Of libertie and necessitie a treatise, wherein all controversie concerning predestination, election, free-will, grace, merits, reprobation, &c. is fully decided and cleared, in answer to a treatise written by the Bishop of London-derry, on the same subject / by Thomas Hobs.

To the Arguments from Reason.

OF the Arguments from Reason, the first is that which his Lord∣ship saith is drawn from Zeno's beat∣ing of his man, which is therefore cal∣led Argumentum baculinum, that is to say, a wooden Argument. The sto∣ry is this, Zeno held, that all actions were necessary, his man therefore being for some fault beaten, excused himself upon the necessity of it, to avoid this excuse, his Master pleaded likewise the necessity of beating

him. So that not he that maintained, but he that derided the necessity, was beaten, contrary to that his Lordship would inferr. And the Argument was rather withdrawn than drawn from the story.

The second Argument is taken from certain inconveniences which his Lordship thinks would follow such an opinion. It is true that ill use might be made of it, and there∣fore your Lordship and my Lord Bishop, ought at my request to keep private what I say here of it. But the inconveniences are indeed none, and what use soever he made of truth, yet truth is truth, and now the que∣stion is not, what is fit to be preach∣ed, but what is true.

The first inconvenience he saies is this. That the Laws, which prohi∣bit any action, will be unjust.

2. That all consultations are vain.

3. That admonitions to men of

understanding, are of no more use, than to children, fools, and mad men.

4. That praise, dispraise, reward and punishment are in vain.

5.6. That Counsels, Acts, Arms, Books, Instruments, Study, Tutours, Medicines, are in vain.

To which arguments his Lord∣ship expecting I should answer, by saying, the ignorance of the event were enough to make us use the means, adds (as it were a reply to my answer foreseen) these words. A lass! how should our not knowing the event be a sufficient motive to make us use the means? Wherein his Lord∣ship saies right, but my answer is not that which he expecteth, I answer.

First, that the necessity of an acti∣on doth not make the Laws that prohibit it unjust. To let pass that not the necessity, but the will to break the Law, maketh the action unjust, because the Law regardeth the will

and no other precedent causes of action. And to let pass, that no Law can possibly be unjust, in as much as every man maketh (by his consent) the Law he is bound to keep, and which consequently must be just, unless a man can be unjust to himself. I say what necessary cause soever precede an action, yet if the action be forbidden, he that doth it willingly may justly be punished. For instance, suppose the Law on pain of death prohibit stealing, and that there be a man, who by the strength of temptation is necessita∣ted to steal, and is thereupon put to death, does not this punishment deter others from Theft? is it not a cause that others steal not? Doth it not frame and make their wills to justice?

To make the Law, is therefore to make a Cause of Justice, and to ne∣cessitate Justice, and consequently

'tis no injustice to make such a Law.

The intention of the Law is not to grieve the Delinquent for that which is past, and not to be undone, but to make him and others just, that else would not be so, and respecteth not the evil act past, but the good to come, in so much as without the good intention for the future, no past act of a Delinquent could justi∣fie his killing in the sight of God. But you will say how is it just to kill one man to amend another, if what were done were necessary? To this I answer, that men are justly killed, not for that their actions are not necessitated, but because they are noxious, and they are spared and preserved whose actions are not noxious. For where there is no Law, there no killing nor any thing else can be unjust, and by the right of nature, we destroy (without being unjust) all that is noxious both

Beasts and Men, and for Beasts we kill them justly when we do it in order to our own preservation, and yet my Lord himself confesseth, that their actions, as being onely spon∣taneous, and not free, are all necessi∣tated and determined to that one thing they shall do. For men, when we make Societies or Common-Wealths we lay not down our right to kill, excepting in certain cases, as murther, theft or other offensive action; so that the right, which the Common-Wealth hath to put a man to death for crimes is not created by the Law, but remains from the first right of nature, which every man hath to preserve himself, for that the Law doth not take the right away in the case of Criminals, who were by the Law excepted. Men are not therefore put to death, or pu∣nished for that their theft proceed∣eth from election, but because it was

noxious and contrary to mens pre∣servation, and the punishment con∣ducing to the preservation of the rest, in as much as to punish those that do voluntary hurt, and none else, frameth and maketh mens wills such as men would have them. And thus it is plain, that from the necessity of a voluntary action, can∣not be inferred the injustice of the Law that forbiddeth it, or the Ma∣gistrate that punisheth it.

Secondly, I deny that it maketh con∣sultations to be in vain, 'tis the con∣sultation that causeth a man, & neces∣sitateth him to choose to do one thing rather than another, so that unless a man say that that cause is in vain which necessitateth the effect, he cannot infer the superfluousness of consultation out of the necessity of the election proceeding from it. But it seemeth his Lordships reasons thus, If I must do this rather than

that, I shall do this rather than that, though I consult not at all, which is a false proposition and a false con∣sequence, and no better than this, if I shall live till to morrow, I shall live till to morrow, though I run my self through with a sword to day. If there be a necessity that an action shall be done, or that any ef∣fect shall be brought to pass, it does not therefore follow, that there is nothing necessarily requisite as a means to bring it to pass, and there∣fore when it is determined, that one thing shall be chosen before ano∣ther, 'tis determined also for what cause it shall so be chosen, which cause, for the most part, is deliberatiō or consultation, and therefore consul∣tation is not in vain, and indeed the less in vain by how much the electi∣on is more necessitated, if more and less had any place in necessity.

The same answer is to be given

to the third supposed inconveni∣ence, namely that admonitions are in vain, for the Admonitions are parts of consultation, the admonitor being a Councellour for the time to him that is admonished.

The fourth pretended inconve∣ence is, that praise, dispraise, reward and punishment will be in vain. To which I answer, that for praise and dispraise, they depend not at all on the necessity of the action praised or dispraised. For what is it else to praise, but to say a thing is good? good I say for me, or for some body else, or for the State and Common-Wealth? And what is it to say an action is good, but to say it is as I would wish? Or as another would have it, or according to the will of the State? that is to say, according to the Law. Does my Lord think that no action can please me, or him, or the Common-Wealth that

should proceed from necessity? things may be therefore necessary, and yet praise worthy, as also necessary, and yet dispraised, and neither of them both in vain, because praise and dis∣praise, and likewise Reward and Punishment, do by example make and conform the will to good and evil. It was a very great praise in my opinion, that Velleius Paterculus gives Cato, where he saies that he was good by nature, Et quia aliter esse non potuit.

To the fifth and sixth inconve∣niences, that Counsels, Arts, Arms, Instruments, Books, Study, Medi∣cines and the like would be superflu∣ous, the same answer serves as to the former, that is to say, that this con∣sequence, If the effect shall necessa∣rily come to pass, then it shall come to pass without its causes is a false one, and those things named Coun∣sels, Arts, Arms, &c. are the causes of these effects.

His Lordships third Argument consisteth in other inconveniences, which he saith will follow, namely Impiety and negligence of religious duties, as Repentance, and Zeal to Gods service, &c.

To which I answer as to the rest, that they follow not. I must confess, if we consider the greatest part of Mankinde, not as they should be, but as they are, that is, as men, whom either the study of acquiring wealth, or preferment, or whom the appe∣tite of sensual delights, or the im∣patience of meditating, or the rash embracing of wrong principles have made unapt to discuss the truth of things, I must I say confess, that the dispute of this question will rather hurt than help their piety, and there∣fore if his Lordship had not desired this answer, I should not have writ∣ten it, nor do I write it but in hopes your Lordship and his will keep it

private. Nevertheless in very truth, the necessity of events does not of it self draw with it any impiety at all. For piety consisteth onely in two things; one that we honour God in our hearts, which is, that we think as highly of his power as we can, (for to honour any thing is nothing else but to think it to be of great power.) The other is, that we signifie that honour and esteem by our words and actions, which is called▪ Cultus, or worship of God. He therefore that thinketh that all things proceed from Gods eternal will, and consequently are necessary, does he not think God Omnipotent? Does he not esteem of his power as highly as is possible? which is to honour God as much as may be in his heart. Again, he that thinketh so, is he not more apt by external acts and words to acknowledge it, than he that thinketh otherwise? yet is

this external acknowledgement the same thing which we call worship. So that this opinion fortifies piety in both kinds, external and inter∣nal, therefore is far from destroying it. And for Repentance, which is no∣thing else but a glad returning into the right way after the grief of being out of the way; though the cause that made him go astray were ne∣cessary, yet there is no reason why he should not grieve; and again though the cause why he returned into the way were necessary, there remained still the causes of joy. So that the necessity of the actions taketh away neither of those parts of Repentance, grief for the errour, and joy for returning.

And for prayer, whereas he saith that the necessity of things destroy prayer, I deny it, for though prayer be none of the causes that move Gods will (his will being unchan∣geable)

yet since we finde in Gods word, he will not give his blessings but to those that aske, the motive of prayer is the same. Prayer is the gift of God no less than the blessing, and the prayer is decreed together in the same decree wherein the bles∣sing is decreed. 'Tis manifest that Thanksgiving is no cause of the blessing past, and that which is past is sure and necessary, yet even a∣mongst men thanks is in use as an acknowledgement of the benefit past, though we should expect no new benefit for our gratitude. And prayer to God Almighty is but thanksgiving for Gods blessings in general, and though it precede the particular thing we ask, yet it is not a cause or means of it, but a signi∣fication that we expect nothing but from God, in such manner, as he, not as we, will, and our Saviour by word of mouth bids us pray thy will,

not our will, be done, and by example teaches us the same, for he prayed thus, Father if it be thy will let this cup pass, &c. The end of prayer, as of thanksgiving, is not to move but to honour God Almighty, in acknow∣ledging that what we ask can be effected by him onely.

The fourth Argument from Rea∣son is this, The order, beauty and perfe∣ction of the world requireth that in the universe should be Agents of all sorts; some necessary▪ some free, some con∣tingent. He that shall make all things necessary, all things free, or all things contingent doth overthrow the beauty and perfection of the world.

In which Argument I observe first a Contradiction, for seeing he that maketh any thing in that he maketh it, maketh it to be necessary, it followeth that he that maketh all things, maketh all things necessarily to be; As if a work-man make a gar∣ment

the garment must necessarily be, so if God make every thing, eve∣ry thing must necessarily be. Per∣haps the beauty of the world requi∣reth (though we know it not) that some Agents should work without deliberation (which his Lordship calls necessary Agents) and some Agents with deliberation (and those both he and I call free Agents) and that some Agents should work, and we not know how (and their effects we both call Contingents) but this hinders not but that he that electeth may have his election ne∣cessarily determined to one by for∣mer causes, and that which is con∣tingent and imputed to fortune, be nevertheless necessary and depend on precedent necessary causes. For by contingent, men do not mean that which hath no cause, but that which hath not for cause any thing that we perceive; As for example,

when a Traveller meets with a shower, the journey had a cause, and the rain had a cause sufficient to produce it, but because the journey caused not the rain, nor the rain the journey, we say they were conting∣ent one to another. And thus you see that though there be three sorts of events, necessary, contingent, and free, yet they may be all necessary with∣out destruction of the beauty or perfection of the universe.

To the first Argument from Rea∣son, which is, that if liberty be taken away, the nature and formel reason of sin is taken away, I answer by denying the consequence; The na∣ture of sin consisteth in this, that the action done proceed from our will and be against the Law. A Judge in judging whether it be sin or no which is done against the Law, looks at no higher cause of the action, than the will of the doer.

Now when I say the action was ne∣cessary, I do not say it was done against the will of the doer, but with his will, and necessarily, because mans will, that is every volition or act of the will and purpose of man had a sufficient, and therefore a necessary cause, and consequently every voluntary action was neces∣sitated. An action therefore may be voluntary and a sin, and neverthe∣less be necessary, and, because God may afflict by a right derived from his Omnipotence, though sin were not, and because the example of punishment on voluntary sinners, is the cause that produceth justice, and maketh sin less frequent, for God to punish such sinners (as I have said before) is no injustice. And thus you have my answer to his Lordships Objections both out of Scripture and from Reason.