A treatise of the art of war dedicated to the Kings Most Excellent Majesty / and written by the Right Honourable Roger, Earl of Orrery.

As for Example.

You should never choose a Ground to fight on, (if you

can possibly avoid it) which you cannot fill up, with your fighting, and reserve Squadrons and Battalions; or as 'tis now usually call'd, your first, and second Line. That is, you must still endeavor to cover the outward flanks of your Wings, with a River, a Wood, a moorish Ground, or some∣thing equivalent; for else you will expose your Army too much, if your Enemy does overwing you: Whereas if you cannot be charg'd but in front, you will have the less to fear, and your Adversary the less to hope. For Instance: If I found my Army drawn up in Battalia would take up in its utmost extent but 15000 Foot; I would not choose to fight in a Plain that was 20000 Foot wide, if my Enemies Army were either more numerous than mine, or were stronger in Cavalry than I: But if by some Accident which I could not foresee, or possibly avoid, I were to fight on such a Ground, I would immediately cover one, or, if possibly, both of my Flanks, with what the Nature of the Place afforded; as be∣sides a River, a Brook, a moorish Ground, a Wood, or Cop∣pice; or a steep Ground, with a Ditch or Trench, or some place so incumbred, as my Adversaries Horse could not fall on that Flank, without disordering himself before, and in his doing of it.

But in case the Ground was so level and clear, as it afford∣ed me none of those Advantages, (which would be an ex∣traordinary thing) I would then, by my Carriages, or by immediately casting up a long and large Ditch, or Trench on my Flanks, supply by industry, what I could not otherwise attain. And if I had leisure, at the two ends of each of these Ditches, or Barricade of Wagons, especially at the Front end I would cast up a Sconce, Redoubt, or Fort, and stuff it with Musketeers, whereby the Flank of my Wings would be covered, and the Front and Rear of them de∣fended by those Musketeers.

'Twas almost thus, that Lewis, Prince of Conde acted in the Battel at St. Denis, in the Reign of King Francis the First of France; And had not only thereby the Resolution, with an handful of the French Protestants, to fight the Con∣stable of Montmorancy, whose Army was three times as great as his; but also to make it so disputable who had the Victory, that the Historians of those Times give it without

seruple, to the Party they were of, and wrote for. And it seems indeed but doubtful who had the Victory; for the next morning the Prince, and the Admiral Chastillion (by Andelot's being joined with them, who brought them not above 1000 men, (with which, until then, he made the River of Seine useless to the Parisians) drew up their Army again in the Field of Battel, and shot some Peals of Cannon even into Paris, yet none of that King's Forces came out to fight them; so that the Protestants having for a few hours brav'd the French King's Forces, and that vast City, marched away towards Champagne, to meet their German Relief.

But on the other hand, the Historians who were Royal∣lists, attribute this wholly to the death of the Constable; and not only to the Consternation which it caused, but also to the Irresolution of the Counsels, who should succeed him; since the Duke of Anjou, who at last did, was by many judged too young for so weighty a Charge; and it is reasonably to be believed, he would not then have been nominated, but that the Queen Regent was irremoveably setled, not to lodge in such intricate times, the absolute Military Power in any of the House of Guise; or in that of Montmorancy but in one who intirely depended on her, and would be guided by her.

And 'tis probable that the Protestants (who doubtless had been much disordered in the Battel) durst not have made that Bravade, depending only on their own strength, but at least as much on the irresolution and disputes of their Ene∣mies, who should be their new General: And therefore ha∣ving set the best face they could on their tottering Affairs, for a short time judged it not adviseable to continue playing that part any longer, than they believed they might do it safely by the King's Army being without a Head.

I have only instanced this Particular, to manifest how a les∣ser Army may oppose a much greater in Battel, if the Flanks of the lesser be so well covered, as that it can only be charg∣ed in Front; which ought alwayes indispensibly to be pro∣vided for.

Nor is it only needful where a Battel is to be fought, to pitch on a Ground answerable to the Number of your Ar∣my, but also answerable to the quality of those Forces which

compose it; and to those of your Enemies with whom you must have to do.

As if my Enemy were stronger than I in Cavalry, I would avoid all I might fighting him in a Plain; or if I were the stronger in Horse, I would use my utmost industry to engage him in an open Countrey. And on the contrary, if I were stronger in Infantry, I would shun the Combat, un∣less it were in an inclosed Country, or incumbred by Woods, Brooks, Coppices, Rocks, or moorish Grounds; so if he were the stronger in Foot, I would avoid fighting in a place where he who has the most Infantry, may therefore have the most hopes of Victory.

But if you are commanded to fight by your Prince, or are engaged to do it to answer an end worthy the hazard of a Battel; or for any such other rational Consideration, great care must be alwayes taken to make choice of that Ground which is fittest for you, both in respect of your own Forces, as also of your Enemies; And in a most particular manner, if you are weakest in Foot, to cover them the best you can with your Horse; and on the contrary, if you are weakest in Horse, to cover them with your Foot.

V. The Ranging of an Army in Battel to the very best advantage, is a great furtherance to the winning of the Vi∣ctory. But the so doing of it depends much, not only on the Wisdom and Skill of the General, the Nature of the Ground, and the Quality of his own Forces, but also on those of his Enemies, and on the disposition of him who commands them; so that although no standing Rules can be given to answer all these varieties, yet some positive Maxims may be set down, which if punctually observed, as things are circumstantiated, may beneficially answer all oc∣casions, and emergencies.

And I the rather say this, because I have seldom found that the greatest Captains of elder times, (whose military know∣ledge and practice the Moderns justly value, and extol) have ever observed one and the same form in giving Battel; but have varied therein considerably, according to the occa∣sion.

Cyrus being to fight against Croesus King of Lydia, and in a large Plain, fearing to be inviron'd, drew up his Army but Twelve deep in File, whereas formerly the File was 24 deep. Whereby he augmented the Front of his Army, double; overwing'd Croesus's, and won the Victory.

Caesar, at the Battel of Pharsalia, against Pompey, did quite alter the manner of the Roman Imbattelling. For having found that Pompey exceedingly outnumbred him in Horse, he covered one of his Flanks with a little River, and drew all his Cavalry to the other Flank; among the Squadrons whereof, he placed Bodies of his best Infantry, and there he began the Battel; Where, by having all his Horse in one Wing, and those accompanied by select Legionary Foot, he soon Routed that half of Pompey's Horse which opposed all his; and then falling into the Flanks, and Rear of his Ene∣my, won the Victory.

These two are very remarkable Instances, which, among many others, verifie what I have said.

I shall now mention some of those standing Maxims, which, in my humble Opinion, are indispensibly to be ob∣served, immediately before, and in a day of Battel.

1. The first is, With great diligence to view so well the Field you will fight in, as when you have drawn up your Army on it, you may not afterwards alter the Order of it, or change your Ground; for all such Mutations in the Face of your Enemy are very dangerous, and gives him also the greater Confidence, and your own Men the less; as being an evidence to both, of a great Failure in Conduct; And it may also be highly hazardous, either to remove the whole, or even some gross Squadrons, or Battalions, to the Ground which on second thoughts may be believed the better Ground of the two; since your Enemy being then near, may take the benefit, which such disorders, while the alteration is making, may give him, and may improve it to your total overthrow; so that, 'tis in my poor Opinion, more adviseable to keep the Ground, and Order you are in, though by your oversight, neither should be the very best, than to alter it in the sight of your Enemy, and when he is near; And all changes of Grounds, or Order, in his view, ought never to be made in

Gross Bodies; but almost insensibly to them and your own Army, by a few Files at a time; and where they cannot be so made, 'tis better to leave them unmade.

I had been often told, but could scarcely credit it, that at the fatal Battel of Naseby, after my Lord Fairfax his Army was drawn up, in view of His Majesties, it having been judged that the Ground a little behind them, was better than that they stood upon, they removed thither; I had the opportunity some time after, to discourse on this Subject with Major General Skippon, (who had the chief ordering of the Lord Fairfax his Army that day) and having ask'd him if this were true, he could not deny it; And when I told him I almost admir'd at it, for the Reasons before ex∣prest, he averr'd, he was against it; but he obeyed the Or∣ders for doing it, only because he could not get them al∣tered.

After the Ground to fight on is well chosen, and all the advantages of it discovered, then to possess, and to secure the most useful and commanding Posts of it with all imagi∣nable diligence. As King Henry IV. of France did, at the Battel of Arques, where that great Monarch shewed as much conduct as any of the Greek and Roman Generals ever did, in any of their greatest Battels.

II. The second is, If you come near your Enemy, but yet so late in the day, that the Battel must be defer'd till the next morning; then, if the Season be sharp, to shelter your own Army in the most convenient Villages and Woods, adjoining to the Field you will fight in, and thereby give them all the cease you can, as King Henry IV. of France did, the night before the Battel of Iuri. But you must not on any terms neglect the safety of your Army, for the ease of it; and therefore it must be Quarter'd, or Camp'd so well, as that on the touch of the Drum all may be Embattled, and ready to receive your Enemy.

For which end great Corps de Gards ought to be advan∣ced, and many Centinels, as covertly as may be placed near the Enemy, and every moment visited, and relieved, by vi∣gilant Officers. These Centinels, or Perdu's, are to give in∣stant Notice to the advanced Guards if the Enemy moves,

and those Guards, with their Seconds, or Reserves, are to find the Enemy play, while your Army is drawing up to receive him. But still fresh Troops must be sent to sustain your ad∣vanced Corps de Gard, if they are vigorously attacked; lest by their being totally overthrown, your Enemy be encoura∣ged to push at All, and your own Men be somewhat dis∣heartned; For it may so happen that your Enemy, if he finds all the advantages of the Place to fight in, are so well secured by your care, and diligence, as that the next day it may be hazardous to fight in that Field; he may make choice in the night, if you are not Intrenched, to attempt you, where the confusion which darkness usually engenders, may be equally divided between both Parties; this of the two, being the more eligible.

Nor were it amiss, but very adviseable, if you have to deal with a General who is hot, and undertaking; or one who, by the necessity of his Affairs, must put All to hazard, that in such Nights, when you are near your Enemy, and may, for the beforementioned Reasons, have ground to believe he will attempt you during the obscurity; and while you are unintrenched, to cause great Piles of Wood, or Fagots, or some such combustible stuff, to be ready to be kindled in fit places, and at fit distances, that if he advances, you may the better see how to point your Cannon, and dispose of your small Shot most effectually; and by such Fires also, terrifie, and disorder his Horses, which generally are fright∣ed at the sight of Fire, especially in the Night.

This I find was practised near Lorges in Beausse, by Antho∣ny King of Navarre, Francis Duke of Guise, and the Con∣stable Montmorancy, when Lewis, Prince of Conde, and the Admiral of Chastillion, prest by the necessity of their Af∣fairs, went to attack the Royal Army by Night; and which so much disheartned the Assaulters, as they retreated.

The Quartering of your Army at all times (but especi∣ally when that of the Enemies is very near) ought to be in such manner, as that the Soldiers may be soonest in Battalia to receive him; and therefore to lodge it in the Form you will fight, is still the very best; that is, that such Forces as compose your Wings, and Body, may have only to go out of their Hutts, Tents, Villages, or Houses, to be in the Fi∣gure

you will fight in; else in case of an Alarm, the disor∣ders will be many, and dangerous; but this way, there can be but few, if any.

The nearer you draw towards your Enemy, or your Ene∣my to you, your Quarters must alwayes be brought closer, and your advanced Guards of Horse, and Foot, the stronger; and your discovery the more vigilant.

III. The third is, To be the first drawn up, on the Ground you will fight in; which is constantly attended with three considerable benefits. The point of Honor which you gain by being the earliest on the spot, which ani∣mates your own Party, and often daunts your Enemies. The being thereby enabled without opposition to possess all the advantages of the Ground, either for the planting of your Cannon, or for casting up Parapetts on some Eminencies which command all about it, (as Sir Francis Vere did at the Battel of Newport) or by drawing up your Carriages, or making a Ditch to cover one, or both the Flanks of your Wings; which you cannot well do, if your Enemy be earlier, or as early as you on the place. The being thereby sometimes in a posture to fall upon, and cut off your Ene∣mies Squadrons, and Battalions; or to Rake them with your Cannon while they are drawing up, which is an advantage, when it may be taken, that is of great use.

IV. The fourth is, That your Squadrons of Horse ought not to be too great, for the Reasons which I have formerly mentioned in that Chapter which Treats of the Disciplining of your Soldiery. Yet if that need requires, two, nay three of the small ones may be put into one great one; but still I would advise, that the same Officers should command the same Squadrons, when united, as they did before: By which means they will retain the Agility which is in small Parties, and yet when there is need, have the force of great ones; and this I propound to be observed; because, whoever has been practically versed in fighting, will hardly deny, but that 150 Horse in two Squadrons, will be likely to rout and beat 200 Horse in one Squadron; And the reason to me seems very evident; for besides the opportunity you have there∣by

to fall into his Flank and Rear, whatever Body of Men does fight, or has fought, disorders it self, though it gets the better; and being disorder'd, a less Number that is not, to speak humanely, must (if the Men be equally good) over∣throw a greater that is.

And daily Experience shews how difficult, if possible, it is, suddenly to Rally great Squadrons, when by Fighting they have been disorder'd; especially if but a small Squa∣dron is at hand, to fall on them, and improve their being so discomposed: Nor indeed can great Squadrons march many Paces, though the Ground be clear, and level, without dis∣ordering their Ranks; but if it be uneven, or rugged, they are almost out of their fighting Order, before they come to fight; which are mischiefs that less Squadrons, are not so liable unto: But Battalions of Foot, as being more Gover∣nable, may be large, according to the occasion and need; es∣pecially those which are composed of Pikes: for a great Battalion, or Stand of those in the Vanguard, the Battel, and the Rearguard of the Infantry, are the safety of the whole, and under their shelter All Rallyings may be best made.

V. The fifth is, A General must never omit in the draw∣ing up of his Army, so to dispose of his Squadrons, and Bat∣talions, as probably every one of them may come to fight, again, and again, if the need requires, before they are total∣ly overthrown. It is also observable that in a Battel, who∣ever keeps in Reserve a Body of Men, that are not led to fight until all the Enemies Squadrons have fought, rarely misses to carry away the Victory; and whoever has the last Reserves, is very likely at last, to be the Victorious.

One signal Illustration of this Truth among many, I shall instance; At the Battel of Dreux in France, where the Con∣stable Montmorancy, assisted by Francis Duke of Guise, (the greatest Captains of that Age) commanded the Royallists; and Lewis Prince of Condé, and the Admiral the Prote∣stants; He, and the Admiral, defeated all the Forces they saw; took the Constable Prisoner; past over the Bellies of the Swissers, who made almost a miraculous resistance, and concluded, they had therefore won the Victory. In the mean while the Duke of Guise, who led the Left Wing of the

French King's Army, either by design, as his Enemies said, or as an act of high conduct, so cover'd his Troops, with the Village of Blainville, and the Trees and Shrubs about it, that he was not so much as seen by the Protestants, nor moved from thence, until the Constable was taken Prisoner, the Ma∣reschal de St. André killed, and all those Forces which were considered by the Protestants, as the whole Army of the Royalists, were intirely routed, and so confusedly flying, as he was in no danger to have his Squadrons disordered by the Runawayes of his own Party; but then, advancing his Troops, which were entire, he soon turned the Fortune of the day, took the Prince of Condé Prisoner, and overthrew all that opposed him. For 'tis a tedious, and difficult, if not an impossible task, to put into good order again, an Army that has newly fought, so as to bring it suddenly to fight again; some being busied about the Pillage, and Prisoners they have taken, or are pursuing, others being loth to return to new dangers; and all in effect being so heated, and disor∣dered, that they do not, or will not hear, the Commands of their Superiors.

VI. A sixth is, A General must never bring all his Troops to fight at once; and therefore is still to draw up his Army; at least in two Lines, or orders of Battel, and in three in case the Ground, and the Number of his Forces, allow it: For those Lines are in effect so many Armies; and the second Line being intire, though the first should be broken, often re∣covers the day; especially if the second Line be at so just a distance behind the first, as if the first be overthrown, it does not disorder the second; and also so near, that some Squa∣drons of the second Line, can come up timely enough to re∣dress any beginning of a breach in the first, without too much discomposing it self.

The Romans constantly fought their Infantry in three Lines, or orders of Battel, the one behind the other; if the Hostatii were worsted, they fell between the Intervals of the Principi, and there Rallied again, while the Principi advanced to give a check to the Pursuers; and if both the Hostatii and Principi were Routed, they fell in between the Intervals of the Triarii; but if those could not sustain the shock, the day was lost.

VII. A seventh is, To have expert, vigilant, and valiant Commanders, to be at the Head of those five Gross Bodies, of which an Army is usually composed in a day of Battel; that is to say, the three Tertia's of the Infantry, (which as they march we usually call, Van, Battle, and Rear) and the two Wings of the Cavalry; they ought to be Men of great Judgment, Authority, and Presence of Mind, to remedy all Disasters, and to improve all Advantages in the nick of time; for in such Actions, the least delay or remisness, is too usually irrecoverable.

To these five chief Officers whose Stations ought to be in the first Line, there ought also to be five others to command in the second Line; for this is of equal importance, if not of greater; since tis easier to give the Attack well, while all is in Order; than to recover a Disorder, when it once has happened.

In my opinion it is a Duty in a General which he ought never to omit, not only to appoint before the Armies En∣gage, what Persons by Name shall command in chief the five Gross Bodies of the first Line, and of the second Line; but also what Commander in every of the said Gross Bodies, shall in course, succeed in the Conduct of every such Body, in case the Person whose right it is to do it, or who is ap∣pointed to do it, should be kill'd, or so wounded, as he is thereby disabled to discharge so weighty a Trust, and to de∣clare openly to every Gross Body, who by Name is to lead them; and who by Name is to succeed him who shall be killed, or disabled from discharging his Function; that no Man may be ignorant, or pretend ignorance therein: For if this be not done before Troops are mingled in the Fight, it will be too late to do it afterwards; and I have known sad Disasters occasioned for want of this necessary Precau∣tion.

Some who have been guilty of this Omission, have, as their Excuse, alledged; that when he who commanded that Gross was killed, or put out of Fight by his hurts, or his Horse being killed, the eldest Officer or Colonel in course was to supply his room. But that is not in all Cases, a suffi∣cient and full Answer; for sometimes Regiments of Horse, and Regiments of Foot, have made up one Gross; and

though a Colonel of Foot has been the elder Colonel, yet in the Field, a younger Colonel of Horse, has claimed the right of doing it; and thereby Disputes amongst themselves have risen, when they should have only disputed against the Enemy. Besides, I have also known that the elder Colonel has not been so fit to command a Gross, as a younger Colo∣nel has been; and the Soldiery also have known it, who will not be a little troubled to be lead by one, who they all know was not so capable of that Honor and Trust.

Neither do all the inferior Officers, or private Soldiers, know the dates of every Colonels Commission; and if their own Colonel pretends to the Seniority, they will not desert him in his pretence, by immediately submitting to be led by, and obey another. But by the method I propound, these Uncertainties, and dangerous Disputes, will be avoided; else if they are ever run into, it may too probably be fatal. And since a General in the Field, may appoint on the death of a General Officer, who shall act in his place, till the King's pleasure therein be known, (which is usual enough;) and in making this choice, acts not alwayes by the rule of Se∣niority, but by the fitness of the Person; and yet therein does no Wrong to an elder Colonel: I see no solid Reason why a General may not temporarily Nominate who shall command a Gross Body, in case he who did it, is killed, or disabled; especially in a day of Battel, when All is at stake, and when no Advantage ought to be lost in Nominating the ablest Person for the vacant Charge, lest thereby the Victory be lost.

I am fully of opinion that the greatest Captain that ever was, or will be, is not, or can be, of himself sufficient to re∣dress all Disorders, and lay hold of all Advantages, in an instant, when Armies are once engaged. The utmost he can do, is to choose well the Field of Battel; to draw up his Army according thereunto, to most Advantage; to give his General Orders, and to give the best Orders wherever he is in Person; but he cannot be Ubiquitary, nor send Orders to every place timely enough, to have them obey'd successfully. And therefore 'tis indisputably necessary, that he have under him, expert chief Officers, at the Head of all Gross Bodies, who may supply what it is impossible for him singly to com∣mand;

for he can be well obey'd but to the time he sends his Troops to the charge: after that, those only who lead them, and are with them, can actuate them according to the General Orders, or as the occasion requires, which those un∣der him must have the judgment to lay hold of, as it were in the twinkling of an Eye; so short are the moments to acquire the Victory.

Together with those chief Officers who command Tertia's, and Wings of Armies; it is of high importance to have an able General of the Artillery, and that he have sufficient Of∣ficers under him; for the Carriages well disposed, and the Cannon early and well planted, do not a little contribute to the Victory; and if it may be, I would never have the Can∣non fired, so as the Bullet, if it take place, can only carry away a File; especially also, now our Files are so shallow; but alwayes to point your Artillery so as the shot may rake thwart the Squadrons and Battalions of the Enemy; and then it does not only do execution while it has any force, but also disorders whole Bodies of Infantry, or Cavalry.

VIII. An eighth thing is, to place alwayes your best Soldiery in the Wings of your Army, and to begin the Bat∣tel on that side where you judge your self the strongest, and your Enemy the weakest; and with those Troops to ad∣vance as expeditiously as you can, (without disordering them) while the rest of your Army moves as slowly as they may. For if your first Impression be successful, you may fall into the Flank, and part of the Rear of your Ene∣mies, while the Residue of your whole Army is marching to attack them in the Front; but then the motion of your Ar∣my must be quicker, as soon as ever they see your advanced Wing is successful. I would recommend to Practice one thing more, which I have on tryal found very beneficial; it is this: During the motion of your advanced Wing, to edge it by degrees, and insensibly, towards the outward Flank of that Wing of the Enemies which you go to charge; so as by that time you mingle, you may outwing them, and there∣by attack them at once in Front, Flank, and Rear, if he has omitted to cover that Flank; And therefore to begin the Battel with that Wing of yours, which is the strongest, is not

only most adviseable, but also to place your best men in that Wing of yours, which is opposite to that Wing of his, which has the Flank of it uncover'd; if by neglect, or want of time, or means, either of his Flanks are not secured; I have known great advantage obtain'd thereby; and if your Enemy be not very timely aware of this, it may more than likely contribute considerably to win you the day. I men∣tion very timely aware of this, because if he discover not your design until you are on the Point to execute it, it will be too late to prevent it; since no alteration can be made when you are ready to join, but it will, in all likelihood, be ruinous to him who in that juncture of time shall attempt to make it. When I mention your beginning the Battel with that Wing in which you have placed your valiantest Sol∣diers, I intend thereby, that the second Line of that Wing shall advance as well as the first; else, while you fall in the Flank and Rear of your Enemies Wing, his second Line may fall into the Flank and Rear of as many of your first Line, as are so employed; unless your own second Line be ready to prevent it; and to improve all the Advantages which your first Impression shall give you.

The placing the best Men in the Wings of an Army, is very ancient, and seldom has been omitted, but to the loss of those who were guilty of such Omission; the Reason is, the Troops on your Wings are not wedg'd in, as the Troops in your main Battel are; but are at liberty to take all advan∣tages that by accident, or by the ill conduct of your Enemy, or by your own good; may be offer'd you; and you cannot so much as rationally hope to fall into his Flank and Rear, but by attacking one of his Wings; because you cannot over∣wing him, but only by falling upon one of his outward Flanks.

Hannibal, who was so excellent a Captain to win Victo∣ries, (though possibly not to make the best use of them,) at the famous Battel of Cannes, placed all his valiantest Men in both his Wings, and the worst Men in the midst of his Battel; whereby, when the Romans came to the Charge, (who had placed their choicest Legions in their main Battel) they soon pierced into the Body of Hannibals Army, which was what he designed they should do; for then with his

two Wings, in which were all his choicest Troops, he imme∣diately incompassed the Romans, and totally defeated them. But at the Battel of Zama, or as some call it Nadagara, which •…•…e fought against Scipio, though the Fate of Carthage de∣pended on the issue of that day, yet he totally altered the Order he had observed at Cannes, and lost the Victory; For at Zama he placed all his new raised Men by themselves, to endure the first Attack of the Romans; and of all his old Soldiers who had so memorably served him in his Wars in Italy, he made as it were an Army apart, and drew them up a few Furlongs, behind his new raised Africans, who were therefore soon cut in pieces, as his reserve Army was not long after; whereas if he had observed the like order of Battel at Nadagara, as he did at Cannes, he might have had the like success.

IX. The ninth thing is, To prohibit, under the severest Penalties, the absolute Chace, or the Pillage, until the Enemy is totally Routed on all sides; and then have those Troops only to pursue, which are expresly appointed for it, alwayes having Squadrons to march after the Pursuers as near and in as good order, as if they were going to the Charge; that if the Pursued should Rally, and Face about, you may have those ready to fall on, and break them a second time.

How many Victories seemingly won, have, in an instant, been lost, for want of due care, in these two Particulars of such high concernment, which therefore ought never to be omitted; Neither is there any thing which more encourages flying Enemies to rally, and fight again, than the seeing a disorderly Pursuit of them; for in such a Pursuit, all the advantage of the prevailing Party is immediately vanished, when the Chaced do but turn about; for such an evidence of restored Valor, too often daunts those who are to oppose it: Nor can any thing more deterr the flying Party from doing that, than to see several Bodies in good order, ready to make them repent that confidence; and though brave Officers will not cease pressing, promising, and threatning their Men that flie, to Face about; yet the Private Soldier who sees those Bodies are ready to fall on them, conclude it is more dangerous to do so, than to run, and therefore are too often

deaf to all Oratory, or Menaces of that Nature; for the frighted Soldier, as well as the hungry Belly, has no Ears.

These Nine Particulars may not improperly be called Maxims in War, and therefore ought to be still practised be∣fore a Battel, in a Battel, and after the Enemy is Routed. I know many of the Ancients, and not a few of the Moderns have with much industry alwayes endeavored to gain the Sun and the Wind of their Enemy in the day of Battel, and doubtless both are very desirable to be on our backs, when they may be obtained without losing thereby more certain Advantages from the Nature of the Ground you are to fight on; For those are mutable, especially the latter, and the for∣mer is still in motion, so that no Precaution can ascertain the keeping of them when they are gotten; and therefore one must not lose the stable Advantages, in hope to gain the un∣stable; but if both may be had at once, they must never be neglected.

I shall now proceed to set down several other Particulars, which I hope will be useful to whoever has the Curiosity and Patience to read them.

VVhen an Enemies Army advances to raise the Siege of a place, which otherwise can hardly hold out longer; in my poor judgment, it is not adviseable to defend the ordinary Line of Circumvallation, but to draw out of it, and give the Enemy Battel, if your Men be as good, your Numbers as great as his, and that your Ground you fight on, be as fit for you, as him.

Some of the Reasons and Experiments which induce me to be of this Belief, I shall here express.

If the place be large which you besiege, your Line of Cir∣cumvallation must of necessity be many Miles about, for it ought to be out of the reach of your Enemies Artillery, else you will too much expose to the mercy of it, your Ar∣my that is lodged within it. All this Line must be equally defended, unless it be where the situation of it secures it self, or does it but thinly mann'd: for not knowing in what part, or places of it, he will attempt to force it, you must se∣cure every Foot of it, which in consequence does so disperse your Army, that if he once enters, it will be impossible to

draw it together expeditiously enough to beat him out again; for as soon as ever he is gotten within it, he flings down immediately such parts of it as are near him; that the Squadrons and Battalions of his Army may come in, and they marching on the heels of each other, will certainly be im∣battelled, and rout all the small Forces which may be in rea∣diness near that place; and will also hinder those further off from imbodying. Besides, if the place besieged is seated on an unfordable River, or that may be so in a rainy season, (as most commonly considerable Fortresses are) 'tis not to be doubted but you will cast over it Bridges of Boats, or fixed Bridges, that you may surround the place, (which else might with safety be every day or night relieved) and thereby al∣so have free intercourse between both parts of your Army which are divided by the River; and 'tis as little to be doubted, but as soon as he has enter'd your Line, his first care will be, to make himself Master of all those Bridges, that such as are, as it were, in a Pound, may not escape; and that having defeated half your Army, he may march over them to destroy the rest, who seem then but too ripe for Ruin, when half their Friends are cut off, and all their Enemies are marching against them, and the Besieged, by their Sallies, rea∣dy to assist them.

This seems to me to be the usual, and fatal Consequences, if your Enemies Army entring your ordinary Line of Cir∣cumvallation, which being most frequently but a Parapet with a narrow and shallow Ditch, is but too easily forced, and in∣deed not to be held tenable of it self; If the Forts, Redoubts, and other Works which flank it, and which are usually rai∣sed a Musket-shot from one another, with many hands to mann it, did not, in a good degree, secure it.

But those Works usually are such slight things, especially when an Enemy is entred, that few of the Resolutest which are posted in them, to guard them, stay to do it after; for commonly the attempt on such a Line is made a little before the break of day, that the Obscurity may the less expose the Assailants, while they advance to storm it; and that the day-light, may help them soon after they are gotten in, to improve all advantages which are offer'd them thereby; and 'tis in this twilight ordinarily, that those in the Works to de∣fend

the Line, steal out of them, when they find the Ene∣my is entred, as those who then expect more safety from their feet, than from their hands.

He who resolves to force an ordinary Line of Circumval∣lation, either does it without any noise, or else alarms it round; and often most warmly, where he means not to make his attempt; while small Parties are doing this, in the dark he is drawing all the rest of his Army to the place, or places, (which still are near each other) where he in∣tends to make his real impression, and does it with that si∣lence, as the Defendants cannot discover his intentions, till usually it be too late successfully to oppose them.

I must therefore frankly acknowledge, since the defences of such a Line are so inconsiderable; since the equally man∣ning them so dissipates the Army which does it; since it can∣not hopefully be defended otherwise: And since it cannot be safely defended that way, I have almost wonder'd at those, who rather choose to make good such a Line, than to give Battel to the Enemy who comes to raise the Siege. This being a more hopeful thing, a more glorious action, and whose Consequences, if Success attends the Besiegers in the Field, will be much more great, than to defend the Line can possibly be; for thereby you can at last but carry the place: But by a Battel gain'd over the Relievers, you usually carry the Fortress but as one of the many good effects of getting the Victory; for few, if any Towns, hold out, after the re∣lief sent them is defeated.

What I have said on this Subject, proceeds from my ta∣king two things for granted; the first is, that the Circumval∣lation Line is after the usual and common Form; that is, but a Parapet, and that the Works which defend it are very in∣considerable either towards the Field, or within the Line.

The second is, that the besieging Army has as good Men and more than the Relievers bring; for 'tis necessary he leave his best and most advanced Works well guarded during the Battel, both to preserve them against his return with Victory, as also by them to hinder the Besieged from sallying on their backs, while they are fighting with the Relief; but indeed if the Line need not be of much circumference; if it be

high, and the Graft large and deep; if your Army is not strong enough both to fight the Enemy in the Field, and to secure at the same time your most advanced, and most ne∣cessary Works; if the place you must fight in, is an open Countrey, and that your Enemy does much exceed you in Cavalry; or if it be an inclosed, incumbred Countrey, and he does much exceed you in Infantry; if you have Victu∣als, and Forage enough, within your Line, and your Enemy have little with him, or without it; so that he can stay but a few dayes, and that you may probably in fewer dayes take the place by Assault, or have it surrendred by Capitulation. I say in a Case thus Circumstantiated, I would not admire a General would justifie his Line; but rather admire, if he should draw out of it, to give Battel to the Relievers.

I shall therefore now instance some Examples of famous Captains, who have kept within their Lines of Circumvalla∣tion, when the Enemies Army came to relieve the Besieged, and in them have resisted their Attempts, and as a conse∣quence of that success, have gain'd the places.

I shall also give Examples of some other great Generals, who have chose rather to draw out of their Lines, to give the Relieving Army Battel, than to stay within their Lines, and in them to oppose the Relief.

I shall then enumerate some of the many Reasons, why I believe such various, and opposite methods, have been pra∣ctised by such celebrated Chiefs in War; nay, sometimes by the very self-same General; though I must say, I find many more Examples in Histories, and in my own time, for draw∣ing out of ordinary Lines of Circumvallation to give Battel to the Relievers Army, than for opposing the Succors by con∣tinuing within them.

Caesar, who I esteem the famousest Captain of the Uni∣verse, in the famousest of all his Sieges, that of Al•…•…sia in France, chose to stay within his Lines to oppose the Relief of the united Gaules; or at least fought them in the Field only with his Cavalry, which on occasion he drew out of his Lines, and in which Services he owns his German Horse did him most service; who have been famous, for their Valor, even as long as Historians have recorded any great Actions of War, in which that Nation had a share.

But because this memorable Siege is so minutely, and par∣ticularly related by Caesar himself, and does thereby imply, he thought it even his Master-piece in that kind; and since by his Conduct there, the most eminent Captains of the Moderns, as I have been credibly informed, have model'd the design of their Sieges, viz. the Prince of Orange, the Duke of Parma, and the Marquiss of Spinola, in their great Sieges of Maestricht, Antwerp, and Breda; I hope those who read this Book, will, at least, judge me worthy of their Pardon, if I stay a little in the Relation of this prodi∣gious Siege of Alesia; since also no less an Author than Pa∣terculus, when he treats of it, has these very expressions, viz. So great things were done at Alesia, that they might seem too great for any Man to attempt, or any but a god to effect.

Caesar having defeated the Cavalry of the Gaules, whose Army was led by Vercingetorix (a Person worthy to com∣mand a National Army) Vercingetorix shuts himself up in Alesia with 80000 of his chosen Soldiers, sends away the Reliques of his Cavalry, (as useless in that Siege) and re∣quires all the Nations of the whole Countrey of Gallia, to come to his Relief, which he conjures them to hasten, having but 30 dayes Corn in the Town to feed his Men, which in all probability, by the frugallest management, and the carefullest distribution, could not suffice for above six Weeks.

Caesar immediately resolves to besiege this great General, and greater Army; in hope to reduce both, before the Re∣lief could come; yet admirably well fortifying himself against the Relief, if it should come early enough to succor the Besieged.

What these stupendious Works were, both as to the Cir∣cumvallation to oppose the Relievers, and as to the Coun∣tervallation to resist the Attempts of the Besieged, you shall have briefly related, and from his own Commentaries, where∣in he writes, viz. That he made round about the Town, a Ditch of 20 foot wide, and 20 foot deep, with upright sides, as broad at the top, as at the bottom; 40 foot behind this Ditch, he made his first Works; behind them he made two other Ditches of 15 foot in breadth, and 15 foot deep, and behind all these he made a Ditch 12 foot wide, and 12 foot deep, with a Rampard, and Parapet thereon, and erected Towers round about the whole

Work; at every 80 foot distance the one from the other; be∣sides the Palisadoes, Stockadoes, and those other Fortifications; which he comprehends under the name of Cippi, of which there were five Ranks; and of Stimuli, of which there were eight Courses or Rows, round about his whole Camp. So that it seems to me, none of his Enemies could come to attack his Works, but must run on several Ranks of sharp Stakes, or into Holes, or on Galthrops, which were also covered, or hid with Branches of Osiers. Caesar further adds, That af∣ter the inner Fortifications were thus perfected, he took in 14 Miles of Circuit, and made the like Fortifications in All Points against the Enemy without, as he had done against the Town: which are his own words.

These are the first Lines of Circumvallation and Counter∣vallation, which I ever read of in any Siege; and I fully be∣lieve the making of both as ordinarily they are made in our modern Sieges, when we equally apprehend the numerous Sallies of the Besieged, and the strong Attempts of the Re∣lievers, was taken from this Model of Caesars; but the Copies are very much short of the Original as to the quanti∣ties, and qualities of the Lines; so many prodigious Works of 11 Miles about towards Alesia, and 14 Miles about to∣wards the Armies which came to succor it; with the seve∣ral Rows of Stakes, Holes in the Ground, and other Traps to destroy and catch the Gaules, I think is admirable, and to perfect them, one would judge, must be the labour of some years, though a vast Army undertook it; whereas indeed as I believe it could not possibly be the labour of many days: For though Caesar mentions not how many days it was be∣fore the Relieving Army came; Yet since he expresly says Vercingetorix found scarce 30 days Corn in the place, when he shut up himself in it, with his 80000 chosen Men; and that he surrendred it not, till the Relief had made three Attempts to succor it; it is undeniable 'twas not Famine only which made Vercingetorix yield: And therefore it could not be many days in which Caesar began, and perfected all these wonderful Works.

This being the true Narrative of the strength of his Lines, both towards the Town, and towards the Field; it is not to be thought strange he elected to withstand his Enemy

within such Fortifications, and that he repulsed their Gene∣ral Assaults, though three times made; nor can any one rea∣sonably believe Caesar's Army could have justified 11 miles of a Line against 80000 men within the Countervallation, and of 14 miles against 248000 men without the Circum∣vallation, had not the multiplicity of his Works, the one within the other, and the strength of them every way, made them defensible enough, for the paucity of the hands which were to justifie them.

Yet the finishing of these amazing Works were not the onely Labours of Caesar's Army; but to do the constant Duty, Night and Day, of the Camp, especially most strong∣ly until the Line of Countervallation was finish't; the provi∣ding not only Forage, and Victuals, from hand to mouth; but also to lay in besides, Magazines of both, for 30 days, which Caesar writes, by his Orders, were done: That thereby, as I suppose, he might not be necessitated to stir out of his Lines when the Relief should Incamp it self close by them; which else might have hazarded the cutting off his Army by piece-meel going to Forage, or forced him to have come to a decisive Battel, whereby all his Labour on his Lines would have been needless; as also by carrying into his Leaguer what was in the Villages, and Countrey Neighbouring on his Works, to deprive his Enemies Army of all sustenance but what they brought along with them, or were daily to be fetch'd by them to their Camp, from a great distance.

And lastly, to have still in his Leaguer, more Victuals than the Besieged could then have within the Town, thereby to compel the Relieving Army to attack those almost uncon∣querable Works; or the Town to surrender for want of Food in the sight of the Army which came for the Succor: These necessary performances, together with his often fight∣ing against such Forces, as almost hourly, Night, and Day, made numerous Sallies, and were obliged to do it, both to harass, and lessen Caesar's Army, and to retard the finishing of his Works; which when compleated, would render it highly difficult, if possible, to relieve the Besieged; I say, and I think with reason, all these Economies of War, were at least as difficult in the Actings, as the making those laborious Fortifications; Yet all were to be done, and done at one and

the same time; and in so short a space, that I scarce know to which of the two, my Admiration is justlier due.

At length the Relieving Army appear'd, which consisted of 248000 men, as Caesar, who condescended to be the Commissary of their Musters, reckons them to be; and al∣so writes, how many every State of Gallia, did particularly send; so that at once he was to withstand 320000 of his Enemies; and which was more, to fight with them at the same time, when they attacked him in Front and Rear.

This formidable Relieving Army was led by four Gene∣rals, viz. Comius, Veridomarus, Eporedorix, and Vergesilaunus; All great Captains, and accustomed to make War even against Caesar himself; where they could not but have learn'd much, having to do with such a General, and yet for many Years continued the War against him; and one of them, viz. Comius, had learn'd the Rudiments of War, under Caesar himself, and acquired so much Honour in serving the Romans, that Caesar rewarded him with the Principality over the Morini.

The Gaules seated their Camp on a Hill half a mile from Caesar's Works, and sent their Cavalry into a Plain under it, and their nimblest Archers conceal'd behind their Troops.

Caesar makes his Cavalry match out to fight them, lest the Gaules, by having their Cavalry unfought with, even under Caesar's Works, might grow too insolent, and his own Army be intimidated. The Roman Horse were worsted by the help of the Gaules Archers; but Caesar's German Horse Re∣lieved them, Routed the Gaules, and cut in pieces their Ar∣chers, and then all Caesar's Troops return d within their Line.

The Gaules made three several General Assaults on Cae∣sar's Camp, the first by Day, the second by Night, and the third at full Noon, Vercingetorix every time Sallying out at the same hour with his Army: In these three Attacks all that Valor, Skill, and Industry could perform on both sides, was not omitted. Some Particulars I shall enumerate; the Gaules finding the Rows of Stakes, and Holes, and the Galthorps, de∣stroyd many of their Men, flung up so much Earth over them, as covered them; and thereby made them useless to

the Romans: Then filling their Ditches with Fagots, Hurdles, and Earth, raised the Outside, on which they went to the Assaults, higher than the Line they assaulted, and so went on advantageous Ground to the Attack; and Caesar, when he found his Men distressed in Front, by the Enemies over∣numbring him, and fighting on equal Ground, would often command his Cavalry, sometimes his Legionary Infantry, to sally out of his Line, and to fall on them in the Rear, where∣by he routed them.

The last dayes Attack, seem'd several Battels, rather than one General Assault, such great Bodies fighting at once both within and without the first Lines towards the Field, and to∣wards the Town; for the Gaules having discover'd the weakest, or more properly the least strong part of Caesar's Line, while all the residue of their Army were assaulting the rest of the Works, Vergesilaunus, (who was Vercinge∣torix's near Kinsman) in the obscurity of the preceding Night, had marched behind a Hill, and concealed himself there with 60000 select men; who at Noon-day (when the Romans were with all their Forces defending their Works both against the Besieged, and Comius, &c.) assault∣ed them unexpectedly, entred the Line, whose Ditch they had filled, and with many shouts, daunted Caesar's Soldiers, as he himself confesses. But Caesar, at last, by the Valor and Expertness of his men, and by his excellent Conduct, reliev∣ing them in all parts, where they were oppressed, and leading them in Person, to many Charges, was Victorious, and Cha∣ced the Gaules to the very Works of their Camp, and to the Gates of the Town; and adds, If his Soldiers had not been quite spent with that dayes hot Service, few of all the Gaules had scaped. They lost in that last dayes attempt, above 60000 men, so that despairing to perform what they came for, they did that Night abandon their Camp; and many were kill'd by Caesar's Cavalry, who pursued them in the obscurity; and the next day Vercingetorix capitulated, and yielded; he himself gallantly mounted, and armed, at all points, having first leisurely rid round about the Chair of State in which Caesar sate to receive him, alighted off of his Horse, and, as an evidence of his being Conquer'd, disarm'd him∣self, and then went and sate down on the Ground at Cae•…•…ar's feet, without speaking one word.

Some of those many Reasons which induced Caesar, in my opinion, to continue within his Lines, and not to give the Enemy Battel in the Field, I shall here set down.

I. He could not shut up in Alesia a much greater Army than his own, without making very strong Lines of Coun∣tervallation against it.

II. Having made these wonderful •…•…ines, and knowing of the vast Relief which was certainly hastening, to succor the Besieged; he, with so small an Army as his own, (which probably could not consist of above 30000 Foot, and 6000 Horse, for he never had above 10 Legions at once in all Gal∣lia) could not reasonably hope both to keep in Vercingeto∣rix with 80000 chosen men, and fight against Comius, &c. with 248000 good men, unless by prodigious Works he could supply, what he wanted in Numbers of men, and also by so posting his Army between his Lines of Circumvallation, and •…•…ountervallation, as to be thereby ready to resist both wayes, and often, with the same Reserve, Battalions, and Squadrons. For whatever Justus L•…•…psius computes, That the space between these two Lines must be 5000 Foot, yet in reason I am fully convinced they were much nearer each other, for else they could not answer the end for which they were made; since no Squadrons of Reserve can 〈◊〉〈◊〉 an∣swer both wayes, a distance of a Mile, much less do it as often as need requires; and our modern Lines of Circum∣vallation and Countervallation, (which are but Copies after Caesar's Original) are generally no farther asunder, than to leave space to Camp the Army in, and that the Battalions, and Squadrons, may be drawn up between them so near, as timely enough to relieve either, or both Lines; and to me 'tis inferredly evident, that Caesar had this in his prospect, by acknowledging he was necessitated to run that part of his Line, which Vergesilaunus assaulted as the weakest, on the hanging of a Hill; for had he ran it on the top of the Hill, it would have taken up too much Ground; that is, have made his •…•…ine of Circumvallation too far distant from his Line of Countervallation, and thereby rendered the Reserve Battalions between both Lines, useless to one, or both.

III. Caesar seeing that Vercingetorix, not designedly, but compelled by necessity, had cast himself into Alesia with 80000 chosen men; for the Gaules Cavalry having been de∣feated the day before by the Italian, and German, on which Cavalry of the Gaules, Vercingetorix most depended, and lo∣sing their support, despaired of retreating in the face of the Roman Horse, and of the Legionary Infantry, had no bet∣ter Game to play, than to get into Alesia, which was very near him; Caesar therefore had abundant reason to believe the Town had not wherewithall long to feed so many mouths; for I conclude it was not a Magazine of the Gaules, since Caesar particularly mentions, that the Manubii by whose interest only, Vercingetorix was admitted into it, were by him expelled out of it; the longer to enable his Army to eat: which sure he would not have been so ungrateful to have done, if they had been his Garison, and also had not meer want of Corn constrained him to it; I say, since Cae∣sar, by their want of Corn, had probable hopes to reduce them by Famine, before their expected Relief could come, (for a League of many petty States are not overwarm to adventure their Forces to relieve the Defeated, but are more inclined to make their Peaces apart) and therefore having shut them up with prodigious Works, he was afterwards compelled, as it were, to make as vast Works against the Relief, when he foresaw the Besieged could hold out till the Succor came; for else all he had thitherto done, had been uneffectual to answer his final end; since the full manning of those Lines against the Besieged, must take up too many of his small Army, to leave him enough Forces to fight the vast Succors in the Field; and therefore he resolved to con∣tinue within his Lines.

IV. Since he could lay up one months Magazine of Vi∣ctuals, within his Works, which was more than Vercingetorix could have in Alesia, after Comius, &c. came with the Relief; Caesar had all the reason imaginable to justifie his Lines, and not to draw out of them, to give his Enemy Battel; for he might justly believe, that if the Relief had hopes of cutting him off from all Provisions which he had not got into his

Camp before their coming, they would only design to block him up within his Works, and then he might sooner starve Vercingetorix, than Comius, &c. could starve him: And by having ruined the flower of the Gaules Forces, and their Generalissimo, he should be the better able to fight the rest in the Field, when the Consumption of his Magazines with∣in his Camp, necessitated him to issue out of it.

Or if the Gaules, soon after their Arrival, should endea∣vor to storm, and force his Camp on the Field-side of it; and Vercingetorix, at the same time, on the Town-side of it, he might be the better able to resist, and repel both, being within such Works; so that which soever way they acted, Caesar had great cause to keep within such stupendious Works; by the help of which, he, at last, defeated his Ene∣mies Field Army, and reduced to his mercy their besieged Army; and did it both at one and the same time. Nor had Caesar left Comius and the Relievers, any probable hopes to besiege him successfully, while he was besieging Vercingeto∣rix, could he have been fed within the Town longer than 30 or 40 dayes; for Caesar had furnished his Camp, for one month, and had thereby brought into it, all the Provisions which were near it in the Countrey, and (more than pro∣bably) destroyed, by his Cavalry, all he could not bring within his Line; and when 248000 Soldiers, with the many useless mouths (as to Fighting) which in the best regulated Armies attend such Forces, must be fed, and all this Victual and Forage must be brought far off; it would have been very difficult, if possible, to have supplied them for any con∣siderable time with Food.

I beg the Readers pardon that I have thus largely insisted on this one Instance, which in some degree to repair, I will almost but name the subsequent ones.

The Example of Caesar's keeping within such excellent Lines, and in them resisting, and defeating the Relief, being very ancient, I will give the Reader a recent one, to evidence that in parallel Cases, equal Success has been the Conse∣quence.

Henry, Prince of Orange, a most excellent Captain, did in

the Year 1632. besiege Maestricht, the Spaniards apprehend∣ing they should not be able with their own Armies onely, to force his Lines (which were as strong in needful places, as the very Fortifications of the Town) prevailed with the Emperor to join with them for that Service; the German Army, commanded by Count Papenheim, a brave and ad∣venturous General; and to heighten his endeavors to relieve the place, he was promised 100000 Crowns, and the Order of the Golden Fleece, if he effected it: But the Prince of Orange had made such Lines about his Camp, and against the Town, and so well furnished his Leaguer, as thereby he re∣sisted all their Assaults; and when the Relief drew off, Maestricht Capitulated, and Surrendred.

The Reasons which, in my poor opinion, did engage the Prince of Orange to stay within, and justifie his Lines, were:

That his Works were almost as tenable as those of Maestricht.

That his Enemies did greatly exceed him in Cavalry; and the Countrey about it was Champion.

That he was well furnished with Horse-meat and Mans∣meat within his Leaguer.

That his Enemies Armies were ill furnished with both.

That he knew Papenheim could not long be spared by the Emperor; and that the other Commanders, without his help, durst not attempt to force such extraordinary Lines.

And that if he had raised his Siege, and retreated before the Enemy advanced, he had not only lost all the Blood, Treasure, and Time, which were consumed in this Siege, but also had given the Enemy leisure, and means, to repair those defects in the place, which his knowledge of, had been a chief invitation to him to besiege it.

I shall now Present my Reader with two remarkable In∣stances, of famous Generals, who even in our own memo∣ries, chose within an ordinary Line of Circumvallation to op∣pose the Army commanded to relieve the Besieged, and

were thereby defeated, and forced hastily to abandon their Design.

The Archduke, assisted by the Prince of Conde now liv∣ing, besieged Arras, and raised one of the ordinary Lines of Circumvallation about it; Monsieur de Turenne, assisted by His Royal Highness the Duke of York, came to relieve that place.

The Archduke, and the chief Spanish Commanders, resolve to justifie their Line; but as I have been assured, the Prince of Conde was absolutely, either for giving the French Army Battel, or retreating before the Relief was near; this whol∣som advice was not followd.

His Royal Highness and Monsieur de Turenne assault, and carry the Line, being themselves two of the very first which entred it; and doubtless had intirely cut off the Spanish Ar∣my, had those Bridges been immediately secured by the French, by which the Spaniards held communication. I was positively told by a Person of great Honour who was pre∣sent, that His Royal Highness, whose judgment in War in so green an Age, was almost as much admired, as his Valor, ex∣ceedingly pressed to have it done; which being a while omitted, the Prince of Conde in Person, with almost incre∣dible diligence, got together many Squadrons of Horse, then caused their own Bridges to be destroyed, and with his usual Conduct, his Sword in his hand, made the Retreat, and saved the residue of that broken Army.

In what the Prince of Conde then did, we may learn one very observable Lesson; That a great Commander, when a fatal mischief is fallen into, which his advice, had it been fol∣lowed, would probably have prevented, is notwithstanding obliged to hazard his Person, and employ his best Conduct, to make the Loss as easie as possibly he can, to his own Party.

A second Instance of the like ill Success, by pursuing the like method, is in the same Monsieur de Turenne's besieging Valenciennes jointly with the Mareschal de la Ferte; and re∣solving within an ordinary Line of Circumvallation, to op∣pose the Spanish Relief, led by Don Iohn of Austria, who

forced the Line on the Mareschal de la Ferte's side of the River: As soon as this was known to Monsieur de Turenne, he instantly broke his own Bridges over it, sent away his Cannon and Baggage, and marched after it, as expeditiously as he could; and therein acted the best part, which in such a Case, was left him to manage.

These two Instances, so fresh in our memories, seem to me no ill Evidence, That whatever Besieging General shall stay within such an ordinary Line, and of great Circumference, when an Army comes to attack it, 'tis great odds but he suf∣fers thereby considerable loss and disgrace.

By the French forcing such a Line justified by the Spani∣ards before Arras; And by the Spaniards forcing such a Line justified by the French before Valenciennes; it looks, as if the Victory were not won so much by the Conduct and Valor of either Army, as by the Difficulty of defending such a Line; And therefore whatever Nation does play the like Game, will, too probably, sustain the like Loss.

I might particularize several other Examples of this Na∣ture, even within our own Times, but, to avoid cloying my Reader, I purposely omit them; and will rather employ his patience, in giving him some instances of great Captains, who chose to quit their ordinary Lines, to give the Reliev∣ing Army Battel, and were successful therein.

Maurice, Prince of Orange, in the Year 1600, had be∣sieged Newport, believing that the mutiny of many of the Spanish Forces, would disable the Archduke from relieving it; but those Mutineers being unexpectedly pacified, and the Archduke marching with his Army to relieve the Place; that Prince, though always loth to come to a decisive Battel, yet in this Case, having had onely time enough to make an ordinary Line of Circumvallation, quitted it, led thereunto by his own judgment, and the concurrent advice of our Noble Sir Francis Vere, and advanced to meet the Archduke; gave him Battel in the open Field, won the Victory, with 116 Ensigns, and 5 Standards; and perhaps had also won Newport, had he in earnest again besieged it, which he for∣bore

to do, partly because la Burlotte had cast into it three Regiments with great Conduct and Celerity.

In the Year 1633, the Duke of Lunenburg, with Mi∣lander, and Mareschal Kniphausen, had besieged Hamelen, a strong and considerable place, seated on the River Vess•…•…r in Germany; and having reduced it to great Wants, the Ger∣mans resolved to relieve it; and Rendezvous'd a great Ar∣my for that end, under the Comand of General Merodes, and Count Cronesfield. The Besiegers on their Enemies Army drawing near, left some Regiments for the defence of their most advanced Approaches, and to hinder the Garisons sal∣lying during the Battel; and with 9500 Horse, near as ma∣ny Foot, with 42 pieces of Cannon, Field and Battering, went to fight the Relief, which consisted of near the like Numbers. The Battel was long, and bloody, it lasted above 9 hours; but at length the Protestant, and besieging Army, got the Victory; the marks whereof were, the Duke of Lunenburgs, Milanders and Kniphausens taking 50 Ensigns and Standards, 800 Wagons, 13 Cannon, 2000 Prisoners, and Merodes the General, who soon after dyed of his Wounds, as 5000 of his Men did on the spot: The Victo∣rious immediately returned to the Siege, and the Garison soon surrendred.

In the Year 1638, Duke Bernard Weymar, on a sud∣den, sits down before Rhinefield in Alsatia, and reduces it almost to the last Extremity; the Imperialists send Duke Savelle, and General John de Wert, with an Army to relieve it. Duke Weymar following his own solid Opinion, and being seconded therein, by the advice of Henry, Duke of Ro∣han, one of the greatest Captains of that Age, (who went a Volunteer to that Action, to wipe off some Calumnies which his Enemies had unjustly laid to his Charge) quits his Lines to give the Enemy Battel, but leaves some Regiments of Foot, and Troops of Horse, to justifie his Works, and beat in the Besieged, if they should sally: Savelle and Wert accept the Battel, and, after a sharp dispute, Weymar got the day, cuts in pieces the best of the Imperial Troops, takes all their Baggage and Cannon, and Duke Savelle, General Wert,

and Spureter Prisoners; then returns to Rhinefield, which soon after surrendred unto him.

Monsieur de Turenne, a few Years since, besieged Dun∣kirk, Don John of Austria came with an Army to relieve it; Monsieur de Turenne abandons his Line, gives Don John Battel, wins the Victory, and as a consequence of it, had Dunkirk yielded to him; in which Battel our Countreymen did great Service.

King Henry the Great of France, when Alexander Ferneze, Duke of Parma, and Charles Duke of Mayenne came to the Relief of Paris with the United Forces of the League, and of Philip II. of Spain, would not stay within his Lines, but drew out of them, to give his Enemy Battel; which those two excellent Captains would not accept of, but, by a rare Conduct, having forced Lainy in the sight of the French Ar∣my, by that way, flung the wanted Relief into Paris.

For whoever does well understand the Trade of War, will never put Affairs to the greatest hazard, when they can be carried on with the less.

In our sinful Times in England, when Robert Earl of Essex marched to the Relief of Glocester, his Highness Prince Rupert, whose high Genius in War, admirable Valor, and great Judgment, has made him justly to be esteemed both by his Friends and Enemies, a General of the very first Form, would not stay in his Works before that City, but leaving most of his Infantry in them, advanced with his Cavalry to meet the relieving Army on the Downes; which doubtless he had defeated, as several of the chief Officers of it have owned to me, had not some Brigades of the Earl of Essex's Infantry, done almost Wonders on that occasion.

These, and many other the like Instances, make it seem to me, even a kind of Maxim in War, That a besieging Ar∣my, which has onely an ordinary and vast Line of Circum∣vallation to cover it, ought not to stay in it; but to give the Relief Battel, or raise the Siege before the Relief be too near; it being, in my poor opinion, altogether unadviseable,

to stay as if you would fight, when you are resolved not to do it; for whatever Army retreats from another, thereby evidences that he apprehends his Enemies; which highly en∣courages them, and does not a little deject your own Forces; who therefore are the more prone to be disorder'd, if vigo∣rously push'd; and to be disorder'd, is almost the next step to being defeated; so that early Retreats, where the Reso∣lution is taken not to fight, is most eligible; for why should you hazard to be engaged, when you resolve to avoid it?

Though I cannot say that the besieging Army quitting an ordinary Line, has alway had success in giving, or offering Battel to the Relieving Army, (for that depends on many Circumstances, and unforeseeable Accidents) yet the Argu∣ments appear to me very strong for the doing of it; and Actions ought not to be judged of onely by the Event, but by the Reasons which make them to be undertaken.

I cannot observe in all the Wars which Caesar mad•…•… that he committed any one oversight so clearly deserving that name, as when at Dirachium, he enclosed, with a prodigious Line for its circumference the Army of Pompey, which was much greater than his own, and consequently might, when he would, force his passage in one part of it, because all Caesar's vast Line was to be equally mann'd and provided for, (where Nature made it not inaccessible) which could not but disperse his Troops to such a distance, as render'd them not only useless when Pompey should attack any one place of them from within with his whole Forces, but exposed them to be cut off by parts, when Pompey got out; So that it was believed the War had that day been ended, had Pompey been a General who had known how to improve a Victory: And if Cae∣sar, whose own Conduct was so excellent, whose Soldiers were so valiant and expert, as he himself writes, That their knowledge and experience was such as they could prescribe unto themselves what was to be done as well as any Commander could teach them; could not, on tryal, justifie so vast, yet weak a Line, when it could then only be assaulted from those within it; how should any other General rationally hope to justifie an ordinary Line, and of great Circuit, when it is at once vigorously attempted both from the Field, and from the

Town; for the strongest Sallies from the Town, are, when the Relief fights the besieging Army. Experiment might teach what Reason did not.

But lest some who peruse this Treatise, may think I have forgot how much I have already spoken of the great advan∣tages which are derived from an Armies being intrenched, though but as it were within a Parapet well flank'd, by my now writing so much against an Armies trusting to an ordina∣ry Line of Circumvallation, I shall desire him to consider, there is a very great difference between an Army which is posted in an Intrenched Camp, and one which is posted within such a Line of Circumvallation, though the Works should be of equal strength. For an Army intrenched lodges so compactly, and close, and has comparatively so lit∣tle Ground to defend, and no Enemy to attack them from within; that all the Forces of it are at hand in a moment, to justifie their Intrenchment against all Assaults from without; but an Army within such a Line of Circumvallation, is neces∣sarily so far disperst, to make good every part of it, not know∣ing where the real Impression will be made; and has so ma∣ny Troops, only to attend the Sallies of the Garison; that if once the Line be entred, it is impossible to bring Forces from such remote distances, so expeditiously to drive them out, as the assaulting General can bring his in, to prevent all conside∣rable Imbodyings to resist him; without which, it were un∣adviseable for the defending General to design it, and rui∣nous to attempt it.

Having thus set down my own opinion for giving Battel to a relieving Army, rather than to oppose it in a large and ordinary Line of Circumvallation, with the needful Cauti∣ons to be observed in choosing to do it; and having both by the reason of the thing, and by examples, endeavor'd to manifest why my opinion therein is taken up; and having also given my Reader nine general Maxims, which are to be observed in giving Battel; I shall now close this Chapter, and this Tome, with some other Particulars, which, in my be∣lief, are not unworthy his perusal; and seem to me fit to be observed, before, in, and after a Battel, as being built on Reason, or Experiment.

Before the fighting of a Battel, the Field Mark, and the Field Word▪ ought still to be given to every one of your men; the first is, That you may be able to distinguish afar off, who are Friends, and who are Enemies; the second is, That when you come to Rally, you may make your Rally∣ment of those onely who are of your own Troops; which else might consist partly of your Enemies men, who might, to shelter themselves, get into your Ranks, as if they were of your Army: And thereby not only preserve themselves, but also when you fight again, contribute to destroy you; by killing some of your Officers which lead you on, or by breaking your Ranks just as you were going to Charge, and thereby also save themselves when they had done you all the mischief they could; For in the hurry and confusion of a Fight, private Soldiers must have some very apparent Field Mark to enable them to distinguish Foes from Friends, else much mischief may too likely ensue.

And because such Field Marks, wherever you place them, are not still visible on all sides of the Head or Body of every one who wears them. The Field Word is also given; For it often happens that in a Battel, the Field Mark is by accident lost by many out of their Helmets, or Hats, and then if they had not the Field Word, they might be kill'd by those of their own Party who knew them not personally.

Besides, the Field Mark of each Army is seen by All of both Armies before they engage, and the matter of it, being to be had in all places by private Soldiers, (as a green Branch, a piece of Fern, or a handful of Grass, or a piece of white Paper, &c.) If you Rout your Enemy, he may, while he is pursued, take off his own Field Mark, put up yours in the stead of it, and so scape, if not do you hurt; But the Field Word he cannot know, unless it be told him by some of your own men; and therefore the giving of both before the Battel, must never be omitted. I remember once when some Forces I had the Honor to Command, obtained, by the blessing of God, the Victory against the Enemy; an Officer of mine, having kill'd an Officer of the Enemies, and finding he had a good Beaver, he tyed his own Helmet to his Saddle Bow, and put on so hastily the dead Mans Beaver; as he forgot to take out of it the green Branch which was their

Field Mark, and to put on a white Paper which was our Field Mark; and following the Execution with his Sword all bloody, a Captain of Horse of my own Regiment, taking him by his Field Mark for one of the Enemy, and judging he had done no little slaughter by his Sword being all gored to the Hilt, undertook him in the pursuit, and turning short on him, before he could see his face, ran him through and through with his Tuck, whereof he dyed in a few minutes. But finding the Enemies 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Mark had caused his death, he own'd his fault, and so acquitted my Captain from any Guilt.

Whatever can be done before a Battel to distract, or inti∣midate your Enemies Army, ought not to be omitted; some Examples of this way of proceeding I shall mention.

The Archd•…•…ke; before the Battel of Newport, having cut off several Companies of the Prince of Orange's Army (sent unde•…•… Count 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to secure some Passes on the way the Enemy was to march) caused a Trooper of his, on purpose, to be taken Prisoner, just as the Armies were going to En∣gage; who being brought to the Prince, did with a loud voice tell him, That Count •…•…st was defeated, and that im∣mediately the Battel would be given him; and exceedingly magnified, in the hearing of all which were present, the Numbers, Bravery, and Resolution of his own side; and though the Prince immediately caused his mouth to be stop∣ped, yet so many had heard what he said, as it was in an in∣stant diffus d over the States Army, and struck into it no lit∣tle damp, if not terror.

If the Ground admits of it, it were adviseable, if it can be done safely, the Night before the Battel to lodge in a Wood, or Coppice, or hollow Ground, some of your men, concealed on the Flank, or towards the Rear of your Ene∣mies Army; who by falling on just as you are engaging, or newly after you are engaged, may be of great benefit to you, and prejudice to him; as it was done in that great Bat∣tel between Ieroboam and Abijah and in many others: But then great Caution must be had, that the Enemy discover not this Ambush, lest he cut it off before the Battel, and there∣by weaken you, and animate his own Party, as it hapned to

the Suedes near Lind•…•…w in the Year 1632, and to many other parts of Armies in other Countries; For whoever goes upon designs, whose success depends on very fine, and nice management, must be exceeding wary, else he had bet∣ter never attempt them; and therefore though they may be, and have been practised, with good success, yet I am, in my own private judgment, no over-great Friend to any such Policies in War, where I may, in the management of them, be discovered, and not possibly know of it timely enough, to receive no detriment thereby: For where the Fate of a King∣dom, and the Lives of thousands are at stake, as in Battels the first too usually is, and the last alwayes is, I would still act on solid Reasons and Principles; and in Stratagems, em∣brace such methods only, as if they had success would be of great advantage; and if they failed, yet I should thereby lose nothing but my hopes.

The making a Speech by a General to a whole Army be∣fore a Battel, is often read of in our best Histories; as well as Romances; but ought, in my belief, to be onely found in the latter: since 'tis impossible for any General to speak au∣dibly, in an open Field, to above a Regiment at once; and if he makes an Harangue to every Regiment, he will employ that time in talk, which is more usefully spent in ordering his Forces, and in Action. Not but that I think it highly useful that the Officers and Soldiers of an Army before the Battel, should be told all that may heighten their Courages (as the Goodness of the Quarrel they fight in, the beneficial Con∣sequences of their Victory, the fatal Effects which must at∣tend their being worsted, the Honour they have gained in many an Action which is too precious to be all lost in one, &c.) But because I esteem such Orations impossible to be made by one, to many thousands at once; therefore I think it is the duty of a General, to infuse these Incentives to Vi∣ctory, into his chief Officers first, and then to order their imparting them convincingly to the subordinate ones, and those to inculcate them, on all occasions, into the private Sol∣diers, and especially on their Guards, and a little before they go to fight; and to do it but to a Troop, or a Company at a time; and in these wayes I do not only approve of such

Oratory, but esteem it very practicable, and highly useful before a Battel: Besides, when all the Officers thus discourse to their Soldiers, it shews an Unanimity which cannot be so practicably evidenced, when the General singly speaks to them.

The Shouting to the Battel is very ancient, and we read of the practice of it, in most Warlike Nations, as amongst the Iews in the time of David, amongst the Romans in the time of Caesar, &c. The English are so much inclined to it, as I have but once, in those Actions I have been in, seen them omit the doing it, as soon as ever they came within Cannon∣shot of the Enemy they were to fight with; and then I minded them of that Neglect, which they immediately amended; such shoutings bring not only a kind of terror on the Nations which do not use them, as being commonly an evidence of great joy in those who make them, but also it stirs up the blood and spirits before, and heats them during the Fight.

But though such Shoutings are useful going towards the Enemy, yet a deep silence must be observed by the Soldiery, when you are about to engage; that the Officers Orders, and the Words of Command may be clearly heard, and punctu∣ally obeyed.

'Tis observed that the Grecians went alwayes silently to the Battel; alledging for it, That they had more to do than to say to their Enemies.

But such Shoutings is a kind of doing, for it stirs up your own Men, and often damps your Enemies.

This puts me in mind, how that once marching in Batta∣lia in a plain Countrey to fight the Enemies Army, and as they marched in the like order to meet us, some Musketeers of ours running hastily to a Budge-Barrel to fill their Bande∣leers, and being careless of their Matches, the Budge-Barrel took fire, and blew them up; at which the Enemies Army shouted; and finding our Men did not answer them, I rid hastily to the next Squadrons, and Battalions, and command∣ed them also to shout; which the rest of the Forces taking it from them, repeatedly did: soon after, the like Accident happen'd to the Enemies Army, and then our Men shouted,

but were not answer'd; which I bid the next Troops to take notice of, as a sign they were disanimated; and a proof that their loss was considerable by that blowing up; the Sol∣diers took it as an Omen of that Victory which God soon af∣ter was pleased to give us: which seems to shew, That Shouting, according to the Soldiers understanding, is a token of joy; and the Enemies not answering it, an evidence of fear; and whatever may cause fear in your Enemy, ought not to be omitted by you, since Fear is truly said to be a Be∣trayer of that Succor which Reason else might afford.

Besides, there is in all Mankind a weak Part and Experi∣ence has but too clearly evidenced, that the difference be∣tween the Best, and the Worst Men, does not consist in those being totally exempted from the Influences, and Ope∣rations of it, but in the degrees of being less liable to it. Now this weak Part is affected with Noise and Pageantry, and therefore when the shew of danger is thoroughly im∣prest on the Intellect, by the conveyance of the Senses, the minds of Men are too much disturbed to be then actuated by the dictates of Reason.

The putting into Rank and File, and the forming into the order of Squadrons and Battalions, all the Men and Boyes which attend the Soldiers, and can be spared from the Bag∣gage, and are not armed, may be of good use; for all those so ordered, and placed at a competent distance, as a Grand Reserve in the Rear of all, make a formidable shew to your Enemy, and inclines him to believe you have a third Line, or Battalia, to be broken, before they can get the Vi∣ctory.

Nor is this all the advantage which may be derived from thus disposing of those useless Persons in a day of Battel; since thereby also, you will hinder them from filching the Soldiers Goods, while they are busie a Fighting; and will keep the Field clear, which you engage in.

I mention this last Particular, having sometimes seen the Soldiers Boyes, and the Drivers of Carriages, either incited thereto by natural Valor, or desire of Pillage, or both, so closely attend the Rear of their Masters who were fighting; that when they were disordered, it occasioned much hazard and confusion in the Rallyment.

But these appearances of Soldiers, must alwayes be put at such a distance from the Enemy, that he may not see they are unarmed, and consequently but a meer show; for then that will become ridiculous, which otherwise will be terrify∣ing.

Though I have already said in General, That if your Enemy be stronger than you in Cavalry, you must cover yours with your Infantry; and if he be stronger than you in Infantry, you must cover yours with your Cavalry; Yet possibly it may not be useless to set down, in some Particu∣lars, how those General Rules may be best practised.

If my Enemy did much outnumber me in Horse, and I him in Foot, I would flank every Battalion of my Shot with Files of Pikes; Nay, I would so order such of my Bat∣talions as were likeliest to bear the often Charging of the Enemies Cavalry, as that the Front, and Rear of my Shot in them, should be covered with my Pikes, as well as my Flanks; and under my Pikes, my Shot should be still firing, either keeping their Ground, or Advancing, or Retreating, as there should be occasion.

Nor would I omit if my Enemy very much overpower'd me in Cavalry, to place small Battalions of Shot, and Pike, so order'd, as is immediately before express'd, in the Intervals between my Squadrons of Horse in the first Line of my Wings: For to me it seems much more adviseable, if you mingle Battalions with Squadrons in your Wings, that such Battalions should be of Pike and Shot, so ordered, than of Shot alone, as is the usual method in such Imbattellings. For if such small Battalions consist of Shot only, the chief ad∣vantage you can derive from them, is, by their firing to dis∣order your Enemies Squadrons, just as you are going to Charge them; but if that fails of the hoped-for Event, whatever becomes of your Squadrons, these small Battalions are too much exposed to Ruine: for Shot onely, will not resist Horse in an open Field, especially when those Shot also, are disanimated by the Flight, or Routing of the Horse that had fought on their side.

Besides, I have found experimentally, That private Sol∣diers never fight, with the needful Courage, when they are led on such a piece of Service, as this of Firing on an Ene∣my,

and after to shift for themselves, if that Volly does not the Work; for then they do it in haste, and too often time∣rously; for even while they are firing, they are looking which is the best Way to flie, when they have done firing; which would too much distract Men of more setled minds, than private Soldiers are usually blest with: To which I shall further add, That Musketeers, so imbattled, and che∣quer'd, as it were, with Squadrons of Horse, may too likely, on the disordering of your first Line of Cavalry, be so shuf∣fled together by those of it that are Routed by those of your Enemy which pursue the Rout; and by those of your second Line which advance to stop the Enemies pursuit, that the poor Shot can neither be useful to their Friends, nor of∣fensive to their Enemies.

Whereas if those small Battalions be composed of Pike as well as Shot, and be ordered as is formerly set down, they will, (in the Spaces, or Intervals between your Squadrons) not only make almost as great Fire on your Enemies, but also fi∣ring under the Pikes, do it with less apprehension; and con∣sequently take their Aim the better, and thereby do the more Execution.

Besides, fighting with a Resolution to make good their Ground, composes their Minds, and makes them the more Resolute against their Enemies, and the more obedient to their Officers Commands; but what is most material of all, is, If your Squadrons should be disordered, nay, routed, yet such Battalions as these, will, for some time at least, keep their Ground, and with their Shot, if not with their Pikes, gaul your Enemy, while under their Covert, your Horse may Rally, and come again and again to the Charge, and possibly recover the day. Nay, it makes your Cavalry fight with more Confidence, when they know, that one, or more dis∣astrous Charges, may, by thus ordering some of your Infan∣try, be repaired by their own Rallying in the Rear of them; and those who know what belongs to War, will not be over∣forward to Charge the second Line of your Wing, leaving at once such Battalions of Infantry, and the disorder'd Caval∣ry Rallying at their backs; but on the contrary, will hardly judge it adviseable to attempt your second Line, till they have intirely swept out of the Field your whole first Line.

I did frequently, though unworthy of the Honour, com∣mand Forces in Chief, and therefore I esteem'd it my duty to be often thinking, and arguing, how they might be employed to the best advantage; and though in the Wars I was in, we alwayes were, or at least thought our selves to be, superior to the Enemy in Cavalry; Yet I was not seldom busying my thoughts, how we might best fight in case he should be at any time stronger than I, in Horse, and I stronger than he, in Foot.

The Result of those Thoughts I will presume to Present my Reader with.

The Checquering my first Line of Cavalry with small Battalions of Shot, I judg'd was not the most secure, or the most effectual way, and therefore I concluded the Impaling, as it were, my Musketeers by my Pikes, as is before-mentio∣ned, was much the better. And because whatever is new, and surprising to your Enemy, is still of considerable advan∣tage, especially at the instant in which you are going to Charge him; I resolved, had I ever had an occasion to do it, to have acted (when the Ground allow'd of it) as fol∣loweth:

I. I would have drawn up all my Cavalry a-breast, either two, or three deep, as I should have esteem'd it the best, as things were circumstantiated.

II. I would have appointed previously, what Squadrons should have composed my first Line, and what Squadrons should have composed my second Line, and what Officers should lead, or be in the Rear of every Squadron in both Lines, and have communicated to them respectively, my Or∣ders therein.

III. I would then have drawn up those small Battalions of Pike and Shot, order'd, as I formerly mentioned, just in the Rear of every such Squadron only, as was to compose the first Line of my Wing, and just as many in a Rank as might fill up the intended Interval when it was made; and have caused my Pike-men to trail their Pikes, that they might

not have been seen by the Enemy; which if shoulder'd, or ported, they would be.

IV. I would then have advanced towards the Enemy as if I had had no second Line, or Reserved Squadrons; but just when I was come so near him, as that it was time to form my first and second Line, I would, at the Trumpets sounding the Charge, (which should be the Signal for the doing it) have composed my said two Lines of my Wing, by the Squadrons of the Front Line continuing their motion, and by the Squadrons of the second Line making a Stand or Halt.

V. As the first Lines would be forming it self by the Squadrons of it continuing their motion, and the second Lines would be forming it self by standing, I would in the Interval of Ground made thereby, have caused my small Battalions of Pike and Shot behind every Squadron of the first Line, to march up, and made an even Front with the fame Squadrons in whose Rear they had till then marched; and so have begun the Battel, advancing with the Horse, and those Foot, my Shot firing under their Pikes inoes∣santly.

This I esteem'd would have been both new, and surpri∣zing; for it would have been thought strange by the Ene∣my, and likely have given him an ill opinion of my Con∣duct, to see me bring all my Cavalry to fight at onde; which the first Form of my advancing would probably make him believe was my intention: But when he unexpectedly saw that I composed my two Lines orderly in my advancing, it might amaze, and surprize him. And in all likelihood both those Productions might he heightned, when he should also see my small Battalions of Pike and Shot appear unexpected∣ly from behind my Squadron, and advance in an even Front with them to the Charge; so that his Horse singly, must en∣dure the joint shock of my Horse, Pikes, and Muske∣teers.

If this method of Checquering my Squadrons in the first Line of my Wing with small Battalions of Pike and Shot, order'd, as I have set it down, should be approved; and that

you have Infantry enough so to Checquer your second Line also, and that you shall esteem it necessary to have it done, by reason of your Enemies exceedingly overpowring you with Horse, you may also observe the like method of doing it in your second Line, as you did in your first, by having such small Battalions of Pike and Shot, drawn up, and marching in the Rear of those Squadrons which are to compose your second Line, who may advance by the Interval Ground, be∣tween the Squadrons to the Front of them, when by your first Lines continued motion, they have left the Ground free.

In the doing of all this, there are some Particulars I would recommend to be alwayes observed.

I. That your Pikes which are to be trail'd, during your advancing, behind the Squadrons, that the Enemy may not discover by those long Weapons what you would conceal from his sight, be ported as soon as ever you begin to appear between the Intervals, between which you are to march up, to make an even Front with your Cavalry; that thereby they may be the readier to be Charged against the Enemy, who will by that time be very near; and therefore such pre∣parative readiness to receive him, is very needful.

II. I would have all my Firelocks load their Muskets, with Pistol Bullets; for the Enemy against whom you Fire, will be alwayes very near; and therefore several Pistol Bul∣lets out of one Gun, will do as much Execution, as one Mus∣ket Bullet at a time, out of many Guns.

III. Those commanded Pikemen which are to impale your Shot, ought to be of the resolutest and strongest men; for on their Courages, will depend much of the safety of your Horse, and of your Shot; and therefore if I had Pike∣men armed defensively with Back, Breast, Pott and Faces, I would choose to place them there; since they are also to endure the shock of your Enemies Cavalry.

IV. The shot of these small Battalions, must be still be∣stowed on those Squadrons of your Enemies Wing which

compose his first Line; for those are the nearest, and the most pressing; and the Muskets being loaden with Pistol Bullets, they will not do certain Execution on any Squadrons of the Wing of his second Line, which are usually about 100 Yards less advanced than his first Line.

Lastly, If it be on your Right Wing that these small Bat∣talions of Pike and Shot are placed, then I would have them when they advance to Front even with your Squadrons, al∣wayes to do it to the Right of the Squadron they marched in the Rear of; and if it be on the Left Wing, alwayes to the Left: For thereby your Flanks of your outward Squadrons in each Wing, will be cover'd with Pike and Shot, and the innermost Squadrons of your Wings will be flank'd with the Battalions of the Foot of your Army.

Therefore if this be not stedily observed, your outmost Squadron of both your Wings, will be needlesly left un∣flank'd by a small Battalion of Pikes and Shot, which when you are much outnumbred in Horse, will be too hazardous, and therefore the preventing it highly adviseable.

I acknowledge I never practised this against an Enemy, but it was meerly because I never had need to do it, neither did I ever exercise my Men to it; and that proceeded only from an apprehension, that it might discover what I intend∣ed, in case there had been need, and thereby probably have made it less effectual. But I am confident it is very easily practicable, and to be made of very advantageous use, in case the Enemy were much my superior in Cavalry, and I stronger than he in Infantry.

But I submit this Notion to the judgment of those who are better able to determine of it, than I.

If your Army be stronger by much in Cavalry than your Enemies, and his stronger by much than yours in Infantry, I would then earnestly endeavor to fight both, or at least one of his Wings with both or one of my Wings; which I once did: and I would make all my Infantry move as slowly to∣wards the Enemy as they could, while I advanced a round trot with my Cavalry, and Charged that of my Enemies; And if I had success in both my Wings against both his, or

in one of my Wings against one of his, then I would make the next innermost Squadrons of my second Line of that Wing which had beaten the Enemies, or of both my Wings if they had defeated both the Enemies Wings, immediately march to flank my Battalions of Foot; but not to hazard Infantry to Infantry, till mine were Wing'd by some Squa∣drons of my second Line, and then advance to the Charge as expeditiously as I could, without disordering my Battali∣ons; thereby making my Squadrons doubly useful: And the Enemies Infantry must be resolute men indeed, when all their Horse are routed, and that they are to be Charged with all my Infantry, and divers Squadrons of my Cavalry, and are to be raked with my Cannon, which then may be drawn up for that end, if they are not soon reduced to furl their Colours, order their Pikes, and crave Quarter.

I would further, in case I were strong enough in Cavalry to do it, even before my Wings were fighting against the Enemies Wings, appoint some Squadrons of mine to draw up in the Rear of my Battalions, both to countenance my own Infantry, and the more to deter the Enemies from Charging them during the Engagement of all the Horse of both Armies: For it is the duty of a General to order all things as safely as he may, and to leave as little to what is cal∣led Fortune, as possibly he can.

The clearing of the Ground you intend to imbattel on of all such Squadrons, or Battalions, as your Enemy may have advanced on it, before you bring up your Battalions, and Cannon on it, ought never to be omitted, and ought still to be done by your Horse, and Dragoons, or with few, if any of your Infantry: For the neglect of this may hazard your Army; since the Enemy having the start of you, by getting part of his Army in the Field of Battel, before you get any of yours, he may thereby cut you off by peece-meal, while you are forming your Imbattelling; This I observed was carefully practised by the Prince of Conde before the Battel of Rocroy, and Monsieur de Gassion was commanded with his Cavalry to do that Work; which being effectu∣ally done, it did not a little contribute to the Princes Victory.

In the Imbattelling of your Army, I would still do it, (where the Ground admits it) by drawing up in one Line only all the Cavalry and Infantry, and not as I have seen some unexpert Commanders do, Draw up first a Squadron of a Wing, which was to compose part of your first Line, and then a Squadron of Reserve to it, which was to compose part of your second Line; and so in Sequence all your Squadrons and Battalions of your whole Army; for that method is te∣dious, and the just spaces of your Intervals between Squa∣dron and Squadron, and between Battalion and Battalion, cannot be so well adjusted by the Eye, as by the first filling up those spaces with the Soldiery; for the first is but Gues∣sing, but the last is Certainty.

I would observe this method not only in order to the bet∣ter, and more expeditious Imbattelling my Army if the Ground allow'd it, but I would also observe it as much as orderly I could in my advancing to the Charge, until I saw it time to form my two Lines by the continued motion of those Troops which are to compose my first Line, and by Alting of those Troops which were to compose my second Line, and of my third Line, if the Ground were so scanty as my two first could more than employ it all. And this not singly for the Reasons before exprest, but for this additional one also, viz. It being very difficult for many and great Squadrons which have Intervals, between every two of them to preserve the just Wideness of the Intervals if they march far; and if those Intervals are not duly observed, 'tis impossible to avoid one of these two mischiefs, either if they are contract∣ed during your Advance the Troops which at need are to march up through them will be disabled from doing it, or at least so many of them as cannot, will in their separating from those which can, be disorder'd, and too likely remain useless. Or if these Intervals be inlarged, your Flanks are thereby exposed to be fallen into by the Enemy, therefore in my poor judgment, that way is the very best, which will most likely prevent your being involved in either of them; and that is practicable and attainable I believe, by not ma∣king any Intervals, till almost you may have need of them, which by advancing all your Army in one Line, until you come so nigh the Enemy, as you judge is a fit time to form

your Lines in the manner before set down. And then the distance being so little between you and your Enemy, 'tis not likely (if but ordinary care is taken) that the Inter∣val Ground can be either much contracted, or much enlar∣ged, at least 'tis not so likely, that either of those Ills will be run into, marching over but a little Ground, as marching over much: and if but moving a few paces, the mischief is probably in some degree to be run into, then so much the more care ought to be taken, that as few paces may be so marched as possibly you can contrive.

I cannot see any solid Objection can be made hereunto, in reference to your Artillery, for those usually being drawn in the Front of your Battalions, till you come to place them where they are to do execution, they may be advanced still before the Front of your Army, though you should march it but in one Line till you come near the Enemy; but this, as all things I write, I shall chearfully submit to better judg∣ments.

If you are desirous to come to a Battel with your Enemy, and that he endeavors to shun it by constant Intrenched Campings, and by having good Magazines and Arsenals with or near him, and a plentiful Countrey at his devotion behind him, which is usually the best Game of him whose Countrey is invaded; for he has little reason to give you Battel, when by keeping unfought with, you cannot safely enter far into his Countrey, leaving his Army intire behind you; I say, in such a case, you ought, by often Removings, to try for an opportunity to give him Battel; for since he is to attend your motions, sometimes an occasion to fight him unexpectedly both to him and you may be offer'd you.

Sometimes also by your suddenly sitting down before a Garison of his, and endangering the taking of it, he may be induced to give you Battel, which he would not do, but in hope to prevent such a loss.

Sometimes it may be adviseable for you, (if you are much his Superior in strength) with as little Baggage as possible, and with as much Bread as your Men can carry, and with Herds of fat Cattle to be driven with you, (which last is a Provision that carries it self) to make Inroads into

his Countrey, both to destroy and pillage it, this may pro∣voke him to follow you, lest his Countrey esteem him care∣less in the defence of it, and thereby you may find oppor∣tunities to fight him.

And sometimes by your invading parts of his Territories, at a considerable distance from those places where he has formed his Magazines, either necessitate him to remove from them, or else expose to your Army those Countries of his which you fall upon. As Caesar by the like method drew Pompe from his Magazines and Fleet at Dirachium, and made him follow him into Thessaly, by which means Caesar won his famous Battel of Pharsalia.

I look upon it as a Maxim in War, never to have the Ar∣my of the Invaded Countrey to give Battel to the Invading Army, but on very great necessity, or on very great advanta∣ges; for the Invaded by losing a Battel, may lose his Coun∣trey; but the Invader by losing one, will but lose his Hopes, his Baggage, and as many Men as are kill'd in the defeat; and few discreet Gamesters will play their All against little or nothing comparatively.

Therefore as the Invaded must still be careful to avoid a Battel, so the Invader must still be forward to offer it, on any fitting terms; for should he not, nothing else will keep up his Reputation, which, of all humane things, ought most carefully, and jealously, to be kept up and increased in War.

In my private thoughts, I cannot readily believe, that any Kingdom can easily be Conquer'd, where the true Principles and Methods of War are alwayes observed, unless some great internal Revolutions of Affairs, or general Revolts of Subjects, should occasion such a misery.

And therefore whatever I have heard to the contrary, I freely own, I cannot be brought to believe, that this present fatal War kindled almost all over Europe, will have such great Progresses as some of more sanguine Complexions than

I am, have believed, or rather fancied; for though France has the formidablest League against it, that perhaps was ever yet made in Europe against any one Monarch of it, yet I cannot find the Advances of his Confederated Enemies are very considerable, nor can I believe they will be, for the Rea∣sons formerly mentioned in this Book, and also because he does by Intrenched Incampings, and providing timely and plentifully for his Armies to eat, frustrate, in effect, all the great Enterprises of his Enemies, which is practicably to per∣form the solidest Maxims of War; and whoever he be that can stedily observe them, will find the necessary benefits which will result to him thereby, unless a higher Power does turn the Wisdom of Man into Foolishness, and against that stroke, there neither is or can be any defence.

I shall now offer to Consideration three Particulars more, which are, I think, useful to be observed previously to a Battel.

The first is, That Orders be given that no chief Officer who commands a Squadron, or Commissioned Officer who leads one with him, have that Horse he Charges on, advanced above the length of his head, before the Front Rank of his Troopers.

My Reason for it is this:

Because if those who lead Squadrons to the Charge, be before the Front Rank, they either without cause adventure to be shot by their own Men behind them, or hinder some of them from firing, or which is far worse, when both Bo∣dies come to the shock, such as are out of the Ranks, and between both Bodies, are needlesly exposed, even when they are of most use to those Men they command, and consequent∣ly the whole Army.

In answer to this, I know some have said, It does not a little animate the Squadrons, to see the Officers which command them, lead them on eight or ten Paces before the first Rank, and then just as they are going to mingle to fall into it. But I must say, I believe good Soldiers need not such Airy Anima∣tions,

and the Bad will not fight well, though they have more substantial ones.

Besides, I believe it does rather Disanimate, than En∣courage Soldiers, who have any consideration, when they see those Officers, whose Conduct they relie upon, •…•…ive them so ill an impression of it, as doing a vain thing, by which also they may too probably incapacitate themselves to command their Men, when they are likely to have most need of being order'd to the best advantage, either as to their Rallying, if discomposed in the Charge, or an orderly Pursuit if success∣ful.

To which also may be added these two other Considera∣rations; If the Officers advancing some Paces before their Men, be a great Animating them, may it not be a greater Disanimating of the Soldiery, to see them, when ready to Charge, put themselves into the first Rank: For their going before their Squadrons while there is no danger, and the re∣turning when there is, will, in all likelihood, make the latter Action dishearten more than the former can encourage; for all Animations are more effectual, when the danger is at hand, than when it is remote.

When the Squadrons advance to Charge, the Troopers Horses and their own Knees are as close as they can well en∣dure, so that it will be impossible for the Officers to fall into the Rank if it be well wedged up; or if it be not, thereby to give them admittance, it may leave such Gaps in it as may hinder the close uniting of the Rank, which is so neces∣sary to make the Charge effectual, and commonly the Offi∣cers Horses being of the best and of the highest mettle, when they come among strange Horses, especially back∣wards, may by their fighting and kicking so disorder the Rank, that the Enemy is more likely to come in at the breach than they.

I would also strictly forbid all those who have the chief Command of a Squadron, to fight against any of the Ene∣mies Squadron, who should come out in a bravery to fight;

For who knows but the Enemy may send an ordinary Per∣son, but valiant, on such an Exploit, and if your chief Offi∣cer of a Squadron should engage with him, his killing of the other will signifie little, but his being kill d would much pre∣judice the whole Squadron, and possibly thereby the whole Wing, if not the whole Army.

Therefore still in such Pickeerings if they shall be judged necessary at all when Troops are ready to mingle, only such young Gallants should be allowed to be the Actors, whose deaths, if they should happen, will not be of such a Conse∣quence as the Fall of an Officer, who has the Honour and Trust to command a whole Squadron; For in War I am an utter Enemy for the sake of Showes to hazard Substan∣ces: And since the Nature of War •…•…ves but too much to Uncertainty, I would expose as little as might be of it to Choice or Capriciousness.

A second thing which I offer to Consideration is, That your Standards or Cornets Colours, in a day of Battel, be in the second Rank;

For these Reasons:

They are safer there than in the first Rank; and thereby the briskest of your Enemy has the least invitation to at∣tempt the winning of them.

The chief and solid Ends of having Standards or Cornets flying, is, That Troopers, if they are disordered in the Charge, may see under what they are to Rally; and it being a high disgrace to lose their Colours, it makes Men fight the heartilier against those who would cast it on them; there∣fore, in my opinion, those Cornets should still be placed in a Battel, both for the greater safety of them, and the better to answer the speedy Rallying under them, where they are most useful, and most secure; which last, I think, will be in the second Rank: For there every way that your Troop can be attack'd, it has a Rank between it and the Enemy to defend them, and all the Troop also to do it, being it is in the Centre of it.

A third thing I offer to Consideration, is, That when your

Enemy does very much overpower your Infantry, that the Battalions of Pikes which are in your first Line, may have only so many Colours flying at the head of them, as will serve to let the Soldiers see where respectively they are to Rally, in case of their being disorder'd or routed; For nothing does more excite an Enemy to push for Colours, than to see many, and near him; and since a few will serve to answer the need of orderly Rallying, why should there be more in the first Line.

All the rest of the Colours I would have flying at the head of your Pikes in your second Line, where they will be much safer; and when the smoke of the Cannon, and of the Small Shot is driven away by the Wind, or so attenuated, that your Enemies may see through it, the sight of so many Colours flying at the head of your Battalions or Stands of Pikes, casts a kind of dread on the Soldiery of your Ene∣my, who having been accustomed to see Colours guarded by full Companies, conclude those are the Pikes of so many in∣tire Companies, in your second Line, as they see Colours flying at the head of those Pikes, and makes them thereby even despair of vanquishing such a Force in your second Line, especially if they have been vigorously opposed, and much shatter'd by your first Line▪

If in Objection to this it be said, That in case you win the day, though you should for a time lose any of your Colours, yet as one of the many consequences of your Victory, you will recover the Colours you lost; and if you lose the Field, they will as certainly be lost in the second Line, as if they had been in the first.

To that I answer, It is a disgrace to have had for any time, any of your Colours in your Enemies possession; and who knows also as soon as any of them are taken, but some may convey them so expeditiously out of the Field, as though you get the day, you cannot get again your lost Colours.

Besides, I have known a defeated Army, at the close of the day, which has had some success in the beginning of it,

and had then taken some Colours by shewing which in Pla∣ces and Countries they retreated into, have persuaded the People they were the Victorious, and thereby have gotten the Recruits, for their shatter'd Troops, which nothing but such a Belief, grounded on such Evidences, could have pro∣cured for them.

During a Battel, or in it, it is the duty of the General still to send timely Succor to any of his Battalions, or Squadrons, and rather a little before than one moment after they need it.

And for that end to have several Gentlemen about him well known to the chief Officers of the Army, to carry to them on the spur the necessary Orders from time to time.

It is also his duty when he sees a breach in his Army, which nothing but his own presence can probably repair resolutely in person to lead those Troops which are to do it; but as soon as ever it is made up, then to return in per∣son to that station from whence he may see how all things go, that from thence he may timely send alwayes his requisite Orders.

He ought also neither too hastily to believe the Enemies Army is Routed, and therefore to command the general pur∣suit; for thereby he may hazard his dawning Victory: nor too slowly to order the Follow of the Rout, when he is sa∣tisfied it is Real and General; for else he may lose the best advantages of his success.

A General ought, when he sees a Wing of his Enemies Army palpably Routed by a Wing of his, to draw as many as he can well spare from the second Line of his successful Wing, to the rest of his Army, (leaving the rest to follow the execution) that by such help and such order he may intirely and more safely both defeat such of his Enemies as yet make head, and pursue those which are Routed.

He ought also never to think upon, much less order his Army in a plain Field to receive the Charge, but still to meet the Enemy in giving it. Pompey, in the decisive Battel of Pharsalia by the advice of Triarius, commanded his Soldiers to receive Caesar's Assault, and to undergo the shock of his Army, without removing from the place whereon they stood, alledging that Caesar's men would be disorder'd in their Ad∣vance, and Pompev's by not moving keep their Order; on which Caesar himself sayes, viz. In my Opinion this was against all Reason, for there is a certain Incitation and Alacrity of Spirit naturally planted in every Man, who is inflamed with a desire to fight, and therefore no Commander should repress or re∣strain it, but rather increase, and set it forward. And the Event justified Caesar's Opinion therein was well ground∣ed.

A General ought, when he sees the day irrecoverably lo∣sing, having first done his very utmost to recover it, to get to∣gether as many of his Soldiers as possibly he can, especially Horse, and with them to bring up the Rear; and make his ill success as easie as he can to his own Party; and if he have any Garisons which he doubts his Enemy may attempt in the heat of his Victory, to fling into such Garisons those of his Infantry which are left amazed at their defeat, thereby to stop the current, and give some check to the Victorious, while he is getting together the residue of his Army, the sooner to recruit it, and to try to recover afterwards what then he lost.

After the Battel is fought, and the Victory apparently won, a General ought to take great care, as is before set down, that the Pursuit be orderly made, and consequently the safelier; for which end I offer to consideration,

That the Cornets Squadron of every Troop be expresly forbidden ever to be of the loose Pursuers, but to keep al∣wayes intire, and follow as fast in order as they can, those of the other two Squadrons of it which are on the exe∣cution.

This I have practised, and found these three Benefits thereby:

First, Thereby the Standards of all Troops are still well secured, which ought alwayes to be carefully minded for I have known those of them of the victorious Party often in hazard to be lost, when out of too eager an haste to pur∣sue a flying Enemy, the Troopers of the Cornets Squadron have follow'd the Pursuit, and left their Colours unattended, or but slenderly guarded.

Secondly, The Cornets Squadrons of the first Line of your Wing, being still kept in order, and by being the nea∣rest to a flying Enemy, are much fitter to follow in a Body to countenance, and if need requires actually to justifie your Pursuers, than any Squadrons of your second Line of your Wing can possibly be; for the Enemy by his flight ha∣ving got the start, and Men who run for their lives doing it with their best speed, it will be almost impossible for those which are so much behind them as your second Line is be∣hind your first, ever to overtake them; wherefore such as are the nearest to them when they first begin to Run, are those only who most properly and most hopefully are to march in a Body, after those who dispersedly pursue; that the Enemy may immediately be Routed, if he begin to Rally, which nothing does more frighten him from attempt∣ing, than to see so near him so many Parties in good order to make him smart for it.

Thirdly, The more of the first Line of your Wing which in orderly Bodies can follow, to countenance and protect your Pursuers, the more you can spare of your second Line of your Wing, to join with others of your Army to defeat those of your Enemies which remain unbroken; and though in the Battel you should fight the Cavalry three deep, yet af∣ter your Men have absolutely Routed those they Charged, I would have every Cornets Squadron follow your Pursuers but two deep, whereby a Troop of 90 Horse having in eve∣ry Squadron of it 30 Men, the Cornets Squadron being drawn up two deep, will have 15 in each Rank, and having

a Standard at the head of them, will appear a full Troop to those who flie, and shall have but now and then time to cast a sudden look behind them, when seeing so many seeming entire Troops as there are Squadrons in a Wing of your Ar∣my, it will be so terrifying a Prospect, as few will dare to Rally, while they see it, and so near them.

After the Chace is finished, which ought still to be conti∣nued, as warmly and as far as may be, I esteem it an indis∣pensible duty in a General, even in the Field of Battel, to draw together all his Forces that he can, and with them cause to be returned to Almighty God, their most humble and hearty thanks, for his blessing, in his bestowing on them the Victory, and his preserving so many of them from death; for an unfeigned and publick Gratitude to God, is not only what Piety, but even what the light of Nature does teach, and nothing does more incline God to bestow future bles∣sings, than to have Men really thankful for the present, and to own him to be the onely Author and Finisher of them.

A Generals next care ought to be, to have his Wounded Men well tended, his Dead honourably buried, his Prisoners strictly, but civilly kept (and to have a true List of all;) to take publick notice of those who behaved themselves well, to rebuke such as did the contrary, to send Spies to discover what measures his Enemies will take in their Calamity, the better and more advantageously to form his own Counsels and Actions, and most vigorously to pursue his Point, while the terror of a Defeat is fresh in the minds of his Enemies; since 'tis as essential to a General to make the best use of a Victory, as to know how to obtain it.

I confess I have the more minutely insisted upon the pro∣tractive or fencing parts of War, by Intrenched Incampings, &c. because few of my Countreymen have made it mu•…•…h their study, but being carried on by the natural Genius and Hereditary Gallantry of the Nation, they are alwayes ready by true Valor expeditiously to determine their quarrels; and though this is highly estimable, yet I would not be ignorant

of other useful methods; for I know few Men use to travel on foot, that would not be willing to have Horses to lead in their hands, that when they are weary of Walking, they may by Riding on them come to their Journies end. And since Battels are what our Countreymen most breathe after, and long for in War, I have also the more particularly insist∣ed in this Chapter on what seems most materially, if not es∣sentially to be known Before, In, and After they are fought.

But after all that I have said on Battels, nay possibly after all that has been said, or has been practised in them, (could both those be known) it is my firm belief, that still very much will be, nay must be left to the Judgment and Presence of Mind of a General, and the chief Officers under him, whose actings must be order'd according to the circumstances present; in doing whereof most advantageously, no set Rules previously can be given, for they must be taken as the occasion is offer'd, and then resolutely and speedily pursued; yet what I have written, may possibly be of some use, to such of our less experienced Officers, as shall well remember, weigh and practise them, who may by their own more illu∣minated Reasoning, do as the Spaniards did, who though they ow'd the first discovery of America to Columbus, yet they ow'd the Riches they deriv'd from it, to their own fur∣ther improving, of what he had but laid the Foundation: And if this should be the Result of my Endeavors, I should esteem them happily employ'd.