Joel Barlow to his fellow citizens, of the United States of America. A letter on the system of policy hitherto pursued by their government. Paris 4 March, 1799.

JOEL BARLOW TO HIS FELLOW CITIZENS, OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

A LETTEROn the system of policy hitherto pursued by their Government.

Paris 4 March, 1799.

FELLOW CITIZENS,

SINCE your commercial intercourse with this country has been suspended, and the produce of your labour arrives at market by a double voyage, as it used to do when we were British Colonies, I rarely see an American News-Paper. It was only yesterday, that a writing, said to be a Letter from me to a member of Congress, dated in march 1798, came into my hands. I have it in a Boston Pa|per, called the Centinel; and, by some observa|tions of the editor, I perceive that the authorship, a circumstance very trifling in itself, has, occa|sioned

doubts and disputes. The general tradi|tion, that it is mine, has been questioned by some persons who express a tenderness for my reputation; for which I will certainly thank them, whenever they will convince me of the morality of their motives. Both opinions in this case are partly right, and both partly wrong. Truth lies between, as it often does in questions of more consequence than the present.

I did write a Letter to a member of Congress in march 1798, to which the publication in ques|tion bears a strong resemblance. Indeed the po|litical cast and general complexion of my Letter are easily recognised in this; but every part of it is mutilated and distorted more or less. There is not a paragraph without some omissions, addi|tions, or changes, which in some places give a bitterness to party ivective which I did not mean; in others, destroy all meaning, and render me unintelligible; and in others, vulgarise the style, vitiate the grammar, and make the phrasealogy ridiculous.

I know not by what means, nor for what pur|pose this Letter has been intercepted, metamor|phosed, and published. I pretend not to say there was any intention of doing an injury to me or to my friends. The hasty manner in which a copy may be supposed to have been taken, if done by stealth, and the number of presses and hands of ignorant editors which it has probably passed through, might perhaps be sufficient to account for the variations, were it not that they are uni|formly against me,—that is, against that calm|ness of temper, dignity of manner, purity of lan|guage, and delicacy of political or personal ani|madversion, which I wish to preserve. The Let|ter was written in great haste, addressed to a very particular friend, and confided to a channel

of conveyance which I thought uncommonly safe. It may be supposed therefore to have been penned with a carelessness and freedom which would admit of corrections or alterations in fa|vour of method and moderation. And there is reason to suppose that some at least of the alter|ations it has undergone would have been on that side, had they been the effect of chance, or even of ignorance.

But the substantial character of the Letter, so far as it respects my opinions on the system of policy pursued by our Executive towards France and England, during the period to which it re|lates, must answer for itself. Though I always reserve to myself the right of changing my opi|nions, as every man who is not omniscient must often have occasion to do; yet on this subject I have not changed them during the last year. It is my belief that it would cost you dearer even now to settle your dispute with France, than it would have done (had your negociations been properly managed) at the time I wrote that Letter. How much you have unfortunately suffered from the piracies carried on under the French laws since that period, you can doubtless determine better than I; and what will be the final expense of the negociation, those only will be able to decide who shall live to see it.

Thus much for the sentiments originally con|tained in that Letter. I will now rectify one or two mistakes, which I have observed in the American papers, relative to the circumstances under which it was written.

First: it is supposed by some, who do not reflect on the chronology of dates, that I was apprized of the attempts which had been made here to extort from our commissioners a bribe to individuals, and a promise of a loan to the govern|ment.

They imagine that I wrote under this im|pression, and consequently approved the mea|sure. I believe that not the most distant hint of either of these base attempts was known, or whispered (beyond the circle of those persons mentioned in the dispatches) until their publica|tion in Philadelphia▪ which happened to be on the same day, that my Letter was dated in Paris. The printed dispatches arrived here in May; and no man in America could feel a greater indigna|tion than I did, at the piece of villainy therein detailed; though I am far from thinking that a proper use was made of the circumstance, either before or after it was communicated to the Ame|rican government. I had no knowledge that even a loan was asked for, or contemplated to be asked for on the part of France. It was my opinion that it was the policy of the American government, under circumstances then existing, to offer a loan; and a small one would have been sufficient. One fourth part of the sum you have since lost by plunder would have been ac|ceptable, and might have been loaned consist|ently with that honour and national independence which I wish to see you maintain. The dis|patches of general Pinckney, alluded to in my Letter, were not those of the three commis|sioners, as supposed by the Centinel, but were dated the year before, and were the fruits of his former embassy.

Secondly: had that Letter been designed for publication, I should not have left it open to cri|ticism in another point more remarkable than the one above noticed. In reviewing the errors of the American government, I there made no men|tion of those of the French; and it has been concluded, from this omission, that I approved the conduct of the latter;—that I saw nothing

wrong in that monstrous system of piracy and plunder exercised towards neutrals;—indeed, I am supposed to have relished all the horrors that have attended this tremendons revolution. God forbid that I should lose my senses to such a degree! I have not only disapproved the innume|rable acts of injustice and violence committed under the order of the 2^d of march 1797, and the law of the 18th of January 1798, but I have uni|formly remonstrated, with as much force as an individual of little influence could do, against that order and that law, and against the general current of resentment which has marked the mea|sures of this government towards that of the Uni|ted States, ever since the ratification of the British treaty. This resentment has appeared to me far greater than the occasion would justify; and I have not failed to enforce this opinion wherever I thought it could be usefully done. But Paris is the place where it is proper to point out for cor|rection the errors of the French government; and Philadelphia, those of the American. My friend was in Philadelphia. My Letter was written with the simple hope of doing some immediate good; not with a design of transmitting history to future ages. Where then would have been the use of swelling it with a list of blunders which might have been discovered on this side of the question? blunders, or crimes if you please, which no man of candour will deny; but on which his silence ought not to be construed into approbation. You might as well say that I believe in the doc|trines of Mahomed, because I do not go out of my way to refute them.

We are so constituted and circumscribed in our powers of action, that most of the good or ill which we do in the world is the result of cir|cumstances not always in our power to control.

Whoever will give himself the trouble of obtain|ing a competent knowledge of the French revo|lution, so as to be able to judge with intelligence, and weigh the infinite complication of difficulties and incentives to ungovernable passions that have lain in the way of its leaders, must indeed be shocked at their follies and their faults; but he will find more occasion to ask why they have committed so few, than why they have commit|ted so many. A state of political insanity is not at all inconsistent with the situation in which they have been placed by the irresistible force of circumstances. And there are cases in which we ought to applaud men for the mischiefs they have not done, as well as to search excuses for those they have brought about.

I am sensible that, in your view, the wrongs committed by the French towards the United States are less excusable than those towards other na|tions. You form this opinion, not so much from national prejudice, as from a consciousness of the purity of your own intentions in your con|duct towards this republic; from having felt a ge|neral friendship to her cause, and not perceiving a sufficient ground of complaint on which her resentment can be founded. But you are not to learn that jealousy is one of the strongest and blindest of the human passions; and I believe you will be convinced that the facts hinted at in my Letter, viewed through the mist of jealousy that had constantly surrounded the leaders in the re|volution, could not fail of producing essects simi|lar to what we now deplore.

No! my fellow citizens: I have too high a sense of justice and the rights of nations, to sanction maritime plunder from any quarter, or even to approve the least restriction on trade. A perfect liberty of commerce is among the most indubita|ble

rights of man; and it is the best policy of na|tions. The establishment of this principle alone, with proper measures to preserve it, would have a powerful tendency, if not an infallible effect, to maintain a perpetual peace between countries separated by the ocean. The opposers of this branch of liberty, who do it from reflection, are not only the enemies of America, but they are the abettors of injustice, and the foes of humanity. They strive to perpetuate a system of war, of public devastation, private rapine, fraud, and cruelty, which disturb the tranquillity of states, discourage honest industry, and blacken the cha|racter of man. Those who oppose it through ignorance, and at the same time aspire to the task of administering the government of a free people, ought to be sent back to school, and there taught the rudiments of the science which solicits their ambition▪

Possessing these opinions, and seeing America move nearer to this principle than any other na|tion, how is it possible that I could approve the blind policy of European plunder, or look with indifference on the tyranny of the seas? From the time when your first vessel was taken by the English, at the beginning of the present war, I expected to see some of your great men in power come forward with something luminous on the rights of nations relative to trade. From the reputed wisdom of America I expected to see Europe at last enlightened on a subject of so much importance to the human race. In addition to the freedom of your constitution, I considered you as possessing two singular advantages for the attainment of this great object. 1st. Nature had placed a wide ocean between you and those na|tions to which your commercial intercourse ex|tended. And you had not, or ought not to have

any other political intercourse abroad, but what relates to commerce. 2d From the nature of your trade and the constant result of your accounts current, you are always indebted to those nations in sums amounting from 15 to 30 millions of dol|lars. This state of your accounts was not confi|ned to England, It extended (before the present war) to those other countries whose manufactures you were in the habit of importing; and to France and Holland in as high a proportion, compared with their manufactures imported, as to England.

The first of these advantages, being a sufficient bulwark against attacks by land, secured you from the political squabbles of Europe; leaving you vulnerable only in your commerce, The second furnished you, in your commerce itself, with a most powerful weapon of defence. The English began to plunder you in the year 1793, in a manner totally unprovoked, and without even a pretext. Here was an occasion which called for the talents of your leaders, and invited them to use with dexterity this weapon, which was the most legitimate, the most pacific, and the most effectual that was ever put into the hands of any government. But instead of this, an embassy is dispatched to London, to resign this precious weapon, the only infallible one you had, into the hands of the British king; and this for no other reason than for fear that a future Congress and another Executive might use it. Your situa|tion, though new to you, was not difficult nor delicate; it required a declaration of neutrality, a solemn declaration and definition of the rights of neutrality, and a notification of your intention that all property taken unjustly from your citizens by any Power at war should be compensated by 〈◊〉〈◊〉 much property of the subjects of that Power 〈◊〉〈◊〉 within your jurisdiction, whether in the

public funds or in the hands of private debtors. There is nothing unjust or immoral in this mode of proceeding. The aggression would be on the part of the foreign Power; you compensate your own citizen, and leave that Power to compensate hers; and if she does not do it, the injustice is on her side, both as first aggressor and final delin|quent. If she makes the compensation she will not be likely to repeat the offence▪ because it would be an expensive business; if she refuses compensation, she will soon be brought to reason by the clamours of her suffering subjects. England, in such cases, would not fail to do you justice; and that on the only principle you can count upon with certainty from any foreign nation, an attention to her own interest.

Let it not be said that such a system of policy would prevent our merchants from obtaining suffi|cient credits abroad for all the useful purposes of commerce. Or if any person is really of that opinion, I desire him to visit Manchester and Birmingham, and see whether he can pass through those towns without being struck with the won|derful facility of obtaining credit; and without being besieged for orders by rival houses on almost any terms. Let him then travel in Germany, or in any part of Europe, and observe the quantity of riders for English manufacturing houses, who are hawking their samples of goods, and offers of credit, in every corner of the continent.

I am sensible that I might strengthen this part of my argument, in the minds of some readers, by adopting a prevaling opinion, that the facility of obtaining private credits abroad is of no service to our country. But I do not adopt this opi|nion. I believe that such credits are of service; and that the English trade in particular is highly

beneficial to the United States, in an aggricultu|ral and economical point of view; but more espe|cially as furnishing a ready instrument in the hands of American debtors, to be held up by our go|vernment in terror to one of the most quarrelsome States of Europe.

But it is said to be dishonorable to resort to the sequestration of private properly as a compen|sation for public wrongs. Alas, when are we, poor children of feudality, to obtain proper ideas of honor, or of any other of the moral sentiments! What can be more honorable in a government than to prevent the occasion of wars, protect the works of peace, encourage honest industry, and induce foreign Powers to hold a steady check on the licentiousness of private violence, sea rob|bery, murders; and other cruelties, which attend the consciousness of maritime superiority in some of the nations of Europe? Such being the object, and this object being at least an honorable one, Let us examine the means here proposed, and compare them with those which are commonly re|sorted to; for which we find plenty of precedents, and therefore have not been told that they are dis|honorable. After spoliations have been commit|ted on the property of individuals, and you have made sufficient and ineffectual remonstrances to the government of the offending party▪ I suppose none will deny that it would be honorable to fit out armed vessels and make reprisals on the pro|perty of the nation that has committed the vio|lence. But what is this but sequestring private property? The only difference in the two cases is, that the latter is attended with great expence to yourselves, leads to battles, homicides, cruel|ties, and a surplusage of plunder, which gene|rally bring on a war; whereas the former is a calm, unexpensive proceeding, which gives you

your compensation by weight and measure, ex|cites no ill blood, and can never, of itself, be|come a pretext for a continuance of hostile mea|sures on either side. Take another comparison: it is not uncommon to lay embargoes, and to sequester embargoed property, to compensate for injuries sustained. This indeed is attended with less expence, and less bullying and battling, than reprisals made at sea; and therefore it may be thought not quite so honorable; but it is allowed. And what is the difference between this mode and the one of sequestring debts? In both cases the property is bona side brought to your country and entrusted to your care, with a full under|standing that you will perform the part of faithful agents, pay for what you buy, and restore the rest to its owners. Why, I will tell you what is the difference: in the case of embargo, the ships at least are subjected to great and useless damage; the crews are left in idleness and vice; the vessels rot; and the cargoes are exposed either to perish, or to be sold at a forced sale; and it will often happen that at least three quarters of the value of the property detained is clearly lost to all parties: while in the seizure of debts, there is no loss, and no extraordinary expence.

But there is another objection which I must undertake to answer. It is said that to sequester the property of a foreigner in the public funds would injure the credit of the United States. I comprehend the argument perfectly well: it means their borrowing credit. As to their credit for mo|ral honesty, political economy, national dignity, good sense, and that steady pursuit of pacific principles which inspires respect and confidence abroad, and the love and veneration of their own citizens,—this sort of credit would be greatly benefited by such a system, if it were solemnly

declared as a principle of neutrality, and impar|tially executed whenever occasion should require. But a credit in the mercantile sense of the word, or a facility of making loans, deserves a farther consideration. It is, in my opinion, an instru|ment too dangerous to be trusted in the hands, I will not say of any executive government, but even a legislative body. I have examined pretty fully in a former publication* 1.1 the advantages and disadvantages of such a credit in the policy of a free republic generally; without applying it to my own country in particular. The disad|vantages are terrible beyond description; and I will only add here, that I wish to see no such credit habitually in the government of the United States. I acknowledge that there are cases in which it might be highly beneficial; and so there are cases where an unlimited arbitrary power might be advantageously concentred for a moment in one man. But no prospect of such a case, though possible, has been or ought to be thought suffi|cient to induce you to provide for it in your con|stitution. If you had been convinced, therefore, that the power you have delegated to congress of borrowing money on the credit of the United States was as dangerous as it would be to delegate the power of creating a dictator, you doubtless would not have inserted such a clause in your constitution, without some modification or re|striction, which would not have been difficult to apply to so tremendous an instrument of innova|tion and abuse. Though great mischiefs have already been done by the exercise of this power, thus indiscreetly trusted out of your hands, yet it is not impossible to arrest the evil where it is;

and in my opinion you ought to attempt it with|out farther delay. Otherwise it will inevitably go on increasing to a degree which no man will pretend to calculate, and no friend to his coun|try can think of but with horror. Annex to your constitution an amendment to this effect: That in future no assumption or obligation for the pay|ment of money shall be made or authorised, by the Congress, the Executive, or any other officer of the United States, so as to be binding on the people thereof, except in case of actual invasion; and then for the sole purpose of imme|diate defence against such invasion.

Experience has certainly taught us by this time, what theory unhappily did not, that a few detach|ed citizens, however virtuous in other respects, cannot be safely trusted with the fates of nations, and the happiness of future ages, in a business attended with so many temptations, as that of thrusting the hand into the long and open purse of posterity. The giddiness of power, the violence of passion, the multiform solicitations of artful speculators, will almost necessarily drive them headlong to sell our future earnings, and entail slavery on mankind; when it can be done by the simple act of voting; and when the responsibility is not to us who sent them, but to generations not yet in being.

Look back through ten years of your history, and examine, if you can with patience; the rise, progress, and present state of your national debt. See with what wanton prodigality it has been hunted up from every corner and in every shape, assumed, funded, and saddled upon you. You were told ten years ago, and with such effrontery as appeared to gain your belief, that if you would have the goodness to fund the proposed debt, with all its accumulations, it would be very easi|ly

lessened and very soon extinguished; that the rate of interest in America would soon fall from six to five, and then to four per cent, and you were flattered with the idea that you would spee|dily be able to make new loans at these latter rates, to purchase in the old capital; and by that means so diminish the annual call for money, as to be able by a surplusage of revenue to sink the whole debt in a short time. You have now had ten years of peace since this arrangement; eight of which were years of such uncalculated prosper|ity as was never before experienced by any nation, and was astonishing even to yourselves, During this time, how have the prospects, held out in your finding scheme, been realised? Your debt has been constantly increasing; and your govern|ment is now borrowing money, or trying to bor|row it, at eight per cent; and for no other ob|ject, as I can discern, but to augment the bles|sings of a national debt. As to the rate of inte|rest offered, it is a matter of very little impor|tance in my view of the subject. I wish the mo|ney were not to be found at twenty per cent; or rather, I wish the government of the United States, were unable to borrow a dollar at any interest whatever, and were always to continue so, except in case of war and invasion.

Your funding system, considered as to the cir|cumstances and prospects under which it was adopted, is doubtless one of the most memorable pieces of imbecility and impudence that ever was imposed upon a nation. The scheme when pre|sented to Congress, and the report on public cre|dit that accompanied it, have indeed procured extraordinary honours to their authors in America; but they would have done no remarkable credit to any clerk employed at seventy five pounds a year in the fiscal department in London. They con|tain

no ideas that are new, or luminous, or ana|logous to your situation. All is a dead routine of expedient, familiar to every corrupt government in Europe, whose only object is to find present money by any means whatever. And all the me|rit there is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the scheme, is the novelty of applying an old and desperate remedy where there was no disease; or rather of creating a disease, in order to apply it to the remedy. The debt thus accumulated, and still accumulating by the constant solicitude of those who raised it up, has indeed finally assumed the appearance of an incu|rable disease; or at least its state has become so alarming as to require your most serious consider|ation and immediate exertion, to arrest it, if possible, where it is, and try to get it under.

The actual state of things with you, if not des|perate, is at least disquieting to the friends of li|berty. When I see the American Executive ad|vertising to borrow money at eight per cent, what do I see but a youthful, free, and flourishing na|tion advertising itself for sale! I see an infant Hercules, after having strangled the serpents in his cradle, and risen on his feet with an indi|cation of future force destined to free the world from violence, tie himself for life to the apron|strings of the same Juno who had brought the serpents to devour him. Your leaders attach you to England, not only by commercial treaties, which ought to humble you in your own eyes, as much as they disgrace you in the eyes of the world, but by seeking precedents in every thing among the worst of her follies; things indeed that scarce|ly pass for follies in her, since the weakness, or wickedness, consists chiefly in applying them to a country where they do not belong, and for which they never could have been invented. Your physicians have gone to a decrepid, intemperate

old man, and borrowed his strong cordials, his bandages and gouty velvet shoes, to administer them with cruel empiricism to a sturdy plow-boy.

France is at this time unable to obtain a credit, or to borrow money on any terms, even from her own citizens, As a friend to France I rejoice at it. She now spends about thirty millions sterling a year; if she could borrow with the same fatal facility as England, she would spend at least sixty millions. What will be her financial situation or policy at the end of the war, I cannot tell. Her dept will doubtless be enormous, and in a very depreciated state. I hope she will have more jus|stice than to follow our example in funding it, in all its undistinguished forms and accumulated size. I would rather see it cut up into paper mo|ney, given out to the creditors, and then set afloat, collected and burnt, in the course of three years, by the operation of one specific and ade|quate tax. I do not pretend that this would be the most just or politic method that could be devised; but I am certain it would be less unjust, and less impolitic, than to encrease it ten fold, by raising it at once from ten per cent to a hun|dred, and fixing it on the nation forever at the highest rate of interest known in the country. A middle course may doubtless be found, which would do less injustice than either of these ex|tremes. I think too there was such a middle course, to be discovered in America; and I think it would have been discovered, had there been no speculators in congress, or about the treasu|ry. Whenever your eyes shall cease to be dazzled with men, and you will fix them on measures, you will doubtless adopt the same opinion.

But in answer to what I had suggested relative to the best mode of defence against the insults of Europe, it will be said that you have settled your

dispute with England, without resorting to it; and, what is more, you have stipulated that you never will resort to it. Have you ever calculated the real expense, past, present, and to come, of settling that dispute in the manner in which you have done it? It has cost you, 1st a sacrifice of character, perhaps irretrievable, in the disgrace of having injured your old friend in her distress, aided your most inv••rate enemy, and abandoned the strong hold which the nature of things had given you, and in which you always would have been able to defend yourselves against them both, with perfect dignity and independence. You seem to have forgotten that different nations, as well as different animals, have different means of defence, with which nature and circumstances have respec|tively endowed them. England is defended almost entirely by a maritime force, without deeming it necessary to fortify her towns, or keep on foot any considerable army by land. Austria depends whol|ly upon her land troops and her fortifications. The Pope, though for many ages the most pow|erful monarch in Europe, depended on no physi|cal force by land or sea, but altogether on a moral force, or church policy. Now if either of the latter Powers had said to England: lay aside your navy: it is dishonorable to make use of wooden walls and floating batteries: you ought to allow your enemy to land in your country when he pleases, and then trust to your bayonete or your prayer-book for defence,—is it probable that England would have been persuaded by that argu|ment; to set fire to her ships? The defence of the United States lay in the peculiar nature of their commerce. You had an invincible bulwark in the debts you were constantly owing and renewing with all the nations that had it in their power to

menace your repose. But the first nation that takes it in her held to insult you, comes and tells you that your mode of defence is dishonorable, that you must not use it, but give it up by compact. And, although it was more sure, more peaceable, more natural and less expensive than any other that could be imagined, you immediately resign it into her hands.

2 Your manner of settling that dispute has brought on a rupture with France, which has already cost, in private plunder and public pre|paration for war, at least 60 millions of dollars. And it is not yet certain how much higher these losses will rise, before the business is terminated.

3. The most frightful and most incalculable expense, is one which is only yet beginning to begin: it is that terrible scourge of maritime na|tions, a military navy. I beg you to contemplate for a moment the abyss that your leaders are dig|ging under your feet in the naval system now organising with so much address. You will then listen at your leisure to that swarm of speculators, who live upon your losses, and are now clamor|ing in favour of this system with as much affecta|tion of patriotism, as if your salvation, instead of theirs, depended upon it. I will only observe that it has been the ruin of every nation that has hitherto adopted it; and that it must be so from its nature. It is the syphon put in suction, which never can stop, or moderate its action, till all that feeds it is exhausted.* 1.2

To assist in dragging you into this business, you have been told (I think in one of those oracles

delivered to both houses of Congress) that there is no example among mankind of a commercial ma|rine, without a military marine to support it. The fact is not so; and if it were, that is no reason why it should continue to be so. The re|publics of Ragusa, Hamburgh, Lubeck, and Bre|men, are among the oldest governments of Eu|rope; and they are in a high degree navigating States; that is, they have each of them a large commercial marine, and have had for many ages, without any military marine. Some of my read|ers will smile when they perceive that I am going to compare any of those little sovereigns with the great and independent republic of the United States. I shall do it only in one point; and there is one point in which the comparison is very stri|king, and I think applicable to the present sub|ject. None of the neighbouring Powers thinks proper to attack the commerce of those sovereign|ties, because the interest of other neighbouring Powers is concerned in its independence. In like manner, the Power of St. James's (if our com|merce were kept on its natural footing of self-defence) would not think proper to attack it, because the Power of Liverpool, Bermingham, Sheffield, Manchester, London, and other com|mercial towns, which contain our creditors and stockholders, would oppose it for the strongest of all reasons, and with indubitable effect. The power of the Hague would be restrained, for the same reason, by the Power of Amsterdam; the Power of Paris, by that of Bordeaux, Nantz, and St. Domingo; and so of the rest. I make no exception in the argument on account of the pre|sent deplorable rupture with France, because this rupture never would have happened, if we had not first resigned our armour to England; and because the necessary energies and violent convul|sions

of the revolution have concentrated for a moment all possible powers within the walls of Paris; so that the voice of the commercial towns, the colonies, and the true interests of the nation, are not heard. But this is a crisis, so far as it respects France, which cannot be repeated; and so far as it respects the provocation on our part; I hope it never will.

Our essential character is that of an agricultural people; and, happily for us, the vast quantities of our vacant lands, which call for culture, and demand a population equal to half Europe, will preserve us in this condition for ages to come. Our consumption of European manufactures must therefore continue, and even encrease. The rate of interest, during this period, will necessarily be higher in America than in Europe. Of con|sequence, the mass of private debts, habitually due from our merchants to those of the manufac|turing nations, will not diminish, but probably increase, at least for many years; perhaps as long as a military marine will be suffered to exist in any country. There could be no fear therefore that this our national defence would fail us, as long as the present system of European policy should continue; and we might at least furnish an example, if we could not find one, of maintain|ing a commercial, without a military marine. And I cannot but hope that there are persons now living who will see the day when not a cannon shall be allowed to be carried to sea, at least on the Atlantic and the European seas.

But the navy system with you is like the fund|ing system. When once the funding scheme was adopted as a principle by your speculating legisla|tors, it was necessary to create a debt to support it. For as the system could not live without the debt; and as they were determined to have the

former, they must of course raise up the latter. In like manner, the rage for a navy, which the same politicians have been kindling and puffing for some years, is at last wrought into a system. They have created a new ministerial department, adorned with all the pomp of patronage, and rea|dy to contribute its part in the splendor of the Executive, and the growth of the public debt. They have now at least one argument for building a fleet; for what is a marine minister, without a marine? And what is a navy, without ships? These two systems, whatever may have been the intention of their authors, are certainly calculated for the destruction of liberty in the United States. And they will not fail of their effect,▪ unless they are checked in their present career.

No one will deny that a great change is taking place in the state of society in Europe, both as to the interior government of nations, and their ex|terior and reciprocal intercourse. The rapid pro|gress of thought, set loose from the shackles of precedent, and following the career of revolution that now shakes the political world, must neces|sarily lead to a new order of things. We all agree likewise, at least all who reflect, that the Law of Nations is exceedingly vitious and unreasonable in many respects; especially in what concerns the rights of war and peace relative to commerce. It gives too much favor and encouragement to a state of war, and subjects to too many inconveniencies and vexations the inhabitants of such countries as choose to remain in peace. It is evident that these unnatural regulations were made for kings, and not for people. They are founded on the princi|ple that a state of war is the chief solicitude of those who govern: and the great object to be en|couraged and secured. This is the origin of those exceptions in the articles of free transportation,

which have risen to an enormous list, called con|traband of war; it likewise gave rise to the prac|tice of searching neutral vessels for enemy's goods; of subjecting them to extraordinary and unneces|sary rules of proof, to establish the property; and many other ingenious vexations; as if we must make apologies for wishing to live in peace, and for being producers, instead of destroyers, of the aliments of human life.

No pacific nation can certainly be satisfied with this state of things; as it evidently prefers violence and rapine to the honest pursuits of industry. Some of the Powers of Europe, sensible of these wrongs, have united their efforts with those of the friends of liberty, in attempting, for many years past, to change the Law of Nations in this respect; to emancipate neutral commerce from the tyranny of contraband, and screen it from the seizures and vexations incident to▪ the prevailing system. America once joined them in these views, and adopted the amelioration, as far as possible, in her early treaties in Europe; till her govern|ment chose to sacrifice them to a more favorite project, and threw them into the general hecatomb of rights and principles, buried in the British treaty.

If these revolutions in Europe should terminate in favor of general interior liberty, which is alto|gether probable, they must necessarily extend to exterior or commercial liberty. The Law of Na|tions must undergo a revision; and it must be settled on a general basis of peace and honesty, instead of violence and rapine. It would indeed have been glorious in the United States, who had given the first example to the world of interior and domestic liberty (in which they have now so ma|ny imitators) to have been also the first in assert|ing, desining, and maintaining the exterior liberty

of trade, and those rules of national intercourse which must finally be resorted to, as the basis of a pacific system. Your geographical situation as relative to Europe, not only called for such a measure, but would have ensured its success.

But while we regret that so singular an oppor|tunity of doing so much good as has been slighted and thrown away▪ it becomes us to consider how much of the error is still capable of being retrieved, and what will be the proper moment and the best method of attempting it. What are the measures that America ought to take, to secure her own liberty; establish a permanent and equal inde|pendence from every foreign Power; command the respect and gain the confidence of all man|kind; and induce the commercial nations to adopt a general plan of pacific intercourse, which will perpetuate itself, and better the condition of society? It is possible that these enquiries may be the subject of another Letter which I may address to you, my fellow citizens, whose interest I will never cease to cherish. I am your brother by the close and complicated ties of blood, of early sym|pathies, common dangers, and common triumphs; and your happiness is naturally and habitually nearer to my heart than that of any other nation; though my general philanthropy leads me to pity the condition of every injured people, and to cen|sure, if I cannot restrain, those who lead them into error▪

Some of you who have blamed me for the seve|rity of my remarks on the conduct of your Exe|cutive. It is because you have made them gods, that you are offended with me for finding them but men. I never doubted the patriotism of your principal leaders; that is, so far as patriotism consists in good intentions. But I doubt the pa|triotism of those who lead your leaders. I see

immense fortunes made by your funding legisla|tors, out of the public funds which they funded for themselves. I see the most perfidious mea|sures proposed, adopted, and persisted in, for hur|ling you from the exalted station which enabled you to give commercial law to the governments of Europe; and for crouching you under the peli|can wing of the worst of those governments. I see the treaty that consummates this business, ratified in a gust of passion, a moment of personal resent|ment at an intercepted letter written by an offici|ous French Minister which happened to speak of the western insurrection. And when the indigna|tion of France, though excited by repeated pro|vocation, rises with symptoms of extravagant fury, and threatens an unjustifiable measure of revenge, I see no prudent or manly attempts on your part, to allay the storm and prevent a rup|ture; but prevarication about facts is given for explanation; and gasconade at home keeps time with humiliation abroad. Then comes the flood of piracy and plunder let loose upon your pro|perty; a scene of wickedness which no man can abominate more than myself, and no man has endeavoured more to prevent or mitigate. But when I trace these deplorable effects to their pro|per and indubitable causes, I cannot confine my animadversions to this side of the Atlantic. Though you may choose to deify your first magistrates, the original authors of these calamities,—though you enshrine them in the temple of infallibility, fence them round with sedition laws, and intoxi|cate them with addresses, birth-day-odes, and bac|chanalian toasts,—I see in them some of the frailties of men; and I will not join the chorus of adoration.

With respect to men, I am of no party; I am a republican in theory and practice; notwithstand|ing

the disgrace into which that principle seems to be falling in America. I consider it as my unalienable right, as well as my indispensable duty, to render a service to you wherever I find occasion. And when such service has led me to notice what I thought wrong in the administration of your government; I have always done it: and in such a manner as I thought would be most like|ly to lead to a correction of the abuse. And I shall not relinquish this right, nor neglect this duty, whoever may be the men, and whatever the party, to whom you may choose to delegate your powers.

Among my endeavours to serve you, as a vo|lunteer in the cause of humanity, there is none which I have had more at heart than that of pre|venting a war between you and France, and of bringing about a reconciliation on terms honora|ble and advantageous to each I have no doubt but that both governments desire it; but whether they do or not, as long as I deem it for the inte|rest of both nations, and there remains any hope of success, I will not slacken my exertions. I do not believe in the modern doctrine of your cabinet, that it is a crime in a private citizen to serve his country, or even to call in question the infallibility of its administration. And I know no man in America who did believe it, as long as he remained a private citizen. I am confident, and you may be in time, that the labours of my|self and a few other men, not commissioned for the purpose, have hitherto prevented a war. But how long this will continue to be the case, I cannot pretend to say.

I have been animated in these exertions, not only by the desire of diminishing present evils, and of sparing the blood and treasure of the pre|sent

generation, but of preventing the cause of liberty from falling into disgrace by the quarrels of the two republics, and of disappointing the tyrants of the world, who anticipate this sort of triumph to their own cause. Perhaps I deceive myself; but I cannot yet renounce the belief that the principle of free representative government is so manifestly preferable to the principle of monar|chy, that it will soon be adopted and brought into general practice among the nations of Europe. I believe that if France has not yet reduced to practice, the liberty she has vindicated in theory; both civil and commercial, it is owing to a pro|longation of revolutionary measures—necessita|ted state of Europe, and not to a forgetfulness of principle. She has not yet taken measures to establish the liberty of the seas, because she has not yet arrived at that state of tranquillity which will enable her to look beyond present exegincies, to plans of permanent improvement. The same apology will not apply to the United States. You have had one period, and a pretty long one, of unexampled prosperity and repose; during which your government appears to have done little for America but increase her debt, and nothing for Europe but imitate her follies.

I was indeed in hopes that advantage would be taken of the elevated ground on which you stood to lay the foundation of an edifice that should promise, at least one day, to afford a shelter to the human race. I expected to see you propose a basis for a Law of Nations, to be established in reason, justice, and the principles of peace. And I flattered myself that when France should come to her senses, and rest from her military labours, we might see the two greatest republics on earth, not only enjoying liberty themselves, but recom|mending it to others, by removing the occasion

of wars. But if you really have no talents among you of a higher nature than what is necessary to copy precedents from old monarchies, I pity you, and call upon you to pity me. It is time to de|spair of the perfectability of human society, and make up our minds to return to slavery, monar|chy, and perpetual war.

JOEL BARLOW.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Advice to the Privileged Orders, chap. 5. where the funding system is discussed.
• * 1.2

  I purpose, on another occasion, to examine the naval system of Europe; and to show that it has been and must be ruinous, even to those nations which had more plausible rea|sons for adopting it than we can have.