A collection of miscellanies consisting of poems, essays, discourses, and letters occasionally written / by John Norris ...

A Letter concerning Love and Music.

SIR,

TO the first of your Enquiries concerning the true Idea of Love, and particularly that between Man and Woman, and wherein it stands distinguish'd from Lust, my Answer in short is this. That Love may be consider'd ei∣ther barely as a Tendency toward good, or as a willing this good to somthing capable of it. If Love be taken in the first Sense 'tis what we call Desire, if in the second, 'tis what we call Cha∣rity or Benevolence.

2. Then as to Desire, there is either an Intel∣lectual or a sensual desire, which denomination is not here taken from the Faculty, but from the Quality of the Object. That I call here an In∣tellectual Desire whose object is an Intellectual good, and that a sensual desire whose object is a sensual good. And this is that which Plato meant by his two Cupids. The latter of these is what we call Lust.

3. But then this again signifies either abstract∣ly and indifferently (viz.) a bare desire of Cor∣poreal pleasure, or else concretely and immo∣rally (viz.) a desire or longing after corporeal pleasure in forbidden and unlawful instances.

4. These things being thus briefly premised my next Resolution is this. That the Ordina∣ry Passion of Love, that which we mean when we say such a man or such a woman is in Love, is no other than plain Lust, if Lust be taken ac∣cording to the first signification, namely, for a sensual Desire, or a Tendency toward a sen∣sual good. But if Lust be taken in the latter sense, as a Tendency to corporeal pleasure in unlawful instances, that which our Saviour meant when he said He that looks upon a woman to lust after her, &c. then 'tis not necessary that the Passion we here speak of should be Lust, be∣cause then 'twould be a sin to be in Love, and consequently, there would be a necessity of sin∣ning in order to Marriage, because no man is supposed to marry but whom he thus Loves.

5. And now to your 2d Enquiry, whether Music be a Sensual or Intellectual pleasure, be∣fore this can be determin'd, the Idea of a Sen∣sual and Intellectual pleasure must be stated.

6. And 1st I observe that the precise diffe∣rence of a sensual pleasure cannot consist in this, that the Body be pleased or gratefully affected, nor of an Intellectual that the Mind be pleased. For by reason of the strict union of Soul and Body, one so sympathizes with the other, that these pleasures are always Mutual and compli∣cated. So that there is no pleasure of mind that does not also recreate the Body, and no pleasure of Body but whereof the Mind has its

share. And thus far there is agreement and re∣ciprocation. That then which is peculiar and discriminative must be taken from the Primary∣ness or Secondaryness of the Perception. That Pleasure therefore is an Intellectual Pleasure when the Soul is primarily and immediatly af∣fected, and the Body only secondarily and by participation. And that is a sensual pleasure when the Body is primarily and immediatly af∣fected, and the Soul only secondarily and by participation.

7. Now according to this Measure we must of necessity define the pleasure of hearing Mu∣sic to be properly Intellectual. Because the Soul is the part that is then primarily and imme∣diatly affected, and the Body only by result. And that for this evident Reason, because Mu∣sic consisting formally in Proportion, and Pro∣portion pleasing only as understood, that part must be primarily and directly pleased which is capable of understandiug. But this is not the Body but the Soul. 'Tis true indeed the ear may be directly pleased by a single sound, as the eye is recreated by a single Colour (suppose green) and this I grant to be a pleasure of sense as much as smelling or tasting, tho not so gross. But the Ear may no more properly be said to be pleased with the Proportion of sounds, or with sounds as proportionate, than the eye is with a Picture.

8. If it be here objected, that Music is a plea∣sure

of Sense because 'tis convey'd by the Ear, I reply that if this be sufficient to make a Plea∣sure Sensual, the most Intellectual pleasures we are here capable of may be call'd Sensual, as reading fine discourses, contemplating the Beauty of the Creation, attending to Mathe∣matical Diagrams and the like, because all these as well as Music are enjoy'd by the Mediation of the Senses.

9. But it matters not tho the Senses be the Instruments of conveyance, so the Soul be the part directly and primarily affected, which is the case here. For tho the Ear may be pleased with those single sounds which with relation to each other are really Harmonical, yet it is not, it cannot be pleased with them as such, or in that Formality. This is the sole Priviledge of the Mind, which as it can only judge of, so is it on∣ly capable of being pleas'd with Harmony.

10. And thus Sir you have my sentiments with as much Brevity and Clearness as I could use, and it may be, as the Matters would bear. I have now nothing further to add, but to re∣new the assurances of my being

Your Friend and Servant J. N.