A dissertation on miracles: containing an examination of the principles advanced by David Hume, Esq.; in An essay on miracles. / By George Campbell, D.D. Principal of the Marischal Collge, and one of the ministers, of Aberdeen. ; [Two lines from John]

A DISSERTATION ON MIRACLES. PART I. Miracles are capable of proof from testimony, and religious miracles are not less capable of this evi∣dence than others.

SECTION I. Mr Hume's favourite argument is founded on a false hypothesis.

IT is not the aim of this author to evince, that miracles, if admitted to be true, would not be a sufficient evidence of a divine mission. His design is solely to prove, that miracles which have not been the objects of our own senses, at least such as are said to have been performed in attestation of any re∣ligious system, cannot reasonably be admitted by us, or believ'd on the testimony of others. "A miracle," says he,

supported by any human testimony, is

more properly a subject of derision than of argu∣ment * 1.1."Again, in the conclusion of his essay, Upon the whole, it appears, that no testimony, for any kind of miracle, can ever possibly amount to a probability, much less to a proof † 1.2.

Here he concludes against all miracles. "Any kind of miracle" are his express words. He seems however immediately sensible, that in asserting this, he hath gone too far; and therefore, in the end of the same paragraph, retracts part of what he had advanced in the beginning.

We may establish it as a maxim that no human testimony can have such force, as to prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation for any system of religion.

In the note on this passage, he has these words.

I beg the limitation here made, may be remarked, when I say, that a miracle can never be prov'd, so as to be the foun∣dation of a system of religion. For I own that otherwise there may possibly be miracles, or violations of the usual course of nature, of such a kind, of to admit of proof from human testimo∣ny.

So much for that cardinal point, which the essayist labours so strenuously to evince; and which, if true, will not only be subversive of revelation, as received by us, on the testimony of the apostles, and prophets, and martyrs; but will directly lead to this general conclusion:

That it is impossible for God Almigh∣ty to give a revelation, attended with such evidence that it can be reasonably believed in after-ages, or even in the same age, by any person who hath

not been an eye-witness of the miracles, by which it is supported.

Now, by what wonderful process of reasoning is this strange conclusion made out? Several topics have been employ'd for the purpose by this subtle dispu∣tant. Among these there is one principal argument which he is at great pains to set off to the best ad∣vantage. Here indeed he claims a particular con∣cern, having discovered it himself. His title to the honour of the discovery, 'tis not my business to con∣trovert; I confine myself entirely to the consideration of its importance. To this end I shall now lay be∣fore the reader, the unanswerable argument, as he flatters himself it will be found; taking the freedom for brevity's sake, to compendize the reasoning, and to omit whatever is said merely for illustration. To do otherwise would lay me under the necessity of transcribing the greater part of the essay.

'Experience,' says he,

is our only guide in rea∣soning concerning matters of fact * 1.3. Experience is in some things variable, in some things uniform. A variable experience gives rise only to probability; an uniform experience amounts to a proof † 1.4. Proba∣bility always supposes an opposition of experiments and observations, where the one side is found to o∣verbalance the other, and to produce a degree of evidence proportion'd to the superiority. In such cases we must balance the opposite experi∣ments, and deduct the l••sser number from the greater, in order to know•• he exact force of the supe∣rior evidence ‡ 1.5. Our belief or assurance of any fact

from the report of eye-witnesses, is derived from no other principle than experience; that is, our observation of the veracity of human testimony, and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses * 1.6. Now, if the fact attested partakes of the marvellous, if it is such as has seldom fallen under our observation, here is a contest of two op∣posite experiences, of which the one destroys the other, as far as its force goes, and the superior can only operate on the mind by the force which remains. The very same principle of experience, which gives us a certain degree of assurance in the testimony of witnesses, gives us also, in this case, another de∣gree of assurance, against the fact which they en∣deavour to establish; from which contradiction, there necessarily arises a counterpoise, and mutual destruction of belief and authority † 1.7. Further, if the fact affirmed by the witnesses, instead of being only marvellous, is really miraculous; if besides the testimony consider'd apart and in itself, amounts to an entire proof; in that case there is proof a∣gainst proof, of which the strongest must prevail, but still with a diminution of its force, in propor∣tion to that of its antagonist. A miracle is a viola∣tion of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle from the very nature of the fact, is as entire, as any argument from ex∣perience can possibly be imagined ‡ 1.8. And if so, 'tis an undeniable consequence, that it cannot be surmounted by any proof whatever from testimony. A miracle, therefore, however attested, can never

be render'd credible, even in the lowest degree.

This, in my apprehension, is the sum of the argument on which my ingenious opponent rests the strength of his cause.

IN answer to this I propose first to prove, that the whole is built upon a false hypothesis. That the evi∣dence of testimony is derived solely from experience, which seems to be an axiom of this writer, is at least not so incontestable a truth as he supposes it; that, on the contrary, testimony hath a natural and original influence on belief, antecedent to experience, will, I imagine, easily be evinced. For this purpose let it be remark'd, that the earliest assent, whch is given to testimony by children, and which is previous to all experience, is in fact the most unlimited, that by a gra∣dual experience of manknd, it is gradually contracted, and reduced to narrower bounds. To say, therefore, that our diffidence in testimony is the result of experi∣ence, is more philosophical, because more consonant to truth, than to say that our faith in testimony has this foundation. Accordingly youth, which is unexperienced, is credulous; age, on the contrary, is distrustful. Exactly the reverse would be the case were this author's doctrine just.

Perhaps it will be said. If experience is allowed to be the only measure of a logical or reasonable faith in testimony, the question, Whether the influence of testi∣mony on belief, be original or deriv••d? if 'tis not mere∣ly verbal, is at least of no importance in the present controversy. But I maintain it is of the greatest im∣portance. The difference between us is by no means so inconsiderable, as to a careless view it may

appear. According to his philosophy, the presump∣tion is against the testimony or (which amounts to the same thing) there is not the smallest presump∣tion in its favour, till properly supported by experi∣ence. According to the explication given, there is the strongest presumption in favour of the testimony, till properly refuted by experience.

If it be objected by the author, that such a faith in testimony as is prior to experience, must be unrea∣sonable and unphilosophical, because unaccountable; I should reply, that there are, and must be, in hu∣man nature, some original grounds of belief, beyond which our researches cannot proceed, and of which therefore 'tis vain to attempt a rational account. I should desire the objector to give a reasonable account of his faith in this principle, that similar causes al∣ways produce similar effects; or in this, that the course of nature will be the same to-morrow, that it was ye∣sterday, and is to day: principles, which he himself acknowledges, are neither intuitively evident, nor deduced from premises; and which nevertheless we are under a necessity of presupposing, in all our rea∣sonings from experience * 1.9. I should desire him to give a reasonable account of his faith in the clearest in∣formations of his memory, which he will find it alike impossible either to doubt, or to explain. Indeed me∣mory bears nearly the same relation to experience, that testimony does. Certain it is that the defects and misrepresentations of memory are often corrected by experience. Yet should any person hence infer, that memory derives all its evidence from experi∣ence, he would fall into a manifest absurdity. For,

on the contrary, experience derives its origin solely from memory, and is nothing else but the general maxims or conclusions, we have form'd, from the comparison of particular facts remember'd. If we had not previously given an implicit faith to memory, we had never been able to acquire experience. When there∣fore we say that memory, which gives birth to expe∣rience, may nevertheless in some instances be correct∣ed by experience, no more is imply'd, but that the in∣ferences form'd from the most lively and perspicuous reports of memory, sometimes serve to rectify the mis∣takes which arise from such reports of this faculty, as are most languid and confus'd. Thus memory, in these instances, may be said to correct itself. The case is often much the same with experience and testimo∣ny, as will appear more clearly in the second section, where I shall consider the ambiguity of the word ex∣perience, as us'd by this author.

BUT how, says Mr Hume, is testimony then to be refuted? Principally in one or other of these two ways: first, and most directly, by contradictory te∣stimony; that is, when an equal or greater number of witnesses, equally or more credible, attest the con∣trary: secondly, by such evidence either of the inca∣pacity or baseness of the witnesses, as is sufficient to discredit them. What, rejoins my antagonist, can∣not then testimony be confuted by the extraordinary nature of the fact attested? Has this consideration no weight at all? That this consideration hath no weight at all, 'twas never my intention to main∣tain; that by itself it can very rarely, if ever, amount to a refutation against ample and unexceptiona∣ble

testimony, I hope to make extremely plain. Who hath ever denied, that the uncommonness of an e∣vent related, is a presumption against its reality; and that chiefly on account of the tendency, which, expe∣rience teacheth us, and this author hath observed, some people have to sacrifice truth to the love of wonder * 1.10? The question only is, How far does this presumption extend? In the extent which Mr Hume hath as∣sign'd it, he hath greatly exceeded the limits of nature, and consequently of all just reasoning.

In his opinion,

When the fact attested is such as has seldom fallen under our observation, there is a contest of two opposite experiences, of which the one destroys the other, as far as its force goes, and the superior can only operate on the mind, by the force which remains † 1.11.

There is a metaphy∣sical, I had almost said, a magical balance and arith∣metic, for the weighing and subtracting of evidence, to which he frequently recurs, and with which he seems to fancy he can perform wonders. I wish he had been a little more explicit in teaching us how these rare inventions must be us'd. When a writer of genius and elocution expresses himself in general terms, he will find it an easy matter, to give a plausible appear∣ance to things the most unintelligible in nature. Such sometimes is this author's way of writing. In the instance before us he is particularly happy in his choice of metaphors. They are such as are na∣turally adapted to prepossess a reader in his favour. What candid person can think of suspecting the im∣partiality of an inquirer, who is for weighing in the scales of reason, all the arguments on either side?

Who can suspect his exactness who determines every thing by a numerical computation? Hence it is, that to a superficial view his reasoning appears scarce in∣ferior to demonstration; but, when narrowly canvass∣ed, 'tis impracticable to find an application, of which, in a consistency with good sense, it is capable.

In confirmation of the remark just now made, let us try how his manner of arguing on this point can be applied to a particular instance. For this purpose I make the following suppsition. I have lived for some years near a ferry. It consists with my know∣ledge that the passage-boat has a thousand times cross∣ed the river, and as many times returned safe. An unknown man, whom I have just now met, tells me in a serious manner, that it is lost; and affirms, that he himself standing on the bank, was a spectator of the scene; that he saw the passengers carried down the stream, and the boat overwhelmed. No person, who is influenced in his judgment of things, not by philosophical subtilties, but by common sense, a much surer guide, will hesitate to declare, that in such a testimony I have probable evidence of the fact asserted. But if leaving common sense, I shall recur to metaphysics, and submit to be tutored in my way of judging by the essayist, he will remind me,

that there is here a contest of two opposite experi∣ences, of which the one destroys the other, as far as its force goes, and the superior can only operate on the mind by the force which remains.

I am warned, that

the very same principle of experience, which gives me a certain degree of assurance in the testimony of the witness gives me also, in this case, another degree of assurance, against

the fact, which he endeavours to establish, from which contradiction there arises a counterpoise and mutual destruction of belief and authority * 1.12.

— Well, I would know the truth, if possible; and that I may conclude fairly and philosophically, how must I balance these opposite experiences, as you are pleased to term them? Must I set the thousand, or rather the two thousand instances of the one side, against the single instance of the other? In that case, 'tis easy to see, I have nineteen hundred and ninety-nine degrees of evidence that my information is false. Or, is it necessary, in order to make it credible, that the single instance have two thousand times as much evidence, as any of the opposite instances, supposing them equal among themselves; or supposing them unequal, as much as all the two thousand put together, that there may be at least an equilibrium? This is impossible. I had for some of those instances, the evidence of sense, which hardly any testimony can equal, much less exceed. Once more, must the evidence I have of the veracity of the witness, be a full equivalent to the two thousand instances, which oppose the fact attested? By the supposition, I have no positive evidence for or against his veracity, he being a person whom I never saw before. Yet if none of these be the balancing, which the essay-writer means, I despair of being able to discover his mean∣ing.

Is then so weak a proof from testimony incapable of being refuted? I am far from thinking so; tho' even so weak a proof could not be overturned by such a contrary experience. How then may it be

overturned? First, by contradictory testimony. Go∣ing homewards I meet another person, whom I know as little as I did the former; finding that he comes from the ferry, I ask him cencerning the truth of the report. He affirms that the whole is a fiction; that he saw the boat, and all in it, come safe to land. This would do more to turn the scale, than fifty thousand such contrary instances, as were sup∣posed. Yet this would not remove suspicion. In∣deed, if we were to consider the matter abstractly, one would think, that all suspicion would be removed, that the two opposite testimonies would destroy each other, and leave the mind entirely under the influence of its former experience, in the same state as if nei∣ther testimony had been given. But this is by no means consonant to fact. When once testimonies are introduced, former experience is generally of no account in the reckoning; it is but like the dust of the balance, which hath not any sensible effect upon the scales. The mind hangs in suspence between the two contrary declarations, and considers it as one to one, or equal improbability, that the report is true, or that it is false. Afterwards a third, and a fourth, and a fifth, confirm the declaration of the second. I am then quite at ease. Is this the only effectual way of confuting false testimony? No. I suppose again, that instead of meeting with any person who can inform me concerning the fact, I get from some, who are acquainted with the witness information concerning his character. They tell me, he is notorious for lying; and that his lies are commonly forged, not with a view to interest, but merely to gratify a malicious pleasure, which the takes in alarm∣ing

strangers. This, tho' not so direct a refutation as the former, will be sufficient to discredit his report. In the former, where there is testimony contradicting testimony, the author's metaphor of a balance may be used with propriety. The things weighed are homo∣geneal: and when contradictory evidences are pre∣sented to the mind, tending to prove positions which cannot be both true, the mind must decide on the comparative strength of the opposite evidences, before it yield to either.

But is this the case in the supposition first made? By no means. The two thousand instances formerly known, and the single instance attested, as they re∣late to different facts, tho' of a contrary nature, are not contradictory. There is no inconsistency in be∣lieving both. There is no inconsistency in receiving the last on weaker evidence, (if it be sufficient evidence) not only than all the former together, but even than any of them singly. Will it be said, that tho' the former instances are not themselves contradictory to to the fact recently attested, they lead to a conclu∣sion that is contradictory? I answer, 'Tis true, that the experienced frequency of the conjunction of any two events, leads the mind to infer a similar con∣junction in time to come. But let it at the same time be remarked, that no man considers this inference, as having equal evidence with any one of those past events, on which it is founded, and for the belief of which we have had sufficient testimony. Before then the method recommended by this author can turn to any account, it will be necessary for him to compute and determine with precision, how many hundreds,

how many thousands, I might say how many myri∣ads of instances, will confer such evidence on the conclusion founded on them, as will prove an equi∣poize for the testimony of one ocular witness, a man of probity, in a case of which he is allowed to be a competent judge.

There is in arithmetic a rule called REDUCTION, by which numbers of different denominations are brought to the same denomination. If this ingeni∣ous author shall invent a rule in logic, analogous to this, for reducing different classes of evidence to the same class, he will bless the world with a most im∣portant discovery. Then indeed he will have the honour to establish an everlasting peace in the repu∣blic of letters; then we shall have the happiness to see controversy of every kind, theological, historical, philosophical, receive its mortal wound: for though, in every question, we could not even then determine with certainty, on which side the truth lay, we could always determine (and that is the utmost the nature of the thing admits) with as much accuracy as geometry and algebra can afford, on which side the probability lay, and in what degree. But till this metaphysical reduction is discovered, 'twill beimpossible where the evidences are of different orders, to ascer∣tain by subtraction the superior evidence. We could not but esteem him a novice in arithmetic, who be∣ing asked, whether seven pounds or eleven pence make the greater sum, and what is the difference? should, by attending solely to the numbers, and over∣looking the value, conclude that eleven pence were the greater, and that it exceeded the other by four.

Must we not be equal novices in reasoning, if we follow the same absurd method? Must we not fall into as great blunders? Of as little significancy do we find the balance. Is the value of things hetero∣geneal to be determined merely by weight? Shall sil∣ver be weighed against lead, or copper agaist iron? If in exchange for a piece of gold, I were offered some counters of baser metal, is it not obvious, that till I know the comparative value of the metals, in vain shall I attempt to find what is equivalent, by the assistance either of scales or arithmetic?

'TIS an excellent observation, and much to the purpose, which the late learned and pious bishop of Durham, in his admirable performance on the analo∣gy of religion to the course of nature, hath made on this subject. "There is a very strong presumption," says he,

against the most ordinary facts, before the proof of them, which yet is overcome by almost a∣ny proof. There is a presumption of millions to one against the story of Caesar, or of any other man. For suppose a number of common facts, so and so circumstanced, of which one had no kind of proof, should happen to come into one's thoughts every one would, without any possible doubt, conclude them to be false. The like may be said of a single com∣mon fact * 1.13.

What then, I may subjoin, shall be said of an uncommon fact? And that an uncom∣mon fact may be proved by testimony, hath not yet been made a question. But in order to illustrate the observation above cited, suppose, first, one at random mentions, that at such an hour, of such a day, in such a

part of the heavens, a comet will appear; the con∣clusion from experience would not be as millions, but as infinite to one, that the proposition is false. In∣stead of this, suppose you have the testimony of but one ocular witness, a man of integrity, and skilled in astronomy, that at such an hour, of such a day, in such a part of the heavens, a comet did appear; you will not hesitate one moment to give him credit. Yet all the presumption that was against the truth of the first supposition, tho' almost as strong evidence as experience can afford, was also against the truth of the second, before it was thus attested.

It is necessary to urge further, in support of this doctrine, that as the water in the canal cannot be made to rise higher than the fountain whence it flows; so it is impossible, that the evidence of testimony, if it proceeded from experience, should ever exceed that of experience, which is its source? Yet that it greatly exceeds this evidence, appears not only from what hath been observed already, but still more, from what I shall have occasion to observe in the sequel. One may safely affirm, that no conceivable conclusion from experience, can possess stronger evidence, than that which ascertains us of the regular succession and duration of day and night. The reason is, the instances on which this experience is founded, are both with∣out number and without exception. Yet even this conclusion, the author admits, as we shall see in the third section, may, in a particular instance, not only be surmounted, but even annihilated by testimony.

Lastly, let it be observed, that the immediate con∣clusion from experience is always general, and runs thus: 'This is the ordinary course of nature.'

Such an event may reasonably be expected, where all the circumstances are entirely similar.

But when we descend to particulars, the conclusion becomes wea∣ker, being more indirect. For though all the known circumstances be similar, all the actual circum∣stances may not be similar: nor is it possible in any case to be assured (our knowledge of things being at best but superficial,) that all the actual circum∣stances are known to us. On the contrary, the direct conclusion from testimony is always particular, and runs thus;

This is the fact in such an individual instance.

The remark now made will serve both to throw light on some of the preceding observations and to indicate the proper sphere of each species of evi∣dence. Experience of the past is the only rule where∣by we can judge concerning the future: And as when the son is below the horizon, we must do the best we can by light of the moon, or even of the stars; so in all cases where we have no testimony, we are under a necessi∣ty of recurring to experience, and of balancing or numbering contrary observations * 1.14. But the evidence

resulting hence, even in the clearest cases, is ac∣knowledged to be so weak, compared with that which results from testimony, that the strongest conviction built merely on the former, may be overturned by the slightest proof exhibited by the latter. Accordingly the future hath in all ages and nations, been deno∣minated the province of conjecture and uncertain∣ty.

FROM what hath been said, the attentive reader will easily discover, that the author's argument against miracles, hath not the least affinity to the argument used by Dr Tillotson against transubstantiation, with which Mr Hume hath introduced his subject. Let us hear the argument, as it is related in the Essay, from the writings of the Archbishop.

'Tis acknowledged on all hands, says that learned prelate, that the au∣thority either of the scripture or of tradition, is founded merely on the testimony of the apostles, who were eye-witnesses to those miracles of our

Saviour, by which he proved his divine mission. Our evidence then for the truth of the Christian religion, is less than the evidence for the truth of our senses; because even in the first authors of our religion, it was no greater; and 'tis evident, it must diminish in passing from them to their disciples; nor can any one be so certain of the truth of their testimony, as of the immediate objects of his senses. But a weaker evidence can never destroy a stronger; and therefore, were the doctrine of the real pre∣sence ever so clearely revealed in scripture, 'twere directly contrary to the rules of just reasoning to give our assent to it. It contradicts sense, tho' both the scripture and tradition, on which it is supposed to be built, carry not such evidence with them as sense, when they are considered merely as external evidences, and are not brought home to every one's breast, by the immediate operation of the Holy Spirit. * 1.15

That the evidence of testimony is less than the evidence of sense, is undeniable. Sense is the source of that evidence, which is first transferred to the memory of the individual, as to a general reservoir, and thence transmitted to others by the channel of testimony. That the original evidence can never gain any thing, but must lose, by the transmission, is be∣yond dispute. What hath been rightly perceived, may be misremembered; what is rightly remembered may, thro' incapacity, or thro' ill intention, be mis∣reported; and what is rightly reported may be mis∣understood. In any of these four ways therefore,

either by defect of memory, of elocution, or of veracity in the relater, or by misapprehension in the hearer, there is a chance, that the truth received by the information of the senses, may be misrepresented or mistaken; now every such chance occasions a real diminution of the evidence. That the sacramental elements are bread and wine, not flesh and blood, our sight and touch, and taste, and smell concur in testify∣ing. If these senses are not to be credited, the apostles themselves could not have evidence of the mission of their master. For the greatest external evidence they had, or could have, of his mission, was that which their senses gave them, of the reality of his miracles. But whatever strength there is in this argument with regard to the apostles, the argument with regard to us, who, for those miracles, have only the evidence, not of our own senses, but of their testimony, is incompa∣rably stronger. In their case, it is sense contradicting sense; in ours it is sense contradicting testimony. But what relation has this to the author's argument? None at all. Testimony, it is acknowledged, is a weaker evidence than sense. But it hath been already evinced, that its evidence for particular facts is infinitely stronger than that which the gene∣ral conclusion from experience can afford us.— Testimony holds directly of memory and sense. Whatever is duly attested must be remembered by the witness; whatever is duly remembered must once have been perceived. But nothing similar takes place with regard to experience, nor can testimony, with any appearance of meaning, be said to hold of it.

THUS I have shown, as I proposed, that the au∣thor's reasoning proceeds on a false hypothesis. — It supposeth testimony to derive its evidence solely from experience, which is false.—It supposeth by consequence, that contrary observations have a weight in opposing testimony, which the first and most acknowledged principles of human reason, or, if you like the term better, common sense, evi∣dently shows that they have not.—It assigns a rule for discovering the superiority of contrary evidences, which, in the latitude there given it, tends to mislead the judgment, and which 'tis impossible, by any ex∣plication, to render of real use.

SECTION II. Mr Hume charged with some fallacies in his way of managing the argument.

IN the essay there is frequent mention of the word experience, and much use made of it. 'Tis strange that the author hath not favoured us with the definition of a term of so much moment to his argu∣ment. This defect I shall endeavour to supply; and the rather, as the word appears to be equivocal, and to be used by the essayist in two very different senses. The first and most proper signification of the word, which, for distinction's sake, I shall call personal experience, is that given in the preced|'ing section. 'It is,' as was observed,

founded in memory, and consists solely of the general maxims

or conclusions, that each individual hath formed, from the comparison of the particular facts he hath remembered.

In the other signification, in which the word is sometimes taken, and which I shall distinguish by the term derived, it may be thus de∣fined.

It is founded in testimony, and consists not only of all the experiences of others, which have thro' that channel been communicated to us, but of all the general maxims or conclusions we have formed, from the comparison of particular facts at∣tested.

In proposing his argument, the author would sure∣ly be understood to mean only personal experience; otherwise, his making testimony derive its light from an experience which derives its light from testimony, would be introducing what logicians term a circle in causes. It would exhibit the same things alternately, as causes and effects of each other. Yet nothing can be more limited, than the sense which is conveyed under the term experience, in the first acceptation. The merest clown or peasant derives incomparably more knowledge from testimony, and the commu∣nicated experience of others, than in the longest life he could have amassed out of the treasure of his own memory. Nay, to such a scanty portion the savage himself is not confined. If that therefore must be the rule, the only rule, by which every testimony is ultimately to be judged, our belief in matters of fact must have very narrow bounds. No testimony ought to have any weight with us, that doth not relate an event, similar at least to some one observation, which

we ourselves have had access to make. For exam∣ple, that there are such people on the earth as ne∣groes, could not, on that hypothesis, be rendered cre∣dible to one who had never seen a negro, not even by the most numerous and the most unexceptionable attestations. Against the admission of such testimony, however strong, the whole force of the author's ar∣gument evidently operates. But that innumerable absurdities would flow from this principle, I might easily evince, did I not think the task superfluous.

The author himself is aware of the consequences; and therefore, in whatever sense he uses the term experience in proposing his argument; in prosecuting it, he with great dexterity shifts the sense, and ere the reader is apprised, insinuates another.

'Tis a miracle,

says he,

that a dead man should come to life, because that has never been observed in any age or country. There must therefore be an uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appella∣tion * 1.16.

Here the phrase, an uniform experience against an event, in the latter clause, is implicitly de∣fined in the former, not what has never been observed BY US, but (mark his words) what has never been observed IN ANY AGE OR COUNTRY.— Now, what has been observed, and what has not been observed, in all ages and countries, pray how can you, Sir, or I, or any man, come to the knowledge of? Only I suppose by testimony, oral or written. The personal experience of every indi∣vidual is limited to but a part of one age, and com∣monly

to a narrow spot of one country. If there be any other way of being made acquainted with facts, 'tis to me, I own, an impenetrable secret; I have no apprehension of it. If there be not any, what shall we make of that cardinal point, on which his argument turns? 'Tis in plain language,

Testimo∣ny is not intitled to the least degree of faith, but as far as it is supported by such an extensive expe∣rience, as if we had not had a previous and inde∣pendent faith in testimony, we could never have acquired.

How natural is the transition from one sophism to another! You will soon be convinced of this, if you attend but a little to the strain of the argument. "A miracle," says he,

is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable expe∣rience hath established these laws, the proof against a miracle is as entire, as any argument from ex∣perience can possibly be imagined * 1.17.

Again,

As an uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the na∣ture of the fact, against the existence of any mi∣racle † 1.18.

I must once more ask the author what is the precise meaning of the words firm, unalterable, uniform? An experience that admits no exception, is surely the only experience, which can with propri∣ety be termed uniform, firm, unalterable. Now since, as was remarked above, the far greater part of this experience, which compriseth every age and every country, must be derived to us from testimony; that the experience may be firm, uniform, unalterable

there must be no contrary testimony whatever. Yet by the author's own hypothesis, the miracles he would thus confute, are supported by testimony At the same time to give strength to his argument, he is under a necessity of supposing, that there is no ex∣ception from the testimonies against them. Thus he falls into that paralogism, which is called begging the question. What he gives with one hand, he takes with the other. He admits, in opening his design, what in his argument he implicitly denies.

But that this, if possible, may be still more mani∣fest, let us attend a little to some expressions, which one would imagine he had inadvertently dropt. "So long," says he,

as the world endures, I pre∣sume, will the accounts of miracles and prodigies be found in all profane history * 1.19.

Why does he presume so? A man so much attached to experi∣ence, can hardly be suspected to have any other rea∣son than, because such accounts have hitherto been found in all the histories, profane as well as sacred, of times past. But we need not recur to an inference to obtain this acknowledgment. It is often to be met with in the essay. In one place we learn, that the witnesses for miracles are an infinite number † 1.20; in another, that all religious records of whatever kind abound with them ‡ 1.21. I leave it therefore to the author to explain, with what consistency he can assert, that the laws of nature are established by an uniform experience, (which experience is chiefly the result of testimony) and at the same time allow, that almost all human histories are full of the relations of

miracles and prodigies, which are violations of those laws. Here is, by his own confession, testimony against testimony, and very ample on both sides. How then can one side claim a firm, uniform, and unalterable support from testimony?

It will be in vain to object, that the testimony in support of the laws of nature, greatly exceeds the testimony for the violations of these laws; and that, if we are to be determined by the greater number of observations, we shall reject all miracles whatever. I ask, Why are the testimonies much more nume∣rous in the one case than in the other? The answer is obvious: Natural occurrences are much more fre∣quent than such as are preternatural. But are all the accounts we have of the pestilence to be rejected as incredible, because, in this country, we hear not so often of that disease, as of the fever? Or, because the number of natural births is infinitely greater than that of monsters, shall the evidence of the former be regarded as a confutation of all that can be advanced in proof of the latter? Such an objector needs to be reminded of what was proved in the foregoing secti∣on; that the opposite testimonies relate to different facts, and are therefore not contradictory; that the conclusion founded on them, possesseth not the evi∣dence of the facts on which it is founded, but only such a presumptive evidence, as may be surmounted by the slightest positive proof. A general conclusion from experience is in comparison but presumptive and indirect; sufficient testimony for a particular fact is direct and positive evidence.

I SHALL remark one other fallacy in this author's reasoning, before I conclude this section.

The In∣dian prince,

says he,

who refused to believe the first relations concerning the effects of frost, rea∣soned justly; and it naturally required very strong testimony to engage his assent to facts, which arose from a state of nature, with which he was unacquainted, and bore so little analogy to those events, of which he had had constant and uniform experience. Tho' they were not contrary to his experience, they were not conformable to it * 1.22.

Here a distinction is artfully suggested, between what is contrary to experience, and what is not con∣formable to it. The one he allows may be proved by testimony, but not the other. A distinction, for which the author seems to have so great use, it will not be improper to examine.

If my reader happen to be but little acquainted with Mr Hume's writings, or even with the piece here examined, I must intreat him, ere he proceed any farther, to give the essay an attentive perusal; and to take notice particularly, whether in one single passage, he can find any other sense given to the terms contrary to experience, but that which has not been experienced. Without this aid, I should not be surprised, that I found it difficult to convince the judicious, that a man of so much acuteness, one so much a philosopher as this author, should, with such formality, make a distinction, which not only the essay, but the whole tenour of his philosophical writings, shows evidently to have no meaning. Is

that which is contrary to experience a synonymous phrase for that which implies a contradiction? If this were the case, there would be no need to recur to experience for a refutation; it would refute itself. But 'tis equitable that the author himself be heard, who ought to be the best interpreter of his own words. "When the fact attested," says he,

is such a one, as has seldom fallen under our observation, here is a contest of two opposite experiences * 1.23.

In this pass∣age, not the being never experienced, but even the be∣ing seldom experienced constitutes an opposite experience. I can conceive no way but one, that the author can evade the force of this quotation; and that is, by obtruding on us, some new distinction between an opposite and a contrary experience. In order to pre∣clude such an attempt, I shall once more recur to his own authority.

'Tis no miracle that a man in seeming good health, should die of a sudden.

Why?

Because such a kind of death, tho' more unusual than any other, hath yet been frequently observed to happen. But 'tis a miracle that a dead man should come to life,

Why? Not because of any inconsistency in the thing. That a body should be this hour inanimate, and the next animated, is no more inconsistent, than the reverse that it should be this hour animated, and the next inanimate; though the one be common, and not the other. But the author himself answers the question:

Because that has never been observed in any age or country † 1.24.

All the contrariety then that there is in miracles to experience, doth, by his own concessi∣on,

consist solely in this, that they have never been observed; that is, they are not conformable to expe∣rience, To his experience personal or derived, he must certainly mean; to what he has had access to learn of different ages and countries. To speak beyond the knowledge he hath attained, would be ridiculous. It would be first supposing a miracle, and then inferring a contrary experience, instead of concluding from experience, that the fact is miraculous.

Now, I insist, that as far as regards the author's argument, a fact perfectly unusual, or not conformable to our experience, such a fact as, for aught we have had access to learn, was never observed in any age or country, is as incapable of proof from testimony, as miracles are; that, if this writer would argue consistently, he could never, on his own principles, reject the one and admit the other. Both ought to be rejected or neither. I would not, by this be thought to signify, that there is no difference between a miracle and an extraordinary event: I know that the former implies the interposal of an invisible agent, which is not implied in the latter. All that I intend to a sert is, that the anthor's argument equally affects them both. Why doth such interposal appear to him incredible? Not from any incongruity he discerns in the thing itself. He doth not pretend it. But 'tis not conformable to his experience. "A miracle," "says he," is a transgression of the law of nature * 1.25," But how are the laws of nature known to us? By experience. What is the criterion, whereby we must

judge, whether the laws of nature are transgressed? Solely the conformity or disconformity of events to our experience. This writer surely will not pretend, that we can have any knowledge a priori, either of the law, or of the violation.

Let us then examine by his own principles, whe∣ther the King of Siam, of whom the story he alludes to, is related by Locke † 1.26, could have sufficient evidence from testimony, of a fact so contrary to his experience as the freezing of water. He could just say as much of this event, as the author can say of a dead man's being restored to life.

Such a thing was never ob∣served, as far as I could learn, in any age or country.

If the things themselves too are imparti∣ally considered and independently of the notions ac∣quired by us in these northern climates, we should account the first at least as extraordinary as the second. That so pliant a body as water should become hard like pavement, so as to bear up an elephant on its sur∣face, is as unlikely in itself, as that a body inanimate to-day should be animated to-morrow. Nay, to the Indian monarch, I must think, that the first would appear more a miracle, more contrary to experience than the second. If he had been acquainted with ice or frozen water, and afterwards seen it become fluid; but had never seen nor learned, that after it was melted, it became hard again, the relation must have appeared marvellous, as the process from fluidity to hardness never had been experienced, tho' the reverse often had. But I believe nobody will que∣stion,

that on this supposition it would not have ap∣peared quite so strange, as it did. Yet this supposition makes the instance more parallel to the restoring of the dead to life. The process from animate to inanimate we are all acquainted with; and what is such a resto∣ration, but the reversing of this process? So little reason had the author to insinuate, that the one was only not conformable, the other contrary to experience. If there be a difference in this respect, the first to one alike unacquainted with both, must appear the more contrary of the two.

Does it alter the matter, that he calls the former

a fact which arose from a state of nature, with which the Indian was unacquainted?

Was not such a st•••••• quite unconformable, or (which in the author's language I have shown to be the same) contra∣ry to his experience? Is then a state of nature which is contrary to experience, more credible than a single fact contrary to experience? I want the solution of one difficulty: The author, in order to satisfy me, presents me with a thousand others. Is this suitable to the method he proposes in another place, of admit∣ting always the less miracle and rejecting the greater * 1.27? Is it not, on the contrary, admitting without any difficulty the greater miracle, and thereby removing the difficulty, which he otherwise would have had in admitting the less? Does he for∣get, that to exhibit a state of nature entirely differ∣ent from what we experience at present, is one of those enormous prodigies, which, in his account, render the Pentateuch unworthy of credit † 1.28? "No

Indian," says he in the note,

'tis evident, could have experience that water did not freeze in cold climates. This is placing nature in a situation quite unknown to him, and 'tis impossible for him to tell a priori, what will result from it.

This is precisely, as if, in reply to the author's objection from experience against the raising of a dead man (suppose Lazarus) to life, I should retort:

Neither you, Sir, nor any who live in this century can have experience, that a dead man could not be restored to life at the command of one divinely commissioned to give a revelation to men. This is placing nature in a situation quite unknown to you, and 'tis impossible for you to tell a priori what will result from it. This therefore is not contrary to the course of nature, in cases where all the cir∣cumstances are the same. As you never saw one vested with such a commission, you are as unexperienced, as ignorant of this point, as the inhabitants of Sumatra are of the frosts in Muscovy; you cannot therefore reasonably, any more than they, be positive as to the consequences.

Should he rejoin, as doubtless he would,

This is not taking away the difficulty; but, like the ele∣phant and the tortoise, in the account given by some barbarians of the manner in which the earth is supported, it only shifts the difficulty a step further back. My objection still recurs. That any man should be endowed with such power is contrary to experience, and therefore incredible:

Should he, I say, rejoin in this manner, I could only add.

Pray Sir, revise your own words lately quoted, and con∣sider

impartially whether they be not as glaringly exposed to the like reply.

For my part, I can only perceive one difference that is material between the two cases. You frankly confess, that with re∣gard to the freezing of water, besides the absolute want of experience, there would be from analogy a presump∣tion against it, which ought to weigh with a rational Indian. I think, on the contrary, in the case sup∣posed by me of one commissioned by Heaven, there is at least no presumption against the exertion of such a miraculous power. There is rather a presumption in its favour.

Does the author then say, that no testimony could give the King of Siam sufficient evidence of the effects of cold on water? No. By implication he says the contrary: "It required very strong testi∣mony." Will he say, that those most astonishing effects of electricity lately discovered, so entirely unanalogous to every thing before experienced, will he say, that such facts no reasonable man could have sufficient evidence from testimony to believe? No. We may presume, he will not, from his decision in the former case; and if he should, the common sense of mankind would reclaim against his extravagance. Yet 'tis obvious to every considerate reader, that his argument concludes equally against those truly mar∣vellous, as against miraculous events; both being alike unconformable, or alike contrary to former ex∣perience * 1.29.

THUS I think I have shown, that the author is chargeable with some fallacies, in his way of mana∣ging

the argument; that he all along avails himself of an ambiguity in the word experience; —that his reasoning includes a petitio principii in the bosom of it;— and that, in supporting his argument, he must have recourse to distinctions, where, even him∣self being judge, there is no difference.

SECTION III. Mr Hume himself gives up his favourite argument.

'MR Hume himself,' methinks I hear my reader repeating with astonishment,

gives up his favourite argument! To prove this point is indeed a very bold attempt.

Yet that this attempt is not altogether so arduous, as at first hearing, he will possibly imagine, I hope, if favoured a while with his attention, fully to convince him. If to acknowledge, after all, that there may be miracles, which admit of proof from human testimony; if to acknowledge, that such miracles ought to be received, not as probable only, but as absolutely certain; or, in other words, that the proof from human testimony may be such as that all the contrary uniform experience, should not only be overbalanced, but, to use the author's expression, should be annihilated; if such acknowledgments as these, are subversive of his own principles; if by making them, he abandons his darling argument; this strange part the essayist evidently acts.

"I own," these are his words,

there may pos∣sibly be miracles, or violations of the usual course of nature, of such a kind as to admit a proof from

human testimony, tho' perhaps

(in this he is modest enough, he avers nothing; perhaps)

it will be impossible to find any such in all the records of history.

To this declaration he subjoins the following suppsition:

Suppose all authors, in all languages, agree, that from the 1st of January 1700, there was a total darkness over the whole earth for eight days; suppose that the tradition of this extraordinary event, is still strong and lively among the people; that all travellers, who return from foreign countries, bring us accounts of the same tradition, without the least variation or contradiction: 'tis evident, that our present philo∣sophers, instead of doubting of that fact, ought to receive it for certain, and ought to search for the caus∣es, whence it might be derived * 1.30.

Could one imagine, that the person who had made the above acknowledgment, a person too who is justly allowed by all who are acquainted with his writings, to possess uncommon penetration and philosophical abilities, that this were the same individual, who had so short while before affirmed, that "a miracle," or a violation of the usual course of nature,

supported by any human testimony, is more properly a subject of derision than of argument † 1.31;

who had insisted, that

it is not requisite, in order to reject the fact, to be able accurately to disprove the testimony, and to trace its falsehood; that such an evidence carries falsehood on the very face of it ‡ 1.32;

that

we need but oppose even to

acloud of witnesses, the absolute impossibility, or,

which is all one,

miraculous nature of the events, which they relate; that this in the eyes of all reasonable people, will alone be regarded as a sufficient refutation * 1.33;

and who finally to put an end to all altercation on the subject had pronounced this oracle.

NO TESTIMONY FOR ANY KIND OF MIRACLE CAN EVER POSSIBLY AMOUNT TO A PROBABI∣LITY, MUCH LESS TO A PROOF † 1.34.

Was there ever a more glaring contradiction!

YET for the event supposed by the essayist, the testimony, in his judgment, would amount to a probability; nay to more than a probability, to a proof; let not the reader be astonished, or if he cannot fail to be astonished, let him not be incredulous, when I add, to more than a proof, more than a full, entire and direct proof; for even this I hope to make evi∣dent from the author's principles and reasoning. "And even supposing," says he, that is, granting for argument's sake,

that the testimony for a miracle amounted to a proof, 'twould be opposed by another proof, derived from the very nature of the fact, which it would endeavour to establish ‡ 1.35.

Here is then, by his own reasoning, proof against proof, from which there could result no belief or opinion, unless the one is conceived to be in some degree supe∣rior to the other. "Of which proofs," says he,

the strongest must prevail, but still with a diminuti∣on

of its force in proportion to that of its antago∣nist. * 1.36

Before the author could believe such a mi∣racle as he supposes, he must at least be satisfied that the proof of it from testimony is stronger than the proof against it from experience. That we may form an accurate judgment of the strength he here ascribes to testimony, let us consider what, by his own account, is the strength of the opposite proof from experience.

A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable expe∣rience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire, as any argument from experience can possi∣bly be imagined † 1.37.

Again,

As an uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle ‡ 1.38.

The proof then which the essayist admits from testimony, is, by his own estimate, not only superior to a direct and full proof; but even superior to as entire a proof, as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. Whence, I pray, doth testimony acquire such ama∣zing evidence? 'Testimony,' says the author,

hath no evidence, but what it derives from experi∣ence. These differ from each other only as the species from the genus.

Put then for testimony, the word experience, which in this case is equivalent, and the conclusion will run thus: Here is a proof from experience, which is superior to as entire a proof from experience as can possible be imagined. This

deduction from the author's words, the reader will percieve, is strictly logical. What the meaning of it is, I leave Mr Hume to explain.

What hath been above deduced, how much soever it be accounted, is not all that is implied in the con∣cession made by the author. He further says, that the miraculous fact so attested, ought not only to be re∣ceived, but to be received for certain. Is it not enough, Sir, that you have shown that your most full, most direct, most perfect argument may be over∣come; will nothing satisfy you now but its destruc∣tion? One would imagine, that you had conjured up this demon, by whose irresistible arm you proposed to give a mortal blow to religion, and render scepticism triumphant, (that you had conjured him up, I say) for no other purpose, but to show with what facility you could lay him. To be serious, does not this au∣thor remember, that he had oftener than once laid it down as a maxim, That when there is proof against proof, we must incline to the superior, still with a diminution of assurance, in proportion to the sorce of its antagonist * 1.39? But when a fact is received for certain, there can be no sensible diminution of assurance, such diminution always implying some doubt and uncertainty. Consequently the general proof from experience, tho' as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined, is not only surmounted, but is really in comparison as nothing, or, in Mr Hume's phrase, undergoes annihilation, when balanced with the particular proof from testi∣mony. Great indeed, it must be acknowledged, is

the force of truth. This conclusion, on the principles I have been endeavouring to establish, has nothing in it, but what is conceivable and just; but on the prin∣ciples of the essay, which deduce all the force of testi∣mony from experience, serves only to confound the understanding, and to involve the subject in midnight darkness.

'TIS therefore manifest, that either this author's principles condemn his own method of judging, with regard to miraculous facts; or that his method of judging subverts his principles, and is a tacit desertion of them. Thus that impregnable fortress, the asylum of infidelity, which he so lately gloried in ha∣ving erected, is in a moment abandoned by him, as a place untenable.

SECTION IV. There is no peculiar presumption against such miracles as are said to have been wrought in support of re∣ligion.

IS it then so, that the decisive argument, the essayist flattered himself he had discovered * 1.40, which with the wise and learned, was to prove an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and would consequently be useful, as long as the world endures; is it so, that this boasted argument hath in fact little or no influence on the discoverer himself! But this author may well be excused. He cannot be

always the metaphysician. He cannot soar incessant∣ly in the clouds. Such constant elevation suits not the lot of humanity. He must sometimes, whether he will or not, descend to a level with other people, and fall into the humble track of common sense. One thing however he is resolved on: If he cannot by metaphysic spells silence the most arrogant bigotry and superstition; he will at any rate, though for this purpose he should borrow aid from what he hath no liking to, trite and popular topics; he will at any rate free himself from their impertinent solicitations.

There are accordingly two principles in human nature, by which he accounts for all the relations, that have ever been in the world, concerning mi••••∣cles. These principles are, the passion for the mar∣vellous, and the religious affection * 1.41; against either of which singly, the philosopher, he says, ought ever to be on his guard; but incomparably more so, when both happen to be in strict confederacy together.

For if the spirit of r••ligion join itself to the love of wonder, there is an end of common sense; and human testimony, in these circumstances, loses all pretensions to authority. † 1.42

Notwithstanding this strong affirmation, there is reason to suspect that the author is not in his heart, so great an enemy to the love of wonder, as he affects to appear. No man can make a greater concession in favour of the won∣derful, than he hath done in the passage quoted in the preceding section. No man was ever fonder of para∣dox, and, in theoretical subjects, of every notion that is remote from sentiments universally received.

This love of paradox, he owns himself, that both his enemies and his friends reproach him with * 1.43. There must surely be some foundation for so universal a censure. If therefore, in respect of the passion for the marvellous, he differ from other people, the dif∣ference ariseth from a particular delicacy in this gentleman, which makes him nauseate even to wonder with the crowd. He is of that singular turn that where every body is struck with astonishment, he can see nothing wondrous in the least; at the same time he discovers prodigies, where no soul but himself ever dreamt that there were any.

We may therefore rest assured of it, that the author might be conciliated to the love of wonder, provided the spirit of religion be kept at a distance, against which he hath unluckily contracted a mortal antipathy, against which he has resolved to wage eternal war. When he but touches this subject, he loseth at once his philosophic composure, and speaks with an acrimony unusual to him on other occasions. Some thing of this kind appears from the citations already made. But if these should not satisfy, I shall produce one or two more, which certainly will. There is a second supposition the author makes of a miraculous event, in a certain manner circumstanced and attested, which he declares, and I think with particular pro∣priety, that he would

not have the least inclination to believe † 1.44.

At his want of inclination the reader will not be surprised, when he learns, that this sup∣posed miracle is concerning a resurrection; an event

which bears too strong a resemblance both to the doctrine and to the miracles of holy writ, not to alarm a modern Pyrrhonist. To the above declara∣tion he subjoins,

But should this miracle be ascribed to any new system of religion, men in all ages have been so much imposed on by ridiculous stories of that kind, that this very circumstance would be a full proof of a cheat, and sufficient with all men of sense, not only to make them reject the fact, but even reject it without further examination.

Again, a little after,

As the violations of truth are more common in the testimony concerning religious mi∣racles, than in that concerning any other matter of fact,

(a point which the author is positive, tho' he neither produceth facts nor arguments to support it)

this must diminish very much the au∣thority of the former testimony, and

(pray observe his words)

make us form a GENERAL RESOLUTION, never to lend any attention to it, with whatever specious pretext it may be covered.

Never did the passion of an inflamed orator, or the intemperate zeal of a religionist, carry him further against his adversary, than this man of speculation is carried by his prejudice against religion. Demagogues and bigots have often warned the people against list∣ening to the arguments of an envied and therefore de∣tested rival, lest by his sophistry they should be sedu∣ced into the most fatal errors. The same part this author, a philosopher, a sceptic, a dispassionate inquirer after truth, as surely he chuseth to be accounted, now acts in favour of infidelity. He thinks it not safe to give religion even a hearing.

Nay so strange a turn have matters taken of late with the managers of this controversy, that it is now the FREETHINKER who preaches implicit faith; 'tis the INFIDEL, who warns us of the danger of con∣sulting reason. Beware, says he, I admonish you, of inquiring into the strength of the plea, or of bringing it to the deceitful test of reason; for

those who will be so SILLY as to examine the affair by that medium, and seek particular flaws in the testimony, are almost sure to be confounded * 1.45.

That religion is concerned in the matter, is reckoned by these sages sufficient evidence of imposture. The proofs she offers in her own defence, we are told by these candid judges, ought to be rejected, and rejected without examination. The old way of scrutiny and argument must now be laid aside, having been at length discovered to be but a bungling, a tedious, and a dangerous way at best. What then shall we sub∣stitute in its place? The essayist hath a most admi∣rable expedient. A shorter and surer method he re∣commends to us, the expeditious way of resolution. 'Form,' says he,

a GENERAL RESOLUTION, never to lend any attention to testimonies or facts urgedby reli∣gion, with whatever specious pretext they may be covered.

I had almost congratulated Mr Hume, and our enlightened age, on this happy invention, before I reflected, that tho' the application might be new, the expedient itself, of resolving to be deaf to argument, was very ancient, having been often with great suc∣cess employed against atheists and heretics, and warm∣ly recommended by Bellarmine and Scotus, and most

others of that bright fraternity the schoolmen: Per∣sons, I acknowledge, to whom one could not, per∣haps in any other instance, find a resemblance in my ingenious opponent.

I'm afraid that after such a declaration, I must not presume to consider myself as arguing with the au∣thor, who hath, in so peremptory a manner, resolved to attend to nothing that can be said in opposition to his theory. 'What judgment he has,' to use his own expression,

he has renounced by principle, in these sublime and mysterious subjects * 1.46,

If how∣ever it should prove the fate of these papers, the for∣bidding title of them notwithstanding, to be at any time honoured with the perusal of some infidel, not indeed so rivetted in unbelief as the essayist, I would earnestly intreat such reader, in the solemn style of Mr Hume,

To lay his hand upon his heart, and after serious consideration declare * 1.47,

If any of the patrons of religion had acted this part, and warned people not to try by argument the metaphysical sub∣tleties of the adversaries, affirming, that

they who were MAD enough to examine the affair by that medium, and seek particular flaws in the reasoning, were almost sure to be confounded; that the only prudent method was, to form a GENERAL RESO∣LUTION, never to lend any attention to what was advanced on the opposite side, however specious;

whether this conduct would not have afforded great matter of triumph to those gentlemen the deists; whether it would not have been construed by them, and even justly, into a tacit conviction of the weak∣ness of our cause, which we were afraid of exposing

in the light, and bringing to a fair trial. But we scorn to take shelter in obscurity, and meanly to de∣cline the combat; confident as we are, that REASON is our ally and our friend, and glad to find that the e∣nemy at length so violently suspects her.

As to the first method, by which the author ac∣counts for the fabulous relations of monsters and pro∣digies, 'tis freely acknowledged, that the Creator hath implanted in human nature, as a spur to the improve∣ment of the understanding, a principle of curiosity, which makes the mind feel a particular pleasure in every new acquisition of knowledge. 'Tis acknow∣ledged also, that as every principle in our nature is liable to abuse, so this principle will often give the mind a bias to the marvellous, for the more marvel∣lous any thing is, that is, the more unlike to all that hath formerly been known, the more new it is; and this bias, in many instances, may induce belief on insufficient evidence.

But the presumption that hence ariseth against the marvellous is not stronger in the case of miracles (as will appear from an attentive perusal of the second section) than in the case of every fact that is perfectly extraordinary. Yet how easily this obstacle may be overcome by testimony, might be illustrated, if ne∣cessary, in almost every branch of science, in physio∣logy, in geography, in history. On the contrary, what an immense impediment would this presumpti∣on prove to the progress of philosophy and letters, had it in reality one fiftieth-part of the strength which the author seems to attribute to it. I shall not tire my reader or myself by recurring to the philosophic

wonders in electricity, chymistry, magnetism, which, all the world sees, may be fully proved to us by te∣stimony, before we make the experiments our∣selves.

BUT there is, it seems, additional to this, a pecu∣liar presumpti•••• against religious miracles.

The wise,

as the author hath observed with reason,

lend a very academic faith to every report, which favours the passion of the reporter, whether it magnifies his country, his family, or himself, or in any other way strikes in with his natural incli∣nations and propensities * 1.48.

Now, as no object whatever operates more powerfully on the fancy than religion does, or works up the passions to a higher fervour; so, in matters relating to this subject, if in any subject, we have reason to suspect that the understanding will prove a dupe to the passions. On this point therefore we ought to be peculiarly cauti∣ous, that we be not hasty of belief. In this senti∣ment we all agree.

But there is one circumstance, which he hath o∣verlooked, and which is nevertheless of the greatest consequence in the debate. It is this, that the pre∣judice resulting from the religious affection, may just as readily obstruct, as promote our faith in a reli∣gious miracle. What things in nature are more con∣trary, than one religion is to another religion? They are just as contrary as light and darkness, truth and error. The affections, with which they are contem∣plated by the same person, are just as opposite, as

desire and aversion, love and hatred. The same re∣ligious zeal which gives the mind of a Christian, a propensity to the belief of a miracle in support of Christianity, will inspire him with an aversion from the belief of a miracle in support of Mahometism. The same principle, which will make him acquiesce in evidence less than sufficient in the one case, will make him require evidence more than sufficient in the other.

Before then the remark of the author can be of any use in directing our judgment, as to the evidence of miracles attested, we must consider whether the original tenets of the witnesses would naturally have blassed their m••nds in favour of the miracles, or in opposition to them. If the former was the case, the testimony is so much the less to be regarded; if the latter, so much the more. Will it satisfy on this head to acquaint us, that the prejudices of the wit∣nesses must have favoured the miracles, since they were zealous promoters of the doctrine, in support of which those miracles are said to have been per∣formed? To answer thus would be to misunderstand the point. The question is, Was this doctrine the faith of the witnesses, before they saw, or fancied they saw the miracles? If it was, I agree with him. Great, very great allowance must be made for the prejudices of education, for principles, early perhaps, carefully, and deeply roote•• in their minds, and for the religious affection founded in these principles; which allowance must always derogate from the weight of their testimony. But if the faith of the witnesses stood originally in opposition to the doctrine

attested by the miracles; if the only account that can be given of their conversion, is the conviction which the miracles produced in them; it must be a preposterous way of arguing, to derive their convic∣tion from a religious zeal, which would at first ob∣stinately withstand, and for some time hinder such conviction. On the contrary, that the evidence ari∣sing from miracles performed in proof of a doctrine disbelieved, and consequently hated before, did in fact surmount that obstacle, and conquer all the op∣position arising thence, is a very strong presumption in favour of that evidence: just as strong a presump∣tion in its favour, as it would have been against it, had all their former zeal, and principles, and preju∣dices, co-operated with the evidence, whatever it was, in gaining an entire assent.

Hence there is the greatest disparity in this respect, a disparity which deserves to be particularly attended to, betwixt the evidence of miracles performed in proof of a religion to be established, and in contradic∣tion to opinions generally received; and the evidence of miracles performed in support of a religion already established, and in confirmation of opinions generally received. Hence also the greatest disparity betwixt the miracles recorded by the evangelists, and those related by Mariana, Bede, or any monkish historian.

THERE is then no peculiar presumption against re∣ligious miracles merely as such; if in certain cir∣cumstances there is a presumption against them; the presumption ariseth solely from the circumstances, insomuch that, in the opposite circumstances, it is as strongly in their favour.

SECTION V. There is a peculiar presumption in favour of such miracles as are said to have been wrought in support of religion.

IN this section I propose to consider the reverse of the question treated in the former. In the former I proved that there is no peculiar presumption against religious miracles; I now inquire whether there be any in their favour. The question is important, and intimately connected with the subject.

THE boldest infidel will not deny, that the immortality of the soul, a future and eternal state, and the connection of our happiness or misery in that state, with our present good or bad conduct, not to mention the doctrines concerning the divine unity and perfec∣tions, are tenets which carry no absurdity in them. They may be true for aught he knows. He dis∣believes them, not because they are incredible in themselves, but because he hath not evidence of their truth. He pretends not to disprove them, nor does he think the task incumbent on him. He only pleads, that before he can yield them his assent, they must be proved.

Now, as whatever is possible, may be supposed, let us suppose that the dogmas above mentioned are all infallible truths; and let the unbeliever say, whether he can conceive an object worthier of the Divine in∣terposal, than to reveal these truths to mankind? and

to enforce them in such a manner, as may give them a suitable influence on the heart and life. Of all the inhabitants of the earth, man is incomparably the noblest. Whatever therefore regards the interest of the human species, is a grander concern, than what regards either the inanimate or the brute creation. If man was made, as is doubtless not impossible, for an after state of immorality; whatever relates to that immortal state, or may conduce to prepare him for the fruition of it, must be immensely superior to that which concerns merely the transient en∣joyments of the present life. How sublime then is the object which religion, and religion only, exhi∣bits as the ground of supernatural interpositions! This object is no other than the interest of man, a reasonable and moral agent, the only being in this lower world which bears in his soul the image of his Maker; not the interest of an individual, but of the kind; not for a limited duration, but for eternity: an object at least in one respect adequate to the ma∣jesty of God.

Does this appear to the essayist too much like ar∣guing a priori, of which I know he hath a detestation? It is just such an argument, as, presupposing the most rational principles of Deism, results from those max∣ims concerning intelligent causes, and their operations, which are founded in general experience, and which uniformly lead us to expect, that the end will be pro∣portionate to the means. The Pagans of Rome had notions of their divinities infinitely inferior to the opi∣nions concerning God, which in Christian countries are maintained even by those, who, for distinction's

sake, are called DEISTS. Yet such of the former as had any justness of taste, were offended with those po∣ets, who, exhibited the celestials on slight occasions, and for trivial purposes, interfering in the affairs of men. Why? Because such an exhibition shocked all the principles of probability. It had not that veri∣similitude which is absolutely necessary to render fic∣tion agreeable. Accordingly it is a precept, with re∣lation to the machinery of the drama, given by one who was both a critic and a poet, That a god must never be introduced, unless to accomplish some important design which could not be otherwise effectuated * 1.49. The foun∣dation of this rule, which is that of my argument, is therefore one of those indisputable principles, which are found every where, among the earliest results of experience.

THUS it appears, that from the dignity of the end, there ariseth a peculiar presumption in favour of such miracles, as are said to have been wrought in support of religion.

SECTION VI. Inquiry into the meaning and propriety of one of Mr Hume's favourite maxims.

THERE is a method truly curious, suggested by the author, for extricating the mind, should the evidence from testimony be so great, that its false∣hood

might, as he terms it, be accounted miraculous. In this puzzling case, when a man is so beset with miracles, that he is under a necessity of admitting one, he must always take care it be the smallest; for it is an axiom in this writers DIALECTIC, That the probability of the fact is in the inverse ratio of the quantity of miracle there is in it. "I weigh," says he,

the one miracle against the other, and according to the supe∣riority which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle * 1.50.

Now, of this method, which will no doubt be thought by many to be very ingenious, and which appears to the essayist both very momentous and very perspicuous, I own, I am not able to discover either the reasonableness or the use.

First, I cannot see the reasonableness. 'A miracle,' to adopt his own definition,

implies the transgres∣sion,

or rather the suspension,

of some law of na∣ture; and that either by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposal of some invisible agent † 1.51.

Now, as I should think, from the principles laid down in the preceding section, that it would be for no trifling purpose, that the laws of nature would be suspended, and either the Deity or an invisible agent would interpose; 'tis on the same principles, natural to imagine, that the means, or miracle performed, should bear a proportion in respect of dignity and greatness, to the end proposed. Were I therefore under such a necessity as is supposed by Mr Hume, of ad∣mitting

the truth of a miracle, I acknowledge, that of two contradictory miracles, where all other circum∣stances are equal, I should think it reasonable to be∣lieve the greater. I shall borrow an illustration from the author himself. "A miracle," he says,

may either be discoverable by men or not. This alters not its nature and essence. The raising of a house or ship into the air is a visible miracle; the raising of a feather, when the wind wants ever so little of a force requisite for that purpose is as real a miracle, tho' not so sensible with regard to us * 1.52.

Surely if any miracle may be called little, the last mentioned is intitled to that denomination, not only because it is an undiscoverable and insensible miracle, but because the quantum of miraculous force requisite, is, by the hypothesis, ever so little, or the least conceivable. Yet if it were certain, that God, angel, or spirit, were, for one of those purposes, to interpose in sus∣pending the laws of nature; I believe most men would join with me in thinking, that it would be ra∣ther for the raising of a house or ship than for the rai∣sing of a feather.

But though the maxim laid down by the author were just, I cannot discover in what instance, or by what application, it can be rendered of any utility. Why? Because we have no rule, whereby we can judge of the greatness of miracles. I allow, that in such a singular instance, as that above quoted from the essay, we may judge safely enough. But that can be of no practical use. In almost every case that

will occur, I may warrantably aver, that it will be impossible for the acutest intellect to decide, which of the two is the greater miracle. As to the author, I cannot find that he has favoured us with any light in so important and so critical a question. Have we not then some reason to dread, that the task will not be less difficult to furnish us with a measure, by which we can determine the magnitude of miracles; than to provide us with a balance, by which we can ascertain the comparative weight of testimonies and experiences?

If leaving the speculations of the essayist, we shall, in order to be assisted on this subject, recur to his ex∣ample and decisions: let us consider the miracle which was recited in the third section, and which he declares, would, on the evidence of such testimony as he supposes, not only be probable, but certain. For my part, 'tis not in my power to conceive a great∣ter miracle than that is. The whole universe is af∣fected by it; the earth, the sun, the moon, the stars. The most invariable laws of nature with which we are acquainted, even those which regulate the mo∣tions of the heavenly bodies, and dispense darkness and light to worlds, are violated. I appeal to the author himself, whether it could be called a great∣er, or even so great a miracle, that all the writers at that time, or even all mankind, had been seized with a new species of epidemical delirium, which had given rise to this strange illusion. But in this the au∣thor is remarkably unfortunate, that the principles by which he in fact regulates his judgment and belief,

are often the reverse of those which he endeavours to establish in his theory.

SHALL I hazard a conjecture? It is, that the word miracle, as thus used by the author, is used in a vague and improper sense, as a synonymous term for improbable; and that believing the less, and reject∣ing the greater miracle, denote simply believing what is least, and rejecting what is most improbable; o•• still more explicitly believing what we think most worthy of belief, and rejecting what we think least worthy. I am aware, on a second perusal of the author's words, that my talent in guessing may be justly questioned. He hath in effect told us himself what he means. "When any one," says he,

tells me, that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself, whether it be more probable, that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact he relates, should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other; and according to the superiority which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous than the event which he relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion * 1.53.

At first indeed one is ready to exclaim, What a strange revolution is here! The belief of miracles then, even by Mr Hume's account, is absolutely inevitable. Miracles them∣selves too, so far from being impossible, or even extraordinary, are the commonest things in nature;

so common, that when any miraculous fact is attested to us, we are equally under a necessity of believing a miracle, whether we believe the fact, or deny it. The whole difference between the essayist and us, is at length reduced to this single point, Whether greater or smaller miracles are intitled to the prefer∣ence. This mystery however vanishes on a nearer inspection. The style, we find, is figurative, and the author is all the while amusing both his readers and himself with an unusual application of a familiar term. What is called the weighing of probabilities in one sentence, is the weighing of miracles in the next. If it were asked, For what reason did not Mr Hume express his sentiment in ordinary and proper words? I could only answer, I know no reason but one, and that is, To give the appearance of novelty and depth to one of those very harmless propositions, which by philosophers are called identical, and which, to say the truth, need some disguise, to make them pass upon the world with tolerable decency.

What then shall be said of the conclusion which he gives as the sum and quintessence of the first part of the essay? The best thing for aught I know, that can be said, is, that it contains a most certain truth, tho' at the same time the least significant, that ever perhaps was ushered into the world with so much solemnity. In order, therefore, to make plainer English of his plain consequence, let us only change the word miraculous, as applyed to the falsehood of human testimony, into improbable, which in this passage is entirely equivalent, and observe the effect produced

by this elucidation.

The plain consequence is, and 'tis a GENERAL MAXIM, worthy of our at∣tention, That NO TESTIMONY IS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH A MIRACLE; UNLESS THE TESTIMONY BE OF SUCH A KIND, THAT ITS FALSEHOOD WOULD BE MORE IMPROBABLE, THAN THE FACT WHICH IT ENDEAVOURS TO ESTABLISH * 1.54.

If the reader thinks himself instructed by this discovery, I should be loth to envy him the pleasure he may derive from it.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Page 194.
• † 1.2

  p. 20••
• * 1.3

  p. 174.
• † 1.4

  p. 175, 176.
• ‡ 1.5

  ibid.
• * 1.6

  P. 176.
• † 1.7

  p. 179.
• ‡ 1.8

  p. 180.
• * 1.9

  Sceptical doubts. Part 2.
• * 1.10

  p. 184.
• † 1.11

  p. 179.
• * 1.12

  p. 179.
• * 1.13

  Part 2. chap. 2. § 3.
• * 1.14

  Where-ever such balancing or numbering can take place, the opposite evidences must be entirely similar. It will rarely assist us in judging of facts supported by testimony; for even where contradictory testimonies come to be considered, you will hardly find that the characters of the witnesses on the opposite sides are so precisely equal, as that an arithmetical operation will evolve the credibility. In matters of pure experience it hath often place. Hence the computations that have been made of the value of an∣nuities, insurances, and several other commercial articles. In calculations concerning chances, the degree of probability may be determined with mathematical exactness. I shall here take the liberty, tho' the matter be not essential to the design of this tract, to correct an oversight in the essayist, who always supposes, that where contrary evidences must be balanced, the probability lies in the remainder or surplus, when the less number is subtracted from the greater. The probability doth not consist in the sur∣plus, but in the ratio, or geometrical proportion, which the num∣bers on the opposite sides bear to each other. I explain myself thus. In favour of one supposed event, there are 100 similar in∣stances, against it 50. In another case under consideration, the favourable instances are 60, and only 10 unfavourable. Though the difference, or arithmetical proportion, which is 50, be the same in both cases, the probability is by no means equal, as the author's way of reasoning implies. The probability of the first event is as 100 to 50, or 2 to 1. The probability of the second is as 60 to 10, or 6 to 1. Consequently on comparing the dif∣ferent examples, tho' both be probable, the second is thrice as probable as the first.
• * 1.15

  p. 173, 174.
• * 1.16

  p. 181.
• * 1.17

  p. 180.
• † 1.18

  p. 181.
• * 1.19

  p. 174.
• † 1.20

  p: 190:
• ‡ 1.21

  p. 191:
• * 1.22

  p. 179.
• * 1.23

  p. 179.
• † 1.24

  p. 181.
• * 1.25

  p. 182. in the note.
• † 1.26

  Essay on human understanding, book 4. chap. 2. § 5.
• * 1.27

  p. 182.
• † 1.28

  p. 206.
• * 1.29

  I cannot forbear to observe, that many of the principal terms employed in the essay, are used in a manner extremely vague and unphilosophical. I have remarked the confusion I find in the ap∣plication of the words, experience, contrariety, conformity: I might remark the same thing of the word, miracle. "A miracle," 'tis said, p. 182, in the note,

  may be accurately defined, A TRANS∣GRESSION of a law of nature, by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposal of some invisible agent.

  The word transgres∣sion invariably denotes a criminal opposition to authority. The author's accuracy in representing God as a transgressor, I have not the perspicacity to discern. Does he intend, by throwing something monstrous into the definition, to infuse into the reader a prejudice against the thing defined? But supposing that thro' inadvertency, he had used the term transgression, instead of suspen∣sion, which would have been both intelligible and proper; one would at least expect, that the word miracle in the essay, always exprest the sense of the definition. But this it evidently does not. Thus in the instance of the miracle supposed (p. 203, in the note) he calls it, in the beginning of the paragraph,

  A violation of the usual course of nature;

  but in the end, after telling us that such a miracle, on the evidence supposed,

  our present phi∣losophers ought to receive for certain,

  he subjoins, (how con∣sistently, let the reader judge)

  and ought to search for the causes, whence it might be derived.

  Thus it is insinuated, that tho' a fact apparently miraculous, and perfectly extraordina∣ry, might be admitted by a philosopher, still the reality of the miracle must be denied. For if the interposal of the Deity be the proper solution of the phenomenon, why should we recur to na∣tural causes? Hence a careless reader is insensibly led to think, that there is some special incredibility in such an interposal, distinct from its uncommonness. Yet the author's great argument is built on this single circumstance, and places such an interposition just on the same footing with every event that is equally uncom∣mon. At one time, he uses the word miracle to denote a bare improbability, as will appear in the sixth section: at another, ab∣surd and miraculous are, with him, synonymous terms; so are also the miraculous nature of an event, and its absolute impossibility. Is this the style and manner of a reasoner?
• * 1.30

  p. 203, in the note.
• † 1.31

  p. 194.
• ‡ 1.32

  ib.
• * 1.33

  p. 196, &c.
• † 1.34

  p. 202.
• ‡ 1.35

  ib.
• * 1.36

  p. 180.
• † 1.37

  ibid.
• ‡ 1.38

  p. 181.
• * 1.39

  p. 178. 180.
• * 1.40

  p. 174.
• * 1.41

  p. 164. 185.
• † 1.42

  ib.
• * 1.43

  Dedication to the four dissertations.
• † 1.44

  p. 204. in the note.
• * 1.45

  p. 197. in the note.
• * 1.46

  p. 185.
• * 1.47

  p. 185.
• * 1.48

  p. 200.
• * 1.49

  Nec deus intersit, ••isi dignus vindice nodus Inciderit.

  HORAT.
• * 1.50

  p. 182.
• † 1.51

  Ib. in the note.
• * 1.52

  p. 182. in the note.
• * 1.53

  182.
• * 1.54

  p. 182.