To the extent possible under law, the Text Creation Partnership has waived all copyright and related or neighboring rights to this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above, according to the terms of the CC0 1.0 Public Domain Dedication (http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). This waiver does not extend to any page images or other supplementary files associated with this work, which may be protected by copyright or other license restrictions. Please go to http://www.textcreationpartnership.org/ for more information.
FIrst I conceive, that when it cometh into a mans mind to do or not to do some certain action, if he have no time to deliberate, the do∣ing it or abstaining necessarily follow the present thought he hath of the good or evil conse∣quence thereof to himself. As for example, In sudden anger, the action shall follow the thought of revenge, in sudden fear the thought of escape. Al∣so
when a man hath time to deliberate, but deliberates not, because never any thing ap∣peared that could make him doubt of the consequence, the action follows his opinion of the goodness or harm of it. These actions I call VOLUN∣TARY, (my Lord) if I under∣stand him aright that calls them SPONTANEOUS. I call them voluntarie, because those actions that follow immediate∣ly the last appetite are volun∣tarie, and here where is one onely appetite, that one is the last. Besides, I see 'tis reason∣able to punish a rash Action, which could not be justly done by man to man, unless the same were voluntarie. For no action of a man can be said to
be without deliberation, though never so sudden, because it is supposed he had time to deli∣berate all the precedent time of his life, whether he should do that kind of action or not. And hence it is, that he that killeth in a sudden passion of Anger, shall nevertheless be justly put to death, because all the time, wherein he was able to consi∣der whether to kill were good or evil, shall be held for one continual deliberation, and con∣sequently the killing shall be judged to proceed frō election.
Secondly, I conceive when a man deliberates, whether he shall do a thing or not do it, that he does nothing else but consider whether it be better for himself to do it or not to
do it. And to consider an acti∣on, is to imagine the consequen∣ces of it both good and evil. From whence is to be inferred, that Deliberation is nothing else but alternate imagination of the good and evil sequels of an action, or (which is the same thing) alternate hope and fear, or alternate appetite to do or quit the action of which he deliberateth.
Thirdly, I conceive that in all deliberations, that is to say, in at alternate succession of contrary appetites, the last is that which we call the WILL, & is immediately next before the doing of the action, or next before the doing of it be∣come impossible. All other Appetites to do, and to quit,
that come upon a man during his deliberations, are called In∣tentions, & Inclinations, but not Wills, there being but one will, which also in this case may be called the last will, though the Intentions change often.
Fourthly, I conceive that those actions, which a man is said to do upon deliberation, are said to be voluntarie, and done upon choice and election, so that voluntarie action, and action proceeding from electi∣on is the same thing, and that of a voluntarie Agent, it is all one to say, he is free, and to say, he hath not made an end of deliberating.
Fifthly, I conceive Libertie to be rightly defined in this manner; Libertie is the absence
of all the impediments to Action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsecal qualitie of the Agent. As for example, the water is said to descend freely, or to have libertie to de∣scend by the channel of the ri∣ver, because there is no impe∣diment that way, but not a∣cross, because the banks are impediments. And though the water cannot ascend, yet men never say it wants the li∣bertie to ascend, but the faculty or power, because the impedi∣ment is in the nature of the water, and intrinsecal. So also we say, he that is tied wants the libertie to go, because the impediment is not in him, but in his bands, whereas we say not so of him that is sick or
lame, because the impediment is in himself.
Sixthly, I conceive that no∣thing taketh beginning from it self, but from the Action of some other immediate Agent without it self. And that there∣fore, when first a man hath an appetite or will to something, to which immediately before he had no appetite nor will, the cause of his will, is not the will it self, but something else not in his own disposing. So that whereas it is out of controver∣sie, that of voluntarie actions the will is the necessarie cause, and by this which is said, the will is also caused by other things whereof it disposeth not, it followeth, that volunta∣rie actions have all of them
necessarie causes, and therefore are necessitated.
Seventhly, I hold that to be a sufficient cause, to which no∣thing is wanting that is need∣full to the producing of the ef∣fect. The same also is a neces∣sarie cause. For if it be possi∣ble that a sufficient cause shall not bring forth the effect, then there wanteth somewhat which was needfull to the producing of it, and so the cause was not sufficient, but if it be impossi∣ble that a sufficient cause should not produce the effect, then is a sufficient cause a ne∣cessary cause (for that is said to produce an effect necessarily that cannot but produce it.) Hence it is manifest, that whatsoever is produced is produced neces∣sarily,
for whatsoever is pro∣duced hath had a sufficient cause to produce it, or else it had not been, and therefore al∣so voluntarie actions are neces∣sitated
Lastly, should that Ordina∣ry Definition of a free Agent, namely, That a free Agent is that, which, when all things are present which are needfull to produce the effect, can never∣theless not produce it, implies a contradiction, and is non-sence, being as much as to say, The cause may be sufficient, that is to say, necessarie, and yet the effect shall not follow.