Observations upon the proposed plan of federal government. With an attempt to answer some of the principal objections that have been made to it. / By a native of Virginia.

PLAN OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

WE, the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquillity, provide for the Common Defence, promote the General Wel∣fare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to Ourselves and our Posterity, do Ordain and Establish this CONSTITUTION for the UNITED STATES of AMERICA.

THE introduction, like a preamble to a law, is the key of the Constitution. Whenever federal power is exercised, ••••ntrary to the spirit breathed by this introduction, it will be inconstitutionally exercised, and ought to be resisted by the people.

ARTICLE I.

Section 1. All legislative powers herein granted, shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of •• Senate and House of Representatives.

IT is necessary to observe that, Congress consists only of•• Senate, and House of Representatives. The President make no part of it; for his negative only amounts to a reconsidera¦tion of the public measures; as notwithstanding his disappro¦bation, a bill becomes a law, if two thirds of each House agre•• to it.

Sect. 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed •• members chosen every second year by the people of the sever•• States, and the electors in each State shall have the qualification requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the Sta•• Legislature.

It will be asked by some,—Why should the Representative to Congress be elected for two years, when in Virginia and th•• other States, the State Delegates are annually chosen? I answer to this question a variety of reasons occur; such as tha•• they will have a great distance to go: That the purposes •• their Legislation being purely federal, it will take them som•• time to become acquainted with the situation and interests •• the respective States, as well as the relative situation and in¦terest of the whole Union: That it would be difficult to g•• men of abilities to serve in an office, the re-election to whic•• would be so frequent. If the election had been once in thr•• years, it would perhaps have been an improvement. The u••¦stable councils, the feeble laws, the relaxation of governme•••• which afflict this, and almost every State in the Union, ma•• justly be attributed to the frequent changes which take pla•••• among the rulers in all the American governments.

Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among a several States which may be included within this Union, ac∣••••••ing to their respective numbers, which shall be determined, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 adding to the whole number of free persons, including those ••••nd to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not ••••xed, three-fifths of all other persons. The actual enumeration ••hall be made within three years after the first meeting of the ••ongress of the United States, and within every subsequent term ••f ten years, in such manner as they shall by law direct. The ••••mber of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty ••housand, but each State shall have at least one Representative: And until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to choose three; Massachusetts, eight; Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations, one; Connecticut, 〈◊〉〈◊〉, New-York, six; New-Jersey, four; Pennsylvania, eight; Delaware, one; Maryland, six; Virginia, ten; North-Caro∣••••na, five; South-Carolina, five; and Georgia, three.

EVERY free person counts one, every five slaves ••ount three. ••y this regulation our consequence in the Union is increased, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 an increase of numbers in the Congress. But some objectors ••gue that this arrangement is unjust; and that it bears hard ••on the southern States, who have been accustomed to con∣••••der their slaves merely as property; as a subject for, not as ••ents to taxation; and therefore by adding three fifths of our ••ves to the free persons, our numbers are increased; and con∣••••quently by how much is that increase, by so much is the in∣••••••ase of our federal burthen. It is true, that slaves are pro∣••••rty,—but are they not persons too? Does not their labour ••••••oduce wealth? And is it not by the produce of labour, that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 taxes must be paid? The Convention justly considered 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in the light of persons, rather than property: But at the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 time conceiving their natural forces inferior to those of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 whites: knowing that they require freemen to overlook

them, and that they enfeeble the State which possesses them, they equitably considered five slaves only of equal consequence with three free persons. What rule of federal taxation so equal, and at the same time so little unfavourable to the south∣ern States, could the Convention have established, as that of num∣bers so arranged? Suppose the value of the lands in the respective States had been adopted as the measure: Let us see what then would have been the consequence. The northern States are comparatively small to the southern, and are very populous; whilst to the southward, the inhabitants are scattered over a great extent of territory. Any given number of men in the latter States possess much greater quantities of land, than the like number in the former. It is true the lands to the north∣ward sell for a greater price than those to the southward, but the difference in price is by no means adequate to the difference in quantity; consequently an equal number of men to the southward would have to pay a much greater federal tax than the like number to the northward.

BY the 8th article of Confederation, the value of lands is made the measure of the federal quotas. Virginia in conse∣quence is rated something above Massachusetts, whose num∣ber of white inhabitants is nearly double.

AFTER all, this point is perhaps of no great consequence The Congress probably will rarely, if ever, meddle with direct taxation, as the impost duties will in all likelihood answer al•• the purposes of government, or at any rate the post-office which is daily increasing, and a tax upon instruments of writ¦ing, will supply any deficiency.

INDIANS are mentioned in this clause because there are na¦tions of Indians within the limits of several of the States.

When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive authority thereof shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies.

THE Convention attentive to the preservation of the conse∣quence of each State, have intrusted to the Executives thereof, the power of issuing writs of elections when vacancies happen. An additional security to the independance of the individual States.

The House of Representatives shall choose their Speaker and ther officers; and shall have the sole power of impeachment.

THE Representatives in Congress possess the sole power of ••mpeachment: But here it may be observed, that they cannot ••mpeach one of their own body; but have the power of expul∣••on, when two-thirds of their body shall agree.

Sect. 3. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of ••o Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 six years; and each Senator shall have one vote.

THE inequality of the representation of the Senate, has ••••en made a great ground of objection.

WE should never forget that this is a government proposed ••••r thirteen independent States, unequal in population, and ••••tent of territory, and differing in a variety of other circum∣••••nces. It will not be denied that the small, have an equal ••••ght to preserve their independence with the large States; ••••••d this was their only means of preserving it. The justice of ••is is acknowledged by most of the objectors and amenders of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 plan.

WE should here also recollect, that under the Confederation ••••ich at present exists, the small States have a vote in all re∣spects

equal to the large, even to Virginia; and it certainly was a great point gained by the large ones, to get their consequence increased in the House of Representatives in proportion to their numbers. In the United Provinces each of the seven States has but one vote in their Congress, and in that Confede∣ration the disproportion between the States is much greater, than in ours; for the Province of Holland pays rather more than one half of the whole federal quota. Yet so great are the evils which would arise from a disunion, that this wealthy Pro∣vince readily submits to so unequal a representation.

Immediately after they shall be assembled in consequence of the first election, they shall be divided as equally as may be, into three classes. The seats of the Senators of the first class shall be vacat∣ed at the expiration of the second year; of the second class, at the expiration of the fourth year; and of the third class, at the expiration of the sixth year; so that one third may be chosen every second year: And if vacancies happen by resignation, o•• otherwise, during the recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary appointments until the next meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such va¦cancies.

No person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the age of thirty years, and been nine years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State fo•• which he shall be chosen.

NOTWITHSTANDING the Senators are to be chosen by the Legislatures of the respective States, who surely are compe∣tent judges of those who are most capable of filling this impor∣tant office: Notwithstanding one third of them are re-chosen every two years: Yet the enemies to the Constitution affect to call this an aristocratic body: And endeavour to excite visionary fears in the minds of men, that they will form a dis∣tinct order in the State, and become formidable to the libert••

of America. I am not gifted with the spirit of prophecy, and there∣fore cannot say what will happen; but this I will boldly assert, that if power cannot be trusted in the hands of men so ap∣pointed, it can be trusted no where. The different States will be well acquainted with the characters of those whom they elect to the Senate; their time of duration when elected is too short to enable them to form dangerous intrigues, or bring about important revolutions. It is a well established principle in rhetorick, that it is not fair to argue against a thing, from the abuse of it. Would you say there should be no Physicians be∣cause there are unskilful administers of medicine: No Law∣yers because some are dishonest: No Courts because Judges are sometimes ignorant; nor government because power may be abused? In short, it is impossible to guard entirely against the abuse of power. Annual elections will not do it. The Delegates of Virginia are annually elected, yet it is a fact, that there has not been an Assembly since the government was framed, wherein the Bill of Rights and the Constitution have not been infringed. The instances have been of no great im∣portance and therefore notwithstanding the danger of the prin∣ciple, they have been overlooked.

The Vice-President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no vote, unless they be equally divided.

The Senate shall choose their other officers, and also a Presi∣dent pro tempore, in the absence of the Vice-President, or when ••••e shall exercise the office of President of the United States.

THE Vice-President has been introduced from the State Government of New York. This useful, though surely inoffensive officer, has been made by some objectors the bugbear of the Con∣••titution. It is a strong proof of want of argument in the ene∣mies to it, when they hold up this officer as dangerous. He is ••lected by the same persons as the President, and in the same

manner. He presides in the Senate, but has no vote except when they are divided. This is the only power incident to his office whilst he continues Vice-President; and he is obviously introduced into the government to prevent the ill-consequen∣ces which might otherwise happen from the death or removal of the President. This is the purpose for which a similar offi∣cer has been introduced into the Constitution of New-York.

The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. When sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath or affirma∣tion. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members present.

Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust or profit, under the United States but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject t•• indictment, trial, judgment and punishment, according to law.

I CONCEIVE that the Senators are not impeachable, an•• therefore Governor Randolph's objection falls to the ground I am surprized that a man of that gentleman's abilities shoul•• have fallen into this mistake. The Senators having a powe•• over their own members, have the right of expulsion. Wh•• then should they be impeachable? For upon impeachment the punishment is only removal from, and incapacity to hol•• offices. Expulsion amounts to the same thing. Besides, th•• Senators are elected by the people, though mediately, as we as the House of Representatives, and therefore have not th•• same degree of responsibility annexed to their characters, the officers of government; and for this obvious reason,—t•••• former are ••••pointed by the people themselves to stand their places, and they are the best judges of those who are mo•••• fit to serve them; but the latter are appointed by the servan••

of the people. It is a generally received maxim among writers on government, that the Judiciary and Legislative de∣partments should be kept distinct. The position is true to a certain extent; but this like most other general rules, is liable to exceptions. In the English government, which is certainly the freest in Europe, the House of Lords not only try impeach∣ments, but is the highest civil court in the kingdom. In that Constitution the House of Commons are the impeachers, the House of Lords the triers: But no members either of the House of Commons or House of Lords, was ever impeached as such: But whenever members of either House have been impeached, it was as great officers of State. Under the fede∣ral government this is impossible, because the members of nei∣ther House can hold any office of State.

IF this reasoning be not conclusive, the fourth section of the second article puts it out of doubt, viz. "The President, Vice President, and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment, &c." The Senators are representatives of the people; and by no construction can be considered as civil officers of the State. If this be the case, in whose hands can this power be lodged with greater propriety, or with greater safety, than in those of the Senate? Or how ••an a better court be appointed? To impeach either the mem∣bers of Senate or House of Representatives, would be to im∣peach the representatives of the people, that is the people ••hemselves, which is an absurdity.

Sect. 4. The times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any ••ime, by law, make or alter such regulations, except as to the ••laces of chusing Senators.

The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by law appoint a different day.

Sect. 5. Each House shall be the judge of the elections, re∣turns, and qualifications, of its own members, and a majority of each shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the attendance of absent members, in such manner, and under such penalties as each House may provide.

Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behaviour, and with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member.

Each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in their judgement require secrecy; and the yeas and nays of the members of either House on any question, shall, at the desire of one-fifth of those present, be entered on the journal.

Neither House, during the cession of Congress, shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.

EXPERIENCE and a change of circumstances may render it necessary that the Congress should have the power of regulat∣ing the elections: But as the Senate is elected by the State Legislatures, the place of such election must be the place where they meet. Besides which, this power was necessary lest some of the States from obstinacy, or selfish views, should alter the time and place of holding the elections in such a manner, as might impede the operation of the federal government.

Sect. 6. The Senators and Representatives shall receive a compensation for their services, to be ascertained by law, and paid out of the treasury of the United States. They shall in all cases, except treason, felony and breach of the peace, be privi∣leged from arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other place.

No Senator or Representative shall, during the time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the autho∣rity of the United States, which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such time; and no person holding any office under the United States, shall be a member of either House during his continuance in office.

SAY the objectors,—Why are not the salaries of the members of Congress ascertained by the Constitution? I will answer them by another question,—Why are not the salaries of every officer of the United States ascetained by it? Or rather, why should the Convention have descended into such minutia? Can it be supposed, for a moment, that in the present situation of America, when there are still left many men of talents and virtue, from amongst whom the Congress will doubtless be chosen, that they will pass a law to give themselves immoderate sallaries? But even should they, what would be the mighty evil to this extensive continent, from eighty or ninety persons having salaries larger than perhaps their services might merit?

IT is proper that Congress should have the regulation of this matter for another reason. It is a fact well known in the commercial world, that, from one certain cause, the quantity of specie is insensibly increasing: This of consequence lessens its value: Therefore a salary which now would be sufficient forty years hence, would be wholly inadequate.

IN the latter part of this section there is an admirable check upon the members of both Houses; as nothing can tend in a greater degree, to prescribe their independence of conduct, and prevent intriguing, than that no member shall be eligible to any office which has been created, or whose emoluments have been increased, since the time of his election, and during the time for which he has been elected.

Sect. 7. All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills.

IN this the Constitution is an improvement upon that o•• England: There all money bills must not only originate bu•• must be perfected in the House of Commons: Here though•• the Senate cannot originate such bills, yet they have the powe•• of amending them, and by that means have an opportunity o•• communicating their ideas to the House of Representatives upon the important subject of taxation.

Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representa¦tives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law, be presente•• to the President of the United States; if he approve he shall fig•• it, but if not, he shall return it with his objections, to that Hous•• in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the the objection at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If af¦ter such reconsideration two-thirds of that House shall agree 〈◊〉〈◊〉 pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to t•••• other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and approved by two-thirds of that House, it shall become a law. B•• in all such cases the votes of both Houses shall be determined 〈◊〉〈◊〉 yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting for a•• against the bill shall be entered on the journal of each Hou•••• respectively. If any bill shall not be returned by the Preside•••• within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been pr••¦sented

to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their adjournment prevent 〈◊〉〈◊〉 return, in which case it shall not be a law.

THIS power in the President is derived from the State go∣vernment of Massachusetts and New-York, though in the lat∣ter the Chancellor and Chief Judges are added to the Gover∣nor. This power goes only to a reconsideration of the public measures; and the President's disapprobation, or negative, is nugatory, when two-thirds of each House concur in any mea∣sure after it has undergone his inspection. The Convention wisely judged that the President would in all probability be a man of great experience, and abilities, and as far as his powers extend, ought to be considered as representing the Union; and consequently would be well acquainted with the interests of the whole. Great utility is therefore likely to arise to Con∣gress from his knowledge, and his reasoning upon their acts of Legislation. Farther, the experience of all ages prove that all popular assemblies are frequently governed by prejudices, passions, and partial views of the subject; nay sometimes by ••ndecent heats and animosities. The ten days therefore given ••o the President for his opinion of their measures, is wisely in∣••erposed to prevent the mischiefs which might ensue from those common faults of such assemblies.

Every order, resolution or vote, to which the concurrence of ••he Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except ••n a question of adjournment) shall be presented to the President ••f the United States; and before the same shall take effect, shall 〈◊〉〈◊〉 approved by him, or, being disapproved by him, shall be re∣••••ssed by two-thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, ••••cording to the rules and limitations prescribed in the case of bill.

THE reasoning upon the last clause applies also to this.

Sect. 8. The Congress shall have power

To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts, and excises, shall be uniform throughout the United States;

IT is here to be observed, that all taxes, imposts, &c. are to be applied only for the common defence and general wel∣fare, of the United States. By no possibility will the words admit of any other construction. Yet several popular* 1.1 de∣claimers have attempted to sound the alarm by their illeberal and ill-founded suggestions of peculation, bribery, and cor∣ruption, and of the probability of the public Treasury being converted to the use of the President and Congress. But how will this be possible? They will have all fixed salaries, and perquisites. The public accounts of receipts and expenditures will be regularly kept and regularly published, for the public inspection: Besides which, the public offices will always be open for the search and inquiries of every individual. I doubt if human wisdom could devise any better mode of securing a just application of the public money.

AS scarcely any article of the proposed plan has escaped censure, there are objections made to the grant of the imposts to Congress. But when we consider that the purposes for which the imposts are to be applied are merely national, and falls di∣rectly within the design of the Union, that of making all Ame∣rica one State for great political purposes, the objection falls; for in this view America composes but one great republic, all the subjects of which stand precisely upon the same ground,

and pay only in proportion to their consumption of foreign articles. To this we may add, that those States which export the chief of the produce of their labour, and in consequenec of that circumstance, import more than those which manufac∣ture, receive a compensation for the increased import, by the exported produce being free from duties. And besides, we may fairly conclude, that the consumption of foreign articles throughout America, is nearly in proportion to the enumeration, which is the measure of the respective quotas.

To borrow money on the credit of the United States;

THIS power is lodged with the present Congress.

To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes;

THE power of regulating commerce gives great alarm to the enemies of the Constitution. In this, as in most other instan∣ces, they forget that this is a government for thirteen 〈◊〉〈◊〉; and think only of the immediate interests of Virginia; as if she had a right to dictate to the other twelve, and as if her interests alone were to be consulted. Be not deceived my countrymen. However important we may be in the scale of Union, there are other States which are equally so. The consequence of this power, say they, will be, that the eastern and northern States will combine together, and not only oblige the south∣ern to export their produce in their bottoms, by prohibiting foreign bottoms; but will also lay such duties upon foreign manufactures as will amount to a prohibition, in order to sup∣ply us themselves.

UPON accurately investigating this point, we shall find the reasoning to be as false, as the supposition is illiberal. It is true the eastern States can build and equip ships, upon better

terms than the southern: Nay, I believe I may go farther, and say, that they can upon better terms than any nation in Europe. This arises from their having all the materials for ship-building within themselves, except canvas and cordage, whilst most of the maritime powers of Europe, depend upon foreign countries, not only for these articles, but also for tim∣ber and masts. A great extent of sea coast, a cold climate, a barren soil, and above all, the fisheries, furnish an infinite num∣ber of seamen, who from necessity are willing to navigate for very moderate wages. If this be the case, is their any reason to suppose that the eastern States will not carry our produce upon as reasonable terms as any of the European powers? I believe it is a fact, that before the war, they were the principal carriers to the British West-Indies; so low were the terms upon which their vessels could be chartered. And the same causes still ex∣ists, why they should take freight upon terms equally moderate. But this is not all. The eastern States are not ignorant that the southern possess even better materials for ship-building, than they do; and therefore will take care not to excite their jealousy, nor stimulate them to build ships and become their own carries, by exacting unreasonable freightage. But ad∣mitting that the eastern Delegates should be so dishonest as well as unwise, to combine against those of the south—I will venture to assert, that not a man in America, who is acquaint∣ed with the middle States, can suppose that they would join in such a combination. New-York is rather a country of far∣mers than of sailors: It possesses large tracts of fertile soil, but no fisheries, and before the war, for one ship built in that State, either for freightage or sale, there were thirty in New-En∣gland. All that she will aim at, therefore, will be ships of her own, sufficient to carry her own produce. Her interests, there∣fore will not induce her to enter into this formidable combi∣nation.

JERSEY, from her local situation, and a variety of peculiar circumstances, has fewer ships and seamen than even any of ••he southern States. Her interests, therefore, will lead her ••o adhere to them.

THE same reasoning applies to Pennsylvania that does to New-York; and still more emphatically; because this State is still more employed in husbandry. And as to the State of De∣laware, it does not own six ships.

LET us then see how this question will stand in point of numbers. The four eastern States will have seventeen voices, which will be opposed by the nineteen voices of the middle States and the twenty-nine of the southern.

I WILL not endeavour to answer the other objection.—The fear of a northern combination to furnish the southern States with manufactures. This I conceive, has arisen either from ••gnorance of the subject, or an absolute enmity to all confe∣deration. The only manufactures which the northern States possess and with which they can furnish others, are shoes, cot∣ton cards, nails, hats, carriages, and perhaps paper and refined ••ugars may be added; and should the whale-fishery be ever revived, train oil and spermacaeti candels. The two first ar∣ticles may be in a great measure confined to Massachusetts. Their shoes are as good and as cheap as those imported from Great-Britain, at least as the sale shoes. And as to the second article, the exportation of them from thence is prohibited by act of Parliament. Both New-York and Pennsylvania manu∣facture leather in all its branches, and hats; but not more than sufficient for their own consumption. Connecticut has no manufactures to export; nor has New-York, unless perhaps some refined sugar. Jersey has only domestic manufactures. Pennsylvania manufactures nails, refined sugar, cotton cards, carriages, and, of late, paper for exportation. The Dela∣ware State has only domestic manufactures.

IF Massachusetts can furnish us with shoes, cards, train oil and spermacaeti candles; Pennsylvania with nails, white sugar carriages, and paper, as cheap as we can procure them from beyond the Atlantic, why should not such European article be probibited? There is no probability that either the nor¦thern or southern States, will in many years become extensive manufacturers. The price of labour and cheapness of land will prevent it; and the daily migrations from all the States to the western parts of America, will keep up the one, and keep down the other. I have been informed, and I believe rightly informed, that the amount of the imports from Europe, is a great or greater in the eastern or middle States, as in the south¦ern, in proportion to their numbers.* 1.2 This, to many, may appear doubtful; but I believe it, because I have good reason to think, that the domestic manufactures of the southern States particularly of Virginia, are of greater value than the dome••¦tic manufactures of the northern and middle States, in the sam•• proportion. This has arisen from the cultivation of cotton which will not come to perfection to the northward; and tha•• article is manufactured with much less trouble than eithe•• flax or hemp.

IF this account be just, what have the southern States 〈◊〉〈◊〉 fear? But admitting some of the eastern and middle State

should enter into this illiberal, unjust, and impolitic combi∣nation: Let us see how the numbers would stand. New-Hampshire, Massachusetts, New-York, and Pennsylvania, the only manufacturing States, may combine: Their num∣bers will amount to twenty-five in one House, to be opposed by forty; and in the other the numbers will be eight, to be opposed by sixteen.

AFTER all, suppose these objections are founded in fact: Had we not better submit to the slight inconveniencies which might arise from this combination; than the serious evils that must necessarily follow from disunion?

To establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform ••aws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States;

To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign ••oin, and fix the standard of weights and measures;

To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities ••nd current coin of the United States;

To establish post-offices and post roads;

To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing ••r limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right their respective writings and discoveries;

To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court;

To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the ••••gh seas, and offences against the law of nations;

To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and ••ake rules concerning captures on land and water;

MOST of these powers, the present Congress possess, and ••ne of them have been objected to, except what relates to Courts, which will be taken notice of hereafter.

To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years;

BY this regulation every House of Representatives will have a share in the appropriations; and no mischief can ensue from appropriations of two years, since the proceedings of each House of Congress are to be published from time to time, as well as regular statements and accounts of the receipts and ex∣penditures of all public money.

To provide and maintain a navy;

To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces;

THE present Congress possess the powers given by these clauses.

To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions;

To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the mi∣litia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States; reserving to the States respec∣tively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.

BY these clauses, the appointment of the militia officers, and training the militia, are reserved to the respective States; ex∣cept that Congress have a right to direct in what manner they are to be disciplined, and the time when they are to be ordered out.

THESE clauses have been extremely misunderstood, or pur∣posely misconstrued, by the enemies to the Constitution. Some have said,

the absolute unqualified command that Con∣gress

have over the militia may be made instrumental to the destruction of all liberty, both public and private, whether of a personal, civil, or religious nature.* 1.3

IS this the result of reason, or is it the dictate of resentment? How can the command of Congress over the militia be either absolute or unqualified, when its officers are appointed by the States, and consequently can by no possibility become its crea∣tures?

THEY will generally be men of property and probity: And can any one for a moment suppose that such men will ever be so lost to a sense of liberty, the rights of their country, and their own dignity, as to become the instruments of arbitrary measures? Whenever that shall be the case, we may in vain contend for forms of government; the spirit of liberty will have taken its flight from America, and nothing but an arbitrary go∣vernment will be fit for such a people, however accurately de∣fined the powers of her Constitution may be. But so long as there shall be a militia so officered, or the majority of the peo∣ple landholders, America will have little to fear for liberty. Congress have the power of organizing the militia; and can it be put into better hands? They can have no interest in de∣stroying the personal liberty of any man, or raising his fortune in the mode of organization: They can make no law upon this, or any other subject, which will not affect themselves, their children, or their connexions.

CAN any one seriously suppose, that Congress will ever think of drawing the militia of one State out, in order to destroy the liberties of another? Of Virginia, for instance, to destroy the liberties of Pennsylvania? Or should they be so wicked,

that an American militia, officered by the States, would obey so odious a mandate?* 1.4 The supposition is monstrous.

To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the Legis∣lature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful build∣ings.

So great is the jealousy of some of our citizens, that even this clause has excited their fears. This little spot is to be the centre to which is to be attracted all the wealth and power of this extensive continent: The focus which will absorb the last remains of American liberty. Such are the visionary phan∣toms of the antifederalists.

THE Congress is to govern, as they shall see fit, a district not more than ten miles square. And what possible mischief can arise to the United States from hence? This district must either be purchased by Congress, or yielded to them by the inhabitants of that particular spot, which they may conceive most convenient for them to assemble at, and for which the consent of the State is necessary. If the first, there will be few or no inhabitants; they will therefore induce people to settle it, by establishing a mild government. If the second, the in∣habitants of any particular district certainly have a right to submit to whatever form of government they may think agree∣able, provided the State within which the district lies, consents; without giving offence to Virginia, or any other of the States.

We are told that the wise Franklin has recommended to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Philadelphians to offer their city and its environs as the seat of Congress. Can it be supposed that he would recommend this measure to his favorite city were he not well assured that the government of Congress will be a good one? I have no doubt but this district will flourish; that it will increase in populaton and wealth: Because I have no doubt but most people would think it a happiness to live under the government of such men as will compose the Congress; or under such a government as such men will frame for that district.

And—To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into executiont the foregoing powers, and other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any departmen or officer thereof.

BY this clause, Congress have no farther legislative authori∣ty than shall be deemed necessary to carry into execution the powers vested by this Constitution. This regulation is necessary; as without it the different States might counteract all the laws of Congress, and render the Federal Government nugatory.

Sect. 9. The migration or importation of such persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each person.

THIS clause is a proof of deference in the members of the Convention, to each other, and of concession of the northern to the southern States. There is no doubt but far the greater part of that Convention hold domestic slavery in abhorrence. But the members from South-Carolina and Georgia, thinking slaves absolutely necessary for the cultivation and melioration

of their States, insisted upon this clause. But it affects not the law of Virginia which prohibits the importation of slaves.

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be sus∣pended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.

BY this clause the Congress have the right of suspending the habeas corpus in the two cases of insurrection and rebel∣lion—a power which follows from the necessity of the thing.

No bill of attainder or••ex post facto law shall be passed.

IT is extraordinary that Mr. Mason should have made a part of this clause a ground of objection. 'Till that gentleman denied it, I had supposed it an universally received opinion that ex post facto laws were dangerous in their principle, and oppressive in their execution. And with respect to bills o•• attainder, a very slight acquaintance with the history of tha•• country in which alone they are used, is sufficient to discove•• that they have been generally made the means of oppression.

No capitation, or other direct tax, shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or enumeration herein before directed to be taken.

THIS clause is a confirmation of the third clause of the se¦cond section of the first article.

No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State. No preference shall be given by any regulation of com¦merce or revenue, to the ports of one State, over those of another Nor shall vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to en¦ter, clear, or pay duties in another.

ALL writers upon finance hold taxes upon exports to be im∣politic. Yet there are doubtless some articles which will with propriety bear an export duty; such as tobacco and perhaps indigo. But then these articles are of the growth of only five of the States; and it would be a manifest injustice that the pro∣duce of some States should be taxed for the benefit of others. The latter part of the clause provides that all Naval Officers fees and port charges shall be the same throughout the United States; and that a vessel bound to one State from another, and calling at any intermediate State, shall not be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duty, in such State. This tends to faci∣litate the intercourse among the States, and may produce many commercial conveniencies.

No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in conse∣quence of appropriations made by law; and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money, shall be published from time to time.

AS all appropriations of money are to be made by law, and regular statements thereof published, no money can be applied but to the use of the United States.

No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States:— And no person holding any office of profit or trust under them, shall, without the consent of Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.

THE first part of this clause proves the Convention had no aristocratical views, nor any idea of establishing an order in the State, with rights independent of the people. The latter part of it is introduced to prevent the officers of the Federal Government being warped from their duty.

Sect. 10. No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin mo∣ney; emit bills of credit; make any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts; or grant any title of nobility.

THE States, in their individual capacities, should be re∣strained from the exercise of the powers enumerated in this clause, for a variety of reasons. If any State should have a right of making treaties, granting letters of marque, and the like, America might be perpetually involved in foreign wars. By exercising the right of coinage and of emitting bills of cre∣dit, a State might, by the former, debase the currency of the United States, by mixing great quantities of alloy, and by that means defraud the Federal Treasury; and by the latter it might defraud not only its own citizens, but the citizens of other States. But this is not all. An exercise of these rights would materially interfere with the exercise of the like by the Congress; and therefore the particular, should give way to the general interest. The making any thing but gold and silver a tender in payment of debts, and the impairing the obligation of contracts, is so great a political injustice, that the Constitu∣tion here requires of the States, that they will forever relin∣quish the exercise of a power so odious. This part of the clause would probably never have been introduced, had not some of the States afforded too frequent instances of unjust laws upon these subjects.

No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports and exports, except what may be obsolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws; and the nett produce of all duties and imposts, laid by any State on im∣ports or exports, shall be for the use of the Treasury of the Unit∣ed States; and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and

controul of the Congress. No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage, keep troops, or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign power, or engage in war; un∣less actually invaded, or in such imminent danger, as will not admit of delay.

IF the individual States might lay duties upon the imports, it would be counteracting the same right in Congress, and ruin the great fund out of which the present federal debts are to be paid, as well as the future federal expences defrayed. And with regard to exports, it was highly reasonable that one State should be prohibited from laying an export duty on the articles of a sister State, which may be shipped through that State.

THE exigencies of the Union may however require direct taxes. By this clause, a door is open to the States, to raise their respective quotas, in lieu of direct taxes; by laying a duty upon exports; or even duties upon imports. But as the amount of these duties are to be paid into the public Treasury, no inconvenience can, on the one hand, arise to the general welfare from them; and, on the other, the power of revision in the Congress will be the means of securing a due attention to the interests of all the States, in the mode of laying the du∣ty, as well as in the application of it. The latter part of the clause is no more than a confirmation of principles antecedent∣ly established, and of powers before vested in the Congress; but such as are absolutely necessary for the good order, dig∣nity, and harmony of the whole; and are such as the States have already yielded to the present Congress.* 1.5

ARTICLE II.

Sect. 1. The Executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his office during the term of four years, and together with the Vice-President, cho∣sen for the same term, be elected as follows:

Each State shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a number of Electors, equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: But no Senator or Representative, or person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.

The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote, by ballot, for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inha∣bitant of the same State with themselves. And they shall make a list of all the persons voted for, and of the number of votes for each; which list they shall sign and certify, and transmit, sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to th•• President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open a•• the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted. The person having the greatest number of votes shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed and if there be more than one who have such majority, and have an equal number of votes, then the House of Representative shall immediately chuse, by ballot, one of them for President and if no person have a majority, then from the five highest o•• the list the said House shall in like manner chuse the Presiden•• But in chusing the President, the votes shall be taken by State the Representation from each State having one vote; a quoru•• for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from tw•• thirds of the States, and a majority of all the States shall be n••¦cessary to a choice, In every case, after the choice of the Pres••∣dent,

the person having the greatest number of votes of the Elec∣tors, shall be the Vice-President. But if there should remain two ••or more who have equal votes, the Senate shall chuse from them, ••••y ballot, the Vice-President.

IT has been urged by many, that the President should be continued in office, only a given number of years, and then ••e rendered ineligible. To this it may be answered, were ••hat to be the case, a good officer might be displaced, and a ••ad one succeed. Knowing that he could not be continued, ••e might be more attentive to enrich himself, should opportu∣nities offer, than to the execution of his office. But as his con∣••inuance in office, will depend upon his discharging the duties ••f it with ability, and integrity, his eligibility will most pro∣••ably be the best security for his conduct. The longer a man ••f abilities and virtue, fills an office, the better, and easier ••ill the duties of it be discharged: The whole system of ad∣ministration becomes well arranged; and every department in ••e government well filled. An election to this office once in ••very four years, is a sufficient curb upon the President: The ••lectors hold the reins. If he has misconducted himself, he ••ill not be re-elected; if has governed with prudence, and ••bility, he ought to be continued.

THE Vice-President will probably be a candidate to succeed ••e President. The former will therefore be a perpetual cen∣nel over the latter; will be a stimulus to keep him up to his ••••ty, and afford an additional security for his upright conduct.

NOTWITHSTANDING these reasons, and the powerful ••ecks opposed to the powers of the President, the enemies of ••e Constitution has sounded the alarm with great violence, ••on the ground of his eligibility for life. Some tell us that will be the means of his becoming the hereditary sovereign of ••e United States; whilst others hold up to our view the dan∣••••rs of an elective monarchy.

IT is pretty certain that the President can never become the sovereign of America, but with the voluntary consent of the people: He is re-elected by them; not by any body of men over whom he may have gained an undue influence. No citi∣zen of America has a fortune sufficiently large, to enable him to raise and support a single regiment. The President's salary will be greatly inadequate either to the purpose of gaining adherents, or of supporting a military force: He will possess no princely revenues, and his personal influence will be con∣fined to his native State. Besides, the Constitution has pro∣vided, that no person shall be eligible to the office, who is not thirty-five years old; and in the course of nature very few fa∣thers leave a son who has arrived to that age. The powers of the President are not kingly, any more than the ensigns of his office. He has no guards, no regalia, none of those royal trappings which would set him apart from the rest of his fellow citizens. Suppose the first President should be continued for life: What expectations can any man in the Union have to succeed him, except such as are grounded upon the popularity of his character?

NONE of its citizens possess distinct principalities, from whence money may be drawn to purchase, or armies raised to intimidate the votes. Fortunately for America, she has no neighbouring Princess to interfere in her elections, or her councils: No Empress of Russia to place the Crown upon the head of her favorite Powniotowsky.* 1.6

IT has also been objected, that a Council of State ought to have been assigned the President. The want of it, is, in my apprehension, a perfection rather than a blemish. What pur∣pose would such a Council answer, but that of diminishing, or

annihilating the responsibility annexed to the character of the President. From the superiority of his talents, or the superior dignity of his place, he would probably acquire an undue in∣fluence over, and might induce a majority of them to advise measures injurious to the welfare of the States, at the same time that he would have the means of sheltering himself from impeachment, under that majority. I will here once for all observe, that descended as we are from the English, conver∣sant as we are in the political history of that country, it is im∣possible not to derive both political opinions, and prejudices, from that source. The objectors probably considered, that as in the English government, the first Magistrate has a Council of State; there should be one also in the American. But they should at the same time have recollected, that the King of England is not personnally responsible for his conduct; but that her Constitution looks up to his Ministers, that is, to his Council, to answer for the measures of the Sovereign. But in the American Constitution, the first Magistrate is the efficient Minister of the people, and as such, ought to be alone respon∣sible for his conduct. Let him act pursuant to the dictates of his own judgment; let him advise with his friends; let him ••onsult those of whom he has the highest opinion for wisdom; but let not his responsibility be diminished by giving him a Council.

The Congress may determine the time of chusing the Electors, and the day on which they shall give their votes; which day shall 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the same throughout the United States.

No person, except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States, at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President; neither shall any per∣•••••• be eligible to that office who shall not have attained to the age of thirty-five years, and been fourteen years a resident within 〈◊〉〈◊〉 United States.

In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and du∣ties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice-Presi∣dent; and the Congress may by law provide for the case of re∣moval, death, resignation, or inability, both of the President and Vice-President, declaring what officer shall then ••ct word•• Pre∣sident, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.

The President shall, at stated times, receive for his services, a compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that period any other emolument from the United States, or any of them.

Before he enters on the execution of his office, he shall take the following oath or affirmation:

I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of Presiden of the United States, and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend, the Constitution of the United States.

THE first of these clauses is intended to prevent intrigue and tumult in chusing the Electors: And the reasons already of∣fered, why Congress should have the right of altering "the times and manner of holding the elections for Senators," ap∣ply why they should have the power of determining the time of chusing Electors. The fifth is an additional check upon the President.

Sect. 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United States: He may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the Executive departments, up∣on any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices,

and he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offen∣ces against the United States, except in cases of impeachment.

THE powers vested in the President by this and the subse∣quent clause, belong, from the nature of them, to the Execu∣tive branch of government; and could be placed in no other hands with propriety.

SO long as laws can not provide for every case that may happen: So long as punishments shall continue disproportion∣ate to crimes, the power of pardoning should some where exist. With whom could this power, so precious to huma∣nity, be better entrusted, than with the President? An offi∣cer who, from his age and experience, will seldom be misled in the exercise of it; and who less liable to the influence of prejudice and passion than a popular assembly, will most pro∣bably be guided by discretion in the use of it.

WHY Governor Randolph should wish to take from him this power, at least in cases of treason; and why he should have made a distinction between the power of pardoning before, and after conviction; I am at a loss to conceive; and shall there∣fore attempt no further answer to an objection which appears to me, unsupported by reason.* 1.7

He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Sena∣tors present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appoint∣ments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be

established by law. But the Congress may, by law, vest the ap∣pointment of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of law, or in the heads of depart∣ments.

THE Constitution has here lessened the authority of the President, by making the assent of two-thirds of the Senate necessary in the important cases of making treaties, in ap∣pointing Ambassadors, the Judges of the Supreme Court, and the great officers of State.

WRITERS upon government have established it as a maxim, that the Executive and Legislative authority should be kept separate. But the position should be taken with considerable latitude. The Executive authority here given to a branch of the Legislature, is no novelty, in free governments. In Eng∣land, the Executive, or Cabinet Council, is taken indifferent∣ly from either House of Parliament. In the States of New York and Jersey, the Senate not only act as an Executive Council, but also form a part of the Court of Appeals.* 1.8

THE following reasons suggest themselves in support of the propriety of vesting the President and Senate with the power of making treaties.

THE President is the Representative of the Union: The Senate the Representatives of the respective States. The ob∣jects of treaties must always be either of great national import, or such as concern the States in their individual capacities; but never can concern the individual members of the State. Secrecy and dispatch are necessary in making them: For with∣out secrecy and dispatch, they are seldom made to purpose. Hence arises the impropriety of consulting either the Repre∣sentatives

of the people, or the different States. If the for∣mer were consulted, the interests of the small States might be sacrificed; if the latter, almost insurmountable obstacles would be thrown in the way of every negotiation.

IN the Dutch Republic the States-General are obliged to consult their constituents, upon this, as upon every important occasion, however urgent may be the necessity. This vice in their Federal Constitution has more than once brought them to the brink of ruin.

The President shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session.

THIS inoffensive clause is made a ground of objection by Governor Randolph! I wish he had informed us wherefore.

Sect. 3. He shall from time to time give to the Congress in∣formation of the state of the Union, and recommend to their con∣sideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedi∣ent: He may on extraordinary occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in case of disagreement between them, with respect to the time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper: He shall receive Ambassa∣dors and other public Ministers: He shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed; and shall commission all the officers of the United States.

THE powers given by this section are such as in all govern∣ments, have always been, and must necessarily be, vested in the first magistrate.

Sect. 4. The President, Vice-President, and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office on impeach∣ment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.

THE persons subject to impeachment, are the President Vice-President, and all civil officers of the United States, and no others.

ARTICLE III.

Sect. 1. The judicial power of the United States shall b•• vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as th•• Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. Th•• Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receiv•• for their services, a compensation, which shall not be deminishe•• during their continuance in office.

Sect. 2. The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in la•• and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the Unit¦ed States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; to all cases affecting Ambassadors, other publi•• Ministers and Consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shal•• be a party; to controversies between two or more States, be∣tween a State and citizens of another State, between citizens of different States, between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States, and between a State or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens or subjects.

In all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers, and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other case before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate juris∣diction, both as to law and fact with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.

The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the State where the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the trial shall be at such place or places, as the Congress may by law have directed.

NO part of the Constitution seems to have been so little un∣derstood, or so purposely misconstrued, as this article. Its enemies have mustered all their forces against the Federal Court; and have loudly sounded the trumpet, for the benevo∣lent purpose of alarming the good people of Virginia, with the fears of visionary danger and imaginary oppression. They have told them the Federal Court, like Aron's rod, would swallow up all the judiciary authority of the respective States. That a citizen of Virginia may be forced to Philadelphia for a debt of 5l. although it was contracted with a fellow citizen: And, above all, that the trial by jury is not preserved. In a word, it is the Federal Court that is to be made the great in∣strument of tyranny.

THESE indeed would be serious objections were they well founded.

IT is on all hands admitted, that a Federal Court is necessa∣ry, for a variety of purposes, and under a variety of circum∣stances.

THE only question then is, whether the enumeration of the cases assigned to the Federal Court, by this article, is likely to produce oppression? Or if there be any ground to appre∣hend that Congress will not, by law provide a remedy for all probable hardships, and render the federal jurisdiction conve∣nient to every part of the United States?

THERE has been no objection raised to the Federal Court having original jurisdiction, in all cases respecting public Mi∣nisters, and where a State may be a party; and these are the only cases wherein it has original jurisdiction. In these cases, in controversies between two or more States, and between a State and citizens of another State, and between citizens of the ••ame claiming lands under grants of different States, the pre∣sent

Congress have the right of determining.* 1.9 Here the judi∣ciary is blended in an eminent degree with the Legislative au∣thority; a strong reason, among many others, for new model∣ing that unskilful organized body.† 1.10

THE Convention sensible of this defect, has wisely assigned the cognizance of these and other controversies to a proper tribunal, a Court of Law.

AMONG these controversies, there is but one possible case where a dispute between two citizens of the same State can be carried, even by appeal, to the Federal Court; and that is, when they claim the same land under grants from different States. As their title is derived through States, this case is precisely within the reason which applies to controversies wherein two States are parties.

NOTWITHSTANDING this, we are told that in the most or∣dinary cases, a citizen of Virginia may be dragged within the appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Court, although the trans∣action which gave rise to the controversy originated between fellow citizens. This, it is said, may be effected, by assigning a bond, for instance, given by one fellow citizen to another, either to a foreigner or a citizen of another State. To this I answer, that such assignment would not be attended with any such consequence; because it is a principle in law, that the assignee stands in the place of the assignor; and is neither in a better nor a worse condition. It is likewise asserted, that if two citi∣zens of the same State claim lands lying in a different State,

••hat their suit may be carried to the Federal Court for final de∣••ermination. This assertion is equally groundless. For this being a local action, it must be determined in the State where∣••n the lands lie.

AND I repeat it again, because it cannot be too often repeat∣ed, that but one possible case exists, where a controversy be∣tween citizens of the same State can be carried into the Fede∣ral Court. How then is it possible that the Federal Court can ••ver swallow up the State jurisdictions, or be converted to the purposes of oppression.

SEVERAL reasons occur why the Federal Court should pos∣sess an appellate jurisdiction in controversies between foreign∣ers and citizens, and between the citizens of different States. A foreigner should have the privilege of carrying his suit to the Federal Court, as well for the sake of justice, as from po∣litical motives. Were he confined to seek redress in the tribu∣nal of that State, wherein he received the injury, he might not obtain it, from the influence of his adversary; and by giv∣ing him this additional and certain means of obtaining justice, foreigners will be encouraged to trade with us, to give us cre∣dit, and to employ their capitals in our country. Then con∣troversies must for the most part arise from commercial transactions, by which the bulk of the people can be seldom effected. The first part of this reasoning equally applies to con∣troversies between citizens of different States. Besides, were the jurisdiction of the Federal Court not coextensive with the government itself, as far as foreigners are concerned, a con∣troversy between individuals might produce a national quarrel, which commencing in reprisals, would probably terminate in war. Suppose a subject of France or Great Britain should complain to the Minister residing at the seat of Congress, that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 was impossible to obtain justice in a Court of Law, in Vir∣ginia,

for instance. The Minister represents the matter to hi•• Court. That Court will apply to the Congress, not to th•• individual State, for redress. Congress replies,

we lamen•• that it is not in our power to remedy the evil; but we hav•• no authority over the jurisprudence of the State.

Is it pro¦bable that such an answer will be satisfactory to powerful na¦tions? Will they not say

we must take that redress by forc•• which your feeble government denies us? We are unde•• the necessity of seizing American property wherever we ca•• lay our hands upon it, till the just demands of our subject are satisfied.

THOSE objectors who are so much alarmed for the trial by jury, seem little acquainted either with the origin or use o•• that celebrated mode of trial.

I WILL take leave to inform them, that by our laws a va∣riety of important causes are daily determined without the in∣tervention of a jury, not only in the Court of Chancery, but in those of common law; and that by several of our acts of Assembly, the General Court has a power of assessing fines as high as 500l. for inconsiderable delinquencies, without the intervention of a••••ry, even to find the fact.

AS I have before observed, these causes will be from the nature of things, generally mercantile disputes; must be mat∣ters of account, which will be referred to commissioners, as is the practice of all common law Courts in similar cases. When∣ever it may be necessary that the facts should be stated, no doubt they will be found by a jury of the State, from whence the cause is carried; and will be made a part of the record.

IN criminal cases, the trial by jury is most important. In criminal cases the Constitution has established it unequivocal∣••y.

But in having only recognized this trial in criminal, it by no means follows that it takes it away in civil cases: And ••e may fairly presume, that by the law which the Congress will make to compleat the system of the Federal Court, it will ••e introduced, as far as it shall be found practicable, and ap∣plicable to such controversies as from their nature are subjects proper to be determined in that Court.

ALL civilized societies have found it necessary to punish a ••ariety of offences, with the loss of life. The life of man is a ••erious forfeiture: Our law has therefore humanely and just∣••y said, that it shall not be affected, but by the unanimous opinion of twelve men. In a political view, this mode of tri∣••l, in State prosecutions, is of still greater importance. The ••hief Magistrate, or the Legislature itself, of a republic, is as ••••able to personal prejudice, and to passion, as any King in Europe; and might prosecute a bold writer, or any other per∣••on, who had become obnoxious to their resentment, with as ••uch violence and rigour. What so admirable a barrier to ••efend the innocent, and protect the weak from the attacks 〈◊〉〈◊〉 power, as the interposition of a jury? In this respect, the ••rial by jury may well be called the palladium of liberty.

THE framers of the Constitution viewing it in this light, ••lthough it was impossible to enter minutely into the subject of the Federal Court, and arrange it fully, took care to de∣••lare that, in criminal cases, the trial by jury should be pre∣••••rved, lest we should have had some ground of uneasiness upon that important point.

I MUST farther observe, that the Federal Court has no ju∣••sdiction over any offences except such as are against the 〈◊〉〈◊〉: And the criminal is to be tried in the State where be fact is committed.

IT is asked, why has not the Constitution more accurately defined the jurisdiction of the Federal Court, more clearly as¦certained its limits, and more fully pointed out the modes o•• trial?

TO this it may be answered, that the out-lines of the piece are traced with sufficient accuracy: That to have entered mi∣nutely into this subject, to have filled it with all its parts would have employed almost as much time as framing the Constitution itself, and would have spun out the work to a tedious length. In that case the Convention must have ascer∣tained the number of inferior Courts necessary, the number o•• Judges, and other officers, with their salaries, the times of holding the Federal Courts, the duration of their terms; in what cases the trial shall be by jury, in what not, with an in∣finite variety of circumstances, the introduction of which in a system of government, would have made a strange appearance. They therefore properly left to the Congress the power of or∣ganizing by law the Federal Court: Well knowing that at least eight of the States must, from their local situation, con∣cur in rendering it convenient to the whole.* 1.11

Sect. 3. Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same over•• act, or on confession in open Court.

The Congress shall have full power to declare the punishment ••f treason, but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of ••lood, or forfeiture, except during the life of the person at∣••ained.

THIS section is equally humane and just.

ARTICLE IV.

Sect. 1. Full faith and credit shall be given in each State ••o the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every ••ther State. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe ••he manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall ••e proved, and the effect thereof.

Sect. 2. The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all ••rivileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.

A person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other ••rime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another State, ••hall, on demand of the Executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having ••urisdiction of the crime.

No person held to service or labour in one State, under the ••aws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any ••aw or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or ••abour, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom ••uch service or labour may be due.

THE convenience, justice, and utility, of these sections, are ••bvious.

AT present, slaves absconding and going into some of the ••orthern States, may thereby effect their freedom: But un∣••er the Federal Constitution they will be delivered up to the ••awful proprietor.

Sect. 3. New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned, as well as of the Congress.

The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all need∣ful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other pro∣perty belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Con∣stitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular State.

UPON this section I shall only observe, that illiberal and groundless prejudices against the northern States too generally prevail in this country. Hence the unwarranted jealousy of the politics of those States. But were they well founded, the powers given under this section will manifestly tend to allay our fears of a northern combination. For as the greater por∣tion of those immense tracts of fertile land which remain un∣inhabited, or but thinly settled, and which are yet to be divid∣ed into new governments, lie on the south-western boundary; the southern interest will be strengthened by the Representa∣tives of the new States. Would we could forget our provin∣cial prejudices, and consider ourselves as citizens of America!* 1.12

Sect. 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of government, and shall protect

••ach of them against invasion; and on application of the Legisla∣••ure, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be con∣••••ned) against domestic violence.

THIS is an additional proof of the caution of the framers of be Constitution, and how distant their views must have been ••rom the design of introducing and establishing an arbitrary ••overnment.

ARTICLE V.

The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution; or, •••• the application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several ••tates, shall call a Convention for proposing amendments, which 〈◊〉〈◊〉 either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part 〈◊〉〈◊〉 this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three ••••••rths of the several States, or by Conventions in three-fourths ••••••reof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be pro∣••••sed by the Congress. Provided, that no amendment which ••ay be made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and 〈◊〉〈◊〉, shall in any manner effect the first and fourth clauses in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 section of the first article; and that no State, without consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate.

ALL human productions must partake of imperfection. The ••embers of the Convention did not pretend to infallibility: ••hey considered that experience might bring to light inconve∣••iences which human wisdom could not foresee—And this ar∣••cle wisely provides for amendments, the necessity of which 〈◊〉〈◊〉 may discover.

THERE is not an article of the Constitution that deserves ••cater praise than this. The Convention sensible that they ••••uld not foresee every contingency, and guard against every ••••ssible inconvenience: Sensible that new circumstances might

arise, which would render alterations in the government ne¦cessary; have declard that whenever two-thirds of both Houses of Congress, or two-thirds of the State Legislatures, shall con∣cur in deeming amendments necessary, a general Convention shall be appointed, the result of which, when ratified by three fourths of the Legislatures, shall become a part of the Federal Government.

I CONFESS myself at a loss to conceive what better mode could have been adopted. If the system be reduced to prac∣tice, and experience shall discover important defects, there can be no doubt but that two-thirds of Congress will be sensi∣ble to them, and will point them out to the different Legisla∣tures. On the other hand, it is equally certain, that if the defects be flagrant, they will be readily seen by two thirds of the Legislatures, and a Convention will necessarily be the con∣sequence: Nor is there any cause to apprehend, that the re∣sult of such Convention, will be rejected by one-fourth of the States: Since all the States must feel the inconvenience of im∣portant defects.

BUT, say the friends to previous amendments, friends, as many of them pretend even to an energetic Federal Govern∣ment,* 1.13 why not amend the Constitution before it is adopted? To this it may be answered, that they should first demonstrate their objections to be well founded; and that their proposed amendments, if they can be said to have offered any, would make it better. I am inclined to think, that neither Mr. Ger∣ry's, Mr. Mason's, nor Governor Randolph's, would. Upon this occasion I hope I shall be excused for recommending to those gentlemen, as well as to other objectors, Dr. Franklin's last speech in the Convention, which is replete with good sense,

as well as a marked deference for the opinions of others. If the objections of these gentlemen be groundless, the Constitu∣tion needs no amendment; if they be not, it cannot be amend∣ed in the manner they propose. Mr. Mason, Mr. Randolph, the State of Virginia, raise objections: Mr. Gerry, and the State of Massachusetts, do the same: Every other citizen, every other State, has an equal right. A new Convention is formed, the proposed plan is amended, or a new one produced. It is again presented to the public eye. New blemishes appear new amendments are thought necessary. That which Mr. Mason may think a perfection, another may think a fault: What would be agreeable to Massachusetts, might displease Virginia. In a word, there would be no end to objections, amendments, and Conventions. All federal government falls to the ground. Anarchy ensues, and produces convulsions, which inevitably end in despotism.

ARTICLE VI.

All debts contracted and engagements entered into before the adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation.

This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby; any thing in the Constitution or laws of any State, to the contrary notwithstanding.

The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by oath or affirmation, to support this Con∣stitution; but no religious test shall ever be required as a quali∣fication to any office or public trust under the United States.

THAT treaties should be the supreme law of the land is warmly opposed by the enemies of the Constitution. This power, say they, may be converted to the most arbitrary and destructive purposes.

TREATIES ought of right to be considered in the light, tha•• the Convention has here viewed them. For why should they be made, if due obedience is not to be paid them? The ne¦gative can only be supported by those who feel it their interest that they should be disregarded.

THE objects of government are protection and security Many national circumstances may arise wherein these object cannot be effected, without the observance of treaties.

WHEN we consider who it is that has the power of making treaties, the manner of his election, the checks that the Con¦stitution has interposed to guard against his possible abuse o•• power, among which his liability to impeachment is no•• the least: When we consider the subject matter of treatie•• are always of national import, and can not affect the interest of individuals, we have no reason to fear that they will b•• made improvidently, or converted into instruments of oppre¦sion: They may be unwise, but can never be intentionall wicked.

THIS, like every other article of the Constitution, was th•• subject of long and serious deliberation; and it was ultimatel•• and rightly determined, that as the power of making treatie•• was necessary, it could no where so properly, or so safely b•• placed for the interests of the Union as in the hands of th•• President: And if when made they were not to have the e••¦fect of law, the power of making them would be nugatory

The following passage from Blackstone's Commentaries, will ••nd to illustrate this subject, "It is also," says that elegant ••ommentator, "the King's prerogative to make treaties, leagues, and alliances, with foreign States and Princes. For it is by the law of nations essential to the goodness of a league, that it be made by the sovereign power, and that it is binding upon the whole community: And in England the sovereign power, quod hoc, is vested in the person of the King. Whatever contracts therefore he engages in, no other person in the kingdom can legally delay, resist, or an∣nul. And yet lest this plenitude of authority should be abus∣ed, to the detriment of the public, the Constitution (as was hinted before) has here interposed a check by means of Par∣liamentary impeachment, for the punishment of such Mini∣sters, as from criminal motives advise or conclude any trea∣ty, which shall afterwards be judged to derogate from the honor and interest of the nation." 1 Bl. p. 257. I might ••e all the political writers in support of the general doctrine 〈◊〉〈◊〉 laid down. The Convention considered it just. They ••w the necessity of entrusting the power to the President; but ••oy also knew that in this, as in every other exercise of power, is the Minister of the people; and that whenever in making ••reaty he shall be governed by corrupt motives, he will be ••le to impeachment.

HAVING thus gone through the different articles of the Con∣••••ution. I will now endeavour to answer two other objections 〈◊〉〈◊〉 have been made to it. The first is, "that the liberty of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 press is not secured." The second, "that it will annihilate 〈◊〉〈◊〉 dependence of the different States."

ON the first objection I shall only observe, that as the Con∣•••••• can claim the exercise of no right which is not expressly 〈◊〉〈◊〉 them by this Constitution; they will have no power to

restrain the press in any of the States; and therefore it would have been improper to have taken any notice of it. The ar∣ticle respecting the habeas corpus act corroborates this doc∣trine. The Convention were sensible that a federal govern∣ment would no more have the right of suspending that useful law, without the consent of the States, than that of restraining the liberty of the press: But at the same time they knew that circumstances might arise to render necessary the suspension of the habeas corpus act, and therefore they require of the States, that they will vest them with that power, whenever those cir∣cumstances shall exist. But they also knew, that no circum∣stances could make it necessary that the liberty of the press should be entrusted to them, and therefore they judged it im∣pertinent to introduce the subject. But still there are fears for the district which may become the seat of Congress, and which may be ten miles square.

CAN it be for a moment supposed, that Congress will not preserve the liberty of the press in the government of that dis∣trict? Or that there exist American citizens so lost to a sense of liberty, as to reside under a govenment where it shall be taken away?* 1.14

AS to the other objection, I will admit, that by this Consti∣tution, the several States will be abridged of some of their powers; but of no more than are necessary to make a strong federal government. Sufficient still remains with the State Le∣gislatures to preserve the quiet, liberty, and welfare, of their citizens. To them is left the whole domestic government of

the States; they may still regulate the rules of property, the rights of persons, every thing that relates to their internal po∣lice, and whatever effects neither foreign affairs nor the rights of the other States. Powers weighty enough to be entrusted to most men; and which good and modest men would think sufficient to be entrusted to them. Besides we should remem∣ber that every State has its proportionate share in the national government; and that the Constitution has not only guaran∣teed to them a republican form, but has made their indepen∣dence necessary to its own existence.

THE adoption of this government will not only preserve our Union, and thereby secure our internal happiness; but will restore that consequence and respectability abroad, which have been lost since the days of Saratoga and York. The firm con∣federation of thirteen States, inhabiting a fertile soil, and grow∣ing rapidly in population and strength, will give them an im∣portance in the world, which they never can acquire when dis∣united: And we are assured from the best authority, that the link of the present Union is but a thread. An energetic go∣vernment will give a spring to every thing: New life will be ••nfused throughout the American system. Our credit will be ••estored; because the proposed Constitution at the same time ••hat it will give us vigour, will inspire foreign nations with a confidence in us. The restoration of credit, will be the revi∣val of commerce. The sound of the hammer will be again heard in our ports. The ocean will once more be covered with our ships, and the flag of the United States be respected by the nations.

BUT once disunited, these bright prospects immediately va∣••ish•• Our western hemisphere is clouded over; and destruc∣tive

storms arise. Our inactivity and torpor produced by th•• relaxation of our laws will become inveterate, unless our inter∣nal quarrels shall rouse us into action; the seeds of whic•• have been long sown, and disunion will make the harve plentiful. Massachusetts and New-Hampshire have more tha•• a pretext of quarrel in their pretensions to the province •• Main; and their mutual interference in the fisheries will s•••••• to increase the dispute. Connecticut and New-York may ••••∣vive their old quarrel respecting boundaries. Pennsylvan•••• will not forget that the territory of Delaware was once unit•• to her; and will probably cast thither a longing eye. Ma•• land and Virginia may dispute the right to the Shores of P•••• towmack, and the latter may readily revive with Pennsyl••••¦nia, the old dispute respecting the northern boundings: 〈◊〉〈◊〉 dispute which terminated unfavourably to Virginia, and wh•• from the peculiarity of it, was difficult to settle. When such causes of dissention, we add the commercial regulatio•• of the individual States, the ambitious views of their leads and the ill-grounded, though rooted, prejudices of the wh•• have we not abundant reason to fear the most serious calam••¦ties from a disunion? Then will open a new scene in A••••¦rica; the sword is then drawn not against foreign foes, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 against each other: The sword is then drawn never to sheathed, till some State more powerful or more fortun•• than the rest, shall subjugate the whole.

EXAMINE then, my countrymen, dispassionately the p••••¦posed plan of federal government, and you will find that far from being full of defects, it is a system well calculated preserve the liberty, and ensure the happiness of Ame•• and that it reflects additional honor on the names of a D••ck••

••n, a Franklin, and a Washington.* 1.15 You can not for a mo∣••ent suppose that such men would deceive you! If human ••ature were capable of falling at once from the height of vir∣••e to the depth of depravity; even then you were safe—for ••••ey could construct no government which would oppress you, ••••at would not equally oppress themselves, and their posterity.

Notes

• * 1.1

  See in particular the address and reasons, &c. of the Penn∣sylvania Minority.
• * 1.2

  It is a generally received opinion in this country, that th•• exports of the eastern and middle States are very inconsiderable but this is a great mistake; for when we take into consideratio•• their wheat, flour, lumber, flax-seed, pot-ash, fish oyl, iro•• and rum, there can be no doubt but these articles produce gre•••• sums. I am informed that the European goods annually shipp•• to Massachusetts, are to a greater amount than those shipped 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Virginia. These goods can only be paid for by the produce 〈◊〉〈◊〉 their exports.
• * 1.3

  Minority address, p. 22 23.
• * 1.4

  Minority address. That hasty and passionate performance is full of absurdities upon this head.
• * 1.5

  See Article the 6th of the Confederation.
• * 1.6

  The present King of Poland was Stanislaus Leginski, Count Powniotowsky.
• * 1.7

  See Governor Randolph's letter. He has enforced none of his objections with reasons.
• * 1.8

  It is to be observed, that this is the only instance where the Senate have the shadow of Executive power.
• * 1.9

  9 Article of the Confederation.
• † 1.10

  Under the present Confederation, every department of go∣vernment, is lodged in the same body; which alone is a sufficient ••eason for adopting a new federal system.
• * 1.11

  The four eastern States, and the four southern, being at a great distance from the center, will necessarily concur in mak∣ing the Federal Court as convenient as possible: And therefore appeals to the Supreme Court will be allowed only in cases of great consequence.
• * 1.12

  The vulgar in Massachusetts believe, that the practice of gouging in Virginia is so common, that half of its inhabitants have but one eye. This opinion is on a level with a declaration of a gentlemen high in office, in this country, who declared him self against the Federal Government, because the eastern people were all rogues.
• * 1.13

  See Mr. Gerry's, Mr. Mason's, and Governor Randolph's, objections.
• * 1.14

  It is to be observed, that the consent of the State where this district shall 〈◊〉〈◊〉, must be obtained by the Congress: And the State may stipulate the terms of the cession.
• * 1.15

  I might have mentioned the names of a Madison, a Blair, Hamilton, a Johnson, a King, a Rutledge. I acknowledge abilities of Mr. Mason and Governor Randolph; but let it be forgotten, that at the close of the Convention, there were three dissenting voices.