The history of the reign of Charles the Fifth, Emperor of Germany; and of all the kingdoms and states in Europe, during his age. : To which is prefixed, a view of the progress of society in Europe, from the subversion of the Roman Empire, to the beginning of the sixteenth century. : Confirmed by historical proofs and illustrations. : In three volumes. / By William Robertson, D.D. Principal of the University of Edinburgh, and historiographer to His Majesty for Scotland. Author of the late elegant History of Scotland. ; Volume the first[-third].

A VIEW OF THE PROGRESS OF SOCIETY IN EUROPE. FROM THE SUBVERSION OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE, TO THE BEGINNING OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY. SECTION III. View of the political Constitution of the principal States in Europe, at the Commencement of the sixteenth Century.

HAVING thus enumerated the principal causes and events,* 1.1 the influence of which extended to all the States in Europe, and contributed either to improve their inter∣nal government and police, or to enlarge the sphere of their activity, and to augment their national force; nothing remains, in order to prepare my readers for entering with full information upon pe∣rusing the history of the reign of Charles V. but to give some view of the particular constitution and form of civil government, in each of the nations which acted any con∣siderable part during that period. While these institutions and occurrences, which I have mentioned, formed the people of Europe to resemble each other, and conduct∣ed them from barbarism to refinement, in the same path, and with almost equal steps, there were other circum∣stances which occasioned a difference in their political establishments, and gave rise to those peculiar modes of government, which have produced such variety in the character and genius of nations.

* 1.2IT is no less necessary to become acquaint∣ed with the latter, than to have contemplat∣ed the former. The view which I have ex∣hibited of the causes and events, whose influ∣ence was universal, will enable my readers to account for the surprizing resemblance among the nations of Europe in their interior police, and fo∣reign operations. But, without a distinct knowledge of the peculiar form and genius of their civil government, a great part of their transactions must appear altogether mysterious and inexplicable. The historians of particu∣lar states, as they seldom extended their views farther than to the amusement or instruction of their fellow-ci∣tizens, by whom they might presume that all domestick customs and institutions were perfectly understood, have often neglected to descend into such details with respect to these, as are sufficient to convey to foreigners full light and information concerning the occurrences which they relate. But a history, which comprehends the transactions of so many different countries, would be extremely imperfect, without a previous survey of their constitution and political state. It is from his know∣ledge of these, that the reader must draw those princi∣ples, which will enable him to judge with discernment, and to decide with certainty concerning the conduct of nations.

A MINUTE detail, however, of the peculiar forms and regulations in every country, would lead to deduc∣tions of immeasurable length. To sketch out the great lines which distinguish and characterize each govern∣ment, is all that the nature of my present work will ad∣mit of, and all that is necessary to illustrate the events which it records.

* 1.3AT the opening of the sixteenth century, the political face of Italy was extremely diffe∣rent from that of any other part of Europe. Instead of those extensive monarchies, which occupied the rest of the continent, that delightful country was parcelled out among many small states, each of which possessed sove∣reign and independant jurisdiction. The only monarch in Italy was that of Naples. The dominion of the Popes was of a peculiar species, to which there is no∣thing

similar either in ancient or modern times. In Venice and Florence, a republican form of government was established. Milan was subject to sovereigns, who had assumed no higher title than that of Dukes.

THE Pope was the first of these powers in dignity,* 1.4 and not the least considerable by the extent of his territories. In the primitive church, the jurisdiction of Bishops was equal and co-ordinate. They derived, perhaps, some degree of consideration from the dignity of the See in which they presided. They possessed, however, no real au∣thority or pre eminence, but what they acquired by superior abilities, or superior sanctity. As Rome had so long been the seat of empire, and capital of the world, its bishops were upon that account entitled to respect; they received it; but during several ages they claimed and received nothing more. From these hum∣ble beginnings, they advanced with such an adventu∣rous and well-directed ambition, that they established a spiritual dominion over the minds and sentiments of men, to which all Europe submitted with implicit obe∣dience. Their claim of universal jurisdiction,* 1.5 as heads of the church, and their pretentions to infallibility in their decisions, as successors of St. Peter, are as chimerical, as they are repugnant to the genius of the Christian religion. But on these foundations, the superstition and credulity of mankind enabled them to erect an amazing superstruc∣ture. In all ecclesiastical controversies, their decisions were received as the infallible oracles of truth. Nor was the plenitude of their power confined to these alone; they dethroned monarchs; disposed of crowns; absolv∣ed subjects from the obedience due to their sovereigns; and laid kingdoms under interdicts. There was not a state in Europe which had not been disquieted by their ambition. There was not a throne which they had not shaken; nor a Prince, who did not tremble at their power.

NOTHING was wanting to render this Empire abso∣lute, and to establish it on the ruins of all civil authori∣ty, but that the Popes should have possessed such a de∣gree of temporal power, as was sufficient to second and

enforce their spiritual decrees.* 1.6 Happily for mankind, while their spiritual jurisdiction was most extensive, and at its greatest height, their temporal property was extremely limit∣ed. They were powerful Pontiffs, sormida∣ble at a distance; but they were petty Prin∣ces, without any considerable domestic force. They had early endeavoured, indeed, to acquire territory by arts, similar to those which they had employed in extend∣ing their jurisdiction. Under pretence of a donation from Constantine, and of another from Charlemagne or his father Pepin, they attempted to take possession of some towns adjacent to Rome. But these donations were fictitious, and availed them little. The benefacti∣ons, for which they were indebted to the credulity of the Norman adventurers, who conquered Naples, and to the superstition of the countess Matilda, were real, and added ample domains to the Holy See.

* 1.7BUT the power of the Popes did not increase in proportion to the extent of territory which they had acquired. In the dominions annex∣ed to the Holy See, as well as in those sub∣ject to other Princes in Italy, the sovereign of a State was far from having the command of the force which it contained. During the turbulence and confu∣sion of the middle ages, the powerful nobility or leaders of popular factions in Italy, had seized the government of different towns; and after strengthening their fortifi∣cations, and taking a body of mercenaries into pay, they set up for independance. The territory which the church had gained, was filled with such petty tyrants, who left the Pope hardly the shadow of dominion.

* 1.8AS these usurpations almost annihilated the Papal power in the greater part of the towns subject to the church, the Roman ba∣rons frequently disputed the authority of the Popes, even in Rome itself. In the twelfth cen∣tury, an opinion began to be propagated, "That as the function of ecclesiastics was purely spiritual, they ought to possess no property, and to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 no temporal jurisdiction; but, according to the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 example of their prodec••••••rs in the primitive church, should subsist

wholly upon their tithes, or upon the voluntary oblations of the people a 1.9. This doctrine being addressed to men, who had beheld the scandalous manner in which the ava∣rice and ambition of the clergy had prompted them to contend for wealth, and to exercise power, they listened to it with fond attention. The Roman barons, who had felt most sensibly the rigour of ecclesiastical oppression, adopted these sentiments with such ardor, that they set themselves instantly to shake off the yoke. They en∣deavoured to restore some image of their antient liberty, by reviving the institution of the Roman se∣nate,* 1.10 in which they vested supreme authori∣ty; committing the executive power sometimes to one chief senator, sometimes to two, and sometimes to a magistrate dignified with the name of The Patrician. The Popes exerted themselves with vigour, in order to check this fatal encroachment on their jurisdiction. One of them, finding all his endeavours ineffectual, was so much mortified, that extreme grief cut short his days. Another, having ventured to attack the senators at the head of some armed men, was mortally wounded in the fray b 1.11: During a considerable period, the power of the Popes, before which the greatest monarchs in Europe trembled, was circumscribed within such narrow limits in their own capital, that they durst scarce exert any act of authority without the permission and concurrence of the senate.

ENCROACHMENTS were made upon the Papal autho∣rity, not only by the usurpations of the Ro∣man nobility,* 1.12 but by the mutinous spirit of the people. During seventy years of the fourteenth century, the Popes fixed their re∣sidence in Avignon. The inhabitants of Rome, accustomed to consider themselves as the descendants of the people who had con∣quered the world, and had given laws to it, were too high-spirited to submit with patience to the delegated authority of those persons, to whom the Popes commit∣ted

the government of the city. On many occasions they opposed the execution of the Papal mandates, and on the slightest appearance of innovation or oppression, they were ready to take arms in defence of their own immu∣nities. Towards the middle of the fourteenth century, being instigated by Nicolas Rienzo, a man of low birth and seditious spirit, but of popular eloquence, and an enterprizing ambition, they drove all the nobility out of the city, established a democratical form of government, elected Rienzo Tribune of the people, and invested him with extensive authority. But though the frantic pro∣ceedings of the tribune soon overturned this new system; though the government of Rome was reinstated in its antient form; yet every fresh attack contributed to weaken the papal jurisdiction; and the turbulence of the people concurred with the spirit of independance among the nobility, to circumscribe it within very nar∣row bounds c 1.13. Gregory VII. and other domineering Pontiffs, accomplished those great things which rendered them so formidable to the Emperors, with whom they contended, not by the force of their arms, or by the ex∣tent of their power, but by the dread of their spiritual censures, and by the effect of their intrigues, which ex∣cited rivals, and called forth enemies against every prince whom they wished to depress or to destroy.

MANY attempts were made by the Popes, not only to humble these usurpers,* 1.14 who lorded it over the cities in the ecclesiastical state, but to break the turbulent spirit of the Roman people. These were long unsuccessful. At last Alex∣ander VI. with a policy no less artful than fla∣gitious, subdued and extirpated most of them, and rendered the Popes masters of their own dominions. The enterprizing ambition of Julius II. added con∣quests of no inconsiderable value to the patrimony of St. Peter. Thus the Popes, by degrees, became pow∣erful temporal princes. Their territories, in the age of Charles V. were of greater extent than at pre∣sent;

their country was better cultivated, and more po∣pulous; and as they drew large contributions from every part of Europe, their revenues far exceeded those of the neighbouring powers, and rendered them capable of more sudden and vigorous efforts.

THE genius of the Papal government, however, was better adapted to the exercise of spiritual do∣minion,* 1.15 than of temporal power. With re∣spect to the former, all its maxims were steady and invariable. Every new Pontiff adopted the plan of his predecessor. By education and habit ecclesiastics were so formed, that the charac∣ter of the individual was sunk in that of the profession; and the passions of the man were sacrificed to the interest and honour of the order. The hands which held the reins of administration might change; but the spirit which conducted them was always the same. While the measures of other governments fluctuated, and the ob∣jects at which they aimed varied, the church kept one end in view; and to this unrelaxing constancy of pur∣suit, it was indebted for its success in the boldest attempts ever made by human ambition.

BUT in their civil administration, the Popes followed no such uniform or consistent plan. There▪ as in other governments, the character, the passions, and the inte∣rests of the person who had the supreme direction of affairs, occasioned a variation both in objects and mea∣sures. As few prelates reached the summit of ecclesi∣astical dignity, until they were far advanced in life, a change of masters was more frequent in the Papal do∣minions than in other states; and the political system was, of course, less stable and permanent. Every Pope was eager to make the most of the short period, during which he had the prospect of enjoying power, in order to aggrandize his family, and to attain his private ends; and it was often the first business of his successor to undo all that he had done, and to overturn what he had esta∣blished.

AS ecclesiastics were trained to pacific arts, and early initiated in the mysteries of that policy, by which the court of Rome extended or supported its spiritual do∣minion, the Popes were apt to conduct their temporal

affairs with the same spirit; and in all their measures were more ready to employ the refinements of intrigue, than the force of arms. It was in the Papal court that address and subtilty in negotiation first became a science; and, during the sixteenth century, Rome was consider∣ed as the school in which it could be best acquired.

AS the decorum of their ecclesiastical character pre∣vented the Popes from placing themselves at the head of their armies, or taking the command, in person, of the military force in their dominions, they were afraid to arm their subjects; and in all their operations, whether offen∣sive or defensive, they trusted intirely to mercenary troops.

AS their power and dominions could not descend to their posterity, the Popes were less solicitous than other princes to form or to encourage schemes of public uti∣lity and improvement. Their tenure was only for a short life; present advantage was all that they attended to; to squeeze and to amass, not to meliorate, was their ob∣ject. They erected, perhaps, some work of ostentation, to remain as a monument of their pontificate; they found it necessary, at some times, to establish useful institu∣tions, in order to sooth and silence the turbulent popu∣lace of Rome; but plans of general benefit to their subjects, and framed with a view to futurity, were rarely objects of attention in the papal policy. The patrimo∣ny of St. Peter was worse governed than any part of Europe; and though a generous Pontiff might suspend for a little, or counter-act the effects of those vices which are peculiar to the administration of ecclesiastics; the disease not only remained incurable, but has even gone on increasing from age to age; and the decline of the state has kept pace with its progress.

ONE circumstance farther, concerning the Papal go∣vernment, is so singular, as to merit atten∣tion.* 1.16 As the spiritual supremacy and tempo∣ral power were united in one person, and uni∣formly aided each other in their operations, they became so blended together, that it was difficult to separate them, even in imagina∣tion. The potentates, who found it necessary to oppose the measures which the Popes pur∣sued as temporal princes, could not divest themselves of

the reverence which they imagined to be due to them as heads of the church, and vicars of Jesus Christ. It was with reluctance that they could be brought to a rup∣ture with them; they were averse to push their opera∣tions against them to extremity; they listened eagerly to the first overtures of accommodation•• and were willing to procure it almost upon any terms. Their consciousness of this encouraged the enterprizing pontiffs, who filled the Papal throne about the beginning of the sixteenth cen∣tury, to engage in schemes seemingly the most extrava∣gant. They trusted, that if their temporal power was not sufficient to carry them through with success, the respect paid to their spiritual dignity would enable them to extricate themselves with facility and with honour d 1.17. But when popes came to take part more frequently in the contests among princes, and to engage as principals or auxiliaries in every war kindled in Europe, this ve∣neration for their sacred character began to abate; and striking instances will occur in the following history, of its being almost totally extinct.

OF all the Italian powers, the republic of Venice, next to the Pope, was most connected with the rest of Europe. The rise of that commonwealth, during the inroads of the Huns, in the fifth century; the singular

situation of its capital in the small isles of the Adriatick gulf;* 1.18 and the more singular form of its ci∣vil constitution are generally known. If we view the Venetian government as calculated for the order of nobles alone, its institutions are so excellent, the deliberative, legislative and executive powers are so admirably distri∣buted and adjusted, that it must be regarded as a per∣fect model of political wisdom. But if we consider it as formed for a numerous body of people subject to its jurisdiction, it will appear a rigid and partial aristocracy, which lodges all power in the hands of a few members of the community, while it degrades and oppresses the rest.

THE spirit of government, in a commonwealth of this species, was, of course, timid and jea∣lous.* 1.19 The Venetian nobles distrusted their own subjects, and were afraid of allowing them the use of arms. They encouraged among them the arts of industry and com∣merce; they employed them in manufactures and in navigation; but never admitted them into the troops which the state kept in its pay. The military force of the republic consisted intirely of foreign mercenaries. The command of these was never trusted to noble Venetians, lest they should acquire such influ∣ence over the army, as might endanger the public li∣berty; or become accustomed to the exercise of such power, as would make them unwilling to return to the condition of private citizens. A soldier of fortune was placed at the head of the armies of the commonwealth; and to obtain that honour, was the great object of the Italian Condottieri, or leaders of bands, who, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, made a trade of war, and raised and hired out soldiers to different states. But the same suspicious policy, which induced them to em∣ploy these adventurers, prevented their placing intire confidence in them. Two noblemen, appointed by the senate, accompanied their army when it took the field, with the appellation of Proveditori, and, like the field-deputies of the Dutch republic in later times, observed

all the motions of the general, and checked and con∣trouled him in a••l his operations.

A REPUBLIC, with such civil and military institu∣tions, was not formed to make conquests While its subjects were disarmed, and its nobles excluded from military command, it carried on its warlike enterprizes with great disadvantage. This ••ght to have taught the Venetians to make self-pre••ion, and the enjoy∣ment of domestic security, the ••bjects of their policy. But republics are apt to be seduced by the spirit of am∣bition, as well as princes. When the Venetians so far forgot the interior defects in their government, as to aim at extensive conquests, the fata•• blow, which they received in the war excited by the league of Cambray, convinced them of the imprudence and danger of mak∣ing violent efforts, in opposition to the genius and ten∣dency of their constitution

IT is not, however, by its military, but by its naval and commercial power,* 1.20 that the importance of the Venetian commonwealth must be es∣timated. In the latter, the real force and nerves of the state consisted. The jealousy of government did not extend to this department. No∣thing was apprehended from this quarter that could prove formidable to liberty. The senate encouraged the nobles to trade, and to serve on b••ard the fleet. They became merchants and admirals. They increased the wealth of their country by their industry. They added to its dominions, by the valour with which they conducted its naval armaments.

THE Venetian commerce was an inexhaustible source of opulence. All the nations in Europe de∣pended upon them,* 1.21 not only for the commo∣dities of the East, but for various manufac∣tures fabricated by them alone, or finished with a dexterity and elegance unknown in other coun∣tries. From this extensive commerce, the state derived such immense supplies, as concealed these vices in its constitution, which I have mentioned; and enabled it to keep on foot such armies, as were not only an over∣match for the force which any of its neighbours could bring into the field, but were sufficient to contend, for

some time, with the powerful monarchs beyond the Alps. During its struggles with the princes united against it by the league of Cambray, the republic levied sums which, even in the present age, would be deemed considerable; and while the king of France paid the exorbitant interest, which I have mentioned, for the money advanced to him, and the Emperor eager to bor∣row, but destitute of credit, was known by the name of Maximilian the Money less, the Venetians raised whatever sums they pleased, at the moderate premium of five in the hundred e 1.22.

THE constitution of Florence was perfectly the reverse of that of Venice.* 1.23 It partook as much of the democratical turbulence and licentious∣ness, as the other of aristocratical rigour. Florence, however, was a commercial, not a military democracy. The nature of its institutions were favour∣able to commerce, and the genius of the people was turned towards it. The vast wealth which the family of Medici had acquired by trade; added to the magni∣ficence, the generosity, and the virtue of the first Cos∣mo, gave him such an ascendant over the affections, as well as the councils of his countrymen, that though the forms of popular government were preserved, though the various departments of administration were filled by magistrates distinguished by the ancient names, and elected in the usual manner, he was in reality the head of the commonwealth, and in the station of a private citizen he possessed supreme authority. Cosmo trans∣mitted a considerable degree of this power to his descen∣dants; and during the greater part of the fifteenth cen∣tury, the political state of Florence was extremely sin∣gular. The appearance of republican government sub∣sisted, the people were passionately attached to it, and on some occasions contended warmly for their privi∣leges, and yet they permitted a single family to assume a direction of their affairs, almost as absolute as if it had been formally invested with sovereign power. The jea∣lousy of the Medici concurred with the commercial spi∣rit

of the Florentines, in putting the military force of the republic upon the same footing with that of the other Italian states. The troops, which the Florentines employed in their wars, consisted almost intirely of mer∣cenary soldiers, furnished by the Condottieri, or leaders of bands, whom they took into their pay.

IN the kingdom of Naples, to which the sovereignty of the island of Sicily was annexed,* 1.24 the feu∣dal government was established in the same form, and with the same defects, as in the other nations of Europe. The frequent and violent revolutions which happened in that monarchy, had considerably increased these defects, and rendered them more intolerable. The succession to the crown of Naples had been so often interrupted or alter∣ed, and so many princes of foreign blood had taken possession of the throne, that the Neapolitan nobility had lost, in a great measure, that attachment to the fa∣mily of their sovereigns, as well as that reverence for their persons, which, in other feudal kingdoms, con∣tributed to set some bounds to the encroachments of the barons upon the royal prerogative and power. At the same time, the different pretenders to the crown, being obliged to court the barons who adhered to them, and on whose support they depended for the success of their claims, they augmented their privileges by liberal con∣cessions, and connived at their boldest usurpations. Even when seated on the throne, it was dangerous for a prince, who held his sceptre by a disputed title, to venture on any step towards extending his own power, or circum∣scribing that of the nobles.

FROM all these causes, the kingdom of Naples was the most turbulent of any in Europe, and the authority of its monarchs the least extensive. Though Ferdinand I. who began his reign in the year one thousand four hundred and sixty-eight, attempted to break the power of the aristocracy; though his son Alfonso, that he might crush it at once by cutting off the leaders of greatest re∣putation and influence among the Neapolitan barons, ventured to commit one of the most perfidious and cruel actions recorded in history; the order of nobles was, ne∣vertheless,

more exasperated than humbled by the blow f 1.25. The resentment which these outrages excited was so violent,* 1.26 and the power of the male-content nobles was still so formidable, that to these may be ascribed, in a great degree, the ease and rapidity with which Charles VIII. conquered the kingdom of Naples g 1.27.

THE event that gave rise to the violent contests con∣cerning the succession to the crown of Naples and Sicily,* 1.28 which brought so many calami∣ties upon these kingdoms, happened in the thirteenth century. Upon the death of the Emperor Frederick II. Manfred, his natural son, aspiring to the Neapolitan throne, mur∣dered if we may believe contemporary histo∣rians) his brother the Emperor Conrad, and by that crime obtained possession of ith 1.29. The Popes, from their implacable enmity to the house of Swabia, not only refused to recognize Manfred's title, but endea∣voured to excite against him some rival capable of wrest∣ing the sceptre out of his hand. Charles Count of An∣jou, the brother of St. Louis King of France, under∣took this; and he received from the Popes, the inves∣titure of the kingdom of Naples and Sicily, as a fief held of the Holy See. The Count of Anjou's efforts were crowned with success; Manfred fell in battle; and he took possession of the vacant throne. But soon after, Charles sullied the glory which he had acquired, by the injustice and cruelty with which he put to death, by the hands of the executioner, Conradin, the last prince of the house of Swabia, and the rightful heir of the Nea∣politan crown. That gallant young prince asserted his title, to the last, with a courage worthy of a better fate. On the scaffold he declared Peter, at that time Prince, and soon after King of Aragon, who had married Man∣fred's only daughter, his heir; and throwing his glove among the people, he entreated that it might be carried to Peter, as the symbol by which he conveyed all his

rights to him i 1.30. The desire of avenging the insult of∣fered to royalty by the death of Conradin, concurred with ambition, in prompting Peter to take arms in sup∣port of the title, which he had acquired. From that period, during almost two centuries, the houses of Ara∣gon and Anjou contended for the crown of Naples. Amidst a succession of revolutions more rapid, as well as of crimes more atrocious, than what occur in the history of almost any other kingdom, monarchs, some∣times of the Aragonese line, and sometimes of the An∣gevin, were seated on the throne.* 1.31 At length the princes of the house of Aragon obtained such firm possession of this long-disputed inheritance, that they transmitted it quietly to a bastard branch of their family k 1.32.

THE race of the Angevin kings, however,* 1.33 was not extinct; nor had they relinquished their title to the Neapolitan crown. The Count of Maine and Provence, the heir of this family, conveyed all his rights and pretensions to Louis XI. and to his successors.* 1.34 Charles VIII. as I have already related, crossed the Alps, at the head of a powerful army, in order to pro∣secute his claim with a degree of vigour far superior to that, which the princes from whom he derived it, had been capable of exerting. The rapid progress of his arms in Italy, as well as the short time during which he enjoyed the fruits of his success, are well known▪ Frederick, the heir of the illegitimate branch of the Aragonese family, soon recovered the throne of which Charles had dispossessed him. Louis XII. and Ferdi∣nand of Aragon united against this Prince, whom both, though for different reasons, considered as an usurper, and agreed to divide his dominions between them.* 1.35 Frederick, unable to resist the combined Monarchs, each of whom was far his superior in power, resigned his sceptre. Louis and Ferdinand, though they had concurred in making the conquest, differed

about the division of it; and from allies became ene∣mies. But Gonsalvo de Cordova, partly by the exerti∣on of such military talents as gave him a just title to the appellation of the Great Captain, which the Spanish hi∣storians have bestowed upon him; and partly by such shameless and frequent violations of the most solemn engagements, as leave an indelible stain on his memo∣ry; stripped the French of all that they possessed in the Neapolitan dominions, and secured the peaceable pos∣session of them to his master. These, together with his other kingdoms, Ferdinand transmitted to his grandson Charles V. whose right to possess them, if not altogether uncontrovertible, seems, at least, to be as well founded as that, which the Kings of France set in opposition to itl 1.36.

* 1.37THERE is nothing in the political constitu∣tion, or interior government of the dutchy of Milan so remarkable, as to require a particu∣lar explanation. But as the right of successi∣on to that fertile province was the cause or the pretext of almost all the wars carried on in Italy du∣ring the reign of Charles V. it is necessary to trace these disputes to the source, and to inquire into the pretensions of the various competitors.

DURING the long and fierce contests excited in Italy by the violence of the Guelf and Ghibeline factions, the family of Visconti rose to great eminence a∣mong their fellow-citizens of Milan.* 1.38 As the Visconti had adhered uniformly to the Ghibeline or imperial interest, they, by way of recom∣pence, received, from one Emperor, the dig-of perpetual vicars of the Empire in Italym 1.39 They were created by another,* 1.40 Dukes of Mi∣lan, and together with that title,* 1.41 the possessi∣on of the city and its territories, was bestow∣ed upon them as an hereditary fiefn 1.42. John King of

France, among other expedients for raising money, which the calamities of his reign obliged him to employ, condescended to give one of his daughters in marriage to John Galeazzo Visconti the first Duke of Milan, from whom he had received considerable sums. Valentine Visconti one of the children of this marriage married her cousin, Louis Duke of Orleans, the only brother of Charles VI. In their marriage-contract which the Pope confirmed, it was stipulated that, upon failure of heirs-male in the family of Visconti, the dutchy of Mi∣lan should descend to the posterity of Valentine and the Duke of Orleans. That event took place. In the year one thousand four hundred and forty-seven, Philip Ma∣ria the last Prince of the ducal family of Visconti died. Various competitors pretend to the succession. Charles Duke of Orleans pleaded his right to it, founded on the marriage-contract of his mother Valentine Visconti. Alfonso King of Naples claimed it in consequenee of a will made by Philip Maria in his favour. The Em∣peror contended that upon the extinction of male is∣sue in the family of Visconti the fief returned to the su∣perior Lord, and ought to be re-annexed to the Em∣pire. The people of Milan smitten with that love of liberty which prevailed among the Italian States, de∣clared against the dominion of any master, and estab∣lished a republican form of government.

BUT during the struggle among so many competi∣tors, the prize for which they contended was seized by one from whom none of them apprehended any danger. Francis Sforza, the natural son of Jacomuzzo Sforza, whom his courage and abilities had elevated from the rank of a peasant to be one of the most eminent and powerful of the Italian Condottieri, having succeeded his father in the command of the adventurers who fol∣lowed his standard, had married a natural daughter of the last Duke of Milan. Upon this shadow of a title Francis founded his pretensions to the dutchy, which he supported with such talents and valour as placed him at last on the ducal throne. The virtues as well as abili∣ties with which he governed, inducing his subjects to forget the defects in his title, he transmitted his domi∣nions quietly to his son; from whom they descended

to his grandson. He was murdered by his grand uncle Ludovico, surnamed the Moor, who took possession of the dutchy; and his right to it was confirmed by the in∣vestiture of the Emperor Maximilian in the year one thousand four hundred and ninety-four * 1.43.

LOUIS XI. who took pleasure in depressing the Princes of the blood, and who admired the political abilities of Francis Sforza, would not permit the Duke of Orleans to take any step in prosecution of his right to the dut∣chy of Milan. Ludovico the Moor kept up such a close connection with Charles VIII. that during the greater part of his reign, the claim of the family of Orleans continued to lie dormant. But when the crown of France devolved to Louis XII. Duke of Orleans, he in∣stantly asserted the rights of his family with the ardour which it was natural to expect. Ludovico Sforza, in∣capable of contending with such a rival, was stripped of all his dominions in the space of a few days. The King, clad in the ducal robes, entered Milan in triumph; and soon after, Ludovico having been betrayed by the Swiss in his pay, was sent a prisoner into France, and shut up in the castle of Loches, where he lay unpitied during the remainder of his days. In consequence of one of the singular revolutions which occur so frequently in the history of the Milanese, his son Maximilian Sforza was placed on the ducal throne, of which he kept possession during the reign of Louis XII.* 1.44 His succes∣sor Francis I. was too high-spirited and enter∣prizing tamely to relinquish his title. As soon as he was seated upon the throne, he prepared to invade the Milanese; and his right of succession to it, appears from this detail, to have been not only more natural but more just than that of any other competitor.

IT is unnecessary to enter into any detail with respect to the form of government in Genoa, Parma, Modena, and the other inferior States of Italy. Their names, in∣deed, will often occur in the following history. But the power of these States themselves was so inconsider∣able, that their fate depended little upon their own ef∣forts; and the frequent revolutions which they under∣went,

were brought about by the operations of the Princes who attacked or defended them, rather than by any thing peculiar in their internal constitution.

OF the great kingdoms on this side of the Alps, Spain is one of the most considerable; and as it was the hereditary domain of Charles V,* 1.45 as well as the chief source of his power and wealth, a distinct knowledge of its political constitution is of capital importance towards under∣standing the transactions of his reign.

THE Vandals and Goths, who overturned the Ro∣man power in Spain, established a form of government in that country,* 1.46 and brought in customs and laws, perfectly similar to those which were introduced into the rest of Europe, by the other victorious tribes which acquired settlements there. For some time, society advanced, among the new in∣habitants of Spain, by the same steps, and seemed to hold the same course, as in other European nations. To this progress,* 1.47 a sudden stop was put by the invasions of the Saracens or Moors. The Goths could not withstand the efforts of their enthusiastick valour, which subdued Spain, with the same impetuous rapidity that distinguishes all the ope∣rations of their arms. The conquerors introduced into the country in which they settled the Mahometan reli∣gion, the Arabick language, the manners of the East, together with that taste for the arts, and that love of elegance and splendour, which the Caliphs had begun to cultivate among their subjects.

SUCH Gothick nobles, as disdained to submit to the moorish yoke, fled for refuge to the inacces∣sible mountains of Asturias,* 1.48 and comforted themselves with enjoying there the exercise of the Christian religion, and with maintaining the authority of their ancient laws. Being joined by many of the boldest and most warlike among their countrymen, they sallied out upon the adjacent settlements of the Moors, in small parties; and making short excursions, were satisfied with plunder and re∣venge, without thinking of conquest. By degrees, their strength increased, their views enlarged, a regular

government was established among them, and they be∣gan to aim at extending their territories. While they pushed on their attacks with the unremitting ardour excited by zeal for religion, by the desire of vengeance, and by the hope of rescuing their country from oppres∣sion; while they conducted their operations with the courage natural to men who had no other occupation but war, and who were strangers to all the arts which corrupt or enfeeble the mind, the Moors gradually lost many of the advantages, to which they had been indebt∣ed for their first success. They threw off all dependance on the Caliphs * 1.49; they neglected to preserve a close con∣nection with their countrymen in Africa; their Empire in Spain was split into many small kingdoms; together with the arts which they cultivated, the luxury to which these gave rise, relaxed, in some measure, the force of their military institutions, and abated the vigour of their warlike spirit. The Moors, however, continued still to be a gallant people, and possessed great resources. Ac∣cording to the magnificent stile of the Spanish histo∣rians, eight centuries of almost uninterrupted war elaps∣ed,* 1.50 and three thousand seven hundred bat∣tles, were fought before the last of the Moor∣ish kingdoms in Spain submitted to the Christians arms.

AS the Christians made their conquests upon the Mahometans at various periods, and under different leaders,* 1.51 each formed the territory which he had wrested from the common ene∣my, into an independant State. Spain was divided into as many separate kingdoms, as it contained provinces, and in each city of note, a petty monarch established his throne, and assumed all the ensigns of royalty. In a series of years, however, by the usual events of intermarriages, or legal succession, or con∣quest, all these inferior principalities were annexed to the more powerful kingdoms of Castile and of Aragon, and at length by the fortunate marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella, the former the hereditary Monarch of Aragon, and the latter raised to the throne of Castile by

the affection of her subjects,* 1.52 all the Spanish crowns were united, and descended in the same line.

FROM this period, the political constitution of Spain began to assume a regular and uniform ap∣pearance;* 1.53 the genius of government may be delineated, and the progress of its laws and manners may be traced with certainty. Not∣withstanding the singular revolution which had happened in Spain, and the peculiarity of its fate, its being so long subjected to the Mahome∣tan yoke, the customs introduced by the Vandals and Goths had taken such deep root, and were so thoroughly incorporated with the frame of its government, that in every province which the Christians recovered from the Moors, we find the condition of individuals, as well as the political constitution, nearly the same as in other nations of Europe.* 1.54 Lands were held by the same tenure; justice was dispensed in the same form; the same privileges were claimed by the Nobility; and the same power exer∣cised by the Cortes, or general assembly of the kingdom. Several circumstances contri∣buted to secure this permanence of the feudal institutions in Spain, notwithstanding the conquest of the Moors, which seemed to have overturned them. Such of the Spaniards, as preserved their independance, adhered to their ancient customs not only from attach∣ment to them, but out of antipathy to the Moors, to whose ideas concerning property and government these customs were so totally repugnant. Even among the Christians, who submitted to the Moorish conquerors, and consented to become their subjects, antient customs were not entirely abolished. They were permitted to retain their religion; their laws concerning private pro∣perty; their forms of administering justice; and their mode of levying taxes. The followers of Mahomet are the only enthusiasts, who have united the spirit of to∣leration with zeal for making proselytes, and who, at the same time that they took arms to propagate the doc∣trine of their prophet, permitted such as would not em∣brace it to adhere to their own tenets, and to practise their own rites. To this peculiarity in the genius of

the Mahometan religion, as well as to the desire of the Moors to reconcile the Christians to their yoke, it was owing that the ancient manners and laws in Spain sur∣vived the violent shock of a conquest, and continued to subsist, notwithstanding the introduction of a new re∣ligion and a new form of government into that coun∣try. It is obvious from all these particulars, that the Christians must have found it extremely easy to re∣establish manners and government on their ancient foun∣dations, in those provinces of Spain, which they wrested successively from the Moors. A considerable part of the people retained such a fondness for the customs, and such a reverence for the laws of their ancestors, that they wished to see them restored with full authority, and were not only willing but eager to observe the former, and to recognize the authority of the latter.

BUT though the feudal form of government, with all the institutions that characterize it,* 1.55 was thus preserved entire in Castile and Aragon, as well as in all the kingdoms which depend∣ed on these crowns, there were certain pecu∣liarities in their political constitutions which distinguish them from those of any other country in Eu∣rope. The regal prerogative, extremely limited in eve∣ry feudal kingdom, was circumscribed, in Spain,* 1.56 within such narrow bounds, as re∣duced the power of the Sovereign almost to nothing. The privileges of the Nobility were vast in proportion, and extended so far as to border on absolute independance. The im∣munities of the cities were great, they possessed consi∣derable influence in the Cortes or supreme assemblies of the nations, and they aspired at obtaining more. Such a state of Society, in which the political machine was so ill adjusted, and the several members of the legislature so improperly balanced, produced interior disorders in the kingdoms of Spain, which rose beyond the pitch of turbulence and anarchy, usual under the feudal govern∣ment. The whole tenor of the Spanish history confirms the truth of this observation; and when the mutinous spirit, to which the genius of their policy gave birth and vigour, was not restrained and overawed by the imme∣diate

dread of the Moorish arms, it broke out into more frequent insurrections against the government of their Princes, as well as more outrageous insults on their dignity, than occur in the annals of any other country. These were accompanied at some times with more liberal sentiments concerning the rights of the people, at other times with more elevated notions con∣cerning the privileges of the nobles, than were com∣mon in other nations.

IN the principality of Catalonia, which was annexed to the kingdom of Aragon,* 1.57 the impatience of the people to obtain the redress of their grievances having prompted them to take arms against their sovereign John II, they,* 1.58 by a solemn deed, recalled the oath of allegiance which they had sworn to him, declared him and his posterity to be unworthy of the throne p 1.59, and endeavoured to establish a republican form of government, in order to secure the perpetual enjoyment of that liberty, after which they aspired q 1.60. Nearly about the same period, the indignation of the Castilian nobility against the weak and flagitious administration of Henry IV. hav∣ing led them to combine against him, they arrogated as one of the privileges belonging to their order, the right of trying and of passing sentence on their Sovereign. That the exercise of this power might be as publick and solemn, as the pretension to it was bold, they sum∣moned all the nobility of their party to meet at Avila,* 1.61 a spacious theatre was erected in a plain without the walls of the town, an image represent∣ing the King, was seated on a throne clad in royal robes, with a crown on its head, a sceptre in its hand, and the sword of justice by its side. The accusation against the King was read, and the sentence of deposition was pro∣nounced, in presence of a numerous assembly. At the close of the first article of the charge, the archbishop of Toledo advanced, and tore the crown from the head of the image; at the close of the second, the Conde de Pla∣centia

snatched the sword of justice from its side; at the close of the third, the Conde de Beneventé wrested the sceptre from its hand; at the close of the last, Don Diego Lopez de Stuniga tumbled it headlong from the throne. At the same instant, Don Alfonso, Henry's brother was proclaimed King of Castile and Leon in his stead r 1.62.

THE most daring leaders of faction would not have ventured on these measures, nor have conducted them with such publick ceremony, if the sentiments of the people concerning the royal dignity, had not been so formed by the laws and policy, to which they were ac∣customed both in Castile and Aragon, as prepared them to approve of such extraordinary proceedings, or to ac∣quiesce in them.

IN Aragon, the form of government was monarchi∣cal,* 1.63 but the genius and maxims of it were purely republican. The Kings, who were long elective, retained only the shadow of power; the real exercise of it was in the Cor∣tes or parliament of the kingdom. This supreme as∣sembly was composed of four different arms or mem∣bers. The nobility of the first rank. The Equestrian order, or nobility of the second class. The representa∣tives of the cities and towns, whose right to a place in the Cortes, if we may give credit to the historians of Aragon, was coeval with the constitution. The eccle∣siastical order, composed of the dignitaries of the church, together with the representatives of the inferior clergy s 1.64. No law could pass in this assembly without the assent of every single member who had a right to vote t 1.65. Without the permission of the Cortes, no tax could be imposed; no war could be declared; no peace conclud∣ed; no money could be coined; nor any alteration be made in the current specie u 1.66. The power of reviewing the proceedings of all inferior courts, the privilege of inspecting every department of administration, and the right of redressing all grievances belonged to the Cortes.

Nor did those who conceived themselves to be aggrieved address the Cortes in the humble tone of supplicants, and petition for redress; they demanded it as the birth-right of free-men, and required the guardians of their liberty to decide with respect to the points which they laid before them x 1.67. This sovereign court was held, during several centuries, every year; but, in conse∣quence of a regulation introduced about the beginning of the fourteenth century, it was convened from that period only once in two years. After it was assembled, the King had no right to prorogue or dissolve it without its own consent; and the session continued forty days y 1.68.

NOT satisfied with having erected these barriers a∣gainst the encroachments of the royal prero∣gative,* 1.69 nor willing to rely for the preserva∣tion of their liberties on the vigilance and au∣thority of an assembly, similar to the diets, states general, and parliaments, in which the other feu∣dal nations placed so much confidence, the Aragonese had recourse to an institution peculiar to themselves, and elected a Justiza or supreme judge. This magis∣trate, whose office bore some resemblance to that of the Ephori in ancient Sparta, acted as the guardian of the people, and the comptroller of the Prince. The person of the Justiza was sacred, and his power and jurisdiction almost unbounded. He was the supreme interpreter of the laws. Not only inferior judges, but the Kings themselves were bound to consult him in every doubt∣ful case, and to receive his responses with implicit deference * 1.70. An appeal lay to him from the royal judges, as well as from those appointed by the barons within their respective territories. Even when no ap∣peal was made to him, he could interpose by his own authority, prohibit the ordinary judge to proceed, take immediate cognizance of the cause himself, and remove the party accused to the Manifestation or prison of the state, to which no person had access but by his permis∣sion.

His power was exerted with no less vigour and effect in superintending the administration of govern∣ment, than in regulating the course of justice. It was the prerogative of the Justiza to inspect the conduct of the King. He had a title to review all the royal pro∣clamations and patents, and to declare whether or not they were agreeable to law, and ought to be carried in∣to execution. He, by his sole authority, could exclude any of the King's ministers from the conduct of affairs, and call them to answer for their mal-administration. He himself was accountable to the Cortes alone, for the manner in which he discharged the duties of this high office, and performed functions of the greatest im∣portance that could be committed to a subject [GG] 1.71 z 1.72.

IT is evident from a bare enumeration of the privi∣leges of the Aragonese Cortes,* 1.73 as well as of the rights belonging to the Justiza, that a very small portion of power remained in the hands of the King. The Aragonese seem to have been sollicitous that their Monarchs should know and feel this state of impotence to which they were reduced. Even in swearing allegiance to their so∣vereign, an act which ought, naturally, to be accom∣panied with professions of submission and respect, they devised an oath, in such a form, as to remind him of his dependance on his subjects. "We," said the Jus∣tiza to the King in name of his high-spirited barons, "who are each of us as good, and who are altogether more powerful than you, promise obedience to your government, if you maintain our rights and liberties▪ but if not, not." Conformably to this oath, they estab∣lished it as a fundamental article in their constitution, that if the King should violate their rights and privile∣ges, it was lawful for the people to disclaim him as their sovereign, and to elect another in his place a 1.74. The attachment of the Aragonese to this singular con∣stitution of government, was extreme, and their respect for it approached to superstitious veneration [HH] 1.75.

In the preamble to one of their laws, they declare that such was the barrenness of their country, and the po∣verty of the inhabitants, that if it were not on account of the liberties by which they were distinguished from other nations, the people would abandon it, and go in quest of a settlement to some more fruitful region b 1.76.

IN Castile, there were not such peculiarities in the form of government, as to establish any re∣markable distinction between it,* 1.77 and that of the other European nations. The executive part of government was committed to the King, but with a prerogative extremely limited. The legislative authority resided in the Cortes, which was composed of the nobility, the dignified ecclesiasticks, and the representatives of the cities. The assembly of the Cortes in Castile was very ancient, and seems to have been coeval with the constitution. The members of the three different orders, who had a right of suf∣frage, met in one place, and deliberated as one col∣lective body; the decisions of which were regulated by the sentiments of the majority. The right of imposing taxes, of enacting laws, and of redressing grievances belonged to this assembly; and in order to secure the assent of the King to such statutes and regulations, as were deemed salutary or beneficial to the kingdom, it was usual in the Cortes, to take no step towards grant∣ing money, until all business relative to the publick welfare was concluded. The representatives of cities seem to have obtained a seat very early in the Cortes of Castile, and soon acquired such influence and credit, as were very uncommon, at a period when the splen∣dour and pre-eminence of the nobility had eclipsed or annihilated all other orders of men. The number of members from cities bore such a proportion to that of the whole collective body, as rendered them extremely respectable in the Cortes [II] 1.78. The degree of conside∣ration, which they possessed in the state, may be esti∣mated by one event.* 1.79 Upon the death of John I, a council of regency was appointed to govern the kingdom during the minority of his son.

It was composed of an equal number of noblemen, and of deputies chosen by the cities; the latter were ad∣mitted to the same rank, and invested with the same powers, as prelates and grandees of the first order c 1.80. But though the members of communities in Castile were elevated above the condition wherein they were placed in other kingdoms of Europe; though they had attained to such political importance, that even the proud and jealous spirit of the feudal aristocracy could not exclude them from some share of government; yet the nobles, notwithstanding these acquisitions of the commons, continued to assert the privileges of their or∣der, in opposition to the crown, in a tone extremely high. There was not any body of nobility in Eu∣rope more distinguished for independance of spirit, haughtiness of deportment, and bold pretensions, than that of Castile. The history of that monarchy affords the most striking examples of the vigilance with which they observed, and of the vigour with which they op∣posed every scheme of their Kings, that tended to en∣croach on their jurisdiction, to diminish their dignity, or to abridge their power. Even in their ordinary in∣tercourse with their Monarchs, they preserved such a consciousness of their rank, that the nobles of the first order claimed it as a privilege to be covered in the royal presence, and approached their sovereigns rather as equals than as subjects.

THE constitution of the subordinate monarchies, which depended on the crowns of Castile and Aragon, nearly resembled that of the kingdom to which they were annexed. In all of them, the dignity and independance of the nobles were great; the immunities and power of the cities were considerable.

AN attentive observation of the singular situation of Spain,* 1.81 as well as of the various events which occurred there, from the invasion of the Moors to the union of its kingdoms un∣der Ferdinand and Isabella, will discover those causes, to which all the peculiarites in its political constitution, that I have pointed out, ought to be ascribed.

AS the provinces of Spain were wrested from the Mahometans gradually and with difficulty, the nobles, who followed the standard of any eminent leader in these wars, conquered not for him alone, but for themselves. They claimed a share in the lands which their valour had torn from the enemy, and their prosperity and power increased, in proportion as the territory of the Prince extended.

DURING their perpetual wars with the Moors, the Monarchs of Spain depended so much on their nobles, that it became necessary to conciliate their good will by successive grants of new honours and privileges. By the time that any Prince could establish his dominion in a conquered province, the greater part of the pro∣perty was parcelled out by him among his barons, with such jurisdiction and immunities as raised them almost to sovereign power.

AT the same time, the kingdoms erected in so many different corners of Spain were extremely inconsiderable. The petty Monarch was but litttle elevated above his nobles. They, feeling themselves to be almost his equals, acted as such. The Kings of such limited do∣mains could neither command much respect, nor pos∣sess great power; and noblemen, so nearly on the same level, could not look up to them with that reverence, with which the sovereigns of the great monarchies in Europe were viewed by their subjects [KK] 1.82.

THESE circumstances concurred in exalting the no∣bility, and in depressing the royal authority; there were others, which raised the cities in Spain to consideration and power.

AS the open country, during the wars with the Moors, was perpetually exposed to the excursions of the enemy, with whom no peace or truce was so per∣manent as to prove any lasting security, self-preserva∣tion obliged persons of all ranks to fix their residence in places of strength. The castles of the barons, which, in other countries, afforded a commodious retreat from the depradations of banditti, or from the transient vio∣lence of any interior commotion, were unable to resist

an enemy whose operations were conducted with regular and persevering vigour. Cities, in which great numbers united for their mutual defence, were the only places to which people could retire with any prospect of safety. To this was owing the rapid growth of those cities in Spain of which the Christians recovered possession. All who fled from the Moorish yoke resorted to them, as to an asylum; and there, the greater part of those, who took the field against the Mahometans, established their families.

EACH of these cities, during a longer or shorter course of years, was the capital of a little state, and en∣joyed all the advantages, which accelerate the increase of inhabitants in every place that is the seat of govern∣ment.

THE number of cities in Spain, at the beginning of the fifteenth century, was considerable, and they were peopled far beyond the proportion which was common in other parts of Europe, except in Italy and the Low-Countries. The Moors had introduced manufactures into these cities, while under their dominion. The Christians, who, by intermixture with them, had learned their arts, continued to cultivate these. The trade of several of the Spanish towns appears to have ben con∣siderable; and the spirit of commerce continued to pre∣serve the number of their inhabitants, as the sense of danger had first induced them to crowd together.

AS the Spanish cities were populous, many of the in∣habitants were of a rank superior to those who resided in towns in other countries of Europe. That cause which contributed chiefly to their population, affected equally persons of every condition, who flocked thither promiscuously, in order to find shelter, or in hopes of making a stand there against the enemy, with greater advantage than in any other station. The persons elect∣ed as their representatives in the Cortes by the cities, or promoted to offices of trust and dignity in the govern∣ment of the community, were often, as will appear from transactions which I shall hereafter relate, of such con∣siderable rank in the kingdom, as reflected lustre on their constituents, and on the stations wherein they were placed.

AS it was impossible to carry on a continual war a∣gainst the Moors, without some other military force, than that which the barons were obliged to bring into the field, in consequence of the feudal tenures, it be∣became necessary to have some troops, particularly a body of light cavalry, in constant pay. It was one of the privileges of the nobles, that their lands were ex∣empt from the burden of taxes. The charge of sup∣porting the troops requisite for the publick safety, fell wholly upon the cities; and their Kings, being obliged frequently to apply to them for aid, found it necessary to gain their favour by concessions, which extended their immunities, and added to their wealth and power.

WHEN the influence of all these circumstances, pe∣culiar to Spain, is added to the general and common causes which contributed to aggrandize cities in other countries of Europe, this will fully account for the ex∣tensive privileges which they acquired, as well as the extraordinary consideration to which they attained, in all the Spanish kingdoms [LL] 1.83.

BY these exorbitant privileges of the nobility, and this unusual power of the cities in Spain,* 1.84 the royal prerogative was hemmed in on every hand, and reduced within very narrow bounds. Sensible of this, and impatient of such restraint, different Monarchs endeavour∣ed, at various junctures, to enlarge their own jurisdiction, and to circumscribe that of their subjects. Their power, however, or their abilities were so unequal to the undertaking, that their efforts were attended with little success. But when Ferdinand and Isabella found themselves at the head of all the united kingdoms of Spain, and delivered from the danger and interruption of domestick wars, they were not only in a condition to resume, but were able to prosecute with advantage, the schemes of extending the prerogative, which their ancestors had attempted in vain. Ferdinand's profound sagacity in concerting his measures, his persevering industry in conducting them, and his uncommon address in carrying them into

execution, fitted him admirably for an undertaking which required all these talents.

AS the overgrown power, and high pretensions of the nobility were what the Monarchs of Spain felt most sensibly,* 1.85 and bore with the greatest impatience, the great object of Ferdinand's policy was to reduce these within more mode∣rate bounds. Under various pretexts, some∣times by violence, more frequently in conse∣quence of decrees obtained in the courts of law, he wrested from the barons a great part of the lands, which had been granted to them by the in∣considerate bounty of former Monarchs, particularly during the feeble and profuse reign of his predecessor Henry IV. He did not give the entire conduct of af∣fairs to persons of noble birth, who were accustomed to occupy every department of importance in peace or in war, as if it had been a privilege peculiar to their order, to be employed as the sole counsellors and ministers of the crown. He often transacted business of great con∣sequence without their intervention, and committed many offices of power and trust to new men, devoted to his interest d 1.86. He introduced a degree of state dig∣nity into his court, which being unknown in Spain, while it remained split into many small kingdoms, taught the nobles to approach their sovereign with more ceremony, and gradually rendered him the object of greater deference and respect.

THE annexing the masterships of the three military orders of St. Jago, Calatrava, and Alcantara, to the crown,* 1.87 was another expedient, by which Ferdinand greatly augmented the revenue and power of the Kings of Spain. These orders were instituted in imitation of those of the Knights Templars and of St. John of Jerusalem, on purpose to wage perpetual war with the Mahometans, and to protect the pilgrims who visited Compostella, or other places of eminent sanctity in Spain. The zeal and superstition of the ages, in which they were founded, prompted persons of every rank to bestow

such liberal donations on these holy warriors, that, in a short time, they engrossed a considerable share in the property and wealth of the kingdom. The masterships of these orders came to be stations of the greatest power and opulence to which a Spanish nobleman could be advanced. These high dignities were in the disposal of the Knights of the Order, and placed the persons on whom they conferred them almost on a level with their sovereign [MM] 1.88. Ferdinand, unwilling that the nobi∣lity, whom he considered as already too formidable, should derive such additional credit and influence from possessing the government of these wealthy fraternities, was solicitous to wrest it out of their hands, and to vest it in the crown. His measures for accomp∣lishing this, were wisely planned,* 1.89 and exe∣cuted with vigour e 1.90 By address, by promi∣ses, and by threats, he prevailed on the Knights of each Order to place Isabella and him at the head of it. Inno∣cent VIII. and Alexander VI. gave this election the sanction of papal authority f 1.91; and subsequent Pontiffs rendered the annexation of these masterships to the crown perpetual.

WHILE Ferdinand, by this measure, diminished the power and influence of the nobility, and added new lustre or authority to the crown,* 1.92 he was taking other important steps, with a view to the same object. The sovereign jurisdiction which the feudal barons exercised within their own territories, was the pride and distinction of their order. To have invaded openly a privilege which they prized so highly, and in defence of which they would have run so eagerly to arms, was a measure too daring for a Prince of Ferdinand's cautious temper. He took advantage, however, of an opportunity which the state of his kingdoms and the spirit of his people present∣ed him, in order to undermine what he durst not assault. The incessant depredations of the Moors, the want of

discipline among the troops which were employed to oppose them, the frequent civil wars between the crown and the nobility, as well as the undiscerning rage with which the barons carried on their private wars with each other, filled all the provinces of Spain with disorder. Rapine, outrage, and murder, became so common, as not only to interrupt commerce, but in a great measure to suspend all intercourse between one place and another. That security and protection which men expect from en∣tering into civil society ceased almost totally. Interior order and police, while the feudal institutions remained in vigour, were so little objects of attention, and the administration of justice was so extremely feeble, that it would have been in vain to have expected relief from the established laws or the ordinary judges. But the evil became so intolerable, and the inhabitants of cities, who were the chief sufferers, grew so impatient of this anarchy, that self preservation forced them to have re∣course to an extraordinary remedy.* 1.93 About the middle of the thirteenth century, the cities in the kingdom of Aragon, and after their example those in Castile, formed themselves into an association, distinguished by the name of the Holy Brotherhood. They exacted a certain contribution from each of the associated towns; they levied a considerable body of troops, in order to protect travellers, and to pursue criminals; they appointed judges, who opened their courts in va∣rious parts of the kingdom. Whoever was guilty of murder, robbery, or of any act that violated the publick peace, and was seized by the troops of the Brotherhood, was carried before their own judges, who, without pay∣ing any regard to the exclusive and sovereign jurisdiction which the lord of the place might claim, tried and con∣demned the criminals. By means of this, the prompt and impartial administration of justice was restored; and together with it, internal tranquillity and order began to return. The nobles alone murmured at this salutary institution. They complained of it as an encroachment on one of their most valuable privileges. They remon∣strated against it in an high tone; and, on some occa∣sions, refused to grant any aid to the crown, unless it were abolished. Ferdinand, however, was sensible not

only of the good effects of the Holy Brotherhood with respect to the police of his kingdoms, but perceived its tendency to abridge, and at length to annihilate the ter∣ritorial jurisdiction of the nobility. He countenanced the institution on every occasion. He supported it with the whole force of royal authority; and besides the ex∣pedients employed by him in common with the other monarchs of Europe, be availed himself of this institu∣tion, which was peculiar to his kingdom, in order to limit and abolish that independant jurisdiction of the no∣bility, which was no less inconsistent with the authority of the Prince, than with the order of society [NN] 1.94.

BUT though Ferdinand by these measures considerab∣ly enlarged the boundaries of prerogative,* 1.95 and acquired a degree of influence and power far beyond what any of his predecessors had en∣joyed, yet the limitations of the royal autho∣rity, and the barriers against its encroach∣ments, continued to be many and strong. The spirit of liberty was vigorous among the people of Spain; the spirit of independance was high among the nobility; and though the love of glory, peculiar to the Spaniards in every period of their history, prompted them to support Ferdinand with zeal in his foreign ope∣rations, and to afford him such aid as enabled him not only to undertake but to execute great enterprizes; he reigned over his subjects with a jurisdiction less exten∣sive than that of any of the great monarchs in Europe. It will appear from many passages in the following his∣tory, that, during a considerable part of the reign of his successor Charles V. the prerogative of the Spanish crown was equally circumscribed.

THE ancient government and laws in France so nearly resembled those of the other feudal king∣doms,* 1.96 that such a detail with respect to them as was necessary, in order to convey some idea of the nature and effects of the peculiar insti∣tutions which took place in Spain, would be superflu∣ous. In the view which I have exhibited of the means by which the French monarchs acquired such full com∣mand of the national force of their kingdom, as enabled

them to engage in extensive schemes of foreign opera∣tion. I have already pointed out the great steps by which they advanced towards a more ample possession of political power, and a more uncontrouled exercise of their royal prerogative. All that now remains is to take notice of such particulars in the constitution of France, as serve either to distinguish it from that of other coun∣tries, or tend to throw any light on the transactions of that period to which the following history extends.

UNDER the French monarchs of the first race; the royal prerogative was very inconsiderable. The General Assemblies of the nation,* 1.97 which met annually at stated seasons, extended their authority to every department of govern∣ment. The power of electing Kings, of en∣acting laws, of redressing grievances, of pas∣sing judgment in the last resort, with respect to every person and to every cause, and of conferring donations on the Prince, resided in this great convention of the nation.* 1.98 Under the second race of Kings, notwithstanding the power and splendor which the conquests of Charlemagne added to the crown, the general assemblies of the nations continued to possess extensive authority. The right of determining which of the royal family should be placed on the throne was vested in them. The mo∣narchs elected by their suffrage were accustomed regu∣larly to call and to consult them with respect to every affair of importance to the state, and without their con∣sent no 〈◊〉〈◊〉 was passed, and no new tax was levied.

BUT, by the time that Hugh Capet, the father of the third race of Kings, took possession of the throne of France,* 1.99 such changes had happened in the political state of the kingdom, as con∣siderably affected the power and jurisdiction of the ge∣neral assembly of the nation. The royal authority in the hands of the degenerate posterity of Charlemagne, had dwindled into insignificance and contempt. Every considerable proprietor of land had formed his terri∣tory into a barony, almost independant of the sove∣reign. The dukes or governors of provinces, the counts or governors of towns and small districts, and the

great officers of the crown, had rendered these dignities, originally granted only during pleasure or for life, here∣ditary in their families. Each of these had usurped all the rights which hitherto had been deemed the distinc∣tions of royalty, particularly the privileges of dispensing justice within their own domains, of coining money, and of waging war. Every district was governed by local customs, acknowledged a distinct lord, and pursued a separate interest. The formality of doing homage to their sovereign, was almost the only act of subjection which haughty barons would perform, and that bound them no farther than they were willing to acknowledge its obligation [OO] 1.100.

IN a kingdom broken into so many independant ba∣ronies, hardly any common principle of union remained;* 1.101 and the general assembly in its de∣liberations could scarce consider the nation as forming one body, or establish common re∣gulations to be of equal force in every part. Within the immediate domains of the crown the king might publish laws, and they were obeyed, be∣cause there he was acknowledged as the only lord. But if he had aimed at rendering these general, that would have alarmed the barons as an encroachment upon the independance of their jurisdiction. The barons, with no less care, avoided the enacting of general laws, be∣cause the execution of them must have been vested in the King, and would have enlarged that paramount power which was the object of their jealousy. Thus, under the descendants of Hugh Capet, the States Gene∣ral (for that was the name by which the supreme assemb∣ly of the French nation came then to be distinguished) lost their legislative authority, or at least entirely relin∣quished the exercise of it. From that period, the juris∣diction of the States General extended no farther than to the imposition of new taxes, the determination of ques∣tions with respect to the right of succession to the crown, the settling of the regency when the preceeding mo∣narch had not fixed it by his will, and the presenting

remonstrances enumerating the grievances of which the nation wished to obtain redress.

AS, during several centuries, the monarchs of Eu∣rope seldom demanded extraordinary subsidies of their subjects, and the other events which required the interposition of the States, rarely occurred, their meet∣ings in France were not frequent. They were summon∣ed occasionally by their Kings, when compelled by their wants or by their fears to have recourse to their aid; but they did not, like the Diet in Germany, the Cortes in Spain, or the Parliament in England, form an essen∣tial member of the constitution, the regular exertion of whose powers was requisite to give vigour and order to government.

WHEN the states of France ceased to exercise legisla∣tive authority,* 1.102 the Kings began to assume it. They ventured at first on acts of legislation with great reserve; and after taking every precaution that could prevent their subjects from being alarmed at the exercise of a new power. They did not at once issue their ordinances in a tone of authority and command. They treated with their subjects; they pointed out what was best; and al∣lured them to comply with it. By degrees, however, as the prerogative of the crown extended, and as the su∣preme jurisdiction of the royal courts came to be estab∣lished, the Kings of France assumed more openly the stile and authority of law-givers, and before the begin∣ning of the fifteenth century, the complete legislative power was vested in them [PP] 1.103.

HAVING secured this important acquisition, the steps that led to the right of imposing taxes were rendered few and easy.* 1.104 The people, accus∣tomed to see their sovereigns, by their sole authority, issue ordonances which regulated points of the greatest consequence with respect to the pro∣perty of their subjects, were not alarmed when they were required, by the royal edicts, to contribute certain sums towards supplying the exigencies of government, and carrying forward the measures of the nation. When

Charles VII. and Louis XI. first ventured to exercise this new power, in the manner which I have already de∣scribed, the gradual increase of the royal authority had so imperceptibly prepared the minds of the people of France for this innovation, that it excited no commo∣tion in the kingdom, and seems scarce to have given rise to any murmur or complaint.

WHEN the Kings of France had thus engrossed every power which can be exerted in government;* 1.105 when the right of making laws, of levying money, of keeping an army of mercenaries in constant pay, of declaring war and of con∣cluding peace centered in the crown, the con∣stitution of the kingdom, which, under the first race of Kings, was nearly democratical, which, under the second race, became an aristocracy, terminated, under the third race, in a pure monarchy. Every thing that tended to preserve the appearance, or revive the memory of the ancient mixed government, seems from that period to have been industriously avoided. During the long and active reign of Francis I. the variety as well as extent of whose operations obliged him to lay many heavy im∣positions on his subjects, the States General of France were not once assembled, nor were the people once al∣lowed to exert the power of taxing themselves, which, according to the original ideas of feudal government, was a right essential to every free-man.

TWO things, however, remained, which moderated the exercise of the regal prerogative,* 1.106 and restrain∣ed it within such bounds as preserved the con∣stitution of France from degenerating into mere despotism. The rights and privileges claimed by the nobility must be considered as one barrier against the absolute dominion of the crown. Though the nobles of France had lost that political power which was vested in their order as a body, they still retained the personal rights and pre-eminence which they derived from their rank. They preserved a consciousness of elevation above other classes of citizens; an exemption from burdens to which they were subject; a contempt of the occupations in which they were engaged; the privilege of assuming ensigns

that indicated their dignity; a title to be treated with a certain degree of deference during peace; and a claim to various distinctions when in the field. Many of these pretensions were not founded on the words of statutes, or derived from positive laws; they were defined and ascertained by the maxims of honour, a title more de∣licate, but no less sacred. These rights, established and protected by a principle equally vigilant in guarding, and intrepid in defending them, are to the Sovereign himself objects of respect and veneration Wherever they stand in its way, the royal prerogative is bounded. The violence of a Despot may exterminate such an order of men; but as long as it subsists, and its ideas of per∣sonal distinction remain entire, the power of the Prince has limits g 1.107.

AS in France, the body of nobility was very nume∣rous and retained an high sense of their own pre-emi∣nence, to this we may ascribe, in a great measure, the mode of exercising the royal prerogative which peculi∣arly distinguishes the government of that kingdom. An intermediate order was placed between the Monarch and his other subjects, and in every act of authority it became necessary to attend to its privileges, and not on∣ly to guard against any real violation of these, but to avoid any suspicion of its being possible that they might be violated. Thus a species of government was estab∣lished in France, unknown in the ancient world, that of a monarchy, in which the power of the sovereign, though unconfined by any legal or constitutional re∣straint, has certain bounds set to it by the ideas which one class of his subjects entertain concerning their own dignity.

THE jurisdiction of the Parliaments of France, parti∣cularly that of Paris,* 1.108 was the other barrier which served to confine the exercise of the royal prerogative within certain limits. The parliament of Paris was originally the court of the Kings of France, to which they com∣mitted the supreme administration of justice

within their own domains, as well as the power of de∣ciding with respect to all cases brought before it by ap∣peals from the courts of the barons. When the time and place of its meeting were fixed, when not only the form of its procedure, but the principles on which it decided, were rendered regular and consistent, when every cause of importance was finally determined there, and when the people became accustomed to resort thi∣ther as to the supreme temple of justice, the parliament of Paris rose to high estimation in the kingdom, its members acquired dignity, and its decrees were sub∣mitted to, with deference. The Kings of France, when they first began to assume the legislative power, in or∣der to reconcile the minds of their people to this new exertion of prerogative, produced their edicts and or∣donances in the parliament of Paris, that they might be approved of and registered there, before they were pub∣lished and declared to be of authority in the kingdom. During the intervals between the meetings of the States General of the kingdom, or under those reigns when the States General were not assembled, the Monarchs of France were accustomed to consult the parliament of Paris with respect to the most arduous affairs of govern∣ment, and frequently regulated their conduct by its ad∣vice, in declaring war, in concluding peace, and in other transactions of publick concern. Thus there was erected in the kingdom a tribunal which became the great depository of the laws, and by the uniform tenor of its decrees it established principles of justice and forms of proceeding which were considered as so sacred, that even the sovereign power of the Monarch durst not venture to disregard or to violate them. The members of this illustrious body, though they neither possess le∣gislative authority, nor can be considered as the repre∣sentatives of the people, have availed themselves of the reputation and influence which they had acquired a∣mong their countrymen, in order to make a stand to the utmost of their ability against every unprecedented and exorbitant exertion of the prerogative. In every period of the French history, they have merited the praise of

being the virtuous but feeble guardians of the rights and privileges of the nation [QQ] 1.109.

THE kingdom extends to the confines of the German Empire from which Charles V. derived his title of highest dignity.* 1.110 In explaining the political constitution of this vast and complex body at the beginning of the sixteenth century, I shall avoid entering into such a detail as would involve my readers in that inextricable labyrinth, which is formed by the multiplicity of its tribunals, the number of its members, their interfering rights, and by the endless discussions or refinements of the publick law∣yers of Germany with respect to all these.

THE Empire of Charlemagne was a structure erect∣ed in so short a time that it could not be per∣manent.* 1.111 Under his immediate successor it began to totter: and it soon fell to pieces. The crown of Germany was separated for ever from that of France, and the descend∣ans of Charlemagne established two great monarchies so situated as to give rise to a perpetual rivalship and en∣mity between them. But the Princes of the race of Charlemagne, who were placed on the Imperial throne, were not altogether so degenerate, as those of the same family who reigned in France. In the hands of the for∣mer the royal authority retained some vigour, and the nobles of Germany, though possessed of extensive privi∣leges as well as ample territories, did not so early attain independance. The great offices of the crown conti∣nued to be at the disposal of the sovereign, and during a long period, fiefs remained in their original state, with∣out becoming hereditary and perpetual in the families to which they had been granted.

AT length the German branch of the family of Charle∣magne became extinct,* 1.112 and his feeble des∣cendants who reigned in France had sunk in∣to such contempt, that the Germans, without looking towards them, exercised the right inherent in a free people; and in a general as∣sembly of the nation elected Conrad Count of Franco∣nia

Emperor.* 1.113 After him Henry of Saxony and his descendants the three Othos, were placed, in succession, on the Imperial throne, by the suffrages of their countrymen. The extensive territories of the Saxon Emperors, their eminent abilities and enterpriz∣ing genius not only added new vigour to the imperial dignity, but raised it to higher power and pre-eminence. Otho the Great marched at the head of a nu∣merous army into Italy,* 1.114 and after the exam∣ple of Charlemagne, gave law to that country. Every power there recognized his authority. He created Popes and deposed them by his sovereign mandate. He annexed the kingdom of Italy to the German Em∣pire. Elated with his success, he assumed the title of Caesar Augustus h 1.115; and a Prince born in the heart of Germany pretended to be the successor of the Emperors of ancient Rome, and claimed a right to the same pow∣er and prerogative.

BUT while the Emperors, by means of these new titles, and new dominions, gradually acquired additional power and splendour,* 1.116 the nobility of Germany went on at the same time extend∣ing their privileges and jurisdiction. The si∣tuation of affairs was favourable to their at∣tempts. The vigour which Charlemagne had given to government quickly relaxed. The inabi∣lity of some of his successors was such, as would have en∣couraged vassals less enterprizing than the nobles of that age, to have claimed new rights and to have assumed new powers. The civil wars in which other Emperors were engaged, obliged them to pay perpetual court to their subjects, on whose support they depended, and not only to connive at their usurpations, but to permit and even to authorize them. Fiefs became gradually here∣ditary, They were transmitted not only in the direct, but in the collateral line. The investiture of them was demanded not only by male but by female heirs. Eve∣ry baron began to exercise sovereign jurisdiction within his own domains; and the Dukes and Counts of Ger∣many took wide steps towards rendering their territo∣ries

distinct and independant States i 1.117. The Saxon Em∣perors observed their progress, and were aware of its tendency.* 1.118 But as they could not hope to humble vassals already grown too potent, un∣less they had turned their whole force as well as attention to that enterprize, and as they were extremely intent on their expeditions into Italy, which they could not undertake without the concurrence of their nobles, they were sollicitous not to alarm them by any direct attack on their privileges and jurisdictions. They aimed, however, at undermining their power, and inconsiderately bestowed additional territories, and accumulated new honours on the clergy, in hopes that this order might serve as a counterpoise to that of the nobility in any future struggle k 1.119.

THE unhappy effects of this fatal error in policy were quickly felt.* 1.120 Under the Emperors of the Franconian and Swabian lines, whom the Germans by their voluntary election placed on the imperial throne, a new face of things appeared, and a scene was exhibited in Ger∣many, which astonished all Christendom at that time, and which in the present age appears almost incredible. The Popes, hitherto dependant on the Emperors, and indebted for their power as well as dignity to their be∣neficence and protection, began to claim a superior ju∣risdiction; and in virtue of authority which they pre∣tended to derive from heaven, tried, condemned, ex∣communicated and deposed their former masters. Nor is this to be considered merely as a frantic sally of pas∣sion in a pontiff intoxicated with high ideas concerning the extent of priestly domination, and the plenitude of papal power Gregory VII. was able as well as daring. His presumption and violence were accompanied with political discernment and sagacity. He had observed that the Princes and Nobles of Germany, had acquired such considerable territories and such extensive jurisdic∣tion as rendered them not only formidable to the Em∣perors, but disposed them to favour any attempt to cir∣cumscribe

their Power. He foresaw that the ecclesias∣ticks of Germany, raised almost to a level with its Princes, were ready to support any person who would stand forth as the protector of their privileges and inde∣pendance. With both of these Gregory negociated, and had secured many devoted adherents among them, before he ventured to enter the lists against the head of the Empire.

HE began his rupture with Henry IV. upon a pre∣text that was popular and plausible.* 1.121 He complained of the venality and corruption with which the Emperor had granted the in∣vestiture of benefices to ecclesiasticks. He contended that this right belonged to him as head of the church; he required Henry to confine himself within the bounds of his civil jurisdiction, and to abstain for the future from such sa∣crilegious encroachment on his spiritual dominion. All the censures of the church were denounced against Hen∣ry, because he refused to relinquish those powers which his predecessors had uniformly exercised. The most considerable of the German Princes and ecclesiasticks were excited to take arms against him. His mother, his wife, his sons were wrought upon to disregard all the ties of blood as well as of duty, and to join the party of his enemies k 1.122. Such were the successful arts with which the court of Rome inflamed the superstitious zeal, and conducted the factious spirit of the Germans and Ita∣lians, that an Emperor, distinguished not only for ma∣ny virtues, but possessed of considerable talents, was at length obliged to appear as a supplicant at the gate of the castle in which the Pope resided, and to stand there, three days, barefooted, in the depth of winter, implor∣ing a pardon, which at length he obtained with difficulty [RR] 1.123.* 1.124

THIS act of humiliation degraded the Imperial dig∣nity. Nor was the depression only momentary. The contest between Gregory and Henry gave rise to the two great factions of the Guelfs and Ghibellines; the

former of which supporting the pretensions of the Popes, and the latter defending the rights of the Emperor, kept Germany and Italy in perpetual agitation during three centuries. A regular system for humbling the Emperors and circumscribing their power was formed, and adhered to uniformly throughout that period. The Popes,* 1.125 the free States in Italy, the nobility and ecclesiasticks of Germany, were all in∣terested in its success; and notwithstanding the return of some short intervals of vigour, under the administration of a few able Emperors, the Imperial authority continued to decline. During the anarchy of the long interregnum subsequent to the death of William of Holland,* 1.126 it dwind∣led down to nothing.* 1.127 Rodulph of Haps∣burgh, the founder of the house of Austria, and who first opened the way to its future grandeur was at length elected Emperor, not that he might re-estab∣lish and extend the Imperial authority, but because his territories and influence were so inconsiderable as not to excite the jealousy of the German Princes, who were willing to preserve the forms of a constitution, the pow∣er and vigour of which they had destroyed. Several of his successors were placed on the Imperial throne from the same motive; and almost every remaining preroga∣tive was wrested out of the hands of feeble Princes, un∣able to exercise or to defend them.

DURING this period of turbulence and confusion the constitution of the Germanick body under∣went a total change.* 1.128 The ancient names of courts and magistrates, together with the original forms and appearance of policy were preserved; but such new privileges and juris∣diction were assumed, and so many various rights esta∣blished, that the same species of government no longer subsisted. The Princes, the great nobility, the digni∣fied ecclesiasticks, the free cities had taken advantage of the interregnum, which I have mentioned, to esta∣blish or to extend their usurpations. They claimed and exercised the right of governing their respective terri∣tories with full sovereignty. They acknowledged no superior with respect to any point, relative to the interior

administration and police of their domains. They enact∣ed laws, imposed taxes, coined money, declared war, concluded peace, and exerted every prerogative peculiar to independant States. The ideas of order and political union which had formed the various provinces of Ger∣many into one body were entirely lost; and the society must have dissolved, if the forms of feudal subordina∣tion had not preserved such an appearance of connection or dependance among the various members of the com∣munity, as preserved it from falling to pieces.

THIS bond of union, however, was extremely feeble; and no principle remained in the German con∣stitution of sufficient force to maintain pub∣lic order,* 1.129 and hardly to ascertain personal se∣curity. From the accession of Rodulph of Hapsburgh, to the reign of Maximilian, the immediate predecessor of Charles V. the Empire felt every cala∣mity which a state must endure when the authority of government is so much relaxed as to have lost all vigour. The causes of dissention among that vast number of members which composed the Germanick body, were infinite and unavoidable. These gave rise to perpetual private wars, carried on with all the violence of resent∣ment when unrestrained by superiour authority, Ra∣pine, outrage and exactions, became universal. Com∣merce was interrupted; industry suspended; and every part of Germany resembled a country which an enemy had plundered and laid desolate l 1.130. The variety of ex∣pedients employed with a view to restore order and tran∣quillity, prove that the grievances occasioned by this state of anarchy had grown intolerable. Arbiters were appointed to terminate the differences among the several states. The cities united in a league, the object of which was to check the rapine and extortions of the no∣bility. The nobility formed confederacies, on purpose to maintain tranquillity among their own order. Ger∣many was divided into several Circles, in each of which a provincial and partial jurisdiction was established, to supply the place of a publick and common tribunal m 1.131.

BUT all these remedies were so fruitless, that they served only to demonstrate the the violence of that anarchy which prevailed,* 1.132 and the inefficacy of the means employed to correct it. At length Maximilian, by instituting the Imperial chamber, a tribunal composed of judges named partly by the Emperor,* 1.133 partly by the several States, and vested with authority to de∣cide finally concerning all differences among the mem∣bers of the Germanick body, re-established publick order in the Empire,* 1.134 A few years after, by giving a new form to the Aulick council, which takes cognizance of all feudal causes, and such as belong to the Emperor's immediate jurisdiction, he restored some de∣gree of vigour to the Imperial authority.

BUT notwithstanding the salutary effects of these re∣gulations and improvements,* 1.135 the political constitution of the German Empire, at the commencement of the period of which I pro∣pose to write the history, was of a species so peculiar as not to resemble perfectly any form of government known either in the an∣cient or modern world. It was a complex body, formed by the association of several States, each of which possessed sovereign and independant jurisdiction within its own territories. Of all the members which composed this united body, the Emperor was the head. In his name, all decrees and regulations with respect to points of common concern, were issued; and to him the power of carrying them into execution was commit∣ted. But this appearance of monarchical power in the Emperor was more than counterbalanced by the influ∣ence and authority of the Princes and States of the Em∣pire in every act of administration. No law extending to the whole body could pass, no resolution that affected the general interest could be taken, without the appro∣bation of the Diet of the Empire. In this assembly, every sovereign Prince and State of the Germanick body had a right to be present, to deliberate, and to vote. The decrees or Recesses of the Diet were the laws of the Empire, which the Emperor was bound to ratify and enforce.

UNDER this aspect the constitution of the Empire appears a regular confederacy,* 1.136 similar to the Achaean league in ancient Greece, or to that of the United Provinces and of the Swiss cantons in modern times. But if viewed in another light, striking peculiarities in its political state present themselves. The Germanick body was not formed by the union of members altogether distinct and independant. All the Princes and States joined in this association, were originally subject to the Emperors, and acknowledged them as sovereigns. Besides this, they originally held their lands as Imperial fiefs, and in con∣sequence of this tenure owed the Emperors all those ser∣vices which feudal vassals are bound to perform to their liege lord. But though this political subjection was en∣tirely at an end, and the influence of the feudal relation much diminished, the ancient forms and institutions in∣troduced when the Emperors governed Germany with authority, not inferior to that which the other monarchs of Europe possessed, still remained. Thus an opposi∣tion was established between the genius of the govern∣ment, and the forms of administration in the German Empire. The former considered the Emperor only as the head of a confederacy, the members of which, by their voluntary choice, have raised him to that dignity; the latter seemed to imply, that he is really invested with sovereign power. By this circumstance,* 1.137 such principles of hostility and discord were interwoven in the frame of the Germanick body, as affected each of its members, rendering their interior union incomplete, and their external efforts feeble and irregular. The effects of this vice or disorder inherent in the constitution of the Empire are so consi∣derable, that, without attending to them it is impossible to comprehend many transactions in the reign of Charles V. or to form just ideas concerning the genius of the German government.

THE Emperors of Germany, at the beginning of the sixteenth century,* 1.138 were distinguished by the most pompous titles, and by such ensigns of dignity as intimated their authority to be su∣perior

to that of all other monarchs. The great∣est Princes of the Empire attended and served them on some occasions, as the officers of their houshold. They exercised prerogatives which no other sovereign ever claimed. They retained pretensions to all the ex∣tensive powers which their predecessors had enjoyed in any former age. But at the same time, instead of pos∣sessing that ample domain which had belonged to the an∣cient Emperors of Germany, and which stretched from Basil to Cologne, along both banks of the Rhine n 1.139, they were stript of all teritorial property, and had not a single city, a single castle, foot of land, that pertained to them as heads of the Empire. As their domain was alienated, their stated revenues were reduced almost to nothing; and the extraordinary aids which on a few occasions they obtained, were granted sparingly, and paid with reluc∣tance. The Princes and States of the Empire, though they seemed to recognize the Imperial authority, were subjects only in name each of them possessing a com∣pleat municipal jurisdiction within the precincts of his own territories.

FROM this ill-compacted frame of government, ef∣fects that were unavoidable resulted.* 1.140 The Emperors, dazzled with the splendour of their titles, and the exterior signs of vast authority, were apt to imagine themselves to be the real sovereigns of Germany, and were led to aim continually at recovering the exercise of those powers and prerogatives which the forms of the constitution seemed to vest in them, and which their predecessors Charlemagne and the Otho's had actually enjoyed. The Princes and States, aware of the nature as well as extent of their pretensions, were perpetually on their guard, in order to watch all the motions of the Imperi∣al court, and to circumscribe its power within limits still more narrow. The Emperors, in support of their claims, appealed to ancient forms and institutions, which the States held to be obsolete. The States found∣ed their rights on recent practice and modern privileges, which the Emperors considered as usurpations.

THIS jealousy of the Imperial authority, together with the opposition between it and the rights of the States,* 1.141 increased considerably from the time that the Emperors were elected, not by the collective body of German nobles, but by a few Princes of chief dignity. During a long period, all the members of the Germanick body assembled, and made choice of the person whom they appointed to be their head. But amidst the violence and anarchy which prevailed for several centuries in the Empire, seven Princes who possessed the most extensive territories, and who had obtained a hereditary title to the great offices of the State, acquired the exclusive privi∣lege of nominating the Emperor. This right was con∣firmed to them by the Golden Bull; the mode of exer∣cising it was ascertained, and they were dignified with the appellation of Electors. The nobility and free ci∣ties being thus stripped of a privilege which they had once enjoyed, were less connected with a Prince, to∣wards whose elevation they had not contributed by their suffrages, and came to be more apprehensive of his au∣thority. The Electors, by their extensive power, and the distinguishing privileges which they possessed, be∣came formidable to the Emperors, with whom they were placed almost on a level in several acts of jurisdic∣tion. Thus the introduction of the Electoral college into the Empire, and the authority which it acquired, instead of diminishing, contributed to strengthen the principles of hostility and discord in the Germanick constitution.

THESE were further augmented by the various and repugnant forms of civil policy in the several States which composed the Germanick bo∣dy.* 1.142 It is no easy matter to render the union of independant States perfect and entire, even when the genius and forms of their respective governments happen to be altoge∣ther similar. But in the German Empire, which was a confederacy of Princes, of Ec∣clesiasticks, and of free cities, it was impossible that they could incorporate thoroughly. The free-cities were small republicks, in which the maxims and spirit

peculiar to that species of government prevailed. The Princes and nobles to whom supreme jurisdiction be∣longed, possessed a sort of monarchical power within their own territories, and the forms of their interior ad∣ministration nearly resembled those of the great feudal kingdoms. The interests, the ideas, the objects of States so differently constituted, cannot be the same. Nor could their common deliberations be carried on with the same spirit, while the love of liberty and at∣tention to commerce were the reigning principles in the cities; and ardour for military glory, together with the desire of power, were the governing passions of the Princes and nobility.

THE secular and ecclesiastical members of the Em∣pire were as little fitted for union as the free cities and the nobility.* 1.143 Vast territories were annexed to several of the German bishopricks and abbeys, and the dignified ecclesiasticks held some of the highest offices in the Em∣pire by hereditary right. The younger sons of noblemen of the second order, who had devoted themselves to the church, were commonly promoted to these stations of eminence and power; and it was no small mortification to the Princes and great nobility to see per∣sons raised from an inferior rank to the same level with themselves, or even exalted to superior dignity. The education of these churchmen, the genius of their pro∣fession, and their connection with the court of Rome, rendered their character as well as interest different from those of the other members of the Germanick body, with whom they were called to act in concert. Thus another source of jealousy and variance was opened, which ought not to be overlooked when we are search∣ing into the nature of the German constitution.

TO all these causes of dissention may be added one more,* 1.144 arising from the unequal distribution of power and wealth among the States of the Empire. The electors, and other nobles of the highest rank, not only possessed sove∣reign jurisdiction, but governed such exten∣sive, populous, and rich countries, as ren∣dered them great Princes. Many of the other mem∣bers,

though they enjoyed all the rights of sovereignty, ruled over such petty domains, that their real power bore no proportion to this high prerogative. A well-compacted and vigorous confederacy could not be formed of such dissimilar states. The weaker were jealous, timid, and unable, either to assert or to defend their just privileges. The more powerful were apt to assume and to become oppressive. The Electors and Emperors endeavoured by turns to extend their own authority, by encroaching on the rights of these feeble members of the Germanick body; and they, over-awed or corrupted, tamely gave up their privileges, or meanly favoured the designs formed against them [SS] 1.145.

AFTER contemplating all these principles of disunion and opposition in the constitution of the Ger∣man Empire,* 1.146 it will be easy to account for the want of concord and uniformity, conspi∣cuous in its councils and proceedings. That slow, dilatory, distrustful and irresolute spi∣rit, which characterizes all its deliberations, will appear natural in a body, the junction of whose members was so incompleat, the different parts of which were held together by such feeble ties, and set at variance by such powerful motives. But the Empire of Germany, nevertheless, comprehended countries of such vast extent, and was inhabited by such a martial and hardy race of men, that when the abilities of an Em∣peror, or zeal for any common cause, could rouse this unwieldy body to put forth its strength, it acted with ir∣resistible force. In the following history we shall find, that as the measures on which Charles V. was most in∣tent, were often thwarted or rendered abortive by the spirit of jealousy and division peculiar to the Germanick constitution; so it was by the influence which he ac∣quired over the Princes of the Empire, and by engag∣ing them to co-operate with him, that he was enabled to make some of the greatest efforts which distinguish his reign.

THE Turkish history is so blended, during the reign of Charles V. with that of the great nations in Europe,* 1.147 and the Ottoman Porte interpo∣sed so often, and with such decisive influence,

in the wars and negociations of the Christian Princes, that some previous account of the state of government in that great empire, is no less necessary for the in∣formation of my readers, than these views of the con∣stitution of other kingdoms which I have already exhi∣bited to them.

IT has been the fate of the more southern and fer∣tile parts of Asia,* 1.148 at different periods, to be conquered by that warlike and hardy race of men, who inhabit the vast country known to the ancients by the name of Scythia, and among the moderns by that of Tartary. One tribe of these people, called Turks or Turcomans, extended its conquests, under various leaders, and during several centuries, from the shore of the Caspian to the straits of the Dardanelles. To∣wards the middle of the fifteenth century, these formi∣dable conquerors took Constantinople by storm, and established the seat of their government in that Imperial city. Greece, Moldavia, Walachia, and the other pro∣vinces of the ancient kingdoms of Thrace and Macedo∣nia, together with part of Hungary, were subjected to their power.

BUT though the seat of the Turkish government was fixed in Europe,* 1.149 and the Sultans obtained possession of such extensive dominions in that quarter of the globe, the genius of their po∣licy was purely Asiatick; and may be properly termed a despotism, in contradistinction to these monarchical and republican forms of government which we have been hitherto contemplating. The supreme power was vested in Sultans of the Ottoman race, that blood being deem∣ed so sacred, that no other was thought worthy of the throne. From this elevation, these sovereigns could look down, and behold all their subjects reduced to the same level before them. The maxims of Turkish po∣licy admit not any of those institutions, which, in other countries, limit the exercise, or moderate the rigour of monarchical power. No great court with constitutional and permanent jurisdiction to interpose both in the en∣actment and execution of laws. No body of hereditary nobles, whose sense of their own pre-eminence, whose consciousness of what is due to their rank and character,

whose jealousy of their privileges circumscribe the au∣thority of the Prince, and serve not only as a barrier against the excesses of his caprice, but stand as an in∣termediate order between him and the people. Under the Turkish government, the political condition of eve∣ry subject is equal. To be employed in the service of the Sultan, is the only circumstance that confers dis∣tinction. Even this distinction is annexed so closely to the stations in which persons serve, that it is scarce com∣municated to those who are placed in them. The highest dignity in the Empire does not give any rank or pre-eminence to the family of him who enjoys it. As every man, before he is raised to any station of authori∣ty, must go through the preparatory discipline of a long and servile obedience o 1.150, the moment he is deprived of power, he and his posterity return to the same condition with other subjects, and sink back into obscurity. It is the distinguishing and odious characteristick of the Eastern despotism, that annihilates all other ranks of men, in order to exalt the monarch; that it leaves no∣thing to the former, while it gives every thing to the latter; that it endeavours to fix in the minds of those who are subject to it, the idea of no relation between men, but that of a master and of a slave, the former destined to command and to punish, the latter formed to tremble and to obey [TT] 1.151.

BUT as there are circumstances which frequently ob∣struct or defeat the salutary effects of the best regulated governments,* 1.152 there are others which contribute to mitigate the evils of the most vicious forms of policy. There can in∣deed, be no constitutional restraints on the will of a Prince in a despotic government; but there may be such as are accidental. Absolute as the Turkish Sul∣tans are, they feel themselves circumscribed both by re∣ligion, the principle on which their authority is found∣ed p 1.153, and by the army, the instrument which they must employ in order to maintain it. Wherever religion in∣terposes, the will of the Sovereign must submit to its

decrees. When the Koran hath prescribed any religious rite; hath enjoined any moral duty; or hath confirmed by its sanction, any political maxim, the command of the Sultan cannot overturn that which an higher autho∣rity hath established. The chief restriction, however, on the will of the Sultans, is imposed by the military power.* 1.154 An armed force must surround the throne of every Despot, to maintain his au∣thority, and to execute his commands. As the Turks extended their empire over nations, which they did not exterminate, but reduce to subjection, they found it necessary to render their military establishment numerous and formidable. Amurath, their third Sultan,* 1.155 in order to form a body of de∣voted troops, that might serve as the imme∣diate guards of his person and dignity, ap∣pointed his officers to seize annually, as the Imperial pro∣perty, the fifth part of the youth taken in war. These, after being instructed in the Mahometan religion, in∣ured to obedience by severe discipline, and trained to warlike exercises, were formed into a body distinguished by the name of Janizaries, or new soldiers. Every sen∣timent wich enthusiasm can inspire, every mark of dis∣tinction that the favour of the Prince could confer, were employed in order to animate this body with martial ar∣dour, and with a consciousness of its own pre-eminence q 1.156. The Janizaries soon became the chief strength and pride of the Ottoman armies; and by their number as well as reputation, were distinguished above all the troops, whose duty it was to attend on the person of the Sul∣tans [UU] 1.157.

THUS, as the supreme power in every society is pos∣sessed by those who have arms in their hands, this formidable body of soldiers,* 1.158 destined to be the instruments of enlarging the Sultan's authority, acquired, at the same time, the means of controuling it. The Janizaries in Constantinople, like the Praetorian bands in ancient Rome, quickly perceived all the advantages which they

derived from being stationed in the capital; from their union under one standard; and from being masters of the person of the Prince. The Sultans became no less sensible of their influence and importance. The Capi∣culy, or soldiery of the Porte, was the only power in the Empire that a Sultan or his Visier had reason to dread. To preserve the fidelity and attachment of the Janizaries, was the great art of government, and the principal object of attention in the policy of the Ottoman court. Under a monarch, whose abilities and vigour of mind fit him for command, they are obsequious instruments; execute whatever he enjoins; and render his power irresistible. Under feeble Prin∣ces, or such as are unfortunate, they become turbu∣lent and mutinous; assume the tone of Masters; de∣grade and exalt Sultans at pleasure; and teach those to tremble, on whose nod, at other times, life or death depend.

FROM Mahomet II. who took Constanti∣nople, to Solyman,* 1.159 who began his reign a few months after Charles V. was placed on the Imperial throne, a succession of illustrious Prin∣ces ruled over the Turkish Empire. By their great abilities, they kept their subjects of every order, mi∣litary as well as civil, submissive to government; and had the absolute command of whatever force their vast Empire was able to exert. Solyman, in particu∣lar, who is known to the Christians chiefly as a con∣queror, but is celebrated in the Turkish annals as the great law giver who established order and police in their Empire, governed during his long reign with no less authority than wisdom. He divided his domi∣nions into several districts; he appointed the number of soldiers which each should furnish; he appropriat∣ed a certain proportion of the lands in every province for their maintenance; he regulated, with a minute accuracy, every thing relative to their discipline, their arms, and the nature of their service. He put the fi∣nances of the Empire into an orderly train of admini∣stration; and though the taxes in the Turkish domi∣nions, as well as in the other despotic monarchies of the East, are far from being considerable, he supplied that defect by an attentive and severe oeconomy.

* 1.160NOR was it only under such Sultans as Solyman, whose talents were no less adapt∣ed to preserve interior order, than to con∣duct the operations of war, that the Turk∣ish Empire engaged with advantage in its contests with the Christian states. The long succession of able Princes, which I have mentioned, had given such vigour and firmness to the Ottoman government, that it seems to have attained, during the sixteenth century, the highest degree of perfection of which its constitution was capable. Whereas the great monarchies in Christendom were still far from that state, which could enable them to act with a full exertion of their force. Besides this, the Turkish troops in that age possessed every advan∣tage which arises from superiority in military disci∣pline. At the time when Solyman began his reign, the Janizaries had been embodied near a century and a half, and during that long period the severity of their military discipline had in no degree relaxed. The soldiers drawn from the provinces of the Empire had been kept almost continually under arms, in the vari∣ous wars which the Sultans had carried on with hardly any interval of peace. Against troops thus trained and accustomed to service, the forces of the Christian powers took the field with great disadvantage. The most intelligent as well as impartial authors of the sixteenth century, acknowledge and lament the supe∣rior attainments of the Turks in the military art.[XX] 1.161 The success which uniformly attended their arms in all their wars, demonstrates the justness of this obser∣vation. The Christian armies did not acquire that superiority over 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Turks, which they now possess, until the long establishment of standing forces had im∣proved military discipline among the former; and un∣til various causes and events, which it is not my pro∣vince to explain, had corrupted or abolished their an∣cient warlike institutions among the latter.

Notes

• * 1.1

  A consider∣able variety in the con∣stitution of the different nations of Europe.
• * 1.2

  Necessary to explain the state of each, when Charles V. began his reign.
• * 1.3

  The State of Italy.
• * 1.4

  The papal dignity the highest in Europe.
• * 1.5

  Origin and progress of the Papal power.
• * 1.6

  The territo∣ries of the Popes inade∣quate to sup∣port their spiritual ju∣risdiction.
• * 1.7

  Their au∣thority in their own territories extremely limited.
• * 1.8

  It was cir∣cumscribed by the am∣bition of the Roman barons.
• a 1.9

  Otto Frisingensi de Gestis Frider. Imp. lib. ii, cap. 20.
• * 1.10

  A. D. 1143.
• b 1.11

  Otto Frising. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 lib. vii cap 2•••• 31. Id. de Gest. Frid. lib. i, c. 27. Muratori 〈…〉〈…〉 vol. ix, ••98, 4••4.
• * 1.12

  and by the turbalence of the Ro∣man people, from A. D. 1308. to A. D. 1377.
• c 1.13

  Historie Fiorentine de Giov. Villani, lib. xii, c. 89, 104, ap. Murat. Script. Rerum Ital. vol. xiii. Vita de Cola di Ri∣enze, ap Murat. Antiq. Ital. vol. iii. p. 399, &c. Hist. de Nic. Rienzy, par M. de Boisperaux, p. 91, &c.
• * 1.14

  Alexander VI. and Ju∣lius II. ren∣der the Popes con∣siderable Princes.
• * 1.15

  Defects in the nature of ecclesi∣astical do∣minion.
• * 1.16

  The Popes derive some advantages from the union of their spiri∣tual and temporal authority.
• d 1.17

  The manner in which Louis XII of France undertook and carried on war against Julius II. remarkably illustrates this obser∣vation. Louis solemnly consulted the clergy of France, whether it was lawful to take arms against a Pope, who had wantonly kin∣dled war in Europe, and whom neither the faith of treaties, nor gratitude for favours received, nor the decorum of his character, could restrain from the most violent actions, to which the lust of power prompts ambitious princes. Though his clergy authorized the war, yet Anne of Bretagne, his queen, entertained scruples with regard to the lawfulness of it. The king himself, from some su∣perstition of the same kind carried it on faintly; and, upon every fresh advantage, renewed his propositions of peace. Mezeray, Hist. de France, fol. edit. 16••5, tom. i. 852. I shall produce another proof of this reverence for the Papal character still more striking. Guicciardini, the most sagacious, perhaps, of all modern histori∣ans, and the boldest in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the vices and ambition of the Popes, represents the death 〈◊〉〈◊〉, a Spanish officer, who was killed, during the siege of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, as a punishment inflicted on him by heaven, on account 〈◊〉〈◊〉 having opposed the setting of Cle∣ment Vol. at liberty. G••ic. Historia d'Italia, Genev. 1645, vol. ii. lib. 18, p. 407.
• * 1.18

  Constitu∣tion of the republic of Venice, with its rise and pro∣gress.
• * 1.19

  Defects in its govern∣ment, par∣ticularly with respect to its mili∣tary opera∣tions.
• * 1.20

  Excellence of its naval instituti∣ons.
• * 1.21

  The extent of its com∣merce.
• e 1.22

  Hist. de la ligue fait a Cambray, par M. l Abbé le Bos, lib. v. Sandi. Sto••ia Civil. Vene••iana, lib. viii. c. 16, p. 891, &c.
• * 1.23

  The consti∣tution of Florence.
• * 1.24

  The consti∣tution of the king∣dom of Naples.
• f 1.25

  Giannone, book xxviii. chap. 2, vol. ii. p. 410, &c.
• * 1.26

  A.D. 1487.
• g 1.27

  Ibid. p. 414. Giannone▪ book xviii. chap. 5.
• * 1.28

  State of the dispute concerning the right of succession to the the crown. A.D. 1254.
• h 1.29

  Struv. corp. hist. Germ. i. 481.
• i 1.30

  Giannone, Book xix. ch. 4. Sect. 2.
• * 1.31

  A.D. 1434.
• k 1.32

  Giannone, Book xxvi. ch. 2.
• * 1.33

  Pretentions of the French and Spanish mo∣narchs.
• * 1.34

  A.D. 1494.
• * 1.35

  A. D. 1501.
• l 1.36

  Droicts des Rois de France au Royaume de Sicile. Mem. de Co∣min. edit. de Fresnoy, tom. iv. part. ii. p. 5.
• * 1.37

  State of the dutchy of Milan, and the right of succession to it.
• * 1.38

  Rise and progress of the disputes concerning this.
• m 1.39

  Petrarch epist ap. Struv. corp. i. 625.
• * 1.40

  A. D. 1354.
• * 1.41

  A. D. 1395.
• n 1.42

  Leibnit. cod. jur. gent. diploni. vol. i. 237.
• * 1.43

  Ripalm hist. Mediol. lib. vi. 654 ap. Struv. corp. i. 930. Du Mont Corps Diplom. tom. iii. p. ii. 333. ibid.
• * 1.44

  A. D. 1512.
• * 1.45

  The consti∣tution and vernment of Spain.
• * 1.46

  Conquered by the Van∣dals.
• * 1.47

  A. D. 712. and by the Moors.
• * 1.48

  The Chris∣tians gradu∣ally recover dominion in Spain.
• * 1.49

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. Sim. Assemanus Histor. Ital. Scriptores. Vol. iii. p. 135.
• * 1.50

  1492.
• * 1.51

  The union of its va∣rious king∣doms.
• * 1.52

  1481.
• * 1.53

  Their anci∣ent customs and laws re∣served a∣midst all their revo∣lutions;
• * 1.54

  which ren∣ders their state in some degree similar to that of o∣ther nations of Europe.
• * 1.55

  Certain pe∣culiarities in their constitution and laws.
• * 1.56

  The prero∣gative more limited, and the immu∣nities of the people more extensive.
• * 1.57

  Instances of this.
• * 1.58

  A. D. 1462.
• p 1.59

  Zurita Anales de Arag. tom. iv. 113, 115, &c.
• q 1.60

  Ferreras hist. d'espagne, tom. vii. p. 92. P. Orleans revol. d'Espagne, tom. iii. p. 155. L. Marinaeus Siculus de reb. His∣pan. apud Schotti script. Hispan. vol. 429.
• * 1.61

  A. D. 1465.
• r 1.62

  Marian. hist. lib. xxiii. c. 9.
• * 1.63

  The consti∣tution and government of Aragon.
• s 1.64

  Forma de celebrar Cortes en Aragon. por Geron. Martel.
• t 1.65

  Martel. ibid. p. 2.
• u 1.66

  Hier. Blanca comment. rer. Aragon. ap Schot. script. Hispan. vol. iii. p. 750.
• x 1.67

  Martel. Forma de celebr. p. 2.
• y 1.68

  Hier. Blanca comment. 763.
• * 1.69

  Office and jurisdiction of the Justi∣za.
• * 1.70

  Blanca has preserved two responses of the Justiza to James II. who reigned towards the close of the thirteenth century, Blanca 748.
• [GG] 1.71

  NOTE XXX.
• z 1.72

  Hier. Blanca Comment. p. 747—755.
• * 1.73

  The regal power cir∣cumscribed within nar∣row limits.
• a 1.74

  Hier. Blanca Comment. 720.
• [HH] 1.75

  NOTE XXXI.
• b 1.76

  Hier. Blanca Com p. 751.
• * 1.77

  Constitution and govern∣ment of Castile.
• [II] 1.78

  NOTE XXXII.
• * 1.79

  A. D. 1390.
• c 1.80

  Marian. hist lib. 18. c. 15.
• * 1.81

  Various causes of the limited au∣thority of the Spanish Monarchs.
• [KK] 1.82

  NOTE XXXIII.
• [LL] 1.83

  NOTE XXXIV.
• * 1.84

  Measures of different Princes in order to ex∣tend their power, par∣ticularly of Ferdinand and Isabel∣la.
• * 1.85

  Ferdinand's different schemes for abridging the privile∣ges and power of the nobili∣ty.
• d 1.86

  Zurita anales de Arag. tom. vi. p. 22.
• * 1.87

  Particularly by annexing the grand-masterships of the three orders to the crown;
• [MM] 1.88

  NOTE XXXV.
• * 1.89

  A. D. 1476. and 1493.
• e 1.90

  Marian. hist. lib. xxv. c. 5.
• f 1.91

  Zurita anales tom. v p. 22. Aelii. Anton. Nebrissensis rerum a Ferdinand & Elizabe gestarum decades. ii. apud Schot. script. Hispan i 860.
• * 1.92

  And by cir∣cumscrib∣ing the ju∣risdiction of the nobility.
• * 1.93

  1260.
• [NN] 1.94

  NOTE XXXVI.
• * 1.95

  Notwith∣standing all these, the government of Spain still extremely free.
• * 1.96

  Constitu∣tion and go∣vernment of France.
• * 1.97

  Power of the General Assemblies under the first race of Kings.
• * 1.98

  Under the second.
• * 1.99

  Under the third.
• [OO] 1.100

  NOTE XXXVII.
• * 1.101

  The power of the Ge∣neral As∣sembly less considerable and exten∣sive.
• * 1.102

  The crown begins to acquire le∣gislative au∣thority,
• [PP] 1.103

  NOTE XXXVIII.
• * 1.104

  and the power of levying taxes.
• * 1.105

  Govern∣ment of France be∣comes pure∣ly monar∣chical.
• * 1.106

  The exer∣cise of pre∣rogative re∣strained by the privi∣leges of the nobility.
• g 1.107

  Des Esprits des Loix, liv. ii. c. 4. Dr. Ferguson's Essay on the Hist. of Civil Society, part. i. sec. 10.
• * 1.108

  And by the jurisdiction of the par∣liaments, particularly that of Pa∣ris.
• [QQ] 1.109

  NOTE XXXIX.
• * 1.110

  Constitu∣tion and go∣vernment of the German Empire.
• * 1.111

  Its state un∣der Charle∣magne and his descen∣dants.
• * 1.112

  Other fami∣lies are rais∣ed to the Imperial dignity.
• * 1.113

  A. D. 911.
• * 1.114

  A. D. 952.
• h 1.115

  Annalista Saxo, &c. ap. Struv. Corp. vol. i. p. 246.
• * 1.116

  The Ger∣man nobili∣ty acquire independant and sove∣reign au∣thority.
• i 1.117

  Pseffel. abrege, p. 120, Lib. Feudor, tit. i.
• * 1.118

  The Ger∣man eccle∣siasticks raised to the same power.
• k 1.119

  Pseffel. abrege, p. 154.
• * 1.120

  The fatal effects of ag∣grandizing the clergy. A. D. 1024.
• * 1.121

  The con∣tests between the Popes and Empe∣rors, and the consequences of these.
• k 1.122

  Annal. German. ap. Struv. i. p. 325.
• [RR] 1.123

  NOTE XL.
• * 1.124

  A. D. 1077.
• * 1.125

  The Impe∣rial autho∣rity gradu∣ally declines.
• * 1.126

  A. D. 1256.
• * 1.127

  A. D. 1273.
• * 1.128

  A total change in the political constitution of the Em∣pire.
• * 1.129

  Expedients for putting an end to this state of anarchy.
• l 1.130

  See above page 4•• and note xxi. Datt. de pace publica Imper. p. 25, no. 53. p. 28, no. 26. p. ••••, no. 11.
• m 1.131

  ••att. passim. Struv. Corp. Hist. i. 510, &c.
• * 1.132

  Particular∣larly by the Institution of the Im∣perial Chamber.
• * 1.133

  A. D. 1495.
• * 1.134

  A. D. 1512.
• * 1.135

  At the be∣ginning of the six∣teenth cen∣tury, the Empire an association of sovereign states.
• * 1.136

  Peculiari∣ties in the nature of this associa∣tion.
• * 1.137

  The defects in the con¦stitution of the Empire.
• * 1.138

  Arising from the limited power of the Empe∣rors.
• n 1.139

  Pfeffel. Abrege, &c. p. 241.
• * 1.140

  From the nature of their title and preten∣sions.
• * 1.141

  From the manner in which they were elect∣ed.
• * 1.142

  From the different forms of go∣vernment established in the states which com∣posed the Germanick body.
• * 1.143

  From the opposition between the secular and ecclesiastical members.
• * 1.144

  From the unequal dis∣tribution of wealth and power among the members.
• [SS] 1.145

  NOTE XLI.
• * 1.146

  All these render the Germanick body incap∣able of act∣ing with u∣nion and vi∣gour.
• * 1.147

  View of the Turkish go∣vernment.
• * 1.148

  Its origin.
• * 1.149

  Its despotic genius.
• o 1.150

  State of the Turkish Empire by Rycaut, p 25.
• [TT] 1.151

  NOTE XLII.
• * 1.152

  Power of the Sultan limited by religion;
• p 1.153

  Rycaut, p. 8.
• * 1.154

  and by the military.
• * 1.155

  Origin of the Janiza∣ries. A. D. 1362.
• q 1.156

  Prince Cantemir's History of the Othman Empire, p. 87.
• [UU] 1.157

  NOTE XLIII.
• * 1.158

  Their vast influence in the Turkish govern∣ment.
• * 1.159

  Progress of the Turks towards do∣minion.
• * 1.160

  Advantages which they possessed o∣ver the Christian powers in the six∣teenth cen∣tury.
• [XX] 1.161

  NOTE XLIV.