Observations, censures, and confutations of notorious errours in Mr. Hobbes his Leviathan and other his bookes to which are annexed occasionall anim-adversions on some writings of the Socinians and such hæreticks of the same opinion with him / by William Lucy ...

Sect. 6.

* 1.1First a person is a substance; by that Term it is op∣posed to all accidents, and things onely imaginary; it is an individual substance, by that Term it is opposed to those are called second substances, the general or sp••cial natures of substances, which are dividual into many of the same nature, as a Man, a Lyon; there are many of the same kind under each of these notions, but there are no more the same as one person; yet if perhaps that Term of Richardus de Sancto Victore might seem more fully expressing this business,* 1.2 which is (it is incommu∣nicable) he may use it, and by that may be denyed, that the Soul of man separated is a person; because, al∣though it is incommunicable, ut quod (as the Scotists speak) yet it is not absolutely, for it is communicable ut quo; which distinction may be thus explained; that thing is communicable ut quod, which communicate's its self wholly, and in recto, as they speak, so that it com∣municate's in such a manner, as a man can say another is this; so doe general or special, any universal natures, as we can say, Socrates is a man, a sensitive thing, and the like: but there are other things communicate themselves ut quo, when by them a thing receive's an addition of some nature, yet not such, as that we may say another thing is this, but that it hath this, or is made such, or such, by it: so whiteness, heat, coldness, or any form, the Soul of man, the form of any thing, these communicate themselves ut quo, by which that thing, to which they are communicated, may be say'd to be white, or have whiteness; to be hot, or have heat; not to be whiteness or heat; to be animated or have a Soul; but not to be that soul, and the like: thus they

say that the Soul of man, separated, is communicable ut quo, though incommunicable ut quod; it hath in its self an aptitude to inform the body again, though it be now separated; but, a person is absolutely incommuni∣cable. The last Term in this Definition is,* 1.3 that it is ra∣tionalis, of a reasonable nature: this word reasonable, must be understood, of any intellectual nature, whether by discourse or else, and so it comprehend's all, Di∣vine, Angelical, or whatsoever; and, if I am not de∣ceived, this mere exposition will satisfie all the Ob∣jections which have been made: that of Richardus who saith, this agree's to the Divine Nature, which is the Tri∣nity: No, saith my Definition, that Divine Nature is Dividual; communicable, to three persons; Scotus his first Argument, that it agree's with a Soul separated: No, say I, that is communicable ut quo. His second, which saith, that individuum must be of that is divi∣sible: I think, I might deny that Proposition; how∣soever to that which followe's, that God cannot be divi∣ded, I say, not into Beings or Natures; but, he is into Persons, and that without all Composition. His third, that this phrase Rational cannot be understood of God, is true in a gross sense, as no words we use, can, yet reason may, be affirmed of God in a superexcellent man∣ner, which excell's our knowledge or Discourse; and Angels, although they discourse not, as most think; yet they have an Angelical reason, which discern's, in a finer manner, those things without Discourse, which we doe by Discourse; nor is it necessary,* 1.4 that rationality should be bound up onely in the notion of Discourse, but may well be extended to all manner of knowledge, beyond beasts. Thus you may discern, what a person is estee∣med to be, amongst such as know how to define; and

Mr. Hobbes, if his hatred to the School and common Philosophy be not such as will not suffer him to read their Books, might easily have discovered this amongst them, and have not suffered himself to be transported with the imagination of how this word is used upon the Stage; onely (for which Valla and some such are called Pedagogues and Players,* 1.5 rather than Philosophers) in words, we are not alwayes to consider their Etymo∣logie, but how they are used; yet if we should goe to the Etymologie of this word, the most commonly re∣ceived amongst the Schools is significant of the true use, which is per se una, a person, because it is by its self one; nor are we to consider onely how words have been used, but how they are now in our English; formerly a Knave signified a servant, now a dishonest man; Baw∣dery signified onely bravery, now obscenity, with hun∣dreds of the same nature: So that since the Exposi∣tion, which I have given of this word Person, is that which you shall find alwayes to be the meaning of it when it is used amongst Philosophers, when he give's another sense of it, he ought to have shewed more reason for it, then he hath. But he hath a Design in it: I will therefore consider that.

Notes

• * 1.1

  The Definiti∣on explained and vindica∣ted by the Bishop.
• * 1.2

  The Distincti∣on of Commu∣nicable ut quod and ut qu••.
• * 1.3

  Reasonable, of what extent.
• * 1.4

  The Philoso∣phers ••nd School-men could have r••ctified Mr, H••bbes's mis∣take of a person.
• * 1.5

  The Etymolo∣gie and com∣mon a••ception of Persona.