Message from the president of the United States, accompanying a report of the secretary of state, containing observations on some of the documents, communicated by the president, on the eighteenth instant. : 21st January, 1799. Ordered to lie on the table. : Published by order of the House of Representatives.

REPORT Of the Secretary of State on the Transactions relating to the United States and France, since the last communications to Congress on that sub|ject.

THE points chiefly meriting attention are the at|tempts of the French Government,

1. To exculpate itself from the charge of corrup|tion, as having demanded a douceur of Fifty Thou|sand Pounds sterling (222,000 dollars) for the poc|kets of the Directors and Ministers, as represented in the dispatches of our envoys:

2. To detach Mr. Gerry from his colleagues, and to inveigle him into a separate negotiation; and

3. Its design, if the negotiation failed, and a war should take place between the United States and France, to throw the blame of the rupture on the United States.

1. The dispatches of the Envoys published in the United States, and republished in England, reach|ed Paris towards the last of May: and on the 30th of that month, the French Minister, Mr. Talley|rand, affecting an entire ignorance of the persons designated by the letters W. X. Y. and Z.—calling them intriguers, whose object was to deceive the Envoys—writes to Mr. Gerry, and "prays him immediately to make known to him their names."

Mr. Gerry, in his answer of the 31st, wishes to

evade Mr. Talleyrand's request; and with reason, for he and his colleagues had "promised Messrs. X. Y. that their names should in no event be made public." Mr. Gerry, in his letter of October I, in no|ting the repetition of Mr. Talleyrand's request for those names, states as an objection to giving them up "that they could be otherwise ascertained;" and that Mr. Talleyrand's messenger, admitting the fact that they were already known, immediately mentioned their names. Mr. Gerry nevertheless certified in writing the names of X. Y. and Z; with the reserve "that they should not be published on his authority:" and besides formally certifying to Mr. Talleyrand the names of his own private agents, added, that "they did not pro|duce, to his knowledge, credentials or documents of any kind."—"Credentials" in writing were certainly not to be expected to be produced by agents employed to make corrupt propositions: but Mr. Gerry had Mr. Talleyrand's own assurance that Mr. Y was acting by his authority. It is recited in the Envoy's dispatches, and upon Mr. Gerry's own report to his colleagues, that on the 17th of December, 1797, Mr. Y "stated to him that two measures which Mr. Talleyrand pro|posed, being adopted, a restoration of friendship be|tween the Republics would follow immediately; the one was a gratuity of fifty thousand pounds sterling; the other a purchase of thirty two millions of Dutch re|scriptions," and after conversing on these topics, Mr. Gerry and Mr. Y rode to Mr. Talleyrand's office, where "Mr. Gerry observed to Mr. Talleyrand, that Mr. Y had stated to him that morning, some propositions as coming from Mr. Talleyrand, respecting which, Mr. Gerry could give no opinion," and after making some other observations, Mr. Talleyrand answered, "that the information Mr. Y. had given him (Mr. Gerry) was just, and might always be relied on." This de|claration stamps with the Ministers authority, all the

communications made by Mr. Y. to the Envoys. And Mr. Y. himself, who is Mr. Bellamy, of Ham|burg, in his public vindication, declares, that "he had done nothing, said nothing, and written nothing, without the orders of Citizen Talleyrand." The same may be asserted in regard to Mr. X. for he first introduced Mr. Y. to the Envoys; and his separate communications were substantially the same with those of Y. and both together were present with the En|voys when the communications were more than once repeated.

It also deserves notice, that in stating the prelimi|nary demands of the French Government, the private agents, X and Y, and the Minister, use a similar lan|guage. The agents declare, that the Directory are ex|tremely irritated at the speech of the President, and require an explanation of some parts of it, and repa|ration for others; that this must give pain to the Envoys, but the Directory would not dispense with it: And that as to the means of averting the demand concern|ing the President's speech, the Envoys must search for them, and propose them, themselves. Being asked to suggest the means, the answer is "money"—the pur|chase of the Dutch rescriptions, and "the fifty thou|"sand pounds sterling, as a douceur to the Direc|"tory."

The Minister told the Envoys, that the Directory were wounded by the President's speech; and, in his conversation with Mr. Gerry on the 28th of October, said, "the Directory had passed an arret, which he offered for perusal, in which they had demanded of the Envoys an explanation of some parts, and a repa|ration for others, of the President's speech to Con|gress of the 16th of May, 1797; that he was sensible that difficulties would exist on the part of the Envoys relative to this demand; but that by their offering money he thought he could prevent the effect of the ar|ret.

Mr. Z. (the "interpreter") at the request of Mr. Gerry, having stated that the Envoys have no such powers, Mr. Talleyrand replied, they can in such case take a power on themselves; and proposed that they should make a "loan." But this "loan," as will presently appear, did not mean the "money," which would "prevent the effect of the arret." Mr. Gerry then making some observations, on the powers of the Envoys—that they "were adequate to the discussion and adjustment of all points of real difference between the two nations; that they could alter and amend the treaty; or if necessary, form a new one;" added, "that as to a loan, they had no powers what|ever, to make one, but that they could send one of their number for instructions on this proposition, if deemed expedient:"—"That as he [Mr. Talleyrand] had expressed a desire to confer with the Envoys indi|vidually, it was the wish of Mr. Gerry, that such a conference should take place, and their opinions thus be ascertained." "Mr. Talleyrand, in answer said, he should be glad to confer with the other Envoys, indi|vidually, but that this matter about the MONEY must be settled directly without sending to America; that he would not communicate the arrret for a week; and that if we could adjust the difficulty respecting the speech, an application would nevertheless go to the United States for a LOAN:" Now this matter of the MONEY that must be settled directly, could only refer to the douceur; for a loan in the purchose of millions of Dutch rescriptions, or in any other form, could only be the subject of a stipulation to be afterwards ful|filled by the UnitedStates; but the douceur of fifty thou|sand pounds sterling, was a sum within the immediate reach of the Envoys; for their credit would certainly command it: in fact, a mercantile House had offered to answer their draughts: and this, Mr. Talleyrand unquestionably well knew; for it was a member of the

same House who first introduced the minister's agent Mr. X, to General Pinckney, in the manner stated in the Envoys' dispatches. A collateral evidence that in "this matter of the money that must be settled direct|ly," Mr. Talleyrand referred only to the douceur ari|ses from this circumstance: The very next day (Octo|ber 29th) Mr. X called on the Envoys and said, "Mr. Talleyrand was extremely anxious to be of service to them, and had requested that one more effort should be made to induce us to enable him to be so." After a great deal of the same conversation which had pas|sed at former interviews had been repeated, the En|voys say—"the sum of his proposition was, that if we would pay by way of fees (that was his expression) the sum of MONEY demanded for PRIVATE USE, the Di|rectory would not receive us, but would permit us to remain in Paris as we now were; and we should be received by Mr. Talleyrand, until one of us could go to America and consult our government on the subject of a LOAN."

Although the Envoys dispatches, and the facts and circumstances herein before stated, cannot leave a doubt that X, as well as Y and Z, was well known to Mr. Talleyrand, it will not be amiss to add, that on the 2d of December X, Y, and Z, dined together at Mr. Tal|leyrand's, in company with Mr. Gerry; and that af|ter rising from table the money propositions, which had before been made, were repeated, in the room and in the presence, though perhaps not in the hearing of Mr. Talleyrand. Mr. X, put the question to Mr. Gerry in direct terms, either, "whether the Envoys would now give the douceur" or "whether they had got the MONEY ready." Mr. Gerry, very justly offended, an|swered positively in the negative, and the conversation dropped.

Mr. Z, who has avowed himself to be Mr. Hauteval, was the person who first made known to the Envoys

the Minister's desire to confer with them individually, on the objects of their mission: He it was, who first introduced Mr. Gerry to Mr. Talleyrand, and served as the interpreter of their conversations: and in his letter to Mr. Talleyrand, at the close of Mr. Gerry's document, No. 35, he announces himself to be the agent of the minister, to make communications to the Envoys.

Mr. Hauteval declares "his sensibility must be much affected on finding himself, under the letter Z, acting a part in company with certain intriguers, whose plan, (he says) it doubtless was to take advantage of the good faith of the American Envoys, and make them their dupes": yet this person the avowed agent of the French Minister, apparently so anxious to screen himself from the suspicion of an agency in soliciting the bribe re|quired by Mr. Talleyrand, did himself urge a compli|ance with that corrupt proposition.* 1.1

The sensation which these details irresistably excite, is that of astonishment at the unparralleled effrontery of Mr. Talleyrand, in demanding of Mr. Gerry the names of X, Y, and Z; after Y, had accompanied him on a visit to the Minister, with whom the conversation de|tailed in theprinted dispatches then passed, and who then assured Mr. Gerry "that the information Mr. Y. had given him was just, and might always be relied on;" after Z, had in the first instance introduced Mr. Gerry to the Minister, and served as their mutual interpreter, and when the conversation between them had also been stated in the dispatches; and after X, Y, and Z, had all

dined together with Mr. Gerry at Mr. Talleyrand's table, on rising from which X, and Y, renewed the pro|position about the MONEY!—The very circumstance of Mr. Talleyrand's being continued in office, after the account of these intrigues had been published to the world, is a decisive proof that they were commenced and carried on with the privity, and by the secret or|ders of the Directory. It was to accomplish the object of these intrigues that the American Envoys were kept at Paris unreceived, six months after their credentials had been laid before the Directory: and it was only be|cause they were superior to those intrigues, and that no hopes remained of wheedling or terrifying them into a compliance, that two of them were then sent away—and with marks of insult and contempt.

2. The fact that the French Government attempted to inveigle Mr. Gerry into a separate negotiation will not be questioned: at first it was made privately, and under an injunction of secresy towards his colleagues: it was afterwards plainly insinuated by the Minister, in his letter ef the 18th of March 1798, in which he tells the Envoys that the Executive Directory was disposed to treat with one of the three; and that one he open|ly avowed, in his letter of the 3d of April, to be Mr. Gerry. The pretence for selecting him was, that his "opinions presumed to be more impartial, promised, in the course of the explanations, more of that reci|procal confidence which was indispensable." But when before, have their "opinions" been stated as a justifia|ble ground for rejecting the ambassadors of peace? Ambassadors too, of established probity, whose cha|racters were of the first distinction in their own country, and whose demeanor, towards the government to which they were deputed, was decent and respectful? Who had, with a frankness which the candor of their in|structions warranted, communicated the important points which they contained? And who unremittingly

and with the most anxious solicitude, entreated that the negotiations might be commenced? What more proper or more honorable qualities ought ministers deputed to negotiate with a foreign nation to possess? But why should a foreign Government question the opinions of the ambassadors sent to negotiate with it on subjects of difference between the two nations? If wisely chosen, and faithful to the interests of their own country, they they must of course possess different opinions from the government to which they are sent, the differing opin|ions maintained by the two nations on their respective rights and interests, being the cause and objects of the negotiation.—A government really disposed to treat on fair principles would never object to the opinions of fo|reign ambassadors. It would receive them, and ap|point its own ministers with proper powers to treat with them, propose its terms, and receive those offer|ed; and discuss both: and if then they could not agree, put an end to the negotiation. The French Government did not wish to negotiate, it desired to impose a treaty on the United States. To this practice it had been accus|tomed towards the minor powers in Europe, whom it had subjected to its will: and it expected equal submis|sion from the United States. Hence Mr. Talleyrand's secret declaration to Mr. Gerry "that if he would nego|tiate, they could soon finish a treaty; for the Executive Directory were not in the habit of spending much time about such matters." Hence the objections to Gen. Pinck|ney and Gen. Marshall: they manifested a discernment superior to the intrigues of the French Government and an invincible determination not to surrender the honor, the interest, or the independence of their country. It was necessary then to get rid of them; and seeing that neither despair of negotiating, nor studied indig|nities, could induce them to quit their posts, passports were sent to them to quit France: it was with difficul|ty that General Pinckney could obtain permission to tstay wo or three months for the recovery of his sick

daughter, to whom an immediate voyage would proba|bly prove fatal. Unembarrassed by the presence of these Envoys, the French Government, if it really desired a trea|ty on any terms, hoped to prevail on Mr. Gerry to nego|tiate separately, although from the first overture he de|clined and continued to decline it. But after the ex|pulsion of his colleagues, it hoped by its seductive arts to prevail over his scruples and gain his consent to terms which, while they were present, would be re|jected; or at all events to retain him, with the sem|blance of negotiating, regularly or informally, and thus keep the United States in the torpor of indecision, without preparation for offence or defence. Unfortu|nately, Mr. Gerry was induced, by the threats of im|mediate war against the United States, to separate from his colleagues and stay in Paris; threats which, viewed with their motives, merited only detestation and contempt. Four or five months before, the threats of immediate orders to quit France, and the terrors of war in its most dreadful forms, had been held up to all the envoys, to frighten them into a compliance with the groundless, unjust and corrupt demands of the French Government. Those threats had not been ex|ecuted, and the unworthy purposes for which they had been uttered had been obvious. Happily for the United States, the character of the French govern|ment as delineated in the official dispatches of all the envoys, and the knowledge of its conduct towards other countries whose governments it had overturned, and whose people, in the names of Liberty and Equal|ity, it had enslaved, so operated as not to leave us exposed to all the evils which suspense was calculated to produce. Mr. Gerry indeed resisted all the arts of the French minister to entice him into a formal ne|gotiation, after that government had driven his col|leagues from Paris: a negotiation which in its nature would have been a surrender of our independence, by admitting a foreign government to choose for us the

minister who should represent our country, to treat of our important rights and interests, which that govern|ment had itself violated and deeply injured.

▪The Directory and their minister Mr. Talleyrand hoped and expected that General Pinckney and Gene|ral Marshall would voluntarily have quitted France, after the minister's letter of the 18th of March, in which he made the offensive distinction between them and their colleague Mr. Gerry, on the pretence that his "opinions" were more "impartial" than theirs. Accordingly Mr. Talleyrand, in his letter to Mr. Ger|ry of the 3d of April, says—"I suppose, sir, that Messrs. Pinckney and Marshall have thought it useful and proper, in consequence of the intimations which the end of my note of the 18th of March last presents, to quit the Territory of the Republic." Yet Mr. Talleyrand had given them neither passports nor letters of safe conduct! The fact is, the French government wished to avoid the odium of sending them away, and the blame of a rupture, which Mr. Talleyrand pre|dicted would be the consequence; while it was private|ly intimated to them that they must leave the country. The minister's conduct on this occasion, towards Gen|eral Marshall (as detailed in his journal) was particularly marked with indignities. When it was observed to Mr. Talleyrand, that this was not the manner in which a foreign minister ought to be treated, Mr. Talleyrand replied, that General Marshall was not a foreign min|ister, but was to be considered as a private American citizen; and must obtain his passport like others through the Consul. To this it was answered, That General Marshall was a foreign minister,* 1.2 and that the

French government could not deprive him of that character, which was conferred upon him, not by Mr. Talleyrand, but by the United States; and though the Directory might refuse to receive or to treat with him, still his country had clothed him with the requisite powers, which he held independently of France; that if he was not acceptable to the French government, and in consequence thereof it was determined to send him away, still he ought to be sent away like a min|ister; that he ought to have his passports, with letters of safe-conduct which would protect him from the cruisers of France. Mr. Talleyrand replied, that if General Marshall wished for a passport, he must give in his name, stature, age, complexion, &c. to the Amer|ican Consul, who would obtain a passport for him: that with respect to a letter of safe-conduct, it was un|necessary, as no risk from the cruisers would be in|curred. The result of these conversations was a plain demonstration of the intention of the minister, that in consequence of his intimation at the close of his let|ter of the 18th of March, that the "opinions" of two of the Envoys were not agreeable to the government of France, Generals Pinckney and Marshall should appropriate to themselves the character which the min|ister had drawn generally. The Envoys, aware of this snare, in their answer of the third of April to the in|timation that "the Directory was disposed to treat with one of the Envoys," declare to the minister, "that no one of the Envoys was authorized to take upon himself a negotiation evidently entrusted to the whole," and "that no two of them could propose to withdraw themselves from the task committed to them by their government, while there remained a possibility of performing it;" but that if "it should be the will of the Directory to order passports for the whole or any number of them," it was desired that such passports

might be accompanied with letters of safe-conduct, protect them against the cruisers of France.

These endeavours of the French government, whe|ther real or affected, to draw Mr. Gerry into a sepa|rate negotiation, constitute the substance of the corre|spondence between him and Mr. Talleyrand. They appear to merit consideration in several points of view.

1. Because if real, it was only in the hope and ex|pectation, that by intrigues and terrors the French go|vernment might influence Mr. Gerry to enter into a formal treaty, on the terms which he and his colleagues had repeatedly rejected as incompatible with the inte|rest, honor and independence of their country. For at this time Mr. Talleyrand had not renounced the de|mands of loans and a douceur as the indispensable pre|liminaries of a treaty. Accordingly we see Mr. Talley|rand, in his letter of the 3d of April to Mr. Gerry, proposed "to resume their reciprocal communications upon the interests of the French republic and the United States of America." And in his letter of July 12th, to Mr. Gerry, having mentioned the arrival at Havre of a packet, the Sophia, from the American government, he says, "until then I never suppos|ed you entertained the design of embarking before we had come to an agreement upon the definitive articles to be ratified by your government." 2. Because if that government had so far succeeded, it would have insisted on its ratification by the Presi|dent and Senate, on the ground constantly taken by Mr. Talleyrand, that the powers of the Envoys being several as well as joint, Mr. Gerry when alone, even after the French government had ordered his colleagues to leave France, were adequate to the formation of the treaty; and that therefore the public faith would be violated, if it were not ratified. 3. Because under such circumstances, the French government doubtless calculated at least on a division of the public opinion in the

United States in favour of the ratification of such a Treaty; by means of which it might enforce the rati|fication, or effect still greater mischiefs. 4. But these endeavours to draw Mr. Gerry into a formal negotia|tion are chiefly remarkable because they were persevered in during near five months, against his constant, direct and positive refusals to treat separately; Mr. Talley|rand asserting and Mr. Gerry denying the competency of his powers.

We have seen the Envoys, from the 6th of October, 1797, the date of their first letter to the French minis|ter, to the 3d of April, 1798, when their last was de|livered to him, expressing their earnest desire to enter upon and prosecute the great business of their mission: we have seen them during that long period patiently en|during neglect and indignities, to which an ardent zeal to re-establish harmony and peace could alone induce freemen to submit: We have seen them while held in suspense—neither received nor rejected—yielding to the importunities of private agents of the French gov|ernment, and hearing and discussing their propositions, insulting as they were, in the hope that when these should be shown to be utterly inadmissible, others found|ed in reason and equity, and in the usual course of dip|lomatic negotiation, might be brought forward. Doubt|less they also wished, when their astonishment at the first overtures had subsided, by listening still longer to such dishonourable propositions, to ascertain the true character of the French government. We have seen them, after waiting five weeks from the presentation of a copy of their Letters of Credence, entirely unnoticed, "solicit an attention to their mission," and soliciting in vain. Thus denied an official hearing, they hoped by an unusual step to excite the attention of that govern|ment: they determined to transmit to the Minister a let|ter representing the views of their own government in relation to the subjects in dispute with France. This let|ter

dated the 17th was delivered the 31st of January, 1798. Waiting near a month without an answer, and "still being anxious to hear explicitly from Mr. Talley|rand himself, before they sent their final letter, whether there were no means, within their pow|ers, of accommodating our differences with France, on just and reasonable grounds,—on the 27th of Febru|ary they desired "a personal interview on the subject of their mission"; and afterwards a second interview. They remark on what passed at these meetings, "that the views of France, with regard to the United States, were not essentially changed since their communications with its un-official agents in the preceding October."

At length they received Mr. Talleyrand's letter of the 18th March, 1798, in answer to theirs of the 17th of January. The Minister's letter represented the com|plaints of France; as usual, charging the American Government with the inexecution of the Treaties with France—with dissimulation—insinuating that our Tribu|nals were subject to a secret influence—holding up the British Treaty as replete with evil and injury, and "the principal grievance of the Republic"—accusing the American Government of a wish to seize the first favourable occasion to consummate an intimate union with Great-Britain, and suggesting that a devotion and partiality to that power have long been the princi|ple of the conduct of the Federal Government.

To this letter of the French Minister, the Envoys sent their reply on the 3d of April. This reply and their former letter detect the sophisms and erroneous statements of the Minister—expose his naked asser|tions—refute his arguments—repel his calumnies—and completely vindicate the fidelity, the justice, and, as a neutral power, the impartiality of the go|vernment of the United States; and, at the same time, exhibit the weighty and well-founded com|plaints of the United States against the French Re|public.

Hitherto, instead of a desire to obtain a reconcili|ation, we can discover in the French government only empty professions of a desire to conciliate; while it haughtily refused to receive our Envoys, and du|ring six months disregarded their respectful and ar|dent solicitations to negotiate: And after one of them, whom it induced to remain in France, had de|clared that "he had no powers to treat separately, that the measure was impossible," then the Directory ex|pelled the other Two!

If now we survey Mr. Gerry's individual corres|pondence, we shall find no solid evidence of any change in the disposition of the French government.

In his first letter to Mr. Gerry, Mr. Talleyrand's artifice is visible: he addresses him as "Envoy Ex|traordinary of the United States of America, to the French Republic;" and proposes to him to "resume their reciprocal communications." Mr. Gerry, ap|prehending that the Minister intended to draw him into a negotiation, repeats what he had often before declared, that for him to treat separately was im|practicable: and that he can only confer with him informally.

On the 20th of April, Mr. Gerry addresses a let|ter to the Minister, and presses him to come forward with propositions for terminating all differences, re|storing harmony, and re-establishing commerce be|tween the two nations. He receives no answer. On the 28th he confers with the Minister, who says he cannot make propositions, because he does not know the views of the United States in regard to a treaty. Mr. Gerry gives him the information. He then promises in three or four days to deliver Mr. Gerry the project of a treaty: This promise was never performed. On the 12th of May, the new instructions of March 23d, sent by the Sophia packet, reached Mr. Gerry; and he gave immediate notice to the Minister that he should return to America in the Sophia, as soon as she could be fitted for sea.

"On the 24th of May, the Minister sent his prin|cipal secretary to inform Mr. Gerry, that his govern|ment did not wish to break the British treaty; but ex|pected such provisions as would indemnify France, and put her on a sooting with that nation." Yet that treaty had been made, by the French govern|ment, its chief pretence for those unjust and cruel depredations on American commerce which have brought distress on multitudes and ruin on many of our citizens; and occasioned a total loss of property to the United States of probably more than twenty millions of dollars; besides subjecting our fellow|citizens to insults, stripes, wounds, torture and im|prisonment. And Mr. Talleyrand, in his letter of the 18th March, to the Envoys, declared that treaty to be "the principal grievance of the Republic." But now, instead of breaking that treaty, France de|sires to be put on the same footing. This the Uni|ted States would at any time have done, and the En|voys were now explicitly instructed to do: and seven months before, all the Envoys, in their conversation with Mr. Bellamy (Y) the confidential and autho|rized agent of the French Minister, told him "that he might be assured that their powers were such as authorized them to place France on equal ground with England, in any respects in which an inequality might be supposed to exist at present between them, to the disadvantage of France."

The Secretary also mentioned the claims of the American citizens on the French Republic: he said if the latter should be unable to pay them, when ad|justed, and the United States would assume and pay them, France would reimburse the amount thereof. This has the semblance of candour: but on the 4th of March, when the Envoys were in conference with Mr. Talleyrand, and they disclosed their principal instructions, "General Pinckney and Mr. Gerry told

him they were positively forbidden to assume the debts to our own citizens, even if we were to pay the money directly to them." And douqtless it was because the proposition was already known to be inadmissible that it was now renewed.

The Secretary and Mr. Gerry had also some un|important conversation about the Consular Conven|tion. And it is plain that the whole object of the Secretary's visit was to amuse, by keeping alive Mr. Gerry's hopes of some pacific arrangements.

On the 26th of May, Mr. Gerry had a conference with the Minister; pressing on this, as on former oc|casions, the necessity of sending a Minister to the United States, with powers to negotiate; to which, he says, the Minister acceded; but afterwards ex|plained himself to mean a Minister to reside there af|ter the ratification of the talked-of treaty.

Such are the proceedings of the French govern|ment, by its Minister, Mr. Talleyrand, before the arrival of the printed dispatches of the Envoys. We discover nothing but a proposition for treating with Mr. Gerry alone—which he had repeatedly declared to be impossible—and on terms which Mr. Gerry him|self, as well as the other Envoys, had long before pronounced to be utterly inadmissible, because di|rectly repugnant to their instructions. We shall now see, by an examination of Mr. Gerry's subse|quent communications, that the publication of the Envoy's dispatches, far from causing a discontinu|ance of negotiations with him, or any change in the disposition of the French government more unfriend|ly to the United States, incomparably greater zeal for negotiating was exhibited afterwards than before.

On the 30th of May, the Minister announces to Mr. Gerry the publication of the Envoys dispatches. In his letter of the 27th of June, he says this incident only "for a moment suspended the principal object"

—the negociation with Mr. Gerry: and in his let|ter of June 10th he declares, that "the French Go|vernment, superior to all the personalities, to all the manoeuvres of its enemies, perseveres in the inten|tion of conciliating with sincerity all the differences which have happened between the two countries." On the 18th of June the Minister sends him a plan for conducting the negotiations; for the first time states the "three points" on which he says "all ne|gotiations between France and the United States must essentially rest;" and "gives (what he calls) a large developement" of them; concluding by press|ing him to remain at Paris, to accelerate the nego|tiation—"the drawing together of those ties which the French Republic and the true Americans have re|gretted to see relaxed."

On the 27th of June the Minister again writes to Mr. Gerry, and in language the most importunate, such as had never before been used, urges him not to with|draw, "when the French Government, superior to all resentments, and never listening to any thing but justice, manifests itself anxious to conclude a solid and mutually satisfactory agreement." The Minis|ter even observes that the first of the "three points" mentioned in his preceding letter (respecting amica|ble declarations about mutual recriminations) might be postponed—that the third (about the consular convention) would doubtless experience no difficulty on either side, after the second should be amicably settled: That it was to the second therefore they should first attend; it being so much the more im|portant, as it embraced the source of all the differ|ences between the two nations. And on the 22d of July, the Minister renounces all demands of "loans and explanations on the subject of speeches;" and even affects to be hurt that Mr. Gerry should have mentioned them: although both he and his private

agents had, before, so long and so obstinately perse|vered in demanding them of the Envoys, as the in|dispensable preliminaries to a negotiation. And doubtless it is partly owing to the publication of their dispatches, thereby exposing to the world those shameless demands, with the scandalous proposition of the douceur, that they are now relinquished.

In adducing these circumstances to shew the increased zeal of the French Government, since the publication of the dispatches, to negotiate on its dif|ferences with the United States, it is not to be un|derstood, that they afford a shadow of evidence of its sincerity. But as professions, verbal or written, fur|nished the only ground on which Mr. Gerry could form his opinion, that "before the arrival of the dis|patches of the Envoys, the Minister was sincere and anxious to obtain a reconciliation," much more, pro|fessions stronger and more importunate, afterwards made, afford proportionably higher evidence of sin|cerity. But the present details demonstrate that all those professions were merely ostensible. In the Mi|nister's last mentioned letter, after saying that his "second point" was most important, "as it embra|ced the source of all the differences," and that to this they should first attend—he purposely forgets it, pass|es over it, and sends Mr. Gerry a note on the Con|sular Convention, of all possible subjects in difference the most insignificant; as it would have expired by its own limitation in two years and a half; within which time, the commerce of France, judging from its present state of annihilation, would probably not furnish a single ship to visit the ports of the United States. In his next letter, dated July 6th, he pur|sues his speculations on the Consular Convention, and sends Mr. Gerry two more notes upon it; complain|ing that he had not transmitted to him his opinion upon his first note, and recommending the two last

to his attention: although Mr. Gerry had repeated|ly and positively declined a formal discussion, such as the Minister now urged in writing. Mr. Gerry states also that this first note of the Minister on the Con|sular Convention, was sent to him six weeks after he had demanded his passport, and when his bag|gage was actually on board the Sophia!

In a word, the more clearly the impossibility of entering on a formal negotiation appeared, the more was it pressed by the French Minister. Mr. Gerry in his letter to Mr. Talleyrand of July 20th, as just|ly as pointedly exposes the boasted zeal of the Minis|ter—"You was the first, you affirm, to press seri|ously the negotiation: you will agree with me that the merit would have been greater, had the measure itself been feasible." Again he says to the Minister, "You frequently remind me of your exertions [to negotiate] which I am disposed as much as possible to appreciate, regretting at the same time their cir|cuitous direction."

From this detail of facts, the following are the ne|cessary conclusions:

That by the exclusive attentions of the Minister to Mr. Gerry, the French Government intended to ex|cite the jealousy of his colleagues, to promote dissen|tions betweeh them, to separate him from them, and induce him to remain in France; expecting either to seduce him into a formal negociation of a treaty, on terms exclusively advantageous to France, and injurious and dishonorable to the United States; or, failing in this, to hold the United States in suspense, and prevent any measures for our security—in the e|vent a war; while we, amused and deluded by warm but empty professions of the pacific views and wishes of France, and by "informal conferences," might wait in spiritless torpor, hoping for a peaceful result: and

That by this course of proceeding—this ostenta|tious display of zeal to adjust differences, and restore harmony and a friendly intercourse between the U|nited States and France, the French Government in|tended, in case of a rupture, to throw the blame on the former.

It is necessary to make a few observations on the decree of the Executive Directory of the 31st July 1798.

This decree was sent after Mr. Gerry to Havre, and he supposes that the official impediments, which for se|veral days prevented his failing, are to be ascribed to the minister's desire of sending the decree by him. The minister introduces it as "a part of the measures which he had announced to Mr. Gerry on the 22d of July." In his letter of that date to Mr. Gerry, the minister says, "By information which the Government has just received, it indeed learns that violences have been committed upon the commerce and citizens of the U|nited States in the West-Indies, and on their coasts. Do it the justice to believe that it needs only to know the facts, to disavow all acts contrary to the laws of the Republic and its own decrees. A remedy is preparing for it and orders will soon arrive in the West-Indies, calculated to cause every thing to return within its just limits." This "remedy" is the decree of the 31st of July.

1. The first article of this decree confines to the spe|cial agents of the Directory, the right of issuing com|missions to cruisers; and requires these to conform themselves to all the laws relative to cruising and prizes, and especially to those of the 1st of October 1793. Although the injunction to conform to all the laws of the Republic relative to cruising was ominous, as the laws most recently promulgated and best known were themselves the sources of the depredations and e|vils of which we complained; yet not imagining that a

decree introduced with so much solemnity, of which one copy was sent to Mr. Gerry, another to the Ame|rican Consul General at Paris, and a third to Mr. Lé|tombe, late Consul General of France—all to be com|municated to the Executive of the United States, and all of which have been received—could be a mere pa|rade of words, I was disposed to conclude that the law of the 1st of October 1793, to which all cruisers were especially enjoined to conform, might contain regula|tions that would afford some relief from French depre|dations. By the favour of Mr. Létombe, I obtained a copy of that law; and to my astonishment found its object, conformably to its title, was "To determine the mode of dividing prizes made by French vessels on the enemies of the Republic."* 1.3 And the only restriction, in this lengthy law of six-and-forty articles, imposed on the individuals, officers and all others, composing the crews of their armed vessels is, "that they shall not sell beforehand their eventual shares of prizes."

2. The second article declares that all commissions granted by the agents in the French colonies in Ameri|ca, to fit out vessels for cruisers, or for war and com|merce, shall be void in thirty days after the publication of the decree in those colonies.

It has been supposed that by this regulation the a|gents may gather a fresh harvest of fees for new com|missions; and that this would be its only effect. The agents however had before taken care of this; they had been accustomed to limit the duration of privateer's commissions; and if they continued to cruise after their expiration, such privateers should have been con|sidered as destitute of commissions, and consequently if they made any captures, as pirates:—But the agents

knew their interest better: they did not punish the pi|ratical captors—they did not declare their captures void, and restore the property to the neutral owners—but, declaring such captors to have no title to the cap|tured vessels and cargoes, took the whole to themselves. A remarkable instance occurred in the last year, in the case of the East-India ship New-Jersey, belonging to Philadelphia, to redeem which, the owners have paid to GENERAL HEDOUVILLE, Special Agent of the Exe|cutive Directory in St. Domingo, upwards of two hun|dred thousand dollars in cash. Whether any, and what portion of such prize-money goes into the chest of the Republic, I am not informed.

3. The third article declares that all agents and o|ther deputies in the neutral possessions, appointed to de|cide there on the validity of prizes taken by the French cruisers, and who shall be suspected of having a direct or indirect interest in the cruisers, shall be immediate|ly recalled.

It is remarkable that this article, apparently design|ed to correct the monstrous abuse of public officers sit|ting in judgment in their own causes, should be limited to such of the French agents and their deputies as were appointed to reside in NEUTRAL places. I do not know that an instance of the kind exists. For al|though the French privateers and their prizes find asy|lums in the Swedish and Danish islands, yet the papers are carried thence to Guadaloupe, and there the cap|tured vessels receive their doom under the superinten|dance of another special agent of the Executive Directo|ry, VICTOR HUGUES. And even the captured Ame|rican vessels carried into the West-India ports of Spain and Holland, do not there receive sentence: these cases are decided by the agent or his deputies, or other French tribunals, established in the island of St. Do|mingo, frequently, if not generally, in the absence of the masters and supercargoes. The French agents

and judges find no difficulty in this mode of proceed|ing; justice being administered with more facility and dispatch when only one of the parties is present at the trial; especially when the agents or other judges are interested in the privateers; and this the present de|cree impliedly allows; the penalty of "recall" being applicable, as above suggested, to such agents only as reside in neutral places, if any such there be.

It is also remarkable, that this decree, which was to give the United States a proof of the justice of the French government (a government, Mr. Talleyrand says "never listening to any thing but justice,") and of its desire of a reconciliation with the United States, should be limited to the West-Indies, when as great, if not as numerous abuses were practised by French agents and tribunals in Europe, and even France itself, as in her remote possessions. This too many of our citizens well know. For captures and condemnations are not the less abuses, because made under the colour of mu|nicipal laws and decrees which directly violate treaties, the law of nations, and the plainest principles of justice. At present I shall only mention, that in a report made by major Mountflorence, chancellor of the American consulate at Paris, to General Pinckney, in December 1796, and which was laid before Congress in May 1797, he states, "That the tribunals of commerce in every port of France, take cognizance, in the first in|stance, of every matter relative to captures at sea;" and "these tribunals (he adds) are chiefly composed of mer|chants, and most of them are, directly or indirectly, more or less interested in the fitting out of privateers; and therefore are often concerned in the controversies they are to determine upon."

4. The fourth article requires the special agents of the Executive Directory at Cayenne, St. Domingo, and Guadaloupe, studiously to take care, that the interests and property of vessels, belonging to neutrals and allies, be scrupulously respected.

We have too long witnessed the studious and scru|pulous care of these gentlemen respecting the property of neutrals and allies, and experienced its ruinous con|sequences; and as the same laws which authorized that "care" remain in force, and with a fresh injunc|tion of a strict conformity to them, we can expect only a continuance of the same abuses.

5. The fifth article enjoins the Special Agents of the Executive Directory, Consuls and all others invested with powers for that purpose, to cause to be arrested and punished all who shall contravene the provisions of the present decree.—Unfortunately, these Special A|gents, Consuls, and their Deputies, are themselves the aggressors, and justify their proceedings under the laws of the Republic and the Decrees of the Executive Directory.

This analysis of the present Decree manifests its fu|tility; and, with some remarks on its preamble, will demonstrate it to be a bold imposture; intended to mislead the citizens of the United States into a belief that the French government was going to put an end to the depredations of French cruisers on American commerce; while the means proposed are so gross as to be an insult on our understandings.

The Preamble to the Decree sets forth, "that in|formation, recently received from the French colonies and the continent of America, leaves no room to doubt that French cruisers, or such as call themselves French, have infringed the laws of the Republic relative to cruising and prizes;" and "that foreigners and pi|rates have abused the latitude allowed at Cayenne and the West-India islands, to vessels fitted out for cruising or for war and commerce, in order to cover with the French flag their extortions and the violation of the re|spect due to the law of nations, and to the persons and property of allies and neutrals." And Mr. Talley|rand, in one of his letters before noticed, dated the

22nd of July last, speaks of this information as having been "just received."

But what has been more notorious than French de|predations on neutral, and especially on American commerce, in violation of treaties and the law of na|tions? These have been coeval with the existing war in Europe; but were multiplied under the loose Decree of the Executive Directory passed the second of July, 1796, declaring that "the flag of the French Repub|lic will treat neutral vessels, either as to confiscation, to searches, or to capture, in the same manner as they shall suffer the English to treat them."

This decree committed the whole commerce of neu|trals, in the first instance, to the rapacity of French privateers, and then to the discretion of their Agents, Consuls and Tribunals. These had only to say, truly or falsely, that the English treated neutrals in any given way, and then they were to treat them in the same manner. Accordingly we have seen Santhonax and Raimond, Commissioners of the French Government in St. Domingo, in their adjudication of an American vessel, on the 10th of January, 1797, declare, "That the resolution (or decree) passed by the Executive Di|rectory, on the 2d of July, 1796, prescribes to all the armed vessels of the Republic, and the armed vessels belonging to individuals, to treat neutral vessels in the same manner as they suffer the English to treat them;" and "that it is in consequence of the above resolution of the Executive Directory, and in consequence of the manner in which the English government in the Antilles treats neutral vessels, that the commission passed their resolution of the 7th of January, by which they declare all neutral vessels bound to or from English ports, to be legal prize." From these facts, and the tenor of the decree itself, we can form but one conclusion, That it was framed in such indefinite terms, on purpose to give scope for arbitracy constructions, and consequently for un|limited oppression and vexation.

But without waiting for this decree, the Commission|ers of the French government at St. Domingo began their piraces on the commerce of the United States: and in February 1797, wrote to the Minister of Marine (and the extract of the letter appeared in the official journal of the Executive Directory of the 5th of June) "That having found no resource in finance, and know|ing the unfriendly dispositions of the Americans, and to avoid perishing in distress, they had armed for cruizing; and that already 87 cruizers were at sea; and that for three months preceding, the administra|tion had subsisted, and individuals been enriched, with the product of those prizes."—"That the decree of the 2d of July was not known by them until five months afterwards. But (say they) the shocking conduct of the Americans, and the indirect knowledge of the in|tentions of our government, made it our duty to order reprisals, even before we had received the official no|tice of the decree." "They felicitate themselves that American vessels were daily taken; and declare that they had learnt, by divers persons from the continent, that the Americans were perfidious, corrupt, the friends of England, and that therefore their vessels no longer entered the French ports, unless carried in by force."

After this recital, before the Council of 500, Pastoret makes the following remarkable reflections:

"On reading this letter, we should think that we had been dreaming; that we had been transported in|to a savage country, where men, still ignorant of the empire of morals and of laws, commit crimes without shame and without remorse, and applaud themselves for their robberies, as Paulus AEmilius or Cato would have praised themselves for an eminent service render|ed to their country. Cruisers armed against a friend|ly nation! Reprisals, when it is we ourselves who at|tack! Reprisals against a nation that has not taken a single vessel of ours! Riches acquired by the confisca|tion

of the ships of a people to whom we are united by treaties, and whom no declaration of war had separated from us!"—"The whole discourse of the agents may be reduced to these few words: 'Having nothing wherewith to buy, I seize; I make myself amends for the property which I want, by the piracy which en|riches me; and then I slander those whom I have pil|laged.'—"This is robbery justified by selfishness and calumny." Yet santbonax, one of these "robbers," and the chief of those Directorial agents, continued in office, and going a few months afterwards from Saint Domingo to France, was received as a member into one of the Legislative Councils.

Pastoret also adverts to a letter from Merlin, then Minister of Justice, and now a member of the Execu|tive Directory, to Mr. Skipwith, Consul General of the United States, which also appeared in the Journal of the Directory; and quotes the following passage: "Let your Government break the inconceivable treaty which it concluded on the 19th of November 1794, with our most implacable enemies; and immediately the French Republic will cease to apply in its own favour the regu|tions in that treaty, which favour England to the in|jury of France; and I warrant you that we shall not see an appeal to those regulations, in any tribunal, to support unjust pretensions." "Have I (says Pastoret) read this rightly? Unjust Pretensions! Could it be pos|sible that they should thus have been characterized by the Minister who, is himself their agent and defender?"

After all, this "inconceivable British treaty," was itself but a pretext to countenance the "unjust preten|sions," as Merlin himself calls them, used by the French Government in its tribunals, for the purpose of condem|ning American vessels. The details I have already giv|en prove it. I beg leave to adduce other evidence. It is the testimony of Mr. Barlow, an American by birth, but for several years past a citizen of France, a man of

acknowledged discernment and talents, devoted to the French Republic, and intimate with her leading men. Mr. Barlow has long resided at Paris, and cannot have mistaken the views of the French Government, nor the motives of its conduct. Mr. Barlow's letter dated at Paris the first of March, 1798, to his brother-in-law Mr. Baldwin, has doomed the writer to infamy: yet when it describes the principles and conduct of the French Republic, it merits attention. He says, "that act of submission to the British Government, commonly cal|led JAY'S Treaty, is usually considered, both by its friends and enemies, as the sole cause, or at least the great cause of the present hostile disposition of the French Republic towards the United States. This o|pinion (says he) is erroneous." He then proceeds to an enumeration of a variety of matters which he says have influenced the conduct of France. But the most provoking, and the most unpardonable of all the offen|ces of the United States against France, was, fortunate|ly, not an act of the government, but an act of the peo|ple. The Freemen of the United States, "the true Americans," dared to exercise their independent rights, and contrary to the wishes of the French Government and the endeavours and practices of its Minister Adet, elected Mr. ADAMS to the office of President. Mr. Barlow's observations on this event further develope the character and the principles of that Government. He says, "when the election of ADAMS was announ|ced here, it produced the order of the 2d of March,* 1.4 which was meant to be little short of a declaration of

war:" "the Government here was determined to fleece you of your property, to a sufficient degree to bring you to your feeling in the only nerve in which it was presumed your sensibility lay, which was your pe|cuniary interest." And what was this "feeling" to produce? The answer is obvious—Submission to the will of the French Government. The mystery of French politics is here unveiled. The United States did not submit: Hence the non-reception of her Envoys, and their haughty treatment: Hence the insulting demands of tribute as a preliminary even to their reception; and hence the expulsion of two of them from France.

But to return to the Decree of the Executive Di|rectory of the 31st of July last.

I have already shewn that the mass of depredations on the commerce of the United States, under the French flag, of which we so justly complain, are not those com|mitted, as the Directory in their preamble insinuate, by "foreigners and pirates" but by French armed ves|sels commissioned by the Government or its agents; or whether commissioned or not, whole acts in capturing A|merican vessels receive the sanction of French Consuls, of French Tribunals, and of the special Agents of the Directory. I have shewn that the laws of France and the Directorial Decrees, are themselves the sources of those violations of treaties and the law of nations, which have caused such immense losses to the citizens of the United States. And to the proofs already offered, that the information of such aggressions and abuses, parti|cularly in the West Indies, and on the coast of Ameri|ca, was not, as the preamble suggests, but "recently received." I may add, that their "specialagents" au|thorized those depredations and violations of the law of nations, by decrees assuming the laws of the Re|public, or the acts of the Executive Directory, for their bases—by decrees printed and published, and undoubt|edly from time to time reported by those agents to the

Directory itself. Further, these outrages on the Ame|rican commerce have for years past been the theme of every tongue, and filled columns in our newspapers—those newspapers which Mr. Barlow says, "the office of Foreign Affairs (at Paris) regularly receives." I will conclude this point with the testimony of Mr. Le|tombe, late Consul General of the French Republic, and still residing in Philadelphia. He has long since, and repeatedly assured me, that he collected all those accounts of depredations and outrages committed by French privateers, and transmitted them to his Govern|ment at Paris.

In relation to the depredations and outrages com|mitted by the French on the commerce of the United States, I have said that as great, if not as numerous a|buses were practised by the French in Europe, and even in France itself, as in her remote possessions: and that this fact was but too well known to our citizens, who had felt severely their effects. Among these we have seen the case of the ship Hare, Captain Hay|ley; but never in all its disgusting features. With this I will close my observations on the preamble of the Directorial decree of the 31st July.

Extract of a letter from Rufus King Esq. Minister of the United States in London, dated September 3, 1798 to the Secretary of State of the United States.

"The pretence for this arreté [the Decree of the Directory of July 31st] is of a piece with the vindica|tion of Talleyrand respecting X. Y. and Z. and the justice and sincerity of the Directory should be ascer|tained, not by their word, but by the following co|temporaneous fact."

"Hayley, an American citizen, master of the A|merican ship Hare, lying in the port of London, la|den with a rich cargo, the property of Americans, and bound to New-York, went with my passport from London to Paris, where, in a personal interview, not

with the agents of the Minister of marine, but with the Minister himself, he disclosed his plan of bringing the ship Hare and her cargo into France; and to en|able him to receive the profits of the fraud, without risking the punishment of piracy, he demanded and received from the Minister of Marine, a commission naming him the commander of a Privateer that did not exist; with which in his pocket, he returned to London; and soon after carried the ship Hare and her cargo as a prize into France.

"The ship and cargo were both claimed by the A|merican owners; and upon the unveiling of this in|famous proceeding before the lower Tribunals, the judges hesitated; and finally refused to sanction so unheard of a fraud; though instead of restoring the property to its lawful owners, they on some frivolous pretence adjudged both ship and cargo to be good prize to the nation—Lately the Tribunal in the last resort, upon the appeal of Hayley, has reversed the judgment of the lower Court, and "decreed the ship and cargo to be condemned as good prize to this Renegado."

"If a transaction more grossly corrupt and infa|mous has occurred in the West-Indies—I have not heard of it; and yet with this case of unequalled in|famy and corruption before them, sanctioned by the highest Tribunals of the nation, the Directory expect to amuse us with a disavowal of the conduct of a few subaltern agents, in a remote part of their domin|ions!!!"

Besides the communications from Mr. Gerry, I have received from Fulwar Skipwith, Esq. consul Ge|neral of the United States at Paris, three letters dat|ed the 4th, 8th and 22d of August, copies of which and of the papers therein referred to, are herewith presented, excepting the decree of July 31st, which appears among the communications from Mr. Gerry.

Mr. Skipwith's letter of August 22d with its inclo|sures, was delivered to me by Doctor Logan; I had previously received the original, which had been brought over by Mr. Woodward of Boston.

DOCTOR LOGAN having been the bearer of the last mentioned communications from the French govern|ment, and his EMBASSY having not only engaged the attention of the public, but been made the subject of debate in Congress, I trust it will not be deemed im|proper to introduce into this report some circumstances respecting it.

On the 12th of November the Doctor came to me at Trenton—he advanced with eagerness, and handed me the packet from Mr. Skipwith. On examining its contents, I told the Doctor that I already possessed the same papers. I made some remarks on the Decree of the Directory of the 31st of July, to shew that it was only ostensible and illusory; and that it would not give any relief to the commerce of the United States. The Doctor, not contesting my arguments or opinion, said that more was intendrd to be done; but that the Di|rectory could not accomplish it of themselves; seeing it depended on the laws which the Legislative Councils alone could change. I answered, that this was easy to be done—that as the Directory, on the 18th Fruc|tidor [Sept. 4th, 1797] had garbled the two Coun|cils, and banished some and dismissed others of the best members—all who were firmly opposed to their views, and as on the new elections to supply the vacancies and the new third of the Councils, the Directory sent home every new member who was not agreeable to them—every body must see that the Directory had but to declare its will and it would be obeyed. The doc|tor said, That the Directory was very well disposed towards the United States, and desired a reconciliati|on; that they would promote a revision of the laws in regard to privateering, so as to put the rights of neutral

nations on a just footing: but that it would take some time to bring this about, "the people concerned in priva|teering having gained a very great influence in the two Coun|cils!" — ! — ! Is it necessary to in|quire how this "very great influence" has been ob|tained? are the leading members owners of priva|teers? Or do they receive their shares of prize money from those who are? Do the legislative councils re|ally act independently of the Directory? Or does the same "influence" actuate both?—The printed dispatches of our Envoys, under the date of Octo|ber 29, 1797, state, on the information of Mr. Tal|leyrand's private agent X, that Merlin, one of the members, and now or late President of the Directory, was to receive no part of the douceur demanded of the Envoys, because he was paid by the owners of privateers, and in respect to the loan then demanded, on which subject it was suggested that one of the Envoys should go to America to consult the government, the Envoys "asked Mr. X, if in the meantime the Directory would order the American property not yet passed in|to the hands of the privateersmen, to be restored? He said explicitly that they would not. The Envoys asked him whether they would suspend further depre|dations on our commerce? He said they would not:—but Mr. Talleyrand observed that on this subject we could not sustain much additional injury, because the winter season was approaching when few additional captures could be made." Here we see our Envoys inquiring—not whether the two councils would suspend those depredations—but whether the Directory would do it: and Mr. Talleyrand's agent X, without intima|ting that the Directory wanted power, or that they could only "endeavor to provoke in the legislature, a revision of their maritime laws"—answered perempto|rily, that the DIRECTORY would not suspend the depre|dations. The truth is, that it was an act of the Di|rectory

alone, (their decree of the 2d of March 1797) which authorized and produced more extensive depre|dations on the commerce of the United States than any other decree or law of the French Republic. To effect a repeal of that decree, no application to the Legislative Councils could be necessary. They could also have repealed another of their own decrees, that of the 2d of July 1796, which subjected neutral pro|perty, and particularly that of American citizens, to the discretion of their Consuls and cruisers in the European seas, as well as of their privateers and agents in the West Indies, and on which these agents have founded other numerous decrees, which have occasioned those shocking depredations and abuses there and on the coast of the United States, which the Directory by their decree of the 31st of July last affect to restrain.

When the Executive Directory wished to enlarge the field of depredations on neutral commerce, and on the fourth of January, 1798, proposed to the two Councils the project of the iniquitous law "to declare to be good prize every vessel and her cargo, to whomsoever be|longing, if any part of the cargo came from England or her possessions"—there was a ready obedience. "The Directory thinks it urgent and necessary to pass the law." The plan of a decree is reported to the Council of 500 on the 11th; and "urgency" being declared, is immediately and unanimously adopted. It goes to the Council of Ancients—that Council approves the act of "urgency;" and on the 18th of January the project of the Directory becomes a law.

This law was necessary for the French government: So many American vessels had been entrapped by the Directory's decree of March 2d, 1797, requiring the rôle d'equipage, that the residue were now generally provided with that paper: Some new pretext was therefore requisite for "fleecing" the people of the

United States of their property: and an ordinance of one of the Kings of France, made near a century past, having declared lawful prize, the vessels and their car|goes in which was found English merchandize belong|ing to enemies,"—the Directory declare that the pro|visions of this ordinance ought to be extended, to com|prehend the vessels and cargoes of friends; that is, of allied and neutral nations. The Directory knew that the United States, whose inhabitants were chiefly cul|tivators, required a greater supply of English ma|nufactures than any other neutral country of equal po|pulation; and those manufactures too, were, from the course of American commerce, combined with almost all our mercantile operations, and pervaded entirely our great coasting trade. Hence it is evident that this law was chiefly aimed at them.

It will be remembered also, that this law was passed while our three Envoys were at Paris, where they had passed three months unheeded by the French Go|vernment, except by its indignities—and where they had in vain solicited to be heard on the just claims of our citizens, plundered and ruined under the former decrees of the Republic. This time was preferred, in order to add insult to injury. The Envoys had firmly resisted her demands of loans and douceurs; and when speaking of their country, dared to intimate, that it was independent: it was therefore requisite, on the French system, to "chastise," as well as to "fleece" it.

In closing this subject, it will be proper to notice an assertion of Mr. Talleyrand in a conversation with the Envoys on the 2d March, 1798. In reply to some ob|servations of his respecting the proofs of friendship re|quired by France from the United States, General Pinckney observed, "that the Envoys being in France was a proof of the friendly disposition of our Govern|ment; and that while they were there, the French Government had passed a decree for seizing neutral ves|sels

having on board any article coming out of England; which in its operation would subject to capture all our property on the ocean. Mr. Talleyrand replied, that this was not particular to us, but was common to all the neutral powers." This assertion of Mr. Talleyrand is not true. Although the decree in its terms is general, and applicable to all the neutral powers, yet in its ope|ration, it was not designed to be, and has not been so ap|plied—it has not touched a vessel of Prussia. The mo|tives to this exemption are obvious. France wished not by irritating Prussia, to add so powerful a nation, and one so near at hand, to the number of her enemies, while her peace with Austria remained precarious. But this ex|emption of Prussian vessels from the operation of a gen|eral law, merits particular notice. It demonstrates that there exists in the French Republic a dispensing power—a power above the laws—a power which can prevent their execution: and it is alike demonstrable that this sovereign controuling power can exist, and in fact does exist, in the Executive Directory. It might then, if the Directory desired it, be exercised in the exemption of American as well as Prussian vessels: But the Di|rectory do not desire it: we have not yet been sufficient|ly "sleeced" and chastised."

Mr. Skipwith's letter of the 4th of August inclos|ed the Decree of the Executive Directory already noticed, passed the 31st of July, respecting French depredations in the West Indies and on the coast of the United States. His letter of the 8th of August inclosed Mr. Talley|rand's letter to him of the 6th, respecting that decree in which it is plain that the Minister supposes the world, and particularly the United States, will be amused by that illusory device, and imagine that it was intended to stop abuses, and give security to neutral commerce.

Mr. Skipwith's letter of the 22d of August covers another letter from Mr. Talleyrand, dated the 20th of

August, in which he encloses copies of two letters from the Minister of Marine respecting American seamen who had been imprisoned. When in July last an em|bargo was laid on the American merchant vessels in the ports of France, the agents of the Marine took out their crews and threw them into prison; thus hazard|ing the loss of the vessels, and injuring the men by con|finement and the bad provisions of their jails. These seamen were ordered to be released. The other letter from the Minister of Marine required that no injury should be done to the safety and liberty of the officers and crews of American vessels found to be in order, nor to passengers and other citizens of the United States hav|ing passports and protections.

The same letter from Mr. Skipwith inclosed the co|py of a Decree of the Directory passed the 16th of August, for taking off the Embargo, laid a month be|fore on American vessels.

The Decree itself occupies but two lines: but its pre|amble is extended, for the purpose of insulting the Gov|ernment of the United States, when an act of common justice was done to some of their citizens; by insinu|ating that the Government was "abandoned to the pas|sions of the British Cabinet." This, however, is but the repetition of a calumny familiar in French diploma|cy, respecting other nations as well as our own. Bar|ras, President of the Directory, in his valedictory ad|dress of Mr. Munroe, declared that "France would not abase herself by calculating the consequences of the condescension of the American Government, to the sug|gestions of her former tyrants": professing at the same time great "esteem for the American people." Mr. Adet had before charged the American Government, with a "perfidious condescension to the English;" and af|ter making his last communications to the Government, he, by their immediate publication under his orders, appealed from the Government to the People of the U|nited

States. Yet Mr. Talleyrand says, that the French Government has indeed "complained of the American Government, but to the Government itself;" meaning to have it understood, tho' carefully avoiding the ex|pression, that it had complained to the Government a|lone. With the like sophistry he attempts to evade our well founded allegations, that the French Government has made reproachful and injurious distinctions between the Government and People of the United States, en|deavouring to separate the latter from the former. He says "it is utterly false, notwithstanding the public and private insinuations which have been made, in private writings and in solemn acts, that the French government has ever sought to detach the people of the United States from the Constitution they have given themselves." Such a charge against the French government has not, that I know, ever been made by the American govern|ment: but we have accused them, and truly, with en|deavours to detach the People of the United States from the Government chosen by themselves to administer that Constitution: and this the Minister does not attempt to deny. The Directory would perhaps be contented that the People should retain the forms of "the Con|stitution they have given themselves," and to which they are attached, provided they would elect to ad|minister it, men devoted to France, and ready to obey the intimations of her will. And because the People have not been thus obsequious, but have dared to make a different election,—the French Government has ex|pressed its "terrible" resentment. Mr. Barlow has as|sured us, in the passage already cited from his letter, that for this single act of the People of the United States, in exercising freely their right of election, the Directory passed a Decree "which was meant to be little short of a declaration of war;" by which it "was determined to fleece the people of their property:"

certainly in expectation that, by touching their feeling in that "nerve," they would be induced, in order to save their property, to submit implicitly to the Govern|ment of France. Failing in this attempt the French government made another, in the Decree of the 18th of January, 1798, which tho' general in its terms, I have shewn to have been levelled directly and chiefly at the commerce of the United States. And this at the time (as I have before remarked) when three Envoys Extraordinary were waiting, month after month, and most respectfully soliciting to be heard, and to enter on the discussion of all the subjects of difference between the two countries; and among these, on the French depredations on our commerce. Yet Mr. Talleyrand has the confidence to assert, and to Mr. Gerry too, one of those Envoys, that the French Government "never refused and never will refuse to enter into discussion upon every proper subject?" Does the Minister mean that those depredations are not "a proper subject of dis|cussion;" Yes, with respect to a vast proportion of them. Mr. Y. his private agent, explicitly told our Envoys, that the condemnations of vessels for want of the role d'equipage were not to be questioned; "that being a point on which Merlin while Minister of Justice had written a Treatise, and on which the Directory were decided."

It is fit here to recollect another and a peremptory re|fusal of the French government, "to enter into dis|cussion" upon the subjects of difference between France and the United States.

General Pinckney, appointed the Minister Plenipo|tentiary of the United States to the French Republic, went to Paris in the autumn of 1796. There was at first (as in the case of the Envoys Extraordinary in 1797) a shew of receiving him: but soon the scene was changed; and he was not only refused a hearing, and after bearing a thousand indignities, ordered to leave

France; but the predecessor of Mr. Talleyrand, Charles De La Croix, in a letter to Mr. Monroe, intended to be communicated to Gen. Pinckney, declared, (being specially charged to do so by the Directory, and Mr. De La Croix repeated the declaration to Gen. Pinck|ney's Secretary) "That it will not acknowledge nor receive another Minister Plenipotentiary from the Uni|ted States, until after the redress of the grievances de|manded of the American Government, and which the French Republic has a right to expect from it." To this resolution we have seen the Directory adhere; and we have also seen, in the demands it made to our En|voys Extraordinary, as the indispensible preliminaries to any negotiation, what it meant by a "redress of grievances," prior to the reception of a Minister from America: it consisted in a douceur for the pocket of the Directors and Ministers—in the purchase at par of thirty-two millions of Dutch Securities, then worth but half that sum—and in Loans as immense and indefinite as their depredations on our commeoce.

The same letter from the French Minister De La Croix to Mr. Monroe, affords another proof of the aim and endeavours of the French government to separate the People from the Government of the United States. In the sentence next following the above quoted passage, Mr. De La Croix says, "I pray you to be persuaded, citizen minister, that this determination having become necessary, allows to subsist between the French Repub|lic and the American People the affection founded upon former benefits and reciprocal interests."

If I were to allow myself to make any further re|flections on the conduct of France towards the United States, it would be to illustrate the truth of Mr. Bar|low's assertion, That the French Government determin|ed to FLEECE us. If the French government "listen|ed (as Mr. Talleyrand says it does) to nothing but justice," and really desired a reconciliation, it would

have proposed to fix some measure of satisfaction for the injuries it said it had received. Or if too proud to propose to us, at least it would have prescribed to itself, some limit to reprisals: or at any rate, it would not have spurned us from its presence, when we respect|fully presented ourselves, sought a reconciliation, and offered to make a just satisfaction for every injury we had committed. And if (as Mr. Talleyrand asserts) "the French government has not ceased to offer the exact justice it demands," it would also have permitted us to state our claims.—But it would have been so easy to ascertain all the damages we had done; and their amount would have been so small; even if we agreed to pay for all English, Spanish and Dutch vessels brought by French cruisers into our ports, while all those nations were at war with France—a few of which the justice of the federal courts, in vindication of the sovereignty of the United States, rescued from the hands of the French Consuls, Agents and Privateersmen; and if to that amount we also added ten times the value of the miserable corvette Le Cassius, a vessel which had been unlawfully fitted out for war in the United States, but which has been the burden of every note from Adet's in 1795, to De la Croix's and Talleyrand's in 1796 and 1798, the amount of the whole, it was known, would be so small—the French government did not choose to have it ascertained: for then the in|juries done by the French to the commerce of the United States must also have been examined and ad|justed: and when adjusted, payment must have been made or stipulated: but in this, the French govern|ment, doubtless thought "it would find only a real disadvantage:" the amount of its own demands de|ducted from those of America, would hardly seem to have diminished the latter.

Such a mutual adjustment would also have been accompanied with a settlement of all questions and

disputes about the construction of treaties, and all other subjects of difference: But in this also the French go|vernment, upon its own system, "would have found a real disadvantage." For it would have vastly reduced the field for privateering in the European seas; and in the West Indies it would have been nearly annihi|lated: for there, for every vessel taken from the ene|mies of France, her cruisers have probably captured twenty belonging to the United States. But the French government, by always abstaining from making specific demands of damages—by refusing to receive our min|isters—by at length proposing to negotiate in a mode which it knew to be impracticable,—with the person who had no powers, and who therefore constantly re|fused to negotiate—and thus wholly avoiding a nego|tiation—it has kept open the field for complaints of wrongs and injuries, in order, by leaving them unde|fined to furnish pretences for unlimited depredations.—In this way "it determined to fleece us:" In this way it gratified its avarice and revenge—and it hoped also to satiate its ambition. After a long series of in|sults unresented, and a patient endurance of injuries aggravated in their nature and unexampled in their ex|tent—that government expected our final submission to its will. Our resistance has excited its surprize; and as certainly increased its resentment. With some soothing expressions, is heard the voice of wounded pride. Warmly professing its desire of reconciliation, it gives no evidence of its sincerity; but proofs in abundance demonstrate that it is not sincere. From standing erect, and in that commanding attitude re|quiring implicit obedience,—cowering, it renounces some of its unfounded demands. But I hope we shall remember "that the Tyger crouches before he leaps upon his prey."

Department of State, January 18, 1799.

TIMOTHY PICKERING.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Extract of a letter, dated June 19th, 1798, from Mr. King, Minister of the United States in London, to the Secretary of State.

  "Col. Trumbull▪ who was at Paris soon after the arrival there of the Commissioners, has more than once informed me, that Haute|val told him that both the douceur and the loan were indispensable, and urged him to employ his influence with the American Commis|sioners to offer the bribe as well as the loan."
• * 1.2

  On the 9th of October 1797, the day after the Envoys had delivered to the minister a copy of their letter of credence, "cards of hospitality were sent to them and their secretaries, in a style suitable to their official character." [Dispatches p. 17.] And in the minister's letter to them of the 18th of March 1798, he calls them "the Commissioners and Envoys Extraordinary of the United States of America."—[Dispatches p. 92.]
• * 1.3

  "DECRET de la Convention Nationale du 1. 8 bre 1793, Pan 2d de la Republique Francaise, Que détermine le mode de Répartition des prises faites par les vaisseaux Francais sur les ennemis de la Republique."
• * 1.4

  It will be recollected that this is the Decree of the Executive Directory, ordering the capture and condemnation of American vessels, not having a role d'equipage—that fruitful source of plun|der to Frenchmen, and of ruin to American citizens; and which also declared all American seamen, making a part of the crew of enemies ships, even when put on board them by force, to be pirates and directed them to be treated as such.