Considerations upon the rights of the colonists to the privileges of British subjects, introduc'd by a brief review of the rise and progress of English liberty, and concluded with some remarks upon our present alarming situation. : [Two lines of Latin quotation]

CONSIDERATIONS, &c.

THE English Constitution, in its present State, may be consider'd as a nice Piece of Machinery, which has undergone many Changes and Alterations. To* 1.1 make it applicable to every possible Contingency which might affect any Part of that Society for which it was calculated, many finer Movements have, from Time to Time been added, which may indeed have answered some present Occa∣sion, but which have left it more expos'd to Injury from the slightest Obstruction. What State of Per∣fection it may, at this Period, have obtain'd, I leave to be determin'd by those, who have Talents better adapted, and Opportunities more favourable for such Kind of Speculation. I only mean to take Notice of a few Par∣ticulars which may serve to regulate my Sentiments

upon the present important Dispute between Great Britain and it's Colonies.

The Spirit of the English Nation, depress'd and broken by the Norman Conquest, for many Years quietly gave Way to the Rage of Despotism; and peaceably submitted to the most abject Vassallage. I do not mean to insinuate that before that Period, They ever enjoy'd a State of Liberty. The frequent Irrup∣tions of the Danes and Saxons kept Them in a State of constant Confusion. Each little, temporary Kingdom govern'd by a particular Policy of it's own, had it's Attention too much engag'd by it's encroaching Neigh∣bours, to refine much upon the simplest Principles of Government. But, when the Norman, at one Stroke, subdued all South-Britain, the Weight of his Sword induc'd a general Acquiescence to the most ar∣bitrary Measures. Disjointed as the Kingdom had been, by the Intrusion of foreign Powers, and indeed peopled by different Nations; a very considerable Time was re∣quir'd to produce a perfect Coalition. No sooner was this natural Effect produc'd, and the Nation become one family united Body, connected by the same Ties and engag'd in the same Interest, but the superior and more sensible Part, shew'd it's Aversion to the Tyranny of the Norman Princes, by the boldest Opposition; and laid the Foundation of our present Liberty.

In the first Stages of feudal Government, the common People were reduced to such a State of abject Slavery, that the Voice of Liberty could not easily reach their Ears. The Batons first felt the Weight of Oppression, and, by a spirited Opposition, endeavour'd to reduce within reasonable Bounds, the almost unlimitted Authority of

the Crown. At this happy Period, We may fix the Foundation of English Liberty. The common People, employ'd by their Lords, to effect their glorious Pur∣poses, grew every Day more intelligent. As They became acquainted with and interested in Facts, They naturally acquir'd such a Habit of reasoning upon Them, as soon serv'd to shew Them that nothing but Resolution was requir'd to obtain a reasonable Share of Freedom. Once acquainted with their own Importance, They never stop'd 'till They had secur'd the most valu∣able of those Privileges which are now said to be the Birth-Right of Englishmen. They obtain'd the amplest Charter as a Security against the Encroachments of the Crown, and establish'd for themselves an equitable In∣terest in the Power of Legislation. The Prerogative of the King became limitted by the same Law, which secur'd the Liberty and Property of the Subject; and the more effectually to maintain their invaluable Ac∣quisitions, every County, City and Borough was to choose a certain Number of its Members to sit in a general Assembly for the propounding and enacting, in Conjunction with the Barons, such Laws as future Occasions might demand. The Kingdom thus divided into the three Estates of the King, Lords and Com∣mons; the Policy of it's Government became every Day more refin'd and delicate. The People thus rais'd to such a Degree of Importance, and jealous of their new acquir'd Rights, have, from Day to Day, for Ages past, successfully disputed, with the Ministers of the Crown, every Point which might serve to confirm this happy Establishment. While the Nation knew no Law but the Sovereign's Will, continual Dissatisfaction

and violent Opposition kept alive the Spirit of Discord: But, when the Law of the Land was confirm'd by the Voice of every Freeman properly represented, it's Exe∣cution was enforc'd by the united Power of the whole; since no Man could be depriv'd of Life, Liberty or Property, but by those Statutes which He himself had fram'd.

In this Situation of almost perfect Security, the new World was discover'd, and the Inhabitants of Great Britain, tempted by extraordinary Concessions from the Crown, and a Hope of future Advantage to Them∣selves and their Posterity, left their native Country, to settle and cultivate a Desart. They were not banish'd to America as a Punishment for any Crimes which They had committed, and by which They might possi∣bly have forfeited the Privileges of Society. Far from it! — They left England as free Adventurers; and, bringing with Them the Obligation of Allegiance to their lawful Sovereign, brought with Them all the Rights of Englishmen. As They could not by any Act of their's dispence with the One, so could They not relinquish the Other to the Prejudice of their Pos∣terity. The first Settlements were made under the Direction of the Ministers of the Crown, and to some were given particular‡ 1.2 Charters of Privileges. The highest Encouragement which They receiv'd, scarcely

under their Situation tolerable; or but poorly recom∣pens'd the Inconveniences which They suffer'd.

In the Infancy of their Settlement, before any cri∣tical Occasion, requir'd more particular Regulations, They had the Common and Statute Law of England for their Guide: But, when their Labours had rais'd Them to considerable Importance, and the Emergency of Circumstances requir'd it, They were allow'd to form different Assemblies of select Men, as Represen∣tatives of the Freemen of the different Settlements. The Crown had it's Deputy at the Head of each Colony,

with a considerable Number of it's chosen Servants to form a Third Estate, vested with the Powers and Pri∣vileges of the Lords. Thus were the Interests of the Crown most effectually secur'd by this double Repre∣sentation in the two superior Branches of the Legislature.

As the first Settlement of the Colonies was not a Matter of national Concern; the whole fell under the Direction of the Ministers of the Crown; and in their In∣fant State, all their little Disputes, too crude and undi∣gested to come regularly before any of the superior Courts of Judicature, were brought before the Privy Council for a final Determination. The Conveniency of this Method of Proceeding, render'd it agreeable to the Colonists; who did not conceive all the Evils which it might possibly produce: And thus did the Privy Council usurp a Jurisdiction altogether unconstitutional. The laborious Inhabitants of these Settlements, had their Attention too much employ'd by their necessary Avocations, to examine much into the Minutiae of Government. A Form, in any Degree resembling that of their Mother Country, satisfi'd their moderate Wishes; and, while They were encourag'd in their Pursuit of present Gain, They suffer'd Themselves to be altogether directed by the Ministers of the Crown. To preserve an Appearance of Liberty, each little So∣ciety was allow'd to choose a reasonable Number of it's Members, to meet in a general Assembly, for the propounding such Laws as the State of the Colony might require; but, before any such Act as might be propos'd by the representative Body of Free∣men, could obtain the Force of Laws, They must receive the Approbation both of the Governor and

Council; and even after all this, be laid before the Privy Council for a final Confirmation or Repeal. Disadvantageous as this Form must appear to every un∣prejudic'd Person, to highly were the Colonists affected with a Sense of Duty for their Sovereign, that They never attempted to dispute the Legality of that Con∣stitution which had been settled by his Ministers. They patiently submitted to many Inconveniencies, rather than disturb the publick Peace by a Remonstrance of Grie∣vances. Their Trade not yet opprest by unreasonable Restrictions, They chearfully exerted their utmost In∣dustry to promote the Interest of Great-Britain. The Produce of each different Colony was exported to foreign Markets, to enable the Exporters to pay punctu∣ally for the immense Quantity of British Manufac∣tures which They yearly consum'd. In the Course of a successful Commerce They even submitted, without Murmuring, to Regulations fram'd by the British Par∣liment; and suffer'd the Expediency of the Measure, to prevent their examining into it's Legality. Indeed all such general Regulations as could not be effected by the single Powers of any one Colony, were willingly receiv'd from the Legislature of Great-Britain; from a Consideration of those Advantages which They brought to the whole united Body: But, when that same Legislature, unmindful of those very Principles from which They first deriv'd their Power, have at∣tempted to bind the Colonies by the most injurious op∣pressive Act, They have met with an Opposition which They never could have expected; and that too from a Spirit, which Nothing but the Justice of the Cause could have excited. Warm'd with a Sense of Resent∣ment

for the present Attempt, They naturally extend their Enquiries to what is, or ought to be the Con∣stitution of the Colonies, agreeable to the Plan esta∣blish'd by their Forefathers. No Man will deny that the provincial Americans have an inherent, unalienable Right to all the Privileges of British Subjects. This Position taken for granted, let Us now see how careful our Kind Parent has been to preserve from Violation those sacred Privileges. Let Us take a Review of that Form which generally prevails where the Constitution has not been settled by particular Charters; and, by comparing this with the Form, which, at this happy Period, is establish'd in Great-Britain, We shall easily determine whether the Colonies enjoy the Rights and Privileges of their Mother Country. The Freemen of each Province are duly represented in an Assembly form'd upon the same Principles as the House of Com∣mons; but then the Crown is doubly represented, by no∣minating both the Governor and Council. The Council, generally chosen from the most considerable Persons of of the Province, become the middle Branch of the Legislature, and are vested with the Powers and Pri∣vileges of the Lords. Proud of the Dignity annext to their Office, and fond of maintaining such a flatter∣ing Superiority. They naturally become Tools‡ 1.3 of that Ministry, upon whose Favour their very Existence de∣pends; since, the same Power which rais'd Them to this exalted Rank, can, for a single Act of Disobedience,

sink Them into their original Obscurity. The Crea∣tion of so powerful a Part of the Constitution, depend∣ing altogether upon the royal Mandate, is not the only Grievance. The Counsellors are generally taken from among the most wealthy and important, and the Society thus loses the Weight and Influence of it's most valuable Members. The Lords indeed are of the same Creation; but, once created, cannot be dispossess'd of their Rank; and naturally form a Body so respectable and independent, that They are with great Propriety and Safety trusted with the Liberty and Property of the Nation. Far different is the Nature and Constitu∣tion of a Provincial Council! As a Branch of the Legis∣lature, They can only be consider'd as Creatures of the Crown; and, when sitting as a Court of Judicature, no more than Judges during Pleasure. With Officers so totally under the Influence of the Crown, how can the Subject confide the most valuable Blessings of Life? or how can They weakly think their Liberty and Pro∣perty sufficiently secure, when We must reasonably suppose that the Judge who is to determine upon both, dare not give a Determination, inconsistent with that royal Pleasure by which He holds his Commission. The Prerogative of the Crown thus carefully guarded, in a Manner inconsistent with the Liberty of the Sub∣ject, and unwarranted by the Principles of the English Constitution; the Ministers of the Crown are still de∣termin'd to effect one favourite Purpose, which They may hereafter make Use of for the Introduction and Support of the most arbitrary and tyrannical Measures.

By one single Stroke of political Legerdemain, They have unhing'd the whole Constitution. It was not

sufficient to have our Judges moulded by the Hand of Power. The darling Privilege, of Juries, still remain'd as a formidable Support of Liberty. At once to de∣pretiate these Jewels of English Freedom, and reduce Us to a State of abject Dependence, the privy Council have erected themselves into a Court of final Appeal. — of Appeal upon the Merits of the Cause. A Mea∣sure so fraught with pernicious Consequences, and so incompatible with the Spirit of Freedom, that it cou'd owe it's Birth to Nothing but the horrid Design of re∣ducing the Colonies to an abject State of Vassallage. No Minister of the Crown, tho' ever so warm in the Pursuit of this detestable Purpose, dare think of effect∣ing it so precipitately, without the Assistance of that Power which ought to be the Guardian of English Liberty. How this has been obtain'd one cannot easily imagine, unless it has been by the grossest Misrepresen∣tations of our Conduct, and by exciting such a ridicu∣lous Jealousy, as must, upon the slightest Examination, appear to be as unnatural as it is ill founded. That the Enemies to America have drawn upon Us all the Weight of Parliamentary Power, was clearly evidenc'd by the severe Restrictions upon Trade, before the pre∣sent infamous Act for collecting a Stamp Duty gave the Alarm to the Sons of Freedom. What may be the Consequence of the spirited Opposition which has been given to this daring Act of Oppression, Time only can determine: But, whether we may obtain the invaluable Birth-right for which We now dispute, or whether We may fall a Sacrifice to superior Power, We shall have the Satisfaction of thinking that We have discharg'd our Duty to Ourselves and Posterity; and every Heart

dead to the Sense of Freedom must feel the Justice of our Cause.

The most justifiable Resentment may hurry Men of warm Tempers, into the greatest Extravagancies; and such may have been committed on the present alarm∣ing Occasion: But He, who would, at this interesting Crisis, assume the Character of Stoicism, and preach up Moderation to his Countrymen, may reasonably be considered as no Friend to his Country.

We need no Reasoning to prove, since the Records of our own History evidently shew, that every particular Branch in a mixt Form of Government is continually labouring to extend it's own Power and Influence.

We need not be told that there has been a Time, when the whole representative Body of the Nation, have been intimidated into the most servile Complaisance by the Frowns of their Sovereign; nor, is any Thing more notorious, than that the last Century furnish'd Us with a House of Commons so bold and enterprising, that by extending the Signification of the Word, Pri∣vilege, they gave it Power sufficient to destroy the Pre∣rogative of the Crown and Liberty of the Subject.* 1.4 If this be, as it indubitably is, the grasping Nature of Power, We cannot be surpris'd that the Ministers of the Crown have endeavour'd to increase, in the Wilds of America, the Force of that Prerogative which is so strictly limitted at Home; nor, that the

Parliament of Great-Britain should strive to extend it's Power to such an unreasonable Length, as to aim at Nothing less than the bringing within their absolute Disposal, the Lives, the Liberties and the Property of Millions to whom They owe no Duty, and from whom They have received no Trust. Immoderate, and un∣reasonable as this Attempt may appear, it now no longer assumes a doubtful Face.—It's Meaning is ex∣press'd in every Line of the late Act for collecting a Stamp Duty. Some little Efforts have indeed been made before this; but, as They came mask'd with the Appearance of public Utility, They were receiv'd without any great Reluctance.

An Acquiescence, founded upon Principles of Mo∣deration, was mistaken for the Effect of a tame, passive Disposition, such as would qualify Us for the Slavery to which They intended to reduce Us. But to the Honour of my Countrymen, let it be eternally remem∣ber'd, that the Spirit of Liberty is as warm and active in the Wilds of America, as in the more cultivated Fields of Britain.

Before We have Recourse to such Measures for the Defence of our violated Rights as the Necesity of our Situation may require, let Us first endeavour to prove that We have an equitable Title to those Privileges for which We contend.

Tho' born and bred in the Wilds of America, and

seperated from our more polish'd European Brethren by an immense Extent of Ocean, yet do the Inha∣bitants of the Provincial Settlements claim an unalien∣able Right to all the Privileges of Englishmen.—As Freemen, Subjects of the same Prince, They consider Themselves upon an equal Footing with the Freemen of Great-Britain. To suppose any Subordination would be destroying the very Spirit of the English Govern∣ment. As Freemen, Members of an extensive Society, They conceive Themselves vested with the Power of delegating a select Number of their own Community, with sufficient Authority to frame such Statutes, as may be deem'd conducive to the public Good; first of all obtaining the Approbation of the Crown or it's Deputy before They acquire the Force of Laws. To these Delegates, properly chosen, They willingly com∣mit the absolute Disposal of their Liberty and Pro∣perty; as They are Members of the same Community, influenc'd by the same Interests, and constantly bear a Part of those Burthens which They may think proper to impose. They very reasonably imagine Themselves entitled to the Benefits, and obnoxious to the Penalties both of the common and Statute Law, as it was esta∣blish'd at the Time when their Ancestors quitted their native Country; since the Colonists of the prosent Age claim, by Right of Inheritance, as great an Interest in the Settlement of those Laws; as the present Inha∣bitants of Great-Britain: But who will venture, upon the common Principles of Reason, to assert, that the Freemen of Great-Britain can vest their Representatives with the Power, arbitrarily to dispose of the Property of their American Brethren?

We are told that the Colonists have no more Reason to complain of being bound by Laws to which They have not subscrib'd by their Representatives, than those flourishing Towns in England, which send no Members to Parliament. The Advocates for the Extent of Par∣liamentary Power, must be not a little perplex'd when They would draw an Argument from an evident Defect in the Constitution;—a Defect which may be attended with the most fatal Consequences, altho' it was the natural Result of that Fluctuation which marks the Progress of Time. If there be any Meaning at all in the Doctrine of Representation, We cannot suppose it to be absurdly partial—calculated to pro∣cure the most invaluable Blessings of Life for one par∣ticular Part of Society, and, at the same Time leave the other at the Mercy of unlimitted Power.

When this important Privilege was granted to the Freemen of Great-Britain, no one can doubt but the Representation was intended to be general and strictly impartial; that every County, City and Borough should send to the General Assembly, a Number of it's In∣habitants, duly elected, proportion'd to it's Rank and Importance: But by a Fluxation, which no human Policy can prevent, this Representation, tho' in it's first Establishment it might have been perfectly equita∣ble, became every Day liable to such Changes as pro∣duced the present Inequality. Antient Cities and Boroughs lost their real Importance, and sunk into Obscurity; while others, in the Course of a few Years, became of the highest Value to the Community, by their extensive Trade and Manufactures. Tho' the same Principles which first establish'd this happy

System demanded the strictest Attention to this Altera∣tion of Circumstances; yet has the partial Policy of the Crown prevented it's receiving that Regard which is so evidently it's due.

The Ministers of the Crown, ever solicitious to ad∣vance it's Prerogative, did, by no Means, choose to increase this Power of Representation; but rather wish'd to lessen it's Force, by having it lodg'd in such Hands as might become most easily subjected to their Influence.* 1.5 This very naturally accounts for that In∣equality which at present prevails in the Representation

of England; and, from a Consideration of this single Circumstance, no Man can, with the least Pretensions to Reason, assert, that, because the Inhabitants of Bir∣mingham and Sheffield are not represented in exact Proportion to their Number, Wealth and Importance, the numerous Inhabitants of all the American Settle∣ments shall not be entitled to any Representation at all. Absurd as this Doctrine may appear, it has lately been warmly supported by the refin'd Logic of our State Sophists; Who have, at a great Expence of Thought, elaborated for Us a System of VIRTUAL REPRESENTA∣TION, without allowing Us one Representative, or any one Advantage which ought naturally to attend this happy Institution.

The Members of the British Parliament can only be consider'd as Trustees for the Care and Direction of the Liberty and Property of their Constituents; and, of that They may at Discretion legally and constitutio∣nally dispose: But, with what Appearance of Reason, do They claim the Disposal of Property with which They were never entrusted, or arrogate to Themselves a Power to determine upon that Liberty which was never committed to their Care? Can the little, Self-important Member for Malden look upon Himself as a proper Representative for the Province of Massachusets; or reasonably conceive Himself vested

with more Power than could be transfer'd to Him from the venal Wretches by whom He was elected? Or can any Individual of the whole respectable Body, say, that He is duly qualify'd to represent any one of the Colonies? Has He receiv'd any Power—does He own any Obligation; or is He influenc'd by the same In∣terests? All these are essential Qualifications; and yet not one of these can He boast! How then can He ab∣surdly esteem Himself qualifi'd to represent a Body of People by whom He was never appointed—to whom He owes no Duty; and whose Interests are very pro∣bably incompatible with his own?

I am very far from being an Enemy to Parliamentary Power. I revere the House of Commons as the Watch∣ful Guardians presiding over the Liberty of their Con∣stituents; but when I see Them grasping at a Power altogether foreign, and inconsistent with the Principles of their own Constitution; I could wish to see Them reduc'd within their natural Bounds, and would even shelter myfelf under the Wings of the Royal Prero∣gative. I would much more willingly see my Property arbitratily dispos'd of by a privy Seal, than extorted from me by the unwarrantable Power of a Parliament; whose Members would naturally endeavour to lessen their own Burthens, and gratify the selfish Wishes of their Constituents by sacrificing to Them the Interests of the Colonies.

As loyal and industrious Subjects We may expect impartial Favour from our Prince; who must reason∣ably regard with an equal Eye the Happiness and Wel∣fare of all his Dominions. An ambitious and enter∣prising Monarch might possibly wish to extend the

Force of his Prerogative over those of his Subjects, Who, from the Weakness of their Situation, might not be able to oppose it's Progress: But, from the Freemen of Great-Britain, who already view Us with a jealous Eye, what can We reasonably hope for, but the malevolent Influence of that Jealousy, which would sacrifice a Rival even in the Person of a Brother?

These Sentiments are unhappily confirm'd by incon∣testable Facts; and the slightest Examination of antient History must serve to convince Us, that the Colonies of popular Governments have ever suffer'd the severest Oppression, and groan'd under the most intolerable Slavery.

A Heart the most animated with the Spirit of Li∣berty, if directed by a Head fraught with the least In∣formation, would naturally prefer the despotic Sway of one Man, to the arbitrary Influence of Millions. The One might be easily satisfy'd, while the other would remain ever insatiable. By the one We might reason∣ably expect to be rais'd to the Happiness of Subjects; but, by the other, We should be actually confin'd to a State of Vassallage.

If We have not most egregiously err'd in the Esta∣blishment of our Principles, the World cannot be surpris'd at the Opposition which We have given to the unwarrantable Exertion of Parliamentary Power:—A Power, to which, if We once tamely submit, We shall sacrifice all the most valuable Privileges of the best establish'd Society.

If the Prince requires a Revenue for his own pri∣vate Purposes, the Parliament grants Him an ample One, from a Duty laid upon our most necessary Impor∣tations.

If the Exigencies of Government require £ 300, 000, the Parliament will raise £ 400, 000 by a Stamp Duty. If our Exportations interfere with the Commerce of Great-Britain, the Parliament passes a restaining Law; and thus, by a regular Progression of the same unlimitted Power, We may, with equal Ap∣pearance of Reason, be deny'd the common Benefits of Life. They may ruin our Trade—drain all our Sources of Wealth; and, after binding our useless Hands, leave Us at the Mercy of our savage Neighbours.

It may indeed be objected, that We cannot reason∣ably suppose a Proceeding so inconsistent with the true Interest of the Mother Country. But, has not the incomprehensible Policy of the present Ministry given Us Reason to suppose that future Ministers may be guilty of still greater Absurdities?

With this unpromising Prospect before Them, in what Manner shall the distrest Colonists exert their little Power to resist the Torrent of Oppression?

Let Us calmly remonstrate our Grievances; boldly assert our Rights; and steadily support that Liberty which We receiv'd from our Ancestors. While con∣vinc'd of the Justice of our Cause, let Us not be in∣timidated by any Superiority of Power* 1.6—Let Us prove incontestably, that We are neither unreasonable

nor licentious, when We claim no more than the Li∣berties enjoy'd by the Freemen of Great-Britain; and demand from our Prince and Parliament, a Constitu∣tion fram'd upon the same Principles with the English Government, and reduc'd to a Form as nearly re∣sembling it as the Nature of our Situation will admit.

If still, after every moderate Effort, to convince the Judgment, and remove the Prejudices of our unpro∣vok'd Enemies, We 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the whole Power of Oppression gathering over our Heads; let Us animate our Hearts, by calling to our Memories the glorious Examples of Antiquity, and generously risque the Whole to preserve the most valuable Part.* 1.7

Upon the first Attempts towards the carrying into Execution this last detestable Act of the British Par∣liament, the Genius of America was suddenly awakened from her flattering Dream of ideal Security; and, with a Rapidity scarcely to be conceiv'd, communicated to her deluded Sons a just Sense of their impending Danger. Alarm'd at so bold an Attempt to deprive Them of the most estimable Privileges of Society, in the first uncollected Moments of Resentment, They could only evidence the Spirit of that Resolution, and the Warmth of that Unanimity, by which They

may hereafter raise Themselves to some Degree of Importance, when their Motions may be directed by the Voice of Reason and Experience. The Mea∣sures which They have already pursued have answer'd their first important Purpose—the pre∣venting the immediate Execution of the Act. They were too warm to look forward to ultimate Consequences. They felt too sensibly to reason coolly; nor could They readily conceive, that, after going the Lengths which They had proceed∣ed, it would still be necessary to go one Step further. The first grand Point gain'd by the Resignation of the Stamp-Officers, They are too much elated with their sudden Success, to consider, that, while They suffer'd the Pains and Penalties of the Act, to deter Them from Proceeding in the usual Course of Business, They were giving it sufficient Force to effect it's pernicious Purposes. The general Cir∣culation in a commercial Body, cannot be long obstructed without inducing the most fatal Conse∣quences; nor could the Enemies of America have fallen upon any Method which would more effectu∣ally answer their Ends.

We have already shewn that the Spirit of Liberty is not confin'd to the Shores of Britain. Let Us now endeavour to support that Spirit, by such a prudential Measure as shall serve to prove it's de∣termin'd Nature; and, at the same Time, give Us a more reasonable Hope of effecting our other

Purposes. Let Us at once boldly plead to the Jurisdiction of Parliament.—Let Us totally dis∣allow the Force of that Act so evidently calculated to enslave Us; and unanimously proceed in the Course of our internal Business as if no such Act had ever pass'd. To appear irresolute in a Proceed∣ing of such high Importance, will give the greatest Advantage to the Enemies of American Freedom. The least Appearance of Timidity will encourage Them in the Prosecution of their horrid Designs upon our Liberty; and, to shew any Doubt of our being able to support the Steps We have already taken, will offer such a Proof of future Acqui∣escence, as must be highly grateful to the Promoters of this odious Act.

In pursuing a Measure so well calculated to an∣swer the Purposes of Opposition, the Officers of Government will find Themselves most obnoxious to the Pains and Penalties of the Act; and con∣sequently will not choose to engage in the general Dispute upon such unequal Terms They cannot willingly think of involving Themselves in a Game, where their Stake is so much greater than that of their Fellow Adventurers; and where the Prize which They might gain, wou'd not be more than equal. But, shall We suffer this partial Policy of a few Individuals to interfere with the public Good; when the same spirited Conduct which

oblig'd the Collectors of the Stamp Duty to resign, would secure a ready Compliance from the Officers of Government; and once more set the whole politi∣cal Machine in Motion?

FINIS.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Malgrè tous les Travaux des plus sages Legislateurs, L'Etat politique demeura toujours imparfait, parcequ'il etoit presque L'Ouvrage du Hazard; et que mal commence, le Tems, en decouvrant les De∣fauts, et suggerant des Remedes, ne put jamais reparer les Vices de la Constitution.

  Rousseau.

  Nothing appears more exquisitely combin'd, to an unexperienc'd Examination, than the English Government, where the executive and legislative Powers controul each other so perfectly; where the Pre∣rogative of the Crown, and the Rights of the People, are so nicely ad∣justed and counterpoiz'd. It is indeed a fine Machine in Idea, yet the Fabric is too delicately wrought to go well long, and Subtilty of Work∣manship wants Strength of Par•••• to sustain it.

  Angleloni's Letters.
• ‡ 1.2

  Among the several Colonies whose Form of Government is settled by particular Charters, I am led to take Notice of that happy Consti∣tution establish'd in the Province of Pennsylvania, from some very ex∣traordinary Measures lately set on Foot to effect a Change of Govern∣ment. The Form which at present prevails, was granted by the Pro∣prietor in the Charter of 1701 to the Petition of it's Inhabitants can∣celling the original Charter, which had obtain'd the Approbation of the greatest Politicians, merely to gratify their capricious Wishes. Enrich'd with such immense Possessions, and vested with such extensive Powers as almost put Him upon a Footing with a Prince of the Empire, Mr. Penn, in every Transaction, not only evidenc'd the greatest Ex∣tent of Genius, but the most obliging Condescension to the fluctuating Humours of his first Adventurers.

  From this new Grant They receiv'd such extraordinary Privileges, as secur'd Them the Enjoyment of more than English Liberty. Their Assembly of Representatives, annually chosen by Ballot, have the pe∣culiar Privilege of setting upon their own Adjournment, and an absolute Power to dispose of the public Monies in what manner They please. Unmindful of all these singular Advantages, and blind to their own Interests, They have suffer'd an ill founded Resentment against their Proprietor, encourag'd by the artful Management of one designing Man, to hurry Them into such a Measure, as They may here∣after have Leisure to repent. To acquire a Power of throwing upon their Proprietary what They conceive to be his exact Proportion of the public Burthen. — to extort from the Man who is the Object of their implacable Hatred, perhaps an Addition of £500 per. Annum to the public Funds, They would willingly resign to the Ministers of the Crown the absolute Disposal of the whole; and to effect the malicious Purposes of a few splenetic Individuals, They would sacrifice the Interests and Happiness of the whole Community. His∣tory cannot furnish Us with a more amazing Instance of blind Infatu∣ation; nor could any Man, with less Abilities than Mr. F—n possesses, have led a whole Province blindfold to Destruction.
• ‡ 1.3

  The honourable Members of the Council, for the Province of New York, in a late very interesting Debate, have prov'd that this general Maxim, tho' supported both by Reason and Observation, is not unexceptionable.
• * 1.4

  That the Ministers of the Crown have, even in the Infaney of our Setlements, meditated for us a Form of Government, essentially dif∣ferent from that of England, and only calculated to answer their in∣famous purposes, must evidently appear from the following very ex∣traordinary Speech made by Mr. Commissioner Atwood upon the Trial of Colonel Bayard in New-York for high Treason.

  I do not say petitioning the King is a Crume; but, it may be to petition the House of Commons in the Plantations where the King govern, by Prerogative.

  State Trials, Vol. V.
• * 1.5

  To what can We so naturally attribute the present Coincidence of Ministerial and Parliamentary Power, as to the Increase of this pernicious Influence?—an Influence which must very shortly affect the Liberty of Great Britain as well as that of America, unless it receives a sudden and seasonable Check! The Antient Boroughs reduc'd to a State of Obscurity and Poverty become easy Purchases for the Tools of the Court; and the present Machiavelean Minister, refining upon a System establish'd by his Predecessor Sir Robert Walpole, has with great Economy, bought up all these Bargains for such Gen∣tlemen of the Army as have Talents fitted for the Support of his Party. There are undoubtedly many military Gentlemen who have Abilities to fill with Honour the most distinguish'd Stations: But, as a Friend to my Country, and jealous of every Thing which may endanger it's Liberty, I must confess, that I had rather see them upon the Parade at St. James's, than in the Parliament House at Westminister. The military Members of the House of Commons must be thought very improper Representatives of the Freemen of Great Britain. Indeed They may, with great Propriety, be consider'd as no more than animated. Puppets, directed by the arbitrary Hand of our great State Juggler who is sure to evidence both the Extent of his Power and Policy, by punishing with a total Degradation any One who may dare to think, speak or act inconsistent with that Plan laid down for the Rule of his Political Conduct. The Removal of General Conway from his military Command for daring to speak the Language of Indepen∣dence, must serve to convince Us, that, in the present Administration, the most violent and arbitrary Measures will be us'd to extend and support this dangerous Influence.

  When I mention the present Administration, I mean to take no Notice of the many delusive changes which have been made to blind or amuse the World.
• * 1.6

  Unless Corruption first deject the Pride And Guardian Vigor of the free-born Soul, All crude Attempts of Violence are vain; For firm within, and while at Heart untouch'd Ne'er yet by Force was FREEDOM overcome. THOMPSON:
• * 1.7

  Let Us draw our Term of Freedom out In it's full Length, and spin it to the last, So shall We gain still one Day's Liberty; And, Let me perish, but in Cato's Judgment, A Day—an Hour of virtuous Liberty Is worth a whole Eternity in Bondage. ADDISON.