is too large, because it agree's to that which is not a Person, as the Divine Essence; for, saith he, this Divine Essence is the Trinity, which is not one Person. In ••is 24 cap. he give's another Definition: Persona est per se existens, solùm juxta singularem quendam rationalis exi∣stentiae modum: A person is a thing existing by its self onely, according to a single manner of a reasonable exi∣stence: if he had expounded, what this singular manner of a reasonable existence is, by which we might have discerned how the manner of existing had been divers from others, he had acted somewhat that we might have understood his meaning; but, as it is, will be ve∣ry hard: and this learned man (I see) but little follo∣wed; onely his Countrey-man Scotus in 1 mum senten. distinc. 23. quaest. unica, with his Sect make other Ob∣jections against this Definition, because (saith he) by this Definition, the Soul of man, separated from the body, should be a person, for it agree's to that Soul; but that the Soul separated is a person, is denyed by him, as indeed by most, although affirmed by some very lear∣ned, as the Master of the Sentences himself, and others: again, saith Scotus, by this Definition, there would be no Person in God, because individuale cannot be where is no Dividuum, a dividible thing, which cannot be af∣firmed of God. Again, this phrase, rationalis naturae, onely agree's to man, not to God, or Angels, whose knowledge is after a more excellent way, than by ratio∣cination and discourse. These are the main Objections of Scotus, and his followers, which I would answer im∣mediately in their order, but that I think the bare ex∣plication of Boethius his Definition will doe it, with∣out more business, which thus I doe.