The benevolence of the Deity, fairly and impartially considered. In three parts. The first explains the sense, in which we are to understand benevolence, as applicable to God. The second asserts, and proves, that this perfection, in the sense explained, is one of His essential attributes. The third endeavors to answer objections. ... / By Charles Chauncy, D.D. Senior Pastor of the First Church of Christ in Boston.

PART III. Answering the principal objections which have been urged against the benevolence of the Deity.

THE traces of goodness are so visible, in every part of the creation we know any thing about, particularly in this world of our's, and in the formation of man, his implanted fa|culties, and the methods by which, according to established laws, under the government of providence, they may be improved to his be|ing as perfect and happy as can reasonably be desired, that it is strange any should call in question the Creator's benevolence: And yet, no one of his attributes have been more vio|lently attacked. The great difficulty objected, is the evil there is in the world. This world of our's, and mankind in particular, its noblest inhabitants, which are represented as monuments of the Deity's goodness, are mentioned as proofs of a deficiency in this very point.

Say these objectors, if an infinitely benevo|lent Being is the Supreme Creator, and Ruler, whence came those imperfections, and positive evils, which abound in the world, and which all ranks of creatures are subjected to? How shall we account for the miseries, in innumera|ble kinds, which men in particular lie groan|ing

under? What shall we say of the many dis|eases, accompanied with torment of body, and anguish of mind, to which they are liable, and which finally put an end to their present state of existence? And could these things be ac|counted for, who can reconcile that moral ir|regularity, which has been introduced into the world, and its direful effects, with the super-in|tending agency and government of a being absolutely holy and good?

This, in general, is the difficulty pleaded. And a very great one it is; but a difficulty, it may be worth remarking, as we pass along, not levelled against Christians only, or the religion they profess, but against all religion, natural as well as revealed: Insomuch, that let men's religion be what it may, whether they are Jews or Hea|thens, Deists or Christians, they are equally em|barrassed with it. For it being a sure fact, that sin and misery are in the world, if they believe that a wise and good God made and governs it, they are all under like obligations to do what they can to reconcile these two things, which have such an appearance of in|consistency with each other. And this accor|dingly has been the endeavor of persons of all different religions, in all parts of the world. Whence came evil? has indeed, in all ages, been a perplexing question; and no one, it may be, has more puzzled the greatest pre|tenders to reason, as well as religion.

It was this that gave rise to the scheme of two independent opposite principles in the universe; the one good, from wh••m is derived every thing that is good; the other evil, from whom is derived every thing that is evil, whether natural or moral. It is observable, even this Manichean notion, however ridiculous, is yet founded on the supposition of such evidences of goodness in the creation, as are too glaring to be denied. The fault therefore of the system is, not so much that it disputes the existence of a benevolent cause, as that it weakly imagines the existence of ano|ther opposite one, equally powerful and inde|pendent; the supposition of which two co-or|dinate Deities looks too much like an arbitrary contrivance, invented only for the sake of re|moving away the difficulty arising from the appearance of evil. To be sure, it is an opi|nion so far from being founded on solid proof, that it cannot be supported by any argument fetched from the principles of true reason. It is indeed a scheme utterly destructive of itself. For these two opposite principles being, by suppo|sition, perfectly equal, it is impossible there should have been, either good or evil, unless by their mu|tual consent in operation; and it is impossible also there should have been this consent, upon any other plan than that, of the production of good and evil in equal proportions. And is this the truth of fact? So far from it, that, in the whole circle of existence, there is no ap|pearance of such equality. The truth is, the

uniform, invariable tendency of nature, with respect to all the creatures we know any thing of, is their perfection and happiness within their proper sphere: Nor can it be truly said of any species of creatures that they do not ac|tually attain to the enjoyment of good, much out-weighing the evil they are obliged to suf|fer; which could not have been the case, if there was existing an evil power of opera|tion equal to the good one. Some of the crea|tures, upon this hypothesis, must have carried the marks of the evil principles that produced them, in the tendency of their constitution to mise|ry, balancing the tendency of it to good: Other|wise, there would not be an equality in the ex|ertions of these opposite equal powers.—But I need not enlarge in the refutation of so pal|pable an absurdity. However, the difficulty, which occasioned it, deserves to be seriously and thoroughly debated. A•• this will be more clearly and intelligibly done, by going over its several parts, and treating them distinctly as so many objections.

Only, it may be fit to make one previous general remark, which I esteem an important one, and desire may be kept in mind through the whole that may follow. It is this; that no objection ought to be esteemed sufficient to set aside the positive proof, that has been given of the Deity's benevolence, which, when thoroughly examined, will be found finally to terminate in IGNORANCE. What I mean is, that no appear|ance

in nature, capable of being alledged, ought to be looked upon as conclusively arguing an inconsistency with goodness, MEERLY or ONLY because we may not be able particularly and ful|ly to point out their consistency with each other: I say, meerly or only for this reason, because there is an evident difference between our not particularly discerning wherein the consistency of two things lies, and clearly perceiving that there is a real inconsistency between them. And could any appearance be alledged, between which and infinite goodness, the human mind clearly perceives a real inconsistency, it is rea|dily confessed, it would be a sufficient restraint, in true reason, from attributing this perfection to the Deity. But the case is quite otherwise, where the amount of all that can be said con|cerning any appearance is only this, that it surpasses our ability particularly to trace the ways, wherein it may tend to good. And shall it be thought strange that there should be, in na|ture appearances of this sort? It is no more than might reasonably be expected, considering the imperfection of our faculties, and incapa|city therefrom to view the works of God as con|nected with, and dependant on, each other, in the Divine plan of operation. No eye but God's can take in the whole scheme of creation and providence. And therefore it is probable, the highest order of created beings are inca|pable of seeing perfectly into the reasons of the Divine conduct. Much less may it be thought,

that this should be the privilege of such com|paratively low, weak creatures as we are. So far are we from comprehending the connection of the universe in its various parts, their mu|tual dependence on, and subordination to, each other, that our knowledge is confined to a few beings and things in it, and to a very small part of the scheme of God, even with respect to these. And shall it then be counted an objection of any weight against the goodness of God's works, that we are not able, in every instance, to see wherein they are connected with good? Ought it not rather, to be concluded, as to such in|stances, that the defect lies, not in the tendency of God's works, but in our incapacity to connect them together, and view them in the reference they bear to each other? This is certain|ly no more than a fit expression of humility and modesty in such short-sighted creatures as we are. And it were to be wished, that our inqui|ries into the measures of the Divine conduct were more generally made under the habitual influence of these principles. I would not be misunderstood in what I now say. I have no intention to restrain mankind, imperfect as they are, from reasoning with all freedom upon the present, or any other subject, wherein the De|ity is concerned: Much less have I it in view to stop the mouths of objectors, only by bid|ding them be humble and modest, because God is above them, and his ways and thoughts high above their's as the heavens are high above the

earth. I am sensible, that humility duly regu|lated by reason and religion, as it ought al|ways to be, is no enemy to the freest debates not those which relate even to the proceedings, of God. It is the pretence of humility, not the principle itself, that makes an out-cry against such inquiries. And to this false humility, at least in part, it may be owing, that so many ab|surdities, horribly reproachful to the nature and government of God, have been embraced in the world. It has doubtless too often be|trayed men into superstition and bigotry, giving them a mean, abject cast of mind, whereby their intellectual faculties have been very much unfitted for the right discharge of their proper office. This, in truth, is the rock which mul|titudes have split upon; not considering that submission even to the Deity ought always to be exercised under the conduct of reason and good sense. And if thus exercised, though it will be an effectual restraint from pride and ar|rogance, keeping men within the sphere of their powers, and making them modest and cautious, especially in regard of the things which they are able to consider not in their intire con|nection but singly and as separate parts of some great whole: Yet, it will, at the same time, put them upon due care and pains, in the use of their faculties, that they kn••w the truth; it will dispose them freely and fairly to hear and examine whatever may be decently offered on both sides of a question, that they may be

rationally prepared to make a wise and impar|tial judgment in the case; in a word, it will influence them to form their sentiments, not according to the authoritative decisions of men, or the opinions generally prevailing in the pla|ces where they live, but according to the truth of things so far as they are able, under the advantages they are favoured with, be they more or less.

It will not be supposed after saying this, that the present remark is made with a view to take shelter under the pretence of that humility and modesty, which become creatures, especi|ally such imperfect ones as men are, towards the great Creato••. It is freely confessed, there are many things, possible to conception, which are absolutely inconsistent, in tr••e reason with infinite benevolence. And it is as readily con|ceded, that we are endowed with faculties, ena|bling us clearly and certainly to discern this inconsistency: Insomuch that no solid reason can be assigned, why we should call in question the truth of our perceptions in this case, any more than in others. And should we do it, in|stead of humility and submission, I see not but we should discover downright contempt of our implanted powers. And, in truth, could any appearances, in all nature, be produced between which and infinite goodness the human mind could, clearly perceive a real, positive inconsistency, it could, acting rationally, assent to it as true that there was existing an infinitely benevolent first

cause. Here therefore is full scope allowed for the objectors in the present dispute. And if they are able to produce, in the whole compass of being, any appearances that will excite in the minds of rational agents the idea of a real, un|doubted inconsistency with goodness, it is granted their end is answered, they have argued con|clusively. But then, it ought to be acknowled|ged, on the other hand, that if these appear|ances, in their last result, center in ignorance, and only prove that our capacities are scanty, and not formed to take in the whole of what is proper to be considered in the case; and that good, the greatest good, may be the production of these appearances, in the end, for all that we know, or can prove, to the contrary; I say, in this view of the matter, it ought to be ingenu|ously confessed, that such appearances, in strict reasoning, conclude nothing against the benevo|lence of the Deity. For this is certainly the truth of the case. And all the reproach that is re|flected on the Divine goodness by this kind of arguing can reasonably be looked upon as no other than the effect of ignorance; not to say pride and arrogant presumption, in taking upon us to judge and determine in matters so evi|dently beyond the reach of our powers.

This general observation, which I believe no one will deny to be just, I esteem fully suf|ficient to answer the general objection against the benevolence of the Deity, which has been brought from the appearances of evil in the cre|ation.

However, I shall not content myself with this general reply, but proceed to a distinct consideration of the particular objections con|tained in the general one above-mentioned. And they may be reduced to these three, the im|perfect powers of so many of the creatures who are capable of happiness; the moral disorders which have taken place in the world; and the natural evils which are so numerous, and turn so much to the disadvantage, especially of man.

1. The first objection against the infinite be|nevolence of the Deity is taken from the imper|fection of so many of the creatures on this earth of our's. What a diminutive creature, com|paratively speaking, is even man, the most per|fect of them all? How small his capacity for happiness? And how much smaller still the capacities of the inferior perceiving beings, through their several ranks, in the de|scending scale, of subordination? And could it be thus, if God was infinitely good? Could not an infinitely benevolent Cre|ator have communicated nobler capacities for happiness? And if he could, how can his not doing it be reconciled with the idea of him as an infinitely benevolent Being?

In answer to this difficulty, it may be said, the bringing into existence an absolutely per|fect creature is not within the reach of infi|nite goodness, aided by almighty power. The very idea of a creature is essentially connected with comparative imperfection; as it derives

its being from another, is dependent on that other for its continuance in being, and is ne|cessarily finite in its nature and powers. To sup|pose a created being infinite, would be to sup|pose it equal with its Creator; which is too absurd to be admitted. Absolute perfection therefore is an incommunicable glory of the only true God. And should there be a crea|tion, comparative imperfection must exist in it, otherwise it could not exist at all. Consequently, if such imperfection is an evil, it is such an one as must take place, or there could be no dis|play of the Divine benevolence. —But the truth is, meer imperfection is no evil, to be sure no positive one: Nor may God, with the least propriety, be considered as the author of it. This matter has been set in a clear and strong point of light by Arch-Deacon Law, in his 32d. Note on Arch-Bishop King's "origin of evil." His words are these, "God is the cause of perfection only, not of defect, which so far forth as it is natural to created beings hath no cause at all, but is meerly a negation, or non-entity. For every created thing was a negation or non-entity, before it had a positive being, and it had only so much of its primitive nega|tion taken away from it, as it had positive be|ing conferred on it; and therefore, so far forth as it is, its being is to be attributed to the so|vereign cause that produced it: But so far forth as it is not, its not being is to be attri|buted to the original non-entity out of which it

was produced. For that which was once no|thing would still have been nothing, had it not been for the cause that gave being to it; and therefore, that it is so far nothing still, that is, limitted and defective, is only to be attribu|ted to its own primitive nothingness. As for in|stance, if I give a poor man a hundred pounds, that he is worth so much money is wholly owing to me, but that he is not worth an hun|dred more is owing wholly to his own pover|ty. And just so, that I have such and such perfections of being is wholly owing to God, who produced me out of nothing; but that I have such and such defects of being is only owing to that non-entity out of which he produced me."

It will probably be said here, we see in the creation innumerable beings with implanted faculties, making them the capable percipients of happiness in indefinitely various degrees, some in an higher, others in a lower, till we have got down to the lowest we can conceive of. Can this be the work of an infinitely benevo|lent Being? Would he have made so many crea|tures so imperfect, as to be capable of happiness in such low degrees only? If it was his pleasure to bring beings into existence, from non-entity, would he not if infinitely good, have endowed them with higher and more noble capacities for happiness? The obvious answer is this, if in a creation, in which there are beings inconcei|vably various in their capacities for happiness, there may be the communication of MORE

GOOD, than could otherwise have been com|municated, it is so far from being an objection against the Divine benevolence, that these be|ings of lower capacities for the enjoyment of happiness were brought into existence, that it is at once an illustration, and strong proof of it. It is readily owned, if the whole result of com|municated good was nothing more than the production of such imperfect beings, as are ca|pable of happiness in a low measure only, it might be thought the Deity, if infinite in benevo|lence, had been wanting in the manifestation of it. But, if there are other beings gradually rising, in the scale of existence, to an incon|ceivable height in their capacities for the en|joyment of happiness, and of the most superior kind too, why should it be thought strange, that there should be imperfect ones also, in the like gradually descending scale? Especially, if they are all considered as parts of some GREAT WHOLE, severally concurring to make one uni|versal, gloriously connected system, capable of yielding as much good, as the infinitely be|nevolent Being, guided in his exertions by unerring wisdom, has thought fit to commu|nicate.

In this view of the matter, it is not neces|sary, that every system making the universal one, or that every creature in each system, should be equally perfect. For, though, with respect to particular systems, and beings, com|pared with one another, there should be ever

so great a diversity; yet this ought not, in rea|son, to be esteemed an objection against the Divine benevolence, if, upon the whole, there is the display of as much good as infinite wis|dom has thought proper: Nay, upon supposition there may, in this way, be the communication of more good, than in any other, it would be an objection against infinite benevolence, if it was not in this way displayed. The creation is, in fact, a diversified one. It therefore lies up|on the objectors against the benevolence of the Deity to make it appear, that less good is capa|ble of being communicated upon this plan, than might have been upon some other. Until this is done, which never will be, as it has never yet been, no complaint can reasonably be made against the Deity, as having been wanting in his benevolence, on account of bringing into existence a creation, diversified in the manner we see this is in which we hold our beings.

There are only two ways in general, in which an infinitely benevolent cause is supposed capa|ble of exerting itself in the communication of good. One is, by displays ad ultimum posse, that is, to the utmost in all instances whatever; the effect of which displays would be one or|der only of beings, the most perfect there can be. But this supposition is, perhaps, an im|possible one, as it carries with it that which looks very like a contradiction. That which is infi|nite is unlimited, and not to be restrained with|in any bounds. To suppose therefore a ne plus

of exertion in an infinite being, is to suppose that this being is restrained within certain limits; which seems to contradict his being infinite. If the Deity is infinitely benevolent, his exertions in manifesting the glory of this attribute can ne|ver be exhausted. To suppose otherwise, would be to suppose that he was not thus infinite, strictly and properly speaking, the word utmost, or any other word of similar signification, can|not be applied to an infinite being, with respect to any of his communications. He ought rather to be conceived of, as having with|in himself an ability to go on communicating to eternity. Communications to the utmost, so far as we are able to conceive of the matter, are incompatible with the idea of an infinite ability to communicate. Besides, should the benevolence of the Deity (was this possible) be displayed in all instances to the utmost, this at|tribute of his would appear more like a natural instinct, mechanically and blindly urging him on to the communication of happiness, than a mo|ral disposition, immutably guided in all its ex|ertions by unerring wisdom, and in consistency with unspotted rectitude.—The other way of the Deity's communicating good, may be by limited displays of it, in particular instances; the consequence of which might be the produc|tion of creatures indefinitely diversified in their powers; some capable of happiness in one de|gree, others in another, and so on, in a gra|dual ascention, without discontinuity, to the

highest conceivable perfection. This, I say, may be the effect of limited exertions of bene|volence, in an infinitely productive cause, with respect to the particular parts of some great and good whole. And the reason is obvious at first view. For if any one conceivable degree of imper|fection will argue a defect in the exertions of an infinitely benevolent Being, another will argue the same thing with equal truth, and no stop can be made till we have got to the highest created perfection. If a low reptile, for instance, cannot be the production of an infinitely be|nevolent cause, because less perfect than a man; a man, for the same reason, could not have had existence, because less perfect than an angel; and an angel, for the same reason still, could not have been made, because less perfect than some being of a yet superior order; and so on, till there are no creatures but of the highest, and most perfect class in the creation. So that, if there can be any limited exertions of Divine benevolence, there are no creatures, be their capacities for happiness as low as any in na|ture, but may have existence in a scale of beings, which shall gradually ascend to as high perfec|tion as infinite benevolence, guided by infinite wisdom, shall think fit to create.

The only inquiry then is, which of these sorts of exertion are capable of yielding, upon the whole, the most good. And it will not be denied, that the presumption is strong in favor of the latter; as they actually take place in a

world, that will readily be owned to be the effect of infinite benevolence, conducted by unerring wisdom, if it be possible, that more good should be the result of such exertions, than of any other within the reach of our ability to point out. And that this is not only possi|ble, but highly probable, if not certain, I shall endeavour to evince by the following reasons, which appear to me strongly conclusive, espe|cially if considered in one conjunct view.

The first, I would offer, may be set in the following light. We see, in fact, that the various species of creatures, living on our earth, are so constituted, as that the existence of one of them is no hindrance to the existence of ano|ther; but they are all well enough capable of existing together, as the extent of the world gives a sufficiency of room for it. The exist|ence of man, the top-creature in this system, is no bar to the existence of any other class of creatures, in the descending scale, quite down to the lowest perceiving animal: But there is as real a sufficiency of space for their existence, as if he had not been made; and as like a suf|ficiency for him, as if they had not been in be|ing. And the same may be said, with equal truth, of all the other orders of beings, with respect to the existence of one another, in this part of the creation.—And should we extend our thoughts to other worlds, and the various classes of beings in them, there is the same rea|son still to think, that the existence of one of

them does not interfere with the existence of another. Angels, and any superior order of be|ings, may as easily be made capable of existing, at the same time, as if one only of these orders had been created. And as to all the other classes of beings, in all worlds, they are doubtless so made, as to be all of them capable of existing, as truly as if only one class of them had been brought into existence.

Upon the truth now of these premises, it plainly follows, that the capacity for happiness, in the universe, is enlarged by means of the di|versity of beings that have existence in it. And if the capacity is enlarged, it is, from hence, demonstrably certain, that the quantum of good may be greater than it could have been, if, instead of this diversity, fewer orders of beings, or a single one only, had been made.

It is, indeed, from this diversity of beings, duly subordinated to each other, that the pleni|tude of nature arises. A few orders of beings only would not have served to this purpose. The creation is filled up, by that admirably nice and curious variety in the classes of creatures, whereby they are fitted to be proper links in the chain of existence; all concurring, as so many well adjusted parts, to constitute one whole without void or chasm. Thus we are naturally led to think, from what falls within the reach of our observation, in this system to which we belong. For, it is evident, that, if the order of men only had been created, the

room, that is now filled with the inferior ranks of creatures, would have been a vast chasm. Men would have multiplied no faster than they do, if there were no brutes: Nor would they have been better accommodated. One of the brutal species does not hinder the existence, or increase, or support, of another; but there is both room and suitable provision for them all. And should any other classes of the creatures be pitched upon, they are so constituted as that there would be room still for all the other or|ders. And the same reasoning will hold good if extended to all other systems. There are vari|ous ranks of creatures in them: And, perhaps, otherwise, they would not have been so full of being as they might have been.

The truth is, This world of our's is so con|trived, as that we can no where discern in it any void. It appears, on the contrary, by means of the various ranks of creatures, gradually rising in perfection to men, the highest order of them, to be perfectly filled with being. And, if there is no chasm in this system, of which we are a main part, why should we suppose one, in the other systems constituting the universe? It is far more reasonable, from the analogy of nature, to think, that the gradation still goes on rising, in other worlds, beyond the bounds of our most enlarged imagination.

And what though, in this vast diversity, there should be orders of beings formed for happiness (at least in the first stages of their possible ex|istence)

in an imperfect, low degree only? Is it not sufficient to answer, that no capacity for happiness, however small, should be excluded the creation, so long as it is not an hindrance to the existence of other gradually rising capa|cities, till we have exceeded all conception: Especially, if it be added, that the leaving out any capacity for happiness, however diminutive, in this chain of beings, will proportionably substract from the sum total of general happi|ness; which, in this case, would not be so great as it might have been.

The short of the case is, the creation of God, by means of this diversity of beings, gradually and regularly rising in perfection, even to the highest possible degree, becomes a most perfect and contiguous whole; demonstrating the riches and glory of the Creator's goodness, far beyond what it could have done, if the continuity had been broken, by the non-existence of any of the ranks of creatures, which now make it an ab|solutely full and well-connected universe.

It may add both light and force to the present argument, if I just subjoin, That the various ranks of creatures are so far from being an ob|struction to the existence of one another, that their existence in this multiform be|stowment of it, is a greater blessing than it would have been, if they had existed singly and alone. This is certainly the truth, in fact, with respect to the order of man. The existence of the other classes of beings below him is so far from being a disservice to him, that, if they had not

been created, he must have enjoyed existence without many of the advantages, tending to the comfort of it, which he now possesses. And this is most probably the truth, with respect to all the other species of creatures. They are placed in such a degree of subordination, as to be fitted to be useful to one another: In|somuch that every class of beings, by reason of this subservient diversity, enjoys existence un|der more desirable circumstances than it could otherwise have done. And this may be the real truth of the case, throughout the whole compass of percipient existence.

Another consideration, not improper to be mentioned, in proof of the point we are upon, is, its being plainly impossible, that any single or|der of beings could be formed capable of all the good, which many orders, variously endowed with faculties, may be fitted for the enjoyment of. It is indisputable, that every being, of whatever rank, whether high or low, must have its own proper nature. This, we at once perceive to be necessary, in regard of beings that have ma|terial bodies. They are indeed ranked into different classes, on account of their different bodily make. And a difference in bodily struc|ture can no more exist in the same bodies, at once, than they can occupy different pla|ces, at the same time. And, as different or|ganizations of parts, in perceiving beings that have bodies, are intended, among other uses, to form different capacities, in kind sometimes,

as well as degree; it is plain, that beings thus differently organized can no more be capable of just the same good, than they can partake of the same bodily structure. And the same is as true of incorporeal beings. They must, in all their different classes, have different men|tal powers: Otherwise, they could not be rank|ed into different orders. And there is no rea|son to think, but that different mental powers, as well as bodily ones, should form different capacities for happiness, and such, many times, as cannot exist in the same minds, at the same time: The consequence from all which is obviously this;—That should the most perfect order of beings be created that could be, it must be an order of some certain nature and constitution, which nature could not be capable of all the different powers of innumerably various natures, some of which, at least, are absolutely incom|patible with each other. And if no single or|der of beings could be endowed with the various faculties of all natures, it is impossible they should be the subjects of all the various degrees and kinds of happiness, which these natures may be severally fitted for, and capable of.

Perhaps, it will be objected here, though no single order of beings could be capable of just the same happiness, which various orders might be capable of; yet one order possibly might be so formed as to be qualified for greater hap|piness of another and more perfect kind.

In reply whereto, it ought to be considered, that the first link, in the chain of diversified beings we have supposed, is the most perfect order that can be. And it is certain, if all the happiness of all the subordinate ranks of beings be added to the happiness of this highest order, the sum-total will be greater, than if the happi|ness of this highest order only is taken into the account. And the strength of this reasoning will still increase, if it be remembered, agree|ably to what has been, already observed, that the existence of none of the subordinate ranks of beings is any obstruction to the existence of the highest, but that they may all exist together, and as free from interference, as if only one of them had been brought into existence.

Another argument still, to the purpose we are upon, is this; that the infinitely benevolent Being ought always to be supposed to exist him|self in producing good, with intelligence, wise design, and according to some method discover|ing exquisite skill and contrivance. A myste|rious something, capable of happiness without faculties fitted for such an end; or actually en|joying it, without regard to any stated method adapted to the purpose, is a supposition if not impossible in itself, yet entirely dissonant from the idea we entertain of good wisely commu|nicated. In order to this, there must be facul|ties previously created and contrived for the perception of this good; and more than this, it must be the effect of the exercise of these

faculties upon their proper objects, according to some well-established constitution. And in a diversified creation, one filled with different ranks of beings, all variously endowed with ca|pacities fitted to make them happy, according to stated laws, in a certain degree; I say, in such a creation as this, there may be manifes|tation of more art and contrivance in dispensing good, than in a creation in which one order only of beings should have existence, though the skill herein displayed should be as great as it could be. For it is indeed impossible, that all the methods of wise contrivance should be discovered in the make of any single order of beings whatever. And of this we have as good proof as we can desire; because it is evident from what we see, in fact, that some of these methods are of such a nature as to be incompatible with any one class of beings that can possibly be made. It is a contradiction that any order of beings should have a mental structure only, and yet, at the same time, possess bodies with vari|ous organs admirably contrived for the convey|ance of sensations of such a kind. And unless the same beings could have bodies, and not have them, at the same time, it is impossible that the whole of that contrivance, which is actually discovered in the creation, could be manifest|ed in the make and circumstances of any one order of beings that could be created. So that, had the goodness of the Deity been displayed towards one rank of beings only, however per|fect,

and not to numberless orders of them, va|riously endowed and situated, there could not have been those amazing discoveries of exqui|sitely wise contrivance and art, which are now visible in all parts of the creation;* 1.1 obliging us to own the pertinency of those words of admi|ration, How manifold are thy works, O Lord! In wisdom hast thou made them all.

Should any object here, Though just the same traces of wisdom which are discernable in the creation, according to its present plan, could not have taken place, if one order of beings only had been made; yet this is no reason why an order could not have been made, that might have discovered greater skill and wiser contri|vance, though of another kind. It may be suf|ficient to return a like answer to one we had occasion to give before, viz. That this very order of beings may be the highest in the ascen|ding scale of existence, and compleat the mani|festation of the riches of Divine wisdom, in the manner of communicating good.

But besides what has been hitherto said, it may be worth while to enquire, whether much of the most valuable kind of good could have been communicated, had not the creation been a di|versified one, like to that which really exists. It will not be denied, that intelligent moral beings are the most noble, and formed with capacities for the highest good, in kind as well as degree. And perhaps, upon examination, it will be found, that a great part of the good they are capable

of is so essentially connected with a diversified constitution of beings and things, as that they could not possess it but upon this plan. It is certain, in point of fact, that the intelligent moral beings, in our system, do, from this di|versity, receive, according to established laws, those numberless ideas, which are the source of all those acquirements in knowledge, which give them their whole intellectual pleasure. And it is from the same diversity that those various relations and dependencies arise, which are the foundation of their moral dispositions, and give occasion for the exercise of them, in infinitely various fit ways, to the production of all the happiness they are capable of. And there is reason to think, that this is the truth of fact, among all intelligent moral beings, in all worlds. I do not mean, that their ideas, the spring of their intellectual delight, are conveyed into their minds in just the same way that ideas are let into our's; or, that the relations subsisting among them, giving occasion for moral exertments, ac|companied or followed with high pleasure, are precisely the same that take place among us: But what I intend is, that they all come by their ideas, the foundation of their intellectual happi|ness, according to some constitution, wisely con|trived and adapted to such a purpose; and that they are also so endowed, and situated with respect to one another, as that ther•• may be fit occasions for the exercise of their moral powers, in order to their perceiving the pleasure that is proper to

moral agents. And it seems as though they could not otherwise, in a rational, wise way, enjoy the happiness that is suited to such kind of beings. It is true, if the happiness of intelli|gent moral creatures might be supposed to con|sist in indolent ease, or a meer inactive enjoy|ment of existence, there would be no room for dispute upon the matter: But such an Epicu|rean sort of happiness ought not to be ascribed to an infinitely wise agent as its cause, how|ever benevolent; for it is not worthy of a com|munication from him. Happiness, in respect of intelligent moral beings, ought always to be conceived of as the result of intelligent moral powers, regularly exerted, according to establish|ed laws, wisely adjusted to the nature of such beings. They ought to be considered, as re|ceiving their ideas, not by immediate infusion, but in conformity to some stated order, mani|festing wise design and contrivance: They ought to be considered, as making a regular use of their intellectual faculties in the management of their ideas, in order to their perception of intellectual delight: And they ought also to be considered, as so situated with respect to other beings, as to have proper occasions for the ex|ercise of their moral powers, in various fit ways, so as to enjoy pleasure herefrom.

And now, in a diversified constitution, there is room for the conveyance of all possible ideas into all various minds, not by meer impressi|on, but in certain ways, and according to stat|ed

laws, manifesting the greatest wisdom and design: And there is likewise all the scope that can be desired for all possible relations and de|pendences, from whence, according to the ab|stract reason of things, may arise a fitness and propriety in infinitely various exertments of moral dispositions; making the beings possessed of them wisely and rationally as happy as they can be: Whereas, in a creation of one order of beings only, be their perfection as great as possible, it is not conceivable, how they should be capable of that happiness which may naturally and wisely result from the contrary plan.

There is certainly one sort of happiness, which I esteem a consideration sufficient of itself to bear the whole weight of the present cause: I say, there is one sort of happiness (perhaps the noblest, and most God-like) which could not have place in the creation, but upon suppositi|on of its being, in some measure, a diversified one. What I mean is, that if there had been one order only of beings, equal in perfection and happiness, there could not have been the plea|sure that is the result of the communication of good. For it is only upon the plan of diversity in beings, that one creature can be the object of another's beneficence. Reduce the creation to a perfect equality, and all participation of that part of the Creator's happiness, the communication of good, is, at once, necessarily destroyed. Fo•• where the same perfection and happiness, both in kind and degree, is, at all times, equally pos|sessed

by all beings, it is evident, that good can|not possibly be communicated from one to ano|ther. And can it be imagined that the Deity would pitch upon a plan for the communication of good, which would render it impracticable for any of his creatures, either to resemble him in that which is his greatest glory, or to partake, in any measure, of that which is his greatest pleasure? There is no truly benevolent mind, but will readily be reconciled to a diversity in beings, ra|ther than the pleasure of communicating good should be excluded the creation: And excluded it must be, if there is not some diversity. Upon any other supposition, not one being, in the creation could be the object of another's beneficence; and consequently, the noblest and most truly divine pleasure, that which arises from doing good, could not have place in the whole circle of existing creatures. So that it is evident, a diversity of beings is so far from being an ob|jection against infinite benevolence, that it really flows from it as its proper cause. There could not have been the manifestation of so much goodness, if there had not been some difference between the creatures brought into existence. And the least attention will obviously lead any one to determine, that if goodness may be the cause of any diversity at all, no stop can be made, without continuing it down, through all variety of orders, so long as the balance shall turn in favor of happiness, or, in other words, so long as existence can be called a good, and pronounced better than not to be.

I shall only subjoin, upon the whole, that we know not but those beings, who are the perci|pients of happiness, in the lowest and most im|perfect degrees, may be designed for a much higher state of existence. This may be possible to the power and wisdom of the infinitely be|nevolent Creator; and that he has not actu|ally made provision for it, in the plan upon which he intends to operate for the general good, is more than any one can pretend to determine. It is highly probable from reason only, and cer|tain from revelation, that man, though, at pre|sent, one of the lowest intellectual moral beings, is yet designed for exalted perfection and hap|piness. He is now in an infant state, compared with what this may be introductory to. And, for all that can be proved to the contrary, he may go on in intellectual and moral attain|ments, till he has reached as great perfection, and is possessed of as great happiness, as, at present, comes to the share of any of the ranks of created beings: Though they also may be supposed to be gradually rising in perfection and happiness, in proportion to their greater ori|ginal capacities; so that the distance will still be preserved among the various orders of creatures, and go on to be so, forever.

II. I now proceed to the second objection, taken from those moral disorders, which, it is pleaded, could not have existence in the crea|tion, if it was produced and governed by an infinitely holy and benevolent being. Such a

Maker and Ruler of the universe, it is said, must have taken effectual care for the preven|tion of moral evil, and the unhappiness arising therefrom. It cannot be supposed, that a be|ing infinitely averse from moral impurity would have suffered the works of his hands to be de|filed with it. It cannot be imagined, that an infinitely benevolent Being would have left crea|tures of his own forming to such immoral conduct as would reflect dishonor on his goodness, by bringing unhappiness and misery into a world of his contriving and making? It is not possi|ble that such a being as the Deity is represented to be, should place his creatures in circum|stances, wherein they might pervert their pow|ers, and involve themselves in ruin. These things cannot be. They are not worthy of an infinitely holy and good God: Especially, if it be considered, that the existence of moral evil cannot be conceived of without permission, at least, from the Deity: Nay, it cannot be sup|posed, but that he must have foreseen, not only the possibility, but the high probability, of its taking place in the world; and yet he suffered it to do so: Yea, so far was he from prevent|ing it, that it seems as though some of the most important measures of his conduct were formed, upon the supposition of its actual being in the universe.

This is the objection urged at large, and, I think, in its full force, against the creation and government of an infinitely holy and benevo|lent

Being. And it is far from being a trifling one. Had it so been, such numbers of philo|sophers and divines, in all parts of the world, would not have employed so much of their time and pains in order to remove it. And it is, perhaps, a difficulty that cannot be perfectly re|moved, in the present state of human faculties. But this is no proof that it cannot be done. It ought to be remembered, that we men are but a low order of intelligent creatures; and what wonder is it, if that should be a difficulty, and an insuperable one, to us, which may be none at all to a superior order of beings. It is a cer|tain fact that moral evil exists in our world; and it is as certain a truth, that God is infi|nitely benevolent. And should we find our|selves unable to point out so clearly and fully, as we might desire, the consistency between this fact, and this truth, we may, notwithstand|ing, keeping within the reach of our faculties, go so far as to say, and upon rational grounds, that which may be sufficient, if not to silence all objection, yet to satisfy ourselves, that mo|ral evil may exist, and the Deity at the same time be infinitely benevolent. Let it then be observed,

Though the being of moral evil, in our world, is not denied; it may have been exaggerated. A great deal of this kind of disorder, it is rea|dily owned, we are acquainted with; but not so much as has been pretended. If we may be|lieve the representations of some, this world, by

reason of the vices, of all kinds, which are almost universally committed in it, is little bet|ter than hell itself. But it is not fair, in ma|king an estimate of the corrupt state of the world, to enumerate all the horrid immoralities which have been perpetrated, at the same time overlooking the many shining virtues which have adorned the character of multitudes. The greatest vices can be matched with as great vir|tues. If some have sunk their moral powers so as to become capable of the basest and vilest actions; others have improved them so as to exhibit a truly God-like temper and conduct. And, it may be, notwithstanding the out-cry that is made of the wickedness of the world, if a just comparison could be made, it would be found, that it is far more than balanced with the good that is in it of the moral kind. But however this is, it is not disowned that there are moral disorders in the world, and many of them too, and of various sorts: Nor is it pre|tended, that this has not been the case in all ages; though it is very evident, that in some they have not prevailed to so great a degree as in others.

And now, that I may, in as clear a manner as I possibly can, offer what may be proper in order to account for this appearance, and recon|cile it with perfect wisdom and goodness in the great Creator and Governor of the universe, it may be necessary to observe, that the evil spe|cified in the objection, and called moral, includes

in it two things, irregularity in the beings char|geable with it, and consequent unhappiness as the fruit thereof, either by the constitution of nature▪ or positive infliction from the Deity. And I shall, accordingly, be distinct in speaking to each of them.

As to the first;—The very supposition of mo|ral irregularity, as distinguished from natural, and meaning the same thing with vice or wic|kedness, is essentially connected with free agency, in the beings upon whom this guilt is fastened. Its nature indeed consists in wrong determinations, and disorderly conduct, which yet are voluntary, and argue a wilful misapplication of moral and rational powers. And as this is the true notion of moral irregularity, in contradistinction to meer weakness and imperfection in causes that are inca|pable of blame: I say, this being the true idea of this first part of moral evil, free agents them|selves, and not the Deity, are the sole and pro|per authors of it. It takes rise intirely from them, and would not have been but for their corrupt choices, and voluntary perversion of fa|culties, which they might have employed to wise and good purposes.* 1.2 And shall the Deity be charged with want of goodness, for that which is not the work of his hands, but a produc|tion wholly owing to the creatures; insomuch, that it could not have existed, had not they abused the powers he was pleased to endow

them with, perverting their design and ten|dency, and by this means bringing unhappi|ness upon themselves, and confusion into the world.

But could not the Deity, it will be here said, have prevented this abuse of liberty, and per|version of moral powers? And if he could have prevented this mischief, how comes it to pass that he did not? And how can his not taking this care be reconciled with his character as in|finitely holy and benevolent? In answer where|to, I see not, I confess, but the Deity, if infi|nitely holy and benevolent, must have pervented this moral disorder, if he could have done it. Only, let it be remembered, when I say, if he could have done it, I speak not so much of a natural, as moral ability; an ability invariably guided, in all its exertions, by perfect wisdom, and in exact conformity to the abstract reason and fitness of things. And it should seem, as though, in this sense, it was not within the power of the infinitely benevolent Cause of all things, to have prevented moral defection. If it was, what imaginable reason can be assigned, why it was not actually done? And, in what possible way, can the non-prevention of it be reconciled with that goodness, which is attributed to the Deity as an essential character? Whereas, if he could not prevent it, in consistency with wise and fit conduct, it is a good reason why he did not do it; and he may notwithstanding be fairly and justly acknowledged as an infinitely benevolent

being. And that this is the real truth of the matter, it shall now be my business to show. In order whereto, let it be observed,

If the Deity could have prevented the abuse of moral liberty, it must have been in one of these three ways, either by not giving free agents a place in the scale of beings; or by making them so perfect as to be incapable of any wrong conduct; or by interposing, at all times, as occasion might require, to hinder the misuse of moral powers, in beings that possess them, either in a higher or lower degree. These are the only conceivable ways, in which the Deity can be supposed to have it in his power to prevent moral disorder in the creation. And will any say, that he must, if infinitely benevolent, in one or other of these ways, have certainly prevented it? So far is this from being capable of proof, that there is good reason, on the contrary, to think, it was naturally, or morally impossible, that he should, in either of them, have done it.

As to the first;—The not giving free agents a place in the scale of beings would have been a gross reflection upon the benevolence of the Deity, instead of making way for its bright|er display. For the quantum of good, capable of being communicated, would, upon this sup|position, have been greatly lessened, and indeed reduced to a very pitt••nce, comparatively speak|ing: And the good enjoyed would have been of the lowest and most imperfect kind too. For there is no pleasure like that which is intel|lectual

and moral; none so noble and divine in its nature, none so satisfying to the subjects of it. Besides, if there were no moral agents existing, there could be no way for the Deity to manifest his moral glory, which is his great|est. He might, it is true, by creating and go|verning an unintelligent world, or creatures in it endowed with intelligence in so low a degree as to be incapable of moral conduct, display, in a measure, both power, and contrivance, as well as goodness; but he could make no ma|nifestation of holiness or justice, or those mo|difications even of goodness, mercy, forbear|ance, long-suffering, forgiveness. If there was no free agency, there could be no virtue, nor any of that sublime happiness, which may be the result of it. There could not, in one word, be any such thing as moral government, with|out which the richest displays of the most ami|able perfection could have no place in the creation. And would it now have been for the honor of the Deity to have withheld the bles|sing of moral liberty, by not giving existence to free agents? Can it be thought fit, that such an intelligent moral agent, as God is, should create beings, but with such constituted pow|ers, as that in the whole circle of existence, there should be no living images of himself, no creatures made capable of that intelligent moral conduct, or of that rational moral happiness, which compleat his character as a most glori|ous and blessed Being? Is it reasonable that

the high privilege of moral intelligence should be excluded the creation? That no being should be made capable of virtue, and that truest kind of happiness which is the result of it? Will any say, it is better there should be no free agency, than that beings should be liable to abuse it? This cannot justly be pleaded; for if free agents are liable to abuse their liberty, they are also capable of making a good use of it, to their consequent, unspeakable happiness. And can it be thought right, that so glorious a ca|pacity for happiness as free agency, should be totally withheld from all beings, because it might possibly have been perverted in its ten|dency? What though some should abuse it, might not others make a wise improvement of it? And why should this be prevented? Why put out of their power, by the non-bestowment of freedom of choice?

It is true, if the gift of liberty was likely, upon the whole, to produce more moral evil than good, it would be a sufficient reason why it should be withheld. But there is no solid ground on which to build such a supposition. It may be justly questioned, whether this is the case, even in this world of our's, where moral freedom is enjoyed but in a low and im|perfect degree: Much less may it be thought to be so, in other words, among superior orders of intelligent moral beings. Perhaps, taking in|to consideration all the ranks of this kind of beings, in all parts of the creation, but a few,

comparatively, have misused their moral freedom. To be sure, it is not known to be otherwise▪ and therefore, for all the proof that can be given to the contrary, the effect of moral and intel|lectual endowment may have been the happiness of the creation, inconceivably beyond what it could have been, if these endowments had not been bestowed. And should this be the truth of fact, as it may be, can it be thought fit, that so much happiness should never have been, by not giving existence to free agents at all, be|cause some have foolishly misimproved their moral liberty to their own disadvantage? It cannot, with any reason, be pretended.

But, it will be said, could not the Deity have made all free agents so perfect as to be incapa|ble of wrong conduct? This is the second way, in which it is imagined, that he might have pre|vented moral evil, and would have done it, if he had been infinitely benevolent. To which it may be replyed as follows.

That, if all free agents had been made with such perfect moral powers, as is here supposed, it must have been an unavoidable bar to that diversity in the creation, which, as has been already proved, is so far from lessening the quan|tity of communicable good, that it really makes way for a richer and fuller communication of it, upon the whole, than would otherwise have been possible. And, was there no other rea|son, this must have been effectual to restrain the infinitely benevolent Deity, from making

all beings so nearly equal in their rational and moral powers.

But, letting this pass for nothing, it may be justly questioned, whether the creation of intel|ligent beings so perfect as to be incapable of mis|conduct, is not an impossibility in the nature of things. For, should we suppose creatures as perfect as they can be, they would yet be finite: And how intelligent moral beings that are finite should be wholly incapable of becoming faulty, in any kind, or degree, is beyond all conception. It is certainly more reasonable to think, that the infinitely perfect Being is the only one that can be absolutely impeccable. For he only can see, at once, all the possible connecti|ons of ideas, and unerringly know what is right and fit in all cases whatever: And he only is immutably and everlastingly disposed to chuse and act according to the truth and reason of things.

But, should it be supposed naturally pos|sible for free agents to be at once created so per|fect as that it could not be that they should err in choice or behaviour, it will still remain a question, whether it be morally possible, i. e. possible in consistency with wise and fit conduct in the Deity? And, perhaps, thus morally speak|ing, it is not possible. This, it is probable, may seem a paradox to some; but there are reasons for its support, which are justly con|clusive; though they should not amount to strict demonstration.

So far as our knowledge extends, it is cer|tain, in point of fact, that intelligent moral be|ings are not when they first come into existence, either so perfect or happy as they may be, and indeed cannot but be, if the tendency of their faculties is not obstructed. They are so formed, some of them at least, as to be capable of pro|gress, both in perfection and happiness, to a very high degree: Which progress is very much dependant on themselves, the use they make of their implanted powers, and the pains they are at to cultivate and improve them. Thus it is with man, the highest intelligent moral agent we are particularly acquainted with. His facul|ties, at first, are feeble, and not to be exercised but in a low degree: Yet they are so made as to be gradually capable of enlargement, even beyond what could have been imagined, if it had not been for experience. And this enlarge|ment is, in a great measure, though not wholly, dependent on himself: insomuch, that he will be m••re or less perfect and happy, both as an intelligent and moral being, in proportion to the use he makes of his faculties. Neither the per|fecti••n, n••r happiness, he is capable of, is com|municated to him independent of his own choice and conduct, but in connection therewith, or in consequence thereof, and as a reward therefor. If he makes a wise and good improvement of the powers he is endowed with, he will reap the advantage of his pains in corresponding attain|ments in perfection and happiness: Whereas, if

he takes no care to cultivate his faculties, the effect will be, their remaining in a low, imper|fect state: Nay, such is the constitution of his nature, as we may see afterwards, that, by mis|improving them, he may not only check their growth, but bring them into a declining con|dition, so as that they may become gradually unfit to yield him any fruit but that of unhappi|ness and misery.

This is the truth of fact, respecting the high|est, if not the only, order of intelligent moral be|ings, in this world. And the fact, so far as we are able to judge, is perfectly agreeable to what is wise and fit in the reason of things. As the beings, we are speaking of, are made capable of happiness, in consequence of their own choice and conduct, and in proportion to the re|gularity therein discovered, what more just than its dependence thereon? In what more proper way could wise, though infinite, benevolence communicate happiness to them? What un|suitableness is there in making happiness their own acquisition, the fruit of their own industry? What reasonable beings would not chuse exist|ence upon these terms? And who will say, that they would make an unwise choice? It is certain, this method of communicating hap|piness may be the wisest and best; and that glorious intelligent Being, who perfectly sees the fitness of things, in all possible connecti|on, may know it to be so: And sh••uld this be the case, as cannot be disproved, it was not

possible for him, acting morally, or, in other words, as an intelligent wise agent, to have com|municated it any other way.

And this reasoning, if extended to the other ranks of free agents, in other worlds, will equal|ly hold good. It is fit and right, in true rea|son, that they also should be so constituted, as that their perfection and happiness should not be communicated with their beings, but made to depend, in some suitable measure, on the wise and regular exercise of their powers: The consequence of which must be their liableness, in common with mankind, though in various degrees, according to their various capacities and circumstances, to a voluntary perversion of their faculties. This, I say, appears to an at|tentive mind the fittest method of communi|cating good to reasonable moral beings: And the Deity perceiving it to be so, may have all along observed this rule, in the bestowment of it. Nor is there a known fact to the contrary, in the whole creation: Though, if we may give credit to the writings called sacred, there is a fact, relating to some of the intelligent be|ings, in other worlds, which perfectly coincides with this method of dispensing happiness. For we there read of the 'angels which sinned,' and of the 'angels which kept not their first estate; which account of these moral intelligences does not consist with their being created happy, in|dependent of their own virtuous conduct, but supposes the contrary: Obviously leading to the

thought, that they were made, as men are, capable of happiness, but yet liable to a voluntary self-cor|ruption. And all the ranks of moral beings might be created in like circumstances: And, I will add, must have been so created, if this was most wise, and fit, as we have seen there is reason to think it was, and no proof can be given to the contrary.

Not but that there are free agents, who may, before this time, have got beyond any probable danger of moral defection. And this may be the case, even of men, in some other state; though so inferior an order of intelligent beings. But then, this freedom from danger ought to be considered, as owing, not to the perfection of their faculties, as, at first, communicated to them; but partly to the strong, habitual turn that has been given them, by wise and regular exercise; and partly, though principally, to the superintending influence of the Deity, who may think it fit and wise, after suitable trial and im|provement, to preserve them from all faulty con|duct, so far, at least, as that they shall never fall from the perfection and happiness of their present state.

But, before intelligent moral beings have gone through some state of trial, wherein they have made the happiness proper to their natures, their own choice, and have so conducted themselves as to be worthy of it, and to have fitted them|selves, by a course of suitable exercise, for the enjoyment of it: I say, before this, it does not seem meet and fit, that it should be con|ferred

on them; much less in such a way as that it could not be but they must be happy. It is cer|tainly consonant to the notions we most readily and naturally form of right and fit, that such kind of beings should come to the enjoyment of happiness, in conformity to some method wisely adjusted to their proper natures: And what more suitable one can be imagined than this, which makes happiness, not the unavoida|ble privilege of their creation, but the effect of their own moral freedom? Which bestows it, not absolutely, but in consequence of their own vir|tuous conduct, or, in other words, as the result herefrom, according to settled laws, under the notion of a motive hereto, or a suitable reward therefor? This, to be sure, as has been obser|ved, may be the fittest way of communicating happiness to all moral beings, without distincti|on; and might appear to be so to the infinite and supreme Mind: And, if this was the real truth, as we cannot say it was not, it could not be within the moral power of the Deity, to have created free agents, and put them at once, without previous trial or improvement, in a state of full perfection, and confirmed happiness. And if so, they could not have been made impecca|ble, as it is pleaded they might have been, and must have been, if their Maker had been an infinitely benevolent Being.

There is yet another way, in which it is thought the Deity might have prevented moral evil; and this is, by interposing, at all times,

as occasion should require, to keep free agents from misusing their liberty. If by this interposition be meant (and it must mean, if to the purpose for which it is introduced) such a presidency of the Deity over free agents as is accompanied, at all times with such exertions as shall be certainly effectual to restrain them from perverting their faculties, it may be answered, as under the for|mer head, that it looks like a moral impossibility, or, in other words, a method of conducting to|wards free agents which is unfit, in the reason of things; as not being suited to the nature of such kind of beings. The exertions of the Deity ought always to be conceived of as directed by perfect wisdom: And if, as the effect of such exertions, free agents are brought into existence, the same wisdom that created them, requires such a method of conduct towards them, as is consistent with the powers bestowed on them. And can it be justly said, that such a method would be taken, if, by any extrinsic power, their faculties were unavoidably put into exercise in one certain way only? If all conjunctures of cir|cumstances should constantly be prevented, in which their moral freedom could possibly be abu|sed; or, if motives should, in all cases, be set in such a strong and powerful light, as that no wrong choice could be made; or if, by immediate impression from the Deity, free agents should be kept, in all times of temptation, from all hazard of being drawn aside: I say, if, in any of these ways, the Deity should exert himself to the

prevention of moral irregularity, how would such a method of operation consist with the proper powers of free agents! It does not appear to the human mind a thing fit, that they should be thus irresistibly guided, by any extrinsic power, though it were even Divine. This method of govern|ment is well suited to the unintelligent part of the creation; which, being possessed of no self-directing principle, must be absolutely conduct|ed by the power of the Supreme Will. But the influence of the Deity on free agents must needs be of a different kind: Otherwise, it would not harmonize with the essential powers of their nature. And why indeed should there be any beings at all endowed with moral liberty, if they are not left to the free use of their faculties? What room would there be, upon supposition of some foreign over-ruling influence, either for their chusing or acting virtuously? What foun|dation for the moral government of them? And, in a word, what distinction would there be, in reality of consequence, between them and meer in|animate beings, as to the Deity's exercising rule over them? It is true, being endowed with the faculty of perception, they would be capable of happiness; but this could have no connection with, or dependance on, any proper choice of their own. It would be an unavoidable communication of good; good dispensed, not as the effect of the regular exercise of a self-directing principle, not in consequence of any real determining power of their own, but by the irresistible will of the Deity, in

his government of them. And will any call this a fit method of dealing with free agents? It can|not be so pronounced, unless by those, who have no idea of good, but as communicated to the utmost, without regard to the natures of essentially different beings, and that wise conduct which ought always to be used with reference to them.

But, after all that has been offered, some will say, should it be allowed to be fit, that an order of moral agents, such as men are, might be brought into existence, and that it would consist with the benevolence we attribute to the Deity, to place them in a state, wherein their virtue should be put to a trial; why need this trial have been so dangerous an one? Why should there have been the implantation of these appetites, pro|pensities, affections, and passions, in their nature, with a variety of external objects so suited to give them pleasure, as almost unavoidably to entice them to will, and to act, in contradiction to the rules of virtue, and so as to make them|selves unhappy? Would a kind and good Crea|tor have put them to a trial so difficult and hazard|ous? Yea rather could he have done it, if he had been infinitely benevolent?

In answer to this, which, perhaps, is an ob|jection to the Divine benevolence, the most difficult of any intirely to remove, it may be observed as follows.

In a creation inconceivably diversified, it may be proper there should be as great a variety of moral beings, as of meerly animal ones; and

that there should be a similar gradation from the highest to the lowest order of them: The consequence from which is, that the capacities of these moral beings must be various, and their attainment to a confirmed, virtuous temper pro|portionably more or less difficult. The class of men, I suppose, may justly be reckoned the lowest of the moral kind; for which reason, their conducting in life so as to deserve the character of virtuous may be most difficult. But this notwithstanding, it may be fit there should be such a class of moral intelligences, in order to compleat that variety in existence, which the infinitely wise Deity might judge expedient for a full manifestation of his benevolence. As many orders, of beings, as might be thought proper, not united to matter of any kind, may have been brought into existence, the lowest of which may surpass in glory the highest of those who are embodied; among whom also there may be as great a variety in the mode and degree of their perfection: In which view of the mat|ter, it is no other than might be expected, that there should be, such a creature as man, what|ever comparative imperfection may attend his make, and whatever difficulties may lie in the way of his attaining to that virtue and happiness, he is formed capable of: Especially, if it should be found, that, for a being compounded as he is, there is nothing in his constitution but what is wisely and kindly adapted to promote his good, with respect to both parts of his composition.

Has he animal appetites and propensities? These, as planted in him by his Maker, were intended, and are wisely adapted, to guard him against inconveniences; and not only so, but to give him pleasure. And he is, accordingly, sur|rounded with objects purposely suited, by the benevolent Creator, to yield him this pleasure: Nor can he reasonably be charged with acting below his character, as a man, if, within proper limits, be gratifies these natural appetites. They are therefore a wise contrivance to increase, not to diminish, his happiness.

Has he implanted in him a variety of affec|tions and passions? They are all designed to promote his good, not his hurt. Was he des|titute of self-love, how feeble and languid would be his endeavors, if he endeavored at all, to pre|serve life, or render it so comfortable as it might be? Had he no fear, how often would he run into danger, and expose himself to numberless disasters? Had he no resentment, how would he invite injuries, and suffer abuses of every kind in such a world as this? Had he no ambition, what a powerful stimulus would be wanting in his constitution to excite his endeavors to excel in this or the other art and science, or in any thing laudable and praise-worthy? And the same may be said of every other affection and passion. They all tend to good, and we should enjoy less of it with|out them than with them. It is true, they are capable of abuse; and so must have been, or we could not have been free agents, placed in a state of trial.

And should we abuse that to our hurt, which ou•• Maker designed, and wisely adapted, to promote our good, would it not be highly unreasonable to bring such an abuse, as a complaint against his benevolence? And yet, this is the real purport of the objected difficulty, put into plain English: Unless it should be said, that the Deity would have manifested more kindness to us men, if he had not planted these appetites and passions in our nature, than he has done by planting them; as the danger of our falling from virtue and be|coming miserable, by means of them, is so great as scarcely to be avoided. But will any one of found understanding calmly and deliberately say, (to speak in the words of a very sensible and ju|dicious writer) "That the Creator, if he would have approved himself wisely benevolent to man|kind, should have precluded all from the plea|sure they taste in eating and drinking, because otherwise some will prove intemperate: That he should have appointed marriage, and the care of children, to be unattended with any sensible pleasure, because otherwise some persons would be lewd and unjust; that we should receive no pleasure from beauty of any kind but moral, lest some should foolishly and wickedly prefer the beauties and pleasures of sense and imagina|tion, before the beauty of virtue: That none should naturally love themselves, and be strong|ly excited to take care of their own welfare, lest some should be tempted to gratify this passion with the injury of others: That we should

have been formed indifferent to oppression, in|justice, and wickedness, and have felt no re|sentment at the view of those, to prevent any person's being angry, even when they are not injured: That there should have been naturally no satisfaction attending a just self-approbation, that men might not be inclined to value them|selves without reason; and no desire to recom|mend ourselves to the esteem of others, by ex|cellent qualities and benevolent actions, lest some should endeavor to gain the favorable opinion of others by foolish, or wicked actions: That men should have been without the pas|sion of shame, to restrain them from what is base, and deserving infamy, lest some be asham|ed of what is virtuous and honorable: That there should have been no attraction in liberty, lest some should be tempted to licentiousness; and nothing appear desirable in a power to do great good, that none might strive for a power of doing great mischief: And that no noble emulation should have been felt in the human bosom, lest envy should creep in, and make self-tormentors, and mischievous to their neighbours. Would this have been a better constitution, than the present? What wise and considerate person can think it?" The plain truth is, there is no appetite, affection, or passi|on, as planted in our nature by the God who made us, but what was intended, and wisely adapted, to answer some valuable purpose or other; insomuch, that it would have been greatly disadvantageous to us, had we not been

furnished with them. And should they, by not being kept under due government, prove the occasion of sin, and consequent misery, could the Creator, in consistency with reason, be charg|ed with not having been benevolent? Espe|cially, if it be considered, that these very appe|tites and passions, might have been a means, wisely improved, of promoting that virtue in us, which would yield the full happiness proper to such beings as we are.

Some will still plead, if appetites and passi|ons, in such a constitution as our's, should be supposed to be proper, why need they have been heightened to such a degree of strength? Or if even this should have been expedient, why were not our intellectual and moral powers proportionably exalted, that the undue influ|ence of appetite and passion might the more easily be controuled? Would it not have been more kind in our Creator, and have argued greater benevolence, if he had given us stronger rational abilities, and weaker animal propensi|ties? Especially, as it is principally owing to the strong impetus of our bodily inclinations, that we are so generally, led aside into the path of vice and folly, to our own great disadvan|tage. The answer I would return to this ob|ection, which, far from being a trifling one, deserves a serious consideration, is as follows.

If our appetites and passions, in their na|tural state, and as implanted in us by our Crea|tor, had been lowered in their strength, they

might have been insufficient to answer the good ends of their original implantation. In like manner, had our intellectual powers been height|ened, they might have unfitted us to live in such a world as this is. The contrivance of the Deity in man's constitution, and the adjust|ment of its various parts, both animal and mental, is perfect, and will admit, other things remaining as they were, of no amendment. One power is so closely connected with, and near|ly related to another, and that other to another still, and the whole to such a world as we are placed in, that no alteration could be made in one part, but what would ••ffect another, and that other still a•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and so on, till there must be a total alteration, not only in man, but the world he lives in; the absurdity of which will be explained, and the pertinency of this whole paragraph justified, in its proper place hereafter.

It may also be worthy of notice, that a varie|ty in the trial of various classes of intelligent moral beings, in point of difficulty and hazard, may be a wise contrivance of the Creator for the more illustrious display of his goodness, in harmony with his other moral attributes. It is certain, with respect to us men, that our trial, as individuals, is, for wise and good ends, ad|mirably various in point of difficulty and dan|ger; and why might ••t not, for like good ends, be a more difficult one, should we be consi|dered as a class, of beings, than has been allotted

to other classes of a superior order? There is an analogy in this with the whole conduct of God, which has been various, both in making and governing all the creatures he has given existence to. And, it may be, his benevolence, by means of this variety, is more wisely, and fully displayed, than it would have been by any other. And one class of beings would have no more reason to complain, should the difficulty of their trial, in consequence of this expedient variety, be greater, and attended with more hazard, than the trial of another class; I say, they would have no more reason for com|plaint, than they have because they were not made that other class of ••atures.

It ought to be considered still further, that men's appetites and passions, by being indulged beyond what is fit and right, may be heighten|ed in their impetus, and quite altered from their natural state. And when this is the case, as we all know it too commonly is, by not keep|ing them within those restraints we both might, and ought to have done, we ourselves, and not our Creator, are to blame, if disorders are introduced into our frame, and our trial, by this means, is made more difficult and dange|rous, than it otherwise would have been; and, instead of reflecting on the Deity for not hav|ing been so benevolent, as we fondly imagine he might have been, we should condemn our|selves, and throw the blame wholly of our own wickedness and folly; for to this it ought, in all reason, to be ascribed.

It is acknowledged, that the natural state of the appetites and passions may be altered, and often is so, and much for the worse, even where the subjects of this alteration are not the blam|able causes of it. By propagation, a disad|vantageous bodily temperature may be convey|ed, subjecting the descendants from parents to a greatly heightened force of animal propensity. And by the neglect also of these to wh•• the care of children has been commit|ted, in restraining their inclinations and passion, or by purposely allowing them to take an unbounded latitude, they may increase is strength▪ so as to be, with great difficulty, kept unde•• government of reason. In which cases, the trial of these persons will be attended with much more danger, than the trial of others of the same species. But this is to be accounted for, and may justly be so, by duly considering, that the state these persons are in is the effect of general laws, wisely contrived, and powerfully adapted, to promote the good of the system, of which they are parts; Nor could the difficulties, they are subjected to, have been prevented without the extraordinary interposition of the Deity, the inconveniences of which have already been mentioned; or without an alteration in these laws, that is, without altering the plan upon which this world, and the creatures that are in it, were formed, which would be to substitute another world in the room of this, which may be as

suitable an one, in that variety which consti|tutes the universe, as wisdom has thought pro|per. What has been suggested here will be enlarged upon, and set in a clear light, when we come to answer the objection from natural evil.

In fine, it may tend to break the force of the objection we are upon to bear in mind, ••t the difficulty of attaining to a virtuous temper and conduct, however great, is not unsurmountable; as it may be counter-acted by a wise improvement of that reason, con|science, moral discernment, and other powers, which our Maker has implanted in our con|stitution, on purpose to check 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••ndue in|fluence of our appetites and passions, and to keep them within their proper sphere; espe|cially, as, in addition hereto, we may, upon just grounds, hope for the smiles of heaven upon our careful endeavours, in the use of the means, helps, and advantages, we are fa|vored with, to get delivered from the dominion of sin and lust, and to become possessed of that noblest of all moral powers, a freedom, without hindrance or controul, to do that which is right and good. And let it be remembered, the greater the difficulty we are put to in order to this, the greater our virtue will be; laying a just foundation for a proportionably higher reward, in self approbation here, and pleasure forevermore in the future world. Besides all which, it may be depended on as a sure truth,

the good God will make all reasonable allow|ances for whatever disadvantages our state of trial may be attended with; conducting to|wards us, conformably to that eternal rule of, equity, "according to what a man has, and not according to what he has not, shall be gi|ven to him." And this same rule, adapting it to all other classes of beings, in all worlds, is that by which the Supreme Ruler and Judge will measure his conduct towards them: In consequence of which, they will all, in re|gard of just and fair treatment, be brought to an exact equality. Less will be required of those beings, whose powers were small, and their difficulties great; and proportionably more of those, whose powers were greater, and their difficulties less. So that, however low the capacities of us men are, and whatever dif|ficulties our state of trial may be attended with, the Supreme King and Judge will be equally impartial and just in his dealings towards us, as with respect to any of the beings that are above us, in the scale of existence.

The sum of what has been said, in order to reconcile moral irregularity with benevolence in the Deity is, that it ought not to be attributed to him, as its productive cause; but to the creatures that were made free agents: That the making of free agents was necessary in order to the communication of the highest good in kind; because, if they had not been made, this kind of good would have been wanting in the crea|tion:

That, if free agents were at all brought into existence, it must have been with powers so far imperfect, as to import a possibility of their erring, without interpositions of the Deity to pre|vent it: That their could not have been such in|terpositions, in consistency with wise and fit con|duct; because they would, in true construction, destroy the very notion of free agency, and to|gether with it all foundation for any distinction between moral right and wrong: And finally, that however low a class of moral agents we men are, and however difficult our trial, by means of implanted appetites and passions, may be, such an order of beings might be fit, in that variety of existences the wisdom of God might judge proper, in order to a full display of his perfections in general, and his benevo|lence in particular: From which premises, if true, as we have seen good reason to think them to be, and no proof can be given to the con|trary, it follows, that the actual defection of free agents is not to be imputed to any deficiency of goodness in the Deity; and therefore that there can be no real inconsistency between the exist|ence of this moral depravity and infinite benevo|lence, whatever there may be in appearance.

I would only observe, before I proceed, it is all along supposed, in the above reasoning, that the entrance of moral disorder into the creation would have been irreconcilable with pure and unbounded goodness, unless every thing had been ••one, which, in true reason, was fit and pro|per

to be done, to have prevented it. And could it be proved, in respect of any class of in|telligent moral beings, or in respect of any in|dividual in this class, that the Deity had been wanting in what was reasonably necessary, on his part, that there might not have been a defec|tion, I see not but it would be an invincible ob|jection against the infinite benevolence of his na|ture. For it is not supposable, but that a being supremely and absolutely good should desire the happiness of his whole creation; especially of intelligent moral creatures, in all their various ranks, and numberless individuals: And that he should operate, in all wise and reasonable methods, to promote it. And it would certainly argue a deficiency in his goodness, if he could see them act wrong, and not exert himself so far as he might do, in consistency with reason and wisdom, to hinder it. It is indeed impossible, if we may say any thing is so, not only that infinite bene|volence should put innocent moral agents into cir|cumstances, wherein their seduction would be unavoidable; but that it should withhold its co|operation, in any proper ways, agreeable to their natures, to advance the perfection and felicity they are made capable of. To us men, it may possibly seem, as though more might have been done for the human species, some of them at least, to have secured their attachment to virtue: But are we sure of this? Are we able to exhibit clear and full proof, that the Deity has been wanting in any thing, proper

on his part, to keep mankind from debasing their natures? It is true, we were not placed in the highest class of moral beings: But can we say, that the order of the creation, and the wise and good ends for which it was made, would not allow, that a rank of beings, constituted and endowed as we are, should be in it? Or will we take upon us to show, that the conduct of the Deity, towards us, has not been so wisely and fitly adjusted to the design of making us happy, as it might reasonably have been? Can it be proved, that the only good God expects more from us, than he ought to do, in true equity? Or that he has neglected any suitable method of operation to guard us against error, either in choice or practice? Are we not consci|ous to ourselves, when we do wrong, that we do it freely, and as furnished with all the pre|servatives against such conduct, which we could reasonably expect, or desire, as moral agents, and which might have been effectual to our restraint, if we had carefully used them, in the due ex|ercise of understanding and attention? And if this is the real truth, as we are conscious to ourselves that it is, shall we reflect upon the Deity, as not having exerted himself, in all pro|per ways, to prevent our misconduct? We can|not pretend, without the highest arrogance, to say, much less to prove that he has not done all that he could wisely do to preserve us inno|cent: And more than this would have been inconsistent with his own absolute perfection. So

that he may be infinitely good, notwithstanding the degeneracy of mankind, which we know most about, and complain most of.

I now proceed to consider, in the second place, the unhappiness arising from immoral conduct. For by the evil complained of, in the objection, is meant, not only the irregularity of free agents, but the misery connected herewith, or consequent hereupon, either by the constitution of nature, or infliction from the Deity. If wrong determinations, and unreasonable pursuits, were not accompanied nor followed with unhappiness, either to the faulty agents themselves or others by their means, the objectors against infinite goodness would not, it may be, be so strenuous in urging this difficulty: But as the fact is, they are bitter in their complaints, thinking it extremely hard, that creatures, for only mis|using their liberty, should be subjected to conse|quent punishment, natural or penal; and that others likewise should be made such great sufferers by their vices and follies. How, say they, could the Deity, if infinitely benevolent, not only per|mit creatures of his own forming to corrupt themselves, but connect misery with their so doing; constituting things so as to make their wrong doing an occasion of unhappiness, in infinitely va|rious kinds, not only to themselves, but to others also? What a wide door has hereby been opened for the entrance of misery into the crea|tion? Who can compute the immense sum of pain and torment, of one sort or another, this

constitution has paved the way for? And can it be attributed to an infinitely benevolent Cause? Could such a state of things have ever been, if a good God had been at the head of it, as its supreme directing Cause?

It is answered, in the first place, by freely owning, that moral irregularity is unavoidably connected with unhappiness; insomuch, that by far the greater part of those evils which abound in the creation are the natural or penal effect hereof: Nay, it is readily granted, that the constitution of things is such, that moral in|telligent beings are capable of so corrupting their implanted powers, as that misery must be the consequence, both to themselves and others also, in certain degrees, while they continue in this state of degeneracy. Nay, I deny not, but the constitution of things is such, as that unhappi|ness must be the fruit of abused moral freedom, in another period of existence, so long, and in such proportion, as the wisdom of the Supreme Creator and Governor may think requisite.

But then I add, in the next place, that this is so far from arguing want of goodness in the Deity, that it very conspicuously illustrates the benevolence of his nature. It will probably seem strange, to those who have not exercised their thoughts upon this subject, to hear it said, that unhappiness may be the fruit of benevolence, and an argument in pro••f of it, rather than an objection against it. And yet, this is the real truth; and I doubt not but that may be said

upon the matter, which will make it clearly and fully appear to be so.

Only, let it be previously remembered, that the possibility of moral irregularity has been al|ready accounted for, and the actual being of it, in the creation, reconciled with infinite good|ness: Which being supposed, in this part of the argument, I proceed to show,

Wherein the unhappiness that is connected, in nature, or by positive infliction from the Deity, with the misuse of moral powers, is subservient to the general good of the rational creation, which is hereby more effectually promoted than it would have been, if free agents might have acted wrong with impunity.

And it is very obvious, in the first place, that a great part of the unhappiness following upon voluntary misconduct is of the medicinal kind, and strongly tends to the cure of its pa|tients. The uneasy sensations occasioned by vicious practice, together with those various other pains, which are naturally consequent thereupon, what are they but so many motives to repentance, and a due care to make a wiser use of moral powers? What better adapted means could have been contrived to rouse the faulty agents to attention, bring them to con|sideration, and put them upon endeavours to prevent their own ruin? If they found no in|convenience in an irregular course, what should stop their progress, having entered on it? What probable prospect would there be, in

this case, of their ever coming to themselves, and recovering a right mind? And is it not for their good, that their vicious conduct should be attended with suffering, while this suffering is con|sidered under the notion of a means powerfully fitted, in a reasonable way of operation, to check their folly, and reduce them to virtue? Does not pain, in this view of it, cease to be an evil, and become a real good? And ought not the Deity, who has thus constituted things, to be looked upon as a physician and friend, de|signing their interest, and not as an enemy, who is doing them harm? And the case is just the same in respect of punishments more posi|tively inflicted. They are a means wisely adap|ted to promote the welfare of those who suffer them, and are so intended by the all-merciful Governor of the universe, so long as they are capable of amendment by any means whatever. And if, after this, they should be continued in suffering circumstances, even such a method of conduct would be perfectly consistent with in|finite goodness, for some other reasons we may have occasion to mention afterwards.

It is very evident, in the next place, that the evils connected with immoral action, in the Divine government, are for the good of others, as well as the faulty agents themselves. They are indeed, at least in this lower world, with which we are best acquainted, a general discou|ragement to vicious practice, a standing, per|petual means provided by the Deity to secure the

virtue, and by consequence the greatest hap|piness, of the human species, it may be, the only rational moral agents here existing. It is highly probable, if not certain, that mankind, consi|dering their various propensions, though all suited to their condition, and subjected to the guidance of their reason, would not be restrain|ed within any tolerable bounds of decency, if it was seen that no disadvantage followed, when any of their rank perverted the order of their faculties, and pursued an irregular course of action. The unhappiness, inseparably conjoined with voluntary, continued misconduct, by the known, established laws of the Divine admini|stration, is one of the grand restraints provided for their security: And were this to be taken off, they would, without all doubt, notwith|standing all the remonstrances of reason against in|clination, be soon lost to all sense of virtue, and trample upon the sacred obligations to the practice of it. And if it is for the good of man|kind that this should be prevented, so far as may be, in all suitable ways, it is equally for their good, that vice should be connected with misery; because a powerful, and yet well adap|ted means, to this end. And it should seem indeed as though this connection was a necessary provision, in the government of the whole intel|lectual system, to preserve it from confusion, and accomplish, by a regular and consistent method of operation, the great thing intended and pursued by the Deity, viz. its greatest good. It may, per|haps,

be thought more noble for rational crea|tures, especially the higher order of them, to be influenced to right conduct solely from the fitness of the thing in itself considered: But, it may be, there are no created intelligences above the need of other motives. It is certain, an aversion from misery must be looked upon as a leading principle in all their natures, from the highest to the lowest of them: And if so, what a powerful guard must it be to their in|nocence, to see the loss of it, in other beings like themselves, attended, in fact, with vexa|tion and sorrow? How strongly must it tend to secure their adherence to the rule of right, to behold a deviation from it, in this and the other instance, accompanied with misery, by the Divine constitution? It is reasonable to think, it may be owing, in part, to this connection, that the whole moral creation is preserved, under the superintendency of the Supreme Governor, in a regular, orderly state. It must be confessed, it is true, that some ranks of rational beings have probably never acted below the dignity of their character, and consequently that they know not, from what have seen among themselves, what un|happiness means: But who can say, that the sad effects of immoral conduct, in one system of intelligent beings, may not, in the Divine administration, be so related to others, as to be useful to them also? What is there unreasonable in supposing, that the evils suffered, by means of abused fa|culties, in this world of our's, may, in ways,

surpassing our comprehension, be capable of promoting, in a measure, the good of moral beings, in other parts of the creation? It is certain, in the system of material nature, that other globes, and some of them vastly distant too, are useful to this earth, as that also in return may be, in some degree, useful to them: And it is by this mutual usefulness, to each other, that they become one harmonious good whole. The like may be said of the intellectual general system;—It may be constituted the best whole, by the mutual subserviency of the various ranks of rational beings to each other, and their jointly conspiring, according to some set|tled order, to advance the general good. And, among the ways, wherein the wisdom of the infinitely benevolent first Cause may have made the several classes of intelligent agents capable of being thus useful, this we are considering may be one. The misery, which the indivi|duals of one order, of moral beings, may, by their disorderly pursuits, bring upon themselves, may be designed, in the divine plan, and adapted, to promote the good, not only of that particular order, but of other orders likewise, by exhibiting a most powerful motive to discou|rage the like misconduct, and secure an at|tachment to the law of reason and right.

But, if any should think this is carrying the matter too far, and upon conjecture only, it cannot however be denied, that the unhappi|ness accruing to some of the individuals of any

species of moral beings, in consequence of their having chosen and acted perversely, may be of service to the rest of the same species, by mini|string to them seasonable and proper warning. And it may, upon the whole, be a kindness to this order of beings, and an argument of the Deity's benevolence towards them, that he has thus connected vice and unhappiness together. For it is one of the most powerful restraints from irregular action, and as strong an induce|ment to the choice and practice of virtue. And so far as they are preserved in due order, this, without all doubt, is one of the great means by which it is accomplished.

And should we pursue this reasoning, and examine its force as applied to a future state, and the punishments there is reason to think will be there inflicted on wicked men, we shall find it a sufficient vindication of them. For if they are considered, as the present argument requires they should be, under the notion of a needful moral mean intended and calculated to promote, upon the whole, more good in the intelligent creation, than might otherwise be reasonably expected, they are so far from being the effect of ill-will, that they really spring from benevo|lence, and are a proof of it. It carries the ap|pearance, I own, of hardship and severity, for creatures to exist in suffering circumstances: But if their sufferings, whether in this or ano|ther state, are the fruit of their own mis-do|ings, and it is for the real benefit of the moral

creation, upon the whole, (as we have seen that it is) that such sufferings should be the conse|quent effect of such conduct, why should the goodness of the Deity be called in question? It is true, the sufferers in a future state, if sup|posed to be past amendment, can reap no ad|vantage themselves from their sufferings: But then, it is to be considered, these sufferings were originally intended for their good, by being presented, in the forebodings of their own minds, as a powerful motive, not only to re|strain them from those courses which would end in these sufferings, but to urge them on to those virtuous pursuits which would be fol|lowed with all the happiness they were made capable of. And if, notwithstanding so pow|erful a means used with them for their good, they have gone on debasing their natures, till they have rendered them incurable by any of the means the wisdom of God has seen fit to use with them, why should it be thought a dis|honor to infinite goodness to subject them to that misery they have thus exposed themselves to by their own wickedness, that they might be a warning to others, and serve as public exam|ples for general good, so long as the wisdom of God shall know it to be best: Is it not better that some individuals should be in suffering circum|stances if they will not, by any of the methods of God's dealing with them, be brought back to the choice and practice of virtue; I say, is it not better, that some individuals should be

made miserable, in consequence of an estab|lished connection between vice and misery, than that the virtue of the moral creation, together with all the happiness dependant thereon, should be endangered, through want of such a provision for their security? The plain truth is, the benevolence of the Deity, is not confined to particular beings, or orders of beings, but is absolutely universal; and ought therefore to be conceived of as exerting itself in those ways which are best adapted to advance the general good of the creation. And if, by connecting misery with moral irregularity, this end is, in the most effectual manner, promoted, as we have seen reason to think it is, the establishment of such a connection, notwithstanding what may eventually happen to particular individuals, must be an argument of goodness, rather than of inconsistency with it.

There is yet another way wherein it may be for the good of the intelligent creation, that wic|kedness should be connected, in the manner it is, with misery. What I intend is, that by this connection occasion is given for such mani|festations of the Divine glory, as are ration|ally and powerfully suited to promote the vir|tue, and consequent happiness, of moral beings; which manifestations there would have been no room for, or, at least, not in so great a degree, had it not been for this connection. It is evi|dently from hence, that most of the moral at|tributes of the Deity become capable of a more

illustrious display, than would otherwise have been possible: And it may be, some of them could not have been manifested at all, had not this given the opportunity therefor. The ho|liness of the Divine Being would not have ap|peared so conspicuous, if moral agents might have behaved ill, and not found it to their disadvantage: Neither would his justice have shone with such a distinguishing lustre; as he could not, so fully and impartially, have ren|dered to them according to their deserts. And, as to the various modifications of goodness, such as mercy, forbearance, patience, long-suf|fering, forgiveness, it does not appear, how these perfections of the Deity could have been at all displayed, had it not been for these evils that are the consequent fruit of voluntary miscon|duct. The idea of pity, and mercy, and par|don, as Divine attributes, exercised towards mo|ral agents, is essentially connected with their actual suffering, or, at least, liableness to it, on account of their ill-doings: insomuch, that, were it not for the unhappiness we become ob|noxious to, upon being faulty in their beha|vior, they could have had no notion of these amiable, Divine glories. And it is from hence that those marvellous displays of goodness, in these modes of exercise, have taken rise, which tend, not only to the eternal honor of the Deity, but the best and greatest good likewise of moral and intelligent beings. Nor is it difficult to conceive how the display of these attributes of

the Supreme Creator should operate to this end. For it is obvious, upon the slightest attention, that riches of forbearance, long-suffering and forgiveness, are naturally adapted to work pow|erfully upon intelligent minds, if they have been faulty, to lead them to repentance, and bring them back to the practice of virtue, the only way to true happiness. And, perhaps, so long as there are any remains of ingenuity, no|thing is more rationally suited to produce this effect. And where any, under the influence of these Divine displays, have been recovered to a virtuous disposition, there are no motives better fitted to strengthen and establish it, than those which may be selected from that pity and mercy, which the Deity has exercised towards them. Besides, there will be the excitement of pious affections in their minds towards the Divine Being, accompanied with high pleasure; which pleasure they could never have perceiv|ed, but in this method of conduct. And, I may add, this same goodness of the Deity, appear|ing in his lenity, and patience, and mercy, to|wards guilty moral agents, is as naturally fitted to produce, in other intelligent beings, who are not the immediate objects of it, such sentiments and affections, attended with corresponding de|light, which they could not otherwise have been the subjects of; whereby both the virtue and happiness of the rational and moral creation is better provided for, than it could have been in a different state of things.

It will not from hence follow, it is owned, that moral irregularity ought to have been permitted: Nor was the above reasoning intended to justify such a permission; this having been before ac|counted for upon other considerations. The only inquiry here in debate is, whether the connection of unhappiness with this moral irregularity is re|concilable with goodness? And the argument we are upon, is, I think, sufficient for the proof of the affirmation; as it has particularly point|ed out the way wherein the good of intelligent beings is better provided for by this expedient, than it could otherwise have been. For by means of the evils that accompany ill-doing, occasion, we have seen, has been offered for such a display of the Divine moral perfections as is the greatest encouragement to virtue, not only to the agents who may have acted wrong, but to others also; besides that it lays a foundation for such pleasing perception as could not have been enjoyed in any other method.

In fine, whereas it is complained, that wick|edness is made an occasion of suffering, not only to the guilty agents themselves, but to others likewise, in various ways, so as to render life very uncomfortable;—The answer is, that this unavoidably arises from the constitution of na|ture, at least, in respect of the human species. It is impossible, up•• supposition of the exist|ence of such an order of beings as men are, but that they should suffer more or less by the vices and follies of one another. According to the

proverbs as old as Solomon, a foolish son is the heaviness of his mother; and again a foolish son is a grief to his father. And the consequences of oppression, rapine and violence, whether public or private, must be felt and groaned under, in a world, where creatures are so nearly allied to, and dependant on, each other. Nay, the penal evils, which the Deity may, in kindness, inflict to stop the progress of wickedness, must, many times, touch the innocent as well as guilty, while they live mixed together, as in the present state: Nor could it be otherwise without an inversion of the course of nature. So that, if this objection proves any thing, it is that such an order of beings ought not to have been crea|ted. But we have already seen, that the Deity was not obliged to make only the most perfect beings; yea, that the communication of the greatest good required the creation of all ranks of beings, in the descending line, so long as the enjoyment of existence could be called an happiness. Nor may such creatures as we are, who have so narrow a view of the works of God, and the whole system of the universe, take upon us to say, that an order of beings constituted as we are, could not, in consistency with wisdom and goodness, have a place in the creation; or that such creatures, with all the evils to which they are subjected, would not make a beautiful, necessary part, in the Divine plan, contrived to form a scene wherein the perfections of the Deity might be most admira|bly

displayed in producing, upon the whole, the greatest possible good.

Besides, it ought to be considered, that these evils, which wicked men bring upon others by their vices, are supposed to bear hard upon the benevolence of the Creator and Governor of the universe, chiefly on the presumption, that the present is an entire independent state, not having relation to, or connection with, any future ex|istence: Upon which supposition, it is owned, the difficulty objected would be an un|surmountable one. But will any pretend to demonstrate, that there is no future state, that death puts a total end to the being of man, and all further capacity of enjoyment? And if this cannot be demonstrated, which must be confessed to be the truth of the matter, it is possible, that the evils which any suffer in this may be made up to them in another state: Nay, it is possi|ble, that these evils which they suffer may be intended as a means to prepare and qualify them for greater happiness, in some future period of existence, than they could otherwise have en|joyed. And this leads to another remark of great importance in the present argument, which is,

That the evils suffered by some, through the faulty conduct of others, are so over-ruled, in the all-wise, gracious government of the Deity, as to give occasion for the exercise and improve|ment of such virtues as tend to promote their greater happiness. Vice, it is true, has intro|duced

into the world a great many trials, griev|ous to bear: But it is as true, that they are capable of being improved to advantage. And what though any should suffer through the caprice, the pride, the hatred, the malice, and other ungoverned passions and lusts of wicked men, if they may hereby be gainers in the end? And this is made possible as the Deity has con|stituted things. For these very distresses, which are caused by the prevalence of sin and folly, are so many opportunities offered, in provi|dence, for the exercise of meekness, patience, forgiveness, and the like virtues; which, being often, by this means, thrown out into action, be|come settled moral dispositions, not only forming a most beautiful character, but together with it a capacity for happiness, which could not otherwise have been enjoyed. It is certain, that the exertment of the mind, in one par|ticular way, is the method, according to the established laws of nature, by which it con|tracts a faculty in this way of exertion, and becomes possessed of what we call habits, in any kind. And it is as certain, that opportu|nities offered, in the course of providence, for the frequent repetition of these exertments, are the occasion by which the mind receives that corresponding bent, or turn, to which we give the name, habit or disposition. From whence it follows, that the evils suffered through the fault of others, as they give opportunity for acts of meekness, and forbearance, and for|giveness,

are properly adapted to form the vir|tuous dispositions answering to these acts. And accordingly it is seen, in fact, that none among men are possessed of these excellent virtues, in so confirmed a degree, as those who have taken occasion, from the evils they have suffered, to be much in the exercise of acts of patience, contentment, and resignation. They have, by this means, got formed in them, and greatly strengthened, the dispositions to these virtues. Nor is this all: But their capacity for moral rational happiness is thereby proportionably enlarged. These virtues, when called forth in|to exercise, are, at present, rewarded with pleasure, and such pleasure as none know the value of but those who have felt what it is, Besides which, there is no reason to think but that, in some other and future state, they shall further reap the fruit of their moral improvements, in answerable measures of rational satisfaction and delight. To be sure, it cannot be prov|ed, that this may not; yea, that it will not, be the case. And upon this supposition, it is easy to conceive, how the evils which good men have suffered, through the wickedness of their fellow creatures, may finally turn out to their benefit. What special use there may be, in another state, for those dispositions which have been formed in this, and particularly suited to trials from the perverse behaviour of others, we know not: But thus much we may be sure of, that virtuous habits, by what means soever they

have been formed, improved, and strengthen|ed, do enlarge the general capacity for ration|al moral happiness; insomuch, that, if there is anothere is another state, the subjects of them, on this account, must be the more happy in proportionable returns of true and solid plea|sure.

The sum of the whole argument is this, that the connection of unhappiness with moral irregula|rity is a means wisely adapted to operate pow|erfully upon rational moral agents, to reduce them to a right conduct, if they have been faulty, and to preserve them inviolable in their attachment to virtue, if they have been inno|cent: Insomuch, that it may be owing to this connection, there is so much order and happiness in the intelligent creation; of both which, had not this connection been constituted, there would undoubtedly have been much less than there now is, and has all along been. The consequence wherefrom is, that this provision, fitted for the production of so much good, is so far from being inconsistent with benevolence, that it is a strong indication of it. And whereas the sufferings of the virtuous, by the wickedness of the vicious, are great and trying, these also, upon supposition of another state (which cannot be proved to be an unreasonable, much less an impossi|ble one) may be, in the end, for their advantage; as they are capable of being improved so as that the fruit, upon the whole, shall be more happiness, than if these sufferings had not been

endured: And if they may possibly be a means to produce greater good, they cannot prove a deficiency in the benevolence of the Deity, but are rather an argument in proof that he is endowed with this attribute.

I have now offered what I had to say in il|lustration of the consistency between infinite be|nevolence, and moral irregularity, together with all its consequent unhappiness. And I see not, upon the review, but the reasoning employed to this purpose is strictly conclusive. God ha|ving created free agents, it appears, from what has been discoursed, that they are the proper and sole causes of all the moral disorder that is com|plained of, and not the Deity; who has done every thing that he could, in consistency with reason and wisdom, not only ••o prevent their abuse of their faculties, but to promote their improvement of them so as to attain to the highest perfection and happiness: And further, that the very evils, he has connected with their voluntary misconduct, are kindly intended, and wisely adapted, to bring about their best good, and will certainly do it, if it is not their own fault. So that, upon the whole, it cannot be conceived, what the Deity could have done more, in a wise and rational method of opera|tion, to have made intelligent moral beings, in all their various orders, as happy as their origi|nal capacities would allow of: Which is as much as can be expected, even from benevo|lence that is infinite.

It now remains to consider the third and last objection to the infinite benevolence of the Deity. And this is taken from the natural evils, common to all perceiving beings, in this world of our's, in all their classes, from the highest to the lowest; such as pains, diseases, and disasters, in various kinds, and degrees; and, at last, death, mostly accompanied with distress, and sometimes with aggravated cir|cumstances of misery and torment. And the complaint upon this head is, that these evils are not only permitted by the Deity, but were, in a sense, appointed; as being the effect of that constitution of things, which he contrived, and established, and has all along upheld: Nay, it is urged, with respect to some of these evils, as to their kind, if not degree, that the Deity intended they should take place, and originally endowed the creatures with such na|tures, as that a liableness to them was abso|lutely necessary. And would an infinitely be|nevolent Being, say the movers of this objec|tion, have brought creatures into existence under such circumstances, subjected, by the very laws of their nature, to pain and misery? Does this look like the doing of supremely perfect goodness? Can it be supposed, that such a state of things could have been, if ori|ginally planned, and all along conducted by a Being essentially, and infinitely kind and good?

I answer by acknowledging, that the percei|ving beings of all orders, in this lower world,

are liable to pain, and death; and that they were made thus liable by the God, who gave them existence under such circumstances, as that these evils could not be avoided. Only, let it be remembered, and considered, before I come to a particular resolution of this diffi|culty,

That even these natural evils, so far as man|kind are concerned in them, are all of them increased in their malignity, by means of that moral disorder, which they have introduced into the world. And to this same cause, and not to the Author of our beings it is owing also, that the kinds of natural evils are become more numerous. Had it not been for the lusts of men, we should never have heard of many tormenting diseases, which multitudes now lie groaning under. And as to those which were unavoidable, in consequence of the established laws of nature, they would have been comparatively few, and attended with only tolerable degrees of pain. An intempe|rate, luxurious, debauched course of living, through the prevalence of ungoverned appetite, and sensual inclination, in opposition to the dictates of reason, and the remonstrances of conscience, is that which has aggravated, as well as multiplied, the evils of the world. It is therefore very unfair to take occasion, from the vexations and sorrows of human life, in its present degenerate state, to reflect dishonor on the goodness of the Deity. The only just

way of forming an impartial judgment, in the case, is, to consider these evils, not as multi|plied and aggravated, through men's pervert|ing their powers, and acting counter to the rules prescribed for the government of them; but as it may reasonably be supposed, they would have taken place, according to the course of nature, not hindered in its regular opera|tion. The miseries that infect the human spe|cies, in the former view, are the sole fruit of their own folly, not an effect of God's produ|cing, for which men themselves, and not God, are answerable: Though I may add here, his goodness is such, that he has done every thing fit and proper, that even these evils of men's own bringing upon themselves may turn out, in the end, to their final good, as we have al|ready seen. In the latter view only of the evils of life is discovered the proper effect of those laws of nature, which the Deity has establish|lished, and which we are, at present, called to consider, in order to vindicate his supreme benevolence.

And here it may be again proper, before I proceed to the particular evils complained of as inconsistences with the Divine goodness, to observe in general, that they are the effects of established laws, the design and tendency of which are greatly beneficial. And though they may be, in some instances, more especial|ly at certain times, the occasion of evil, they are notwithstanding eventually productive

of a vast overbalance of good. The air we breath in may, in consequence of the laws of nature, be sometimes subjected to those hetero|geneous mixtures, which will, until it is purified, make it of such an ill temperature, as to oc|casion hurt both to man and beast; but yet, life itself in all animals, without which there could be no enjoyment, is absolutely depen|dant on it, and preserved by means of it. Fire, conformably to the laws of nature, may unhappily be the occasion of extensively ruin|ous desolation; while yet, it is one of the most useful creatures of God. Storms and tempests, thunder and lightning, may sometimes be the causes of no small hurt, by destroying the lives, or substance, of numbers of individuals; bu•• by clearing the air, and disengaging it from those noxious exhalations that were blended with it, it fits it for respiration, and in this way does good, beyond all comparison for surpassing the evil it ever brings into event. The same may be said of earthquakes, inun|dations, famines, and pestilences, they are the effects of laws, which are not only, in that ge|neral tendency, good, but actually produce more and greater good, than they ever do evil In short, the laws of nature are all of the be|neficial kind, and we feel that they are so, by the enjoyment of innumerable good things, which are the effects of their operation; and the evils they may, at any time, be the occa|sion

of, are not worthy of being mentioned, they are so much over-balanced with good.

And it may be, upon the whole, best, in this world of our's, that general laws should be so established, as that evils should sometimes be occasioned by them. The final cause of such an establishment might be the good, par|ticularly of mankind. A world, in which there is a mixture of evil with good, may be most suitable for such creatures as we are. Were the laws of nature such as to leave no room for those occasions of sorrow, fear, and suffering, we are now subjected to, this earth might have been a place altogether unadapted for training us up for the enjoyment of God, the supreme good. It was, perhaps, highly expedient, if not absolutely necessary, that we should live in a world of discipline, a world that would, in the natural course of things, be the occasion of dif|ficulties, inconveniences, and trials, by means of which we might be formed to a meetness for another world, in which we should be totally freed from them. An uninterrupted state of ease and pleasure, would, morally speaking, be the ruin of mankind. We need a mixture of evil with good to check our pride, to restrain our sensual appetites; to take off our affections from the things of the earth; and to excite in us a just sense of our depend|ance on God. And we need also, every now and then, to be alarmed by this or that dis|pensation, which shall speak with a voice more

loud and awful, than is common and ordinary. The inhabitants of the world in general, and those of this or the other place, in special, are sometimes sunk into a state of such carelesness and stupidity, have so little faith in God, and are so given up to commit all iniquity with greediness, that, humanly speaking, there is no room left to expect their reformation and amendment, but by such manifestations of the power, the greatness, and majesty of God, as even force a faith in him, and a serious atten|tion to his character as the moral Governor of the world. The course of nature is, according|ly, wisely and mercifully adapted to both these ends; giving occasion, at all times, for disci|plinary trials; and bringing on also, at certain intervals, such tremendous events as are pow|erfully suited to alarm their fears, and engage them to betake themselves to a better course of conduct. And it is highly probable, the all-wise good God has so adjusted the laws of nature, as that they shall operate, in all ages, and in all places, so as may best answer his benevolent designs in the moral government of his intel|ligent creatures. What I mean is, he may have settled such laws, with respect to natural causes, may have so proportioned their force, sphere of action, degree and manner of opera|tion, as that, under his all-powerful and all-wise concurring influence, they shall conspire together to produce those effects, at such times, and in such places, which may be suited to

their moral state, and serve for warning, or correction, or ruin, as he should judge most ex|pedient. It is from these laws of nature, that tempests, famines, pestilences, earthquakes, and the like evils, take their rise. And they may reasonably be viewed as the great instruments of providence. It is by these, at least in part, that God keeps this degenerate world within restraint. Were it not for the displays he makes, at proper times, and in proper places, of his being, perfections, and governing providence, in these ways of terror, mankind might, at length, forget there was a God, or live as though there was none.

But it will, perhaps, be said here, why should beings be made so imperfect as to need a con|stitution of things, in consequence of which there would unavoidably be these evils? Could not the Deity have make mankind, in particu|lar, more perfect, and placed them in a world, in which, conformably to established laws, they might have enjoyed good without any mixture of evil? And if he could, would he not have done it, if infinitely benevolent? These ques|tions, and all other of a similar kind, are only so many vague, unsupported suggestions, im|porting, that a world, so constituted as our's is, could not, upon the supposition of infinite bene|volence, have been brought into existence. But this is so far from being a truth, that, had not the Deity created such a world as this in which we live, he would not have manifested so

much benevolence, as he might have done, and ac|tually has done. It has been already said, and large|ly proved, that there may be the communicati|on of more good by the creation of a diversity of beings, variously capable of happiness, from the greatest conceivable height, quite down to the lowest. It is therefore no objection against in|finite benevolence, that all beings are not a|like perfect, but rather a proof of it; because the less perfect, in all their gradations, so long as they are at all capable of enjoyment, instead of diminishing, increase the s••m total of good. Why then should they be excluded the creation? Why should not our world, imperfect as it is in comparison with other worlds, have been brought into existence, with all its inhabitants, animal and rational, however low some of them may be in their capacities for the perception of happi|ness? They are all, according to their several ranks, capable of pleasure, and actually enjoy it, and an over-balance of it, notwithstanding all the evils they are liable to. If therefore they had not been made, nor the world in which they live, because so constituted as sometimes to be the occasion of evil, the place they now sus|tain in the creation would have a vast void. And what a mighty chasm in nature would this have been the means of? How much lessened must have been that good, which might have been communicated? None of that hap|piness would have been possible, which is now enjoyed, has been, and may hereafter be en|joyed,

by innumerable beings which have exist|ed, and may in future time exist, on this earth. And is it not more for the honor of the bene|volent Deity, that this happiness should have been communicated, than that he should have withheld it? In a diversified creation, there must be a diversity in the displays of goodness, should they proceed even from an infinitely be|nevolent being. If the displays of goodness, therefore, in the constitution of our world, and the innumerably various creatures in it, are less than in the constitution of other worlds, and the creatures in them, it is no other than might reasonably be looked for. There is, beyond all controversy, more benevolence discovered in making such a world as our's, than if the place it occupies in the creation had been a blank? And what is more, for aught any man living can prove to the contrary, or pretend without arrogance to prove, it may be a fit link in that chain of existence, which God may have intended for as full a manifestation of his be|nevolence, as, in his infinite wisdom, he has judged proper.—But, instead of enlarging any further here, I shall rather proceed

To a more direct answer to the objection against the infinite benevolence of the Deity, as fetched from those natural evils, which all the percipient beings in our world, and mankind in special, are, from their very make, and the laws of nature, subjected to. And here I shall be particular in enumerating the principal of

these evils, and endeavor to account for them, in consistency with goodness, should it be sup|posed to be infinite, but guided, at the same time, by unerring wisdom.

The first evil complained of is pain. This indeed is nearly connected with most of the other evils, and constitutes so great a part of them, that it might be considered in general, and the answer to it, if just, esteemed a full reply to them all. But I chuse rather to speak to it distinctly, and particularly, as one of the evils objected to. It is supposed in the objec|tion, that it is in itself an evil, and such an one as there was no occasion for, and could not have had existence from an infinitely bene|volent Being. But this may be a great mis|take. Pain, in a relative view, and as intro|duced into such a world as our's, may lose its nature as an absolute evil, and be rather wor|thy of being called a real good.

Some have endeavoured to account for pain, so as to make it consist with goodness, by saying, that it gives a quicker and stronger relish for pleasure; and that pleasure could not have been felt, at least in many cases, and with so high a gust, had it not been for pre|ceeding experience of the thing meant by the sensation of pain. But it is evident, beyond all reasonable dispute, that there may be the perception of pleasure without any previous perception of pain; because this is the real truth with respect to him, who is God over all

blessed forever more. It will not be pretend|ed, that the perfectly and infinitely happy Be|ing ever knew what pain was, from any ex|perience he ever had, or could have, of it within himself. And it is possible, I might rather say highly probable, that there are crea|ted beings of a superior order to the noblest in our world, who never felt pain; having never had occasion, or reason for such percep|tion.

Others, in vindication of the Divine bene|volence, have supposed, that the constitution, particularly, of man, is so exquisitely nice, that a touch upon his nervous system will oc|casion pleasure, or pain, according to the de|gree and manner in which it is done; and that the bodily mechanism is such, that it could not have been otherwise. But this, per|haps, is going too far beyond the ken of human understanding. We know not, nor is it possible we should know, the height, or depth, of that contriving skill which is a glory peculiar to the Infinite Mind.

The true and proper answer to the objected difficulty we are considering is this, that all the perceiving beings in our world, whether rational or irrational, of an higher or lower or|der, were subjected to the sensation of pain, not for its own sake, but in wisdom and kindness, that it might be an excitement to their care in providing for the support and comfort of life, and that it might also keep them upon their

guard against whatever might be hurtful to them. We men, though the first order of be|ings on this earth, are, comparatively speaking, but low creatures, perhaps the lowest among all the moral existences in the creation of God; and as we are such imperfect creatures, and live in a world wherein we are surrounded with dangers, and liable to innumerable disas|ters, and attacks upon our health and life, pain appears to be a wise and benevolent provision of the God of nature for our holding exist|ence with any tolerable degree of safety. This has been already illustrated, Part II. to which I shall only add, the sphere of our understand|ing is so limited, and such the danger of our being exposed, in thousands of cases, to the loss of health, limbs, and life itself, that our greatest security is this sensation of pain. It supplies the deficiencies in our make, and assists our fee|ble powers, by being a constant, alarming mo|nitor, calling upon us in time to provide for our well-being, and to guard ourselves against wounds, bruises, distempers, and whatever might be disadvantageous, or destructive to us.

It may be said here, what need of so trou|blesome a sensation as this of pain to guard us against dangers, and disorders? Might not this have been done in a more easy way, and yet as effectual an one? And if it might, how comes it to pass that it was not? Would not an infi|nitely benevolent Being have been thus kind to his creatures?

The answer is obvious. The making such an order of imperfect beings as we are, has been already accounted for, and shewn to be consi|stent with infinitely wise benevolence. This being so, a more kind expedient could not have been contrived, forsuch creatures as we are, so far as we are able to judge, than the sensa|tion of pain, for our security from danger, and hurt, and to promote our real welfare. Most certainly, no one is able to point out a better, or to make it evident there could have been a better. Was it not for this expedient, mankind, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of their rea|son, wisdom, and foresight, would, in innume|rable instances, run into danger, and expose themselves to thousands of difficulties, and in|conveniences, they are, by this contrivance of the Divine skill and goodness, in a great mea|sure freed from. It is indeed so useful, I might more justly say so necessary, an ingredient in the human constitution, that it would be scarce possible life should be preserved without it. To be sure, it could not with that comfort and safety it may now be.

Besides all which, it ought to be considered, that we men are moral, and not meerly animal, beings; and it might be in the view of our be|nevolent Creator, by means of this sensation of pain, he has made us capable of, to restain us from luxury, intemperance, lewdness, and de|bauchery, an indulgence to which would be hurtful to our souls as well as bodies, debasing

our nature, and bringing us down to a level with the very brutes; than which nothing would be more dishonorary to the God who made us, or greater reproach to ourselves as moral and intelligent agents. By this expedient also, so useful in so many other respects, occasion is of|fered, especially in certain cases, and at certain times, for the formation and improvement of the virtues, patience, meekness, contentment, and resignation to the all-wise, righteous, and holy Governor of the world, which may be greatly serviceable to us here, and abundantly more so in some future state of existence.— To go on to other evils complained of.

Such are hunger and thirst, toil and labor, to all which we are subjected. But these, if considered as they ought to be, are so far from being designed evils, that they were purposely contrived for good, tend to good, nor could such imperfect creatures as we are have possessed existence so well without, as with them.

The way in which the wisdom of God has thought fit to manifest his goodness in preserv|ing the lives he has bestowed on us, is by the use of food. Our bodies are so constituted as that, even, their solids are daily upon the waste, and their fluids in a perpetual flux; insomuch that new accessions of matter are necessary to supply what falls off, and wears away. Death must otherwise soon, and unavoidably, be the affect. Now this supply is made by eating and drinking; and to this we are urged, partly by

the satisfaction we naturally take in what we eat and drink, but principally by that hunger and thirst, which, though, sometimes heighten|ed to a degree that may be greatly troublesome, are yet necessary, and bring far more pleasure, than pain along with them. Was it not for the implantation of this expedient in our nature, we should be in danger of dying before our time, through negligence in providing, or throw|ing in, the recruits that are continually neces|sary for the support of our bodily system. Hunger and thirst are what nature has made, and intended to give us warning of this danger, and to push us on to a due care, to prevent, in time, those inconveniences that would befall our bodies, if not supplied with food and drink to strengthen and uphold them.

But it will be said, what need of labor in or|der to procure the things needful for the body? Could not the earth, without the toil of man, have yielded a sufficiency for his bodily sup|port? And would not this have been the con|stitution of nature, if an infinitely benevolent Cause had been at its head, as its Supreme Di|rector? I answer, Had the constitution of na|ture been thus altered, there must have been an analogous alteration in the make of man; other|wise greater inconveniences would have taken place, than those that are now complained of, that is, the Deity would not have manifested so much benevolence, as he has now done. Had the earth been so made as that it should spon|taneously

have yielded its produce, and man's labour by this means, have been rendered needless, what would have been the consequence but indo|lent in activity? And what the consequence of that, but the loss of health, the want vigor and spirit, and a general tediousness accompanying life? And what is more, the bringing on death much soo|ner, and with more distressing anxiety and pain, than would otherwise have been the case. Inac|tion, and no exercise, naturally and powerfully tend to relax the solid parts of the body, to wea|ken the circulation of the fluids, and so to dis|order the secretions intended for the smaller vessels, as that, instead of affording them a pro|per supply, they would fill them with obstructi|ons, which, if not removed, would effect a dis|solution of the bodily machine, either suddenly, or in a more slow and lingering way. With respect, therefore, to beings constituted as we are, labor is highly expedient; and it is a proof of benevolence, rather than an objection against it, that we are subjected to it. Mr. Addison has set this in a beautiful, as well as clear and strong point of light. His words, which none will think unworthy of transcribing, are these.—"I consider the body as a system of tubes and glands, or to use a more rustick phrase, a bundle of pipes and strainers, fitted to one another, after so wonderful a manner, a•• as to make a proper engine to work with. This description does not only comprehend the bowels, bones, tendons, veins, nerves, and ar|teries,

but every muscle, and every ligature, which is a composition of fibres that are so many imperceptible tubes or pipes, interwoven on all sides with invisible glands or strainers. This general idea of a human body, without consi|dering it in the niceties of anatomy, lets us see how absolutely necessary labor is for the right preservation of it. There must be fre|quent motions and agitations to mix, digest, and separate the jucies contained in it, as well as to clear and cleanse that infinitude of pipes and strainers of which it is composed, and to give their solid parts a more firm and lasting tone. Labor, or excercise ferments the humors, casts them into their proper channels, throws off redundances, and helps nature in those se|cret distributions, without which the body can|not subsist in its vigor, no•• the soul act with chearfulness. I might here mention the effect which this has upon all the faculties of the mind, by keeping the understanding clear, the ima|gination untroubled, and refining those spirit•• that are necessary for the proper exertion of our intellectual faculties, during the present laws of union between soul and body. It is to a ne|glect in this particular that we must ascribe the spleen, which is so frequent in men of studious and sedentary tempers, as well as the vapors to which those of the other sex are so often subject. Had not exercise been absolutely necessary for our well-being, nature would not have made the body so proper for it, by giving such an

activity to the limbs, and such a pliancy to every part as necessarily produces those com|pressions, extensions, contortions, dilatations, and all other kinds of motions that are necessary for the preservation of such a system of tubes and glands as has been before mentioned. And that we might not want inducements to engage us in such an exercise of the body as is proper for its welfare; it is so ordered that nothing valuable can be procured without it. Not to mention riches and honor, even food and rai|ment are not to be come at without the toil of the hands, and sweat of the brows. Providence fur|nishes materials, but expects that we should work them up ourselves. The earth must be labored before it gives its increase, and when it is for|ced into its several products, how many hand•• must they pass through before they are fit for use? Manufactures, trade, and agriculture, naturally employ more than nineteen parts of the species in twenty; and as for those who are not obliged to labor, by the condition in which they are born, they are more miserable than the rest of mankind, unless they indulge themselves in that voluntary labor, which goes by the name of exercise."—I shall add here, if it was fit such an order of creatures as we men should have had a place in a scale of beings indefinitely diverse from each other, which no one, without high arrogance, will pretend to say, no reasonable complaint can be made on account of that labor we are called to. It

was indeed, for a species of beings constituted as we are, nearly and necessarily connected with the welfare both of our souls and bodies. If we may pay any regard to the sacred books of revelations, Adam, even in paradise was obli|ged to labor; for he was put into the "gar|den of Eden to dress it." The exercise he was called to might be different, in kind and degree, from that which falls to our share, as it is our lot to live on the earth since it was doomed to "bring forth thorns and thistles," that it might be an occasion of that toil and "sweat of face," without which we cannot earn the bread we eat. And, as the moral state of the world has been, from the time of the lapse of the first of our race, it may be best it should be thus, more conducive to the honor of God, and our own good, than otherwise it would have been.

It may properly be subjoined still further, had it not been for the contrivance of labor, this earth would have been a rude wilderness: Nor should we have seen those curious produc|tions of art, which are so beautiful, and, at the same time beneficial, and delightsome. How could we, without labor, have had houses accom|modated to the convenience and comfort of life, and other structures both ornamental and serviceable? The world indeed is filled with a variety of works, innumerable in their kinds, adapted to gratify the senses, and answer ma|ny valuable purposes, which could not have

been brought into effect without labor of body or mind, or both. And in vain, comparative|ly speaking, were we formed with hands, and eyes, and various mechanical turns, had not the Creator intended we should labor: Nor would he have intended this, if a variety of wise and benevolent ends might not have been answered hereby; some of which we have pointed out, and might easily have mentioned many more.

There are yet other evils complained of; among which are bodily disorders in innume|rable kinds, especially those in consequence of which some are idiots, and others distracted, and by this means not only objects of pity, but the occasion of no small trouble to their rela|tions, and sometimes to the communities in which they live as individuals.

The existence of these evils, in our world, in its present state, is not denied. But it may be justly questioned, whether they would have been either so multiplied, or heightened in their malignity, had it not been for the prevalence of folly and vice, which is chargeable on us as its author, and not on God. Such indeed is our constitution, and such the established laws of nature, that, aside from the wrong con|duct of mankind, there might have been some of these evils; but, without all doubt, they would have been far less in number, and far lighter in degree, in comparison with what they now are. But be this as it may; as they are the effects of established natural laws, intended

for good, and productive of it in innumerable instances, they ought not to be complained of; especially, if it be remembered, that pre-esta|blished general laws, for such a world as our's, are preferable to immediate, unrelated exertions of the Divine agency; and inconveniences may have been lessened, rather than increased there|by. Were there no general laws; but every thing was effected by immediate, unrelated acts of Divine power, the bad consequences arising herefrom would be at once obvious. "There would be no arts and sciences, no skill or in|dustry; no regular methods of providing for our bodies, or improving our minds in the knowledge of things; all which evidently pre-suppose, and are entirely founded on some set|tled, certain laws of the universe discoverable by us." The reader, if he pleases, may turn to Part II, where he will find this point large|ly considered.

It may be further said here, as mankind are brought into existence, not by immediate exertions of Divine power, but in consequence of the general law of propagation, they are, in virtue of this law, subjected to evils, which would not have been prevented, but by an extra|ordinary interposition of heaven, which, if com|mon, might be followed with more inconve|niences, for aught we can say to the contrary, than it would guard against. By a variety of ways, and means, this law of nature may be so obstructed in its operation, or such a turn given

to it, as that children may come into the world with a bodily machine, unfitted for the soul to work by; in consequence of which some might be idiots, and some naturally turn wild. These cases, indeed, are comparatively rare. It is more common for children to derive from predecessors, and as the effect of their vices too▪ bodily constitutions subjecting them to infirmi|ties, and diseases, various in kind, and some|times greatly afflictive in degree. And, per|haps, most of the disorders mankind groan un|der, especially as to the malignant degree of them, are owing to this cause. But these in|conveniences notwithstanding, it is better, beyond all comparison better, this law should have been established, than otherwise. For it is by succession, and not a continued existence of the same individuals, that the human species is preserved in being. And as this is not done by a constantly created supply of individuals, how could it have been better effected, than by this law of propagation? Especially, if it be considered, that it has made way for the mani|festation of riches of wisdom, as well as good|ness, in the formation of different sexes, in the adjustment of a different bodily organization, and the contrivance of natural propensions, all which are admirably fitted to bring into event the intention of this law. And it is so closely con|nected with other laws, good in themselves, and productive of good; such as the law of love, particularly, between the sexes, which

gives occasion for many reciprocal services greatly beneficial, of which we could otherwise have had no idea; and the law of growth from infancy and childhood, to a state of maturity with respect to both mind and body, which makes way for thousands of kind offices in parents to|wards children, as also for the trial and im|provement of many important virtues: Such, I say, is the connection between the law of pro|pagation, and other laws of nature, that the present system must, in many respects, have been altered, if this had not been established; that is, in other words, this world must have been another world, and not the world it now is: While yet, such a world as this is must have been brought into existence, or the Divine be|nevolence would not have been so amply ma|nifested, as, by this means, it might be, and really has been.

There are two other evils still particularly complained of; the shortness of life, and the unavoidable necessity of death.

As to the first, the brevity of life; it might be enough to say, in general, it was ordered by unerring wisdom, and, at the same time, argues benevolence; as life, short as it is, is much preferable to non-existence.—But we shall be more particular in considering this complaint.

It is readily allowed, the general limitation of life, with respect either to the human species, or any of the classes of inferior creatures, can|not be accounted for upon philosophical prin|ciples;

but must finally be resolved by repair|ing to the all-wise pleasure of Him, who is infinite in understanding, as well as goodness. All the species of percipient beings, in our world, are subjected to the same general laws of na|ture; and yet, the time of the duration of their existence is, notwithstanding, greatly various. Some of the brutal kind are confined within the period of twenty or thirty years; others seldom reach beyond fifteen or twenty; others still are quite old at about ten or twelve. The like difference there is between the continuance of being in the animals of more inferior classes. A single year completes the time of existence as to some of them; a few months as to others; and life may be much shorter, with respect to many of those species which are visible to us, only by the help of glasses. This variety in the duration of life is, no doubt, effected by the operation of general laws, but then it must be by the operation of those laws, conformably to a peculiar difference of constitution in these dif|ferent species of creatures; and this, as alotted to them by God, and not to be accounted for, but by recurring to his all-wise good pleasure.

This is eminently true, with respect to man. Notwithstanding the general laws of nature, and their tendency to bring on a dissolution of our bodily structure, no good philosophical reason can be given, why this dissolution should be effected within such a general, limited time. If we may give credit to the Mosaic history,

the Anti-Deluvian patriarchs lived, some of them at least, till they were six, seven, eight, nine hundred years old: and it is particularly remarked of Methuselah, that "his days were nine hundred and sixty nine years:" Whereas, the life of man, from the time of the flood, has been confined within much narrower limits. About "seventy years," according to the com|putation of king David, was the general period of life in his days; and so it has been ever since.

Some have attempted to assign the philoso|phical reason of this difference in the period of human life. And, in order hereto, they have recurred to the natural firmness and vigor of the human constitution, which, at first, was propagated without those contracted weaknesses and decays, which have been gradually increa|sing ever since, and descending from parents to children. And, together with the original strength of the human structure, they have ta|ken into consideration the peculiar aptitude of the productions of nature to afford nutri|ment; which, they suppose, were in their great|est perfection at first, but have been conti|nually upon the decline. And, adding to these reasons, the kind of food, the first generations of men lived upon, which, they imagine, was not flesh, but the fruit of the earth; they think it not strange, that their lives should be protracted to a period so much longer, than the common term of life at present.

But however plausible this account may ap|pear to any, it is far from being satisfactory; and insuperable objections might easily be made to it, if it would not occasion too great, and, what some may think, a needless degression. The truth is; after all that has been said by learned men to solve this difficulty, it still re|mains a mystery in reason and philosophy. Nor can any thing be offered, with reference to its solution, that may more reasonably be acquiesc|ed in than this, So it pleased the sovereign good God; who, as he is the Creator of man, and of all the orders of inferior beings in our world, may assign to him, and to them, what time of existence he shall judge fit. And the periods of life, however various in the various orders of creatures, were doubtless ordered in good|ness, as well as wisdom. There is evidently an analogy between this diversity, and the di|versity that takes place in the several classes of beings; and it might be as fit there should be both these diversities, as either of them, in or|der to a wise and benevolent constitution of the links in the chain of existence. Nor may any one, unless endowed with a larger share of understanding than belongs to the order of men, presume, without vanity, to assert, much less to prove, that it was not better things should have been thus, than otherwise.

There are, most certainly, good reasons, with respect to us men, why our years should not be lengthened beyond the general period

of seventy or eighty. Our present life, as we are intelligent moral beings, ought, in agree|ment with philosophy as well as divinity, to be looked upon, not as intended for the enjoy|ment of the greatest happiness, we are made capable of, but rather as a probation-season that will finally issue in it, in consequence of an ac|quired meetness for it. This is the light, in which it is reasonable we should view our life here on earth; and if the period, assigned for its continuance, is a duration sufficiently long for the attainment of that perfection and hap|piness, which is the grand design of God, it is, in true reason long enough: Nor would it be desirable it should be protracted to a greater length. In short, our existence, and continu|ance in it, in this world, were designed by our all-wise benevolent Creator for a quite dif|ferent purpose from what we are too commonly apt to imagine. He intended both, not so much for the enjoyment of our highest happi|ness here, as to prepare us for it in a better state. This is the true and proper idea of life. And the limitation of its continuance is ad|mirably well adjusted to this notion of it: Those who are formed to a preparedness, by a wise and right improvement of their time, and talents, for an admission to the joys of God's presence, will not complain of the short|ness of life. And as to others, who chiefly employ themselves to the purposes of this, and not the coming world; who make no provi|sion

for another state, but walk in the way of their hearts, and in the sight of their eyes, fulfilling the desires of the flesh and mind, the period of life is full long enough for their continuance here: Nor would it answer any valuable end, if it were of a still greater length. In all probability, they would grow more bold and daring in iniquity, more hardened in vice, and more ripe for inhanced degrees of the Divine vengeance. Besides, the present term of life is, one would think, a space full long enough for such persons to be continued nusan|ces to the world. And it is really a kindness to mankind in general, that they are limited, by the law of their nature, to threescore or fourscore years.

The other evil, I mentioned as complained of, and the last I shall mention, is the unavoid|able necessity of death. And this is common to all the percipient beings in our world, from the highest to the lowest class of them. And their subjection to death, in consequence of the operation of the laws of nature, is a wiser and better contrivance for the production of good, and a stronger proof of the benevo|lence of the Deity, than an establishment the reverse of this.

As to the creatures inferior to man, in all their degrees of subordination, it is obvious, upon the slightest attention, that more benevo|lence may be manifested by their succeeding one another in life, than by their continuance

in being without death. In the former of these ways of communicating life, there may be inconceivably more of it, and consequent|ly more enjoyment of good, so far as life is at all a basis for such enjoyment, than in the latter. There can be no reasonable room for doubt as to this. Should as many species of percipient beings, and as many individuals in each of these species, be brought into exist|ence, as this world of our's could contain, without unavoidable inconvenience; if there was no death to make way for a succession in life, there would be but a very small pittance of life, in comparison with what there might be, conformably to the method in which hea|ven has contrived to communicate it. Upon the supposition of no death, in the case pro|posed, there could be no multiplication of life. It would always continue precisely the same with respect to the numbers that enjoyed it: Whereas, upon the present plan, there may be the continuance of every species, with a like number of individuals, in thousands of succes|sions. And should a calculation be made of life multiplied in this way, it would amount to a sum inconceivably greater, than it could otherwise have been. Millions of animals, in every class, are capable, in this way, of being brought into life, and made percipients of en|joyment, which must have remained in non-en|tity, had it not been for this contrivance of death, and its being made an establishment of

nature. In short, by means of the present scheme of God, there has been, and may yet be, as much more life, and enjoyment, among the inferior ranks of animals, than there would have been, without the introduction of death, as there already have been, and may still be, successions in their life; for, in every succession, there may be as much life, and enjoyment, as in the first class that had existence.

It ought to be considered yet further here, that, had it not been for death, the law of pro|pagation still continuing in force, there would not have been, long before the present day, room in our world for a millionth part of the animals that might be brought into existence; yea, the increase of a very few of the classes of these animals would have so filled the earth, that the rest must have been shut out.

And what has been thus said of the inferior animals is equally true, should it be applied to us men. Was it not for death, there must have been, beyond conception, less life, and con|sequently enjoyment, than there has been, and still may be, upon the present plan of nature. If we take into consideration only those of our race, who, in successive generations, have had existence, there would not have been room on this earth for a thousandth part of them, at one and the same time; much less would there have been a possibility of this, if all that have died, before their arrival to a capacity of increasing their kind, should be taken into the number

and they had all gone on multiplying to this day, conformably to the law of propagation. Perhaps, an hundred worlds, as large as this, would not have been sufficiently extensive for their existence, and comfortable support, in the way they are now provided for. Instead there|fore of objecting against the benevolence of the Deity for the introduction of death into the world, we have reason rather to admire and adore that wisdom of his, which has contri|ved and established this effectual way for the fuller illustration of that infinite goodness, which is so amiable an attribute of his nature.

Some, that they might keep at the utmost distance from reflecting dishonor on the Divine benevolence, on account of the law of death, have supposed it was in itself a matter of ne|cessity, and could not have been otherwise; as the bodies of all animals, from the lowest to the highest class of them, being compounded of heterogeneous parts, are naturally corrupti|ble, and must unavoidably, in time, undergo that dissolution, which is the thing meant, by death. Whether it be true, or not, that animal bodies must have been subjected to SUCH corruptibi|lity, as that a dissolution could not have been guarded against, and prevented, I shall not dispute at present. But thus much is unques|tionably true, that the time of existence, with|out the coming on of a dissolution, is different in different classes of the inferior animals; which cannot be accounted for, by the ope|ration

of any of the laws of nature, without recurring to that wisdom of God, which so formed the bodily constitution of all animals, and so differenced it with respect to the diffe|rent classes of them, that the laws of nature should be unable, unless by accidental interfe|rance, to effect a dissolution in any of them, but in conformity to that special difference, as to the general time, that had been previously alot|ted for their continuance in being.

And with respect to the race of men, in par|ticular, so far as we may receive for truth what Moses has related, the time of their bodily dis|solution, the same general laws of nature still subsisting, and in operation, has been greatly varied. Men live now, generally speak|ing, but seventy, or eighty years: Whereas, in the Anti-Diluvian ages, they lived some hundreds of years; and they might, had God so pleased, have gone on living as many thou|sands: Yea, their special constitution might have been such, for aught any one can prove to the contrary, as that they should not have seen corruption.* 1.3 But, in the plan of God,

it has been ordered otherwise. He has so con|stituted our bodily structure, that it shall, with|in such a general period, naturally fall to pieces. And this general period he has fixed, not from any necessity there was for it by reason of the corruptibility of the materials of which it is formed; but by so contriving the continuance

of one generation, as that the succession of another should be admirably adapted to mani|fest both wisdom and goodness in providing for the existence of mere life, and consequent en|joyment, than there would otherwise have been on this earth.

It might also be with a view to promote morally good purposes, that the law of death, especially as to its general time, has been esta|blished by God. It is not easy to conceive of any motive more strikingly adapted to excite to consideration, and such a behavior in life as may lay a just foundation for calmness and serenity of mind, when the time comes that we must depart out of this into another state. And it is, most certainly, a very powerful re|straint from vicious practices, especially in those kinds, and degrees, which naturally tend to hasten death, and bring it on before its proper time. It is indeed one of the wisest and best contri|vances for the government of men, and to keep them within the restraints of reason and virtue. As Dr. Sherlock, in his excellent treatise on death, expresses it, "Mortality and death are necessary to the good government of the world. Nothing else can give a check to some men's wickedness, but either the fear of death, or exe|cution of it. Some men are so outrageously wicked, that nothing can put a stop to them, and prevent the mischief they do in the world, but to cut them off. This is the reason of ca|pital punishments among men, to remove those

out of the world who will be a plague to man|kind kind while they live in it. For this reason God destroyed the whole race of mankind by a deluge of water, excepting Noah, and his family, be|cause they were incurably wicked. For this reason he sends plagues, and famine, and sword, to correct the exorbitant growth of wickedness, to lessen the number of sinners, and to lay re|straints on them. And if the world be such a bedlam as it is under all these restraints, what would it be were it filled with immortal sin|ners!"

Upon the whole that has been said, in rela|tion to natural evil, it appears either that it could not have been prevented in such a world as our's; or, that it is miscalled evil, being rather the contrivance of wisdom in order to the production of more good, than there other|wise would have been. It is conceded, a better world than this, more perfect, and more power|fully adapted to make happy, might be created by the Deity; but then it ought to be remem|bered, such a better world may be already one of the links in the diversified chain of existence. The only proper question therefore is, whether the making such a world as this, is not a proof of more benevolence, than a chasm would be in that part of the creation, which it now occu|pies? If so, imperfect as it is, comparatively speaking, it is better it should be, than not be. And, for such an imperfect world as this ought 〈◊〉〈◊〉 be, in an indefinitely variegated creation, in

order to its being a proper part in the chain of existence, no alteration, it may be, notwithstand|ing all the complaints that have been made of deficiences, redundances, deformities, and evils, could be made without damage to the system. If in some things, absolutely viewed, an alter|ation for the better might be supposed, yet this very alteration, considered, as it ought to be, in its relation to other parts, which, as truly as these, go to the constitution of the whole, it might turn out greatly to its disad|vantage. Arch Deacon Law, in his 42 Note, on Arch Bishop King's "origin of evil," has well expressed himself upon this head. Says he, "we may safely conclude, that there could have been no partial alteration of this system, but for the worse, as far as we know, at least not for the better. They who hold that there might have been a total one, that the whole scheme of things might possibly have been al|tered, or reversed, and that either the direct contrary, or a quite different one, would have been equally, or more worthy of God; the men, I say, that hold this, are obliged to show the possibility of conceiving of it, and to ex|plain the manner of how it may be, before we are obliged to believe them.—And when they have done this, and compleated their system, and made a total alteration of things, a•• they ima|gine, for the better, they are at last got only to the absurdity of putting this system into an higher class; whereas, all the different classes,

in every conceivable degree of perfection, were supposed to be entirely filled at the first. We must therefore take things as they are, and ar|gue only from the present nature of them, col|lectively. In which view, we shall find no possible alteration of any thing, but what would produce greater inconveniences, either in itself, or others, to which it bears a strict relation." He goes on, taking occasion to borrow a section from Mr. Maxwell's general remarks on Cum|berland, in these words. "The nature of things, in the natural world, is so exactly fitted to the natural faculties and dispositions of mankind, that were any thing in it otherwise than it is, even in degree, mankind would be less happy, than they now are, Thus the dependence of all natural effects upon a few simple principles, is wonderfully advantageous in many respects. The degrees of all the sensible pleasures are ex|actly suited to the use of each; so that if we enjoyed any of them in a greater degree we should be less happy: For our appetites of those pleasures would, by that means, be too strong for our reason; and, as we are framed, tempt us to an immoderate enjoyment of them, so as to prejudice our bodies. And, where we en|joy some of them in so high a degree, as that, it is, in many cases, very difficult for the strong|est to regulate and moderate the appetites of those pleasures, it is in such instances where it was necessary to counterpoize some disadvanta|ges, which are the consequences of the pursuit

of those pleasures. Thus the pleasing ideas, which accompany the love of the sexes, are necessary to be possessed in so high a degree, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 balance the cares of matrimony, and also the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of child-bearing in the female sex. The 〈◊〉〈◊〉 may be said of our intellectual pleasures. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 did we receive a greater pleasure from be|••lence, sloth would be encouraged by an ••oderate bounty. And were the pleasures ••r inquiries into the truth greater, we should be ••o speculative, and less active. It seems also probable, that the degree of our intellec|tual capacity is very well suited to our objects of knowledge, and that had we a greater degree thereof, we should be less happy. Moreover, it is probably so adapted to the inward frame of our bodies, that it could not be greater, without either an alteration in the laws of na|ture, or in the laws of union between the soul and body. Farther; were it much greater than it is, our thoughts and pursuits would be so spiritual and refined, that we should be taken too much off from sensible pleasures. We should probably be conscious of some defects or wants in our bodily organs, and would be sensible that they were unequal to so great a capacity, which would necessarily be followed by uneasiness of mind. And this seems to hold in the br••te-creation. For, methinks, it would be for the disadvantage of a h••rse to be endow|ed with the understanding of a man: Such an

unequal union must be attended with continual disquietudes, and discontents. As for our pains, they are all either warnings against bo|dily disorders, or are such as, had we wanted them, the laws of nature remaining as they are, we should either have wanted some pleasures we now enjoy, or have possessed them in a less de|gree. Those things in nature which we cannot reconcile to the foregoing opinion, as being ig|norant of their use, we have good reason, from analogy, to believe are really advantageous, and adapted to the happiness of intelligent beings of the system; though we have not so full and complete a knowledge of the entire system, as to be able to point out their particularities. From these observations we may conclude, that all the various parts of our system are so admi|rably suited to one another, and the whole con|trived with such exquisite wisdom, that were any thing, in any part thereof, in the least otherwise than it is, without an alteration in the whole, there would be a less sum of hap|piness in the system than there now is."

I have now said all that I intended to say in illustration of the supremely perfect benevo|lence of the Deity, as also in solving the objec|tions which have been made against this attri|bute of his from the known appearances in nature. How far what I have offered, may be worthy of notice, must be left with those into whose hands it may fall, to judge. If any should think the arguing is inconclusive, finding them|selves,

at the same time, unable to reconcile the manifestations of Divine goodness with the character of God, as infinitely benevolent, let them not, on this account, question in their hearts whether he is endowed with this most amiable perfection. For there is no way of rea|soning, by which we can prove that he posses|ses any perfection, but it may in the same way be proved, that he is supremely benevo|lent. Nor would it be any thing strange should we, who are so low an order in the scale of intelligent beings, be unable to remove away these difficulties that may attend, in some instances, the display of this Divine attribute. Instead therefore of perplexing our own minds, or the minds of others, with seeming inconsis|tencies in God's manifestations of his goodness, let us adore before him as a Being infinitely benevolent; patiently waiting for the coming day of revelation, when it shall be made to appear with a meridian lostre, that nothing was ever done in the conduct of God towards our world but in harmony with wise goodness, accurate justice, and the most perfect consistency with all those moral qualities, which constitute the blessed God an infinitely amiable Being.

FINIS.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Vid. Taylor, p. 48, of his Key.
• * 1.2

  Vid. A thought in Hutcheson on vice being the dege••racy of powers designed for good.
• * 1.3

  According to the new-testament writings, there will be no death, among the true servants of Jesus Christ, in the resurrection-world. They will have bodies there, as they have here. Their bodies may be there more refined, and with greater skill organized, so as to be fitter machines for the soul to act by; but they will be bodies still, and yet not subject to mortality. Hence that emphatically strong declaration of the apostle Paul, "This corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality. So, when this corruptible shall have put on incorruption, and this mortal has put on immortality, then shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, "death is swallowed up in victory." It is from hence evident, that material bodies may, by the skill of the all-wise and all-powerful Archi|tect, be so formed, as that, under his over-ruling guidance and protection, they may continue in existence without death forever. According to the same writings also it is evident, that mankind would not have been subjected to death, had it not been for the lapse of the f••st man, Adam. But it is evident likewise, that it could not have been the intention of God, that Adam, together with all that might proceed from him, should have lived on this earth at one and the same time; and for this very good reason, because it was plainly impossible that they should. This world could not have contained and subsisted them; unless their bodies, and the manner of supporting them, had been quite diffe|rent from what they now are. If therefore they had not died, some other way must have been provided to make room for those who would have been brought into being. Perhaps, in certain periods, numbers of those who had been fitted therefor, might have been translated to some other place of abode, to enjoy happiness there, in some superior mode of existence. But be this as it may, this non-subjection to death was not owing to a created natural incorruptibility, but to a special promise from Almighty God, that, while innocent, they should be so protected, and preserved, as not to see corruption. But, innocence being lost, the promise of immortality became vacated, and death of course too•• place: Only, it was left with God to fix the general period of life; which he has done with wisdom that discovers great goodness.