A collection of miscellanies consisting of poems, essays, discourses, and letters occasionally written / by John Norris ...

A Letter concerning Friendship.

SIR,

1. TO your Question whether in propriety of speaking there may be strict Friend∣ship between a man and his wife, I answer first that the solution of this Question depends upon another, (viz.) what are the Requisites essen∣tially necessary to the Exercise of Friendship, and this Question likewise depends upon ano∣ther, (viz.) what is the true Notion or Idea of Friendship. This being rightly stated, 'twill be easy to discern what are the essential Requi∣sites, and consequently whether Man and Wife are capable Terms in this Relation or no.

2. Now as to the Idea of Friendship, I answer first in general, that Friendship is nothing else but Benevolence or Charity under some certain Modifications or accidental circumstances. Ac∣cidental I mean as to Charity, tho necessary and essential to Friendship. And thus far I think all Moralists are agreed. But now what these cer∣tain Modifications are, here they begin to be divided. 'Twould be too tedious a work to in∣sist here upon the variety of other mens Opi∣nions, and therefore I shall only briefly deli∣ver my own, which is, that all the Modifica∣tions of Charity necessary to the constitution of

Friendship may be well enough reduced to these three. 1. That it be in a special manner in∣tense, 2ly, that it be mutual, and 3ly that it be manifest or mutually known. Charity when cloth∣ed with these three Modifications immediatly commences Friendship. More than these it need not have, but of these not one may be spared, as will easily appear if you examine them se∣verally.

3. Now from this Idea of Friendship 'tis very obvious to deduce what are the Requisites ne∣cessary to Friendship, not in reference to its Idea (for that's already stated) but in reference to its Existence or actual Exercise, that is in one word, what are those Dispositions or Aptnesses in the Subject whether as to person, state or con∣dition, which may render it capable of Friend∣ship according to the foremention'd Idea. Now I say what these are may be easily collected from the Idea it self, as will appear if we consi∣der it distinctly according to those three Mo∣difications, and by applying the genus to each of them. For 1st whereas Friendship is said to be Charity in a special manner intense, hence I collect 1st, that it cannot be but between good men, because an ill man cannot have any true Charity, much less such an intense degree of it as is requisite to Friendship. So that Vertue in general is one Requisite. 2ly, hence I collect that a Friend must not be only according to the Character Lucan gives of Cato—rigidi ser∣vator

honesti, rigidly vertuous and honest, but he must be also 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a man of a liberal, sweet, obliging temper, one of those good men of whom 'tis said in Scripture (by way of con∣tradistinction to the Righteous or rigidly honest) that some would even dare to dye for them. For tho I may have common Charity, nay more, a great Esteem for a man of plain honesty and in∣tegrity, yet I can never love him with that spe∣cial intenseness of Affection which belongs to Friendship, unless he be also of a beneficent, kind and obsequious temper. So that good na∣ture is another requisite. 3ly, hence I collect that there must be also (at least in a competent proportion) an agreeableness of humours and manners, for unless the materials be of an apt and correspondent figure, the building can nei∣ther be compact nor lasting, so that likeness of disposition is another Requisite. 4. hence I col∣lect that true Friendship cannot be among ma∣ny. For since our faculties are of a finite ener∣gy, 'tis impossible our love can be very intense when divided among many. No, the rays must be contracted to make them burn. So that ano∣ther Requisite is, that the Terms of▪ this Rela∣tion be few in Number.

4. These are all the Requisites that I can think of at present deducible from the first part of the Idea (viz. Charity in a special manner intense) As for fidelity in retaining secrets, con∣stancy of Adherence and the like, I think they

are vertually included in the first Requisite, it being hardly conceivable how a man can be good and vertuous that wants them. But if you think the Reduction not so obvious, you may if you please add them here in the fifth place as distinct Requisites, 'twill be all one. Thus far of the Requisites deducible from the first part.

5. To proceed. Whereas it is further said that Friendship is a Benevolence that's Mutual, there is but one general Requisite deducible from this, which is, that all the other be found in both (or if more) in all the persons supposed to be Friends. The third of which importing Relation will of necessity be so, for all Similitude is mutual. Lastly, whereas 'tis said that Friend∣ship is a Benevolence mutually known, all that will be Requisite upon this head is, that the Persons who are to be confederated in this u∣nion, have such opportunities of Converse or Correspondence, that they may be satisfy'd of the Degree and Reality of each others love.

6. Having thus stated the Idea of Friendship, and from thence deduced all the necessary qua∣lifications in the subject for its entertainment, I think I may now from the Premises venture to affirm that there may be strict Friendship be∣tween Man and Wife. For which of these Re∣quisites is it that they must necessarily want? As for your Objection taken from their inequa∣lity, I grant Equality is wanting both as to Sex

and as to Conjugal Relation, but neither is all Equality necessary. 'Tis not absolutely neces∣sary that Friends should stand upon a Level, either in respect of Fortune, State or Condition. This sort of Equality I grant is a good Prepa∣rative for a more easy Introduction of Friend∣ship, and 'tis also advantagious to the lasting∣ness of it, but yet 'tis dispensable. 'Tis like levelling the ground betwixt two rivers, it makes way for a more easy union, but yet 'tis possible from Earthquakes, Floods or other con∣tingencies they may be united without it. The only equality that is necessary is an equality of dispositions, an harmony of affections, but this may be in persons of unequal fortunes and con∣ditions. I confess, there can be no such thing as Friendship between persons of different qua∣lity if the Superiour takes advantage of his pre∣heminence or Authority, for then 'tis true what the Poet says, Si vis Sexte coli, non amabo.

7. But then 'tis not the being invested with superiority that is inconsistent with Friendship (for then Kings who have no equals but those of other Kingdom's with whom they cannot inti∣mately converse, would be the miserablest Crea∣tures alive) but the habitual use and exercise of it, and the standing upon its priviledges.

8. But there is no necessity that it should be so. Friendship may level those whom Fortune has made unequal, and the greatest Monarch in the world may find Opportunities to descend

from the throne of majesty to the familiar Ca∣resses of a dear Favorite, and unking himself a while for the more glorious title of Friend. 'Tis but to apply this to the particular case in hand, and you have a Solution to your Que∣stion. And now Sir from the Theory of Friend∣ship I shall most readily descend to the Practise of it when ever you please to employ the ser∣vice of

(Dear Sir)

Your most real Friend and Servant J. Norris.