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I Let pass his Introduction, although very ob∣noxious to censure, and, first encounter his first Chapter, which seems to be the foun∣dation of what followes, but how unfit to support such a heavy building, will ap∣pear in the examining. The Title of this Chapter is Of Sense, and he begins with a definition of the thoughts of
Man single, which he saith (are, every one, representati∣on, or appearance, of some quality, or other accident, of a body without us called an Object.* 1.1) In this observe his first mistake, that he makes a mans thought nothing but a re∣presentation, and he brings no proof for what he affirms, nor answers such obj••ctions as are brought by Philoso∣phers against it; but, as if his Book were writ by him for the Novices of Pythagoras, and his authority were enough, he would have it swallowed without chewing; but that this is true in no thoughts of men, whether intel∣lectual, or sensual, is most apparent to him who shall consider, that when a man sleeps, or indeed is attent up∣on other business waking, although both visible and au∣dible objects are presented to him, yet he thinks not of them, nor discerns them; so that a mans thought is more then a representation. And to him who shall an∣swer, that this is for lack of attention, I object, he con∣futes himself, for then thought is not onely a representa∣tion, but something more, a cogitation of that man, which is an act of the soul; and certainly, as he him∣self phraseth it, the thought of man is an act of mans, but this representation is an act meerly of the object, and therefore cannot be the thought of man: It is true, that in every thought of man there is something appearing, but mans thought is not that apparition, but the appre∣hension of that appearance, and some way or other some judgment of it; the original or first thought is sense, con∣cerning which, he consents with the stream of Philoso∣phers, that nihil in intellectu quod non prius fuit in sensu, one way or other. But here he cites another Book, where he hath written more at large of this matter; I shall apply my self to both, that is named Humane Na∣ture, or the Fundamental Elements of Policy, chap. 2.
A mans thought some∣thing more then represen∣tation.