Peripateticall institutions. In the way of that eminent person and excellent philosopher Sr. Kenelm Digby. The theoricall part. Also a theologicall appendix of the beginning of the world. / By Thomas White Gent.

LESSON VI.

Of the Chief Animal and the essen∣tiall distinction of Bodies.

1. OUt of what has been said, it may be convinc'd, if some Animal can be apply'd to one or more determinate operations, and another to whatever, without any term or limitation; this later kind has so great an eminency a∣bove the former, that they are not of the same Order: wherefore, It will be the no∣blest, and something above the Order of the rest.

2. 'Tis plain, too, that nothing greater can be imagin'd, in the notion of an Ani∣mal; no, nor of a Body: For, if a Bodie be an Instrument applyable to a determinate action, an Instrument to all extends to both the noblest and the most: Where∣fore, nothing can be conceiv'd higher in the notion either of a Body or an Ani∣mall.

3. Since, therefore, in our Physicks,* 1.1 it appears, that a Man, even in his Body, is pro∣vided

to do any thing whatever; 'tis plain, that a Man is the prime both of Bodies and Animals; and something beyond them.

4. It appears out of what has been said, that there cannot be any other differences of Bodies, which are not comprehended in the fore-mentioned. For, the Elements, dif∣fering in Rarity and Density, divide Body, precisely, as it speaks Quantity united to Substance: The nature of Mixtum's, which consist in the Number and Proportion of rare and dense bodies, follows that divisibility of quantity, whereby bodies have num∣ber and proportion: And, the Site and Or∣der of Parts we chiefly see in Animals, whose members can act one upon another: Last∣ly, the Infinitude of Quantity shew's it self in Man, in that he is ordinable, after a sort, to infinite things.

5. Again, since Quantity is divisibility into parts, those are distinct either in Num∣ber, as it were, and Site only; and bodies divisible into such parts are the Elements: or, they differ in Nature; and such are the parts of Mixtum's: or, lastly, they are parts which, in the Thing it self, are, as it were, certain Things exercising their own proper operations; such are the Members of Ani∣mals; the complex of which, if it makes a

body orderable to all possible Action, it constitutes a Man.

6. Again, the division which a body makes is, either simply dividing more and lesse; and, by this, the Elements are di∣stinguish't: or, 'tis a modify'd division, by which certain bodies, with a certain quali∣fication, are distinguish't; and this is the proper division of Mixt bodies, by which their so many effects are produc'd: or 'tis an abstractive division, that is, which, of it self, has no effect, but is a way and instru∣ment to another division; and such is the motion of Animals; which, if it be in a certain determinate manner and number, constitutes the other Animals, if indetermi∣nately and with infinite variety, belongs to Man.

7. And, that these differences are essen∣tiall, appears from hence, that they, of themselves, divide and include the notion and end of a Thing consisting of parts, that is, of Body or bodily Substance; as cloven-footednesse includes pedality, and the being divided into three or four Toes includes cloven-footednesse: for, no difference, of any of these above-mentioned kinds, can be understood without the notion of a Thing consisting of parts; nor, be ap∣apply'd

to any other common notion, un∣lesse accidentally.

8. Nor, is it lesse apparent, that these essentiall differences are the very Accidents, that is, the very complexion or clinging to∣gether of rare and dense parts: which is call'd Substantiall or essentiall, in as much as it furnishes the body for its prime and chief operation; and as, saving the order to the chief operation, 'tis mutable, so far 'tis some of the Accidents: For, since the parts are not actually in a formall Com∣pound; 'tis clear, that whatever is in the Compound cannot be this and that, seve∣rall and distinct Things.

9. A transmutation, therefore, is acci∣dentall only or more then accidentall, in as much as 'tis greater or lesse, or, as it ex∣tends to severall notions.

10. Hence, again, 'tis evident, that Ge∣nericall unity, though it be founded in na∣ture (as appears out of what has been said): yet 'tis not truly any other then Mentall (that is, by being in the under∣standing) as to the effect of unity; though the similitude in which 'tis founded be re∣all.

11. And that the ultimate essentiall u∣nity, which they term Specificall, and ima∣gine

common, is no other then the very Individuall unity: For, since all difference consists of the collection of rare and dense, and all operation follows the same differences in the very instant of the birth or first being of every thing, when the In∣dividuation is determin'd; it must needs be, that whatever Accidents there are, in the thing once made, either fit or avert it from the primary operation, to which 'tis ordain'd: Since, therefore, every change in the Form makes an essentiall difference, and all variety in respect of the primary o∣peration is a change in the Form, 'tis plain that every Accident concurs to an essenti∣all change; and (which was intended) that Numericall difference, which is the ul∣timate and compleat proportion of a Thing to its operation, is essentiall.

12. Wherefore, since, from the high∣est ratio or notion of a Thing consisting of parts, one may descend, by numberlesse de∣grees, to whatever Individuall; Generi∣call degrees will be without any known number, but the specificall will be no other then that of an Individuum.

Notes

• * 1.1

  B. 2. les. 24. n. 6.