Passion rises from goods or ills to Nature, that is, those things which are conformable or dissonant to nature: Man, if he be applyable to all things, that is, prompt to embrace any ill of nature, or fly any good; must of necessity have such a faculty in him, that, in his Brain, ills of nature greater then any such good may

be joyn'd to the good which he is to es∣chue, and likewise greater goods to the ill he is to embrace; that, so, he may, by the applyer, be impell'd to his destin'd acti∣ons.

2. These goods, therefore, with ills, and contrariwise, since they are not con∣joyn'd in the things themselves, and yet must appear to him conjoyn'd, and this not by mistake but by the design of na∣ture; 'tis plain, there is in the Man a fa∣culty whereby it may appear to him that those goods are conjoyn'd with the ills, and that he from that appearance is mov'd; and not because the appearances are natu∣rally conjoyn'd (as, peradventure, 'tis in Beasts), which, not having any conjun∣ction from a conjunction of the objects in nature, (as, future or past things), cannot from such conjunction, that is, by force of nature, have a power of moving through conjunction.

3. And, since this conjunction moves a man, not as being a manner of the know∣ledge of things, but because 'tis the thing known; the other conditions, too, of Things and chiefly their very Existence must be, so, in a man and, so, move him: The objects, therefore, as existing, that is,

Existence as Existence must be known by a man.

4. And, because existence, by its own Form and its very being existence, ex∣cludes non-existence; he that knows a thing exists knows that it does not not-ex∣ist, or (which is as much) that what exists, whilst it does so, cannot not-exist. Man, therefore, has a foundation whereby he may be certify'd of all Truth, viz. that The same cannot be and not-be, at once.

5. Since, therefore, then we are judg'd to understand, when we know a thing is and cannot be otherwise; a Man, certainly, is to be call'd an Vnderstanding Creature.

6. Again, since our knowledge rises from our Senses, & our Senses, sometimes, are so imperfectly mov'd by the Objects, that, though we perceive ther's something, yet we know not its quality, (for example, we see a body, which we know not whether it be alive or dead; or, we discern it moves it self, but doubt what kind of Animal 'tis): 'tis evident, we know some one thing, of more like to one another which we are acquainted with, to be, without distinguish∣ing the individuality, that is, we have an universall notion which is indifferent to many.

7. And, compounding these former with this farther Consideration, that 'Tis the same thing to know One thing is another, & to know that Those things, which are the same with a third, are the same between them∣selves: 'tis plain that a Man is Discoursive; and that his knowledge is deriv'd from those things, whereof he's certain, to some∣thing, whereof he was not certain, but is rendred certain by the very derivation.

8. And because, of those things which are unknown, either part is indifferent to the Understanding, and the Understand∣ing is undetermin'd concerning them: it follows, that a Man, by this Discourse, of un∣determin'd, is rendred determin'd; and, be∣cause the Principles of determination are in himself, it comes to passe that a Man de∣termines himself and moves himself.

9. Again, since, 'tis clear, that one part of a Man is affected from another part, as from a sensible object; for example, One hand Feels the other or whatever other exteriour part of the Body; in like man∣ner, we are sensible of our selves by Smell, Hearing, and Sight: it follows, that a Man can think and discourse of himself and, consequently, of his actions; and, by con∣sequence, that he can determine himself to

act or not-act, the understanding descen∣ding by discourse to the good or illnesse of the action he is about to doe.

10. A Man, therefore, moves himself to act and is Master of his action, and, out of the notion of good and ill, differently disposes his action; which we use to call being Free: a Man, therefore, is Free.

11. You'l object, that liberty, according to the common notion of men, consists in this, that, Supposing all things requisite for action, yet a Man can, out of an in∣trinsecall faculty, immediately will to act or not-act. 'Tis answer'd, This is not the notion of the vulgar; which holds to act and not-act for the notion of liberty, without that addition of supposing all things requisite besides the action it self: nor is it the notion of the Learned, that have sought in Na∣ture it self, how the notion of the vulgar should be explicated.

12. But 'tis an errour in Metaphysick, in as much as it supposes an indifferent, as in∣different, to act; and that to be in Effect which never was in Cause, that is, an effect to be without a cause.

13. Again, 'tis erroneous in Morall Sci∣ence: for the Notion of Vertue would be taken away; whose nature 'tis to incline

to will actually, so that, a more vertuous person is more determin'd to will just things then a lesse vertuous.

14. Perswasion, too, and Negotiation would be taken away: for, if the determi∣nation of the will should proceed not out of the preceding causes, in vain would be the endeavours of drawing men to fol∣low one thing more then another.

15. Out of what has been said, it may be determin'd, that Man, by force of his Intellective vertue, consider'd in it self, is capable of infinite Science: For, since, whatever is added is still a degree and dis∣position in the Man to farther Science 'tis apparent, the understanding is not bur∣den'd but rendred more capable by for∣mer Science: Wherefore, since Science, for its part, may, by addition, encrease with∣out end, and is only restrain'd by uninfi∣nitenesse of the number of the Objects, it must needs be that Man is capable of com∣prehending all, that is, infinite Science, to∣gether and at once; that is, he is of a capa∣city absolutely infinite, in respect of bo∣dies; comprehending infinite of them, as a Superficies comprehends infinite Lines, and a Line infinite Points.

16. Again, since, among knowable

things, those are contain'd, too, which are to be done by a Man; to this, also, hu∣mane Science extends, even to know what's to be done. And, since Science is an active Principle, a Man, by Science, will be ena∣bled to direct his actions; that is, to govern his life; and this most perfectly, because he is enabled to know what's best to be done.

LESSON IX.

Of the Soul of the Chief Animal, or, of the MIND.

1. OUt of what has been hitherto ex∣plicated, 'tis easily deduc'd that Man, according to this princi∣ple, is rais'd above the notions of Matter and Quantity. For, since Matter is a cer∣tain capacity of Quantity, Quantity of Figure, Figure is determin'd by Place, and all these in Time: but, 'tis clear, that the intention and thought of Man, in an uni∣versall conception, is entertained about something indifferent to infinite Figures, Places, Times, and Magnitudes; and this, not out of the nature of the thing, but be∣cause 'tis in the Mind of Man: 'Tis most evident that the Mind is something of ano∣ther kind then Matter and Quantity; and

consequently, nobler, since 'tis an additi∣on to the perfectest bodies.

2. Again, since Thing and Existence is that which first and primely fixes the Mind, and to which it seems to be a cer∣tain capacity: but Thing (out of what has been said) abstracts from and is before great and little, both in rarefy'd and augmented things: it follows, that the notion of the Mind is before and nobler then Quantity and, its com-part, Matter.

3. Again, since all the negotiation of our Mind reduces divisibles to indivisibi∣lity; as appears in Numbers, Figures, Points, Lines, Superficies, Instants, Com∣parisons, Denominations, Relations, Ne∣gations &c. but, nothing is so different as an indivisible from a divisible: 'tis clear, on all sides, that the nature of the Mind is wholy opposite to the nature of Quanti∣ty; and Quantity implying a kind of un∣determinatenesse and confusion, that the Mind is still the nobler part.

4. Nor, with lesse evidence, is it prov'd that the Mind is a Substantiall principle of Man: For, since his operations are ma∣nifestly indivisible; but, what is receiv'd in a divisible, ipso facto becomes divisible

upon the division of the subject; 'tis clear, his operations are not receiv'd in a Magni∣tude, and, consequently, that his Mind is an indivisible Substance.

5. Again, if the Substance of Man be wholy materiall and divisible, his Mind it self and all its affections can be nothing but certain Manners and determinations of divisibility (as, 'tis plain, of the other qualities which are accessory to bodies): but, 'tis plain, out of what has been said, that 'tis no such thing: wherefore, neither that the whole Substance of Man is ma∣teriall, but, in part, Spirituall and indivisi∣ble.

6. 'Tis clear, too, that the Mind is not another, but the same Substance with the Man: For, since an Instrument to all things includes the being an Instrument to some; wherein consists the notion of an Animal: 'tis clear, that a Man is a certain Species of Animal; and consequently, that his Mind, by which he is a Man, is formally one and the same Thing with the rest of the Sub∣stance of Man.

7. And indeed, were it suppos'd a di∣stinct Thing from the Substance of the Man, it would not suffer from the body, nor could it acquire any thing through its

conjunction to the body, nor be at all conjoyned to it: for, it must be either en∣titatively, and this cannot be otherwise then by unity of Substance, for a Thing speaks Substance; or, some other acciden∣tall way, whereof ther's nothing common to a body and a Spirit.

8. You'l say, Since a Spirit is a Thing of another order then a body, how can it concurre into the same Thing? then, how will it be cemented? and, what neighbour∣hood of one to the other? 'Tis answered, that, as, in a Magnitude, one part is fast∣ned to another, and has the power of a Sub∣sister without division, that is, the propri∣ety of a sever'd Thing without separation: so, the Soul also, may be the same with the body, without confusion of properties.

9. And, because, in a corporeall Sub∣stance, ther's admitted a certain negative∣ly indivisible vertue antecedent to divisibili∣ty, viz. a not-yet divisibility of the Sub∣stance before the Quantity: such as is the connexion and gradation from the divisi∣bility to the negative indivisibility; ano∣ther like that will be apt to unite, without a Paradox, the Mind positively indivisible, to the Substance negatively indivisible.

10. And, how will it unite? but, accor∣ding

to those parts, in which the Sub∣stance primarily and principally resides: which, as 'tis principally in the Heart, that being a certain Fountain of the whole Thing; so, specially, as to the notion of Animality, 'tis in the Brain, whence Sense and Motion is deriv'd to the whole Ani∣mal, which are those operations from which 'tis denominated an Animal.

11. Since, therefore, the other actions, which do not affect the Heart nor the Brain, strike not home to the inmost Sub∣stance; so, neither do they reach Mentall Knowledge or the integrity of the Soul: but, the changes that strike upon these Principles affect the Soul, too; and, it comes to passe that not-the-same ordination of bodily parts, especially of the Spirits and Heart, follows in Man from the Brain's being affected, which would follow in ano∣ther Animal; but one, from the propriety of the affected Substance, conformable to the whole, not to the body alone.

12. But, any other unity, then that the Soul should intimely be comprehended in the definition of Man, and consequent∣ly, should consist of the same notion and indistinct predicates, is not to be look'd for in Substance.

LESSON X.

Of the Proficiency and Deficiency of Man, and of his Essence.

1. THis, therefore, is out of Contro∣versie, that Man, as to his Soul, suffers from Corporeall Agents: For, since the Soul it self is a certain Af∣fection or Qualification of a divisible Sub∣stance, which is introduc'd and expell'd by corporeall actions; 'tis clear, that those actions, which reach to the very Sub∣stance, must, of necessity, affect and be re∣ceiv'd in it, after its manner.

2. Consequently, it acquires Science: For, since, 'tis nothing but a certain Possi∣bility to Science, as to its perfection; 'tis ma∣nifest, that all its change is towards Sci∣ence, viz. to be some kind of Knowledge, either perfect or imperfect.

3. Whence, even they, that deny the Soul acquires Science, say that 'tis excited and admonish't by the presence of the bo∣dy: but, to be excited and admonish't is to receive knowledge: the Soul, there∣fore, acquires knowledge from the Body.

4. Nor makes against this Socrates's ex∣periment of a Boy, orderly ask'd and an∣swering right to Geometricall propositi∣ons: for, this questioning was a producti∣on of Science, not a renovation; for 'twas an application of the notion of the same Being, which is between the Terms, to the understanding of the Boy; whereby it came to passe that the Truth to be known was by the notion of Thing, knit to the Soul of the Boy, and made, as it were, a part of it, in which the vertue of know∣ledge and Science consists.

5. Yet, the Soul has not, by this Sci∣ence, a power to move the body: For, we see, Science is often overcome by Passion; but, if it had any proper activity, it could not be resisted by any power of its own body: Moreover, it would no longer be a part of a Man, but something grafted in him of a superiour nature, according to that vertue.

6. It follows, therefore, that, by vertue of the Soul, more motives of goods or ills are conjoynd to the singular objects; by whose conjunction the Heart and the body is affe∣cted otherwise to those goods or ills, then it would be had they not that conjunction: So that, the force of Pain and Pleasure is that

which moves a Man, even then when he seems to follow the firmest Reason; name∣ly, because to be Reasonable to follow this and to fly that, is nothing else but that more of delightfull is conjoynd with this and more of painfull with that.

7. In vertue of these, therefore, a Man is chang'd, and acts otherwise then if he had not understanding. Nor, is he carry'd, from the very beginning, by reason or any proper power, to this connection of goods with ills; but is prevented by some chance or obvious disposition of objects & corpo∣reall causes, either intrinsecall or extrinsecall.

8. Now, this disposition in the Soul, upon which Operation follows, we call the WILL, and the first beginning Volition; which, 'tis apparent, is left by precedent judgements, chiefly those that are about good or ill, since, by such judgements, 'tis plain, a Man is determin'd to action.

9. Hence, it appears, how the Soul fails in Opining: For, seeing Objects occurre to the Soul, not deduc'd and drawn-in, by its own force and nerves, as it were, but, by the agitation of bodies; if the affection to any thing so presses a Man to action, that it leaves not room for the objects to run in that order which is necessary for de∣monstration;

the Man must needs fall to acting, before he has any absolute evidence what's to be done.

10. If this be done by reflection, a Man see's that he's mov'd uncertainly; but, he see's, too, that nature requires he should move upon apparences; whence, he does no unbeseeming incongruous thing: But, if it be done without reflection, a Man takes an uncertainfor a certain; which is, to Opine; for he says, this is, which he has no determinate cause to say.

11. From this precipitation of action, it happens, that one Man operates better, ano∣ther worse; according as one, more frequent∣ly or more grievously, precipitates his action, then another. And, those that come nearest to evidence, as far as nature will bear, doe the uttermost of their power; which is to ope∣rate vertuously: but, those that very much recede from it, are call'd vitious: between which, a certain middle state of Men in∣clines notoriously to neither part.

12. 'Tis clear, therefore, whence the defectibility of Vice rises in Man-kind: to wit, because, by too much precipitation of bodily motion, false or the worse opini∣ons are generated. Whence, it follows, that man is not only changeable from

imperfect to perfect, but also from good to evil, and contrariwise: For, if he has o∣pin'd a falsity, upon farther light, he may be led to the Truth, and if, invited by apparences, he has follow'd the Truth, by others he may be averted again.

13. Whence, 'tis evident, ther's some opposition in the Soul, that is, some acts incompossible at once in it: for, since those things which are in the Soul inhere in it, in vertue of Being; 'tis plain, it must be ga∣ther'd, out of the very notion of Being, what things consist together in the Soul and what not. Now, 'tis clear, that 'tis against the notion of Being, that the same should Be and not-Be: but, of those things that are, all agree in the notion of Being, nor does any thing hinder that white and black, light and darknesse, hot and cold should co∣exist; wherefore, neither does any thing forbid their being together in the Soul: but, for the same to Be and not-Be, which is, to be affirm'd and deny'd, 'tis wholy re∣pugnant.

14. Since, therefore, Man suffers no re∣pugnancy in himself to have whatever o∣ther things together in his Mind; it comes to passe, that he is capable and cognosci∣tive of all Things: He can, therefore,

know what's best for himself, or, in what State he may most perfectly enjoy himself: Nor, will he doubt that he is to strain to∣wards this by all his actions; wherefore, he will be govern'd against nature, if he be employ'd otherwise then is convenient to attain This last End.

15. Whether, therefore, one Man rules another, or whether some superiour Power governs him; he govern'd against nature, if he withdraw him from This chiefest Good: And because Nature is the Principle of acting; a Man, as far as he is able, will reduce himself to a rectitude and straight course towards his ULTI∣MATE GOOD, and will resist all con∣trary operation.

16. Though Man, therefore, be an In∣strument, fram'd to be mov'd by another, as all other Animals: yet, 'twill be with this difference, that other Animals are or∣dain'd to be mov'd to the End of the Mo∣ver, without any respect to their proper good; but, Man is govern'd to the Mo∣ver's End, no farther then as the same is a Motion towards the proper Good of Man.

17. MAN, therefore, is an Instrument, fram'd by nature apt for universality of A∣ction,

that is, to do any thing whatever, so it be in order to his proper good: or, a Thing, of connected parts, in a passive and active order, that is, which can order themselves: or, lastly, Consisting of a RATIO∣NALL SOUL and an ANIMAL BODY.

Notes

• B. 2. Les. 2. N. 2.
• B. 2. less. 1. N. 4.
• Les. 3. n. 4.
• B. 2. les. 2. n. 7.
• B. 2. les. 24. n. 6.
• Les. 7. n. 11. 16.