to resist or prevent, by force, the execution of any statute of the United States, has a direct tendency to dissolve all the bonds of society, to destroy all order, and all laws; and also, all security for the lives, liberties, and property of the citizens of the United States.
The court are of opinion, that military weapons (as guns and swords, mentioned in the indictment) are not necessary to make such insurrection or rising amount to levying war; because numbers may supply the want of military weapons; and other instruments may effect the intended mischief: The legal guilt of levying war may be incurred without the use of military weapons, or military array.
The court are of opinion, that the assembling bodies of men, armed and arrayed in a••warlike manner, for purposes only of a PRIVATE nature, is NOT TREASON; although the judges, or other peace officers should be insulted, or resisted; or even great outrages committed to the persons, or property of our citizens.
The true criterion to determine whether acts committed are treason, or a less offence, (as a riot) is the quo animo or the intention with which the people did assemble. When the intention is universal, or general as to effect some object of a general public nature, it will be treason; and cannot be considered, construed, or reduced to a riot. The commission of any number of felonies, riots, or other misdemean∣ors cannot alter their nature, so as to make them amount to treason; and, on the other hand, if the intention and acts combined amount to treason, they cannot be sunk down to a felony, or riot. The intention with which any acts (as felonies, the destruction of property, or the like) are done, will show to what class of crimes, the case belongs.
The court are of opinion, that if a body of people conspire and meditate an insurrection to resist or oppose the execution of any statute of the United States by force, that they are only guilty of a high mis∣demeanor; but if they proceed to carry such intention into execution, BY FORCE,—that they are guilty of the treason of levying war; and the quantum of the force employed neither lessens, nor increases the crime; whether by one hundred, or one thousand persons, is wholly immaterial.
The court are of opinion, that a combination, or conspiracy to levy war against the United States is not treason, unless combined with an attempt to carry such combination, or conspiracy, into execution; some actual force, or violence, must be used, in pursuance of such de∣sign to levy war; but that it is altogether immaterial, whether the force used is sufficient to effectuate the object; any force connected with the intention, will constitute the crime of levying war.
This opinion of the court is founded on the same principles, and is, in substance, the same, as the opinion of the circuit court, for this district, on the trials (in April 1795) of Vigol and Mitchell, who were both found guilty by the jury, and afterwards pardoned by the late President.
At the circuit court for the district (April term 1799) on the trial of the prisoner at the bar, Judge Iredell delivered the same opinion, and Fries was convicted by the jury.