The speech of Albert Gallatin, delivered in the House of Representatives of the United States, on the first of March, 1798, upon the foreign intercourse bill.

THE following amendment to the bill providing the means of intercourse between the United States and foreign nations, being under consideration, to wit: In the section which pro∣vides that "the President shall not allow to any minister plenipotentiary a greater sum than at the rate of nine thou∣sand dollars per annum, as a compensation for all his personal services and other expenses; nor a greater sum for the same than four thousand five hundred dollars per annum, to a chargé des affaires;" strike out the word "plenipoten∣tiary," and insert in lieu thereof, the words "to Great-Britain, France or Spain;" strike out the words "chargé des affaires," and insert in lieu thereof the words "any minister to any other foreign nation."

MR. SPEAKER,

THE amendment proposed to this bill fixes the salary of ministers, employed at foreign courts, not accord∣ing to the grade of those ministers, as has heretofore been the case, but according to the courts to which they may be sent. Its object is to reduce the diplomatic establish∣ment nearly to what it was before May, 1796, by confining the salary of 9000 dollars a-year to the ministers at Lon∣don, Paris and Madrid, and allowing only 4500 to all others. The shape of the bill precludes an amendment more simple in its nature, and by which the same object would have been attained. The present permanent establishment, which the framers of the bill mean to support, requires an annual appropriation of sixty-four thousand dollars; and yet twenty-four thousand dollars of that sum are thrown

〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••〈1 paragraph〉〈1 paragraph〉 section, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 temporary 〈◊〉〈◊〉 for the present 〈◊〉〈◊〉, thereby presenting us from proposing a reduction in the sum which is openly asked for the support of the per∣manent establishment.

Before we are permitted to enter into the merits of the question, we are arrested in the threshold of discussion by constitutional objections. It is not indeed insisted that the amendment itself is unconstitutional; it is not denied that the legislature has a right to fix the salaries of public mi∣nisters; but the reduction of the establishment, is supposed, in its operation and tendency, to affect the legitimate au∣thority of the president. We are charged with a design of subverting, by our doctrine, the principles of the constitu∣tion, and we are thus drawn, in an incidental manner, into a previous discussion of a constitutional question.

The 2d section of the 2d article of the constitution, amongst other things, provides, that "the president shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the supreme court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be estab∣lished by law." The first inference, attempted to be drawn from the clause, is, not only that the appointment of minis∣ters is exclusively vested in the executive, which position is self-evident, but, that an unlimited number of offices of am∣bassadors, and other diplomatic agents, is created by the constitution itself, and that the president, in appointing, only fills those pre-existing offices. It appears to me, that it would be more correct to say, that the possible existence of those officers is recognized by that section, but that the of∣fice of minister to any foreign court, where we have not had any before, is created by the president making the ap∣pointment. And it may even be thought doubtful whether a law may not be necessary to create the office, before an appointment takes place. This clause recognizes the exis∣tence of judges of the supreme court, as well as that of fo∣reign ministers, and gives the same unlimited power of ap∣pointment in both cases to the executive. Nay, the case of judges is stronger than that of ministers; for, upon these, the constitution is silent in every other part, whilst not only

it is here declared, that judges of the supreme 〈◊〉〈◊〉, as well as public ministers, may exist, but the 3d article o•• the constitution positively enacts, that there shall be a su∣preme court, and fixes its jurisdiction. Yet it has not been contended that the office of judges of the supreme court was created by the constitution, or could be created by the mere appointment of the president, without the previous authorization of a law. It has not been contended that the president had, by the constitution, the power of appointing any unlimited number of those judges, to be fixed by his own discretion. On the contrary, a law had passed defin∣ing their number, before any appointment took place; and it is not insisted that the executive can appoint more than six, as fixed by that law. Had that power, contended for in relation to public ministers, existed in the case of judges, that part of the law, which declares that there shall be six judges, and no more, must be unconstitutional, as we have no right by law, and even with the consent of the presi∣dent, to divest him of any of his constitutional authorities. Still, it is not my intention to lay any stress upon this ar∣gument; some nice discrimination may perhaps be drawn between the two offices; a different construction has here∣tofore prevailed in the case of ministers, and it is not ne∣cessary, in order to prove the constitutionality of our doc∣trine, to contend for the construction of this section. I would not, therefore, have made these preliminary observa∣tions, had it not been to show, that the power of the exe∣cutive to appoint ministers without the previous sanction of a law, from which it is attempted to derive by implication the right of controuling the legislature in the exercise of its own constitutional powers, is itself of a doubtful nature, and can only be admitted by a very liberal construction of that clause of the constitution.

On the other hand, the constitution his expressly and exclusively vested in congress, the power of raising, grant∣ing, and directing the application of money. The 8th sec∣tion of the ••st article declares, that "congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, and to borrow money on the credit of the United States." The 1st section emphatically states, that "all legislative

powers herein granted shall be vested in a congress;" and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 9th section provides, that "no money shall be drawn from the t••••••sury, bu•• in consequence of appropriations made by law.'

We say that congress having the sole power of granting money, are judges of the propriety or impropriety of mak∣ing a grant, and that they have a right to exercise their dis∣cretion therein; whilst those who oppose the amendment upon constitutional grounds, contend that the power of creating the office of public ministers, vested in the presi∣dent, imposes an obligation upon congress to provide an adequate compensation for as many as he shall think fit to appoint. We say that th•• power of granting money for any purposes whatever, belongs solely to the legislature, in which it is literally vested by the constitution: they insist that that power in this instance attaches, by implication, to the president, and that congress are bound to make provi∣sion, without having a right to exercise their own discretion.

In order to establish this doctrine, it is asserted that, by our constitution, each department may have checks within itself, but has none upon the others; that each department is self-independent, has its own share of powers, and moves uncontrouled within its sphere; that, therefore, whenever a certain authority is, by the constitution, vested in any one department, it must possess the means to carry that authority into effect, and that the other departments are bound to lend their assistance for that purpose.

These positions will not stand the test of investigation. Whenever the powers vested in any one department are sufficient to complete a certain act, that department is in∣dependent of all the others, and it would be an unconsti∣tutional attempt in any of the others to try to controul it. But whenever the powers have been so distributed between two departments, in relation to another certain act, that neither of the two can complete the act by virtue of its own powers, then each department is controuled by the other, not in relation to the operation of its appropriate powers, but in relation to the act itself. Each department, in that case, may go as far as its own authority will permit, but no farther. The refusal of the other department, to ex∣ercise

its powers in relation to that act, in the same direc∣tion and in concurrence with the first department, is no abridgment of the legitimate powers of the first. It is the constitution which, in that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••ridges the powers of both, and which has rendered the concurrence of both ne∣cessary for the completion of the act. If either of the de∣partments, in that case, after having exercised its own au∣thority towards the completion of the act, shall pretend to have a right to force the pow••••s of the other in the same direction, so as to have the act completed against or with∣out its voluntary consent, it is that department which abridges the legitimate exercise of the powers of the other. Thus, in the instance before us, the president may appoint as many public ministers as he thinks fit, and if he can send them to their intended mission without the assistance of any act of the legislature; if he can, as in the case of consuls, find men who will serve without a salary, he has a right to do it, and thus to act uncontrouled by the legislature; be∣cause, in this supposed instance, his own authority is suffi∣cient to carry into effect his intentions. But farther than that he cannot go; for the constitution, in no part, gives him any power to force the legislature to grant the money which may be necessary to pay the ministers. In the same manner the legislature have a right to appropriate a sum of money, for the purpose of paying twenty public ministers, if they shall, in their judgment, think so many necessary. But farther than that they cannot go; they cannot force the president to appoint twenty ministers, if he does not think them necessary. In this instance, the act is placed partly un∣der the jurisdiction of the executive, and partly under that of the legislature—under the jurisdiction of the executive so far as relates to the creation of the office and to the ap∣pointment—under the jurisdiction of the legislature so far as relates to granting the money; and the concurrence of both departments is necessary to complete the act.

The contrary doctrine leads to a palpable absurdity; for, if it be true that any department, having expressed its will in relation to an act, upon which it can operate but par∣tially, binds the other departments to lend their assistance, in order that its will may be completely carried into effect,

it follows, that whenever two department shall differ in opinion as to a certain act, we shall have two different wills acting in contrary directions, and each, however, binding the other respectively; that is to say, that there is a necessi∣ty 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the act should at the s••••e time be done in two dif∣ferent ways, or, in some instan••es, that it should, at the same time, be done and not be done. But the fact is, that the true doctrine of those gentlemen, though not openly avowed on the present occasion, is not, that each depart∣ment may act uncontrouled in the exercise of its own ap∣propriate powers; but that they have two standards, one which they apply to the executive, and another by which they measure the powers of the legislature; and that in their opinion the powers of the executive are paramount, and must limit and controul those of the legislature, when∣ever they happen to move in the same sphere, whenever the execution of an act depends upon the concurrence of both.

This doctrine is as novel as it is absurd. We have al∣ways been taught to believe that in all mixed governments, and especially in our own, the different departments mutu∣ally operated as checks one upon the other. It is a prin∣ciple inherent to the very nature of those governments: it is a principle which flows from the distribution and separa∣tion of legislative and executive powers, by which the same act, in many instances, instead of belonging exclusively to either, falls under the discretionary and partial authority of both: it is a principle of all our state constitutions: it is a principle of the constitution under which we now act: it is a principle recognized by every author who wrote on the subject: it is a principle fully established by the theory and practice of the government of that country, from which we derive our political institutions. In Great Britain, the power of declaring war is vested in the king; but the power of granting supplies, in order to support the war, is vested in parliament. It has never been contended there, that parliament were bound by the act of the king to grant mo∣ney for that purpose; it is, on the contrary, fully understood that a concurrence of opinion is necessary, before a war can be carried into effect, that the two departments, in that re∣spect, controul and check each other, and that war is never

declared by the king, unless he can depend on the support of parliament.

Wh•••••••• is found that the constitution has distributed the powers in a manner different from that contended for, although there is no clause, wh•••••• ••ire••••s that congress shall be bound to appropriate money is order to carry into effect any of the executive powers, some gentlemen, recurring to metaphysical subtleties, and abandoning the literal and plain sense of the constitution, say, that, although we have a constitutional power, we have not a moral right to act according to our own discretion, but are under a moral obligation, in this instance, to grant the money. It is evident, that where the constitution has lodged the power, there ex∣ists the right of acting and the right of discretion. Con∣gress is, upon all occasions, under a moral obligation to act according to justice and propriety. We do not claim the absurd privilege of acting without sufficient motives, but we wish every proper motive to have its due weight. The opinion of the executive, and, where he has a partial pow∣er, the application of that power, to a certain object, will ever operate as powerful motives upon our deliberations. I wish it to have its full weight; but I feel averse to a doc∣trine which would place us under the sole controul of a sin∣gle force impelling us in a certain direction, to the exclu∣sion of all the other motives of action which should also influence us.

The last clause of the 8th section of the 1st article of the constitution, which declares, that

congress shall have pow∣er to make all laws which shall be necessay and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer there∣of,

was introduced ye••••••••day, in order to prove that con∣gress were bound to pass the laws necessary to carry into exe∣cution any of the powers vested by the constitution in the president. But it is evident, that this clause gives a power, and does not impose duty: it does not say that congress shall make laws, but shall have power to make laws; that is to say, shall exercise their own discretion. This clause, con∣trasted with the language of the constitution in another part, affords an additional proof in support of our arguments.

It ••••nno•• have escaped observation, that the doctrine of some gen••••••men on this floor would, by transferring to the executive 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••ower of determining the amount of an ap∣propriation, ••••ve him a legislative power, the power of do∣ing what it within the province of a law, the power of fixing the rule by which a certain act is to be executed; whilst the legislature, being bound to carry into effect the inten∣tion of the president, would, in that instance, be trans∣formed into an executive power. That such was not the intent of the constitution, appears, from its not using, in the last mentioned clause, the same mode of expression which is applied to mere executive duties. The 3d section of the 2d article directs, that

the president shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

Here no discretion is left: the con〈7 letters〉〈7 letters〉tion does not here say, that the president shall have power to execute the laws; but, by the phraseo∣logy, he is bo••nd to have them executed. When, there∣fore, the constitution means to impose a duty, it is suffici∣ently explicit, and positively directs the act to be done; and we may safely conclude, that where it gives no such di∣rection, where it impowers instead of commanding, the rea∣son is that it meant to leave a discretion.

It is also objected that congress cannot, in every case, ex∣ercise that discretion we contend for, as those clauses of the constitution which provide "that the president and judges shall rece••ve, for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished, &c." would be defeated, by the refusal of the legislature to appropriate for that purpose.

The constitution recognizes the existence of public mi∣nisters as well as that of the president and judges. It goes no farther on the subject of ministers; but declares, that the president and judges shall have salaries, &c. Had the fra∣mers of the constitution also intended that congress should be bound to make provision for ministers, they would have introduced a similar clause in respect to them. The consti¦tution is explicit in one case, and declares, that salaries shall be given; it is silent in the other, and does not declare that salaries shall be given. The objection, therefore, cannot reach farther than the specific case upon which it is groun∣ded Permit me to add, that in respect to the president and

judges, the discretionary power of the legislature to grant money is limited only by the constitution, and is not trans∣ferred to any other department. For the number of those officers being determined, in respect to the president by the constitution, and in respect to the judges by law, the amount of money necessary for their support, which must be in proportion to their number, is fixed in the first instance by the legislature and not by the executive. The limitation of the legislative power does not go farther there, than to bind subsequent legislatures for a certain time, by the acts of former ones. But, in respect to public ministers, should the doctrine, against which we contend, prevail, as their number would be fixed, not by the legislature, but by the president, the amount of money, necessary for their support, would also depend upon him; and the power of granting money, in that instance, would be transferred from the le∣gislature to the executive.

Some gentlemen, embarrassed by the clause respecting appropriations, have attempted to diminish its force, by connecting it with the following one, which directs the pub∣lication of the accounts of receipts and expenditures of the public money, and representing it as a mere matter of form. It is strange indeed that an attempt should be made to repre∣sent appropriation clauses in the constitution as mere mat∣ters of form, as nominal provisions, whilst the only secu∣rity against standing armies, contained in the constitution, consists in the clause which provides that

no appropria∣tion of money to raise and support armies shall be longer than two years.

But the ingenuity of those gentlemen cannot erase the obnoxious clause: and so long as it shall remain a part of the constitution, so long shall it be ne∣cessary that a law be passed before any money can be drawn from the treasury—so long shall it be necessary that mo∣ney drawn from the treasury be applied only in such man∣ner, to such extent, and for such purposes, as shall have been previously ascertained by law. It is this clause which completes the power vested in congress over money. And it should be well understood that the doctrine, for which we contend, is that constitutional principle, which gives to the legislature an exclusive authority of raising and granting money; an authority which our opponents wish to place,

in several cases, the present one, and that of treaties, in the hands of the executive, allowing him thereby to raise and to expend money without the controul of congress. I say to raise money; for it is immaterial to me, whether he does it directly, or whether the legislature are bound to do it according to his discretion.

In this investigation, I have confined myself strictly to the constitutional question, wishing to ascertain what the constitution was, and not what it should be. Before I make any observations on the tendency and consequences of the two opposite constructions, I wish to make some on the me∣rits of the amendment itself.

We conceive that the effect of the amendment will be, to prevent an extension of our political connections with fo∣reign nations, at the same time that it will reduce any e••••en∣diture of money, which, if unnecessary, may be applied to give an undue influence to the executive, through the means of patronage, even over the legislature. But, we do not believe that this amendment will injure our commer∣cial intercourse with those nations, or cause any prejudice to our commercial interest.

The commercial intercourse between nations is regula∣ted by the law of nations, by the municipal laws of the re∣spective countries, and by treaties of commerce. The ap∣plication of those different laws to individual cases, the protection of individuals against acts of oppression not con∣sonant with those laws, the protection of our seamen and of our citizens trading to foreign countries, fall within the province of those agents known by the name of consuls. Consuls are appointed for that specific purpose: we have them in all countries with which we trade, whether we have there public ministers or not; they protect our com∣merce as effectually at Hamburgh, in Denmark or Swe∣den, where we have no diplomatic characters, as it is pro∣tected in Spain or Holland, where we have ministers. It is only when we wish ••o obtain a change in the regulations provided by the acknowledged law of nations, or by the municipal laws of the country, that public ministers are necessary, as they alone can negociate with a foreign go∣vernment, as they alone can form treaties of commerce. But it is only the application of laws and treaties to indi∣vidual

cases which require a continual attention and a per∣manent residence. The extraordinary occasions on which it may be necessary to negociate treaties, may be provided for by special missions, by extraordinary envoys; and it is worthy of remark, that the two only treaties, which have yet been made, under the present constitution, with foreign nations, those with Great-Britain and Spain, have both been formed by extraordinary envoys (Mr. Jay and Mr. Pinckney) although we had at that time public ministers at those two courts. The proposed amendment affects only the permanent diplomatic establishment; it applies neither to consuls, nor to such extraordinary missions as circum∣stances may render necessary.

It must be acknowledged, however, that it is not impro∣bable that the extention of our diplomatic establishment may tend to increase the number of our commercial treaties beyond those which might result from extraordinary mis∣sions. But is this a definable object? It would, indeed, be extremely advantageous to obtain from all nations, such ge∣neral alterations in the law of nations, as would secure the freedom of the sea, and effectually protect the flag of neu∣tral powers, against the danger of capture or detention in all possible cases. But have we yet ever formed a commer∣cial trea••y, in which those provisions were not connected with some commercial restrictions of a different nature, and which did not even contain some clauses of a politi∣cal nature? I will go farther, and I will ask, whether we have derived any commercial advantage from the commer∣cial treaties we have heretofore made? Let me remind gentlemen on this floor, with the situation of our commerce before the organization of this government. The treaties of commerce we had at that time with France, Holland, Sweden and Prussia, had not prevented its depression. And to what cause must we ascribe the vigour it had ac∣quired before the present European war? Not to com∣mercial treaties; for we had formed no new ones. To the want of a general government, having a power of mak∣ing general commercial regulations, was due, the languid situation of our trade; and its revival was owing to the adoption of that government, to our own regulations, to ourselves, and not to any compact made with foreign na∣tion.

The restrictions which we have laid upon ourselves, by our commercial treaties, have been attended with political consequences fatal to our tranquility. We had made two treaties with France, one of alliance avowedly of a politi∣cal nature, another of commerce unconnected with the first. I need not remind the house of the difficulties in which we have been involved by several clauses of the commercial treaty. The articles relative to the admission of prizes of one nation into our ports, and to the exclusion of those of ano∣ther, were the cause of long and critical diplomatic discus∣sions. We have now extended to the other belligerent pow∣er the same clauses, with a reservation of our prior en∣gagements, but to the exclusion of nations with whom we had no treaties, and have not thereby lessened our difficul∣ties.

But I will again ask, what commercial advantage have we derived from our commercial treaty with France, which we would not have enjoyed without that treaty? Have we derived any from the commercial part of our treaty with Great Britain? Is our commerce with that nation on a bet∣ter footing than it was without the treaty. I do not mean to allude to the conventional part of that treaty, by which our differences were arranged. I do not mean to allude to the political consequences of that treaty: they are foreign to the present discussion. I speak only of commercial ad∣vantages. All we know on that subject is contained in the two acts of parliament communicated to us by the pre∣sident. It results from them, that England has opened the East-India trade to us under the restrictions provided by the treaty, and to all neutral nations without those restrictions. Whether she means to include us in the general provision, which relates to all neutral nations, or to keep us under the treaty restrictions, I will not pretend to say, and it is not material to the present question. But it is evident, that we are placed, by the treaty, in a worse commercial situation, in respect to the East Indies, than we were, in fact, before the treaty, or than we might be by the sole effect of the municipal laws of Great-Britain. It also appears by that act of parliament, that England has laid a countervailing duty on our imports there in American vessels. This they had a right to do without the treaty; but they had not at∣tempted

to do it until the treaty took place, because we had till then the natural right of defeating that measure, by our own regulations here. We have abandoned that right by the treaty; we have, in order to obtain some sup∣posed commercial advantages, laid a restriction upon our natural power of making our own general commercial re∣gulations. This act of parliament, however, is the only effect, in relation to commerce, which has as yet resulted from the treaty. What its consequences upon our trade may be, I cannot judge; but it places us precisely in the situation in which we were before the year 1789, when we had no efficient general government, when we could not make commercial regulations of a general nature. If the commercial part of our former treaties has not been atten∣ded with any beneficial ••••nsequences; if, on the contrary, it has involved us in a critical situation, we may be per∣mitted to doubt, whether commercial treaties are not as likely to check as to protect our commerce.

It is not denied that an extension of our political con∣nections with Europe would be injurious to us; but it is said, that our having no ministers in foreign countries will not prevent foreign nations sending their ministers here, and that our ministers abroad will not increase our political foreign connections. I do not mean to make any personal allusions to the conduct of our ministers in Europe; but we may judge—from past events, we may judge from the conduct of foreign ministers here, that diplomatic charac∣ters are not likely to be inactive. From the nature of their appointment, from the nature of man, we know that they will try to acquire importance with their own government and credit to themselves; they are placed in a dangerous vortex, and they will all, more or less, according to circum∣stances and to their personal character, take a part in the political intrigues or quarrels of Europe; they will attempt to do something—they will attempt to involve us in the po∣litical vortex of Europe—they will try to make for us new connections, or to break ancient connections.

Whether foreign nations, with whom we have no public ministers, will send ministers here, cannot be absolutely foretold, but we know that it is not usual; at all events, it cannot be wise to invite a greater number of foreign mini∣sters

here, by extending our diplomatic establishment to countries where we have not heretofore sent ministers. The amendment under consideration has no tendency to annihilate that establishment, but it will effectually check its extension. If our ministers abroad are necessary for the protection of our commerce, or on account of our politi∣cal situation in respect to the belligerent powers, this amendment will not withdraw their compensation. Its avowed object, its only possible effect, is, to reduce the es∣tablishment to what it was in 1796, when we had no mini∣ster at Berlin, and when our minister at Lisbon, with a sa∣••••ry of 4500 dollars, rendered us the same services as if he had had 9000.

But, we are told, that this is not the time to make a reduc∣tion, that our situation in respect to Europe forbids it, and that our differing in opinion with the President on this subject, will prove us to be a divided people. I am much afraid, that if now is not the time, it will be with this re∣form as with all others, it will never be time. To evince to European nations that we wish not to mix in their political sphere of action, that we are not desirous of forming poli∣tical connections, that we wish not to interfere, especially at this time, with their political interests, is, in my opinion, the best mode in our power to prevent their interfering with us, and the most likely to produce a termination of our present dispute. Nor can I conceive how our expressing on this ground, a difference of opinion with the executive, will tend to prove that we are not united on the subject of self-defence. But I believe that now is the time to express our opinion, because the object of the extension of our di∣plomatic establishment having been explained to us by the President, it is our duty, if we think the object contempla∣ted to be dangerous, not to be silent upon this occasion. Our information is derived from the following paragraph of the Presiden•••••• speech at the opening of the last extraor∣dinary session of c••••••••••ss:

Although it is very true, that we ought not to involve ourselves in the pol••••ical system of Europe, but to keep ourselves always distinct and sepa••••••e from it, if we can; yet, to effect this separation, early, punctual and continual inf••rmation of the current chai•• of events, and of the political

projects in contemplation, is no less necessary, than if we were directly concerned in them: It is necessary in order to the discovery of the efforts made to draw us into the vortex, in season to make preparations against them. However we may consider ourselves, the maritime and commercial powers of the world will consider the Uni∣ted States of America as forming a weight in that balance of power in Europe, which never can be forgotten or ne∣glected. It would not only be against our interest, but it would be doing wrong to one half of Europe at least, if we should voluntarily throw ourselves into either scale. It is a natural policy for a nation that studies to be neu∣tral, to consult with other nations engaged in the same stu∣dies and pursuits: At the same time that measures ought to be pursued with this view, our treaties with Prussia and Sweden, one of which is expired, and the other near expiring, might be renewed.

Permit me, before I proceed to make any remarks upon that part of the President's speech, to contrast it with the sentiments contained in the late President's address to the people, on his retiring from office.

The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith.—Here let us stop.

Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence, she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her poli∣tics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.

Our detached and distant situation, invites and enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain one peo∣ple, under an efficient government, the period is not far off, when we may defy material injury from exter∣nal annoyance..... Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with

that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and pros∣perity in the toil of European ambition, rivalship, in∣terest, humour, or caprice? 'Tis our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances, with any portion of the foreign world, so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it.... Let those engagements be observed in their genuine sense. But, in my opinion, it is unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them.

Supported by this authority, may I hope to escape the censure of arrogance, if, on this occasion, I dare express an opinion in some degree opposed to the very respectable au∣thority of the president of the United States.

The object of both the late and the present president is perfectly the same; it is that we may not be involved in the political system of Europe, that we may not be drawn into the vortex. But they do not seem altogether to agree on the means by which to obtain that object.

The president of the United States conceives that it is a natural policy for us to consult with other nations engag∣ed in the same studies and pursuits; and that measures ought to be pursued with this view. The late President thinks it unwise, by interweaving our destiny with Europe, to en∣tangle our peace—unwise to implicate ourselves by artifi∣cial ties—unwise and unnecessary to extend our engage∣ments. His opinion is emphatically expressed by these words, "Here let us stop."

As to that balance of power in Europe, which never can be forgotten or neglected, it is a system, which, so far as relates to Europe itself, it is not necessary for us to dis∣cuss. And yet, without examining all the useless wars to which it has served as a cause or a pretence, we must recol∣lect, at what late period the British ministry wanted to in∣volve the British nation into a war with Russia, for the pur∣pose of preserving that balance, which might, in their opi∣nion, be affected by the transfer or Oczackow, situated as it is in a remote corner of the black sea, from the hords of Tartars which rule Turkey, to the Tartar hords which inha∣bit Russia. But, however interesting that balance may be to Europe, how does it concern us? We may lament the fate of Poland and Venice, and I never can myself ••ee, without regret, independent nations blotted from the map

of the world. But their destiny does not affect us in the least. We have no interest whatever in that balance; and by us, it should be altogether forgotten and neglected. If we ever think we have an interest in it, shall we not be indu∣ced to throw our weight in the scale.—shall we not involve ourselves in the destinies and the wars of Europe? If we act on our own ground, is it likely that other nations will ever consider us as forming a weight in their balance?

But if we adopt the policy to consult with other nations—if measures are to be pursued with that view—if we are to form new foreign political connections; how can we hope to escape being unavoidably drawn into the vortex? It was, after having thus communicated his intention—it was in pursuance of that plan, that the president thought fit to send a minister to Berlin. With Prussia, we have no com∣merce. Had commerce been the object of that embassy, Sweden, Denmark, the Hanse-towns, or Italy, would have been preferred. The mission is avowedly and evidently of a political nature; and if we are to consult and to form con∣nections with nations, who may, in our opinion, be engaged in similar pursuits with ourselves; if Prussia is considered as such, with what nation in Europe, may we not and shall we not, according to circumstances, consult, concert mea∣sures, and form political arrangements? It is from this view of the subject, that I have been induced, however reluctantly, fully to state all the reasons which impress upon my mind a conviction of the importance of the present amendment, of the importance of checking at this time, and in its birth, a system which tends to increase our political connections with Europe.

So much has already been said on the subject of patron∣age, on the danger which might hereafter result from an influence obtained through those means over the legislature, and on the system, said to be adopted by the administration, to exclude, from every description of office, men who do not subscribe to a certain political creed, that I think it use∣less to add any observations on that subject. As, however, the patronage, now vested by law in the executive, has been stated as very insignificant, I will merely state its real extent.

It consists in appointment to offices and in the disposal of public monies by contracts. The annual pay of the officers

in the different departments of the treasury, of state and of war, and all the subordinate offices of loans, mint, &c. of the officers in the North West Territory, of the attorney-general, surveyor-general, Indian-agents, diplomatic cha∣racters, agents for the protection of seamen, agents and commissioners appointed by virtue of certain treaties; in fine, the pay of all civil officers, whose appointment depends upon the executive or some branch of the administration, including therein all the clerks, but excluding the judici∣ary department, added to the pay and other emoluments of the commissioned officers of the army and navy, forms an aggregate of about 420,000 dollars. The salary and other emoluments of the officers employed in the collection of the impost and of the internal revenues, including therein post-masters, amount to about 430,000 dollars. These two sums amount together to 850,000 dollars yearly, received by officers who derive their appointment from the executive.

The amount of monies disposed of by contracts, and it is well known that lucrative contracts may be made a pow∣erful engine of influence; that amount calculated on some objects upon an average of three years, and including those relative to the mint, to the printing of the several offices, to the printing of the laws, those for the transportation of the mail, for supplying the provisions, clothing, horses, medicines, cannons, arms, of the army, for Indian goods, and all the immense details of the quarter-master's depart∣ment, for building and furnishing all the supplies of the navy, for building light-houses, and for several other con∣tingent expences, exceeds 1,200,000 dollars a year.

The aggregate of the two sums exceeds 2,000,000 dol∣lars, a sum by no means despicable, when compared with our population and wealth, when compared with a revenue which till last year never exceeded seven millions of dollars.

After having stated these considerations, which appear to me immediately applicable to the present discussion, I would not encroach any longer on the patience of the com∣mittee, had not some gentlemen brought into view a num∣ber of topics of a more general nature, in which, it may not be altogether useless to follow them.

The first position they assume is, that there is a natural tendency in the legislative department to encroach upon

the executive, and they attempt to prove, by historical facts, that in all countries, where a republican form of govern∣ment ever existed, the executive has in fact been swallowed up by the legislature. The instance of the Greek republics and their subversion by Philip of Macedon, and that of Rome, have chiefly been insisted upon. Both are altoge∣ther inapplicable to the American constitution. The ques∣tion is not, whether governments, constructed on different principles from ours, have been destroyed by the effect of those principles, but, whether the history of those similar to our own will support the assertion?

The small Greek republics, Athens especially, were go∣verned directly and immediately by the people themselves. In Rome, where the constitution, though imperfectly, was better balanced, the popular branch of government was al∣so an assembly of the whole people of the city; and when their virtues and their manners, which could alone support such a system, had been corrupted by the spoils of a con∣quered world—when the dregs of every other town of Italy, admitted to the rights of citizenship, had resorted to a cor∣rupt metropolis—when a few citizens, enriched by the trea∣sures of Asia, had it in their power to bribe that mixed mass, which, alone, and without being controlled by the other parts of an extensive empire, disposed of every office of honor or power—when these offices, thus obtained, placed ambitious leaders at the head of the standing armies, which constituted, at that time, the sole military force of the na∣tion; we cannot be at a loss to discover the causes of the civil wars and contests for power which terminated in the establishment of despotism.

These instances are inapplicable to our own situation, because those governments essentially differed from that of America; in that, that the legislative power was there lodg∣ed in the people residing in a single city, and that it is here vested in the representatives of the whole people. There, not only there was no proper or precise distribution of pow∣ers; but there also the people themselves had the authority of deliberating and of enacting laws, and here they have only that of electing the persons who are to make laws for them. All that can be proved by this, is, that power ought not to be vested in the body of the people. But, because the

heterogeneous mass, which constituted the body of the citi∣zens in Rome, abused the power they had, ought we to conclude that the people of America will abuse the power they have not? Or, that because a government, where the principle of representation was unknown, was destroyed by the corruption of the people, and the ambition of their de∣magogues, the representative government of the United States will be destroyed by the representatives themselves? The history of those ancient republics may indeed teach us to cherish that principle of representation, which is the leading feature of our constitution and the safeguard of our liberties. It may teach us another lesson applicable to all times and to all men; that money accumulated in the hands of a single man, or of a few, may be applied with success to the destruction of any government. The foreign gold of Philip gave the last blow to the expiring liberty of Athens. And the same engine in the hands of the citizens of Rome was not attended with less fatal effects.

But if we turn our attention from a view of obscure anti∣quity, to modern Europe, how shall the assertion be supported, that, in representative governments, the legislature usually swallows up the executive? History tells us, that, three centu∣ries ago, representative forms of government existed through∣out Europe, in which the representatives of the people, or of a part of the people, had more or less power and influence, according to the various circumstances under which they respectively arose. But, if we look at the present situation of that country, such at least as it was before the French re∣volution, where can we discover traces of those institutions? What has become of the Cortes of Spain? of the States General of France? Of the Diets of Denmark? Every where we find the executive in possession of legislative, of absolute powers. The glimmerings of liberty, which for a moment shone in Europe, were owing to a decay of the feudal system. When the princes were deprived of the per∣sonal services of their vassals and of the revenues derived from their ancient domains; when industry and commerce rendered money the principal engine of power; those po∣pular assemblies which had the ••••••l-then unimportant right of raising taxes and granting supplies, arose, at once, into consequence. And as the executive, either by force, or by

fraud, or by the folly of the people themselves, succeeded in wresting that power from them, they fell again into mis∣use or insignificance.

The fate of the European republics would lead us to similar conclusions. Venice, the greater part of Switzer∣land and Holland, would shew us the legislative powers equally merging into the executive, and a self-created council or hereditary Stadtholder usurping, by artifice, the legitimate authority of the representative bodies. Almost every vestige of liberty was erased from the continent of Europe; and it is to England that we are indebted for the preservation of those principles, which from the basis of our constitution.

It is from England that we have borrowed our political institutions. Taught by her example, we have improved them, and adapted them to our own situation; but her histo∣ry is still that which is most applicable to ourselves; for, notwithstanding the happy modifications which we have introduced, the great outlines of representation, and distri∣bution of powers, are the same; and notwithstanding the strong distinguishing features, there has never existed a go∣vernment more similar, upon the whole, to our own, than that of that country.

Some gentlemen, leaving out of view that period in the British, history, which should naturally attract our attention, have attempted to draw from the events of the reign of Charles the first, a proof of their favorite doctrine, the dan∣ger to be apprehended from the encroachments of the legis∣lature. They have forgotten that those events were not the effect of the slow progress of an established government, but the result of an unsettled constitution. The precise boundaries of power were not ascertained; parliament con∣tended for the acquirement of rights which had been usurped or enjoyed by the kings. In its beginning, the con∣test was between the king in his own right and parliament in the right of the people. Convulsions, a civil war, a re∣volution ensued. But the position, which we controvert, is not that the people, or a popular assembly, may, by a con∣vulsion, ••rest, from the executive, powers originally ob∣tained by fraud or violence. It is that, when a representa∣tive government, with properly distributed powers, is once

established, the legislature will finally encroach upon the executive. This position cannot be illustrated by the events of Charles's reign; but that period, which extends from the revolution of 1688 to the present reign, after the con∣stitution had been settled and ascertained, is that to which we must recur as immediately applicable to our own situ∣ation.

It is during that period that a progressing patronage, and a systematic, corrupting influence have sunk parlia∣ment to a nominal representation, a mere machine, the con∣venience used by government for the purpose of raising supplies: the medium through which the executive reach, with ease, the purse of the people. And now, when the farce of obtaining even the nominal consent of parliament is sufficiently understood, the ministry dispense with the ce∣remony, and have carried so far their contempt for that body, that the sum spent during last year, without the con∣sent, exceeds the amount spent with the consent of parlia∣ment. The executive, there, have acquired the unlimited and uncontrouled power of raising and expending money, and the house of commons is under a moral obligation of making the necessary appropriations.

But, is it to be apprehended, from the structure of our own constitution, that the executive will be destroyed by the legislature? The legislative powers, vested in congress, seem to have been given under such efficient checks, as should remove any fears of that nature. They are not given to a single popular branch, but to two distinct bodies.—The consent of both is necessary to do any act, and one of them, elected not immediately by the people, but through the medium of the state legislatures, is, at the same time, united with the executive in the exercise of its most impor∣tant powers, that of appointing to offices, and that of mak∣ing treaties. Thus, no encroachment can be made upon the executive powers, without the consent of the senate; and this body never will give their assent to any act, which, by weakening the executive, would necessarily diminish their own authority. But, should ever such an act pass both houses of congress, it must not be forgotten, that the con∣stitution has vested the president with a modified negative. That negative, already twice exercised, was, on both occa∣sions,

effectual; and, it is an absurd supposition, that, at any time, the president should not be supported, by at least one third of one of the two branches of the legislature, ageanst any unconstitutional attempt to deprive him of his legiti∣mate authority.

To these constitutional barriers, may be added, in re∣spect to any supposed encroachments of this house, the grea∣ter degree of permanency in the senate and president, and the systematic line of conduct, which a single magistrate, whose powers are always in action, and a permanent body, who, like the senate, are only renewed by thirds, are ena∣bled to pursue; contrasted with the insulated efforts of this house, liable to a total renovation every two years, and com∣posed of members occasionally in session, but dispersed, through this extensive country, the greater part of the year. Nor should the gentlemen, who attach so great a degree of influence to the supposed popularity of this house, forget, that to us belongs the most obnoxious share of government, that of laying taxes, whilst the executive enjoys the m••••e grateful employment of the individual application of the public money.

The object of our constitution has been, to divide and distribute the powers between the several branches of go∣vernment. With that distribution, and with the share allo••ted to us, we are fully satisfied. We only wish to preserve the equilibrium intended by the constitution.—The constitu∣tional right, which is the subject of this discussion, is of a ne∣gative kind. By this exercise, we may prevent, but we can∣not act; nor is there any power, claimed by us, which does not equally attach to the senate, and lays us under their con∣trol. In this instance, we ask only, that the powers, which the constitution has separated, may not be blended; that the power of raising and granting money may remain invi∣olate in they legislature, and that of appointing to offices, or even, in the case of public ministers, of creating offices, in the executive. But the doctrine, introduced by some gen∣tlemen, tends, in its immediate effects, to blend those pow∣ers, and by vesting that legislative authority▪ which they represent as so formidable, in the same hands where the exe∣cutive power is lodged, to overset every barrier and to de∣stroy the most fundamental principles of our constitution.

In the same manner, as in this instance, they insist that we are bound to appropriate, they, in the case 〈◊〉〈◊〉 treaties, also claim for the executive, a power of abridging the con∣stitutional authority of congress of raising and granting money, and vest in that department what they take from this. Nor do they stop there. The most important powers entrusted to congress, exclusively of that over money, con∣sist in regulating; commerce, raising armies, providing a navy, and declaring war. And all these are swept away, and transferred to the executive, by the construction put upon the treaty-making power, which rests on the same foundation with that which is now claimed. The executive has the power of appointing public ministers, of making commercial treaties, of making subsidiary treaties, of mak∣ing treaties of alliance offensive and defensive. The same principle which should bind us in one case, binds us in every other. If we are under a moral obligation to lend our assis∣tance, in order to carry into effect the constitutional powers of the executive; if we have no discretion left in the exer∣cise of our own; if it be not true, that when an act, in order to be completed, requires the concurrence of two depart∣ments, each department has an equal right to give or to re∣fuse its assent; if, in the instance of public ministers, we are bound to appropriate; if, in the instance of commercial treaties, we are bound to repeal or to make commercial regulations, in conformity with the provisions of the trea∣ties, the inference is unavoidable, that where the executive has formed a subsidiary treaty, we are also bound, without any discretion being left to us, to appropriate the sums of money necessary to pay the subsidy, to raise the required number of auxiliary troops, and to provide the stipulated number of ships of war; that where a treaty of alliance offensive has been made, we are under a moral obligation to make war. Thus would the important powers entrusted to congress by the constitution, be reduced to those of coining money, passing penal lays, granting patents, and establishing post-roads. The rule of cons••••uction which, in one instance, vests in the executive the power of granting money, or any other legislative authority, makes the transfer in all the cases I have enumerated. Any construction which shall except a single case, shall restore our discretion in all.

Can any fatal consequences attend the full exercise of the constitutional discretion of congress, in granting mo∣ney? Its general effect must be, to diminish the expendi∣ture of public money. By restraining it, you take away the most efficient check, provided by the constitution, to controul and to keep within proper bounds that expendi∣ture. Thus, applied to the present amendment, the exer∣cise of that discretion, may prevent too large a sum of mo∣ney being applied to the support of foreign ministers. It never can be used to increase that sum. Thus it may pre∣vent an appropriation, for the payment of a subsidy to a foreign nation; it may prevent an extension of our politi∣cal foreign connections; it may prevent the raising of troops, or the equipping of a fleet; it may prevent a war. But it never can create an expenditure of money, an army, a navy, a war, which, upon the ground of the doctrine supported by our opponents, would not equally take place. The checks intended to prevent those evils, and their inse∣parable attendants, taxation and public debts, cannot be too strong. For it is the natural tendency of governments, and I will add, it is the natural tendency of every adminis∣tration, and of every executive, to encrease the rate of ex∣penditure beyond the necessary demands, and the real abi∣lities of the nation. It is here, indeed, that we may appeal to the history of other countries: it is here that it will af∣ford us instructive lessons, applicable to all times, and to every form of government.

Wherever the executive have acquired an uncontrouled command over the purse of the people, prodigality, wars, excessive taxes, and ever progressing debts, have unavoida∣bly ensued. Not to speak of Spain and Holland, weakened by those causes; not to speak of France, whose example is still more awful, the fate of England is sufficient to warn us against the dangers of that system. In vain did the insular situation of that nation preserve it from foreign invasions; in vain did she alone, amongst the great powers of Eu∣rope, enjoy the advantages of laws which protected pro∣perty and encouraged industry; in vain did her agricul∣ture arrive to a superior degree of perfection; in vain did she obtain the commerce of the world; in vain were the treasures of India poured in her bosom; in vain did the in∣dustry

of her inhabitants, and the incalculable effects of machinery, raise her manufactures to their unrivalled pre∣sent state; in vain did she enjoy a century of uninterrupted and unparalleled prosperity. The folly and extravagance of government have kept pace with all the efforts of indus∣try, with every improvement of the individuals. The whole surplus of the labour of the industrious part of the com∣munity, has been destroyed by expensive wars; or, if any part escaped annihilation, it was what was plundered by the direct or indirect agents of government—it was applied to the accumulation of wealth in the few unproductive con∣sumers. And now she stands on the brink of ruin, overbur∣thened by a debt of four hundred and fifty millions ster∣ling, and by taxes amounting to twenty-five millions ster∣ling a year, and yet insufficient to support her peace-estab∣lishment. * 1.1

Can we hope for a greater prosperity—for a more fortu∣nate concurrence of circumstances? Have we any security that we shall be preserved from those evils? And yet, this is the system which flows from the doctrine which would wrest from the legislature their exclusive controul over the expenditure of money; that would vest in the executive, in certain specific but widely extended cases, the power of raising and applying money. It is the system which seeks for support in the influence of patronage, by increasing the number of offices, and avowing a determination to distri∣bute them exclusively as rewards amongst men of a certain description. It is the system which entangles us in new po∣litical connections, raises standing armies, builds navies, squanders the public money, swells the public debt, and multiplies the burthens of the people.

Shall we be told that the frequent elections of the execu∣tive are a sufficient safeguard against every danger? Doubt∣less they will, provided we are not altogether lost to our∣selves. They afford us that remedy to which hereditary go∣vernments cannot resort. But should we, on that account, suppose that we are not open to danger? No one can set a higher value on the benefits resulting from an elective go∣vernment than myself. But let us never forget, that the forms of a constitution afford us security, only as they pre∣serve us from abuses, and that they will become useless,

whenever they shall be applied to cover, protect and defend abuses.

May we not be alarmed, when we hear the gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Bayard) in accents of regret, telling us that our executive is the most weak, the infirm branch of government, and that danger is to be apprehended from its weakness; contrasting the scanty provision and insigni∣ficant patronage of our executive, with the immense army, the incalculable navy, the church patronage, the nobility-creating power and the civil list of the monarch of Great-Britain? And concluding, by delivering an opinion, that, notwithstanding all those sources of corrupting influence, the house of commons, were the venal boroughs abolished, would lop off every prerogative of the crown, till, though the features of monarchy might remain, the substance would be gone.

A government which loses the substance, however it may retain the features of monarchy, is in substance a re∣public; and the last idea of that gentleman is only, that a pure representation and monarchy are incompatible. But in his opinion, provided an equal representation is establish∣ed, monarchy is destroyed, and a substantial republic may exist, notwithstanding an accumulation of power and in∣fluence equal to those possessed at present by the king of England. And, when this follows his declaration of the dangers, to be feared from the weakness and infirmity of our executive, are we not irresistibly forced to infer, that he thinks, that the introduction of armies, navies, patro∣nage and civil list are necessary to strengthen our executive, and would not injure the principle of our constitution?

To such doctrines avowed on this floor, to such systems as the plan of government, which the late secretary or the treasury (Mr. Hamilton) had proposed in the convention, may perhaps be ascribed that belief in a part of the com∣munity, the belief, which was yesterday represented as highly criminal, that there exists in America a monarchico, aristocratic faction, who would wish to impose upon us the substance of the British government.

I have allowed myself to make this last observation, only in reply to the gentleman who read the paper I allude to. It is painful to recriminate: I wish denunciations to be avoi∣ded,

and I am not in the habit of ascribing improper mo∣tives to gentlemen on the other side of the question. Ne∣ver shall I erect myself into a high priest of the constitution, assuming the keys of political salvation, and damning without mercy whomsoever differs with me in opinion. But what tone is assumed, in respect to us, by some gentlemen on this floor?

If we complain of the prodigality of a branch of the ad∣ministration, or wish to controul it, by refusing to appropri∣ate all the money which is asked, we are stigmatised as dis∣organizers; if we oppose the growth of systems of taxa∣tion, we are charged with a design of subverting the consti∣tution, and of making a revolution; if we attempt to check the extension of our political connections with European nations we are branded with the epithet of jacobins. Re∣volutions and jacobinism do not flow from that line of po∣licy we wish to see adopted. They belong, they exclusively belong, to the system we resist: they are its last stage;— the last page in the book of the history of governments un∣der its influence. It is after centuries of extravagance, vice and oppression, that the people make revolutions; and it is then, it is during the general convulsion that ensues, that the dregs of the nation rise to the surface, and overwhelm in a common ruin both the oppressors and the deliverers of the people.

Are gentlemen serious in their fears? Do they, from us, apprehend revolutions, plunder and massacre? Have we not an equal stake with themselves? I speak not of myself; but I will ask what benefit could those men, who are com∣monly called jacobins, derive from a convulsion? Have they less property? Have they less to lose or more to hope from a change? If you think us deprived of common integrity, you might, at least, allow us some share of common sense. But if no confidence is to be placed in ourselves, some might be put in the people of America and in their situa∣tion. In a country, where a scattered population covers an extensive territory, where the means of subsistence are ea∣sy, where the dangerous class, which constitutes an Euro∣pean mob, does not exist, where actual oppression is yet unknown; the people who enjoy those advantages, who enjoy a better government and more happiness than any

other nation of the globe, are not the people ready for a revolution. Nor should it be forgotten, that those parts of the union, that are commonly charged with a design of oversetting the constitution, are those, which, on account of their peculiar situation, on account of the unhappy race of men they contain, would be exposed to the most dan∣gerous convulsion by an internal revolution.

But the evils we wish to prevent, are precisely those which attach to a nation in our situation; they are such as are easily engrafted in the body-politic in its infancy; not calculated in their origin to create much alarm, and sup∣ported by a powerful number of men who derive an imme∣diate benefit from them, and to whom they are the means of acquiring wealth and power.

Still, in the same style of denunciation, by whom, it is triumphantly asked, "by whom are those charges made? By men who have rendered services to their country? A Hampden or a Sidney alone have a right to assume the lan∣guage of opposition." Was I to answer in the name of those gentlemen, with whom I generally agree in political prin∣ciples, a recapitulation of their services would easily repel this attack. Was I to answer as an individual, I would say that I can claim no right of that kind: I derive none from birth, none from personal merit, none from personal ser∣vices. But as a representative of the people, I feel it a right, and not less a duty than a right, to resist, upon every occasi∣on, those systems, which, if adopted, must, in my opinion, prove fatal to America. Should I ever, from any personal considerations, think myself unauthorized to exercise that right, I would tell my constituents,—Resume your trust; send, as your representative, a man, who, to the same zeal and to the same principles, may unite those qualifications, which I want, and which will enable him to fulfil his trust. And, notwithstanding the partiality they have, heretofore, evinced in my favour, they would find no difficulty in supplying my place.

But, by what strange fatality did the gentleman from Connecticut (M. GOODRICH) mention Hampden and Sid∣ney? Surely, his evil genius must have suggested the names; for, in the long list of English patriots, no two could be more applicable to the present discussion.

Whenever we hear of Hampden, we must recollect that event in his life, which has immortalized his name. The doctrine of the crown, in the case of ship-money—the doc∣trine, against which Hampden made his noble stand, was, that the king being, by his constitutional authority, entrus∣ted with the defence of the country, was the sole judge of the danger, and of the necessity of the measures proper to be adopted; that he must possess the means necessary to carry into effect his constitutional powers; that he had a right to fix the sum of money necessary for that purpose; and that he might, by a tax, raise that money from the people. It is true that it is not attempted here to claim this lost power for the executive. Hampden's trial has settled this point. But, in all its other parts, the doctrine of ship-money, and the modern doctrine supported on this occasion, are the same— the object the same—the arguments on which they are grounded the same. It is still the power of raising and ap∣plying money, claimed by, or for the executive, in certain cases, with the only difference, that Charles the first exer∣cised it by levying a tax without the consent of parliament, and that here, it is to be carried into effect, by depriving the legislature of the right of with holding their consent, through the means of amoral obligation imposed upon them.

Sidney has left in his writings a still more permanent monument of his talents, Permit me, since his name has been mentioned, to trouble the committee with quota∣tion from that work, written against the divine right of kings, which brought him to the block.

"Men are naturally propense to corruption; and if he, whose will and interest it is to corrupt them, be furnished with the means, he will never fail to do it. Power, honors, riches, and the pleasures that attend them, are the baits by which men are drawn to prefer a personal interest before the public good; and the number of those who covet them is so great, that he who abounds in them will be able to gain so many to his service as shall be able to subdue the rest. 'Tis hard to find a tyranny in the world that has not been introduced this way; for no man by his own strength could ever subdue a multitude; none could ever bring many to be subservient to his ill designs, but by the rewards they re∣ceived or hoped. By this means, Caesar accomplished his

work, and overthrew the liberty of his country, and with it, all that was then good in the world. They who were corrupted in their minds, desired to put all the power and riches into his hands, that he might distribute them to such as served him. ....

"They speak of employing the revenue in keeping the king's house, and look upon it as a propriety to be spent as he thinks convenient: which is no less than to cast it into a pit, of which no man ever knew the bottom. That which is given one day, is squandered away the next: The peo∣ple are always opprest with impositions, to foment the vices of the court: These daily increasing, they grow insatiable, and the miserable nations are compelled to hard labor, in order to satiate those lusts that tend to their own ruin....

"The base, slavish, and so often subdued Asia, by the ba∣sest of men revenged the defeats they had received from the bravest; and by infusing into them a delight in pomp and luxury, in a short time rendered the strongest and bra∣vest of nations the weakest and basest. I wish our own ex∣perience did not too plainly manifest, that these evils were never more prevalent than in our days, when the luxury, majestic pomp, and absolute power of a neighbouring king, must be supported by an abundance of riches, torn out of the bowels of his subjects, which renders them, in the best country in the world, and at a time when the crown most flourishes, the poorest and most miserable of all the nations under the sun. We too well know who are most apt to learn from them, and by what means and steps they endea∣vour to lead us into the like misery. But the bird is safe when the snare is discovered, and if we are not abandoned by God to destruction, we shall never be brought to con∣sent to the settling of that pomp, which is against the prac∣tice of all virtuous people, and has brought all the nations that have been taken with it into the ruin that is intended for us."

The gentleman of Connecticut (Mr. GOODRICH) actua∣ted by the purest motives, has invited us to state our griev∣ances, and to meet on some ground of reconciliation. To operate at once a reconciliation of parties, inflamed as they now are, is perhaps impracticable, but we may not be alto∣gether unsuccessful in establishing at present some princi∣ples,

which may hereafter produce that desirable object. Yet, ••ad I no other hearers but the gentleman of Maryland to my left (Mr. CRAIK) and the gentleman who spoke last from New-York (Mr. WILLIAMS) I would not make any observation on that point.

The first of those gentlemen going upon the ground of an organization of parties, avows an intention of opposing party by party.—He looks upon us as incorrigible—he de∣clares that his observations are not addressed to the house, but to his constituents, and I believe, it is the first time, that a gentleman told the house that he meant to use them only as a medium, through which to make an electioneer∣ing speech. When that gentleman made that declaration, I could not think him in earnest; and I waited with impa∣tience for arguments, or something that approached towards arguments; but half an hour of hearing convinced me of his sincerity, and of my mistake.—Whilst he remains blinded by such rooted prejudices, no observations of mine could, I am sure, produce any effect upon him.

The gentleman from New-York, in the extraordinary history of parties he gave us, seems to have described the fluctuations of his own mind, rather than those of other men, and he appears to have laid a claim to a knowledge of the motives of all parties, because he had, by turns, been acquainted with all. A great portion of his speech was em∣ployed in proving the unconstitutionality of refusing an ap∣propriation, for the purpose of carrying into a effect the powers of the president, or an existing law. The first at∣tempt of the kind which I witnessed, was, that made, two years ago, to withhold the appropriations for the support of the mint established by law. That gentleman cannot have forgotten who made the motion for that purpose, and by whom it was most strenuously supported? I need not address that gentleman on the subject of a reconcilia∣tion of parties: he may safely be trusted on that point to himself: his own good sense and the next vibration will, doubtless, bring him back to support our principles.

Whatever difference of sentiment may exist between us on a variety of topics, there is a ground on which we must certainly meet—on which, throughout the United States, there can be—there is, but one opinion. The importance,

the necessity of preserving the union, are too universally ac∣knowledged to require any comments at this time. The constitution, which binds us together, cannot, in my opinion, be made an instrument to sow divisions of a fatal nature. If it met with strong opposition, when it first made its appearance, the objections have long been buried in ob∣livion; and it is a fact, that they have never since been made the instrument of opposition. Nor do I apprehend any real danger from the geographical situation of the different states: the natural bonds of union, which result from their mutual wants, and from their relative situation, will fore∣ver counteract the effect of the slight diversity of interests, which may exist.

Without recurring to any abstract discussion, has not experience taught us, that the two important subjects of division have heretofore been, money systems and foreign politics? May we not, with truth, ascribe to those two cau∣ses, the party spirit which now rages in America? Is there any real danger to be apprehended from any other quarter? And if we are satisfied that the systems of debt and taxa∣tion, which have been so obnoxious to us, shall be per∣mitted to subsist without any attempt on our part to disturb them; if we are satisfied, that our subsisting compacts with foreign nations, however dangerous some of them may have appeared to us, shall remain inviolate; will the gentlemen, with whom it is our misfortune to differ, agree, that those money-systems, those foreign connections, shall not be extended beyond their present state? We ask not for the redress of past grievances, but, with the late Pre∣sident, we exclaim, "Here let us stop."

May we not hope that a fixed determination to prevent the increase of the national expenditure, and, so far as our present engagements will permit, to detach ourselves from any connection with European politics, will tend to recon∣cile parties, and that our united efforts may then prove not altogether unsuccessful in promoting the happiness of Ame∣rica, and conciliating the affections of every part of the Union?

Note on page [28.]

THE funding system of Great-Britain, like that of the United States, originated during the war which resulted from their revolution (that of 1688) and established their liberty.

In 1701, at the conclusion of the reign of William III. after the end of the revolutionary war of Great-Britain, and before they had been involved in any new contests, the debt of that country amounted to 16,394,702 l. ster∣ling, * 1.2 equal to dollars, 72,865,342. At that time the re∣venue of that nation was 3,895,205 l. † 1.3 equal to dollars, 17,312,022.

On the first of January, 1796, the debt of the United States (after deducting the stock of the bank held by the United States, and the sums redeemed by the sinking fund) amounted to dollars, 79,811,187 ‡ 1.4 and the revenue for the year ending on the 30th September, 1796, amounted to— dollars, 6,665,685. § 1.5

Thus, the apprehension of a fate similar to that of Great-Britain cannot be looked upon as unfounded, when we find that our debt at the end of our own revolutionary war, of the war which gave the first birth to that debt, exceeds by seven millions of dollars, that contracted by England during the war which also created their debt; at the same time, that the population and resources of that country, at that time, were more than double, and their revenue almost treble of our own. The present situation of Great-Britain is as follows:

Total amount of the debt contracted before 1788,	£.255,789,287
Funded and unfunded debt, contract∣ed during the present war,	177,778,225
	433,567,512
Deduct Stock purchased by Com∣sinking fund	23,334,200
Due in 1797,	410,233,312 ¶ 1.6

And if to that sum be added the Imperial loan, and the enormous expenses attending the latter part of 1797, and the beginning of 1798, estimating the same in proportion to the expenses of the war establishment for 1796 (viz. 32,837,994 l. of which 14,952,776 l. were expended with; and 17,885,218 l.without the previous consent of Parlia∣ment) the sum of 450 millions sterling, cannot much ex∣ceed the present amount of the public debt.

The amount of annual taxes is as follows:

Nett amount of land tax,	£ 1,950,000
Malt ditto,	600,000
Customs,	4,000,000
Excise,	6,800,000
Stamps,	1,300,000
Miscellaneous,	1,800,000
	16,450,000* 1.7
Nett produce of taxes imposed in 1793,94,95,	2,400,000 † 1.8
Ditto of ditto in 1796 and 1797,	3,700,000†
Nett revenue in 1797,	22,550,000
Expences of collection of all taxes laid be∣fore the present war, bounties, &c.	2,350,000 ‡ 1.9
Total of taxes, exclusively of charges of col∣lection on new taxes,	24,850,000

Those taxes, which, therefore, exceed twenty-five mil∣lion sterling, fall short of the expense of the peace-establish∣ment by a sum of 2,200,000 l. sterling.

For the permanent expenses are,

Interest and charges on funded debt,	£ 15,500,000
Ditto on unfunded debt,	2,700,000
Peace establishment, navy and army	5,650,000
Civil list,	900,000
	24,750,000 †
From which deducting the nett revenue,	22,550,000
Leaves a deficiency of	2,200,000 sterling:

Which last sum, added to the 1,200,000 l. annually appro∣priated for the sinking fund, makes an annual deficiency of near three millions and a half sterling. The addition∣al tripled assessed taxes, estimated at seven millions sterling, are not included in the above account.

We need not be astonished at that immense increase of debts and taxes, when we find that since the revolution of 1688 to 1797, the war expences of Great-Britain have ex∣ceeded 614 millions and a half, sterling, viz. for the navy 244,380,685l. before,† 1.10 and 44,926,955 l. during the pre∣sent war, * 1.11 in all 289,307,640 l. and for the army and ord∣nance 270,272,512 l. before, † and 55,001,765 l. during the present war, * in all, 325,279,277 l. And to these sums should be added, 500 millions sterling, paid during the same period, for interest, charges and principal of the debt (viz. 390 millions before, † and 110 millions since the year 1788 *) making the enormous aggregate of 1100 millions sterling consumed in the wars of about a century.

Notes

• * 1.1

  See Note at the end.
• * 1.2

  Sinclair's Hist of public revenue, part 2d, chap. 4th.
• † 1.3

  Ditto, part 3d, chap. 1st.
• ‡ 1.4

  Report of the secretary of the treasury, dated 28th Dec. 1796.
• § 1.5

  Ditto, including a statement of receipts and expenditures, dated 15th Dec. 1796.
• ¶ 1.6

  Morgan on finances, 1797, sect. 5th.
• * 1.7

  Sinclair's 3d part, chapters 3d and 5th.
• † 1.8

  Morgan on finances, 1797. Sect. 5th.
• ‡ 1.9

  Sin••lai••'s 8d par••, chap. 5th.
• † 1.10

  Sinclair's 3d part, chap. 2d.
• * 1.11

  Morgan sect. 5th.