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If I am limited to a certain Ground for my standing Camp, by reason that it is to command some beneficial Pass, or that it is to bridle a considerable City, or Town, where your Enemy has his Arcenals, Magazines, or Bridges, over some Navigable River; and that by so placing my standing Camp before his Army is Rendezvouz'd in or near that City or Town, I may make it of little use to him as to his inva∣ding
the Countrey I am to defend; for if I am posted so near it, as that he cannot imbattle his Army but under the reach of my Artillery, or march his Squadrons and Battali∣ons over his Bridges, but so as I may attack as many of them as I think fit, and which are come over, while the rest are on the other side, or marching to those which are got over; I say, if in these two Cases, or in other the like Cases, I am limited to a set proportion of Ground to incamp in, I will make the length and depth of my Lines of Lodgments ac∣cordingly: As for instance, if by making my standing Camp to consist but of four Lines of Lodgments, I thereby get some Eminences of Ground within my Camp, which if I made it consist of five or six Lines, I should be necessitated to leave out, and consequently must secure such heighths, by making Forts on the top of them, and Lines about the foot of them, which will be a prejudice to me if done; and by the Enemies possessing them, a disadvantage to me if not done, I would make the Number of my Lodgment Lines but four; and on the other side, if the Ground for my stand∣ing Camp be such, that if I should make but four or five Lines of Lodgments, I should thereby inclose within my Camp, or border upon it, some Moorish Lands, I would make it consist of 6 or 7 Lines of Lodgments, to avoid that mischief.
These two Instances will evidence no standing Rule can be given of how many Lines of Lodgments the setled In∣camping shall consist; for that must still depend upon the judgment of the General, and nature of the Ground; where∣fore the Romans manner of making their standing Camps alwayes an exact Square, and the usual modern way of ma∣king it a long Square, may neither of them be alwayes the best.
After the Ground for the standing Camp is resolved on, and that in Pasteboard or Double Paper, the Lodgments are agreed upon with how many Lines of Lodgments deep the whole shall consist of, it is the duty of the Quartermaster General, and of the Engineer General, to wait on the Ge∣neral with it, who approving of it, the Quartermaster Ge∣neral with his Assistants, and the Quartermasters of every Foot Regiment, and of every Troop of Horse, with those
appointed to take care of the Lodgments, for the General Officers, the Train, the Strangers, the Sick, and the Market-place (if you will have it within the Intrenchment) are to receive from him respectively, their Number of Foot in breadth, (for the length never alters) which every one of their Lodgments is to consist of, and also in what Line of Lodgments, and who is, or what is next on their right, or left hand, to be lodged or left void, with the breadth of the Street on each side of the Lodgment, when it varies from the usual wideness of 50 Foot, and then the four Angles of the whole Camp, and afterwards of every Lodgment are to be staked out, with the Streets, which are to run the whole breadth of the Camp, as also between Gross Lodgment and Gross Lodgment; after which, every Gross Lodgment is to be gone upon, by those appointed to work on the Hutts, and the Breast-work, which is to inviron every Gross Lodgment, yet so as no hands must be diverted, of the Foot Regiments from intrenching the whole Army, for that of all things, must be the very first gone about, and finished; then the Engineer General leaving the 300 or 206 Foot wideness for the Alarum place, round the whole Incamping, is to shew the General in Paper, his Project for fortifying the Camp, with the several sorts of Works which are to defend it, and flank the Line; alwayes having the largest Bastions, or Forts, on the four Angles of the whole Intrenchment, and the most capacious Works on the rising'st Grounds, to plant the most Ordnance on, the better to command the Fields with∣out the Camp, and with Graffs and Rampards, the deeper and the broader, to those larger Works; all things being seen by the General, and agreed unto by him, the Engineer General with his Assistants, is immediately to put them in practice.
And first he is to stake out the Alarum place, which is to be the 300 or 206 Foot in wideness, between the Circum∣vallation Line, and the Lodgments of the whole Camp; then to stake out the four Lines of the whole Circumvallation of it, erecting long Poles with Streamers on them, at the four right Angles of them; then to turn up one Sod all along the said Lines, for the better direction of those, who are to raise the Parapet, the whole length of it; leaving the Gaps
which are to be at the Entrance or Gorge of every Work or Bastion, which is to flank and defend it.
Next to stake out and mark the Fortifications, which are to secure the Camp, with their Graffs, and the distance be∣tween the undermost inward Sods of the Parapet, and Ram∣pards, and the outwardmost nearest the Graff; then he is to sum up how many Feet invirons the whole Line, which shuts up the Camp, together with the several Works which are to defend it round; afterwards he is to cast up how much in proportion to the just number of the whole In∣fantry of the Army, every Regiment is to do of all those Works and Lines, and to appoint every one of them the part they are to perform, which he is afterwards to stake out to their Officers, that every Regiment may know its proper task, and where it begins and ends, and then they are with∣out delay to fall to their Work, and never cease till it be finished.
This apportionating to every Regiment of Foot, its equal share of the whole Work, is done by the Rule of Three, and when thereby the exact share of Regiment A. is found, the like must be done as to every other Regiment, till all of them be gone thorow. In what is already exprest, I take it for granted, that the Works to flank the Line as well as the Line it self, are only in effect Parapets, and that may serve for a short time of Incamping, or when you are certain the Enemies Army cannot attack yours; but if it be for a standing Camp, and in which you will secure your self against his Attempts; then all your Works which flank your Line, ought to be fill'd with Earth, to the heighth you judge needful, and from that heighth to erect your Parapets, which may be Cannon-proof, with Portholes, or with great Can∣non Gabions well fill'd with Earth, or Skite Gates thorow the Flanks and Faces of the said Works; and in such cases, the usual method is to have your Pioneers or hired Soldiers, or both, to do those extraordinary labours; and this must be resolved upon at your first Incamping; since it will be too late to go upon it afterwards, because when your Bastions and other Works, to defend the Line, are only thin Para∣pets, made 6 foot high, both the casting the earth over those Parapets, to fill the Vacuities will be of hard labour, and al∣so
the Sod Work too weak to keep in the burden of new Earth, which by the great weight of it may belly and slide, and all Works which have Rampards, ought to have the Earth fill'd, but as the Sod-work rises, both that the casting in of the Earth may be the easilier done, and that it may have the more time to settle as the Work rises.
Besides if your intire Line, and the Work which scours it, is only to be six Foot high, and but six Foot thick at the bottom, and three at the top, the Sod-work which faces and lines it, is usually but one Sod thick, which is sufficient to keep in the Earth between, giving it so much battering; but if you come to fill the Vacuities of your flanking Works with Earth, then you ought to lay double, sometimes treble Rows of Sods, and those well ram'd, to face and line your Works; also good store of Frith must be mingled amongst the Earth, which fills the Vacuities; both which will bind it so, as it shall not be apt to slide.
This Caution I esteem'd not amiss to set down.
The Ichnographie of an Army Incamp'd, is in the follow∣ing Figure Number VI. with a Table annexed, as also a Prospect, how a Line may be fortified, and secured.
When the whole Circumvallation of the Camp is intire∣ly finished, for that must be the first Work of all, the gene∣ral safety depending on it, the General of the Ordnance, and his Officers, and others belonging to the Train of Ar∣tillery, must mount their Cannon or Field-pieces, on the several Works which are to command the Countrey about the Camp, and to defend the Line which invirons it; and to have them loaden with Round or Case-shot, and a suffi∣cient quantity of Ball and Powder, and number of Gunners and Matrosses, constantly to attend the Service. If your Camp be designed for a standing one, and that you appre∣hend an Enemy will straiten you in it, because you are too weak to give him Battel; then I would also raise some Ca∣valeers, or mounts of Earth, of a reasonable heighth, and plant the longest Ordnance on them, the more to command the Fields; the•…•…e Cavaleers I would raise on the most advan∣tageous places in the Bullwarks, at the Angles, and in the Works which inviron the whole Camp.
Whil'st these things are doing, the Quartermaster Gene∣ral and his Officers, ought to distribute to the General Offi∣cers, and those of the Train, as also to the Colonels of Horse, Foot, and Dragoons, &c. the quantities, dimensions and places, where their several Lodgments respectively are to be; the boundaries or outmost Lines of every one, be∣ing forthwith to be staked out; at the four Angles of eve∣ry Gross Lodgment respectively, and on those Stakes, small Streamers of Taffaty, or other slight Stuff, are to be placed; and of the colour of the respective Regiments, or General Officers, to the end that all of every Lodgment, by those small Streamers may know, where they are to lodge, and how much ground is allotted for it; then the Quartermasters of the Regiments, and of the Troops, with those appointed for the Lodgment of the General, and others, unregiment∣ed Officers, are immediately to fall to work, in dividing their Lodgments, and in making their Hutts and Stalls, the Qu•…•…r∣termasters of Troops with their Corporals, and the Se•…•…∣geants of Foot with their Corporals, are to see the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and Stalls finish'd, for the Lod•…•…ments of their respect 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Troops and Companies, and the due regularity in hutt•…•…g or pitching their Tents, punctually observed; according
| feet | |
| A Foot Regimt of 8 Comp. euery one 100 men bredth of its Lodgmt | 276 |
| B Foot Regimt of 9 such Companyes breadth— | 300 |
| C Foot Regimt of 10 such Comp. breadth— | 324 |
| D Foot Regimt of 11 such Comp. breadth— | 348 |
| E Foot Regt. of 12 such Comp. breadth— | 372 |
| F Foot Regt. of 13 such Comp. breadth— | 396 |
| G Foot Regt. of 14 such Comp. breadth— | 420 |
| H Foot Regt. of 15 such Comp. breadth— | 444 |
| Souldiers 9200 Breadth of Lodgmts.— | 2880 foot |
| 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Foot Regt. of 8 Comp. euery one 150 men bredth— | 404 |
| 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Foot Regt. of 9 such Comp. breadth— | 444 |
| 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Foot Regt. of 10 such Comp. breadth— | 484 |
| 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Foot Regt. of 11 such Comp. breadth— | 524 |
| 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Foot Regt. of 12 such Comp. breadth— | 564 |
| 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Foot Regt. of 13 such Comp. breadth— | 604 |
| 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Foot Regt. of 14 such Comp. breadth— | 644 |
| 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Foot Regt. of 15 such Comp. breadth— | 684 |
| 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Foot Regt. of 16 such Comp. breadth— | 724 |
| Soldiers of these 9 Regts. 16200 Breadth of the Lodgmt.— | 5076 foot |
| 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Horse Regt. of 4 Troopes each 100 men bredth— | 388 |
| 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Horse Regt. of 5 such Troops breadth— | 458 |
| 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Horse Regt. of 6 such Troops breadth— | 528 |
| 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Horse Regt. of 7 such Troops breadth— | 598 |
| 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Horse Regt. of 8 such Troops breadth— | 668 |
| 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Horse Regt. of 9 such Troops breadth— | 738 |
| 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Horse Regt. of 10 such Troops breadth— | 808 |
| •…•…orse 4900 Breadth of the 7 Lodgemts.— | 4186 foot |
| 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Generalls owne Lodgmt. breadth— | 600 |
| 〈◊〉〈◊〉 One Officer Generall Lodgmt. breadth— | 400 |
| 〈◊〉〈◊〉 One other Generall Officer Lodgmt breadth— | 300 |
| 〈◊〉〈◊〉 One other Genll. Officer Lodgmt breadth— | 300 |
| 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Strangers Lodgment breadth— | 300 |
| 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Generall of ye Ordance Lodgmt breadth— | 450 |
| 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Lodgmt for ye sick breadth— | 300 |
| 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Lodgemt for ye Artilerye breadth— | 400 |
| 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Lodgemts for ye Waggons Carts &c breadth— | 500 |
| 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Lodgemt for ye Magazine of Victuall breadth— | 500 |
| 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Place for ye Markett breadth— | 400 |
| 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Piazza before ye Generalls Lodgmt breadth— | 400 |
| •…•…tall of ye breadth of these 12 Lodgements— | 4850 foot |
•…•…e Numbers which are sett down in the •…•…uerall Lodgemts are the Numbers of feet •…•…ontained in ye breadth of each Lodgemt
Place this foll: •…•…20
to the beforementioned Rules, and that no time be lost.
The Romans in hot Weather, made the Soldiers by turns, to sprinkle well with Water all those Streets round their Line, as also the Piazza, other Streets, and void places, where the Officers and Soldiers use to walk all the day long; and if something like this were done in Camps, it would be of good use.
The distributing the Guards, the Word, and going the Rounds, I would recommend to have observed in the Camp, as in the Garison; only if you suspect to be assaulted in your Camp, you must have Parties of Horse, Day and Night; especially in the Night, beating the wayes, and scou∣ring the Countrey on all sides, that you may have timely notice for your defence; And if you believe your Enemy will attempt you in the Night, it would be adviseable to have great Piles of Wood, and Fagots, a convenient distance without your Line, to set them on Fire when your Enemy is ready to begin his Work, the better to see how effectively to bestow your small and great shot, amongst them; and still in case of Alarums or Assaults, those Regiments must be led to defend that part of the Line, which they are the nea∣rest unto, the like for the Horse; and every Regiment must know the portion of the Line, which they are to make good before there be need, lest then it may be too late. There seems to be ten Particulars which ought (if they be attainable) to be minded, in Incamping an Army in a standing Camp.
I. That the Camp be setled in a safe place, that is to say, that no heighths or eminent Grounds be so near it, as that an Enemy seizing on them on a sudden, may both by seeing into your Camp, or planting his Cannon and Mortar-pieces on those heighths, annoy, and disturb it.
II. If it be possible, that it be seated on a Navigable Ri∣ver; for by the benefit thereof, the expences of bringing Victuals, Ammunition, and Forage, will be cheap and expe∣ditious, but otherwise dear and slow, if all be brought on the Axel-tree, or Backs of Beasts; for whatever is so brought,
the Bringers (when it is for Sale) so heighten the price, as the poor Soldiers are hardly able to buy what they need.
But if you cannot Camp near a Navigable River, you must never omit to have your standing Camp by a River; for the dung of the Horses, and the stanch of the Butche∣ries, will else hazard the infecting the very Air of the Camp; besides Water must still be at hand for the Soldiers, the Horses, and the Beasts of draught, to drink; and if Water can be brought about the Graff of your standing Camp, or a great part of it, it will thereby become the more safe and defensible.
I would still have the Butchers Quarter, near the brink of the River, that they may with the less pains rid their Quarters of all the filth, which else will soon be nauseous in them.
III. Great care must be taken, that no Woods or large Coppices, be too near your Camp, lest your Enemy lodging in them, may from thence too safely annoy you, and accom∣modate himself.
IV. A flat Champaign Ground is the most eligible to In∣camp in, because in such a Scituation, the Enemy may be discover'd, and seen afar off, the Cannon of your Camp will be the more useful to you, and prejudicial to him; and when you find your opportunity, you may the sooner, and the more easily draw out your Army, and put them in Bat∣talia to fight.
V. A standing Camp, though it be best posted in a Plain, yet there must be no moorish or wet Ground in it, for the Vapors which will thence incessantly arise, may soon infect your Army.
VI. Great and strict Inquiry must be made, whether the Plain your standing Camp is to be in, cannot be overflow'd by the River near it, if great Rains should happen; and your own Engineers must diligently view, if your Enemy, (in case he be the stronger) by making great Dams below
your Camp, cannot force the River to overflow it, though the greatest Rains will not do it; as also, whether your Enemy being in effect the powerfuller in the Field, may not turn the River, from above your Camp into it, in which ca∣ses, if Floods, if Dams below, or turning of the River above, may drown your Camp, such a Scituation must not be made use of.
VII. In scituating of a standing Camp, you are to elect a place, near to which you may have good Grazing for your Horses, and Cattle; Grounds proper for Medow, (which usually are near a River) and Wood and Coppice, both for Fuel, and making your Hutts.
VIII. If the River adjoining be Navigable, or not al∣wayes fordable, Bridges of Boats must be cast over it, else you will be soon streightned by your Enemy, and probably he will raise Mounts and Batteries on the other side the Ri∣ver, which shall play into your Camp, and exceedingly an∣noy it, if not force you to abandon it, and in disorder too, whereby he will have too fair an opportunity to defeat you; therefore before your Bridges of Boats are cast over the Ri∣ver, you must immediately provide to secure them against they are cast over, by raising Forts, and Lines between the Forts, in which you may draw up safely your Battalions and Squadrons, and likewise furnish those Forts with good Artil∣lery, and man them alwayes sufficiently.
Also a competent distance above your standing Camp, you must have a Boom or Cable under Water, or Chain ready to draw across the River, and cover and well defend them at both ends, together with Boats well mann'd, there∣by to defeat any design of your Enemies, by floating En∣gines he may make, to destroy the Bridges of Boats.
IX. The standing Camp must not be too scant, nor too large, but duly proportionate to the Army, Train, and Bag∣gage, you are to lodge in it; and all the wayes unto it, you must with your best industry secure, and what you cannot secure, you must spoil and make them useless to your Ene∣my.
X. Lastly, If there be any Eminencies of Ground near your standing Camp, and yet without your Line that invi∣rons it, you must secure those heighths, not only by making Redoubts or Forts on the tops of them, but also by making a Line, if you have men enough to do it, round about the foot of those heighths; and you must make cover'd wayes from your Camp to those Redoubts, or Forts, the more safely to relieve them, in case your Enemy vigorously should attack them; nor is it amiss to have Mines under them, to blow them up, should your Enemy enter them; whereby he will be the more endamaged if they enter, or the more deterr'd from entring.
All Coppices and Woods which are at too much distance to be secured by a Line, ought to be cut down or burnt, to prevent those advantages, which else in many wayes, your Enemy will draw from them.
In making your Line, you may have sometimes unequal Grounds, through which you run it, some being high, and some low; on the heighths of a standing Camp, (which are natural Cavaleers) I would still make Forts, and plant my longest Cannon on them.
Where the Ground is sandy, or gravelly, or for any cause apt to slide, I would not depend on the facing of Sods, but drive Poles into the Ground, Wattle between them, and fling the Earth which arises out of your Graft, between the outwardmost and innermost Wattlings.
Where the Ground is Moorish on the Verge of your Line, and is sometimes, in dry Seasons, passable by Horse or Foot, I would with Pallisadoes and Stockades, secure it; or by many join'd Turnspikes, or Chevaleers de Freze, and without these I would, during the whole length of the Moorish Grounds, at a competent distance, cut two or three broad and deep Ditches, which will fill themselves with Water, and thereby discourage your Enemy to attack you in the weakest part of your Line, or if he did assault you there, much incommodate him, and render it almost impos∣sible for him to make use of his Horse in the attempt; I have also known in such cases, several Lines of deep and pretty large holes without, but near your Line, made at unequal di∣stances, and cover'd with slight Hurdles, with a little Earth
strew'd over them, both to intangle an assaulting Enemy if he know it not, or discourage him if he knows, or has cause to suspect it; for it were Temerity with Foot only, to enter the Line of an inviron'd Camp, where Horse, and Foot, and Cannon, are ready to welcome them; and by the immedi∣ately beforemention'd methods, it will be difficult, if pos∣sible, for him in case his Foot enter, to have them seconded by his Cavalry, without which they are much likelier to be driven out, than to be successful.
I would likewise for the better defence of those feebler parts of your Line, erect Batteries and Redoubts within it, the better to defend them, and to rake your Enemy, should he enter.
There are several Cares indispensably incumbent on a Commander in chief, who posts himself in an intrenched standing Camp, I shall enumerate some.
I. To have a Countrey behind his standing Camp, to supply it constantly, and at reasonable Rates, with Victuals, Forage, and all other Necessaries, and to preserve it, both from the incursions of the Enemy, and from the insultings or injury of his own Army.
II. To secure throughly those Towns, Forts, or Fortres∣ses, nearest to his Camp, and in which he lodges his Maga∣zines, which are to supply him, when the Countrey cannot, or will not do it longer; and therefore he ought alwayes, before his Enemies are near, (whereby they may awe the Countrey from supplying him, or the People of it may make that the pretence) to get into those places, with great diligence, all the Victuals and Forage he can; and from thence to furnish himself, with what his Camp cannot contain, or cannot be laid up dry in it; but still to have as much Provision within the Line of his Camp, as possibly he can, for there 'tis safest and at hand; for Bisket, Cheese, But∣ter, Meal, and such like meats, may be long kept in good condition, in little room, and are ready for food without Cookery; if the Countrey be not perfectly well affected to the General, he ought to take Hostages from it, to supply the Victuals, Forage, and other Necessaries, at the rates, times
and quantities, which shall be agreed upon; these Hostages, if well chosen, and diligently kept within the Camp, will make the Countrey punctual in performing, and be a suffi∣cient answer to make those of it, who would starve the Camp, or the Enemy, (who else might frighten them from supplying it) that they dare not but obey, because their Hostages else will suffer.
As the chief Commander of such a standing Camp, must make his agreement on equal terms with the Countrey, for his sustenance out of it, and see to their punctual per∣formance of it, so he must as punctually pay the Country, according to his Contract, since Fear and Gain, are usually the most operative motives with the People, to make good all Agreements.
III. The Convoys of Horse and Foot, which are to se∣cure those who must supply your Camp, must never omit their duties, in punctually meeting, rather before than after the hour, and in carefully conveying, what is brought to the Camp, and must be strong in proportion to the need; for should such Parties fail of meeting the Countrey, at the set time and place, it might discompose all your Affairs, dis∣courage the Bringers of Necessaries, and give them but too much cause to fail, by your example; or should the Con∣voys by being weak or negligent, be defeated by the Ene∣my, or the disaffected of the Countrey, you would not on∣ly lose that one Supply, but too probably, deter the Coun∣trey from coming with another.
IV. The Major General, and Commissary General of the Horse, must make all the Regiments of Horse and Foot, do equal and proportionate duty, according to their Num∣bers, in going on such Convoys; for which end they ought to keep exact and written Lists, of all the Parties they send on such employments, from time to time; and inform the General of them; else if by favor any be exempted, or fa∣vor'd, the duty will be the heavier, and the discontents the higher.
V. If the places in which the standing Magazines are set∣led, which must supply the Camp, be at a great distance from it, or may have the Wayes infested by the Enemy, Forts ought to be erected, and well mann'd at competent distances, the one from the other; into which should any of your Convoys be unexpectedly fallen upon, they may shelter themselves, and what they Convoy, till relieved from the Camp; for all such attempts from the Enemy, are sud∣den, and by surprize, and they dare not stay to force such a Fort, lest they draw the Camp upon them; besides when every two or three miles there are such Forts, erected in the fittest places, they do not only make the Convoys march the more securely, and discourage your Enemy from attempting them, but also the Countrey People without Convoys are the more invited to bring their Provisions for your suste∣nance.
VI. If I foresaw, my Enemy would endeavor to straiten my standing Camp, by possessing the Countrey about it, I would immediately burn and drive whatever I could not se∣cure, in my Magazines, or within my Line, the sooner to ne∣cessitate him to dislodge; so that no two Particulars are more carefully and speedily to be perform'd, than to secure your own Victuals and Forage, and to destroy all that your Enemy will otherwise be Master of; and doubtless the first and most important duty of a General, is to provide Food and Ammunition for his Army; for men can live and fight without Pay, but can do neither without Food and Ammu∣nition; and he who intrenches well his Camp, and hath Food the longest, must in time have the better of that War, without fighting, though his Enemy be his Superior in strength; Gaspar de Coligny, Admiral of France, and who in military knowledge has been exceeded by few, if by any Captains in past Ages, would often say, War is a great Mon∣ster, which begins to be form'd by the Belly, meaning that Food ought to be the very first care of a General for his Ar∣my.
A standing Camp thus situated, fortified, and provided for, may truly be said to be in a good posture; but in re∣gard all these desirable Particulars beforemention'd, are not
usually to be compassed in all places; whatever is defective by Nature, must be supplied by Art and Industry.
There are several Orders for the well regulating a Camp within it self, which ought to be given, punctually observed, and the Breakers of them indispensibly punish'd.
I. That all Cursing, Swearing, Lying, Stealing, Drawing a Sword, and Quarrelling, be exemplarily punish'd, both in those who are the Guilty, and in those who knowing it, do not detect it; for which end, daily Court Martials ought to be held, that the Faulty may as soon suffer as their Offences are proved; that the Officers and Soldiers daily come to the Service of God, at the times the several Chaplains of the Regiments are appointed to officiate; for without the bles∣sing of Almighty God, how can any so much as hope to prosper: Yet alas how debauch'd are the Generality of the Soldiery, who hourly, as it were, carrying their lives in their hands, ought, most of all men, to be prepared for death; yet they, of all other Vocations, are too frequently the least fitted for it; and though God himself does at all times, and on all persons, forbid Wickedness, yet he repeatedly does it to the Soldiery, in the XXIII. Chapter of Deuteronomy, and the 9th Verse, viz. When the Host goeth forth against thine Enemies, then keep thee from every wicked thing. If we own God to be our General, which who dares deny he is, since he is pleas'd to call himself the Lord of Hosts, we ought to obey his commands, and punish those who break them, else we shall be found to be more obedient to a General, than to our God.
II. That the Camp be kept exceeding clean, which is not only decent, but healthy.
That none of the Soldiers do their Easements within it, but in some convenient places, at least 100 Foot without it, as the Martials of every Regiment shall appoint, either in the River or Brook, or in some Pits to be digged by every Regiment for that end.
That the Troopers, every morning and evening, be made carry out of the Line, all the dung of their Horses.
That the Butchers do the like as to all the filth in their Shambles, and be made kill their Beeves, Sheep, &c. out of the Camp, and that all dung and filth be buried; and that the Suttlers and Victuallers, keep their Cellars and Kitchins sweet, and that the latter be still cover'd with Sods, or raw Hides, for fear of Fire.
III. No man, without express leave of his Officer, is to go further than Cannon-shot out of the Camp; nor lie out of the Camp, under a most severe Penalty.
IV. That none be admitted who are Suttlers or Victual∣lers, to entertain Soldiers at Night, after the Warning-piece is gone off; nor in the morning, until the Reveille be beaten.
V. That none be admitted Suttlers or Victuallers, but by the Martial General, who is with his Under-Officers to take care, that no bad Meat or Drink be sold to the Soldiers, or good sold at unreasonable Rates; That he set the price on all the Camp Provisions, which are daily sold, and are not supplied out of the Magazine; nor must any thing be sold amongst the private Soldiery, but by his or his Officers Li∣cence; and by sound of Drum, to prevent the sale of stol'n Goods, to detect the Thieves, and to hinder many other mis∣chiefs. Many such and other Orders are given in standing Camps and Leaguers, according to the Wisdom of the Gene∣ral, the Discipline of the Army, or the present condition of the Countrey.
I have the longer and more particularly, insisted on this part of the Art of War, of intrench'd Incampings, because it is what in England we have not been much accustomed unto, and therefore are generally the less knowing in it; for I have seen eminent Commanders there, when they came with Armies for the War of Ireland, so great Strangers to the Rules of it, as their Camps appeared to me to be like Fairs; and some of them, not only have ingeniously ac∣knowledged to me, they were to seek in that great part of War, but condescended to inform themselves from me,
what I could tell them on that Subject, choosing rather to confess their ignorance, that they might mend it, than to continue under it; though I heartily wished them a better Instructer.
I also have been convinced by reading the Greek and Ro∣man Histories, that they ow'd as much of their Conquests, to their well Incamping, as to their other excellent Military Discipline, and their Valor; it would be almost endless to enumerate, what Kingdoms and Provinces they kept in obe∣dience, by their standing Camps; and how often they stop'd the invasions of Torrents of barbarous Nations (as they were pleas'd to term them) by the same proceeding; and having first wearied out their Enemies, by such safe and beneficial delayes, then on some great advantages, they would give them Battel, and defeat them; none of which they could have effected, or rationally have attempted, but by their thoroughly knowing how to Incamp advanta∣geously, by constantly practising it, and by a timely provi∣ding of Food, and Forage.
I have likewise observed these few last Years, that the French, who have not only many eminent Commanders, if not the most of any one Nation, and daily improve the Art of making War, have begun to revive, and with great benefit to themselves, this almost obsolete part of it; For I take the Prince of Conde, to be one of the famousest Cap∣tains, that any Age hath produced; and I observed when the Prince of Orange, the Imperialists, under the Count de Souches, and the Flemish Forces, were united; the Prince of Conde who was sent to oppose them, would not give them Battel, but Incamped himself advantageously on the French Frontiers; so that they justly apprehended to enter them, and leave him at their backs, whereby he kept them long at a Bay, and when he found his opportunity, gave them at Se∣neff so considerable a blow, as the French from having been on the defensive, they became afterwards the Assaulters, and closed that Campagne, by taking some of their Enemies Garisons.
The Mareschal de Turenne also, who was sent General to the War in Germany, and who in the Military Art had hardly a Superior, having there to do with the Count de
Montecuculi, who, I believe, has not been excell'd by any Captain in any Age, would still by intrench'd Incampings, when the Germans were the strongest, preserve himself and Army, by spinning out the time, and cover those Territories and places he had won, while he had been the most power∣ful; and to me it seems a thing very worthy observation, that after by the Mareschal de Turenne's being kill'd, when the French King sent the Prince of Conde from the Army in Flanders, to command his Army in Germany, he did also by intrench'd Incampings, weather that Storm; which in it self was so threatning, not only by the sudden loss of so great a Captain, but also by the Germans being led by the Count de Montecuculi, and the present Duke of Lorrain, two persons as considerable as the very Forces they lead; I say it seems to me very worthy of observation, that two such justly celebrated Commanders, as the Prince of Conde, and Monsieur Turenne, should observe the very same me∣thods, in managing the same War; whereas usually when one General succeeds another, in heading the same Ar∣my, and ordering the same War, the last Comer judges it a kind of diminution to his own skill, to tread in the very paths of his Predecessors; but the Prince of Conde not doing so, thereby, in my poor opinion, renders three things evi∣dent:
I. That he truly judged himself so justly secure in his own Reputation, as it could receive no diminution, in fol∣lowing the steps of the dead General; especially he having done the like before, and successfully in Flanders.
II. That a wise and great Captain, will rather by his actings, confirm that course to be best, (if it be so in it self) by imitating his Predecessor, than try new methods of War, whereby out of but a meer hope to do the like thing, by a different way, he may hazard his Reputation, his Army, and the Countrey he is to cover and protect.
III. What two such Generals have practised, (all cir∣cumstances consider'd) is to me an Evincement, that by Camps intrenched and well posted, a Countrey may be best
secured, an invading Enemy may be best resisted; and in time, all advantages being taken in the nick, may be defeat∣ed, or made retire
As the French King manages his Wars on the German side, by his Captains, and makes it oftner defensive there, than invasive; so on the Flanders side, he makes it generally offensive, and leads his Armies himself, which is the solidest way to be successful; some few of the many Reasons why I believe it is the very best way for a King to lead his own Armies, I shall here set down:
I. It evidences he has a Genius to the Wars, else he would not himself be at the head of his own Armies; and that makes the Nobility and Gentry of his Kingdom War∣like, since all Subjects of Quality, generally addict them∣selves to what they find their Prince is most inclined.
II. No Prince is likely to be so well served, or is so well served, as he who with his own eyes, sees who are active or remiss in their duties; to reward the first, and punish the last.
III. How many opportunities to be victorious are lost, by a Generals sending for, and staying to receive Orders from his Prince; all which, by his own being on the place, are laid hold of and improved.
IV. How many brave men will not go to the War, if the Prince be not there in person; who if he be, cannot then be kept from the honour and duty of waiting on him.
V. How many valiant men of his Guards are to attend his person, which if it be not with his Army, is thereby de∣prived of so many good Fighters.
VI. How many good heads may be consulted with in the Army, when the King is there, who would not be drawn thither, unless he were there; either by reason of their cra∣zy healths, or believing it below them to be in an Army,
where any commanded but themselves, or some such other Considerations.
VII. How many Garisons may be bought, and Comman∣ders bought off from the Enemy, when the King in person is the Merchant, which otherwise would not listen to, or trust to the Bargains offer d by his General.
It were endless to enumerate all the real advantages, which a Sovereign has, who makes War in person, against Enemies, which make War only by their Generals; nor can there be almost a larger illustration, of the truth of what I have said, than what we have seen with our own eyes, these three last Years; even that the French King singly, not only makes War, in effect, against all the Continents of Europe, but al∣so gains, rather than loses Ground; which possibly could hardly be done by him, though he is a great and brave Prince himself, though he has a large and noble Monarchy, many eminent Commanders, and almost an innumerable company of good subaltern Officers, and is absolute, and has all his Territories united, and fronting upon the Countries of almost all his Enemies; If to all these advantages he did not in person often lead his Armies, where he means to make his chief impressions; and if he did not by intrench'd In∣campings, oppose by his Generals, those of his Enemies, who else might invade his Dominions; and if he did not also excellently manage the Wars on his side; and if he were not also help'd by his Confederated Enemies being intang∣led under many inconveniencies, and hinder'd by many ob∣structions; I say, if all these did not concur, it would seem to me almost impossible to do as he does, especially since he hath also at the same time engaged himself in the protection of the Messineses, with his Maritine and Land Forces; whose Militia he must not only pay, but what is worse, feed the useless mouths of both Sexes, and of all Ages; and which perhaps is more than all this, he must send all things to them in his Fleets, by a long Navigation; and hinder'd therein, by the joint Naval Forces of Spain, and the United Provin∣ces, so that many conclude, he may gain more fame by ex∣tending his Arms so far abroad, even while he has so much
need of them near home, than solid benefit by engaging in that revolted Peoples defence, unless some considerable Emergencies be favourable unto him; but yet on the other side, why may it not be believed, that the inuring his Sub∣jects to Navigation and Sea-fights, is singly worth the ex∣pence of that Sicilian War; and indeed all things rightly consider'd, perhaps he could not more usefully attempt the attaining that end, than by making War in the Mediterranean Sea against Spain; for thereby he gives His Majesty and the States of the United Provinces less jealousie, than if he managed it in any other of the European Seas; he makes the War laborious, chargeable and tedious to the States, if they pay their Mediterranean Fleet; or to Spain, if that King be at the sole expence of doing it.
It is also no little augmentation of his Glory, that France, which till his Reign was so little considerable at Sea; and that Spain, which though during the Reign of King Philip the Second, made Europe, and the Ottoman empire apprehend his Armada's, yet cannot now, even in conjunction with the Fleet of the States, hinder France from frequently relieving of Messina, and the other revolted places of the Island of Sicily; nay, in Sea-Battels has forced his way to that end: so that all things duely weighed, perhaps the French Monarch could not make a more hopeful War by Sea than this, to train up his Subjects to fight on that Element, if he aspires to be as formidable on it, as he is actually on the Land; which may not be unreasonably presumed he does, by the Stupendious and Royal Foundations he has laid for the building of Ships, and equipping them; and for the educa∣ting his Subjects to Navigation, and encouraging them to pursue that Calling; and by the numerous and stately Na∣vy he has built in a very few Years; which is such, as some believe, may at the present, equal for Number, and size even the Fleet Royal of England, or the Navy of the States; and should this be true, may it not be more likely, that he may ten Years hence, if not sooner, attempt to give the Law at Sea; then that ten Years past, he should be so strong in Ships of War as now he is; especially if while his Navy is growing, he can render his own Subjects capable to manage it; for 'tis easier to increase Fleets, than at first to
build them: So that this Messinese War, which some consi∣der as a blemish in his Politicks, may be none of the least depths of them.
But since I have asserted two particulars, viz. the French Kings excellent management of his Wars, and the advan∣tage he reaps, by the intanglements and difficulties which his Confederated Enemies are under: I esteem my self ob∣liged to set down some of my Grounds for those two As∣sertions.
I. I find that having so many formidable Armies to deal with, and being thereby unable to have Forces, both to face every one of them, and reserve Armies also, he is very cau∣tious to avoid a general decisive Battel, lest the loss of it might hazard his Monarchy.
II. He has been usually in the Field about the beginning of March, and by having his Armies excellently well provi∣ded, and frankly hazarding his Soldiery, he has taken in 18 or 19 Weeks, before the whole Confederacy can imbody, more Countries and important Garisons, than they have re∣taken in the six succeeding Months after they are im∣bodied.
III. Being an absolute Monarch, and having none in his Armies but such as depend on his Will; he may alwayes pursue the Councel which is in it self best, and may execute it with expedition, and secresie; so that having resolved where to make his impression in the very opening of the Spring, he provides in the Neighbouring Territories his Ma∣gazines for Victuals and Forage accordingly; and thereby what supplies him with both, doth disable those Territories to supply his Enemies on the place, should they come to raise any of his Sieges, with an Army formed of the Forces of the whole Confederacy: And by his having formerly secured or consumed all Meat and Forage near his Leageurs, makes it impossible for the other in that ill season of the Year, to carry all of both forts on the Axle-tree, sufficient for them∣selves, though it were but for a few dayes; and having by his Lines of Circumvallation made it almost an act of Te∣merity
to attempt to force them, he makes it also an impos∣sibility to constrain him to raise his Sieges by a diversion. For what place can they besiege in a Season, when the earth yields no sustenance for Man or Horse; and when they have not Magazines of both laid in beforehand to supply them. And if they should attempt to raise his Sieges, but by such part of the Forces of the Confederacy as can carry Provision and Forage with them on the Axle-tree, or by Boats, 'tis much more than an even Wager, that they will re∣pent it, sooner than he.
IV. Since the Germans are the greatest force of the Confederacy, by his so early in the Year attacking the Spa∣niards, Flemish Territories, he renders the German assistance useless to those Countries in that Season; since 'tis almost a Winters march to lead Armies timely enough from the Centre, or remote parts of the Empire (where commonly they have their best Winter quarters) to the Frontiers of Flanders, were there no impediment but the length of the Way; but when to that is added, the ill season of the Year, and the vast charge and difficulty of carrying Horse and Mans meat, besides Artillery, Ammunition, and needful Baggage so far, to form also Magazines then timely enough to answer the occasion, Experience as well as the Reason of the thing, sufficiently evidences is not practicable; so that no formidable Army, can at such times be expected from thence: Besides the great Garisons the French keep at Bri∣sac, Schleckstad•…•… &c. and the Flying Camp they have on those Frontiers of Germany, renders it hazardous to send the Body of their Army to relieve Flanders lest during their absence, their own Territories be exposed to the incursions of the French. The Spaniards on the other side, though assisted by the States, are not over-able to cope with all the power of France, headed by their King in person, and at∣tended by all that brave and numerous Noblesse, which usu∣ally wait on him; nor is it over-likely that the States will be ready to hazard their Armies, onely to relieve the Spa∣niards, who some have thought are not able, and others have fancied are not very willing to relieve themselves in Flanders; so that to me it seems the French King plays a
wise and secure Game, as he orders his War: for if the Germans should march in that ill season, and unprovided with Magazines, they would probably by such a march in the dawn of the Spring, disable their Army to do much all the ensuing Summer; and if they do not make such marches in the Spring, the French King does then gain more than he can lose all the rest of the Campagne, which is a Military Dilemma can hardly be avoided: Besides, the farther the French King advances his Conquests, and the more Garisons he takes, in his Enemies Countries, during the Spring, the more he secures himself from having his own Dominions in∣vaded by them in the Summer, at least by the way of the Spaniards Netherlands.
There seems to remain then but two other probable ways for their doing of it, by Lorrain, or by Alsatia; in the first, he is not only gathering a great Army, but strongly fortifying all considerable places there, and in the latter, I hear, he has laid all the Countrey waste; so that it will be difficult, if possible, to invade him by Alsatia, and it will be no easie task to do it by Lorrain, when so many strong Garisons must be taken, his Army looking on; or if untaken left at their backs should they enter France, and Monsieur de Cre∣qui's Army to watch and attend their motions, which by great detachments may be reinforced according to their need by the French Armies in Flanders; and to me it would seem a temerarious Action, for the Confederates to enter France, if they could, and leave the French New Conquests in Flan∣ders, with the Armies which cover them, the old and newGa∣risons in Lorrain and the Mareschal de Crequi's Army there, and the Desart of Alsatia at their backs, and this too with∣out having any Confederates (that are yet visible) in France to join with them, or any Garison in it at their devotion, where they might form Arcenals, Magazines, leave their Sick or Wounded, &c so that in my poor judgment, it seems against all the Maxims of Reason and Military Experiment, that the Confederates will invade France if they could, as the present state of Affairs are: I know 'tis almost the gene∣ral opinion, that great Action will be this ensuing Summer, but I must own I cannot bring my self to believe, the Event will be proportionable to the Expectation. For to me it
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seems very probable, that the Game the French will play is, with their best and greatest Army to oppose (but without giving a decisive Battel) the Germans, when they enter Lorrain, which is the likeliest, if not the onely way they will come; and thereby the French having all the Garisons, and the standing Bridges over the unfordable Rivers, they may, by posting themselves in advantageous places, and by intrench'd Incampings, keep the Germans at a Bay, spin out the Summer, and by the little progress of the War, endea∣vor to render the Empire weary of it.
For having, in effect, made Lorrain the onely way by which the Germans can advance, they have doubtless already so well furnished their own Magazines in those parts, that they will be provided for plentifully; whereas 'tis to be doubted whether the Germans can be so well furnish'd with Victuals, when all they eat must be brought on Carriages, and often from Countries or Stores at a considerable di∣stance, and from Princes whose Territories get little, and suffer much by the War, while the French will have their Food at hand, and will destroy whatever they cannot secure; by which means, the farther their Enemy advances into Lor∣rain, the more unlikely and troublesom it will be to be fed, while they are there; Nor will the Germans probably be able to force any considerable place there, since such as are so, will be well fortified, mann'd and provided for, and to sit down before a strong Garison, while an Army which it may be is as strong as their own, is ready to relieve it, or to cut off all their Convoys, is no usual Enterprise.
If the Prince of Orange be strong enough to act apart with his own Army, and the Governor of Flanders, by additional Forces of the Germans, be able to do the like with his Ar∣my, the French, who have Armies to attend their motions, will, in all likelihood, either relieve the places they shall be∣siege, or if they shall have so strengthned their Lines of Cir∣cumvallation, before the French can fling the necessary re∣lief into those Garisons they shall besiege, as it will render it too hazardous to try to force the Line, the French, by diver∣sion, may besiege some places of theirs, and Take as much as they Lose; for in that Season they will have Forage in the Field, and their Magazines of Victuals near, neither of which
the Germans could have in the beginning of the Spring; when the French inlarge their Conquests, so that the French by that excellent conduct wherewith they order their Af∣fairs, do certainly take places, before the Confederates can come into the Field, and will, in all likelihood, lose few after.
On the side of Alsatia, the French keep but very few Garisons, and those excellently furnished, and the Countrey generally wasted; so that if the Forces of the Circles of the Empire besiege and reduce one of them the ensuing Summer, that will probably be the most they can aim at, and possibly all things consider'd, more than they can effect.
To the best of my observation, the French with great prudence, attack Places in the beginning of the Spring, when there is no Army to relieve them; and in the Sum∣mer, when the whole Confederacy is in the Field, they are usually on the defensive, and cover what they have took; and in my weak judgment, they do at least as much by their alwayes providing well to eat, and by their intrenched In∣campings, as by their good Fighting, which questionless is the most hopeful and the most solid way of making War; for it has been for many Ages a standing Military Axiom, That the lesser Army if it can feed and avoid being forced to fight, it will weary out the greater Army in no long time.
These are some of the many Reasons which induced me to commend the French Kings excellent manner of mana∣ging this War, and why I cannot readily believe the results of this ensuing Summer, will be so great as many think.
I shall now mention some of those Inconveniences and Intanglements which his Confederated Enemies, seem to me to lie under, and which are so helpful to him.
I. That Union being made up of many absolute Sove∣reigns, and States, some of the highest, some of the middle, and some of the lesser size, nothing can be designed, much less attempted by them, but by joint consent, and after long consultations; at which since the Sovereigns cannot be per∣sonally present, they must be carried on by their Ministers, whereby before any thing can be finally resolved, much time is consumed, motions are much slower, than the Nature of
War requires, the due secresie of designs cannot be observed, on which depends the life of all Military Action; and such Resolutions as possibly in themselves are the very best; are usually opposed by those of them, who find not their parti∣cular Interests in the observing and pursuing them.
II. When after much time and labour, during a whole Winter, all the Confederates agree how the War shall be best managed the ensuing Summer; it is great odds, but all or the most considerable measures then taken, will be broken again, for they only knowing their own Project for the Campania, and not their Enemies, his early actings may necessitate them to alter theirs; in which case most of the Summer will be consumed in concerting how it shall be employed. This un∣certainty, during which their Armies are at a gaze, does not only give great Advantages to an active and vigilant Enemy who is resolved what to do, and vigorously prosecutes his designs, but also slackens the courage of their own Soldiery; towards which, no one thing can more contribute, than Ir∣resolution in their Superiors; Nor is it a possible thing (at least in my humble opinion) to order a War as it ought to be, when those who command in it, must on all Emergencies send to their Masters for new directions. And therefore the Romans, as jealous as they were of their liberty, never were imbark'd in a dangerous War indeed, but they created a Dictator, who was absolute for the time being, and who was not fetter'd with the necessity of sending to the Senate for new Orders, on new Accidents, but was at his liberty to im∣prove them on the place. All which confirms on the account of Reason what Experiment in all Ages has clearly evinced, which is, That a Monarch who is at the Head of his own Ar∣mies, has a hopefuller Game to play in War, than many mighty Princes who compose a League, and act by several Generals, and are acted by various Interests.
III. Though the opposing the formidable and growing Power of France was the true Cement of the present Con∣federacy and Union, yet as by the greatness of their own strength their fears of France lessen; so many of it cool in their first vigor, lest by too much humbling their Enemy
abroad, they may too much heighten their greatest Allies at home; and so what in shew renders the League the stron∣ger, does, in effect, weaken the actings of it.
IV. Oftentimes they can neither agree to divide what they have gotten, nor how they shall divide what they may get; though possibly, the dividing of the Bears skin is more easily agreed unto before he is kill'd, than after; and pos∣sibly also those of the Confederacy which are weary of the War, had rather make their being unsatisfied with their Par∣tition past, or to come, the pretence of their withdrawing, or remissness, than to own they are tyred with the charge, trouble, and hazard they undergo, and then how apt are such Princes or States to listen to a Neutrality, if offer'd by the French.
V. What differences are and must be raised every Win∣ter, how the Armies shall be then quarter'd; for some So∣vereigns which are the least rich, and have the scantest Ter∣ritories, yet have the fittest to make Winter Quarters in; and whereby posting great Bodies of the Soldiery, they may be the better able to resist the incursions of their Enemy, and to make successful ones into his Territories; but if such Winter Quarters be granted by the lesser Princes, and States; than those who are to be least Gainers by the War, undergo the greatest burthen of it, and suffer the most considerable damage by it: And if they will not quarter the Forces where they are most useful, then not only the whole Union suffers thereby, but also those lesser Princes themselves and their Subjects; who not being willing to be eaten up by their Friends, and unable to resist with their own Forces those of France, become a Prey unto the latter, to avoid be∣ing devoured by the former.
Nay, sometimes the necessity of the common safety and benefit, makes the stronger of the Confederacy take Win∣ter Quarters on the weaker, without or against the permis∣sion of the Princes themselves; whereby Animosities are raised, in which Friends to the Wrong'd, or fear of being in the future under the like usage, makes others share in the discontents and resentments. And such Forces as are quar∣ter'd
in any Princes Territories against his leave, are thereby all the Winter put on double duty; that against the Enemy, and that against the People of the Countrey; who else, would by surprize revenge their Princes Affront, and prevent their own farther Sufferings. So that their Winter-quar∣ters which should be to refresh them against the Spring, is frequently more harassing to them, than all the Summer Ser∣vice is, or can be.
VI. Since the War is pursued by several Armies at once, and consequently a greater Monarchs Forces is to be often united with those of a lesser, many difficulties arise about the chief Command in an Army so composed, and greater mischiefs are too frequently the inseparable consequences of its being so composed. For where the two Sovereign Pow∣ers whose Troops make that Body, have their distinct Gene∣rals in it, though one of them be made the Superior as to Command, yet Battels are not to be given, nor Sieges un∣dertook, or continued, without the concurrence of the other General, who perhaps if the hazards both Armies are to un∣dergo, be to redound to the benefit of his own Master singly, or chiefly, will be more inclined to embark in them, than he will be, if the result of the Success be more for the advantage of his Colleague, whereby particular ends, often obstruct the general good of the Union.
I shall give two remarkable instances of this great Truth which very recently happen'd.
The Prince of Orange not being able singly to take Maestricht, is therefore join'd with the Flemish Forces, &c. When by the Valor, Conduct, Danger, and Indefatigable∣ness of that brave young Prince, (true Inheritor of the Vir∣tues of his famous Ancestors, and deservedly Worthy of the Royal Blood of England, which he has the honour to be of) the Siege was so far advanced, as that the place must be ta∣ken, unless relieved by a Battel, or his own being necessitated to raise it; the French King orders Monsieur de Schomberg with all the united Forces of those Parts, (which his Courage and Conduct justly intitled him to command) to try to relieve the place sufficiently, or make the Prince raise his Siege: Upon the advance of Monsieur Schomberg, the
Prince, (as I am credibly inform'd) was absolutely for giv∣ing him Battel, that the fruits of so much Time, Labour, Ex∣pence, and Blood, might not be lost, and lost with some dis∣paragement; but his Associates judging that to be too hazar∣dous a Counsel, the Siege was raised, and possibly with more loss of Men, Cannon, and Reputation, than the ill success of a Battel could have cost. Far be it from me to say, that those who were for raising the Siege, believed it of more importance to their King to keep his Troops entire, than that the Prince should be again Master of Maestricht; much less will I say that they would not venture all their Forces on an Engagement, where the States were to have the greatest, if not the sole benefit of the success, though the others were to run a great share of the hazard; but this I hope with∣out offence may be thought, that it had been more advise∣able never to have engaged in that Siege, than after having so far proceeded, to have quitted it: For who could in rea∣son believe, that so great a Monarch as the French King is, and so jealous of the Glory of his Arms, as all Europe has seen, and too many of it felt, would let a place of so vast importance as Maestricht, be torn from him without a Battel; so that in my poor judgment, the Siege should never have been resolved upon, or the Battel should have been given to have made it good. To be warm in undertaking a great de∣sign, and cool in justifying it when undertook, is seldom at∣tended with success, or reputation. All which that Gene∣rous young Prince so well foresaw, as I am confident nothing would have made him besiege Maestricht, if he had not ful∣ly believed his Allies would have ventured a Battel to have carried it. I know not whither to do so, was a part of their written Contract, but I take it to be clearly inferr'd by their sitting down before it; and therefore though the Prince might share in the trouble of the ill success, yet he ought to have no part in the fault of it.
The second Evidence of this Truth, was in the Year be∣fore; when the Prince of Orange was in conjunction with the Imperial Forces, and the Flemish; how little was there done when united, and how much was suffer'd, few are ig∣norant of; but as soon as the Prince commanded singly, how Gloriously did he end that Campagne, by the reduction of
Grave, which though it had been long besieged by General Robenhoft, who was a brave Commander, yet till the Prince of Orange came thither, the Siege moved not on, with the Life, Vigor, and Success, which his Example and Conduct gave unto it.
And in the taking whereof, it will not be so much a Com∣plement to him, as a Truth of him, if I should say, Alexan∣der the Great at his Siege of the Mallians, or King Henry IV. of France, (as great a Captain I believe as even Alexander himself) at the taking of Cahors, ran not greater hazards as to their Persons, than the Prince of Orange did for the re∣duction of Grave.
Lastly, (to omit many other Particulars) oftentimes those Generals which are really the fittest to manage the War, cannot be employ'd to do it; since if a Sovereign who is of the Confederacy, will go in Person to command an Army, or send his Son, Brother, or some first Prince of his Blood to do it, none of them but will be the chief, though some under them may perhaps be more capable of being it: Whereby Superiority in Command may not alwayes be vest∣ed in him, who is the fittest to discharge it; and therefore sometimes the War prospers accordingly.
I hope whoever shall undergo the trouble of reading what I write, will be in some degree satisfied, That I had Reason to assert both the French Kings excellent manage∣ment of his War, and his being help'd therein, by the una∣voidable obstructions and intanglements which the Con∣federacy of his Enemies does subject them unto, both from the nature of such an Union, and from the situations of the Territories of those Sovereigns which compose it.
But if the Body of the Confederates strength could con∣stantly lie as near the Frontiers of France, as the strength of France, by that Monarchs Absoluteness, Unitedness of his Dominions, and wise Management, can be brought (when he will) near the Territories of the less strong Princes of the Union; possibly his maintaining a War against almost all the Continent of Europe, might be a greater Trouble, Charge and Difficulty to him, than yet he has found it.
Nor indeed can so dull a judgment as mine is, readily fore∣see, why the French King may not continue the War, long
enough, to make his Enemies, or many of them, weary of it, unless his methods be broken by some unforeseen great Accident; as a Revolt within his own Territories, or some decisive Victory which the Confederates may obtain, either from the French Generals confident belief of winning it, or from the necessity of the French giving them Battel, to pre∣serve an endanger'd detachment of his Army, or a Garison or Territory worthy of that hazard, or some such other great Accident; or unless the Kingdom of Spain (now new∣ly under the intire Ministry of Don Iohn, a wise, and war∣like Prince) be able, and willing, to invade the South-west part of France with a Royal Army; such a powerful diver∣sion perhaps might put all the Affairs of France into a new Fold; for hitherto, little Armies have busied Spain at home, and preserved the French Pyrenean Frontiers, while all the great Ones have been employed against Germany, and the Spanish and States Netherlands: Nor is it very impro∣bable but such an Attempt may be made; for I have still ob∣served, that when the Ministry of a great Monarchs Affairs is on a sudden changed, the new Comer either intirely alters the measures taken by his Predecessor, or if he pursues those, he does it with greater Forces and Vigor; since in all such Mutations, the Honor of the new Minister, (if not his Safety) as well as the good of the State, incites him to a better, or more prosperous Conduct of Affairs, than that un∣der the late Administration has been. Now whether that Conduct shall consist in acting by Maxims diametrically op∣posite to the former, or in heightning considerably of those, does depend upon the judgment, or inclinations of him that sits at the Helm; or on the state of things as they are then circumstantiated. But that Don Iohn should attempt, or hope to incline his Master to a separate Peace, is not very likely; since to do it, nay perhaps but to attempt it, will be dangerous in it self, ungrateful to the Confederates, and in all likelihood is not solidly and durably attainable; And to en∣deavor to gain all the rest of the Union to it, or the major, or weightier number of them, looks more unlikely to be effected; for neither has there ever yet been made so nume∣rous, or so strong an Union against France, as this now is; and it may be no Age has seen, that so many Monarchs, and
States, and of such various Interests, and Religions, should be at once so firmly Confederated; which perhaps nothing could have brought about, had not the Examples of the Duke of Lorrain, and some other Sovereigns of the lesser size, fil∣led all of them with so great apprehensions of the like u∣sage, as nothing could allay, but such a League; which since they have after the employing of much time, treasure, and industry, so happily made, 'tis not probable they will dis∣solve it; especially when their Affairs seem more promi∣sing, and that notwithstanding this stupendious League, they have hitherto lost Ground. Whereby none of them all, nor no less than all of them, can judge himself safe til, by the Forces of all, they have by Arms reduced this deluge of France, into its first and natural Channel. For to think to do this by a Treaty, looks very improbable to me; because the French King is yet too high in his hopes and strength to fall so low, as to give more by a Treaty, than (it may be) he can lose by a War; and none of his Enemies can well think themselves secure, but by keeping fast this knot, which was so long a tying, and which experimentally they have found, has been their common safety; and that in nothing less, can it well be found; so that the continuance of the War appearing to be the likeliest measure that can be taken, 'tis hardly to be believed, that Don Iohn, whose Genius is for Arms, and his Education has been in them, will draw his Masters Sword but half out; but if he unsheaths it, 'twill be to purpose; which yet as I think can hardly be done, but by being at the head of a brave Army, (and possibly getting his young Monarch to be personally present) and thereby ma∣king an effective Invasion on the Southwest parts of France: For no Ministry that preceded his, did of late attempt it; and yet the only attempting it, may give more solid Advan∣tages to the whole Union, than hitherto all the Arms of Spain has done as they have been order'd; nor may he in any other way more acceptably Apologize to the Emperor in particular, and to the rest of the Union in general, for having got the Queen Regent out of the Government, than by his own being more beneficial to him and them in it.
Besides, the present complexion of the Affairs of Spain, seems such, that it may be his only true interest, to be consi∣derable
in Arms; which he can never be, but by being great with the Sword-men; and that he can never hope for, but by being at the head of them, and leading them to daring and high Attempts. All this seems to manifest, 'tis not im∣probable he may invade the French Pyrenean Frontiers, for there only he can be so considerable, and at once both so useful abroad, and safe at home; on which last there seems a necessity on him to fix one Eye, as the other on the hum∣bling of France; lest otherwise the late Ministry of Spain, get again into the Saddle.
I beg the Reader's pardon for this long digression, which perhaps I may the sooner obtain, when he shall be pleased to consider, that I was partly drawn into it, by observing how useful this revived Part of the Art of War, of posting Ar∣mies in Intrench'd Camps, has lately been to those, who have well understood, and on fit occasions practised it; And though all which I have now said, is not properly congruous to the Title I have given to this one Chapter; yet it may not be altogether impertinent to what the whole Book treats of; for the successful active part of the Art of War, has no less dependency on the considerative part of it, than the effect has on the cause; and what I have so weakly, and disorder∣ly exposed, may yet furnish a solid, and fertile judgment, with no ill Reflections, and Notions, on this Great Subject.