Of libertie and necessitie a treatise, wherein all controversie concerning predestination, election, free-will, grace, merits, reprobation, &c. is fully decided and cleared, in answer to a treatise written by the Bishop of London-derry, on the same subject / by Thomas Hobs.

Certain Distinctions which his Lordship supposing might be brought to evade his Arguments are by him removed.

HE saies a man may perhaps an∣swer, that the necessity of things held by him, is not a Stoicall necessi∣ty, but a Christian necessity, &c. But this distinction I have not used, nor indeed ever heard before, nor could I think any man could make Stoicall and Christian two kindes of necessi∣ty, though they may be two kindes of Doctrine. Nor have I drawn my Answer to his Lordships Arguments from the authority of any Sect, but from the nature of the things them∣selves.

But here I must take notice of certain words of his Lordships in this place, as making against his own Tenet. Where all the causes, saith he

being joyned together and subordinate one to another do make but one total cause, if any one cause (much more the first) in the whole series or sub∣ordination of causes be necessary, it determines the rest, and without doubt maketh the effect necessary. For that which I call the necessary cause of any effect, is the joyning together of all causes subordinate to the first into one total cause. If any of these saith he, especially the first, produce its effect necessarily, then all the rest are determined. Now it is manifest, that the first cause is a necessary cause of all the effects that are next and immediate to it, and therefore by his Lordships own reason all effects are necessary.

Nor is that distinction of neces∣sary in respect of the first cause, and necessary in respect of Second causes mine, it does (as his Lord∣ship well notes) imply a contra∣diction.

But the distinction of free into free from compulsion and free from Necessitation, I acknowledge, for to be free from compulsion is to do a thing so as terror be not the cause of his will to do it; for a man is then onely said to be compelled, when fear makes him willing to it. As when a man willingly throws his goods into the sea to save himself, or submits to his enemie for fear of be∣ing killed. Thus all men that do a∣ny thing for love, or revenge, or lust are free from compulsion, and yet their actions may be as necessarie as those that are done by compulsi∣on; for sometimes other passions work as forcibly as fear. But free from Necessitation. I say, no man can be, and 'tis that which his Lord∣ship undertook to disprove.

This distinction, his Lordship says, uses to be fortified by two reasons (but they are not mine.) The first

he says, is, that it is granted by all Divines, that an Hypothetical neces∣sitie, or Necessitie upon supposition, may stand with Libertie. That you may understand this, I will give you an example of Hypothetical necessity. If I shall live, I shall eat. This is an Hypothetical necessitie. Indeed it is a necessarie proposition, that is to say, it is necessarie that that proposition should be true whensoever uttered, but 'tis not the necessitie of the thing, nor is it therefore necessarie that the man should live, nor that the man should eat. I do not use to fortifie my distinctions with such reasons, let his Lordship confute them how he will, it contents me; but I would have your Lordship take notice hereby, how easie and plain a thing, (but withal false) with the grave usage of such terms as Hy∣pothetical necessitie, and Necessitie upon supposition, and such like terms

of School-men may be obscured and made to seem profound learning.

The second reason that may con∣firm the distinction of free from compulsion, and free from necessitati∣on, he says is, that God and good Angels do good necessarily, and yet are more free than we. This reason, though I had no need of, yet I think it so farforth good, as it is true that God and good Angels do good ne∣cessarily, and yet are free; but be∣cause I find not in the Articles of our Faith, nor in the decrees of our Church, set down in what manner I am to conceive God and good An∣gels to work by necessitie, or in what sence they work Freely, I sus∣pend my sentence in that point, and am content that there be a freedom from Compulsion, and yet no freedom from Necessitation, as hath been pro∣ved, in that a man may be necessi∣tated to some action without threats

and without fear of danger. But how my Lord can avoid the consist∣ing together of freedom and necessi∣tie, supposing God and good An∣gels are freer than men, and yet do good necessarily, that we must exa∣min. I confess, saith he, that God & good Angels are more free than we, that is, intensively in degree of Free∣dom, not extensively in the latitude of the object, according to a libertie of exercise, not of specification.

Again, we have here two distin∣ctions that are no distinctions, but made to seem so by terms invented by I know not whom, to cover ig∣norance, and blind the understand∣ing of the Reader: For it cannot be conceived that there is any libertie greater, than for a man to do what he will. One heat may be more in∣tensive than another, but not one libertie than another; he that can do what he will, hath all libertie possi∣ble,

and he that cannot hath none at all. Also Libertie (as his Lord∣ship says the Schools call it) of ex∣ercise, which is as I have said before, a libertie to do or not to do, cannot be without a Libertie (which they call) of Specification, that is to say, a libertie to do, or not to do this or that in particular. For how can a man conceave he hath libertie to do any thing, that hath not libertie to do this, or that, or somewhat in particular? If a man be forbidden in Lent to eat this, and that, and e∣very other particular kind of flesh, how can he be understood to have a libertie to eat flesh, more than he that hath no licence at all? You may by this again see the vanitie of distinctions used in the Schools, and I do not doubt but that the impo∣sing of them, by Authoritie of Do∣ctors in the Church, hath been a great cause that men have labored,

though by Sedition and evil courses, to shake them off, for nothing is more apt to beget hatred, than the tyrannizing over mens reason and understanding, especially when it is done, not by the Scriptures, but by the pretence of Learning, and more judgement than that of other men.

In the next place his Lordship bringeth two Arguments against distinguishing between free from compulsion and free from necessitation.

The first is, that election is op∣posite not onely to Coaction or compulsion, but also Necessita∣tion or determination to one. This is it he was to prove from the beginning, and therefore bringeth no new Argument to prove it, and so those brought formerly I have already answered. And in this place I deny again, that election is op∣posite to either, For, when a man is compelled for example to subject himself to an enemy or to die, he hath

••till election left him, and a delibe∣ration to bethink which of the two he can better endure. And he that ••••led to prison by force hath election ••nd may deliberate whether he will ••e hal'd and traind on the ground, ••r make use of his own feet: Like∣wise when there is no compulsion, but the strength of temptation to do ••n evil action, being greater than ••he motives to abstain, it necessari∣ly determines him to the doing of it, ••et he deliberates while sometimes the motives to do, sometimes the motives to forbear are working on ••im, and consequently he electeth which he will. But commonly when we see and know the strength that moves us, we acknowledge necessity; but when we see not or mark not the force that moves us, we then think there is none, and that it is not causes but liberty that produceth the action. Hence it is that they think he does not choose this that of ne∣cessity

choose it, but they might as well say, fire doth not burn because it burns of necessity.

The second Argument is not so much an argument as a distinction, to shew in what sence it may be said that voluntary actions are necessi∣tated and in what sence not. And therefore his Lordship alledgeth as from the authority of the Schools (and that which rippeth up the bot∣tom of the Question) that there is a double act of the will. The one he says is Actus imperatus, an act done at the command of the will, by some inferiour faculty of the soul; As to open or shut ones eyes, and this act may be compell'd, the other he saies, is Actus elicitus, an act allured or drawn forth by al∣lurement out of the will, as to will, to choose, to elect, this he saies can∣not be compelled. Wherein (let∣ting pass that metaphorical speech

of attributing command and subje∣ction to the faculties of the soul, as if they made a Common-Wealth or family within themselves, and could speak one to another, which is very improper in searching the truth of a question) you may ob∣serve, first, that to compel a vo∣luntary act, is nothing else but to will it, for it is all one to say, my will commands the shutting of my eyes, or the doing of any other action, and to say, I have the will to shut my eyes; so that Actus impe∣ratus, here, might as easily have been said in English a voluntry a∣ction, but that they that invented the term understood not any thing it signified.

Secondly, you may observe, that Actus elicitus, is exemplified by these words, to will, to elect, to choose, which are all one, and so to will is here made an act of the will; and

indeed as the will is a faculty or power in a mans soul, so to will is an act of it according to that power; but as it is absurdly said, that to dance is an act allured or drawn by fair means out of the ability to dance, so is it also to say, so that to will is an act allured or drawn out of the power to will, which pow∣er is commonly called the will. How∣soever it be, the sum of his Lord∣ships distinction, is, that a volunta∣ry act may be done by compulsion, that is to say, by foul means, but to will that or any act cannot be but by allurement, or fair means. Now seeing fair means, allurements, and enticements produce the action which they do produce, as necessari∣ly as foul means and threatening, it follows, that to will may be made as necessarie as any thing that is done by compulsion. So that the di∣stinction of Actus imperatus, and

Actus elicitus are but words, and of no effect against necessitie.

His Lordship in the rest of his discourse, reckoneth up the opini∣on of certain professions of men, touching the causes wherein the ne∣cessitie of things (which they main∣tain) consisteth. And first he saith, the Astrologer deriveth his necessitie from the stars; Secondly, that the Physitian attributeth it to the tem∣per of the bodie. For my part, I am not of their opinion, because, nei∣ther the stars alone, nor the tempe∣rature of the Patient alone is able to produce any effect, without the concurrence of all other Agents. For there is hardly any one action, how casual soever it seem, to the causing whereof concur not what∣soever is in rerum natura, which be∣cause it is a great paradox, and de∣pends on many antecedent specula∣tions, I do not press in this place.

Thirdly, he disputeth against the o∣pinion of them that say, external ob∣jects presented to men of such and such temparatures, do make their actions necessarie, and says, the power such objects have over us, proceeds from our own fault, but that is nothing to the purpose, if such fault of ours proceedeth from causes not in our own power, and therefore that opinion may hold true for all that answer.

Further he says, Prayer, Fasting, &c. may alter our habits; 'tis true, but when they do so, they are causes of the contrarie habit, and make it necessarie, as the former habit had been necessarie if Prayer, Fasting, &c. had not been. Besides, we are not moved or disposed to prayer or any other action, but by outward objects, as pious company, godly preachers, of something equivolent. Fourthly, he says a resolved mind is

not easily surprised, as the mind of Vlysses, who when others wept, a∣lone wept not, and of the Phyloso∣sopher, that abstained from striking, because he found himself angrie; and of him that poured out the water when he was thirstie, and the like. Such things I confess have, or may have been done, and do prove onely that it was not necessarie for Vlysses then to weep, nor for that Philoso∣pher to strike, nor for that other man to drink, but it does not prove that it was not necessarie for Vlysses then to abstain (as he did) from weeping, nor for the Philosopher to abstain (as he did) from striking, nor for the other man to forbear drinking, and yet that was the thing his Lordship ought to have proved. Lastly, his Lordship confesses, that the dispositions of objects may be dangerous to libertie, but cannot be destructive. To which I answer, it

is impossible; for libertie is never in any other danger than to be lost, and if it cannot be lost (which he confesses) I may infer it can be in no danger at all.

The fourth opinion his Lordship rejecteth, is of them that make the will necessarily to follow the last dictate of the understanding; but it seems his Lordship understands that Tenet in another sence than I do; for he speaketh as if they that held it, did suppose men must dispute the sequel of every action they do, great and small, to the least grain, which is a thing his Lordship (with reason) thinks untrue. But I understand it to signifie, that the will follows the last opinion or judgement immedi∣ately proceding the action, concern∣ing whether it be good to do it or not, whether he have weighed it long before, or not at all, and that I take to be the meaning of them that hold it. As for example, when

a man strikes, his will to strike fol∣lows necessarily that thought he had of the sequel of his stroak, immedi∣ately before the lifting up of his hand. Now if it be understood in that sence, the last dictate of the understanding does necessitate the action, though not as the whole cause, yet as the last cause, as the last feather necessitates the breaking of a horses back, when there are so many laid on before, as there needed but the addition of one to make the weight sufficient.

That which his Lordship allead∣geth against this, is, First out of a Poet, who in the person of Medea says,

— Video meliora, probo{que} Deteriora sequor.

but that saying (as prettie as it is) is not true: for though Medea saw many reasons to forbear killing her children, yet the last dictate of her judgement was, that the present re∣venge on her husband out-weighed them all, and thereupon the wicked

action necessarily followed. Then the story of the Roman, who of two competitors, said, one had the bet∣ter reason, but the other must have the office. This also maketh against his Lordship, for the last dictate of his judgement that had the bestow∣ing of the office, was this, That it was better to take a great bribe, than reward a great merit.

Thirdly, he objects that things nearer the sence move more power∣fully than reason; what followeth thence but this, the sence of the present good is commonly more im∣mediate to the action than the fore∣sight of the evil consequence to come? Fourthly, whereas his Lord∣ship saies that do what a man can, he shall sorrow more for the death of his Son than for the sin of his soul, makes nothing to the last di∣ctate of the understanding, but it argues plainly that sorrow for sin is not voluntary, and by consequence,

that Repentance proceedeth from Causes.

The last part of this discourse containeth his Lordships opinion a∣bout reconciling liberty with the prescience and decree of God, other∣wise than some Divines have done, against whom, he saies, he had for∣merly written a Treatise, out of which he repeateth onely two things. One is, that we ought not to desert a certain truth, for not being able to comprehend the certain man∣ner of it. And I say the same, as for example, that his Lordship ought not to desert this certain truth, That there are certain and necessary causes which make every man to will what he willeth, though he do not yet con∣ceive in what manner the will of man is caused. And yet I think the manner of it is not very hard to conceive, seeing we see daily, that praise, dispraise, reward and punish∣ment, good and evil sequels of mens

actions retained in memory, do frame and make us to the election of what∣soever it be that we elect, and that the memory of such things pro∣ceeds from the sences, and sence from the operation of the objects of sence (which are external to us and go∣verned onely by God Almighty) and by consequence all actions, even of free and voluntary Agents are necessary.

The other thing that he repeateth is, that the best way to reconcile con∣tingence and liberty with Prescience and the decrees of God, is to subject future contingencies to the Aspect of God. The same is also my opinion, but cōtrary to what his Lordship all this while laboured to prove. For hither∣to he held liberty and necessity, that is to say, liberty and the decrees of God irreconcileable, unless the A∣spect of God (which word appeareth now the first time in this discourse) signifie somewhat else besides Gods

will and decree, which I cannot un∣derstand. But he adds that we must subject them, according to that presentiality which they have in eter∣nity, which he saies cannot be done by them that conceive Eternity to be an everlasting succession, but onely by them, that conceive it as an Indivisible point. To which I answer, that assoon as I can con∣ceive Eternity to be an Indivisible point, or any thing, but an everlast∣ing succession, I will renounce all, that I have written on this subject. I know S. Thomas Aquinas calls Eternity, Nunc. stans., an▪ ever-abi∣ding now, which is easie enough to say, but though I fain would, yet I could never conceive it, they that can, are more happy than I. But in the mean time his Lordship alloweth all men to be of my opinion save onely those that can conceive in their minds a nunc stans, which I think are none. I understand as lit∣tle

how it can be true his Lordship saies, that God is not just but justice it self, not wise, but wisdom it self, not Eternal, but Eternity it self, nor how he concludes thence that Eter∣nity is a point indivisible, and not a succession, nor in what sence it can be said, that an infinite point, and wherein is no succession, can com∣prehend all time, though time be successive. These phrases I finde not in the Scripture, I wonder there∣fore what was the design of the School-men to bring them up, un∣less they thought a man could not be a true Christian unless his un∣derstanding be first strangled with such hard sayings. And thus much for answer to his Lordships dis∣course, wherein I think not onely his Squadrons of Arguments, but also his Reserve of Distinctions are defeated. And now your Lordship shall have my doctrine concerning the same question, with my Rea∣sons

for it, positively, and as briefly as I can, without any terms of Art in plain English.