The speech of Th-m-s P-wn-ll, Esq; late g-v-rn-r of this province, in the H--se of C-m--ns, in favor of America.

THE SPEECH Of Th-m-s P-wn-ll, Esq Late G-v-rn-r of this Province, in the H—se of C—m—ns, in Favor of America.

THE C—tee having gone through the examination of the facts contained in the North-American papers, and the discussion of the opinions and re∣solutions formed and originated in another place, and sent to us for our concurrence, have taken up these resolutions with an address that accom∣panies them, as the only proper measures for P—t to adopt on this important occasion, at this very dangerous and perilous crisis. 'Tis not more strange that this should be thought any remedy at all for this dangerous disease, than that it should be taken up as the only remedy—however, such as it is, this is the only matter pro∣posed for our deliberation, and therefore the only matter into the consideration of which I shall enter. As this appears to me in two different lights, I shall beg to view it under two different considerations.—In the first view I consider the H—se as acting in its jurisdiction of grand inquest of the nation, as having made an inquisition formed into resolutions, and as having, by their address, made a presentment of the crimes and misdemeanors found in the said resolutions. In the second place I shall consider this measure, now taken by Ministry, as a political measure, under the parti∣cular case laid before us for the inforcing of revenue laws. When, Sir, I consider this h—se as acting in its jurisdiction of grand inquest of the nation, I must beg leave to mark, to every individual who hears me, the essential difference that there is be∣tween coming to an opinion upon a political measure, and the giving a judgment which becomes their verdict. In the first case. I do not wonder that gentlemen should defer their opinions to the opinions of persons, who, from their situation and employment, must be better informed of the necessity, the propriety, and effect of any political measure, as they alone can be fully informed of the circumstances which call for it—of the means, connected with collateral events, which are really practicable—and as they are more especially responsible for the consequences of such measures which they propose or undertake—I say, Sir, it is natural, for various rea∣sons, that there should always be a majority of gentlemen who are disposed to make this deference of their opinions; but, Sir, when they do consider that they are sitting

in judgment, and are to give their verdict, there is not a single individual who hears me, that can think it consistent, either with his honour or his conscience, to make that deference of his judgment, when that judgment is to form the verdict: I there∣fore, Sir, call upon and appeal to the conscience of every m—r of this h—se to ex∣amine, with the same precision and justice, the facts stated in these resolutions, before they give their judgment on them as crimes, as they would do if they were members of a grand jury: and it is in this view that I beg to submit my opinion upon the resolves now offered to the h—se. Upon the whole, I do venture to pronounce, that however illegal and unconstitutional we may suppose the proceedings of the h—se of representatives of the Massachusets Bay to have been; yet, Sir, these resolutions, if they charge them not only with crimes and misdemeanors that they have not com∣mitted, but with those which they have carefully and cautiously avoided to commit, there would be in our proceedings a spirit and temper hardly to be reconciled to justice. If there be any thing in these resolves, now proposed to you, charging the council and civil magistrates of that province with having neglected to execute and perform those duties, which, as a trust, they are by their charter required to do, and if those charges should lead to any thing that is to affect that charter—while those charges are neither rightly understood, nor sufficiently grounded—surely we ought not preci∣pitately to come into these resolutions, without having thoroughly examined the case and circumstances under which these people were to act, and also the steps and conduct which they, to the best of their judgment, thought proper to take, in order to restore and keep peace. However illegal and unconstitutional the proceedings of the town-meeting of Boston may have been—whatever tendencies they may be supposed to have had—however dangerous the meeting of convention may be supposed to have been, and whatever intention may be imputed to it—we surely should not hastily, and without sufficient examination of the state of the evidence, charge them with the usurpation of the powers of government, and with intentions of setting up a new and unconstitutional authority independent of the crown of Great-Britain. It is therefore, Sir, for this purpose I must intreat the indulgence and patience of the h—se to permit me to examine these several charges by the nature of the evi∣dence upon which they are founded.

When I consider the charge which is made in the first and second resolutions against the proceedings of the house of r— in January and February 1768, I do, Sir, acknowledge that there are many things which I would not dare to justify in this h—. I do acknowledge, Sir, that wherever they call into question the power and authority of the King, Lords & Commons in parliament assembled, to make laws and statutes of sufficient force and validity to bind the colonies and people of Am— subjects of the crown of Great Britain in all cases whatsoever—Whether this be done by resolutions, or by writing of letters, they are unwarrantable and dangerous, are illegal and and unconstitutional proceedings, and derogatory of the right of the crown and parrliament of Great Britain. But when there is any particular fact charged in aggravation of these proceedings▪ when the h— of r— is charged with in∣tent to create unlawful combinations against the laws and statutes of Great Britain, upon the fact that they came to a resolution, by letters, to desire the other houses of

assembly on the continent, to join with them in this denial of the authority of parlia∣ment—that fact ought to be very carefully stated, and very surely founded in the evidence that is given of it.—Now, let me state how this fact does actually stand, and then compare it as it is stated in the second resolution. The h— of r—, in January 1768, in a dabate upon the

expediency of writing to the assemblies of the other colonies on the continent, with respect to the importance of their joining with them, &c,

put a question upon their proposition of writing letters, desiring those assemblies to join with them—which passed in the negative—and was so negatived for this very reason, because containing that very proposition of joining, the h— thought exceptions might be taken to it, as having a tendency to the forming combinations, and might be considered at home as the appointing another congress. Be∣sides what I know from my own informations of this matter, I am founded in saying that this was the very reason why this motion received its negative, because Governor Bernard, in his letter of the 30th of January 1768, gives this very account of it. But although, Sir, the house of r—s thought that that this mode of proceeding, to desire the other assemblies to join with them, was neither prudent nor justifiable, yet they did not think that there could be any exception taken to their acquainting the other houses of r—s on the continent with

the measures they had taken with regard to the difficulties arising from the acts of parliament for levying duties and taxes on the American colonies.

The first question received its negative, because it was liable to the very imputation you now charge them with; and the second cautiously avoids every step, and even expression, that might be liable to such imputations, and yet you do charge them therewith. You charge them first with unlawful combinations, and support that charge by evidence of a fact which never did exist, by reciting the exceptionable words of a motion which received its nega∣tive because it had those exceptionable words in it: and notwithstanding the gentle∣men who first brought forward this charge have condescended to amend the error, as to date, yet I perceive they think still that the resolve that gave occasion to the circular letter still stands in the affirmative upon the Journals of the house for January. They are led into this error by their ignorance of the proceedings of that house, when it proceeds to reconsider a negative, so as to leave the original subject at large—yet they might have been set right (first) by Governor Bernard's letter of the 30th of January, which acquaints the Secretary of State that the whole of this business stood negatived in the month of January: and (next) by the Speaker's letter, which tells the same Minister, that

the resolution which gave birth to the circular letter took place on the 4th of February:

but I see it is determined that we must censure a resolve which never existed. Now, Sir, however you may be founded in the other parts of the charge brought forward in the two first resolutions—can any man give his judgment upon inquest that this charge is founded.

In considering the charges brought against the council and civil magistrates in the third and fourth resolutions—I beg leave, first, to examine the nature and cir∣cumstances of the riots and tumults said to have continued for some time in the town of Boston. Whatever may have been the general discontents of the people of that town at the revenue laws—whatever may have been their general disgust against the

commissioners of the revenue—whatever may have been their murmurings—what∣ever their complaints, either in speaking or writing—whatever may have been the illegal conduct of some audacious smugglers, in open defiance of law and civil autho∣rity—I find, in the evidence, but two transactions that can be construed into riot and tumult. The first was on the 18th of March; the second on the 10th of June; that on the 18th of March, was nothing more than a mere procession of a post-chariot or two, and some single horse chaises, with a mob of boys, and idle people at their heels, by way of ovation or triumph over the stamp-act, on the anniversary of its repeal. There was, Sir, a procession of the very same nature in London upon the anniver∣sary of the failure of the excise bill; and yet, Sir, the civil magistrates of the city of London never had any such severe charge brought against them for not putting a stop thereto. On the contrary, that great minister Sir Robert Walpole said, he should be ashamed not to distinguish opposition to the laws from opposition to the minister, and should think himself a very bad man to confound what was harmless in the one case with what was dangerous and criminal in the other. As to the riot on the 10th of June, it was undoubtedly not only illegal, but of a dangerous nature—yet, Sir, it was sudden, unpremeditated, and temporary.—It began and ended within a few hours, on the same evening—The effect was over before any preventive measures could have been taken to suppress it; nor was any civil ma∣gistrate applied to at the time; nor has any violence, riot or tumult happened since. The council (which is all that their authority could do) took the occasion to express their abhorrence of all such riots and tumults, and to advise the governor to direct the attorney-general to prosecute the offenders; and notwithstanding government has been informed, on this particular occasion, that nothing but the exertion of military power could prevent an open revolt of the town of Boston, which might probably spread throughout the provinces: yet, Sir, it is plain by the letter of Governor Bernard to the commissioners of the revenue, written by the unanimous desire of the council, that so far from expecting, at that time, any further violences, there was no ground to expect any violences at all.—Which unanimous opinion of the governor and council hath been justified by the event; because no such riots or violences have since happened; so that the whole of these riots and tumults, said to have continued for some time, are reduced to the sudden unpremeditated rising of a mob for two or three hours.—Upon this state of the facts—is there any ground to bring forward a charge of censure against the town in general, or upon the council or civil magistracy of that province, which can lead to any thing that may affect their charter! If the resolution leads to that—it is not founded—if it does not—it is irritating & provoking, & means nothing.

I take no notice of the fifth resolution, as it contains only the approbation of a mea∣sure taken by Ministry here, the good or bad effect of which is yet in the womb of time, and may prove a monstrous unnatural birth.

On the sixth resolution, I must own that I have no grounds on which to justify or defend the town meetings of Boston on the 14th of June, & 12th of September—for their imprudencies have taken the ground from under my feet; yet knowing that the generality of the people there met, are and ever have been a faithful, valuable and loyal people, I will still hope that there was nothing so mischievous in their inten∣tions

as the aspect of them was bad and suspicious. I will still hope that independency never was in their heads—I am sure sedition and rebellion never was in their hearts, however they may have been deluded and misled into actions which they did not understand, and have not seen the consequences of.

The seventh and eighth resolutions do indeed contain very heavy and very crimi∣nal charges upon the town meeting of Boston, and on the meeting of convention. They are not indeed charged with treason and misprision of treason in the direct and technical terms thereof; but when we are told that all those terms are cautiously avoided, and yet hear it said, at the same time, that it is impossible to say how far, upon the examination of the acts and deeds committed (all conspiring to usurpations of the powers of government, and the sitting up of new and unconstitutional authority in∣dependent of the crown of Great Britain) how far they may amount to treason or misprision of treason—I own, Sir, I am still more afraid of those words than if the charge had been direct and technical, as I do not see what (by implication or con∣struction) they may not lead to; and therefore, Sir, if there be any treason, or mis∣prision of treason, it would have been fairer to have charged them with it directly, in the technical terms thereof, than to leave any future judge, or future jury, to trans∣late our words into technical terms hereafter. But let us examine how the facts do actually stand: if the selectmen of Boston had issued precepts for the electing of deputies to meet in convention, as a general assembly of the representatives of the province, they would undoubtedly have usurped the powers of government, & not only manifested a design to set up, but would have actually set up, a new and unconstitutional authority, independent of the crown of Great Britain; and the convention meeting at that predicament, would have been a direct treasonable meeting. The issuing a precept cannot be done but under the authority of the King's writ, which passes under the great seal of the province: the forms of such precept, and such writ, are prescribed and directed by a law of the province; nor can any other letter or matter issued in any other form be, by any implication or construction whatsoever, deemed a precept. On the contrary, that the select men of one town should write letters to the select men of other towns, desiring them to appoint committees to meet and convene upon matters of common concern, hath been the common law and invariable practice of that country, from their first establishment, and is in one particular instance directed & required to be done by a statute of the province—But as the candor of the gentlemen induces them to recede from this charge, and to alter the words issuing a precept, to those of writing a letter, I shall say no more on that head.

Deputies are such as are elected or deputed to serve for and represent the freeholders of the province in general assembly, appointed under the great seal to be held or convened. These deputies must be freeholders, and elected or deputed by freeholders—must be elected by direction of a precept under the King's writ.—If therefore the town-meetings had elected such deputies it would have been a treasonable usurpation of the powers of government: but the fact is, that the town meeting chose one or more persons each, as a committee, which they are authorised by the practice and law of their province to do. The persons chosen for these committees need not be free∣holders, nor are they chosen by freeholders, but by any inhabitant qualified to meet

in town meeting. The election, therefore, of such is not setting up a new and uncon∣stitutional authority—is no usurpation of the powers of government. And although the word convening, or convention, from the use of it in this country in the year 1688, and by the strange and unaccountable application of it in the town meeting referring to that period as a precedent, may convey to us here an idea of a most dangerous and unwarrantable assembly, and the more dangerous and unwarrantable, if any case was supposed that could give ground for such assembly: yet in that country the word convene is a mere concurrent word to the word meeting. By an act of the 4th of William and Mary, for regulating townships, it is said,

the freeholders shall annually meet and convene.

By the 5th and 6th of George the second, touching precinct meetings, it is said, "the freeholders and inhabitants so convened."—And by the 1st of Anne, commissioners of sewers are impowered to meet and convene.— So that so far as the word goes, meeting and convening, or meeting in convention, means no more than a common and usual act But, Sir, as it did meet and con∣vene, in so questionable a form, I hope I may be permitted to consider the design in meeting—the conduct of this convention when met—and the effect of its meeting. Whatever may have been contained in the letter from the select men of the town of Boston, yet that was neither the foundation nor the warrant for their convening.

Seeing the violent agitation and state of inflammability in which the people of the maritime parts of the province especially were heated to a degree of madness, the town meetings chose committees, and the committees met and convened, in order to prevent any mischief and ill consequences that might have arisen from that dan∣gerous state of the people's minds. They met to promote, to the utmost of their abilities, peace and good order amongst the people, and due submission to government. They met to restrain them from going into any illegal or unconstitutional practices, and to turn their spirit into the right and constitutional channel of hoping and waiting for redress of such grievances as they thought they were under, by petitions preferred to his Majesty, and by relying on the justice of the nation: and their conduct, Sir, was agreeable to this design; for the moment that they met, before they had advice of the arrival of the men of war, and of the troops,

They disclaimed all pretence to any authoritative or governmental acts, and did actually disclaim all pretences of usurping any of the rights of sovereignty, or even of arrogating to themselves any authority whatsoever.

They gave their free and sincere advice, not in an au∣thoritative, but merely friendly manner—advising and persuading the people of the province to avoid all tumults and disorders—stating to them the dreadful conse∣quences of such—and converting the channel of their conduct into that of reliance upon government, in expectation of the effect that the petition sent home some time before by their representatives would have, and undertaking themselves as commit∣tees met and convened to repeat that measure of petitioning; the drawing up of which petitions, one to the Governor, another to the King, and the writing a letter to Mr. De Berdt (whom they considered as a sort of agent for the province) was all that they actually did.

The authority which these gentlemen had with the people, and the prudent and temperate steps which they took, does to me appear the rather to have been the cause

that no disturbances have happened in the province since the arrival of the troops, than any other reason that can be given, however specious, and however calculated for our belief; and to this meeting or convention I impute this good effect.

This, Sir, being to the best of my judgment the actual state, and the real facts of this case—if I consider my giving my opinion upon the resolutions before us as a verdict upon an inquest, however I may believe and be of opinion, there may have been a conduct in many things very blameable—in many more imprudent;—yet, upon the whole of the charge brought in these resolutions, I must, as far as my judgment goes, think it is no true bill: and, if this be my opinion of the resolutions, I must necessarily, if I consider the address (as I do) as a presentment upon this in∣quest, give my opinion against that also: but I am not only against it as a present∣ment upon a charge which I think no true bill, but as it goes to the advising the crown to a proceeding directly contrary to that law, and to those rights which I think the people of the province of Massachusets Bay are intitled to—as it goes to the advising the crown to a proceeding which, consistent with its own acts, it cannot go into, and which I think none of his Majesty's council will ever advise him to enter into;—at least, such advice would put his Majesty under such difficulty, as no one man would wish to put another.—And what I am going to say is the foundation of this opinion, which I wish and call upon the crown lawyers to attend to and con∣sider.—The crown, in the 8th of William the Third, gave its consent to an act of the province of Massachusets Bay, for regulating trials for high treason within that province, according to an act of parliament of the 7th of William. I know that no provincial act whatever, even with the consent of the crown added to it, can alter or supersede any act of parliament—I know, and will allow, that this act does not su∣persede or repeal the thirty-fifth of Harry the Eighth—but so far forth as the issuing this special commission for trying treasons here in England under that act, be a measure which the King may or may not take—I do say, that the crown having given its consent that the people of the province of Massachusets Bay shall be tryed within that province, according to the seventh of William, so far as that will or pleasure can be bound by that consent so given, never will or can, consistent with the acts of the crown, issue such commission to bring any delinquent out of the province, and to try him here upon the act of Harry the Eighth.

I suggested this before in the form of doubt, in hopes it might have drawn forth some answer. I do now pronounce peremptorily and positively that the crown nei∣their will or can issue such commission, and I call upon the crown lawyers to an∣swer this, if they have answer to give. The people have thought themselves aggrieved in having the cases of their property determined in the court of Admiralty, without the benefit of juries—perhaps that complaint may not be founded entirely in law; but if they think so, and if this procedure by which they may, without the present∣ment of an inquest of twelve lawful men, be taken into custody, and in that custody sent over hither to be put upon their trial for their lives, should strike their hearts upon this old sore, how deeply must it wound them, and to what a dangerous state of desperation may it not drive their minds. If they consider that they may be pre∣sented by their Governor, a single man, and in consequence of that presentment

taken into custody, and sent prisoners 3000 miles to be put upon their trial, which of itself, should they be acquitted, is a punishment of the severest and most cruel nature: if they consider that they are thus deprived of the common liberty which we enjoy, of not being presented and put upon trial but by the inquest of twelve lawful men of our country—to what predicament must they think themselves reduced—I own I dread the consequence if the Americans should feel that they are in that predicament, but I am comforted because I am sure they never will feel it, as I am convinced that such commission never will nor can be issued, that such proceedings never will be, nor can be, carried into execution.

I will therefore next consider this measure connected with the military manoeuvres in America—as a political measure planned and designed to enforce the execution of the revenue laws in that country.—To be able to judge of the effect of such mea∣sure, it will be necessary to state the case to which it is applied.

On one hand you have your declaratory law,—your revenue laws as the exertion of the declared right—you have your commissioners to execute these laws—and the military to enforce this execution.—On the other hand, the Americans do universally, invariably and unalterably declare, that they ought not to submit to any internal taxes imposed upon them by any legislature wherein they have not representatives of their own election.—On this principle they oppose such taxes by their Petitions and Remonstrances only, as yet, but there is something threatning in the bad temper and ill blood which seems to be forced up—so that the issue is well nigh brought to force.—The people of that country and the king's troops are, as it were, set in array against each other.—The sword indeed is not drawn—but the hand is upon it.— The word for action is not indeed yet given, but mischief is on tip-toe; and the slightest circumstance would in a moment throw every thing into confusion and bloodshed. And if some mode of policy does not interpose to remove this exertion of military power—the union between Great Britain and North America is broken for ever—unless (what is worse) both are united in one common ruin.

Where the whole spirit and bent of a people, who have the powers of government within themselves, is fixed and determined against a tax—experience and common sense will convince you, that no civil power, no civil coercion, will ever assess or collect it.

It will be found also in the trial, fact; that no military force can do this—it ne∣ver did, so long as the forms only of government remained: it cannot assess or collect: it may raise a contribution by military execution—but that is not government, it is war.

Here, Sir! I must beg to mark the distinction between the application of mili∣tary force in this case, and the application of it in the usual cases which arise in Great Britain.

Military force is never applied, but when called for by the civil magistrate—never acts, but in aid of the civil magistrate—and under the orders and command of the civil magistrate: but if they are sent to Boston—the civil magistrate the mean while protesting that they are not wanted—if they are sent, not in aid of the civil magi∣strate, but as it were to force him to act: are not put under his orders, but take pos∣session of his jurisdiction, and take the command—that is not government, it is war.

If the people are indeed in rebellion—it is a necessary war: but if they neither make, nor intend, any opposition by force or arms—if they have continued, and do continue, to pay the duties—what is there for the troops to do? however the people may submit, in these points, in fact—the troops will never convert them to the opinion of the right.

And here I cannot withold an observation which a friend of mine in that country makes on this occasion:

If you mean to govern the country by the aid of military force, you have not sent a sufficient number of troops— if you do not mean this, you have already sent too many.

But— thank God, resistance by force and arms is not the resistance which you have to guard against. The people of America are husbandmen and mer∣chants; who have lived by their dependence upon, and under the protection of Great Britain—are unaccustomed to arms—are not trained up in a mili∣tary spirit—do not (to use an expression of their own) feel hold to resist by arms: yet, if you attempt to force taxes against the spirit of the people there, you will find, when perhaps it is too late, that they are of a spirit which will resist all force—which will grow stronger by being forced— will prove superior to all force—and ever has been unconquerable: they are of a spirit to abide, nay, to court, persecution: and if amongst other propositions which they have taken up they should once take it into their heads that they are under a state of persecution; that spirit of enthusiasm which is of their temper, and of their very nature, will arise; and every mischievous consequence, in every extreme, will accompany it.

This spirit is not dead in them; it is only dormant; the utmost care and skill of those who lead them, either in civil or religious matters, is employ∣ed to restrain and keep it down. If this spirit should once take fire—and believe me, Sir, it is in such a state of inflammability that the smallest spark would give it fire—it will break out into a flame, which no reason, no pru∣dence, no force can restrain: those who yet retain some lead, and have kept matters from running to extremities, to whom the people still listen—will either lose that lead, or will take the lead of this spirit when it shall be once gone forth—and if the ministers (whom we here call the clergy) once fall in with this spirit; if the people once call upon them, they must take the lead—and if they do, the people (to use their own phrase) will be led by Moses and Aaron, by the civil and religious, under a bond of unity that no factions will divide, no force can break.

The spirit of their religion—or if you please so to call it of fanaticism —will, like Moses' serpent, devour every other passion and affection: their love for the mother country, changing its nature, will turn to the bitterest hate: their affectation of our modes and fashions, (the present source of great part of our commerce) will become an abomination in their sight.

That spirit which led their ancestors to break off from every thing which is near and dear to the human heart—from every connection which friend∣ship, relation, blood could give—which led them to quit every comfort that a settled and civilized country (their own native country) could afford; and to encourage every difficulty and distress, which a wild wilderness of savages could oppose to them, to struggle even for their existence;—that spirit, equally strong and equally inflamed, has but a slight and trifling sa∣crifice to make at this time—they have not to quit their native country, but to defend it—they have not to forsake their friends and relations, but to unite with and to stand by them, in one common union. The only sa∣crifice they have to make is that of a few follies and a few luxuries.—It is not necessity that is the ground of their commerce with you; it is merely the affectation of our modes and customs—the love for home, as they call England, that makes them like every thing which comes from thence; but passion may be conquered by passion, and they will abominate as sincerely as they now love you; and if they do, they have within themselves every thing which is necessary to the food, raiment, or the dwelling of mankind, and have no need of your commerce.

But that gentlemen may not think this to be mere harangue—I will come to particulars. They have a great surplusage of hides and leather— hides are even part of their exports. They have peltry—they have wool, linen and cotton. They work up all these, and have home-made and home-spun, sufficient for their cloathing. They have fish, game, beef, mutton and every other article at about one third of the price which we pay here—they have iron and copper which they cast and work up in every form that is necessary. The only difficulty which they have at first to la∣bour against, will be the manufacture of hardware. But when I tell the H— that they do already make all the implements of husbandry better than those which come to them from England—and that the husbandmen buy such, in preference to those made in England—they will see how large a stride they have taken towards the establishment of this branch of business: and (overloaded, from various reasons, as every branch of our

manufactures is with manufacturers) if a stop be put to them but for one year,—the tide is upon the turn; the manufacturers with the turn of that tide will go over in shoals to America—as they once came over hither from the Netherlands. If it be not the humour of the h— to bear to be told this now, they will remember it hereafter.

In one word. If this spirit of fanaticism should once arise upon the idea of persecution—those people whom Great Britain hath to this hour drawn as it were with a thread—and whom it has governed, as you have been ingeniously told, with a little paper and packthread—you will not for the future be able to govern it with a rod of iron: and every benefit which this country has derived from that country, will be stopped at every source.

If it be not the humour of the h— to believe this at present—I only beg they will remember it has been said, and that they are forewarned of it.

If this then be the state of this business, and these the consequences of proceeding by exertion of force instead of measures of policy—and if after all, force will not and cannot produce the effect aimed at—but will produce such directly contrary and pernicious effects: if after alienating the people of the colonies—after dissolving the union that is between us—after break∣ing all communication of commerce between us; it shall be found impos∣sible to tax a people who have the powers of government within them∣selves, unless by and with their own consent, either in the grant, or by their acquiescing in the grant with their consent to assess and collect such tax—if this be the case—there remains no other alternative, but to adopt some mode of policy, that will carry that consent along with the power of government.

But why do I endeavour, under the discouragement which gentlemen give to any reasoning, any consideration of this matter; why should I en∣deavour to obtrude my poor reasoning so ill received? Why should I talk of adopting modes of policy when the shorter way—of the question and de∣cision, the short way of force, seems already adopted? Nevertheless, even under this discouragement, if gentlemen attend, I will mark out that mode of policy by which every evil may be avoided, and all again be restored to peace, to union and government. This mode lies in the nature of the business, in the actual state of things—it is the most easy to be understood— the most easy to be executed—nay, the only one that is practicable.

What I would wish to suggest to the consideration of the h—, and what I know would succeed—is this plain and simple advice—that you

should not stir up, but wave, all questions which become mere articles of faith—that you should make no innovotions in practice, nor suffer any en∣croachments to be made on government—that you should take the ground that you now actually stand upon—and that government should act upon that ground, as it hath done invariably for 160 years past, from the first establishment of the colonies.

This would heal that union between the mother country and her colonies, which hath been vitiated;—would restore that communication of com∣merce which otherwise will be cut off—would revive again the spirit of obedience—and re-establish the power of government.

Truth lies in a very narrow compass. I shall not therefore take up much time in explaining to the h— this plain and practical proposition. I see the h— is im∣patient to decide; but it is for that very reason, seeing the danger of the decision, that I labour to obtrude and even force, against their inclinations, my poor opinion to their consideration—I do not attempt or pretend to amuse and entertain them. I cannot expect their attention, it is from the importance of the subject that I beseech their patience.

From the first establishment of the colonies, till within three or four years past, the people there have enjoyed and exercised the power of taxing themselves internally— of giving and granting their own money,

First, For the support of government within the limits and precincts of their res∣pective jurisdictions.

Secondly, For the aid of the mother country whensoever called upon or required for that special purpose.

In which the mother country never interfered.—On the other hand, the mother country has uninterruptedly and invariably laid and imposed upon them external taxes by port duties—which the people never have opposed—never considered as a grievance—nay, never objected to, or petitioned against.

Government gave to these people no occasion of disputes, by laying internal taxes; and hath always found reason to be satisfied with the liberality and chearfulness of their free grants and aids.

The people, on the other hand, never objected to external taxes —to imposts, sub∣sidies and duties. They know that the express conditions of their settlements and establishments were, that they should pay these—and therefore they never have had any disputes with government on this head—but have always found reason to be satisfied in the moderation with which government hath exercised this power.

Within four or five years past, it was thought adviseable to lay internal taxes on the people of the colonies. The questions which this measure and the repeal of it, raised and brought into discussion—and the manner in which this question was most unaccountably agitated; by arguing from precedents of external taxes to the justice and propriety of internal taxes; by saying, that there was no difference— has taught the colonies, to retort the reverse of the proposition, by arguing from internal to external. In this argument they have adopted your own proposition—

and by your help have reasoned themselves into an opposition to all external taxes which they had hitherto submitted to for a century and half. Hence we receive at this day complaints of grievances, calls for redress, petitions and remonstrances against these taxes—and hence, all the mischiefs of this day's perplexity.

But, Sir! all this is a mere outwork; advanced on your ground—it is not their real defence, on ground which they hope to maintain—it is mere argument ad ho∣minem; it is fighting you with your own weapons. Neither their own principles, nor the constitution of their establishments, give ground for this reasoning—nor do their own arguments lead them to these conclusions. They neither are nor can be in earnest in making these claims, otherwise than having something to negotiate with, and to give up.

If therefore you will act in the government of the colonies as you have done for 160 years past; and will take the ground that this business does actually now stand upon—and will suffer it to be known and understood that you do really adopt this mode of administration, all may be quiet, and would be quiet, as soon as a ship could arrive with the news of it in North America.

The ground that this business doth actually stand upon is this—you have now no internal taxes upon which questions may be raised or disputes arise with the Americans.—You have no concessions to make—no repeals as to internal taxes— The external taxes which are laid upon the colonies, are no other as to the matter of them, than such as the colonies have ever since their first establishment submitted to and paid: and you have pledged yourselves, that if in the mode of these taxes there be any thing which is injurious to the spirit of commerce—any thing which is matter of real grievance—you will be ready to relieve and to amend: there is not at present any intention of extending the exercise of our power to the laying internal taxes; nor will any future ministry (be they composed of whomsoever they may) over venture to lay internal taxes.

But as there are those who say that there is no such distinction—as also others who do not see how this distinction can arise—I will, if the impatience of gentlemen to come to a decision without discussion, without a debate, will permit me, mark such distinction: after which, I will establish the plain, simple advice which I pre∣sume to give on those reasonings which I advance, as to the policy, the wisdom, the experience, the justice, the necessity of the measure.

1. The conditions of the grants and charters under which these people did first quit this country and settle in America; and on which their corporations and powers of government are established—do expresly stipulate for the payment of subsidies, duties, and imposts, almost without variation, in the same words, through∣out every grant and charter. I need not now repeat or recite these clauses—they are apparent, and open to the inspection of every one.

On the other hand, every charter does expresly or intentionally make a distiction between these and such taxes as they are permitted and impowered to lay on their own estates, real and personal, within the precincts and limits of their territories; and on such transactions as shall pass within their own jurisdiction.

The charter of Virginia, after having directly fixed the right of payment of the subsidies, imposts and duties, from the company to the crown; and having made a grant of the same to the company for 21 years—has these words:

That they

shall be free of all subsidies and customs in Virginia for 21 years, and from all taxes and impositions for over.

—Making not only an express distinction in the matter but in the right—and in consequence of this distinction, the incorporating charters of government gave them power to tax themselves.

The charter of Maryland, in all the grants therein made, makes an express saving of imposts, duties and customs to the king and his heirs for ever, which the people of that province by the express condition of their charter are bound to pay—yet the same charter, likewise making the distinction both in matter and right, between internal and external taxation—

We our heirs and successors shall at no time set and make, or cause to set, any imposition, custom, or other taxation, rate or contribu∣tion whatsoever, in and upon the dwellers and inhabitants of the aforesaid pro∣vince, for their lands, goods, tenements or chattels WITHIN THE SAID PROVINCE.

—And in consequence of this, the legislature of the province has power granted to impose and assess taxes within the precincts and jurisdictions of its territories.

In the same manner (for it would be tiresome to cite all particulars) and almost in the same words, all the charters of incorporation and government—which are to be distinguished from the original grants of the lands and territories—make the same distinction—stipulating expresly for the payment of all imposts, subsidies and duties, according to the law of merchants.—But as to the lands, tenements and here∣ditaments within the precincts and jurisdictions—leaving those at large, as objects of the taxation of the several legislatures which are respectively thereby established; with powers to ordain and establish all manner of laws, impose and assess, and to levy money on the lands and hereditaments within the bounds of their grants.

2. And as this was both intentionally & expresly the liberties & franchises grant∣ed to these colonies at their first settlement; and so understood; as far as the crown could or might grant* 1.1.—So the exercise and administration of government towards these people hath been for a century and half invariably conducted on this plan— always imposing or requiring external or port duties—never, till of late years, cal∣ling forth the power of parliament to exert its absolate power in laying duties and taxes on the dwellers and inhabitants of those colonies for their lands, heridita∣ments or transactions within the precincts and jurisdictions of their several terri∣tories.

3. The colonies having been used to this distinction by the course and practice of government, have in their reasoning marked an essential difference in the nature of the thing.

Whatever tax or duty is imposed upon external property imported into their country—is indeed annexed to the property, but not upon them either in their rights or persons; untill they choose, by purchasing that property with the tax an∣nexed to it, to annex that tax also to themselves: but this is an act of their own consent.

Whatever tax is imposed on any property immediately and intimately united with their persons or rights, must be paid without any interposition of their own will, unless they quit that property, or forego that right.

The first is external; and annexed or not, at their own will—the second is in∣ternal, and absolutely annexed to what is inseperable from them.

Seeing this essential difference in the nature of the thing, established by invariable prescription from their first establishment as a government—they reason (and justly too) from this distinction and this prescription, That whatever right of taxing them∣selves within the precincts and limits of their own jurisdictions they may enjoy by the principles of the British government and their own constitution; or whatever rights they may have been permitted to exercise by prescription and practice— such right or rights are confined to their own limits. Howsoever they may reason right or wrong as to internal taxes, their arguments go not beyond low water mark —whatever passes the great ocean to or from without, either is originally, or com∣mences to be, separate and distinct from their internal rights and property: who∣ever acts and trades beyond the limits of their precincts, acts and trades under the express conditions of the maritime laws, both of regulation and revenue.

If therefore there be any difference in this distinction—in the nature, circum∣stances and effect of taxes, internal and external—if there be any distinction in the case whether the consent of the subject goes or does not go along with a payment made under a tax—so far as these distinctions do go, so far is there a distinction in the right; respecting the extent to which the rights of such people may be ad∣mitted.

4. But the principles on which the House of Commons grounds its peculiar right to originate all grants, and to frame all money bills, gives the colonies reasonable expectation, that, whatever be the right of the king, lords and commons, assembled in parliament to make laws which shall be binding on the colonies in all cases whatever—the House of Commons will never in act and deed originate any grants from the lands or money within the limits and precincts of the colonies, until it shall be clear beyond all doubt that the members of that house do in act and deed represent the counties, cities and boroughs in America, as they do the counties, cities, and boroughs of Great-Britain, for whom they give and grant—or that ac∣cording to the principles maintained by the House of Commons, they do give and grant for the counties, cities and boroughs whom they do in act and deed represent.

I say, Sir! no ministry will ever venture—the present do not desire or mean— to propose such taxes to the House of Commons: and that house never will, con∣sistent with those principles by which it maintains this right of originating grants, exclusive of the lords—I say, never will, adopt and originate any such tax.

What then remains—but that as you are in fact, and by good fortune, restored again to the safe old ground on which this matter hath always stood—but that you resume again the spirit of your old policy. I am founded when I say that this would restore again peace, order and government.—I have letters in my pocket from some of the principal, some of the leading men in that country—who say we do not call upon Great Britain to give up her rights and claims—〈…〉〈…〉 desire to be returned back, and set again upon our old safe ground, which we understood, and that in the exercise of your power you would return to your old policy.

Let the matter of right rest upon the declaratory law, and say no more about it. It may be understood (as it is in the same words as that respecting Ireland) that it

shall stand in the same line of administration—I say it may be so understood, and will be better understood by being never explained.

Do nothing which may bring into discussion questions of right, which must be∣come mere articles of faith—Go into no innovations in practice, and suffer no en∣croachments on government—Extend not the power which you have of imposing taxes, to the laying internal taxes on the colonies—Continue to exercise the power, which you have always exercised, of laying subsidies, imposts, and duties—but ex∣ercise this, as you have always hitherto done, with prudence and moderation, and directed by the spirit of commercial wisdom.

This spirit and mode of government would cement again that union which is shattered, if it is not quite broken—would restore again that spirit of obedience, which the loss of authority on the one hand, and the loss of affection on the other, hath in∣corrupted— would re-establish the authority as well as force of civil government, which has almost lost its force by losing its authority.—EXERT THE SPIRIT OF POLICY that you may not ruin the colonies and yourselves BY EXERTING FORCE.

FINIS.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Virginia charter.