Observations, censures, and confutations of notorious errours in Mr. Hobbes his Leviathan and other his bookes to which are annexed occasionall anim-adversions on some writings of the Socinians and such hæreticks of the same opinion with him / by William Lucy ...

CHAP. XXX.

A Person what, and what to personate. Boethius's defini∣tion explained and asserted. Of keeping and breaking Covenants. The true God personated neither by Moses, nor any else. The Israelites, whose people.

Sect. 1.

THIS Chapter I should wholly have let pass, but that, by a few weak Grammatical Notes, the plot of it seeme's to be aymed at most pro∣fane and wicked purposes: for that reason I must cen∣sure it, as not befitting a Christian Writer, and in its self containing many dangerous falsities; he begin's it thus:

[A person is he, whose words or actions are considered, either as his own, or as representing the words or actions of another man, or any other thing, to whom they are attribu∣ted, whether truly or by fiction.] Reader, here is a strange Definition; Definitions should be short, without un∣necessary Circumstances, of which this is composed: I will make it shorter for him, in his own sence; A per∣son is he who doth or speake's any thing; and this is as full as his; for whosoever doth or speake's, his words or

deeds are considered either as his own, or anothers; or he might have say'd, it is a particular man, for actions or speeches of every particular man are either considered as his own, or representing another man, or thing; so that his tedious description might, without such cir∣cumstances, have been cut shorter, and have had the full expression of his intendment. But because Mr. Hobbes will speak pertinently, and be clearly understood what he meane's, he proceede's with a distinction.

Sect. 2.

[When they are considered as his own (that is, those actions or words) then is he called a Natural Person: and when they are considered as representing the words and acti∣ons of another, then is he a feigned or artificial person.] Thus may a man be distinguished into a true and coun∣terfeit man; and no more than the picture or the image of a man is a true man, no more is a feigned or artificial person, a true person; and yet this feigned or artificial person doth as fully agree to his definition, as the true person; which shewe's the Definition to be to blame: The Metaphysicians have an undoubted Axiom, that ens and verum convertuntur; what is not truly such, is not such. If then such a man, whom he name's, be but a feigned person, he is not a person truly, and then not a person; yet we shall find him endeavouring to set him out, as the onely true person, presently after∣ward with his Grammar Rules.

Sect. 3.

[The word person (saith he) is Latine.] Sir persona is Latine, person is English; if he had sayd, person had been derived from the Latine, it had been Truth; but

to say, person is Latine, is false; persona in no case is person, [instead whereof the Greeks have 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,] it is true they have, and those two in Greek and Latine are, by the use of speaking, most strictly in these two Langua∣ges appropriated, to signifie this which we call person in English; there were other words often used to the same purpose. The Grecians used 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and the La∣tines Suppositum, which in time (for words,

—juvenum ritu florent modò n••ta vigentque

) grew out of esteem, and now signifie other subsisting substances, and those two former have gained, in the language of Divines, the expression of that which we in English call person; and there was reason for it, be∣cause the latter have been frequently used, by Divines and Philosophers in antient times, for other things be∣sides persons; and so now, to avoyd equivocations or tedious Descriptions, both Divines and Philosophers speak both of suppositum and hypostasis, in a general na∣ture, as belonging to all other substances; but persona and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as peculiar to reasonable substances, so that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is a reasonable 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and persona a rea∣sonable suppositum. He goe's on with [which (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,) signifie's the face, as persona in Latine signifie's the dis∣guise.] This is true, consented unto by all Gramma∣rians; but use of words in divers matters, and divers arts, is divers: First in the Art of Grammar, we find but three persons, I, thou, and he. Secondly, in Civil Law, we sometimes find it the quality of a man, as rich, or poor; In Canon Law a Dignity, Bishop called person, &c. in Metaphysicks and Divinity, a reasonable subsistence; which is totally neglected by Mr. Hobbes, as some other acceptations: so that, when he had so debated, in such a large Discourse, upon the sense of the word, he was

to blame, in dwelling onely among the Players, to have omitted the use of this Word in so many Sciences. Consider the result of this horrid Criticism.

Sect. 4.

[So (saith he) that a Person is the same that an Actor is, both on the Stage and in common Conversation; and, to personate, is to act or represent himself or another:] This is it I foretold you of, that although a feigned thing cannot be a true thing, yet he make's the feigned onely the true, and the representor onely to be the true person, not to be, who is represented; and although in his Definition he sayd, That [a Person is he whose words or actions are considered as his own, &c.] and in his fol∣lowing division there was a natural and a feigned per∣son; yet here he make's all persons feigned, and their words and actions to be others: If he answer, that his words were [represent himself or another] then if he act himself, it is enough to constitute him a person.] I re∣ply, that what it is to act himself, he hath expressed in the words immediately preceding, [a Person is the same that an Actor is, both on the Stage and in common conversation:] Now no man can properly be say'd to act himself, or represent himself; for the Actor and the acted, the Representor and the represented, are two. He proceed's, [and he that acteth another is say'd to bear his Person, or act in his name:] very true, but if he beare's another's person, the other is the person, not he that beare's it: The Constable beare's, represent's the person of a King, but is not his person; so doth a Player; this make's all against himself, and so doth that which fol∣lowe's, [In which sense Cicero useth it, where he sayes, Unus sustineo tres personas; Mei, Adversarii, & Judi∣cis:

I bear three persons; Mine own, my Adversaries, and the Judges:] and it is likely he might say so truly, but he doth not say, I am three persons, but I bear three, or act them; they were the persons, whose parts he acted, at that time; not he who acted them; the persons which he bare, and he who bare them, are divers; thus he o∣verthrowes himself, when he labour's to shew, that the Representor is the person; but his Argument prove's onely the represented to be the person; and this we shall find in the antient Tragedyes and Comedyes put out. The Critick, which put••s them out, calle's the persons those which were represented, not the Actors, as is to be seen in Seneca and Terence, &c. not that I deny, this word hath sometimes been used by Writers, as Mr. Hobbes expresseth it: but I deny that that is the universal acception of that word; or that Mr. Hobbes his Argument doth shew, that it was ever so accepted: but rather clean contrary; the person is he who is repre∣sented, not the Representor. But now it will become me to shew the right use of the word, and how it may and must be used otherwise than Mr. Hobbes direct's.

Sect. 5.

A person then, taken in the most received conceipt, that Divines and Philosophers acknowledge, is defined by Boethius, de duabus naturis, to be rationalis naturae individua substantia: An individual substance of a ratio∣nal nature: This Definition is most generally received, and I doubt not, but it will abide the Test, when it is clearly explained, which I shall endeavour to doe; only Richardus de Sancto Victore gave it a rub, and make's men pause a while to explain it; for he, in his fourth book de Trinitate, cap. 21. object's against this, that it

is too large, because it agree's to that which is not a Person, as the Divine Essence; for, saith he, this Divine Essence is the Trinity, which is not one Person. In ••is 24 cap. he give's another Definition: Persona est per se existens, solùm juxta singularem quendam rationalis exi∣stentiae modum: A person is a thing existing by its self onely, according to a single manner of a reasonable exi∣stence: if he had expounded, what this singular manner of a reasonable existence is, by which we might have discerned how the manner of existing had been divers from others, he had acted somewhat that we might have understood his meaning; but, as it is, will be ve∣ry hard: and this learned man (I see) but little follo∣wed; onely his Countrey-man Scotus in 1 ^mum senten. distinc. 23. quaest. unica, with his Sect make other Ob∣jections against this Definition, because (saith he) by this Definition, the Soul of man, separated from the body, should be a person, for it agree's to that Soul; but that the Soul separated is a person, is denyed by him, as indeed by most, although affirmed by some very lear∣ned, as the Master of the Sentences himself, and others: again, saith Scotus, by this Definition, there would be no Person in God, because individuale cannot be where is no Dividuum, a dividible thing, which cannot be af∣firmed of God. Again, this phrase, rationalis naturae, onely agree's to man, not to God, or Angels, whose knowledge is after a more excellent way, than by ratio∣cination and discourse. These are the main Objections of Scotus, and his followers, which I would answer im∣mediately in their order, but that I think the bare ex∣plication of Boethius his Definition will doe it, with∣out more business, which thus I doe.

Sect. 6.

First a person is a substance; by that Term it is op∣posed to all accidents, and things onely imaginary; it is an individual substance, by that Term it is opposed to those are called second substances, the general or sp••cial natures of substances, which are dividual into many of the same nature, as a Man, a Lyon; there are many of the same kind under each of these notions, but there are no more the same as one person; yet if perhaps that Term of Richardus de Sancto Victore might seem more fully expressing this business, which is (it is incommu∣nicable) he may use it, and by that may be denyed, that the Soul of man separated is a person; because, al∣though it is incommunicable, ut quod (as the Scotists speak) yet it is not absolutely, for it is communicable ut quo; which distinction may be thus explained; that thing is communicable ut quod, which communicate's its self wholly, and in recto, as they speak, so that it com∣municate's in such a manner, as a man can say another is this; so doe general or special, any universal natures, as we can say, Socrates is a man, a sensitive thing, and the like: but there are other things communicate themselves ut quo, when by them a thing receive's an addition of some nature, yet not such, as that we may say another thing is this, but that it hath this, or is made such, or such, by it: so whiteness, heat, coldness, or any form, the Soul of man, the form of any thing, these communicate themselves ut quo, by which that thing, to which they are communicated, may be say'd to be white, or have whiteness; to be hot, or have heat; not to be whiteness or heat; to be animated or have a Soul; but not to be that soul, and the like: thus they

say that the Soul of man, separated, is communicable ut quo, though incommunicable ut quod; it hath in its self an aptitude to inform the body again, though it be now separated; but, a person is absolutely incommuni∣cable. The last Term in this Definition is, that it is ra∣tionalis, of a reasonable nature: this word reasonable, must be understood, of any intellectual nature, whether by discourse or else, and so it comprehend's all, Di∣vine, Angelical, or whatsoever; and, if I am not de∣ceived, this mere exposition will satisfie all the Ob∣jections which have been made: that of Richardus who saith, this agree's to the Divine Nature, which is the Tri∣nity: No, saith my Definition, that Divine Nature is Dividual; communicable, to three persons; Scotus his first Argument, that it agree's with a Soul separated: No, say I, that is communicable ut quo. His second, which saith, that individuum must be of that is divi∣sible: I think, I might deny that Proposition; how∣soever to that which followe's, that God cannot be divi∣ded, I say, not into Beings or Natures; but, he is into Persons, and that without all Composition. His third, that this phrase Rational cannot be understood of God, is true in a gross sense, as no words we use, can, yet reason may, be affirmed of God in a superexcellent man∣ner, which excell's our knowledge or Discourse; and Angels, although they discourse not, as most think; yet they have an Angelical reason, which discern's, in a finer manner, those things without Discourse, which we doe by Discourse; nor is it necessary, that rationality should be bound up onely in the notion of Discourse, but may well be extended to all manner of knowledge, beyond beasts. Thus you may discern, what a person is estee∣med to be, amongst such as know how to define; and

Mr. Hobbes, if his hatred to the School and common Philosophy be not such as will not suffer him to read their Books, might easily have discovered this amongst them, and have not suffered himself to be transported with the imagination of how this word is used upon the Stage; onely (for which Valla and some such are called Pedagogues and Players, rather than Philosophers) in words, we are not alwayes to consider their Etymo∣logie, but how they are used; yet if we should goe to the Etymologie of this word, the most commonly re∣ceived amongst the Schools is significant of the true use, which is per se una, a person, because it is by its self one; nor are we to consider onely how words have been used, but how they are now in our English; formerly a Knave signified a servant, now a dishonest man; Baw∣dery signified onely bravery, now obscenity, with hun∣dreds of the same nature: So that since the Exposi∣tion, which I have given of this word Person, is that which you shall find alwayes to be the meaning of it when it is used amongst Philosophers, when he give's another sense of it, he ought to have shewed more reason for it, then he hath. But he hath a Design in it: I will therefore consider that.

Sest. 7.

Page 81. about the top of the leaf he saith [Of per∣sons artificial some have their words and actions owned by those whom they represent; and then the Person is the A∣ctor; and he that owneth his words or actions, is the Au∣thor] I am of another mind, not the Actor, but the acted is the person, as will appear manifestly: A Con∣stable hath his actions, and his words, legally spoke in the King's name, owned as the King's; yet he is not

the person of the King, but the King, in his own person, act's by him; he beare's the person, represent's the per∣son of the King: but the King is the person, he the Actor or Representer: the Author, according to his phrase, is the person, not the actor. I commend his observa∣tions, upon Authority, and what followe's in that page, onely I can by no meanes approve what he saith, in the middle of that page.

Sect. 8.

When the actor doth any thing against the law of Nature by command of the Author, if he be obliged by former Co∣venant to obey him, not he, but the Author breaketh the Law of Nature.] This is very erroneous, or else it make's an impossible supposition, for this supposition [if he be obliged by a former Covenant] must either be understood, that some former Covenant had power to bind him to doe this act against the Law of Nature, and that is impossible: for no Authority, but that of the God of nature, can have right to crosse the Law of Nature; and then it is most consonant to the Law of Nature, to obey him contrary to all Covenants, made to any other, by any authority, yea even of God himself; and upon this ground the obedience of Abraham to sacrifice his onely Son (which was as cross to Nature as any thing could be) was most honourable; or else must be understood, that some Covenant, of one man to another, of generall obedience, in all things should have power to oblige him to breake the Law of Nature, upon such a man's command; and then it is most wicked; First, it is sinfull to make such a Cove∣nant; and it is doubly wicked, to keep it: for when a man make's such a bargaine, it is supposed to be in li∣citis

et honestis, in lawfull and honest things, not against the Law of Nature; yea, should a man, in expresse termes, Covenant or bargaine, in particular, to doe this in∣dividual thing which is unlawful, he were bound to re∣pent, and not to doe it: his reason, he give's for the Conclusion, is not strong enough to enforce it, which is.

Sect. 9.

For though the Action be against the Law of Nature; yet it is not his: but contrarily, to refuse to doe it, is against the Law of Nature, that forbiddeth breach of Covenant] This answer consist's of two parts, I shall examine them distinctly: First he saith [it is not his] that is, his that doth it; he put's these relative termes very doubt∣fully; to this I reply, if it be not his, he is not respon∣sible for not doing of it: for no m••n can be responsible for that which belong's not to him, for any act, but what is his own; that which he hath not power and Authority to doe, his doing is not vertuous, nor his not doing viticus; so that the first part of his answer destroye's the second, which make's the Law of Nature to act against the Law of Nature, when he hath cove∣nanted to doe it; but certainly those actions are the actors owne acts, and he shall answer for them, be blessed or cursed for them; and because a man owe's obedience to God onely, and to men, onely for God's sake, therefore whatsoever any man shall command, contrary to Gods Law written in the Bible, or the nature of man, is a sin against God: and disobedience to men commanding against the Law of God, is true obedience with God. See one Instance in the first of Exodus, be∣gin the Story, at the fifteenth verse you shall find Pha∣raoh commanding the Hebrew Midwives, that they

should destroy ••he Male Children of the Hebrews: it is said in the 17 verse, the Midwives feared God and did not as the King of Egypt commanded, and in the 21. verse it is said, because the Midwives feared God, that God made them houses, that is, blessed them: here it is evident, that when a Command was given, to act that horrid sin of murder, which is against the Law of Nature, God blessed those persons who feared God more then men, and would not be actors in that which was against the Law of Nature, to destroy innocent Children: nor can Mr. Hobbes have any evasion, to say, they had not cove∣nanted to doe this act, for it is exceeding probable that when Pharaoh commanded them to doe it, he would not have dismissed them without a promise; as it is rea∣sonable to think, when he convented them, and char∣ged them with their fault, they would have excused themselves with saying, they did not promise; but be∣sides this Mr. Hobbes a little after this (which I intend to treat) teacheth, that every Subject make's a Cove∣nant with Leviathan, to owne his actions and obey him; now then although there were no other Cove∣nant, these Midwives living under that Government, where Leviathan Pharaoh commanded it, they had co∣venanted to obey him, yet God blessed them, be∣cause they did not; So that, it seeme's their actions were their own, for which God blessed them, though contrary to the command of Pharaoh.

Sect. 10.

The second part of his answeare is this [But contrari∣ly to refuse to doe it (that is, what is commanded.) is against the Law of Nature that forbiddeth breach of Cove∣nant] It is true, that the breach of Covenant considered,

in its self, is against the Law of Nature; for a man by Covenant give's away his liberty of using, or acting that thing for which he covenanted, otherwise then by his Covenant: but consider now, if a man, that hath ali∣enated away formerly his right to an estate, or had no right to it, should make a deed of that estate to ano∣ther man, such an act could be of no benefit to that other: This is that man's case who shall Covenant to act against the Law of God, written in books or hearts; he cannot covenant to doe it, it is voyd ipso facto, it is God's due, and he cannot alien it, and what he shall act, according to such a Covenant, is wicked, the very pretence to have power to doe it, is a Conspiracy against God and his right of Dominion over us: so that there can be no breach of such a Covenant, which had no right to tye or bind any man; that Conclusion therefore was a great mistake of Mr. Hobbes, and is justly censured here, because conducing to other ill Consequences hereafter.

Sect. 11.

In the 82. page, having discoursed of many things which may and may not be personated, towards the midst of that page, he saith that [the true God may be personated] This phrase gave me an amazement: for I cannot call to mind any such expression made either in Scripture, or Orthodox ecclesiasticall writers, and, under∣standing personating in that sense that Mr. Hobbes doth, to say, the Actor is the person, it was too boldly affirmed by him (I think) without any ground; had he spoke of the true God, as he did before of Idols, to say, man might be trusted for those Gods, in things which are dedicated to pious uses, and so, in the place of God, receive

and dispose such Legacies, and, in that sense, say, they personate God, quoad haec; thus farre there might have been some excuse; but to say, that the true God may be personated by any thing which is not God, was too great an exaltation of the Creature, and diminution of his ex∣cellency; but yet thus he doth, as appear's by his In∣stance [as he was; first by Moses, who governed the Israe∣lites (that were not his, but Gods people) not in his own name with hoc dicit Moses, but in Gods name with hoc dicit Dominus] first by Moses. I am perswaded, he can never shew me, that the true God was ever personated by Moses, A man may be instead of God, in divers Offi∣ces; to the poor are in the room of God, instead of his hands, receive in God's stead those Almes which, for Gods sake, are given them; Kings, and those which are in Authority, are in God's stead, to govern and rule us, and therefore we make conscience of obedience to them, because for this purpose they are ordained of God: Priests are loco Dei, in the place of God, in Sacris, holy Duties; so that they open or shut the gates of heaven, absolve and bind m••n, and he that despiseth them, in those holy dispensations, despiseth Christ himself; but, none of these can be say'd to personate God, nor can any Creature doe it; he who personate's God, must represent an infinite Excellency, infinite in Power, infinite in Wisdome, &c. yea must represent an unspeakable, an incommunicable, unexpressible, an unrepresentable excellency, which is impossible: If Mr. Hobbes had say'd, that some men, as Moses, were Messengers of God, as the Apostles; Embassadors of God, to deliver or act his will amongst us, he had say'd a∣right; but to make them personate him, sound's too high for a finite Creature in his sense.

Sect. 12.

I know Exodus 4.36. it is said by God to Moses, That Aaron should be his Spokes-man to the people; he should be to him instead of a mouth; and Moses should be to him instead of God. And again, Exodus 7.1. See I have made thee a God to Pharaoh, and Aaron thy Brother shall be thy Prophet. By the understanding these two places, I think may be cleared whatsoever can be say'd, for Mo∣ses his personating God; for that which concern's h••s being a God to Aaron, we may observe, that he could be no otherwise a God to Aaron, then Aaron was a Mouth to Moses; the same words are used to both: How was he a mouth, but by speaking, and delivering those things which Moses directed? the same way was he a God to Aaron, by directing Aaron, such things as God directed: so as the people need not doubt, but what Aaron spoke was by the Direction of Moses; so Aa∣ron need not doubt, but what Moses appointed him to doe, or speak, was the will of God; and it is remarkable, that in both these places, the word used for God is ELOHIM, which is a name given often to Kings and Princes, to men in Authority, so in particular; not to multiply the places, in the 22 of Exodus, 28. Thou shalt not revile the Gods, that is the Princes, so thou shalt be to him as God, or a Prince; howsoever, the place enfor∣ceth no more, but that Moses should be so a God, as Aaron was his mouth, that was, to deliver his will; this is not to personate or represent him as a person. The second place is as cleare, where Moses is said in the 7 Chap. 1. to be made a God to Pharaoh. The storie is thus; Moses had something of man in him, and was a∣fraid to goe to Pharaoh: be not afraid of him, saith God

to him, as he is above thee without me, so thou shall be above him with me; I can rule him, thou shalt be a God to him: thou shalt terrify him with signes and wonders, and Aaron thy brother shall be thy Prophet, that is, deliver thy words, as it is expounded in the following verse; or else we may take Elohim, in the other sense, for a Prince or King; so, I have made thee a King or Prince over Pharaoh, thou shalt have power over him, as he over his subjects; but, which way soever, he is but enabled by God, for certain workes; and we may take another observation; in neither of these places, is he called God or a Representment of God, but God to Aaron, God to Pharaoh, that is, to those particular persons, in those particular businesses: but this come's not up close to Mr. Hobbes who say's, the true God may be personated; concerning which there is no such expression in these Texts: but that Moses was made an Instrument of God's, to act some things towards these two persons, Pharaoh and Aaron. Nay, I will adde one note more, that from these Texts, had Moses represented God never so fully, yet could he not be say'd to personate God, accor∣ding to Mr. Hobbes his understanding a person, for a per∣son, by Mr. Hobbes, is such a man as is a Li••utenant, a representer, an Atturney &c. according to all these phrases he expresseth him in the preceding page; but none of these could Moses be, because all those must be notified that they are such to the parties with whom they negotiated; but this certainly was onely expressed to Moses, he was made acquainted with this power, not Aaron, not Pharaoh; and therefore he was not made one of Mr. Hobbes his persons: but if he were, which no where appear's, yet, it is most evident, not in that sense, which he express••th, that is, in respect of the people,

which is his expression [who governed the people] now he is never sayd to be a God to the people, which yet he might have been by the same word, which is used in those places, signifiing a R••ler, or Prince: he adde's an unadvised Parenthesis [that were not his, but Gods People.]

Sect. 13.

They were God's by adopting them into a more pe∣culiar favour then any other nation in the world, guard∣ing them with eminent Miracles of his providence; they were Moses his people, by being under God the Dispenser of those acts of providence, and therefore Exodus 32.7. God called them his people; Get thee down, for thy people, which thou broughtest out of the Land of E∣gypt, have corrupted themselves; and Moses repeating, in a long Discourse, the mercyes of Gods providence towards them, rehearseth the same words, Deut. 9.12. so that they were the people of God, by his especial grace; and they were Moses his people, by his being, under God, their Governour; the same act is attribu∣ted to the first and supreme Cause, in a most high and eminent way; to the second, as an Instrument, coope∣rating with it. In the 20 of Genesis, it is said, that God brought them out of the Land of Egypt; in this place it is say'd, that Moses brought them; both in their several wayes, God, as the first, Moses as the second Cause: but let us consider, perhaps he gives, a reason for what he s••ith; he affirme's that Moses govern's the people, not in his own name, with hoc dicit Moyses: but in God's, with hoc dicit Dominus.

Sect. 14.

If this would serve to make him personate another, then he and I should personate God; for when we urge Scripture, we say God, or the Spirit of God saith it; nay, I may say for Moses (whose humility was far from usu••∣ping that excellency which Mr. Hobbes ascribe's unto him) if he had personated God, in Mr. Hobbe•• his sense, he would not have used that phrase, hoc dicit Dominus, but Ego hoc dico; let a man consider a Player upon the Stage, when he personates and act's a King, he doth not say, the King saith this, or the Lord, but I command, as if he were a King; and this is, by Mr. Hobbes the origi∣nal of this word person, to which he applie's all.

Sect. 15.

One word more: I am of Opinion, as Mr. Hobbes in another place speake's rightly (and others, before him, say a much) that in the time of Moses, Josua, and the Judges, God was the sole King of the Israelites; he gave them Lawes; they by Covenant bound them∣selves to obey those Lawes; he to protect them; and Moses was so far from being their King, that he gave them no Lawes; so that he was but, as it were, a Judge, and a Generall to lead them in their battails, as God di∣rected, and to judge their Causes according to God's Lawes which he had given them; and we shall find that Moses used that Authority but sparingly, for, he had recourse to God still, in any weighty matter of that nature, and would not judge any thing besides the letter of the Law: So you may find Leviticus 24.11, 12, 13, 14. that the Lord himself gave sentence upon him who had blasphemed his name; he was in the 12. verse

put in ward, that the mind of the Lord might be knowne, in the 13. verse the Lord spake un••o Moses, not his per∣son, but his Officer, bring forth, &c. verse 14. See like∣wise Numbers 15.35. The Lord declared to Moses what should be done to the man who gathered stickes on the Sabbath day; and the like you may find in the Case of Zelophehad Numbers 27. verse 1. and Moses brought their cause before the Lord, verse 5. and verse 6. the Lord spake unto Moses saying, &c. so that Moses was so far from personating God, that he did nothing but as a Messenger, and Mediatour betwixt God and them, de∣livering God's will to them, their requests, and many times his owne, for them, to God; and therefore though God in 32. of Exodus, when he was angry with the abominations of the Israelites, would disown them, and his peculiar interest in them; he, as it were, threw them off to Moses, and called them his people; yet Moses pleading for them verse 11. &c. returne's them to God againe, and calle's them his people, which he brought forth of the Land of Egypt; he owned none of those glorious workes to be his, of which he was but an Instrument, but attributed all to God. Well, then we see Moses was but an instrument, a Judge, a Generall, and those Offices in a weake manner performed, not without a perpetuall direction from God; but in nothing did he personate him; so that I think Mr. Hobbes was deceiv∣ed in using this unheard of phrase, concerning Moses; but I would he had rested in this, and had gone no fur∣ther; me thinke's, I could have forgiven this, (although somewhat too bold a language) taking personating in a very large sense, that Moses, and all Kings, might be sayd, in a little weake manner, to personate God (al∣though I did distast it) but what followe's is worse.

Notes

• Mr. Hobbes's definition of a Person too cir∣cumstantial.
• No less appli∣cable to a fei∣gned than a true person.
• Person not Latine.
• 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Suppositum.
• Person diffe∣rently used in severall arts and faculties.
• Misplaced by Mr. Hobbes.
• No man per∣sonate's him∣self.
• Cicero mis-in∣terpreted.
• Person how taken by the Criticks.
• Boethius's defi∣nition of a person.
• Rich. de Sancto V••ctore, ob∣ject's against it.
• His other De∣finition of it.
• More d••fficult.
• Scotus's Obje∣ctions against the former.
• The Definiti∣on explained and vindica∣ted by the Bishop.
• The Distincti∣on of Commu∣nicable ut quod and ut qu••.
• Reasonable, of what extent.
• The Philoso∣phers ••nd School-men could have r••ctified Mr, H••bbes's mis∣take of a person.
• The Etymolo∣gie and com∣mon a••ception of Persona.
• Not the Actor, but the acted is the person.
• No Covenant obliging to act against the Law of Nature
• With whom∣soever any such is made, it must not be kept.
• The fi••st part of Mr. Hobbes's answer de∣stroye's the se∣cond▪
• God to be o∣bey••d before man.
• An instance in the Hebrew Midwives.
• Who probably had covenan∣ted.
• No breach of Covenant which had not a right to bi••d.
• The true God improperly and over-bold¦ly said to be personated.
• Moses, though instead of God, did not personate him.
• Nor doe Kings.
• Nor Priests.
• How Moses was instead of God to Aaron.
• ELOHIM.
• How Moses was made a God to Pha∣raoh.
• Ho•• fully so∣ever Moses had represented God, he could not personate him.
• The Israelites how the p••o∣ple of G••d, and how of M••ses.
• Moses's phrase shewe's he persona∣ted not God.
• God was King of the Israelites, Moses but their Judge and Generall.
• A messenger and Media∣tour betwixt God and them