The rights of animals: an oration, delivered at the commencement of Providence-College, September 7, 1791. / By Herman Daggett, candidate for the master's degree. ; [One line of Scripture text]

The Rights of Animals: An ORATION, &c.

THE design of my appearing in public, at this time, is to say a few things in favor of a cer∣tain class of beings, whose rights have sel∣dom been advocated, either from the pulpit, from the stage, or from the press. I mean the INFERIOR ANIMALS.

THE cruelty, and injustice, with which this class of beings has been treated, by their boasted superi∣ors of the human race, is too notorious to need a particular recital. In general, their welfare and hap∣piness has been looked upon as a matter of very little importance, in the system; and in our treat∣ment of them, hardly to be regarded. And one spe∣cies, in particular, has, by almost universal consent, been totally excluded from any place in the benevo∣lent regards of mankind: So that now, "whoso∣ever killeth them, thinketh that he doth God ser∣vice." Yea, and many are so absurd as to suppose, that this is a fulfilment of that antient prophecy, "That the seed of the woman should bruise the ser∣pent's head."

AS every sinful indulgence, and every act of injus∣tice, arises from the blind and criminal selfishness of the human heart; to this must we look, as the cause of that unfeeling disposition, together with all those acts of injustice and cruelty, which are spent upon the inferior animals. It is the nature of selfishness, to exclude all beings but ourselves, and those whom we consider as being related to ourselves, from any friendly, benevolent attention. If WE are exer∣cised with any pain, or are the subjects of any mis∣fortune: or, if this be the case with any of those, who belong to our FAMILY, or the circle of our FRIENDS, we immediately become affected by it: And always in proportion to the nearness of the re∣lation. Whereas, if any calamity befall those, who are no way related to us, but who belong to a differ∣ent class, or circle in society, our feelings are not wont to be interested. This will account, at once, for that disposition and conduct in men, which we are now censuring. For the lower order of sensible beings, are considered as moving in a very different sphere, and belonging to a community of a far dif∣ferent nature from that of ours; so far different, that the feelings of benevolence, are, commonly, not at all interested in their favor.

A well known circumstance, which attends some of these animals, contributes, not a little, to confirm us in the truth of this observation. For those of them which are tamed, and domesticated by us, im∣mediately become the objects of our kind regards,

and our sensibility is deeply wounded, when they are abused. But where there is no such relation, by which they are distinguished from the common her••, to use a phrase denoting cruelty, they are treated LIKE BRUTES. Without the least regard to jus∣tice, we commonly treat them in that manner, which we suppose, will make them conduce the most to our own advantage; and subject them, in all things, to what happens to be our pleasure. Though some∣times, it must be acknowledged, that our malevo∣lence towards them, is of a disinterested nature, and they are tormented only for the sake of the unna∣tural pleasure, which is taken in doing it.

NOW, in order to determine, in what light, these animals ought to be considered, and how they ought to be treated, let us carefully attend to a few things, of known and acknowledged truth, with regard to the objects of our benevolence. And here, I think, it is past dispute, that all beings, capable of happiness belong to the number. Let their circumstances or characters, dispositions or abilities, color or shape, be what they may; if they are sensible beings, and capable of happiness, they ought to be the objects of our benevolent regards. If the moral character of any being has become hateful, and inconsistent with truth and justice, we cannot, tis true, as such, have any compl••cency in it: But, we observe, that the Bring itself, may, nevertheless, be as proper an ob∣ject of our benevolence, as any being whatever: And ••e ought to wi••h, and actually endeavor, to pro∣mote

the welfare, and real happiness of such a being, as much as we possibly can, consistently with the rights and claims of other beings. This is the na∣true of true benevolence. True benevolence is uni∣versal, and uniform. The good man, like his mer∣ciful Creator, wishes to promote the highest happi∣ness of that system to which his influence extends: And feels devoted to PARTIES in society, no far∣ther than the present state of things, and his limited capacities render it necessary. We may, and ought to have a true regard for all beings, according to their real worth, and to wish them well, according to their capacity for enjoyment▪ although, in this life, we are necessarily limited in the execution of such bene∣volent wishes. The case is s••••h with us, at present, that we canno•• 〈…〉〈…〉 to all beings 〈◊〉〈◊〉, to whom, nevertheless, we may wish well, with 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sincerity, and with equal a••d••r. But we observe, that when∣ever an opportunity of securing, or 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••••••sing the happiness of any 〈…〉〈…〉, the benevolent man, acting as such, always improves it.

THESE observations, it is hoped, will help us to determine, in what light, we ought to confider the INFERIOR ANIMALS. That they are sensible be∣ings, and capable of happiness, none can doubt: That their sensibility of corporeal pleasure and pain, is less than ours, none can prove* 1.1: And that there is any

kind of reason, why they should not be regarded with proportionable tenderness, we cannot conceive.

BUT lest this mo••e of reasoning should be thought too ni••e, let us call into view a rule of judging, in∣stituted by a divine Philanthropist, and oracle of wisdom, in the days of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Caesar. "That we do to others as we would have them do unto us;" i. e. in a change of circumstances. This is a maxim which approves itself to the reason and conscience of every man. Whatever obs••urity may involve other rules of judging, this is always clear, and un∣exceptionable. And it must extend to all sensible beings, with whom we have any dealings, and in whose ••••tuation we are capable of imagining ourselves to be. Supposing therefore, (as some have supposed,) that the doctrine of transmigration is true, and that, after this life, we shall pass into the forms of some of the inferior animals, and move in their sphere; how should we wish to be considered, and treated, by those above us? Here, there is left not the least room to doubt, what our feelings would be. Let this rule, therefore, be faithfully applied, in every case, and cruelty to animals would no longer be in∣dulged.

GOD has appointed to all his creatures, a certain sphere to mo••e in, and has granted them certain privileges, which may be called THEIR OWN. If we judge impartially, we shall acknowledge that there are the RIGHTS of a BEAST, as well as the RIGHTS of a MAN. And because man is consider∣ed as the Lord of this lower creation, he is not thereby licensed to infringe on the rights of those below him, any more than a King, or Magistrate, is licens••d to infringe on the rights of his subjects. If the Governor of the universe has given us liber∣ty to prepare animal food; or, if the rights of these creatures, in certain instances, interfere with the rights of others, or with the rights of men, so as thereby to become forfeited; we may, in such cases, take away their lives, or deprive them of their privi∣leges, without the imputation of blame.

"THE creeping ver••in, loathsome to the sight. And charg'd perhaps with venom, that intrudes, A visitor unwelcome, into scenes Sacred to neatness, or repose—th' alcove, The chamber, or refactory, may die. A necessary act incurs no blame. Not so, when held within their proper bounds, And guiltless' of offence, they range the air, Or take their pastime in the spacious field. There they are privileg'd. And he that hunts, Or harms them there, is guilty of a wrong, Disturbs th' oeconomy of nature's realm, Who, when she form••••, design'd them an abode.

The sum is this. If man's convenience, health, Or safety interfere, his rights and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Are paramount, and must extinguish theirs. Else, they are all—the meanest things that are— As free to live, and to enjoy that life, As God was free to form them, at the first, Who, in his sovereign wisdom, made them all."

THUS saith the Poet. And I know of nothing 〈◊〉〈◊〉 nature, in reason, or in revelation, which obliges us to suppose, that the UNALIENATED rights of a beast, are not as sacred, and inviolable, as those of a man: or that the person, who wantonly commits an outrage upon the life, happiness, or security of a BIRD, is not as really amenable, at the tribunal of eternal justice, as he, who wantonly destroys the rights and privileges, or injuriously takes away the life of one of his fellow creatures of the HUMAN race. Here, perhaps, some of my auditory will feel shocked: and will recur, in their minds, to that horror, and desparation, which arises in the breasts of murderers: Whereas, there is no such conscious∣ness of guilt, when one of the inferior animals only has been the subject of human cruelty. But this dif∣ference, I would observe, is owing to education, and to certain contracted habits of thinking and acting. Only let a person be taught, from his earliest years, that it is criminal to torment, and unnecessarily to d••stroy, these innocent animals, and he will feel a guilty conscience, in consequence of any injury, which he shall do them, in this way, no less really,

than if the injury were offered to human beings. The force of education, and of wrong habits, in set∣ting aside natural principles, is amazing, and almost incred••b••e. Witness the feelings of those, who are employed in forcing away the Natives, from the coasts of Africa. Witness the cruelties, and the deaths, which are inflicted upon them, in the West-Indies, and in the Southern States; and witness the indifference, with which, in some countries, they kill their children, when they become too nu∣merous, and their parents, when they become too old. The question, therefore, is not what CAN be done, without remorse of conscience, but what OUGHT to be done, according to the rules of jus∣ti••e and dictates of benevolence.

AND now, let reason judge-does not the idle, and mischievous boy, who, to gratif, himself, climbs the tree, and wantonly destroys the habitation, and murders the family, of an innocent Sparrow, as re∣ally transgress the rules of justice, and is he not as really guilty of incompas••••ion, as the unfeeling wretch, who, to make himself the secure and unsus∣pected owner of a little treasure, whi••h he has se∣cretly removed, sets ••••re to his neighbour's house? The crimes are of the same nature, tho' the guilt may not be equally aggravated: They both act up∣on the same principle—self gratification: And the injury done, is the same, in both cases—the de∣st••••••cti••n of an innocent family. And who, that is capable of e••tering into the feelings of the DISTRES∣SED,

can behold the injured and bereaved bird, set∣ting alone, upon the naked spray, mourning, in fu∣neral grief, over the loss of ALL that was DEAR to her, without shedding the tear of sympathetic sorrow!

AS farther illustration of this subject, let me refer my auditors to a well known sport, and darling a∣musement, with many persons of fortune and lei∣sure. Some wild animal, caught for the purpose, is carried to these persons, and sold. This creature, at a convenient season, is conveyed to the middle of an extensive plain, and set at liberty. Having ad∣vanced to a certain distance, a kennel of hounds are let loose upon the affrighted animal, whilst their more savage masters pursue, on horse-back, until the game is taken, and destroyed. And all this is for no other reason, in the universe, but to gratify them∣selves with the terror and dismay, the labor and fa∣tigue, the screams and death, of this unfortunate creature!

"—Detested sport! That owes its PLEASURES to another's PAIN, And feeds upon the sobs, and dying shrieks Of harmless nature, dumb, but yet indu'd With eloquence that agonies inspire, Of silent tears, and heart-distending sighs! Vain tears, alas! and sighs that never find A corresponding tone in jovial souls."

WHAT ideas should we form of Superior beings, whose employment, or rather, whose AMUSE∣MENT, it was, by certain invisible means, to en∣snare, worry, fatigue, and destroy, the human race?

Or should they, (as we sometimes do with game-cocks, and other animals,) furnish them with in∣struments of death, and then contrive means to bring them together, and excite them to action, on∣ly to make sport for themselves; would they not be execrated, and detested, by every feeling child of humanity? How then can we justify our own con∣duct, which is of the same complexion? But, to show that such treatment of animals is wrong in it∣self, enough has been said. We proceed, therefore, to show that it is hurtful in its consequences; as it ha•• a most unhappy influence upon the human mind.

THERE was a time, (it is said,) when, ••y the laws of England, all BUTCHERS were disqualified from fitting, as jurymen, in any capital cause: Because, it was supposed, that being accustomed to shed the blood, and take away the lives, of other animals, they would not have the feelings, common to the rest of mankind, about the life of a man. Now, if this be the case, where persons are accustomed to take away the lives of these animals, with decency, and humanity; what effect must it have upon those, with whom, allowed and voluntary acts of cruelty, have, through long indulgence, become habitual, and pleasing? How can any tender, and amiable dispositions dwell in that breast, which is shielded against the sharpest sufferings of an innocent being, for no other reason, but because it does not happen to b•• of our race? A person may, thro' sudden temp∣tation, be guilty of an act of injustice, or cruelty, which he habitually abhors, and disapproves. But, we observ••r, that a SINGLE act of cruelty, commit∣ted

upon the MEANEST animal, if it be justified; ••pproved, and delighted in, is utterly inconsistent with any tender sentiments of soul, or feelings of hu∣manity.

"That heart is hard in nature, and unfit For human fellowship, as being void Of sympathy, and therefore dead alike To love and friendship both, that is not pleas'd With fight of animals enjoying life, Nor feels their happiness augment his own."

And to indulge myself still farther, in the use of a favourite Poet,

"I would not enter on my li••t of friends, (Tho' grac'd with polish'd manners and fine sense, Yet wanting sensibility) the man Who needlessly sets foot upon a worm. And inadvertent step may crush the snail, That crawls, at evening, in the public path, But he that has humanity, forewarn'd, Will tread aside, and let the reptile live."

WE are led on the commission of crimes, by slow and imperceptible degrees. Wrong habits indulged, with r••gard to any particular practice, naturally gain strength, and lead on to kindred practices and indulgences. Why should a man, for instance, who, without the least remorse, or rather with a pleas∣ing sensibility and wantonness, torments and destroys other creatures, hesitate to do the same office, for one of the aboriginals of this country? And what is the difference, in the nature of the thing, between this and the murder of any other man? I am per∣suaded, that the obduracy of heart, and unrelenting

disposition, which we discover, in some men, is ow∣ing, in a great measure, to the early indulgence of such a disposition, towards the inferior animals. Are not many persons EDUCATED to torment them? A different mode of education, however, we presume, would be an unspeakable blessing to society. It would greatly tend to soften and meliorate the na∣tural dispositions of mankind, and habituate them to the pleasing sensations of tenderness, and sympathy. "Ye, therefore, who love mercy, teach your sons To love it too"

I CANNOT close these observations, without indul∣ging myself, for a moment, in the plea••ing anticipa∣tion of that time, which is fast approaching, when there shall, no longer be any disposition, in mankind, to hurt the peace of one another, or to wage war with innocent nature: "For the earnest expecta∣tion of the CREATURE, waiteth for the manifest∣ation of the Sons of God"—the joyful period, when the groans of this lower creation shall have an end:

"When lambs, with wolves, shall grace the verdant mead, And boys, in flowery bands, the tyger lead; The steer and lion at one crib shall meet, And harmless serpents lick the pilgrims feet; The smiling infant, in his hand, shall take The crested ba••ilisk, and the speckled snake, Pleas'd, the green lustre of the seales survey, And with their forked tongue, and pointless s••ing shall play."

Notes

• * 1.1

  "The Millepedes rolls itself round upon the ••ightest touch; and the Snail draws in her horns upon the first approach of the hand. Such instances of sensibility certainly confi•••• the observation of our inimitable Shakespere, who teaches us that

  "—the poor beetle, which we trend upon, In coporal sufferance, feels a ping as great As when a giant dies." PERCIVAL.