Observations, censures, and confutations of notorious errours in Mr. Hobbes his Leviathan and other his bookes to which are annexed occasionall anim-adversions on some writings of the Socinians and such hæreticks of the same opinion with him / by William Lucy ...

CHAP. I

Of Sense, its cause, &c. particularly of Sight.

Sect. 1.

I Let pass his Introduction, although very ob∣noxious to censure, and, first encounter his first Chapter, which seems to be the foun∣dation of what followes, but how unfit to support such a heavy building, will ap∣pear in the examining. The Title of this Chapter is Of Sense, and he begins with a definition of the thoughts of

Man single, which he saith (are, every one, representati∣on, or appearance, of some quality, or other accident, of a body without us called an Object.) In this observe his first mistake, that he makes a mans thought nothing but a re∣presentation, and he brings no proof for what he affirms, nor answers such obj••ctions as are brought by Philoso∣phers against it; but, as if his Book were writ by him for the Novices of Pythagoras, and his authority were enough, he would have it swallowed without chewing; but that this is true in no thoughts of men, whether intel∣lectual, or sensual, is most apparent to him who shall consider, that when a man sleeps, or indeed is attent up∣on other business waking, although both visible and au∣dible objects are presented to him, yet he thinks not of them, nor discerns them; so that a mans thought is more then a representation. And to him who shall an∣swer, that this is for lack of attention, I object, he con∣futes himself, for then thought is not onely a representa∣tion, but something more, a cogitation of that man, which is an act of the soul; and certainly, as he him∣self phraseth it, the thought of man is an act of mans, but this representation is an act meerly of the object, and therefore cannot be the thought of man: It is true, that in every thought of man there is something appearing, but mans thought is not that apparition, but the appre∣hension of that appearance, and some way or other some judgment of it; the original or first thought is sense, con∣cerning which, he consents with the stream of Philoso∣phers, that nihil in intellectu quod non prius fuit in sensu, one way or other. But here he cites another Book, where he hath written more at large of this matter; I shall apply my self to both, that is named Humane Na∣ture, or the Fundamental Elements of Policy, chap. 2.

But because I find some things in one, which are not in the other, errours enough in both, I shall treat of them apart, and first of this piece of Leviathan.

Sect. 2.

Here first he undertakes to set down the cause of Sense, as if it had but one (as indeed, by his Philosophy, it might seem to have) this cause he makes to be the ex∣ternal object, which presseth the Organ, proper to each sense, &c. this pressure he followes to the brain and heart, (I wonder which way from the eye, or ear, it gets to the heart,) there this pressure caused a resistance, or counter-passion, or endeavour of the heart to deliver it self, (mark now, the brain, which doubtless is the foun∣tain of sense, is left out) which endeavour, because out∣ward, seemeth to be some matter without; consider the strange uncouthness of this language; if there be such an endeavour which universally cannot be true, yet this endeavour is inward, although that which presseth it be put out; like a man who thrusteth another out of doors, that endeavour to thrust him out is within, although the man be thrust out, all his endeavour must be within, un∣less he follow him out of doors, which I think he will not affirm of the brain, or heart. Secondly, consider that it is impossible that the heart, or brain, should be so displeased with all apparitions, although they press them, as to endeavour to be delivered of them; for there are some things of this nature, as sweet Musick, Tast, Beauties in visible objects, in all senses some ob∣jects so grateful to the Organ, yea, heart, or brain, yea all, that they cannot chuse but delight in them, yea hug and embrace them with all kindness; if so, why should they endeavour to expell them? yes, (he may say) be∣cause

they presse them: I ask, how do the brain or heart discern that pressure? All discerning is either by sense or understanding, no understanding before sense, it must therefore be discerned by sense, and then sense must be before there be any sense, for he makes sense not to be, untill that which pressed be thrown out: These are un∣heard-of discourses amongst Philosophers; but his o∣pinions do confute that saying, Nihil dictum quod non fuit dictum prius; and therefore I must be excused for producing new objections to such opinions; consider then that last clause of the former sentence, (which en∣deavour, being outward, seemeth to be some matter without) First, I have shewed the endeavour must be inward; next, let us consider how this endeavour can appear to be somewhat without; according to him, this endea∣vour expelled that which pressed the brain or heart, but which way can this endeavour look like some matter without? I am confident that neither any other, nor he himself understands what he writ, but he would write somewhat to amuse a Reader; if he had said, the ex∣pelled Species, or I know not what he calls it, that which pressed did seem to be some matter without, it had lookt like reason, although but like it; but to say, the en∣deavour did seem to be some matter without, was a strange kind of unreasonable speech; but he goes on, and I mean to follow him close.

Sect. 3.

(And (saith he) this seeming or fancy is that which we call sense, and consisteth, as to the eye, in light or colour, &c.) this seeming, to what doth it seem? that which seems, seems to somewhat, either the soul, or the powers of the soul, the organs, or heart, or brain; now if it

seem so to any Agent whatsoever, that act on which apprehends this seeming, must be the sense, not the seem∣ing it self: (This seeming (saith he) to the eye, consisteth in light or colour figured,) if so, then, say I, it is true, that light or colour, figured, is sight; for when we say, a thing consists in any thing, we mean to expresse its nature; but to say, that sight is light, or colour figured; or that light and colour figured, is sight, is as much as ••o say, the under∣standing is a horse; or a horse the understanding; or un∣derstanding consists in a horse, because it is busied a∣bout it: It is true, understanding of a horse, doth re∣quire the being of a horse, or else it could not under∣stand it; and sight doth require light, or colour figured, but it cannot be said to consist in it, but as an object. He proceeds [All qualities, called sensible, are in the ob∣ject, that causeth them, but so many several motions of the matter by which it presseth our Organs diversly.] I will let passe this, because I shall have full occasion to speak of it in the second part, concerning his Element of Policy: He goes on, (neither in us are they any thing but divers motions (for motion produceth nothing but motion) but their appearance to us is fancy, the same waking or dreaming.)

Here is an Aphorisme (as if it were undeniable) but without any proof or reason of it to be received by the Reader, without examining for his authority; the Axiome is; That motion begets nothing but motion; a speech far from all truth in Philosophy; for were it not that there is an aim at quiet, there would scarce be any motion, Finis belli Pax, the end to which, and the end for which it is; but to say, it produceth nothing but mo∣tion, is against all the experience in the world; for al∣though in some, and most motions, it may be said, that the effect is not produced by the power of the motion,

but the vertue of that Agent which operates by motion, and whose instrument that motion is; yet that way that motion doth produce any thing, all things are produced by motion, Substances, Men, Beasts, Trees, Accidents, Colours, Quantities, Places, all whatsoever; but all these things are not motions, yea, this last, which is Place, and in which motions, and the effects of motions, are most sensibly discovered, is so far from being motion, that in our sublunary places there can be no motion in them, but onely motions to them; nor can they them∣selves be locally moved, for the place of every thing is the Ambient Superficies: Now that, with us, is either of Aire or Water, and if a man stir in any place, he ac∣quires a new place, and alters the old, so that in that place he stirs not, and you cannot remove the Ambient Aire or Water, but it alters his condition; so that un∣lesse he conceive that all things are motion, it cannot be true, that motion begets nothing but motion, for motion produceth all sublunary things. When he writ his Le∣viathan, there was motion, but this Leviathan, I hope, is not motion; it may, perhaps, in needlesse Readers, cause motion and commotion, but certainly it lies still under my paper at this time, and will do all this night. This is the strangest Proposition that ever was obtruded upon men, but I desist from it at this instant, perhaps to en∣large hereafter, although I think this abundantly enough. Where he addes, that their appearance to us is fancy, I deny it, but that act which discerns the appear∣ance, may in some sense be called fancy, I grant. What he addes afterwards, concerning the pressure of the eye, &c. I refer to another place, but mean not to lose it. At the latter end he censures all the Philosophy Schooles throughout Christendom, but he is not so se∣vere

against them, as to wish them an utter extirpa∣tion; he will hereafter reserve a room and office for them in the Commonwealth; but he lets us see, by the way, what things (when he is made Visitor General of all Christendom) would be amended. In the mean time I shall shew this use of Universities, that there may be alwayes a certain company of learned men in all Pro∣fessions, by whom, as by a Standard, all dangerous Do∣ctrines may be tryed, whether they be Orthodox, or useful to the Commonwealth, or no; which censure I am confident his Leviathan will never abide. And now I will examine this same businesse of Sense, as it is set down more at large in the second Chapter of his Hu∣mane Nature; Chapter 2. censures the 2. Chapter of Humane Nature.

Notes

• A mans thought some∣thing more then represen∣tation.
• Pressure of the heart, or brain, made by the external ob∣ject, not the true cause of sense.
• Not seeming, but some acti∣on, must be sense.
• Sight consist∣eth not in light or colour figured.
• Motion begets somewhat be∣side motion.
• Philosophy Schooles, and Universities, how necessary to Christen∣dom.