A letter addressed to two great men, on the prospect of peace; and on the terms necessary to be insisted upon in the negotiation. : [Nine lines of quotations]

A LETTER ADDRESSED TO Two GREAT MEN.

My LORD, and SIR,

YOU will be surprised at an Address made to you jointly in this Manner; but as I have not the Honour to be much acquainted with ei|ther of you, though I esteem you both, (at least while you remain connected) I hope you will for|give me for troubling you, in this public Way; and the rather, as I think the Matters I shall write upon, to be of very great Importance; and as you will discover by what I am going to suggest to you, that I am a true Friend to Old England, and a sincere Lover of my Country.

I have long thought that our Ministers of State may be much assisted, in their Deliberations, by Persons who have not the Honour of sitting at the Council Board. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 wisest Measures have often

been pointed out, in the Course of parliamentary 〈◊〉〈◊〉; and Members of either House, perhaps those l••ast cons••••••••d by Government, have fre|quently been earliest in suggesting such Plans of public Policy, as Government itself has been glad to adopt. The Ex••inction of factious Opposition, the Un••nimity of every Party, and the Acquies|cence of every Connection, in whatever Scheme is proposed by his Majesty's Servants, while it hath produced infinite Advantages to the Public, hath deprived those who direct the Cabinet, of all such Parliamentary Instruction, as their Predecessors in Power used to receive. You, my Lord, of late, scarcely hear any Speech in the House of Lords, but that of a Lawyer on a Scotch Appeal; and the hereditary Council of the Nation rarely assemble for higher Purposes than to alter Settlements and de|liberate on Bills of Divorce. And you, Sir, in the other House, where so many skilful Champions used formerly to engage and struggle for Victory, remain single in the Field of Battle; and your Speaker takes the Chair only to vote Millions and levy Thousands, without the least Debate or Op|position.

The Channel of Parliamentary Instruction being thus stopt, no other but that of the Press is left open, for those Heads of Advice to which it may be worth your While to attend. For this Reason it is, that I have thought of addressing you in this Manner. Who I am, it matters not. Let it suf|fice, that, unpe••sioned and unemployed, I can vie, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Zeal for the Public, with those who taste the Sw••ets of exorbitant Salaries, and unfathomed Per|quisites. Whether my Knowledge be equal to my Zeal; whether my Acquaintance with the World, and Experience in Business, have enabled me to offer any Thing that may be 〈◊〉〈◊〉 real Utility, must

be determined by you, and by the Public. This I am certain of, that my Intention is honest; and while I please myself, I shall endeavour, at the same Time, not to offend either of you. Some Produc|tions, in which you have, of late, been jointly taken Notice of, proceeded from a fa••tious Disposition, which I am unacquainted with, and detest. For, far from wishing to disunite and separate your In|terests, I am fully persuaded that without your per|fect Harmony and Union, the great Events which have happened under your Administration, will not have those permanent good Consequences so much to be wished for: And it is only from your joint Concurrence, that we can hope for any of those prudent, spirited and national Measures con|cerning which I propose to offer you a few Hints, in this Address.

Considering the present distressed Condition of France, fallen from its alarming Power, and Great|ness, into the lowest State of Distress and Impotence; unfortunate in its military Operations in every Quar|ter of the Globe▪ beaten all Europe over by Sea and Land; its Fleets sailing, only to be destroyed; its Armies marching, only to run away; without Trade; no Credit; stopping Payments, protesting Bills, and to all Intents and Purposes a Bankrupt Nation; their King, the Princes of the Blood, the Nobility, and the Clergy carrying in all their Plate to be coined, for the present extreme Exigency of their Affairs; disappointed and baff••ed in all their Schemes on the Continent, and taught to think no more of Invasions, by the Destruction of the only Fleet they had left;—I say, considering all these Circumstances, which I have not exaggerated, in the least, it is not unnatural to imagine, that a Period will soon be put to the Troubles of Eu|rope. France, 〈…〉〈…〉 on the War, must

soon be reduced to the Necessity of suing for Peace.

We have had Bloodshed enough. God forgive those who have occasioned this terrible Destruction of the human Species, and spread Misery, and De|vastation, for so long a Time, in almost every Corner of the Globe. The great Success with which the Arms of Britain have been blessed, puts it in our Power to give Peace to Europe: and it is to the Honour of his Majesty and those who di|rect his Councils, that the Distresses of our Ene|mies have only enabled him to give the World a Proof of his Moderation; and to shew that his In|clination to make Peace, keeps Pace with the Ina|bility of France to prolong the War.

As his Majesty entered into this War, not from Views of Ambition, so he does not Wish to continue it, from Motives of Resentment. The Desire of his Majesty's Heart is, to see a Stop put to the Effusion of Christian Blood.

What was declared in the above Paragraph of his Majesty's Speech from the Throne, to our own Parliament, at the Opening of this Session, has since that, been notified in Form to our Enemy. The Readiness of England, and Prussia, to enter into a Treaty, and to give Peace to Christendom, which Prince Lewis of Wolfenbuttle hath been authorized to communicate to the French Minister at the Hague, will, no Doubt, open the Door for a Negotiation, in a Manner the most likely to be embraced by the Court of Versailles; whose Disgraces and Distresses, (too great to be dissembled, and too extensive to be remedied) will dispose them to listen with At|tention to every Proposal of Accommodation, made to them by an Enemy whose Sword was unsheathed only to punish Perfidy; and whose Successes, as appears from their 〈…〉〈…〉 first Advances

towards a Treaty, have not infatuated them to prefer unnecessary and ruinous Conquest, to a rea|sonable and solid Peace.

It is, therefore, to be hoped, and to be believed, that Peace is not at a great Distance; and upon this Supposition I shall beg Leave to offer a few Considerations to you, as to the Persons on whom the Fate of this Country depends; Considerations which are equally important as they are seasonable; and an Attention to which, before you enter upon any Negotiation, may, perhaps, assist you (if I may be allowed to suppose you stand in Need of any Assistance) in directing this Negotiation to such an Issue, as may be equally honourable to yourselves, and useful to the Public.

In this Situation of Affairs, one of the first Mat|ters relative to the future Negotiation, which, no doubt, must occur to you, will be the Choice of those Persons who are to be trusted with the great Concerns of this Nation as Plenipotentiaries. As much will depend upon this Point, I shall beg Leave to begin with giving you my Thoughts upon it, and the other Topics on which I propose to trouble you will naturally arise from each other without observing any other Order, or Connection, besides that in which they shall pre|sent themselves to a Mind intent upon its Subject.

With regard then to the Choice of Plenipoten|tiaries, I cannot but lament the Difficulties you have to encounter, before you will be able to find such as the Public will have Reason to thank you for.—I am not totally unknowing in the Charac|ters and Capacities of many among the great. But when I cast my Eyes around me, I own that I am surprized, greatly sur••••••zed, but still more grieved, to find so few among us, ••••pable of conducting the arduous Task 〈…〉〈…〉 Peace. Whether this

hath arisen from Neglect in the Education of our Men of Quality; or whether the Qualifications which fit them for Statesmen, have been neglected, in Comparison of such as fit them for Arthur's or Newmarket; or whether it be owing to the State Policy so systematically adopted, of late Years, of giving Places, not to Persons who can best exe|cute the Business—but to those who can best do a Job; whatever be the Cause, the Fact is certain; and it is Matter of Amazement that there should be so few in this Island, who have given any Proofs that they are capable of conducting with Ability, much less with Dexterity, this important Business of a Nego|tiation with France. Men who are versed in Trea|ties, knowing the Interests, Pretensions, and Con|nexions of the several Princes of Europe; skilled in the Principles of public Law, and capable of ap|plying them on every particular Occasion; ac|quainted with the Commerce, the Colonies, the Manufactures of their own Country; Masters of all the Instances of Infraction of former Treaties, which occasioned the War we are now engaged in: In a Word, Men whose Rank and Consequence amongst ourselves, may command Respect, and procure them Authority, amongst our Enemies; and who, to every other Qualification, already enumerated, can boast of an Integrity not to be cor|rupted, and a Steadiness in supporting the Inter|ests of their Country, which no Difficulties can dis|courage, and no Temptations can shake:— Such are the Men, whom you must endeavour to employ, in the approaching Negotiation, and such, I hope, ye will be able to find; though, I own, I am puzzled to guess on whom the Choice will fall, none being, as yet, ••ointed out by the pub|lic Voice, nor, perhaps 〈…〉〈…〉 upon by yourselves. Times have been, 〈…〉〈…〉 have expected,

to see One named to such an important Office, meerly because he was a Favourite, or a Favourite's Fa|vourite; because he was connected with this Mini|ster, or was a Relation of that great Man. But if we have too frequently trifled with our national Concerns, by trusting them in such Hands, I need not say that there are Circumstances at present which give us reasonable Ground for hoping that the same Sagacity, and Desire to serve the Public which hath found out, and employed the properest Persons to conduct the Operations of the War, will be exerted to find out the properest Persons (few as there are to be found) to conduct the Delibera|tions of the Treaty.

Very deplorable indeed must be the Inabili|ties of the Persons we shall employ, if their Nego|tiations for Peace be conducted so awkwardly as to rob us of the Advantages we have gained by the War. If we may judge from late Events, France seems as little to abound with Wisdom in the Ca|binet, as it doth with Courage and Conduct in the Field. And if the Negotiations at Utrecht, in which almost all the Advantages of War equally successful with the present, were given up, be urged as an Instance of the superior Dexterity of French Politics, it ought to be remembered that this was more owing to our own Divisions, than to their Sagacity, and the Inabilities of our Plenipotentia|ries at Utrecht, tho' we had no great Reason, God knows, to brag of them. What, therefore, may we not expect from a Negotiation to be begun in very different Circumstances; when there exists no Faction whose Interest it may be to perplex and de|feat it; and when that national Unanimity to which we, in a great 〈…〉〈…〉 owe the Success of the War, will still 〈…〉〈…〉 it's blessed Effects, till it make 〈…〉〈…〉 and honourable

Peace?—However, favourable as these Circum|stances are, the Choice of such Plenipotentia|ries as may be likely to conduct the Negotiation, with Dignity, Dexterity and Integrity, becomes a Consideration which the Public will expect should be weighed with the utmost Attention. And, if such Persons cannot be found amongst us (which I hope may not be the Case) there is a very desirable Alternative still in your Power. Fix the Scene of Negotiation, where, indeed, for the Honour of our Country, I could wish to see it fixed. Name no other Plenipotentiaries to conduct the Peace but those Ministers who directed the War: And a Treaty of London, in such Hands, will make ample Amends for our wretched Management at Utrecht.

But let Peace be ever so well made; let Mi|nisters plan Treaties with the greatest Sagacity, and Plenipotentiaries negotiate the Articles with the ut|most Skill and Dexterity, yet we know from Histo|ry and Observation, that they never can be perpetual, and, most commonly, are not lasting. Princes, too frequently, seem to own no other Rule of Action, than present Convenience; and the Law of Nations is seldom appealed to, but to sanctify Injustice, and save Appearances. Nor are the positive Compacts solemnly agreed upon between Nation and Nation, better observed. For how seldom do we see a Treaty religiously adhered to, by the Parties whose Interest it is to break it, and who think they are in such Circumstances as to be able to break it with Impunity?—If such Infidelity be too common a|mongst Princes in general, Experience, long Ex|perience teaches us, that the Nation with whom we are soon to treat, excel us, at least, in this Part of Policy. For no Cord•• are strong enough to bind them.

Gallic Faith is become proverbial, and the Neigh|bours of France can reproach her with innumerable Instances of a most profligate Disregard to the most solemn Treaties. And the Reason seems to be ob|vious, without supposing that Nation more perfi|dious than others. The Power, the Populousness, the Extent, the Strength of the French Monarchy, free them from those Apprehensions which bind the weaker Side to be faithful to it's Engagements; and depending upon the Inability of their Neigh|bours, considered singly, to procure to themselves Justice, this, too frequently, has tempted them to the most shameful and barefaced Instances of na|tional Breach of Faith.

It well becomes us, therefore, at this Juncture, when the Distresses of the French, we may hope, will oblige them to consent to Terms of Peace, unfa|vourable to the Interest, and disgraceful to the Glo|ry of their Monarch, to take every Method in our Power to secure the Observance of those Con|cessions they may make; and to insist upon their giving us such Proofs of their Sincerity, before any Negotiation be entered upon, as may give us some Assurance that they mean to be more faithful to their future Engagements.

What Proof of their Sincerity, I would recom|mend it to you to demand, what Concessions it will be necessary to insist upon, I shall beg Leave to mention; after having first satisfied you by a De|tail of some Particulars, that such Demands as I would propose cannot be looked upon as the Inso|lence of a Conqueror, but as the wise Foresight of a People whom dear-bought Experience hath taught the proper Way of doing itself Justice.

It may not, therefore, be unnecessary to place before your Eyes, 〈…〉〈…〉 the most remarkable In|stances of French 〈…〉〈…〉 ••••ich have give Rise

to all the Troubles of Europe for above these hun|dred Years.

The Peace of Westph••lia * 1.1, while it secured the Liberties and Religion of Germany, also laid the Foundation of that Power which hath made France, ever since, the Terror of Europe. By this Treaty * 1.2, the Upper and the Lower Alsace, a Country of great Extent, and of infinite Consequence in Point of Situation, was ceded to France. In this Country there were Ten Imperial Cities, whose Privileges and Liberties were in the most solemn Manner se|cured by the same Treaty, which expressly says, * 1.3 that they shall preserve their Freedom, and that the King of France shall not assume over them, any Thing more than the bare Right of Protection. How was this Article observed? The ten Imperial Cities have been humbled to receive the French Yoke, equally with the Rest of Alsace, and remain now, lasting Monuments, what others may expect from Power unrestrained by Justice.

The Treaty ‖ of the Pyrenees still enlarged the Boundaries of France, especially on the Side of Flan|ders; and the Spaniards thought themselves safe from farther Losses, by the Marriage of their In|fanta to Louis the XIV. who, upon that Occasion, jointly with her, made a formal Renunciation of all her Rights, to succeed to any Part of the Spanish Possessions. And yet, with unparalleled Insolence, seven Years had scarcely elapsed before Flanders was again attacked, on Pretence of those very Rights which had been so lately renounced, and which even tho' they had not been renounced, must have

appeared chimerical, unless a Sister can have a Right to succeed in Preference to her Brother.

The Peace of Nimeguen * 1.4 restored the Tranquil|ity of Europe, which the Invasion of Holland by the French had disturbed. But scarcely was the Peace signed before it was shamefully violated. The Decrees of the Chambers of Re-union, by which Lewis the XIV. seized so many Territories, to which he had not the least Right; the Surprisal of Strasburg, and the Blockade of Luxemburgh, shew|ed such a Wantonness of Perfidy, as no History of the most barbarous and unpolished Savages could well exceed; and justly drew upon the common Oppressor, the joint Vengeance of offended Eu|rope.

Who is ignorant of the Story of the Partition Treaty? Solemnly entered into to preserve that Tranquility which the Treaty of Reswick had just restored to Europe, it was no sooner made than it was shamefully abandoned by the Court of France; and for such Reasons as will, upon every Occasion, justify every Injustice. The Letter of the Treaty, indeed, was violated, they must own; —but the Spirit of it was what ought to be attend|ed to. And by such a Comment, worthier of a pitiful Sophister, than of a most Christian King, his Grandson was assisted in placing himself on the Throne of Spain.

The Politics of Lewis the XV. have been faith|fully copied from those of his Great-Grandfather; and the Behaviour of France, upon the Death of Charles the VI. is a fresh Proof, of how little Use are the most solemn Treaties, with a Power that knows no Ties but those of Interest.—The Treaty of Vienna had but two or three Years before * 1.5, an|nexed to the Crown 〈◊〉〈◊〉, the Dutchy of Lor|rain;

a Cession which was purchased, and purchased cheaply, by the Guarantee of the * 1.6 Pr••g••atic Sanction. By this Stipulation▪ France was under the most solemn Engagements to support the Queen of Hungary in the Possession of all her Father's Do|minions. But how was the Engagement fulfilled? 〈◊〉〈◊〉 will scarcely believe such bare-faced Per|fi••y 〈◊〉〈◊〉 possible, as our Times saw was actually a|vo••ed upon that Occasion. Germany was instant|ly, covered with the Armies of France, to as••••st the Elector of Bavaria, in an Attempt to overturn the Pragmatic Sanction so lately guaranteed by France and to dethorne that Princess whom the French were bound by a Treaty, sworn to in the Name of the Holy Trinity, to protect and defend from all her Enemies.

I have brought down this Sketch of French Faith to the present Times; imperfect indeed; but, as far as it goes, strictly conformable to Historical Truth.—What Confidence, then, can France ex|pect any of its Neighbours will put in her, after so many and such flagrant Instances of national Per|jury, as she appears to be guilty of?—The Ca|talogue of her Infidelities will still be increased; and the little Reason that our Island, in particular, has to trust Her, will still be more apparent, by reminding you of some of the many Proofs, which Great Britain itself can appeal to, of French Inge|nuity in Treaty-breaking.—I shall go no higher than the Peace of Utrecht, because the Instances in which it hath been violated by France, have produ|ced the present War; and because the Enumera|tion of them will lead me, naturally, to those Hints which I mean to throw out, as necessary to be at|tended to, in our future Negotiations; and which, if neglected, will lose to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Nation all the Fruits

of those Successes, to gain which, we have strained every Nerve, and loaded ourselves with a Burthen under which it is a Miracle that we have not alrea|dy sunk.

The War which was closed by the Peace of Utrecht had been undertaken with Views confined, altoge|ther, to the Continent of Europe, and carried on, though at an immense Expence, more to gain Con|quests for our Allies, than for ourselves. However, in the Treaty of Peace, some Advantages and Con|cessions were stipulated in Favour of the Crown of Great Britain, and its commercial Interests.

By the 12th Article, All Nova Scotia or Acadia, with its ancient Limits, and with all its Dependencies, is ceded to the Crown of Great Britain.

And by the 15th Article, The Subjects of France Inhabitants of Canada, and elsewhere, shall not disturb or molest, in any Manner whatever, the Five Indian Nations which are subject to Great••Britain, nor its other American Allies.

Let us now see how these Articles have been ob|served. The French seem to have had two Capital Views in all their American Schemes, ever since they have thought Trade and Commerce an Object worthy of their Attention. The first was to ex|tend themselves from Canada, Southwards, through the Lakes along the Back of our Colonies; by which Means they might answer a double Purpose, of cutting off our Communication with the Indian Nations, and of opening a Communication for themselves, between the Rivers St. Lawrence and Missisippi, and thus to join, as it were, their Colo|nies of Canada and Louisiana. The other Part of their Plan, equally important, and more immedi|ately fatal to our Interests in North America, was to gain a Communication with the Ocean; the only

Access they now have to Canada, through the Ri|ver St. Lawrence, being shut up half the Year.

Full of this favorite Project of American Em|pire, soon after the Treaty of Utrecht, they began to enlarge their Boundaries on that Continent, in direct Violation of the solemn Concessions they had so lately made.

As long ago as 1720, they seized and fortified the most important Pass in America, at Niagara; in that very Country of the Five Indian Nations, from which the 15th Article of the Treaty of U|trecht had excluded them. The infinite Conse|quence of Niagara made them less scrupulous, no Doubt, about Treaties. For by Means of this U|surpation they, in a Manner, became Masters of the Lakes, and could, at Leisure extend them|selves to the Ohio, and carry their Chain of Forts and Settlements down to the Missisippi.

The Plan of Usurpation on the Back of our Colonies went on gradually and successfully from Year to Year; the Indians owned by the Peace of Utrecht to be our Subjects, were debauched from our Interest, and spirited up to massacre, and scalp the English; and in 1731, the Insolence of the French grew to such an Heighth, that they erected their Fort at Crown-Point, in a Country indisput|ably ours; whether considered as in the Center of the five Nations, or as actually within the Limits of New-York. And whoever casts his Eye upon the Situation of this Fort, in the Map, will see how greatly the Possession of it facilitated the Comple|tion of the great Object of opening a Communica|tion with the Ocean; and how much it exposed our most valuable Colonies to Indian Massacres and French Invasions.

If it should be asked, what was our Ministry in England employed about, during such Instances of

French Perfidy—the Answer must be, (tho' I wish I could draw a Veil over this Period) that our Af|fairs were then conducted by a Minister who was awake, indeed, to every Scheme of Corruption; eager to buy a Borough, or to bribe a Member; but slow to every Measure of national Importance and Utility. His first, his only Object, was to preserve himself in Power; and as, in Prosecu|tion of such interested and mercenary Views, he had actually engaged this Nation in an Alliance with France, in Europe, (to pull down the exorbi|tant Power of our old and natural Ally) it was no Wonder that he heard unmoved, and suffered with Impunity, the French Usurpations in North-America.

Let us next trace the French Infidelity with Re|gard to Nova Scotia or Acadia. Tho' that Pro|vince had been yielded to us at Utrecht, we had taken very few Steps to settle it effectually, till 1749, after the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. And then the French Court gave us a Specimen of Chi|cane worthy indeed, of those whom no Treaty ever bound, in Opposition to their Convenience. They began to speak out, and to tell us, nay to insist upon it seriously in Memorials, that the Country ceded to us under the Name of Nova Scotia, comprehended only the Peninsula, and did not extend beyond the Isthmus. Whereas the Charters of King James I. to Sir William Alexan|der; and Sir William's own Map, as old as the Charter, demonstrate that the ancient Limits of the Country so named included a vast Tract of Land, beyond the Peninsula, reaching along the Coast till it joined New England; and extending up the Country till it was bounded by the South Side of the River St. Lawrence. Of such an Extent of Country they had formed a Plan to rob us; hop|ing, no Doubt, to find the same Supineness in the

British Administration which had overlooked their former E••croachments. With this View they de|sired that Commissaries might meet to settle the Limits, promising not to act in America, till those Commissaries should agree, or the Conferences break up. But how was this Promise observed? While the Commissaries trifled away their Time at Paris, the Usurpations went on in America; Incursions were frequently made into the Peninsula of Aca|dia, the Possession or which they did not pretend to dispute with us; Forts were built by them in several Places, and particularly a most important One to command the Isthmus; thus decid••ng by the Sword, in Time of full Peace, that Contro|versy which they themselves had agreed should be amicably adjusted by their Commissaries; and fur|nishing a lasting Warning to us, that a Treaty which leaves Points of Consequence to be de|termined by any After-Conferences, only serves to light up another War.

While the French Usurpations went on so inso|lently in Nova Scotia; the Plan was carrying on with equal Perfidy on the Banks of the Ohio; a Country, the Inhabitants of which had been in Al|liance with the English above an hundred Years ago; an Alliance frequently renewed; to which also we had a Claim as being a Conquest of the Five Nations, and from which, therefore, the French were excluded by the 15th Article of the Treaty of Utrecht above recited. But what avail Treaties when Interest comes in Competition? The Possession of the Ohio was absolutely necessary, that the great Plan of connecting Canada with Louisiana might succeed: And, therefore, they began their Hostilities against us, in that Country very soon after the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle; in|sulted our Traders, plundered and made them Pri|soners; erected Fortresses, and established Settle|ments;

and our Governor of Virginia having sent Washington, in 17••3, to complain of ••••ese Hostili|ties, he returned with an Answer from the French commanding Officer on the Ohio, which only shewed how much in earnest they were to main|tain themselves in their new Usurpations.

From this Period we may look upon the War as begun. Our Governors in North-America had Orders from England, to oppose the French En|croachments by Force of Arms; and, in 17••4, Washington was sent again to the Ohio, with some Troops; but being defeated, by the superior Num|bers of the Enemy, who had just before taken the English Fort, they made themselves Masters of this important Country.

No Doubt the French Ministers flattered them|selves that England, inattentive to the Interests of its Colonies for so many Years before, and who, so lately, had submitted to a Disadvantageous Peace, would not have the Spirit to oppose Force to Force, and do itself Justice by other Weapons than the Complaints of Lord Al••••marle, and the Memorials of Mr. Mildmay. But the Hour of Vengeance was, at last, come; the Interests of the Kingdom were attended to by those in Power; the infinite Importance of our American Colonies was understood, and a Resolution taken to have Re|course to Arms. And thus England, which, for half a Century, had been wasting its Millions, and lavishing its Blood, to obtain a Barrier in Flanders, which those for whom we conquered it could not defend, or rather did not think it worth while to keep; began the present War, a War truly NA|TIONAL.

If there be Merit in this spirited Conduct of the British Administration, from the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, to the breaking out of the present War,

tell your Enemies, My Lord, that you, and a near Relation 〈◊〉〈◊〉 yours (whose Memory * 1.7 will always be respected) had then the chief Direction of public Business. And you, Sir, will pardon me for pay|ing this Compliment to those who began the War with Spirit; while I, at the same Time, declare it as my Opinion that your coming into Power after it was begun, has contributed to its being carried on with a Success equally glorious and important to the Nation.

But before I make the Application of the above Deduction concerning * 1.8 our American Complaints (which I shall, by and bye, make Use of, when I come to speak to the Terms which it will be ne|cessary to insist upon at the approaching Treaty) it will be proper to mention another most important Instance of French Perfidy in Europe.

Dunkirk, by its Situation, almost opposite the Mouth of the Thames, had done amazing Mischief to the Trade of England, during King William's and Queen Ann••'s Wars. The Demolition of Dunkirk▪ therefore, very naturally became a favourite Object of the Nation; the Parliament, in 1708, addressed her Majesty to make no Peace without this Condition * 1.9, and though after a War so successful, much more might have been obtained for England than really was, this Point was carefully insisted upon, and the Ninth Article of the Peace of Utrecht obtained.

By this Article, the French King engages to de|molish all the Fortifications of the City of Dunkirk; to rui•• the Harbour; to break the Dykes and 〈◊〉〈◊〉.— The Works towards the Se•• to be destroyed in Two Months, and th••s•• to the Land in Three Months af|ter; all this to be done at his own Exp••••ce; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Fortifications, Harbou••, Dykes, and 〈◊〉〈◊〉, n••ver af|ter to ••e restored. Could Words be ••evised in all the Extent of Language to stipulate, in a stronger Manner, the effectual and speedy D••molition of this Pl••ce? And yet all Eur••pe saw w••th Amaze|ment, and England beheld with Indignation, the Peace of Utrecht violated, with Regard to this im|portant Condition, almost as soon as it was signed.

By the Article above-recited we see that Dunkirk was to be demolished within five Months after the signing the Peace; and yet, near a Year after, I

find Mr. Walpole, in our House of Commons, in|sisting that the Peace had already been broken with Regard to Dunkirk; Since instead of ruining the Harbour, the French were then actually repairing the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and working on a new Canal* 1.10. And though the pacific Inclinations of the Ministry in 1713, when Mr. Walp••l•• pushed this Affair, over|ruled the Inquiry, the Facts on which it would have proceeded were certain.

The spirited Remonstrances of Lord Stair at Paris, on the Accession of George I. concerning this Infraction of the Peace, were the last Instances of Humiliation which Lewis XIV. saw himself exposed to; and, perhaps, he would have found himself obliged to do us that Justice, by Neces|sity, which the Regent, who soon after came into Power, willingly agreed to from Views of private Interest. Tho' the Peace of Utrecht had obliged the Spanish Branch of the Bourbon Family to re|nounce their Right of Succession to the Crown of France, the Duke of Orleans, who, by this Regu|lation, saw only an Infant's Life between him and the Throne, knew well, that tho' the Renunciation had been solemnly sworn to, the Doctrine of its Invalidity, of its being an Act, void, ab initio, had been publickly avowed. T••r••y, as appears by his * 1.11 Correspondence with Lord Bolingbroke, very

frankly made no Scruple of telling the English be|fore-hand, that this Expedient, which had been devised to prevent the Union of France and Spain under one Monarch, would be of little Force, as being inconsistent with the fundamental Laws of France; by this Declaration giving us a very re|markable Instance of the Weakness, or of the Wickedness of our then Ministers, who could build the Peace of Europe on so sandy a Foundation, and accept of Terms which France itself was honest enough to own were not to be kept.

However, the Regent was resolved to support his Claim to the Crown of France, in Exclusion to the Spanish Branch; and, as the Support and Assistance of England was necessary for this Pur|pose, it is not to be wondered at that he should court the Friendship of a Nation from whom he had so much to expect; and therefore, he was wise enough to do us Justice, by carrying into Execution, in some Degree, the Article relating to Dunkirk.

The personal Interest of the Regent was the on|ly Reason for this Compliance: But succeeding Administrations in France not being influenced by the same private Views to adhere to Treaties so|lemnly ratified, Dunkirk began gradually to rise from its Ruins; its Port again received Ships; its Trade flourished; England saw itself deprived of this favourite Advantage gained at Utrecht; and such was the Ascendency of French Councils over those of this Island, at the Period I speak of, that we were actually engaged in Alliances with France, while that Nation was thus openly insult|ing us, and insulting us, without Obstruction, in so essential an Article. We all remember what passed in Parliament in 1733, relating to the Point now before us.—Such was the tame Acquies|cence of the British Administration, that Dunkirk, by this Time, stood upon our Custom-House Books as a Port▪ from whence great Imports were

made; and when an Inquiry concerning this was proposed in the House of Commons by a great Parliament Man * 1.12 since dead, the then Minister hung his Head, in the House, for Shame. And who could have believed it possible, that the same Person who had been so ready to promote a Par|liamentary Inquiry into this Violation of the Peace in 1713, should obstruct such an Inquiry, when he himself was in Power, though the Reasons for it had become much stronger? Who could see Him, without Indignation, s••ut his Eyes to the Re-esta|blishment of Dunkirk, and obstruct the proposed Inquiry, by getting from Cardinal Fleury (who then governed France, and, I blush to say it, England too) a delusive, ministerial Letter, promising what he knew would not be performed;—and obtained, perhaps, only because the Cardinal was assured, that the Breach of the Promise would not be resented.

While England remained so averse to do itself Justice, no Wonder that France improved the Opportunity. At the Time when that Minister was obliged to retire from Power, the Re-establish|ment of Dunkirk was compleated. For, in a little more than a Year after * 1.13, we find a Memorial presented by Lord Stair to the Dutch, com|plaining of this Violation of the Peace of Utrecht, and urging it as a Reason for their joining us against France. And as it was for the Honour of the new Administration, that they began with Measures so spirited and national, it is equally remarkable, that the same Person, who had threat|ened Lewis XIV. in his own Palace, for his Slow|ness in demolishing Dunkirk, lived to be again employed by his Country at the Distance of near thirty Years, when the Restoration of Dunkirk be|came an Object of national Resentment.

The two Nations had not, as yet, begun the late War, when we saw, in One Instance, both a

Proof that Dunkirk was again a Port, and a Port which may be made Use of, to endanger the Safe|ty of Britain. At the Time I now speak of * 1.14, we beheld the Harbour of Dunkirk crowded with Transports to embark Count Saxe and the Preten|der to invade us. And, if that Invasion had then taken Effect, from that very Port which was to be no Port (happily the Winds were contrary to the Fleet from Brest) the infinite Mischief which this Nation may suffer from its Re-establishment, would have been fatally experienced.

Though we have no great Reason to brag of the Treaty made at the Conclusion of the last War (which I am ashamed to call a Peace, as it settled nothing that was before in Doubt between the two Nations) the Peace of Utrecht concerning Dunkirk, was, nevertheless in its most essential Part, re|stored to its full Force. I say, in its most Essen|tial Part; because, though the 17th Article of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle left Dunkirk in the State it then was, with Regard to its Fortifications to the Land; the same Article revived our Right, to the Demolition of its Port, by stipulating That ancient Treaties are to be observed in regard to the Port, and the Works on the Sea Side.

Little or nothing was done between the Conclu|sion of the Peace, and the breaking out of the pre|sent War, towards carrying into Execution this fresh Promise. On the contrary, the enlarging of the Fortifications of Dunkirk, is mentioned in his Majesty's Declaration of War, three Years ago, as one of the fresh Heads of Injury offered to Eng|land. And whoever reflects upon the Transactions, since that Period, will see that Dunkirk is restored to its original Importance. Its Privateers have done infinite Mischief to our Trade; a Squadron of his Majesty's Navy, in vain blocked up its Har|bour lately, to prevent the sailing of Thurot's

Fleet: and, it is well known, that the long threatened Invasion of these Kindoms, which France, in Despair, certainly meditated, would have been attempted from this Place, if the De|struction of their Ships of War by Hawke, had not taught them the Absurdity of invading us in their much celebrated flat bottom Boats, which, we may well suppose, will hardly be tried, when their Fleets, really formidable, have been destroyed in the Attempt.

The above Enumeration of French Infidelities, in general, and in particular their Behaviour to England with regard to Dunkirk, and with regard to North-America, so naturally points out the Expediency and Necessity of the Hints I shall now offer, that, in pro|posing them, I may well hope not to have them ridi|culed as the Reveries of a chimerical St. Pierre, but rather attended to, as the sober Dictates of Prudence, and of a Zeal not altogether devoid of Knowledge.

First, Then, my Lord and Sir, before you enter upon any New Treaty, or listen to any plausible Proposals whatever, insist that Justice may be done this Nation, with regard to former Treaties. Shew France the strong, the solemn Engagement she entered into at Utrecht to demolish Dunkirk; put her in Mind of the amazing Perfidy with which she, from Time to Time, eluded the Perfor|mance of that Engagement; and demand imme|diate Justice on that Article, as a preliminary Proof of her Sincerity in the ensuing Negotiation.

Be not deceived any longer in this Matter. The French will, no doubt, assure you that the Demo|lition of Dunkirk shall be an Article in the New Treaty. But let them know, you are not to be so imposed upon. They wlll, to be sure, when this becomes a new Article, reckon it a new Conces|sion on their Side, and expect something in return for it,—perhaps Guadaloupe, or some such Trifle, as they will call it. But tell them with the Firm|ness of wise Conquerors, that the Demolition of

Dunkirk is what you are intitled to by Treaties made long ago, and violated; and that it shall not be so much as mentioned in the insuing Negotiation, but complied with before that Negotiation shall commence.

Or, admitting that no Concession should be re|quired by France in the New Treaty, in Consider|ation of a new Article to demolish Dunkirk, place to them, in the strongest Light, the unanswerable Reasons we have against putting any Confidence in them, that such an Article would be better executed, than that in the Treaty of Utrecht has been.

If they refuse doing us this immediate Justice, previous to the Peace; ask them how they can ex|pect that we should have any Reliance on their Sin|cerity to fulfil the New Engagements they may enter into, when they afford us so strong, so glar|ing an Instance of Infidelity, in an Article of such Consequence, made so many Years ago? Can you have any Dealings with a Power, who, if he refuses this, at the very Time he is treating, affords you such manifest Proof, that his Word is not to be re|lied upon, and that you cannot trust to the Execu|tion of any Promise ever so solemnly made?

Perhaps France may think it a Disgrace to them, to comply with any Thing previous to the Begin|ning of a Negotiation. Tell them, that acting honourably, and doing what Justice requires, can never be disgraceful. But if it be a Disgrace, tell them, with the Spirit of honest Men, that we owe it them, for the greater Disgrace they put, not long ago, upon us, by requiring us to send two Peers of this Realm to remain in France as Hostages, till we surrendered Louisbourg; an Indignity which I cannot call to Mind without Pain, and which, I always thought, was submitted to without Neces|sity.

It is now our Turn to vindicate the Honour of our Nation; and as Dunkirk was put into our Pos|session before the Treaty of Utrecht, as a Pledge of the French Sincerity, and to continue in our Possession, till the Demolition should be completed; let some such Expedient be now agreed upon; with this Diffe|rence only, that instead of five Months after the Peace, the Time fixed, for the Demolition, at Utrecht, let no Peace be signed, at present, till this Right acquired to us by former Treaties, and of which we have been so perfidiously robbed, be actually carried into full Execution.

However, if any insuperable Difficulties should attend the doing ourselves Justice, on this Head, before the Peace; if, for Instance, which perhaps may be the Case, it should be found that it cannot be complied with, unless we consent to a Cessation of Arms, during the Time of Negotiation; rather than give France that Opportunity of recovering from its Distresses, and of being protected from the Superiority of our Arms, before we have, finally, obliged them to accept of our own Terms of Peace (which was one Cause of the Ruin of our Negotiation at Utrecht) I would wave insisting upon the Demoli|tion of Dunkirk, before the Treaty, and think it sufficient to demand Hostages from them, as a Secu|rity that it shall be faithfully complied with, within a limited Time after the Treaty shall be concluded. The Parisians had two English Milords to stare at, upon the last Peace; and I do not see why the Cu|riosity of our Londoners should not be gratified, in the same Way; and Two Ducs and Pairs of France be sent as Hostages to England, till Dunkirk cease to be a Port.

I know well, that Political Opinions, concerning the Importance of any particular Object, are as frequently dictated by Whim and Fashion, as built

on solid Reason and Experience. Perhaps, some may think, that this is the Case, with Regard to the Necessity of demolishing Dunkirk. But, tho' it may not at present be so favourite an Obj••ct of National Politics, as it was in the Queen's Time; this has not b••••n owing to any real Ch••ng•• of Cir|cumstances; but to another Cause, to the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Disputes betw••••n the two Nations, which have been the great Object of the present War, and scarcely permitted us, hitherto, to 〈◊〉〈◊〉, in what other Instances, the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of France must be checked at the i••s••ing Peace.—But as th•••••• ef••••|able Event now approaches, we cannot forget, or forgive the Behaviour of our Enemies with Regard to Dunkirk; and it will be equally necessary for the Honour and for the Interest of this Nation to make no Peace, without obtaining full Satisfaction on this Head. It will be necessary for the Honour of the Nation to insist upon this, if it were only to shew to Europe in general, and to France in parti|cular —That we have too much Spirit not to resent Injuries; and too much Wisdom not to take Care, when we have it happily in our Power, to prevent them for the future.—But the Demolition of Dun|kirk, is also necessary, if we would take Care of the Interest of the Nation. Such hath been our Success, in destroying the Navy of France; and so unable doth that Kindom now appear, to carry on its ambitious Projects by Land, and to vie at the same Time, with England, for Dominion on the Sea; that we may reasonably suppose, there is an End of Brest and Toulon Squadrons, to face our Fleets; and a future War with England, will leave the French no other Way of distressing us by Sea, than to lie in watch for our Merchant Ships, with numberless Privateers. In such a piratical War, Dunkirk, if its Harbour be not now destroyed,

will, too late, be found to be of infinite Conse|quence; and we shall fatally experience it again, what it was in the Queen's Time, and in the Lan|guage of her Parliament, a N••••t of Pyrac••••, in|f••ssing the Ocean, and doing infini•••• Mis••hief to Trad••* 1.15.

For these Reasons, therefore, I am so 〈◊〉〈◊〉-fashion|ed to as expect that our Plenipotentiaries will have this Point properly stated to them in their Instruc|tions, and that Del••nda est Cart••age, Demolis•• Dun|kirk, will be a Preliminary Article in the ensuing Negotiation.

The War having begun, principally, with a View to do ourselves Ju••tice in North America, the Regulation of Matters, on that Continent, ought to be, and no Doubt, will be, the capital Article relating to England, in the coming Treaty. It will be necessary, therefore, to give you my Senti|ments, on this Head; and while I do it, with all becoming Diffidence, I shall, at the same Time, support what I may offer, with Reasons appearing so strong to me, as may perhaps recommend it to your farther Consideration, though it should fail of producing Conviction.

Now it is with the greates•• Pleasure, I would observe, that with Regard to North America, we have nothing to ask, at the Peace, which we have not already made ourselves Masters of, during the War. We have been blessed by Heaven, with a Success, in that Part of the World, scarcely to be paralleled in History. The Rashness of Br••dd••ck, the Inex••erience of Shirley, the Inactivity of Lon|doun, and the Ill-success of Aber••romb••••, seem only to have been so many necessary Means of producing that Unanimity in our Colonies, that Spirit in our

Troops; and that steady Perseverance in our Mini|sters, as hath not only recovered from the Enemy all his Usurpations, but Lo••i••bourg is an English Harbour; Q••ebec, the Capital of Canada, is al|ready in our Possession; and the Rest of that Country will fall of Course. It is a Prospect still more agreeable; that by destroying the Naval Force of France our North American Conquests cannot be retaken; and the Principle I would now lay down, and which I would recommend it to you to adopt, is, not to give up any of them. And I shall now endeavour to prove to you, that such a Demand may be insisted upon, without giving the Enemy any Pretence for accusing us of Insolence to|wards them▪ and cannot be omitted without giv|ing the Nation just Reason to complain, that we have consented to a treacher••us and d••lusive Peace.

It cannot, surely, ever enter the Imagination of a British Administration, to make Peace, without, at least, keeping in our Possession, all those Places, where the French had settled themselves, in Viola|tion of former Treaties, and from which we have, fortunately, driven them. Upon this Plan, then, we shall, at the Peace, be left in Poss••ssion not only of the Peninsula of Acadia, but of all Nova Scotia, according to its old Limits; the Bay of Fundi, and the River St. John.—The important Conquests of Crown Point▪ and Niagara, will not be relinquish|ed; and Fort du Quesite, and the Country near the Ohio, will remain Ours.—They are already Ours; the French know they cannot get them back during the War, and they do not expect that we shall give them up at the Peace.

But though Care should be taken to keep all those Places just mentioned; something more must be done, or our American Colonies will tell you, you

have done Nothing. In a Word, you must keep Canada, otherways you lay the Foundation of ano|ther War.

The Necessity of this may be placed in so strik|ing a View, as to silence the French Plenipotentia|ries, and to convince all Europe, of the Justice of our Demand.

Ask the French, what Security they can give you, if we restore Canada to them, however re|strained in its Boundaries, that they will not again begin to extend them at our Expence? If the Treaty of Utrecht could not keep them from En|croachments, what Reason can we have to suppose the future Treaty will be better observed? If the French are left at Montreal, and the three Rivers, can we be certain they will not again cross the Champlain Lake, and attack Crown-Point? If the North Side of the River St. Lawrence be still theirs, what is to in|sure us against an Expedition to Niagara? Can we flatter ourselves, that a People, who in full Peace, erected those two Fortresses, in direct Violation of their Faith plighted at Utrecht, will be restrained by any future Treaty, from attempting, also in full Peace, to recover them? After having seen the French carrying on a regular Plan of Usurpation, in North America, for these Forty Years past, shall we be so weak as to believe that they will now lay it aside? No, depend upon it, if the French think it worth their while to ask back that Part of North America, which was their own, they mean to take a proper Opportunity, of Elbowing all our Colonies round about, and of resuming the same ambitious Views of Enlargment which the most sacred Ties of former Treaties could not restrain.

The Truth of the Matter is, they were tired of Canada. The Inclemency of the Climate, the difficult Access to it; and a Trade scarcely defray|ing

the Expence of the Colony, would long ago have induced them to abandon it, if the Plan of extending its Boundaries, at the Expence of the English; and of opening its Communication with Louisiana and with the Ocean, had not made them persevere.—Canada itself is not worth their ask|ing; and if they do desire to have it restored to them, it can only be with a View to repeat the same Injuries and Infidelities, to punish which, we en|gaged in the present War. Unless, therefore, we be resolved, with our Eyes open, to expose our|selves to a Repetition of former Encroachments; unless we would choose to be obliged to keep great Bodies of Troops, in America, in full Peace, at an immense Expence; we can never consent to leave the French any Footing in Canada. If we do not exclude them, absolutely and entirely from that Country; we shall soon find we have done Nothing. Let the Treaty be drawn ever so accurately; let the Boundaries between Canada and our Colonies be described ever so precisely, and regulated ever so much, in our Favour; what has happened al|ready, ought to teach us what we may expect a|gain; the future Treaty will be observed no bet|ter than the former have been; Usurpation and Encroachment will gradually revive; and thus shall we have thrown away all our Successes; so many Millions will have been expended to no Purpose; and the Blood of so many Thousands of our brave Countrymen spilt, only to remind us, that though we knew how to conquer, we knew not how to im|prove, perhaps, the only Opportunity we shall ever have, of putting it out of the Power of France to violate its Faith.

I take it for granted that, in the future Nego|tiation, the Island of Cape Breton will follow the Fate of Quebec: I shall only observe with Regard

to it, that though the Harbour and Fortification of Louisbourg be of infinite Service to France; it can be of little or no Use to England, if Canada be left to us. It is of Consequence to France, as a Retreat to their Ships fishing on the neighbour|ing Banks of Newfoundland; and as a Security to the Entrance of the Gulph of St. Laurence. But the Possession of Newfoundland itself, makes Louisbourg of no Utility to the English, in the former Respect; and Halifax, where we have a good Harbour, an|swers very nearly the latter Purpose. Upon this View therefore, may we not hope and expect, that, the Necessity of garrisoning Louisbourg having end|ed with the Conquest of Quebec, its Fate will be de|termined, without troubling the French Plenipoten|tiaries? Without waiting for a Congress, let Orders be forthwith sent to demolish it, so as not to leave one Stone upon another, of the Fortifications; to remove the Inhabitants to Nova Scotia, a better Country; and to leave the Island, a bare and bar|ren Rock; the State it was in, before the Peace of Utrecht gave Leave to France to fortify it. If the Right given to the French by the 13th Article of the same Peace, to fish in some Parts of those Seas should be continued (and I could wish to see it continued, as the Refusal of it would be rather un|reasonable) let Cape Breton unfortified, and ungar|risoned be left open to them; and a few Men of War kept at Halifax, will effectually prevent Lou|isbourg's being again made a Place of Strength.

If you adopt this Measure, I should be inclined to think, France will see that you know your true Interests; and that you are resolved steadily to pur|sue them. And if they should make any Remon|strances against it, tell them they may follow our Example, and demolish, if they please, the Forti|fications of Mahon; which we see them possess

with as great Indifference as we remember the Cir|cumstances of its Loss, with Shame: Which, as being of no Use to them they will not desire to keep, and which, having been kept, by us, at an Ex|pence, not counterbalanced by its Utility, we shall not be very sanguine about recovering. Or rather tell them, that in demolishing Louisbourg, before the Peace, we only copy a former Example given us by themselves, when their Troops were employ|ed in dismantling the Frontier Towns in Fland••rs, at the very Time that their Plenipotentiaries at Aix la Chapelle were consenting to give them up.

The Plan which I have had the Honour of sketch|ing out to you, besides being so reasonable in itself, is perfectly agreeable to that Moderation expressed by his Majesty in his Speech, of not having entered into the War with Views of Ambition. The Pos|session of Canada, is no View of Ambition; it is the only Security the French can give us, for their future Regard to Treaties. We have made other Conquests, of great Importance, our Management of which will give us sufficient Means of shewing our Moderation. And though I shall not presume to give any Opinion about the future Disposal of them, I think, however, I may be allowed to hint, that "the Possession of Guadaloupe," an additional Sugar Island, when we have so many of our own, ought not to be insisted upon so strenuously as to make it a necessary Condition of the Peace. And though "Senegal and Goree," are of real Import|ance in the Slave and Gum Trades, our own Afri|can Settlements have hitherto supplied us with Slaves, sufficient for our American Purposes: And the Trade for Gum is, perhaps, not of Conse|quence enough to make us Amends for the annual Mortality which we already lament, of our brave Countrymen to guard our African Conquests. The

People of England, therefore, will not, I believe, blame the giving them back, for a valuable Consideration,—provided Canada be left to us.

To consider this Affair in its proper Light, it will be necessary to reflect on the infinite Conse|quence of North America to this Country. Our Colonies there contain above a Million of Inhabi|tants, who are mostly supplied with the Manufac|tures of Great Britain; our Trade to them, by em|ploying innumerable Ships, is one great Source of our maritime Strength; by supporting our Sugar Islands with their Provisions, and other Necessa|ries, they pour in upon us all the Riches of the West Indies; we carry their Rice, and Tobacco, and Fish, to all the Markets of Europe; they pro|duce Indigo, and Iron; and the whole Navy of England may be equipped, with the Products of English America. And if, notwithstanding our having lost several Branches of Commerce, we formerly enjoyed in Europe and to the Levant, we have still more Commerce than ever; a greater De|mand for our Manufactures, and a vast Increase of our Shiping; what can this be owing to, but to the Trade to our own American Colonies; a Trade which the Successes of this War, will render, every Day, more and more advantageous? If this Matter, then, be considered, in the above Light, by those whom I now address, they will make our North American Conquests, the sine qua non of the Peace, as being the only Method of guarding our invaluable Possessions there, from Usurpations and Encroachments; and they will look upon every other Conquest, we have made, or may make, in other Parts of the World, as Instruments put into our Hands by Providence, to enable us to settle Affairs on the Continent of Europe, as advantage|ously to our Allies, as our Gratitude could wish, and as their Fidelity doth deserve.

Here, then, let me change the Scene, and hav|ing settled our Affairs in Canada (would to God they were so settled at the Peace!) permit me to fi|nish my Plan of Negotiation, by giving my Senti|ments on the Part we ought to act, to obtain a pro|per Settlement of Affairs in Germany.

If a great Number of Allies can make them|selves formidable to a common Enemy, during the Operations of the War, they are apt to ruin every Advantage they may have gained, by quar|relling amongst themselves, when they begin their Negotiations for Peace. Like an Opposition, in our Parliament carried on against an overgrown Minister, all Sorts of Parties and Connections, all Sorts of disagreeing and contradictory Interests, join against him, at first, as a common Enemy; and tolerable Unanimity is preserved amongst them, so long as the Fate of this Parliamentary War con|tinues in Suspence. But when once they have dri|ven him to the Wall, and think themselves sure of Victory; the Jealousies and Suspicions, which, while the Contest depended, had been stifled, break out; every one who shared in the Fatigue, expects to share in the Spoils; separate Interests counter|act each other; separate Negotiations are set on Foot; till at last, by untimely and mercenary Divi|sions, they lose the Fruits of their Victory, and the Object of the common Resentment is able to make Terms for himself * 1.16. ••his was exactly the Case in the Contest between Lewis XIV. and the Princes of Europe united against him, before the Peace of Utrecht; and the unhappy Divisions of the Allies (Divisions too likely to have sprung up,

even tho' there had not been a Party in England, who to gratify their private Resentments, blew up the Coals of Dissention) gave the French the Means of procuring more favourable Terms of Peace, than they could well have hoped after so unsuccessful a War.

I have mentioned this with a View to observe, that the Circumstances of the present War on the Continent are very different; no such unfortunate Disunion seems possible to happen to us though it may happen amongst the Confederates who are en|gaged on the same Side with France, against Hano|ver and the King of Prussia.

It may be collected from more than one Hint dropt in the Course of this Letter, that I am no Friend to Continental Measures in general; especi|ally such continental Measures as engaged us dur|ing the three last Wars, as Principals; when we seemed eager to ruin ourselves, in Support of that Austrian Family whom we now find, with unparal|leled Ingratitude, and incredible Folly, in close Alliance with France.— But the Continental Mea|sures now adopted by England were necessary, both with Regard to▪ Our Honour and our Interest. Hanover has been attacked by France, on a Quar|rel entirely English; and tho' Care was taken, by the Act of Settlement, that England should not be involved in Wars on Account of Hanover; yet Gra|titude, Honour, the Reputation of our Country, every Motive of Generosity, bound us, not to al|low the innocent Electorate to be ruined for Eng|land's American Quarrel with France. In Regard to our Interest, no English Minister, however in|flexible, in his Attachment to his native Country, could have devised the Means of making the best Use of our American Conquests, if the French could have treated with Hanover in their Hands. It was

with a View to prevent this, to oppose the French in their Projects in Germany, the Success of which would have been so detrimental to England, that we honestly and wisely have formed and have main|tained the Army now commanded by Prince Fer|dinand; and have entered into an Alliance with the King of Prussia.

But tho' this was a Measure of Prudence, it was scarcely possible for the wisest Statesmen to foresee all those great Consequences which it hath already produced. The Efforts which the French have made in Germany, and the Resistance they have there met with by the Care of the British Administration; have contributed more than perhaps we could ex|pect, to our Success in America, and other Parts of the World. Full of the Project of conquering Ha|nover, France saw herself obliged to engage in ex|orbitant Expences; Armies were to be paid, and maintained in Westphalia and on the Rhine; vast Sums were to be advanced to the Court of Vienna always as indigent as it is haughty; the ravenous Russians, and the degenerate Swedes, would not move, unless allured by Subsidies; and the Mouth of every hungry German Prince was to be stopt, with the Louis D'ors of France. Involved in Ex|pences thus enormous, our Enemies have been pre|vented from strengthening themselves at Sea, where England had most Reason to dread their becoming strong.

The infinite Advantages which this Nation hath reaped from the German War, are indeed now so so well understood, that we have seen the greatest E|nemies of this Measure acknowledge their Mistake.

They now confess that if we had not resisted France, in her Projects of German Conquests, her best Troops had not been destroyed; her own Coasts would have been better protected; she would

have been able to pay more Attention to her Ame|rican Concerns; England might have been threat|ened, so seriously, with Invasions, as to be a|fraid of parting with those numerous Armies which have conquered at such a Distance from Home. In a Word, that universal Bankruptcy, which hath crowned the Distresses of France, and gives England greater Reason of Exultation, than any Event of the War, might have been prevent|ed. It is entirely owing to the German Part of the War that France appears thus low in the political Scale of Strength and Riches; that she is found to be a sinking Monarchy, nay a Monarchy already sunk. And, perhaps, it might be an Inquiry worthy of another Montesquieu, to assign the Causes of the Rise and Fall of the French Monarchy; and to point out those silent Principles of Decay which have, in our Times, made so rapid a Progress, that France, in 1712, after upwards of twenty Years, almost constant War, maintained against all Europe, was still more respectable, and less exhaust|ed than she now appears to be, when the single Arm of Great Britain is lifted up against her, and the War has lasted no more than three or four Years.

If this then be the State of the War, in Germany; if England be bound to take a Part in it, by every Motive of Honour or Interest; and if the infinite Advantages it hath already produced, be stated by me fairly—the Inference I would draw, and which, I believe, the whole Nation will also draw, is, that we should continue to exert those Endeavours which hitherto have been so effectual, in defeating the De|signs of France to get Possession of Hanover.

His Majesty, as Elector of Hanover, has no Views of Ambition: His Country has been attacked only because it belonged to the King of Great Britain: and nothing more is required of us, but to be true to ourselves, by neglecting no Step that may pre|vent

Hanover from falling again into the Hands of France, after having been so miraculously rescued from the Contributions of the rapacious Richli••u, and saved from the Military Desert of Belleis••e.—I need not say any Thing of the Glory acquired by that Army, which notwithstanding it's great Inferiority, hath driven the French twice from the Weser to the Rhine. I shall only observe, that the next Cam|paign (if another Campaign should preceed the Peace) will, in all Probability, lose us none of the Advantages we have gained, on that Side; if our Army, still headed by Prince Ferdinand, who has already gained so many Laurels, be rendered more formidable, as I hope it will, by sending to it some Thousands more of our national Troops; who now, since the Conquest of Canada, and the Defeat of the long threatened Invasion, have no other Scene of Action left, but to contribute to another Victory in Germany.

It would be a very pleasing Prospect, if we could speak with equal Confidence, and Probability of Success, concerning the future Operations of the King of Prussia. However, when we reflect on the amazing Difficulties he has had to struggle with; attacked on every Side by a Number of Confederates, each of whom, singly, one would have thought, an equal Match for his whole Strength; bearing up, at the same Time, against the formidable Power of the House of Austria; the brutal Ferocity of the Russians; the Attacks of the Swedes; the Armies of the Empire; and, at one Time, having the ad|ditional Weight of the French Arms upon him; when, I say, we reflect on the uncommon Difficul|ties this magnanimous Prince has to resist, we must rather express our Wonder, and our Satisfaction that his Situation is still so respectable, than indulge

our Fears, that it is likely to be worse. The sever|est Checks he has me•• with during this War, have only served to shew how calm he possesses himself under Distress, and how ably he can extricate him|self. The Hour of Adversity has called forth all his Abilities, and if he has failed some Times, from too great an Eagerness to conquer, he has always been able to retrieve his Affairs, and like Ant••us, gained fresh Strength from every Overthrow.

And, upon this Principle, I flatter myself, his Prussian Majesty will still be able to secure to himself the greater Part, if not the whole of Saxony for his Winter Quarters, and to recruit his Army, no Doubt much shatte•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 with its Losses and Fatigues, before the Opening of an|other Campaign. It is to be hoped also, that besides the amazing Resources He has still left in his own unbounded Genius, and the generous and effectual Support which his Connection with England, affords him; the Power of the Confede|racy against him may be broken, by disuniting the Confederates. History satisfies us how seldom a Con|federacy of many Princes, has ever ruined a single Power attacked. I have give one Instance of this already, when I spoke of the Grand Alliance against Lewis XIV. and the League of Cambray against the Venetians, in the 16th Century, is an Instance still more remarkable.

But, if contrary to our Hopes, our Wishes, our Endeavours, this should fail; if his Prussian Maje|sty, like a Lion caught in the Toils (after a Re|sistance already made, which will hand him down to Posterity as the greatest of Men) should at last be unable to defend himself; let him not despair while he is in Alliance with Britain: For I would inculcate a Doctrine, which I think will not be

unpopular amongst my Countrymen, and which, therefore, I hope, will not be opposed by our Mi|nisters, That whatever Conquests we have made, and whatever Conquests we may still make, upon the French, except North America, which must be kept all our own; should be looked upon as given back to France for a most important Consideration, if it can be the Means of extricating the King of Prussia from any unforeseen Distresses.

Perhaps my Notions on this Subject may seem to border on Enthusiasm; but, however, I can|not but be persuaded, that Things are come to that Pass in Germany, that the Ruin of the King of Prussia will be soon followed by the Ruin of the Protestant Religion in the Empire. The blind Zeal of the bigotted Austrian Family will have no Check, if the Head and Protector of the German Prote|stants be destroyed; and the War begun only to wrest Silesia from him, will, in the End, be found to be a War that will overturn the Liberties and Religion of Germany. If, therefore, the noble Perseverance of the King of Prussia deserves the Esteem of a generous People; if his Fidelity to his Engagements, which has contributed to save Hanover and to ruin France, can demand our Gra|titude; if the Danger of the only Protestant So|vereign in Germany, able to preserve the Privileges of his Religion from being trampled under Foot, can call forth the warm Support of this Protestant Nation; may I not hope, may I not be confident, that our Ministers will dictate, and our People approve, of Terms of Peace in his Favour, though they should be purchased by relinquishing some of our Conquests; while the Possession of Canada will be so reasonable a Bound to the Demands we may make for ourselves?

I have stated this Point upon a Supposition that the Event of the War may turn out to the Disadvantage of the King of Prussia. But if the Fortune, the Capacity, the Perseverance of that Great Prince should enable him (as I think we may still hope) to extricate himself from the Dan|gers that surround him—it may be asked, What is to be done with the Conquests which, besides Canada, we shall be in Possession of when we treat of a Peace? — My Proposal is honest, and, per|haps, will not be treated as chimerical: Employ them to recover, out of the Hands of France, those Towns of Flanders, gained for the Austrian Family by the Valour, and at the Expence of England; and which have been so perfidiously sacrificed. A British Administration must tremble at the Pros|pect of seeing Newport and Ostend become French Property, and, therefore, should use their utmost Endeavours to prevent this at the Peace; though those Endeavours may serve the Court of Vienna, whose Ingratitude to Bri••ain never will be forgot|ten; though, at the same Time, I must own we shall draw no small Advantage from it. We shall learn, for the future, to prefer our own Interest to that of others; to proportion our Expences on the Continent, to the immediate Exigencies of our own Country, and never to assist a new Ally, without remembering how much we did for our Old one, and what Return we have had!

I have, now, nearly executed my principal De|sign, in the present Address; which was to give my Thoughts on the important Business of the ap|proaching Treaty. And if it be conducted with as much Ability, as the War has been carried on with Spirit and Success, there is great Room for flattering ourselves, that the Voice of the Publick demands no Advantages or Cessions in Favour of

England, which the Ministers of England are not resolved to insist upon.

But amidst the signal Successes of our Arms, which give us so reasonable an Expectation of an honourable Peace, and have exalted our Country to the highest Pinnacle of Glory and Reputation abroad—I wish it could be said that our Constitu|tion was not greatly in Danger of being hurt, and al|most lost, at Home.—I shall beg Leave to take this Occasion of touching this equally melancholy and im|portant Subject; with a View, not to blame, but to lament; not to bring any railing Accusation against those who are now in Power, but to exhort and to excite them to endeavour, before it be too late, to add to the Services they have done their Country, in saving it from the open Attacks of France, the still more important Service of saving our Consti|tution, which some unhappy Circumstances of our present Situation have already greatly changed, and seem to threaten with entire Destruction;—Nay, I may say, would have actually destroyed, if it were not for the good Heart of our gracious Sovereign, who scorns to take Advantage.

Considerably above an hundred Millions of Debt, the Sum we must be obliged to sit down with, at the End of the present War, is the Burthen which, however immense, Experience has taught us, con|trary to all Theory, we shall be able to bear with|out Bankruptcy. As our Expences have increased, we have found, contrary to the Predictions of gloomy Politicians, that our Abilities to bear them have increased also.—But tho' our Debts be not too great for the Riches of our Country, they are much too great for the Independency of its Consti|tution. For, when I consider the infinite Depen|dence upon the Crown, created by Means of Them, throughout the Kingdom, amongst all Degrees of

Men; when I reflect on the many Thousands of Placemen, of every Denomination, who are em|ployed in the Collection of the vast Variety of Taxes now levied on the Public; and take a Re|view of a far greater Number of Servants of the Crown, both Civil and Military, for whose Sup|port so considerable a Share of the public Revenue is set apart, too many of whom, I fear, might be tempted to assist in extending the Influence of the Prerogative to the Prejudice of public Liberty; when I consider our vast Load of Taxes, in this Point of View, I cannot help observing the amaz|ing Revolution in our Government which this sin|gle Article has brought about; nor enough lament the unhappy Circumstances of Affairs, and the Necessities of the War which have forced us to an annual Expence, unknown to former Times, and which will almost be incredible to Posterity. I believe I can venture to say upon Memory, that the Expences of the War, for all King William's Reign, about 13 Years, were not, at a Medium, above 3 Millions and a half a Year; and Queen Anne's, tho' the last Years were exorbitant, were little more than 5 Millions. What they are now I sigh to think on. Twelve or fourteen Millions are demanded without Reserve; and, what is still more, voted without Opposition. Nay, of so lit|tle▪ Consequence it is now thought, by our Repre|sentatives, to deliberate on the weighty Business of raising Money on the Subject, that scarcely can Forty of them be got together, to hear the Esti|mates for at least One hundred and fourscore Thousand Men, for so many have we now in our Pay; and to borrow Eight Millions, the Sum of which our Expences exceed our Income.

These are alarming Considerations; but another Object, no less threatning the Ruin of our Consti|tution, also presents itself.

I am old enough to remember what Uneasiness and Jealousies disturbed the Minds of all true Pa|triots, with regard to standing Armies, and mili|tary Establishments. Principles of Liberty in ge|neral, and, in particular, Whig Principles▪ excited this Uneasiness, and produced those Jealousies, which from Time to Time, have been a fruitful Source of Parliamentary Debate. It was no longer ago than the late King's Time, that the vesting Courts Martial, in Time of Peace, with the Power of pu|nishing Mutiny and Desertion with Death, was car|ried in the House of Commons by a small Majority* 1.17. Nay, that a Court Martial, however limited in its Jurisdiction, was inconsistent with the Liberties of a free People, in Time of Peace, was the Doctrine of Whigs in those Days; it was the Doctrine, in par|ticular, of Sir Robert Walpole then in Opposition; whose remarkable Expression, in this great Debate,

That they who gave the Power of Blood, gave Blood, never can be forgotten.

And though afterwards when he became to be a Minister, he was better reconciled to standing Armies and Mutiny Bills, in Time of Peace, seventeen Thousand Men, was all the Army he durst ask; yet even that Demand produced an annual Debate; and the annual Reason, on which he founded the Neces|sity of his Demand—being the Danger from the Pretender and the Jacobites; was the strongest Proof, that even in Sir R. Walpole's Opinion, the Reduction in the Army should take Place, when this Danger from Disaffection should cease. But how are Things changed?—I own indeed that a|midst the Dangers of this War, and the Threats of an Invasion, the vast Army now on our Esta|blishment;

is necessary: But what I lament is to see the Sentiments of the Nation so amazingly re|conciled to the Prospect of having a far more nu|merous Body of regular Troops, kept up, after the Peace, than any true Lover of his Country in former Times thought, could be allowed without endangering the Constitution. Nay, so unaccount|ably fond are we become of the military Plan, that the Erection of Barracks, which, twenty Years ago, would have ruined any Minister who should have ventured to propose it, may be proposed safe|ly by our Ministers now a-Days, and, upon Trial, be ••ound to be a favourite Measure with our Patriots, and with the Public in general.

But what I lament as the greatest Misfortune that can threaten the public Liberty, is to see the Eagerness with which our Nobility, born to be the Guardians of the Constitution against Prerogative, sollicit the Badge of military Subjection, not meerly to serve their Country, in Times of Danger, which would be commendable, but in Expectation to be continued Soldiers, when Tranquility shall be re|stored, and to be under military Command, during Life. When I see this strange, but melancholy Infatuation, so prevalent, I almost despair of the Constitution. If it should go on in Proportion as it has of late, I fear the Time will, at last, come, when Independence on the Crown, will be exploded as unfashionable. Unless another Spirit possess our Nobility; unless they lay aside their Military Trap|pings; and think that they can serve their Coun|try more effectually as Senators than as Soldiers, what can we expect but to see, the System of mili|tary Subordination extending itself throughout the Kingdom, universal Dependence upon Government influencing every Rank of Men, and the Spirit,

nay, the very Form of the Constitution destroyed? We have generally beaten the French, and always been foolish enough to follow their Fashions; I was in Hopes we should never have taken the Fashion of French Government; but from our numerous Armies, and the military Turn of our Nobility, I am afraid we are running into it as fast as we can. And, unless something can be done, to bring back our Constitution to its first Principles, we shall find that we have triumphed, only to make ourselves as wretched as our Enemy; that our Conquests are but a poor Compensation for the Loss of our Liber|ties; in a Word, that, like Wolfe, falling in the Arms of Victory, we are most gloriously—undone!

But though I have drawn so melancholy a Pic|ture, of the Dangers which threaten us with the Loss of our Liberties, it is with no other Design, than to exhort those who are placed at the Helm, to set about the Repairs of our shattered Vessel, as soon as she can be brought safe into Har|bour. After the Peace is once settled, it ought to be the great Object of our Ministers, to devise every Expedient, and to adapt every Plan, that may extricate this unhappy Constitution from the Dangers I have described. Considering the low Ebb of France, we have some Reason to hope that when Peace is once restored, upon solid Terms, it will not soon be interrupted. Much, therefore, may be done during those Years of Tranquility; if our Ministers be diligent and faithful in this great Work of reviving the Constitution. The sacred and inviolable Application of the Sinking Fund, which the Increase of our Trade, and other Circumstances, have so greatly augmented, and must still augment, will operate gradually, and ef|fectually. Universal and unvariable Oeconomy,

must be introduced into every Branch of Govern|ment; the Revenues of the Kingdom may be vastly increased by adopting Schemes that will pre|vent Frauds, and lessen the Expence of Collec|tion; innumerable unnecessary Places may be abo|lished, and exorbitant Perquisites, in those we leave, may be restrained; Attention must be had to the Morals and Principles of the Nation, and the Revival of Virtue and of Religion will go Hand in Hand, with the Revival of Liberty. But no Object will deserve more Attention, than our Military En|croachments on Constitutional Independence. When this War shall be over, there will be less Reason, than ever, for numerous Armies. The Kingdom now happily being united, and Disaffec|tion to the Royal Family at an End, we need fear no Rebellions among ourselves; and Invasions from France are less likely than ever. Besides, by the Care and Perseverance of some Patriots, we have acquired a new internal Strength, a Militia trained up to be useful, and consequently, we may without any Danger to the Public, reduce the Number of our Guards and Garrisons, so low, as to destroy great Part of the huge Fabrick of Military Influ|ence and Dependence. But whatever you do, if you mean to restore the Constitution, you must secure the Dignity and Independence of Parliament. After passing such Laws as may still be necessary to preserve the Freedom of Elections, from Influence of every Sort; to punish Bribery both in the Elec|tors and in the Elected; something, perhaps, may still be done by Way of Place-bill, to lessen Mini|sterial Influence over Parliaments, without having Recourse to an Oliverian Self-denying Ordinance; or to so total an Exclusion of Placemen, as was established, in the original Act of Settlement.

And an House of Commons thus chosen, and thus made independent, now that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 is rooted out, can never be formidable but to those who have Reason to tremble. Such an House of Commons, will co-operate with the Administration in every Plan of publick Utility, and at the same Time inquire carefully into the Abuses of Govern|ment; Supplies will be voted; but only in Pro|portion to the real Income and Abilities of the Na|tion; and we may expect to see, what we have not seen above these forty Years, a Parliamentary Commission of Accounts erected to inquire into the Disbursement of near Two Hundred Millions. And unless we see this soon, I shall look upon our Con|stitution, as lost, for ever.

These, and many such Regulations, as these, may, under an honest and virtuous Administration, be adopted when once Peace is restored: And the Prospect of seeing them adopted, and steadily pur|sued, keeps me from despairing altogether of the Commonwealth.

To you, therefore, whose Power, most likely, will not terminate with the War; and whom I have presumed to address with Regard to the Terms that should be demanded, to secure us from a perfidious Foe; To you, My Lord, and Sir, let me earnestly recommend, the still more impor|tant Care, of saving us, from ourselves; and as you have with an Unanimity, that doth you both great Honour, directed our Councils, so as to humble France, let me intreat you to preserve your Union, till it re-invigorate the almost lost Powers of the British Constitution.

If you have any Regard to Virtue, to Liberty, to your Country; if you would live great, and die lamented; if you would shine in History, with our Clarendons and Southhamptons; let not this Oppor|tunity,

perhaps, this last Opportunity of saving British Liberty, and Independence, be thrown a|way. You, My Lord, whose Rank, whose exten|sive Influence, and personal Authority, have given you the Pre-eminence, in public Affairs, as it were by Prescription; much will depend upon you, in the carrying on this important Work. But when I direct my Address to you, Sir, you must be con|scious that besides the general Expectations we have from you, as a Lover of your Country, we have your own repeated Promises and Declarations, to make us flatter ourselves that you will not stop short, in your Schemes of national Reformation. Not tutored in the School of Corruption, but listed, from your earliest Years, under the Banner of Pa|triotism; called into Power, by popular Approba|tion, and still uniting, the uncommon Characters of Minister and Patriot; Favourite of the Publick, and Servant of the Crown; be not offended, Sir, if I remind you, not to disappoint that Confidence the Public places in your future Endeavours to prop the sinking Constitution. Nor let it ever fall from your Memory, that the Nation expects from your Virtue, your Oeconomy, your Plans for Li|berty, during the future Peace, as great Advantages as we have already gained, from your Spirit, your bold Councils, and vigorous Efforts, in carrying on the present War.

Perhaps I grow too warm, on a favourite Sub|ject; and, therefore, from Schemes which cannot take Effect, till the War be closed, let me turn your Attention again, for a little While longer, to the Object immediately before our Eyes—the in|suing Conferences for Peace. And, with Regard to these, though I suppose, they will begin before the Winter be over, I think there is some Reason for being of Opinion that we must have another

Campaign, before they can be finally closed. France is too low, to think seriously of a Peace, without making some desperate Effort. She never would have exposed her Weakness to all Europe, by so shameful and so ••umbling a Bankruptcy; She never would have ruined her public Credit, and melted her Plate, the last Resource, when every other has been exhausted, only to receive Terms from England. No, she knows she is un|done, for ever, if she gets no Footing in Hanover; and, therefore, we may expect to see another At|tempt made for that Purpose. But, if we are not wanting to ourselves, another Attempt, will end, as unfortunately for her, as the former have done; and her Ruin only be more confirmed. In the mean While, I make no Doubt, the Plenipotentiaries will meet at a Congress; but the Events of the Field, must regulate the Deliberations of the Cabinet. We, no Doubt, shall be firm in our Demands, whatever they are; and the French will endeavour to gain Time, to know whether there is any Likeli|hood of obliging us to offer them better. In this Situation, then, France must hear with Terror, that without breaking our national Faith, without injuring private Property, without giving exorbi|tant Premiums, we have already provided immensely for the Supplies of another Year (and Supplies for Years may still be had) to meet them;—not in Ame|rica; there they are no more;—not on the Ocean— the Destruction of their Fleets leaves that Empire free to us—but once more, on the Plains of another Minden, again to feel and to confess the Superiority of British Valour.

I have only a Particular or two, to add, before I conclude. And I cannot help congratulating the Public, on the Wisdom of our Manner of Open|ing the Negotiation for Peace. I mean to observe,

that our Ministers have happily got rid of a set of very useless, or very pernicious Gentlemen called Mediators, by applying directly to the Enemy him|self. Nothing can be more ridiculous than the Fi|gure of the Pope's Nuncio, and the Ambassador of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, a••ting the F••rce of Mediation at Munster, for several Years, while the War went on, till its Eve••••s regulated the Terms of Peace. The Media|tion of Insignificant Powers is therefore absurd; and the Danger of calling in a powerful Mediator, who may threaten to declare against you, if you do not submit to his partial Decisions, is too obvious to be insisted upon. You have done wisely, therefore, to keep the Negotiation in your own Hands; the Nation, from this Instance, has a full Confidence that her Interests are skilfully conducted; and, therefore, I shall only add, another Particular, which however subordinate, will, no Doubt, be at|tended to by you; though some late Negotiators of ours, with France, neglected it.

The French, by taking the Lead in Europe of late, have, of Course, been able to introduce their Lan|guage in all public Negotiations; so that, perhaps, the French is the only Tongue, by the Channel of which Plenipotentiaries and Ministers of different Countries, can converse. But when the Negotiation is to be put into Writing, to be drawn up in that Form which is to be binding upon all the Parties, and signed jointly by the treating Powers, neither the Honour, nor the Interest of the State, ought to allow us, to accept of the Original Treaty in the Native Tongue of our Enemies. The Honour of the Nation forbids this; as it would be a Con|fession of Superiority, to which Britain, at no Time, much less after so glorious a War, should submit; especially as we cannot submit to it, without giving the Enemy a real Advantage, and laying the Foun|dation

for future Cavils.—Cardinal Mazarine, in his Letters, boasts, that by a latent Ambiguity and Nicety in the French Stile, he had been able to out|wit Don Louis de Haro, in the Conferences at the Pyren••es. And a much later Instance, in which we ourselves were partly concerned, should confirm us, in our Refusal to treat with the French in their own Language.—I mean the famous Capitulation of the Dutch Garrison of Tournay in 1745; which, though only restrained from acting, for a limited Time in any of the Barrier Towns * 1.18, as the Dutch believed, when they accepted of the Capitulation, was soon after interpreted by France, as tying them up from acting in any Part of the World; and might have been fatal to this Country, if the Re|bellion in Scotland, to assist in quelling which the Dutch lent us those very Troops, had been so suc|cessful, as to oblige us, to put our foreign Allies to the Test.

We have no great Reason, no more than other Nations, to trust Gallic Faith, as appears from the many Instances of their unp••lliated Perfidy which I have collected above. Let us not, therefore, be so weak as to give them Room for obtruding upon us, any fallacious Interpretations of the Words, in which they plight their Faith. They are too ready to break it when the Terms are ever so clear; and, therefore, let us take Care not to give them that Advantage which superior Skill in their own Lan|guage, naturally confers, and which upon some future Occasion, they may improve to our Detriment.

Let the original and authentic Copy of the Treaty, therefore, be in a dead Language, the Phrases of which cannot vary, and whose Meaning is equally understood by both Parties. We had once a very learned Plenipotentiary in Queen Elizabeth's Time, who, in a Negotiation with Spain, when it came to be debated in what Language the Treaty should be made, ludicrously enough proposed to the Spa|niard, who was giving himself Airs of Superiority, to treat in the Language of his Master's Kingdom of Jerusalem. But, leaving the Hebrew for our Divines, I would only have our Negotiators treat in Latin: Which seemed, as it were by Prescrip|tion, to have a Right to be the Language of the Public Law of Europe; till some late▪ Instances have shewn that the French was beginning to be substituted in its Room; by the Laziness or Ne|glect of those who treated. As we are sanguine in our Hopes of a much better Peace than we had at Utrecht, with Regard to the Terms, let it not be worse than that at Utrecht, which preserved the Old Custom of settling the Negotiation in Latin. We then had a Bishop indeed, as Plenipotentiary; but without having Recourse to the very learned Bench, or choosing a Plenipotentiary from Cambridge (I hope in a little Time one may join the other U|niversity without giving Offence) the Negotiators at the ensuing Peace, may be accommodated with Latin enough for the Purpose I mention, at a very moderate Expence—If their Secretary or Chaplain cannot assist them.

But when I begin to be ludicrous on so serious a Subject, it is Time to have done: And my Ad|dress has already swelled to such a Size as surprizes myself, as much, as I fear it will tire the Reader. However, the vast Variety of Facts and Particulars which naturally offered themselves to me, and which

could not be omitted without hurting the Con|nection, and weakning my Argument, will, per|haps, procure Indulgence for so long a Pamphlet: And, for the same Reason, I flatter myself, that if I should happen to have been mistaken in any Thing I advance, to have erred in a Date, or to have misquoted a Treaty, some Allowances will be made to me, as I have been obliged to trust much to my Memory, for Want of a proper Opportuni|ty of consulting many of those Books, which fur|nish the Materials I have made use of. However, I believe a candid Reader will find no capital, at least, no wilful, Mistake.

I am far from the Vanity of thinking that my Notions on the important Subject of the Peace, are a regular Plan or System for the Administra|tion to proceed upon. I throw them out, only as loose Hints for my Superiors, to improve as they may think proper. Should there be any Weight in all, or any of them, you, My Lord and Sir, will be able to work them into Utility for this Kingdom. If they are not worth your Notice; as I am an anonymous Writer, and hope never to be known, I can neither loose nor gain Reputation by them. All I can say, if they are neglected, is, Operam et Oleam perdidi.

I am, My Lord and Sir, Yours, &c. &c.

FINIS.

Notes

• * 1.1

  1643.
• * 1.2

  Article 73, & seq.
• * 1.3

  Article 88. Le Roi de France ne s'arroger•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 les villes de la Prefecture, que le simple Droit de Protectio•• 〈…〉〈…〉 appartenoit à la Maison d'Au••r••che.
• * 1.4

  1679.
• * 1.5

  In 1738.
• * 1.6

  Treaty of 〈…〉〈…〉 A••ticle 10.
• * 1.7

  Though this great Minister died in 1754, and the present War was not declared in Form till 175••, he certainly has a Claim to share in the Merit of the spirited Conduct here spoken of. Our American Concerns were properly attended to, in his Time; our Colony of Nova Scotia liberally supported, and its ancient Limits asserted; the Complaints of our Colonies, in general, against the French Encroachments were not sufied or neglected, but Orders were sent from England to repel Force by Force; in Consequence of which Orders, Washington's unfortunate Expedition to the Ohio in 1754, was undertaken. I leave this Note to the Consi|deration of those minute Critics, who thought they had detected an Anachronism here. Perhaps I cannot so well justify my hav|ing omitted (though it was not by Design) to give a Share of Commendation to the great and learned Lord (who retired from the highest Station in the Law, after having filled it with so re|markable Abilities and Integrity) whose Behaviour, upon this Oc|casion, deserved as well of his Country, as it had done many Years before, when his Spirit, in contributing, jointly with the two Relations here meant, to call forth national Vengeance, procured him, from the Wags of those Days, the military Title of C—l Y—ke.
• * 1.8

  For the Particulars of the French Encroachments in Ame|rica, which I have only given a Sketch of, see the Memori••ls of our Commissaries, Dr. Mitchell's Contest in Ameri••a; the Doctor's and Mr, Evans's Maps, and many other Treatises.
• * 1.9

  M••r•••• 2d. 1••••8. The Lords having sent down an Add••ess to the C••mm••••s ••or their Concurrence, relating to certain Con|ditions to be insisted upon▪ •• the ••ine 〈…〉〈…〉. of a Treaty with Fran••••, Mr. Secretary B••yl•• represented. That the British Na|tion having been at a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 E••pence of Blood and Treasure, for the Prosecution of this necessary War, it was but just they should reap some Benefit by the Peace: And the Town of Dunkirk being a Nest of Pyrates, that infested the Ocean, and did infinite Mischief to Trade, He, therefore, moved that the demolish|ing of its Fortifications and Harbours be insisted upon, in the ensuing Treaty of Peace, and inserted in the Address, which was unanimou••ly appro••ed of. and carried back to the Lords. See 〈…〉〈…〉 of Parliament, Vol. vii. p. 122.
• * 1.10

  C••andler's Debates, Vol. 8. P. 69.
• * 1.11

  See the Report of the secret Committe••, P. 13. The fol|lowing Extract from a Letter of Mo••sr. Ter••y to Mr. St. John is remarkable.

  The Renunciation desired would be null and invalid by the fundamental Laws of France; according to which Laws the most near Prince to the Crown is, of Ne|cessity, the Heir thereto.—This Law is looked upon, as the Work of him who hath established all Monarchies, and we are persuaded in France that God only can abolish it. No Renunci••tion therefore can destroy it; and if the King of Spain should renounce it for the Sake of Peace, and in Obe|dien••e to the King his Grand••••ther, they would deceive them|selves that received it as a sufficient Expedient to prevent the Mischief we propose to avoid,
• * 1.12

  Sir W. Wyndham.
• * 1.13

  The Memorial is dated July 1, 1742.
• * 1.14

  I•• 1743-4.
• * 1.15

  See above, P. 18.
• * 1.16

  The true History of the Transaction here alluded to, may, possibly some Time or other, appear; though, as yet, we are persuaded, the World knows very little of it.
• * 1.17

  In 1717-18 the Numbers on the Division were 247 to 229.
• * 1.18

  I have not the original Capitulation before me, but I remember pretty exactly on what the Cavil turned. The Troops were not to act, I think, for two Years, in any of the Places le plus reculées de la Barriere. The Dutch, no Doubt, un|derstood, de la Barriere to be the Genitive Ca••e, but the French said they meant it in the A••lative.