The nature, and danger, of infidel philosophy, exhibited in two discourses, addressed to the candidates for the Baccalaureate, in Yale College, / by the Rev. Timothy Dwight, D.D. president of Yale College; September 9th, 1797.

THE NATURE AND DANGER OF INFIDEL PHILOSOPHY.

COLOSSIANS ii. 8.

BEWARE, LEST ANY MAN SPOIL YOU THROUGH PHILOSOPHY AND VAIN DECEIT, AFTER THE TRADITION OF MEN, AFTER THE RUDIMENTS OF THE WORLD, AND NOT AFTER CHRIST.

WHEN the Gospel was published by the Apos|tles, it was, according to the prophetic decla|ration of its Author, vigorously opposed by the world. This opposition originated from various sources; but, whencesoever derived, wore one uniform cha|racter of industry, art, and bitterness. The bigotry of the Jews, and the sword of the Gentiles, the learn|ing of the wise, the persuasion of the eloquent, and the force of the powerful, were alike exerted to crush the rising enemy.

AMONG the kinds of opposition, which they were called to encounter, not the least laborious, malig|nant, or dangerous, was the Philosophy of the age. A large number of their first converts lived in coun|tries, where the language of the Greeks was spoken, and their Philosophy received. The things, which this Philosophy professed to teach, were substantially the same with those which were taught by the Apos|tles;

viz. the Character and Will of God, and the Duty and Supreme Interest of Men. Hence it na|turally became an object of veneration, assumed the station of a rival to the Gospel, and exhibited an im|posing aspect, especially to young and unsettled con|verts.

THE doctrines, and the spirit, of the Philosophers were, however, generally direct counterparts to those of the Apostles. Some truths, and truths of high importance, they undoubtedly taught; but they blended them with gross and numberless errors. Some moral and commendable practices they, at times, inculcated; but so interwoven with immoral|ities, that the parts of the web could never be sepa|rated by the common hand. Covetous, self-suffici|ent, and sensual, they looked down with supreme contempt on the poor, self-denying, and humble fol|lowers of Christ, and on their artless, direct, undis|guised, and practical preaching. Notwithstanding this contempt, it, however, prevailed against all their specious logic, pompous eloquence, and arrogant pretensions. Their Philosophy, enveloped in sable and figures, perplexed with sophistry, and wandering with perpetual excursion round about moral subjects, satisfied, in no permanent degree the understanding, and affected in no useful degree the heart: while the Gospel simple, plain, and powerful, gained the full assent of common sense, and reduced all the affec|tions under its controul. Of course, the contempt of Philosophers was changed into hatred, rivalry, and persecution; and their ridicule of Christianity was succeeded by the serious efforts of violence and ma|lignity.

St. PAUL, who appears thoroughly to have com|prehended the nature, and often to have experienc|ed the effects, of the existing Philosophy, has with

great force exposed its dangerous tendency. In the beginning of his first Epistle to the Corinthians, he has given an ample account of its inefficiency and emptiness, and a full refutation of its insolent pre|tensions to be a rule of life and salvation. The ar|guments of its weakness and mischievous tendency, furnished, in various passages of Scripture by him and his companions, remain still unrefuted; and, as they were at first, so they are at this day, effectual means of preserving no small part of mankind from the destruction, of which it is the natural and certain parent.

IN the text, this Philosophy is characterized in a most proper and forcible manner. It is termed Phi|losophy and vain deceit; a Hebraism, of the same import with vain and deceitful Philosophy; deceit|ful in its nature, doctrines, and arguments, and vain in its efficacy to accomplish the ends, which it pro|poses. It is asserted to be after the tradition of men, and after the rudiments of the world; but not after Christ; in whom, the Apostle subjoins, dwelt all the fulness of the Godhead bodily: i. e. It is such a scheme of morals and religion, as is suited to the character of the Inventors; Men, weak and wicked, deceived and deceitful; unable to devise, to comprehend, or to teach, the character of God, or the duty of man|kind. It is such a scheme of morals and religion, as accords with the principles and practices of the dis|ciples, to whom it is taught; formed not with a de|sign to amend the heart, and reform the life; but with a view to gain acceptance by flattering lust, and by justifying, soothing, and quieting guilt. The tra|dition of men, and the rudiments of the world, are phrases, which may be variously interpreted, but they admit, I apprehend, of no interpretation, which will not support the paraphrase here given.

To this Philosophy, and the teachers of it, the Apostle directs his followers to beware lest they should become a prey. The Greek word here used, denotes gathering and carrying finally off the spoils of a van|quished enemy; and therefore strongly expresses the complete ruin, to which St. Paul considered his converts as exposed.

THE Philosophy, which has opposed Christianity in every succeeding age, has uniformly worne the same character with that, described in the text. It has rest|ed on the same foundations, proceeded from the same disposition, aimed at the same ends, and pursued them by the same means. Equally remote has it been from truth, equally unsupported by evidence, and equally fraught with danger and ruin.

SATISFIED of the justice of these assertions, I feel it, Young Gentlemen, to be my duty, on this occa|sion, to exhort you

To beware, lest you become a prey to the Philosophy, which opposes the Gospel.

To impress on your minds the propriety, and the importance, of this exhortation, I shall endeavour, in the

First place, To prove to you, that this Philoso|phy is vain and deceitful;

Secondly, To shew you, that you are in danger of becoming a prey to it; and

Thirdly, To dissuade you by several arguments from thus yielding yourselves a prey.

First. I shall endeavour to prove to you, that this Philosophy is vain and deceitful.

YOU will observe, that it is a particular kind of Philosophy, against which all my arguments are di|rected. Philosophy at large, or the Use and the Attainments of our Reason, in the candid and care|ful examination of every question, within the limits of our understanding, so far as it springs from a real desire of investigating truth, and proceeds on satisfac|tory evidence, is not only undeserving of censure, but deserving of the highest praise. It is the inter|est, and the duty, of all men, so far as their condition will allow; and, as you well know, has by me, in the office of an Instructor, been earnestly and un|conditionally urged on you, as peculiarly your in|terest and duty. That Philosophy only, which is opposed to Christianity, is the subject of the follow|ing observations. There is indeed much other Phi|losophy, which busies itself with government, medi|cine, and various other subjects, which is equally vain and deceitful; but with this I have, at present, no concern.

THE great object, professedly aimed at by the Phi|losophy in question, and on the attainment of which all its value depends, is to determine what is the Du|ty, and the supreme Interest, of man. This it is plain, must depend entirely on the Will of God. To do whatever God chooses must be man's supreme inter|est, and duty alike. It is his duty, both because God wills it, and because it is right. As his whole well-being depends on God only, his supreme inter|est must consist entirely in pleasing God. He can receive no good, when God will not give it, and God will not give, unless he be pleased. In order, therefore, to the discovery of man's supreme interest and duty, it is absolutely necessary to discover, first, what is the preceptive will of God, or what God re|quires man to do.

THIS, Philosophy can never accomplish; and hence I assert it to be vain and deceitful in its Na|ture; vain with respect to the end, at which it aims, and deceitful with respect to the means, which it em|ploys, and the conclusions, which it labours to estab|lish.

THERE are three methods, in which, it has been supposed, mankind may obtain the knowledge of the Preceptive Will of God, and, of course, of their own interest and duty.

I. BY Immediate Revelation;

II. BY Arguing analogically from his Providen|tial dispensations;

III. BY arguing from a supposed Character of God, either derived from his works, or determined a priori.

THE first of these methods lies out of the present question. The two remaining ones I propose now to examine; and assert

I. THAT Analogical Argumentation from the Providence of God can never teach us his Preceptive Will, except in a manner greatly imperfect and un|satisfactory.

IN Philosophy, thus directed, we always argue from what God has done to what he will do: i. e. from the past and present state of his Providence we un|dertake to determine what his designs are, and how they will terminate; and hence derive our conclu|sions concerning the Will of God, or that Law, by which our conduct ought to be regulated. This me|thod of Philosophizing is attended with insuperable difficulties.

IN the 1st. place, we know but a very small num|ber of the beings and events, which have existed; but, to form just views of the real scope of Provi|dence, we ought to know every being and every event. To understand the true character of a com|plicated machine, we must understand the nature, and the operations, of every part. He who knows but one in a thousand of such parts, and has seen the operations of that one part only, would be thought wholly destitute of common sense, were he to boast of a thorough knowledge of the whole. The great machine of Providence is infinitely more com|plex, the proportion of the parts unknown to those which are known is infinitely greater, and the ap|proximation to the knowledge of the whole infinite|ly less, than in the machine supposed. What then must be the character of him, who boasts of a tho|rough knowledge of Providence?

2. WE know not thoroughly the nature of those beings and events, with which we are best acquaint|ed. The nature of every being, and of every event, so far as the present question is concerned, depends chiefly, or perhaps with more propriety wholly, on its connections with others? What are the uses of this being, or this event? What are the purposes, which it is designed to accomplish? are the ques|tions, which are ever intended to be solved, in our enquiries of this nature. But these questions Phi|losophy can never satisfactorily solve. The immedi|ate uses and purposes are, indeed, frequently obvi|ous; but those, which lie at a very little distance, are, for the most part, unknown. Bread, we know, will nourish man; and safely determine, that bread was formed for this end; But why man exists at all, why he thus exists, and why he is thus to be nourish|ed, we know not. That, which we know, avails not, therefore, to the purpose in view.

ALL intermediate and subordinate ends in Crea|tion and Providence are capable of being under|stood only by the knowledge of the ultimate end: i. e. the purpose, in which all earthly things terminate. To this end all things directly tend; with it all are indissolubly connected; and for it all are designed, and brought into being. But this end is wholly un|known. If it exist on this side of the grave, it has never been conjectured. If it exists beyond the grave it can only be conjectured; for we can only conjecture whether man will exist beyond the grave. The ultimate end of all earthly things being, there|fore, wholly unknown, the true nature of all prece|ding subordinate ends is also unknown, and of course the real scope of Providence.

IN such a state of things Analogies must plainly be of little use. The arguments, which they actual|ly furnish, are all direct corroboratives of the Scrip|tural system of Theology, and Morality. Without the Scriptures, they are a labyrinth without a clue. No higher proof need be given of this, than the dis|cordant and contradictory explanations of them, adopted by Philosophers; no two of whom, either ancient or modern, agree in their constructions of Providence.

HOW ridiculous an employment would it be thought in a Clown, should he undertake to interpret the designs of a Statesman, in the management of a great empire; to determine from what he had done what he would hereafter do; and to decide on his own duty, and that of his fellow subjects, from a construction of the analogies, which he supposed himself to observe in the conduct of the Ruler? Yet the Clown is infinitely nearer to the Statesman, in understanding, than the Philosopher to the Supreme Ruler; and infinitely more able to comprehend the analogies, visible in the government of an empire,

than the Philosopher those, which appear in the government of the Universe.

3. THE Character of God cannot be perfectly known from Creation and Providence.

OF the truth of this assertion I am entirely con|vinced; yet I shall decline attempting a discussion of it, at this time; because the occasion will not al|low me to enter into so wide a field; and because you have, not long since, heard my opinions and arguments at large, in discourses professedly formed on this subject. Such a discussion, it ought further to be observed, is wholly unnecessary for the present purpose; as Philosophers have totally disagreed con|cerning that Character of God, which is supposed to be visible in his works; and as the prevailing Philo|sophy wholly denies the existence of such a Being.

THE only possible means of discovering the Will, or Law, of God which can be furnished by his works, are either his Designs, or his Character. I flatter myself, that it has been proved, that his designs can never be learned from his works. If his character be also undiscoverable from this source, the conclusion is certain, that his Law must also undiscoverable. If his Character can be learned imperfectly only, his Law must, at the utmost, be known in a degree equally imperfect. If his character be uncertain, his law must be at least equally uncertain: and that his character is uncertain, so far as his works disclose it, and Philosophy has discovered it, cannot be de|nied by any one, acquainted at all with the discor|dant opinions of Philosophers. Of course, the con|clusion must be admitted, that to Philosophy the Law of God, and the Duty, and supreme Interest, of man, must, so far as this method of investigation is relied on, be undiscoverable. Thus Man, as a subject of the divine government, can not, by Phi|losophy,

ever thoroughly know, from this source of proof, what is that conduct, which he is bound to ob|serve, in order to please God, and obtain his favour.

THE view of this subject, here given, does, howe|ver, by no means exhibit the greatest difficulty, un|der which Philosophy labours. Man is not only a subject of the divine government, and, therefore, in the highest degree concerned to know the divine Law, that he may obey it; but he is also a rebel subject, and, therefore, in the highest degree con|cerned to discover the means of restoration to the favour of God. Man has violated such precepts of the divine Law, as, either by Revelation, or Com|mon sense, are discovered and acknowledged: such precepts, for instance, as require him to be thankful to his Maker, and sincere, just, and kind, to his fel|low men. These things may be considered, here, as certainly known to be parts of the Law of God; because those Philosophers, who acknowledge a God, generally agree, that these are plainly duties of man. But all men have violated the precepts, which re|quire these things. The first interest of all men is, therefore, to obtain a knowledge of the means, if there be any, of reconciliation to God, and reinstatement in the character and privileges of faithful subjects. To be thus reconciled, and reinstated, men must be pardoned; and pardon is an act of mere Mercy. But of the Mercy of God there are no proofs in his providence. Could we then discover the Law of God, by examining his works, the knowledge of it would avail nothing to our future well being. That we are sinners cannot be disputed; and, so far as Philosophy can discover, sinners must be condemned, and punished.

II. Arguments, drawn from a supposed character of God whether derived from his works, or deter|mined a priori, labour under difficulties equally great.

1. It is impossible to determine the character of God by arguments a priori.

THE celebrated Doctor Clarke has indeed at|tempted thus to prove the divine character; and his attempt is a specimen of very respectable talents, and of the most laudable designs. Yet I cannot but think it has failed. The very words, necessary and necessity. which are so important to his scheme, are not, I apprehend, used by him with any clear, pre|cise meaning. Perhaps I ought rather to say, that I cannot perceive any such meaning, in his manner of using them. From his illustrations I should believe, that he means nothing more by necessary existence, than existence merely. He does not appear to me to have proved even the Unity of God; and unless this can be evinced, I am doubtful whether it will be possible to prove the perfect character of the God|head. As his is the only respectable effort of this kind, which I have seen, it is unnecessary for me to take notice of any other.

2. SHOULD the character of God be supposed completely ascertained from what he has done, or fully determined a priori; still insurmountable difficulties would attend every attempt to gain, from this source, the object aimed at by Philosophy.

THE only character of God which can be here ad|mitted is that of Infinite Perfection. The designs of a Being infinitely perfect, must be formed to ex|tend through eternity and immensity; and must em|brace all beings and all events, together with all their relations and operations. That therefore, which, by itself, would be a wholly improper part of Crea|tion, or Providence, might, from its relation to the whole great work, be entirely proper. In the sight of him, who perfectly knows all things, that may be beautiful, excellent, and necessary, as a part of the

system, which to every one, who knows a part, and a very small part only, of the whole number of things, would appear deformed and useless. How many measures in Government, how many even in the private affairs of an individual, appear to us to be necessary and useful, when we are thoroughly in|formed of their necessity and use; which, when we are uninformed, appear to be unnecessary and inju|rious? How much more must this fact exist in the system of the universe? He, who sees all things per|fectly, must decide concerning all, according to their whole influence and tendency; we, according to their insulated character, or their immediate conse|quences.

THESE observations are abundantly supported by the real state of Creation and Providence. The ex|istence of Moral and Natural evil; the death of hall mankind under the age of five years; the useless|ness, to the human eye, of most animals and vegeta|bles; the redundance of water on the globe; and the frozen, burnt, or otherwise barren, state of the land; are all things wholly proper in the Creation and Providence of God, because they exist; and his Agency in their existence, in whatever degree ex|erted, is wholly worthy of his character. Yet, so far as we are able to judge, few things could be more improper parts of a work, formed by Infinite Per|fection.

THUS in its Nature must this Philosophy be vain and deceitful. I shall now attempt to shew, that, in fact, it has, from the beginning, been of this un|happy character. This will appear in the

I. Place in the discordance and contradictoriness of its doctrines.

ACCORDING to Themistius, there were more than three hundred sects of the western Philosophers, dif|fering greatly, on subjects of high importance. Ac|cording to Varro, there were two hundred and eigh|ty eight different opinions, entertained by them, concerning the summum bonum, or chief good; and three hundred opinions concerning God; or, as Varro himself declares, three hundred Jupiters, or supreme deities. Critias, Theodotus, Diagoras, the Pyrrhonists, New Academics, and Epicureans, were generally either Sceptics, or Atheists.

Aristotle denied the Creation of the Universe, and the Providence of God, so far as this world is con|cerned.

The Stoics, and various others, taught, that God was fire.

Parmenides held, that God was partly fire, and partly water.

Xenophanes, that Matter, generally considered, was God.

Others held, that God was the Anima mundi, the Soul of the world.

Socrates and Plato taught the existence of one God, and taught, and practised, the worship of the numerous Gods of their country.

Cicero and Plutarch held, that there were two su|preme Gods, one good, the other evil.

THESE instances are sufficient to shew how the greatest and most accurate Philosophers of Antiqui|ty thought concerning this most important subject; and to prove, that not the least reliance can be safe|ly placed in our religious concerns, on the conclu|sions of Philosophy.

THIS variety and discordance of doctrines, among Philosophers, exceedingly perplexed and distressed, in many instances, the Philosophers themselves;

while it wholly destroyed their authority, as instruc|tors, among the people at large.

Plato, in his Epinomis, says, under a strong con|viction, as it would seem, of the imperfection of his own Philosophy, "Let no man presume to teach, if God do not lead the way."

CICERO, de nat. deor. makes Cotta find fault with those, who labour to prove the existence of the Gods, by arguments; declaring, that they thus make the doctrine doubtful; whereas the traditions of their ancestors had rendered it certain.

PLUTARCH declares, that no argument, respect|ing religious belief, is more to be depended on, than the tradition of ancestors.

PLATO declares, that there are, by nature, no such things, as just things; since men always differ about them, and contrive, continually, new standards of right and wrong; and that therefore, there can be no law, unless God should give it to us.

PORPHYRY confesses his conviction, that some universal method of delivering men's souls was need|ed, which no sect of Philosophers had yet found out.

MODERN Philosophers, notwithstanding they have enjoyed the light of Revelation, and have derived from the Scriptures all their defensible moral tenets, are yet, when they leave the doctrines of Revelation, very little better united.

LORD HERBERT of Cherbury, the first consi|derable English, Deistical Philosopher, and clearly one of the greatest and best, declares the following things: viz.

That Christianity is the best religion:

That his own Universal Religion of Nature agrees wholly with Christianity, and contributes to its esta|blishment:

That all Revealed Religion (viz. Christianity) is absolutely uncertain, and of little or no use:

That Men are not hastily, or on small grounds, to be condemned, who are led to sin by bodily consti|tution:

That the indulgence of lust, and of anger, is no more to be blamed, than the thirst, occasioned by the Dropsy; or the sleepiness, produced by the Le|thargy.

That it is our duty to worship God by prayer and praise, by repentance and holiness, by reformation of heart and of life; and that this is indispensably necessary to our acceptance with God:

That the soul is immortal; that there will be a fu|ture, retribution, which will be according to the works, and thoughts, of mankind; and that he, who denies these truths, is scarcely to be accounted a reasonable creature:

That his own Universal Religion is, and ever has been, clearly known to all men:

That to the Gentiles (i. e. to almost all men) it was principally unknown:

And, notwithstanding the declarations, already mentioned, in favour of Christianity, he accuses all pretences to Revelation of folly and unreasonable|ness, and rejects with contempt its capital doctrines.

MR. HOBBES declares,

That the Scriptures are the Voice of God; and yet

That they are of no authority, except as enjoined by the Civil Magistrate:

That inspiration is a supernatural gift, and the immediate hand of God; and yet

That it is madness:

That the Scriptures are the foundation of all ob|ligation; and yet

That they are of no obligatory force, except as en|joined by the Civil Magistrate:

That a subject may believe Christ in his heart; and yet

May lawfully deny him before the Magistrate:

That God exists; and yet

That that, which is not Matter, is nothing:

That worship, prayers, and praise, are due to God: and yet

That all religion is ridiculous:

That the civil or municipal Law is the only foun|dation of right and wrong:

That, where there is no civil law, every, man's judgment is the only standard of right and wrong:

That the Ruler is not bound by any obligation of truth, or justice; and can do no wrong to his sub|jects:

That every man has a right to all things, and may lawfully get them, if he can:

That Man is a mere machine: and

That the Soul is material and mortal.

Mr. BLOUNT declares,

That there is one infinite and eternal God; and yet insinuates,

That there are two eternal, independent Beings:

That the one God is the Creator of all things; and yet insinuates,

That the world was not created, but eternal:

That God ought to be worshipped, with prayer and praise; yet,

He objects to prayer as a duty:

That Christianity is safer than Deism; and yet

That Revelation is not sufficiently supported, because men differ about it: (Of course, no moral doctrine is sufficiently supported; for men differ about every such doctrine.)

That the Soul is immortal, and will be rewarded hereafter, according to its works done here; and yet,

That the Soul is probably material, and of course mortal:

Still he says, that we ought to obey God in the practice of virtue;

And that we ought to repent, and trust in the mercy of God for pardon.

LORD SHAFTESBURY declares,

That the belief of future rewards and punish|ments is noxious to virtue, and takes away all motives to it;

That the hope of rewards, and the fear of pun|ishments, makes virtue mercenary;

That to be influenced by rewards is disingenu|ous and servile; and

That the hope of reward cannot consist with virtue; and yet,

That the hope of rewards is not derogatory to virtue, but a proof, that we love virtue;

That the hope of rewards, and the fear of pun|ishments, however mercenary it may be accounted, is, in many instances, a great advantage, security, and support, of virtue; and

That all obligation to be virtuous arises from the advantages (i. e. the rewards) of virtue, and from the disadvantages (i. e. the punishments) of vice:

That those are censurable, who represent the Gospel as a fraud (or imposition;)

That he hopes the discourses of Doctor Which|cot will reconcile the enemies of Christianity to it, and make Christians prize it more highly than be|fore; and

That he hopes Christians will be secured against the temper of the irreconcilable enemies of the faith of the Gospel; and yet

He represents salvation as a ridiculous thing and insinuates,

That Christ was influenced, and directed, by deep

designs of ambition, and cherished a savage zeal and persecuting spirit; and

That the Scriptures were a mere artful invention to secure a profitable monopoly (i. e. of sinister ad|vantages to the inventors:)

That Man is born to religion, piety, and adora|tion, as well as to honour and friendship;

That virtue is not compleat without piety; yet

He labours to make virtue wholly independent of piety:

That all the warrant for the authority of Religious symbols (i. e. the Institutions of Christianity) is the authority of the Magistrate:

That the Magistrate is the sole judge of Religious Truth, and of Revelation:

That miracles are ridiculous; and

That, if true, they would be no proof of the truth of Revelation:

That Ridicule is the test of truth; and yet

That Ridicule itself must be brought to the test of Reason:

That the Christian Religion ought to be received when established by the Magistrate; yet

He grossly ridicules it, where it was thus estab|lished:

That Religion and Virtue appear to be so nearly connected, that they are presumed to be inseparable companions; and yet

That Atheists often conduct so well, as to seem to force us to confess them virtuous:

That he, who denies a God, sets up an opinion against the very well-being of society; and yet

That Atheism has no direct natural tendency to take away a just sense of right and wrong:

That Atheism is greatly deficient in promoting virtue; and

That the natural tendency of it is to take away a just sense of right and wrong.

Mr. COLLINS, though chiefly a mere objector to Revelation, declares,

That Man is a mere machine:

That the Soul is material and mortal:

That Christ and his Apostles built on the predic|tions of fortune-tellers and divines;

That the Prophets were mere fortune-tellers and discoverers of lost goods;

That Christianity stands wholly on a false founda|tion; yet

He speaks respectfully of Christianity; and also of the Epicureans, whom he at the same time con|siders as Atheists.

Mr. WOOLSTON, also a mere objector, declares,

That he is the farthest of any man from being en|gaged in the cause of Infidelity;

That Infidelity has no place in his heart;

That he writes for the honour of Jesus, and in de|fence of Christianity; and

That his design in writing is to advance the Mes|siahship, and Truth, of the holy Jesus; "To whom," he says, "be glory for ever, amen." and yet,

That the Gospels are full of incredibilities, impos|sibilities, and absurdities;

That they resemble Gulliverian tales of persons and things, which out of romance never had a be|ing;

That the miracles, recorded in the Gospels, taken literally, will not abide the Test of Reason and Com|monsense; but must be rejected, and the authority of Jesus along with them;

At the same time, he casts the most scurrilous re|flections on Christ;

Dr. TINDAL declares,

That Christianity, stripped of the additions, which

mistake, policy, and circumstances, have made to it, is a most holy religion; and yet,

That the Scriptures are obscure, and fit only to perplex men, and that the two great parts of them are contradictory:

That all the Doctrine of Christianity plainly speak themselves to be the will of an infinitely wise and holy God; and yet,

That the Precepts of Christianity are loose, unde|termined, incapable of being understood by man|kind at large, give wrong and unworthy apprehen|sions of God, and are generally false and pernicious:

That Natural Religion is so plain to all, even the most ignorant, men, that God could not make it plainer; even if he were to convey, miraculously, the very same ideas to all men; and yet,

That almost all mankind have had very unworthy notions of God, and very wrong apprehensions of Natural Religion:

That the principles of Natural Religion are so clear, that men cannot possibly mistake them; and yet,

That almost all men have grossly mistaken them, and imbibed a superstition worse than Atheism.

That Natural Religion is unalterable; that noth|ing can be either added, or diminished; and that it is necessarily known to all men; and yet,

That the goodness, or wickedness, of all actions is wholly measured by their tendency; that this tendency is wholly to be judged of by every man, according to his circumstances; and that these cir|cumstances are continually changing:

That one rule is formed by God for every man, and yet,

That every Man must form a rule for himself.

Mr. CHUBB declares,

That he hopes to share with his friends in the fa|vour of God, in that peaceful and happy state, which

God hath prepared for the virtuous and faithful, in some other, future world; and yet,

That God does not interpose in the affairs of this world, at all, and has nothing to do with the good, or evil, done by men here:

That Prayer my be useful, as a positive Institution, by introducing proper thoughts, affections, and ac|tions; and yet he intimates,

That it must be displeasing to God, and directly improper:

That a state of rewards and punishments, hereaf|ter, is one of the truths, which are of the highest concern to men; and yet,

That the arguments for the immortality of the Soul are wholly unsatisfactory; and that the Soul is pro|bably matter:

That men are accountable to God for all their conduct, and will certainly be judged and dealt with, according to the truth and reality of their respective cases; and yet,

That men will not be judged for their impiety or ingratitude to God, nor for their injustice and un|kindness to each other; but only for voluntary in|juries to the public; and that even this is unnecessa|ry and useless:

That God may kindly reveal to the world, when greatly vitiated by error and ignorance, truths ne|cessary to be known, and precepts necessary to be obeyed; and yet,

That such a Revelation would be, of course, un|certain and useless;

That Christ's Mission is, at least in his view, pro|bably divine; and yet,

That Christ, in his opinion, was of no higher character, than the Founder of the Christian sect (i. e. another Sadoc, Cerinthus, or Herbert:)

That Christ was sent into the world, to acquaint mankind with the Revelation of the will of God; and yet,

That his birth and resurrection were ridiculous, and incredible; and that his institutions and pre|cepts were less excellent, than those of other teach|ers and lawgivers:

That the New Testament, Particularly the Wri|tings of the Apostles, contain excellent cautions and instructions for our right conduct; and

That the New-Testament yields much clearer light than any other traditionary Revelation; and yet,

That the New Testament has contributed to the perplexity and confusion of mankind, and exhibits doctrines heretical, dishonorary to God, and inju|rious to men; and

That the Apostles were impostors; and that the Gospels and Acts of the Apostles resemble Jewish, fables, and Popish legends, rather than accounts of facts:

That, as, on the Christian scheme, Christ will be the Judge of the quick and the dead, he has not on this account (i. e. admitting this to be true) any disa|greeable apprehensions on account of what he has written; and yet,

He ridicules the birth and resurrection of Christ, postpones his instructions to those of the Heathen Philosophers and Lawgivers, asserts his doctrines to be dishonorary to God and injurious to mankind, and allows him not to be sinless; but merely not a gross sinner.

He further declares,

That the Resurrection of Christ, if true, proves not the immortality of the Soul:

That the belief of a future state is of no advan|tage to society:

That all Religions are alike:

That it is of no consequence what Religion a man embraces:

AND he allows not any room for dependence on God's Providence, trust in him, and resignation to his will, as parts of duty, or religion.

Mr. HUME declares,

That there is no perceptible connection between cause and effect;

That the belief of such connection is merely a matter of custom;

That experience can shew us no such connec|tion;

That we cannot with any reason conclude, that, because an effect has taken place once, it will take place again;

That it is uncertain and useless to argue from the course of nature, and infer an Intelligent Cause;

That we cannot, from any analogy of nature, ar|gue the existence of an Intelligent Cause of all things;

That there is no reason to believe that the Uni|verse proceeded from a Cause;

That there are no solid arguments to prove the ex|istence of a God;

That experience can furnish no argument concern|ing matters of fact, is in this case useless, and can give rise to no inference; and

That there is no relation between cause and ef|fect; and yet,

That Experience is our only guide in matters of fact and the existence of objects;

That it is universally allowed, that nothing exists without a cause;

That every effect is so precisely determined, that no other effect could, in such circumstances, have possibly resulted from the operation of its cause;

That the relation of cause is absolutely neces|sary to the propagation of our species, and the regu|lation of our conduct;

That voluntary actions are necessary, and deter|mined

by a fixed connection between cause and ef|fect;

That motives are causes, operating necessarily on the will;

That Man is a mere machine (i. e. an object ope|rated on necessarily by external causes;)

That there is no contingency (i. e. nothing happen|ing without a settled cause) in the universe; and

That Matter and Motion may be regarded as the cause of thought (i. e. The Soul is a Material Cause, and thought its effect:)

That God discovers to us only faint traces of his character, and that it would be flattery, or presump|tion to ascribe to him any perfection, which is not discovered to the full in his works (and of course, that it would be flattery or presumption to ascribe any perfection to God:)

That it is unreasonable to believe God to be wise and good;

That what we believe to be a perfection in God may be a defect. (i. e. Holiness, Justice, Wisdom, Goodness, Mercy, and Truth, may be defects in God;) Of consequence, Injustice, Folly, Malice, and Falshood, may be excellencies in his character;

That no reward, or punishment, can be rationally expected, beyond what is already known by experi|ence and observation:

That self-denial, self-mortification, and humility, are not virtues, but are useless and mischievous; that they stupify the understanding, sour the tem|per, and harden the heart (and of course are gross crimes:)

That pride and self-valuation, ingenuity, elo|quence, quickness of thought, easiness of expression, delicacy of taste, strength of body, health, cleanli|ness, taper legs, and broad shoulders, are virtues:

That Suicide, or self-murder, is lawful and com|mendable (and of course virtuous:)

That Adultery must be practised, if we would ob|tain all the advantages of life:

That Female Infidelity (or Adultery) when known, is a small thing; when unknown, nothing: and

That Scepticism is the true and only wisdom of man. * 1.1

Lord BOLINGBROKE declares,

That Power and Wisdom are the only attributes of God, which can be discovered by mankind; and yet,

That he is as far from denying the Justice, as the Power, of God; that his Goodness is manifest: At the same time, he ascribes every other Perfection to God, as well as Wisdom and Power, and says, this is rational:

That the Wisdom of God is merely a natural at|tribute, and in no sense moral; and yet,

That the Wisdom of God operates in choosing what is fittest to be done; (Of course, it is a moral at|tribute; involving perfect moral rectitude, as well as perfect knowledge;).

That God is gracious and beneficent;

That whatever God has done is just and good;

That such moral perfections are in God, as Chris|tians ascribe to him; yet

He censures divines for ascribing these perfections to God:

That we learn from our own Power and Wisdom, the Power and Wisdom of God; and yet,

That it is profane, to ascribe the excellencies of our nature to God, although without limit or imper|fection:

He undertakes to defend the Righteousness of God against divines; and yet asserts,

That Holiness and Righteousness in God are like nothing in men; that they cannot be conceived of by men, nor argued about with any certainty; and that to talk of imitating God in his moral attributes is blasphemy:

That God made all things; and yet,

That he did not determine the existence of parti|cular men: (Of course, he did not determine the existence of any man; all men being particular men.)

That he will not presume to deny, that there have been Particular Providences; and yet,

That there is no foundation for the belief of any such providences; and that it is absurd and pro|fane to assert, or believe, them:

That God is just; and that justice requires, that rewards and punishment, be measured to particular cases, according to their circumstances, in propor|tion to the merit, or demerit, of every individual; and yet,

That God doth not so measure out rewards, or punishments; and that, if he did, he would sub|vert human affairs; that he concerns not himself with the affairs of men at all; or, if he does, that he regards only collective bodies of men, not individ|uals: that he punishes none except through the Ma|gistrate;

and that there will be no state of future re|wards, or punishments:

That divines are deserving of censure for saying, that God made Man to be happy; and yet he as|serts,

That God made Man to be happy here; and that the end of the human state is happiness:

That the Religion of Nature is clear and obvious to all mankind; and yet,

That it has been unknown to the greatest part of mankind:

That we know Material substance, and are assured of it; and yet,

That we know nothing of either Matter, or Spir|it:

That there is, undeniably, something in our con|stitution, beyond the known properties of matter; and yet,

That the Soul is material and mortal; and that to say, the Soul is immaterial is the same thing as to say, that two and two are five:

That Self-love is the great Law of our nature; and yet,

That Universal Benevolence is the great Law of our nature:

That Christianity is a republication of the Religion of Nature, and a benevolent system; that its morals are pure; and that he is determined to seek for gen|uine Christianity with the simplicity of spirit, with which Christ himself taught it in the Gospel; and yet

A great part of his Works, particularly of his Philosophical Works, was written for no other end, but to destroy Christianity.

He also declares,

That there is no conscience in Man; except ar|tificially:

That it is more natural to believe many Gods than to believe One:

He teaches, that Ambition, the Lust of Power, Av|arice, and Sensuality, may be lawfully gratified, if they can be safely gratified.

That the sole foundation of Modesty is vanity, or a wish to shew ourselves superiour to mere animals.

That Man lives only in the present world:

That Man is only a superiour animal:

That Man's chief End is to gratify the appetites and inclinations of the flesh:

That Modesty is inspired by mere prejudice:

That Polygamy is a part of the Law, or Religion, of Nature. He intimates also,

That Adultery is no violation of the Law, or Re|ligion of Nature:

That there is no wrong in Lewdness, except in the highest Incest:

That the Law or Religion of Nature forbids no Incest, except between the nearest Relations: and plainly supposes,

That all Men and Women are unchaste, and that there is no such thing, as Conjugal Fidelity:

These doctrines will serve as a specimen of the Philosophy, which actually exists. Volumes would be necessary for even a summary account of all its diversities. I need only observe further, that, with respect to the Existence, Character, and Providence, of God, Philosophers differ wholly. Most of the In|fidels, of the present age, entirely deny his existence, and treat the belief of it as a contemptible absurdity. Voltaire, at first, believed in a finite God; but, in his old age, doubted of the existence of any God. To|land believed the world to be God. Many of them suppose him to resemble the Gods of Epicureans, to be totally absorbed in pleasure and quietude, and to be utterly unconcerned with the creatures, which, nevertheless, he has thought proper to make. Amid such a diversity, and discordance, whom are you to follow; and what are you to believe?

2dly. IN the gross and monstrous Nature of its Doctrines.

Of this character were very many doctrines of the Ancient Philosophers.

ZENO taught, that all crimes were equal; that we ought never to forgive injuries; and that the most abominable lewdness is lawful.

BOTH Zeno and Cleanthes taught, that Children may as lawfully roast and eat their parents, as any oth|er food.

DIOGENES, and the Cynics generally, taught, that Parents may lawfully sacrifice and eat their Chil|dren; and that there is neither sin, nor shame, in the grossest and most public acts of lewdness.

PLATO taught, that lewdness is justifiable; and

CICERO, that it is a crime of small magnitude.

LYCURGUS encouraged stealing by an express Law.

ARISTIPPUS taught, that both theft and adultery are lawful.

CICERO, that it is lawful to make war, for the sake of fame, provided it be conducted without unneces|sary cruelty.

CICERO also taught, that Virtue consists in the de|sire of fame. Of course Alexander the Great, Juli|us Caesar, Charles the twelfth of Sweden, and Nadir Kouli Khan, were among the most virtuous of man|kind. * 2.1

THE occasion will not allow me to swell the num|ber of these specimens of the ancient Philosophy. I proceed therefore to observe, that the moderns have uttered numerous doctrines, of a similar character. Such is the Atheism, which they now consider as the only rational and enlightened Philosophy. Such is the Scepticism of Hume; the mortality and materi|ality

of the Soul; the doctrine, that Man is a mere animal; that animal gratification is the chief of end our being; that right and wrong depend solely on the decisions of the magistrate; that ridicule is the test of truth; that we may lawfully get all things, if we can get them safely; that modesty is inspired on|ly by prejudice, and has its foundation in the mere desire of appearing to be superiour to animals; that Adultery is lawful according to the Religion of Na|ture; that there is no wrong in lewdness, except in the highest Incest; That God exercises no Provi|dence over mankind; and that holiness, justice, good|ness, and truth, may be defects in the Divine charac|ter. All these, and many others already recited, are doctrines as repugnant to Common sense, and Com|mon good, and fraught with as much impiety and ir|reverence to God, and as much evil to mankind, as any doctrines, which can be proposed. When we view the pernicious tendency of these Doctrines (and these are the substance of the modern Philosophy) we may safely say, that, thoroughly practised, they would overwhelm this world with that misery, which the Scriptures exhibit as experienced only in hell. When we contemplate the folly of these doctrines, we may with the utmost propriety apply to the mod|ern Philosophers what Cicero says of their predeces|sors; viz. that he knows not how it comes to pass, that, when any man utters an absurdity ever so gross, he presently finds the same absurdity to have been delivered by some one of the Philosophers.

3. IN its total inefficacy to reform either them|selves, or their Disciples.

CICERO declares, that the ancient Philosopher's never reformed either themselves or their disciples; and that he knew not a single instance, in which ei|ther the teacher, or the Disciple, was made virtuous

by their principles. * 2.2 Lucian declares them, as a bo|dy, to have been tyrants, adulterers, and corrupters of youth. Plutarch declares Socrates and Plato to have been as incontinent, and intemperate, as any slave; and Aristotle to have been a fop, a debauch|er, and a traitor. Dion Cassius gives no better character of Seneca. Diogenes and Crates commit|ted lewdness, without a blush, in the streets; doubt|less believing, with Lord Bolingbroke, that modesty was inspired by mere prejudice. Speusippus, who ap|pears to have believed, with Mr. Hume, that adultery must be practised, if we would obtain all the advan|tages of life, was caught, and slain, in the act of adul|tery. Aristippus kept a seraglio of strumpets and catamites, and perjured himself, to cheat a friend of a sum of money, which that friend had left in his hands; and refused also to educate his own children; styling them mere vermin. Menippus, because he had lost a sum of money, murdered himself; as did also Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus Cleom|brotus, Cato the younger, and Brutus. Cato the elder parted with his wife to Hortensius, and was accused of drunkenness. Xenophon was a notori|ous sodomite, and said in the absence of a boy, whom he kept, "I would be blind to all things else, so that I might see Clinias:" and again, "thanks to the sun, which discloses to me the face of Clinias." The an|cient Philosophers, indeed, were generally noted for sodomy. Plutarch, acknowledging the fact, makes for them this apology, that, though they corrupted their bodies, they made amends for it by improving their souls. In truth, nothing better was to be ex|pected from them, than what is here recounted; for their doctrines warranted these, and most other crimes.

THESE are among the most respectable of those men, whose theological and moral systems modern

Philosophers prefer to that of Christ and his Apos|tles. The morals of the Moderns have, in some in|stances, been more decent; in others, very little dif|ferent.

THE true character of all men may be certainly known by their opinions. No man is better than the moral opinions, which he holds, will make him, if drawn out into life and practice. Few are in any measure so good. I do not deny, that men may be more decent, before their fellow-men, than the ten|dency of their doctrines would lead us to believe; but in this there is no principle, no virtue. All is the result of wishing to live agreeably, and to possess reputation. The worst of all men have this desire as really, and often as strongly, as any others, even the most virtuous.

THE doctrines of these Philosophers, it will easi|ly be seen, by even a slight recourse to the account already given of them, forbids the belief, and the existence, of virtue in those who embrace them.

LORD HERBERT declares, that the indulgence of lust and anger is no more to be blamed, than the thirst of a fever, or the drowsiness of the Lethargy. In this single sentence, by a sweeping stroke, the guilt of gluttony, sloth, drunkenness, lewdness, wrath, contention, and revenge, is entirely blotted out.

Mr. HOBBES declares, that every man has a right to all things, and may lawfully get them, if he can;

Again, "A subject may lawfully deny Christ be|fore the Magistrate, although he believes Christ in his heart;"

Again, "A Ruler is not bound by any obliga|tion of truth, or justice, and can do no wrong to his subjects;" and

Again, the Civil Law is the sole foundation of good and evil, of right and wrong.

IN the first of these declarations, mankind are let loose upon each other, in all the hideous ways of fraud, theft, plunder, robbery, peculation, oppres|sive taxation, and piracy; in the second, lying and perjury are completely authorized, as all such deni|als were customarily made under oath; the third is an universal sanction of all the horrid evils of des|potism; and the fourth an entire annihilation of right and wrong, and of course of all morality.

TINDAL has, also, set morality wholly afloat, in declaring, that every man must form a rule for him|self, a rule to be changed as circumstances, always varying, shall change. Nor has Chubb left the sub|ject at all more settled, or safe. He declares, that all religions are alike; that it is of no consequence, what religion a man embraces; that the belief of a future state is of no use to society; and that God does not inter|pose in the affairs of this world at all, and has noth|ing to do with the good, or evil, done by men, here. The well-being of society cannot be overthrown, nor morality destroyed, more effectually, than by these opinions, should they be made rules of human con|duct. If all Religions, i. e. all systems of Moral and Theological doctrines, are alike it is clearly ei|ther because all are wholly true or wholly false, or because all are proportionably true and false, or because moral and theological truth is of no impor|tance. The two first are plainly false suppositions, Mr. Chubb being the judge; for he has declared one system to be true, viz. his own; and another to be false, viz. That of the Gospel, Of course, the last is the true supposition as it stood in his mind. Of consequence no doctrines are of any importance: in other words, Truth is of no use to man. Moral and theological truth is plainly more important to

man, than any other; if this be of no significance, none else can be: an opinion fitter for the mouth of a fiend, than for that of a man.

NOR are the two last declarations of his less fatal. No bond had ever holden mankind, none ever will hold them, together, beside the belief of the presence, and providence of God, and of an approaching state of Rewards and punishments.

SHAFTESBURY, Hume, and Bolingbroke, have la|boured, at least equally, to destroy the belief of these doctrines, and have thus aimed the axe at the root of human happiness.

SHAFTESBURY, also, when he asserts salvation to be ridiculous, the magistrate to be the sole judge of religious truth, Atheism not to take away a just sense of right and wrong, and to be no way deficient in promoting virtue, unhinges all serious thinking, and all moral impressions, silences rational enquiry, and obliterates every distinction, which can usefully re|gulate the conduct of intelligent beings.

THE same confusion is introduced by Hume, when he ranks bodily and intellectual endowments, and casual attainments, with virtues, denies the vir|tuous nature of humility and self-denial, and asserts that of pride, self-valuation, and suicide.

BUT what shall be said of this celebrated writer, when he gravely informs us, that Adultery must be practised, if we would obtain all the advantages of life. Must not plunder, falshood, assassination, pi|racy, war, and tyranny, be also practised on the same principle. Were these or any other crimes ever practised, but for the sake of advantages either ob|tained, or expected? What shall we say of him, when, from Rochefoucault, he repeats, and to shew

his fondness for it, often, the maxim, that Female In|fidelity, when known, is a small thing, when un|known, nothing.

BOLINGBROKE has more openly and violently at|tacked every important truth and serious duty. Par|ticularly he has licensed lewdness, and cut up chasti|ty and decency by the roots:

WHAT idea must be entertained of the morals of men, who assert these things, not in careless conver|sation, not in grave conversation, not in sportive writings; but in solemn, didactic, Philosophical trea|tises, sitting in the chair of moral and religious in|struction, speaking to a world, uttering oracular opinions, deciding the duty and happiness both tem|poral and eternal of the whole human race, and un|folding professedly the will of the infinite God? They either believed, or disbelieved, these doctrines. If they disbelieved them, what apology can be made for so gross and so mischievous falshood? If they be|lieved them, the conclusion is irresistibly forced up|on us, that they practised as they believed. They have also laboured to the utmost to persuade man|kind both to believe and practise them. If their la|bours prove successful, if their wishes should be ac|complished, the world will be converted into one theatre of falshood, perjury, fraud, theft, piracy, robbery, oppression, revenge, fornication, and adul|tery. What else is the hell of the Scriptures? Lewd|ness alone, extended as their doctrines extend it, would exterminate every moral feeling from the hu|man breast, and every moral and virtuous action from the human conduct Sodom would cease to be a proverbial name; and Gommorrha would be re|membered, only to wonder at her unhappy lot, and to drop the tear of sympathy upon her ashes.

I know it is often said; it will probably be said in

the present case: and perhaps by no small number of persons; that, provided a man is honest in his belief, he is to be considered as a virtuous man, unless his life disprove the opinion of his virtue. If by this declaration it be intended, that the man in question has faithfully sought for truth, and as faithfully collected, duly weighed, and candidly admitted, all the evidence within his reach, I readily acknowledge, that he has done his duty, and is therefore in this instance undoubtedly virtuous. But that men who believe falshood, and such gross and palpable fals|hood, have really thus done, is yet to be proved.

IF it be intended, that, when a man really believes error, he is, by the reality of his belief, constituted virtuous, I deny the doctrine wholly; and all those, who assert it, deny it also. The Arabians, who, un|der the standard of Mohammed, butchered half mankind, believed that they were doing what was right. Multitudes of Catholics, in the last century, unquestionably believed it to be the will of God, that they should perjure themselves, in their corres|pondence with Huguenots; and that they should roast, dislocate, and assassinate, that unhappy class of men by thousands. Christians have, beyond controversy, really believed, in many instances, that the persecution of Infidels was agreeable to the will of God. Cicero believed it to be right to have a civil war kindled in Rome, that he might return from exile. Numbers of people in Co|penhagen, at a certain time, believed it to be right to murder their neighbours, that, under the horror of an approaching death, themselves might be induced cer|tainly to repent of sin, and to gain eternal life. Alex|ander, with full conviction of the rectitude of his de|signs, wasted the Persin empire, and demanded di|vine homage to himself.

NONE of those with whom I am disputing, will pre|tend,

that all these persons were justified in their designs and conduct by the reality of their belief of its rectitude.

IT will be further said, as it often has been by others beside Mr. Chubb, that what a man believes is of no importance. Infidel writers ought never to advance this doctrine: for their conduct in labouring so earnestly to destroy the faith of Christians, and to establish that of Infidels, gives the lie to the declaration. If the assertion be true, a man may, according to the opinion of the assertors themselves, as well be a Christian in his belief, as an Infidel. But the assertion is not true; and they prove, by every page of their writings, and by every sentence of their conversation, that they feel it to be false; for they labour with the greatest industry, and ardour, to change the tenets of their fellow-men.

ALL the volitions of the mind are of course ac|cordant with the prevailing dictates of the under|standing; and all the actions of men spring from their volitions. Such, then, as is the moral nature of the opinions of a man, will be the nature of his moral conduct. Obedience to error is vice; obedi|ence to truth is virtue. All men hold errors; and all men hold probably some moral truths. Good men obey, mainly, the truths which they receive, and not the errors. Wicked men wholly obey, in their moral conduct, the errors which they adopt, and re|ject truth as a rule of conduct.

COMPLETE virtue is formed by the reception and obedience of truth only. Such is the virtue of the heavenly inhabitants. In the present world such virtue does not exist; for truth is not received by any man unmixed with error; nor is the truth, which is received, alone and perfectly obeyed. The most perfect earthly orthodoxy is, therefore, mingled

with error, and the most perfect earthly virtue with vice. Hence extensive room is furnished for the exercise of charitable regards to such, as differ from us in many moral doctrines.

BUT this charity has its limits. The truths hol|den must, in this case, be fundamental truths; or those on which virtue can rest; and the errors must not be fundamental errors; or opinions subversive of all virtue. The man, who seriously believes in the rectitude of lying, cruelty, fraud, lewdness, and impiety, cannot be virtuous.

THE man, who is pleased with error, is, in the ex|ercise of that emotion, guilty. To love the means of vice, or sin, is the same thing in a moral view as to love sin. Error is the certain means of sin in ev|ery sense. As a rule of conduct, it leads to nothing but sin; as a temptation to sin, it is of incalculable power; as a justification of sin, it is of all opiates to the conscience, and of all supports to the heart, beyond measure the greatest. The man, who loves it, is therefore a guilty enemy to himself, a dishon|ourer of the God of truth, and a destroyer of his own well-being. The man who devises, publishes, and with ingenuity defends it, is the common enemy of God and mankind. To the evil, which he does to the universe, no bounds can be fixed; and with all this evil he is chargeable. The ravages of Alexander were probably less injurious to the human race, and less guilty before God, than the ravages of the mo|ral world by Hume, or Voltaire.

Herbert, Hobbes, Shaftsbury, Woolston, Tin|dal, Chubb, and Bolingbroke, are all guilty of the vile hypocrisy of professing to love and reverence Christianity, while they are employed in no other design than to destroy it. Such faithless professions, such gross violations of truth, in Christians, would have been proclaimed to the universe by these very

writers as infamous desertions of principle and decen|cy. Is it less infamous in themselves? All hypocrisy is detestable; but I know of none so detestable as that, which is coolly written, with full premeditation, by a man of talents, assuming the character of a moral and religious instructor, a minister, a prophet, of the truth of the Infinite God. Truth is a virtue per|fectly defined, mathematically clear, and completely understood by all men of common sense. There can be no haltings between uttering truth and fals|hood, no doubts, no mistakes; as between piety and enthusiasm, frugality and parsimony, generosity, and profusion. Transgression, therefore, is always a known, definite, deliberate villainy. In the sud|den moment of strong temptation, in the hour of unguarded attack, in the flutter and trepidation of unexpected alarm, the best man may, perhaps, be sur|prised into any sin; but he, who can coolly, of stea|dy design, and with no unusual impulse, utter fals|hood, and vend hypocrisy, is not far from finished depravity.

THE morals of Rochester and Wharton need no comment. Woolston was a gross blasphemer. Blount solicited his sister in law to marry him, and, being refused, shot himself. Tindal was originally a protestant, then turned papist, then protestant again, merely to suit the times; and was at the same time infamous for vice in general, and the total want of principle. He is said to have died with this prayer in his mouth. "If there is a God, I desire that he may have mercy on me." Hobbes wrote his Levia|than, to serve the cause of Charles I.; but, finding him fail of success, he turned it to the defence of Cromwell, and made a merit of this fact to the Usur|per: as Hobbes himself unblushingly declared to Lord Clarendon. * 2.3 Morgan had no regard to truth; as is

evident from his numerous falsifications of Scripture, as well as from the vile hypocrisy of professing him|self a Christian in those very writings, in which he la|bours to destroy Christianity. Voltaire, in a letter now remaining, requested his friend D'Alembert to tell for him a direct and palpable lie, by denying, that he was the author of the Philosophical Diction|ary. D'Alembert in his answer informed him, that he had told the lie. * 2.4 Voltaire has, indeed, expressed his own moral character perfectly in the following words "Monsieur Abbe, I must be read, no matter whether I am believed, or not." He also solemnly professed to believe the Catholic Religion, although at the fame time he doubted the existence of a God. Hume died, as a fool dieth. The day before his death he spent in a pitiful and affected unconcern about this tremendous subject, playing at whist, rea|ding Lucian's dialogues, and making silly attempts at wit, concerning his interview with Charon, the heathen ferry-man of Hades. † 2.5

IT will easily be supposed that my information concerning the private lives of these men must be distant and imperfect: What has been said will, however, furnish any one at all acquainted with the human character, with just ideas of their morality. I shall only add that Rousseau (Jean Jacques) is assert|ed to have been guilty of gross theft, perjury, forni|cation, and adultery, and of abjuring and assuming, alternately, the Catholic, and the Protestant, reli|gion; neither of which he believed.

THUS have I summarily exhibited to you the na|ture, and the actual state, of this Philosophy. From this view of it, I think you will unite with me in a full conviction, that, if the Gospel had been liable to so many and so serious objections, it would, instead

of exciting and sustaining a controversy through eighteen centuries, have solicited the faith and obe|dience of mankind in vain, would have been smoth|ered in its birth, and only added one to the nume|rous moral systems, which have, for ages, slept the sleep of death in the regions of oblivion.

Notes

• * 1.1

  The following summary of Mr. Hume's doctrines, published some years before his death, Bishop Home says, was never, so far as he could find, questioned, as to its fidelity or accuracy, either by Mr. Hume, or his friends.

  A Summary of Mr. Hume's Doctrines, Metaphysical and Moral.

  Of the Soul.

  That the soul of man is not the same this moment, that it was the last: that we know not what it is; that it is not one, but many things, and that it is nothing at all.

  That in this soul is the agency of all the causes that operate throughout the sensible creation; and yet that in this soul there is neither power nor agency, nor any idea of either.

  That matter and motion may often be regarded at the cause of thought.

  Of the Universe.

  That the external world does not exist, or at least, that it's exist|ence may reasonably be doubted.

  That the universe exists in the mind, and that the mind does not exist.

  That the universe is nothing but a heap of perceptions, without a substance.

  That though a man could bring himself to believe, yea, and have reason to believe, that every thing in the universe proceeds from some cause; yet it would be unreasonable for him to believe, that the universe itself proceeds from a cause.

  Of Human Knowledge.

  That the perfection of human knowledge is to doubt.

  That we ought to doubt of every thing, yea, of our doubts them|selves, and therefore, the utmost that Philosophy can do, is to give us a doubtful solution of doubtful doubts.

  That the human understanding, acting alone, does entirely sub|vert itself, and prove by argument that by argument, nothing can be proved.

  That man, in all his perceptions, actions and volitions, is a mere passive machine, and has no separate existence of his own, being entirely made up of other things, of the existence of which he is by no means certain; and yet, that the nature of all things depends so much upon man, that two and two could not be equal to four, nor fire produce heat, nor the sun light, without an act of the human understanding.

  Of God.

  That it is unreasonable to believe God to be infinitely wise and good, while there is any evil or disorder in the universe.

  That we have no good reason to think the universe proceeds from a cause.

  That as the existence of the external world is questionable, we are at a loss to find arguments by which we may prove the existence of the Supreme Being, or any of his attributes.

  That when we speak of Power, as an attribute of any being, God himself not excepted, we use words without meaning.

  That we can form no idea of power, nor of any being endued with power, much less of one endued with infinite power; and that we can never have reason to believe, that any object or quality of a|ny object exists, of which we cannot form an idea.

  Of the Morality of Human Actions

  That every human action is necessary, and could not have been different from what it is.

  That moral, intellectual, and corporeal virtues are nearly of the same kind—In other words, that to want honesty, and to want un|derstanding, and to want a leg, are equally the objects of moral dis|approbation.

  That adultery must be practised, if men would obtain all the ad|vantages of life; that, if generally practised, it would in time cease to be scandalous; and, that, if practised secretly and frequently, it would by degrees come to be thought no crime at all.

  Lastly, as the soul of man, according to Mr. Hume, becomes eve|ry moment a different being, the consequence must be, that the crimes committed by him at one time cannot be imputable to him at another.
• * 2.1

  For several of these doctrines see Deism Revealed.
• * 2.2

  See Deism Revealed.
• * 2.3

  See Deism Revealed.
• * 2.4

  See Priestly On the Causes of the Increase of Infidelity.
• † 2.5

  Smith's life of Hume.