The proceedings of the court-martial on the trial of Admiral Byng, held on board His Majesty's Ship St. George, in Portsmouth Harbour, begun December 27, 1756, and continued till January 27, 1757. : Containing a summary of the evidence as delivered each day in court, methodically digested, and the proofs and arguments as well for as against him, fairly and impartially stated. : To which is added, the Admiral's defence, as presented by him, and read in the court January 18, 1757. : Together with an account of his behaviour in his last moments. : With general observations on the whole.

Admiral BYNG's DEFENCE; As Presented by Him to the COURT, on board His MAJESTY's Ship St. George, January 18, 1757.

GENTLEMEN,

WHEN I consider that the Charge exhibited against me is of so criminal a Nature, so copious in its Circumstances, and depends on such a Multiplicity of Facts, I cannot but be very sensible of the Inconvenience I labour under, in being by the Practice of Courts Martial denied the Aid of Council on this Occasion; and this the rather as I am so little versed in the Method of Defence; having, during the Course of so long a Service, never yet been reduced to the Necessity of studying it.—What I shall, therefore, now lay before this Court, will have nothing more than plain Truth to support it—An Advocate altogether sufficient, where the Candour and Capacity of my Judges will, I am persuaded, supply any Defects and Omissions which may proceed from my Inadvertency or Inexperience.

It is my Misfortune, to have laboured under the Disadvantage of a popular, and almost national Prejudice.—For what Reasons this Spirit has been raised and by what Means propagated, is not the Business of this Court to determine: but I have the Satisfaction to find the Time arri∣ved, when I have an Opportunity of approving my Innocence before Judges, whose Integrity is above Corruption, and when my Prosecutors are Persons (for such indeed are the present) who desire nothing more than equal and impartial Justice, and stand indifferent to my Condem∣nation or Acquittal. By this means I am at once secured from being borne down by popular Clamour, or crushed beneath the Weight of an overbearing Power.

It has been said, and indeed very industriously ecchoed through the whole Kingdom,—That the Loss of St. Philip's Castle was solely ow∣ing to my Misconduct; and that Minorca might have been relieved, if I had done my Duty.—As this national Calamity has been urged in or∣der to excite a national Reproach against me, I must beg Leave, in the first Place, to refute this Aspersion; and should this Part of the Accu∣sation be once clearly answered, and the Prejudice removed, certain I am, the Charge of personal Cowardice, in the Action will soon vanish; for I am confident, had it not been convenient, nay I may say necessa∣ry, for some Persons to shelter themselves from the former Part of the Charge, no Man living would ever have thought of calling upon me, for a Justification with respect to the latter.

It may seem somewhat singular, that being accused of two Offences, one whereof is capital, the other not, I should appear more solicitous to acquit myself of that which is only a Misdemeanour, than of that which directly affects my Life: but how little Regard soever, I may be represented, to have had for my Honour, permit me to say, I still retain so just a Sense of it's Value, as to prefer Death to the Disgrace that ought to attend the Author of so inglorious a Calamity to his Country. If then, I can acquit myself of this Imputation (which I am confident I can) I shall with Spirit proceed to my Defence against the Charge of Cowardice, and treat it with the Contempt it deserves.—One Favour I have to beg of the Court, that the two Charges may be kept distinct, and by no Means blended together, as the Fate of Minorca did not at all depend upon this Backwardness (as it is called) in Time of Action.

The first, and what I think the principal Part of my Defence, con∣sists in satisfying this Court,—That I did the utmost in my Power to relieve Minorca:—if in the Course of this, I should happen, from the Necessity of Self-defence, to glance some blame upon others, I hope to stand excused; especially as my Innocence, in many Respects, is so intimately connected with their Neglect, that a Vindication of the one, must necessarily enforce an Exposition of the other: a hard Necessity, I must confess, and imposed upon me much against my Inclination; since no Man in my Situation would wish to contend with such potent Adversaries. I desire not to become an Accuser: but if the Loss of Minorca must be imputed, either to me, or those who sent me on the Expedition, they who have so falsely fixed the Imputation on me, in

order to protect themselves, can with little Shew of Justice complain of my retorting a Charge so unjustly applied to me.—But to proceed.

In order to determine, whether I did my utmost on this Occasion, I apprehend the Consideration of what I could do, should be previous to any Determination of what I ought to have done; and give me leave to lay it down as an undeniable Fact, and which I shall prove, That the French Fleet was superior in the Size of their Ships, Weight of Metal, and Number of Men, besides their Advantage in Point of Sail∣ing; which enabled them to fight, or avoid fighting, as best suited their Purposes. Though this Facts is now so notorious, yet permit me to ob∣serve, that the contrary was with an uncommon, Strain of Industry and Confidence asserted; nor indeed am I surprized at it's gaining an almost universal Credit, when the Gazette, a Paper supposed to be published by Authority, was prostituted to spread a false List of the Strength of both the Fleets among the People, not only by undervaluing the Ene∣my's Force, of which it is possible the Writer might be ignorant, but by over-rating mine, in which it is impossible he should be innocent.

I do not plead the Superiority of the Enemy as a Reason for not at∣tacking them, but only why such an Attempt might not only possibly, but most probably be unsuccessful; since it is evident that notwith∣standing my previous Information of their Strength, I did not hesitate to attack, and do the utmost in my Power to defeat them. And I have the rather been induced, to particularize this Circumstance, because you will find, by a Letter to me from the Admiralty—That the only Reason pretended for the Dismission from my Command, was retreat∣ing from an inferior Force.

Now instead of my retreating from an inferior Force, that a superior Force retreated from me, when the Fleet was unable to pursue, I shall manifest beyond all contradiction, and cannot help observing, that per∣haps I am the first Instance of a Commander in Chief, whose Disgrace proceeded from so unfortunate a Mistake.

I would ask, with what View or Intention I was sent out on this Ex∣pedition?—If it be answered to protect or relieve Minorca, which is the seeming Language of my Instructions.—I would again ask, Did those who sent me, apprehend that Minorca could be invaded before my Arrival, and the Descent covered by a superior Squadron, when they sent me out with so inadequate a Force?—If they did, their

Conduct is unjustifiable,—if they did not, their Ignorance is inexcusable.

This I presume is sufficient to unravel the political Secret—Why the Enemy's Force has been so industriously lessened, and mine so ex∣travagantly magnified; when at the same Time it is known to almost every Man in the Squadron I commanded, that it consisted of several of the worst conditioned Ships, and mostly the worst manned of any perhaps in his Majesty's Navy.

I think I may venture to affirm, that it was not foreseen or expected that the Fleet in the Mediterranean would come to Action; since it will appear from my very Instructions themselves, that no such Service was ever supposed probable, or that the Enemy could have a Force sufficient to venture an Engagement at Sea—In these you will find, I am ordered—If on my Arrival at Gibralter, the French Fleet should have passed out of the Mediterranean, to send a Detachment under the Command of Admiral West after them to North-America. Can it be meant that I was to detach eight Ships out of the ten? as no less would have been necessary to insure Success, and make the su∣perior Force ordered in my Instructions.—Again, I am ordered when ar∣rived at Minorca, to assist the Garrison with Lord Robert Bertie's Regi∣ment, and as many Gunners and Men as I could spare out of the Fleet.

Does not this suppose the Sea to be open, and the Fleet unopposed? or the Order would be absurd; for how could it be expected I should disarm the Squadron, by sending Part of its proper Complement (which please to observe the Fuzileers were) on Shore, when the whole was too little to secure Success at Sea?—I am further Ordered—If Mi∣norca was not attacked, to block up Toulon—What! block up a su∣perior Fleet with an inferior!—And all this Service you will please to observe was expected from a Fleet, which when collected, was still inferior to the Enemy's: I say collected, because as the Island was attacked, it is indisputable the Ships, then at Mahon, might have been blocked up, and taken or destroyed by the Enemy, as they did not quit the Harbour until two Days after the French had arrived off the Island, and part of their Troops were landed, and in the Neighbour∣hood of Mahon.

Does not all this evince, that fighting was the least intentional Part of my Instructions? And if the Admiralty had expected an Engage∣ment, is it not to be supposed they would have sent more Ships, as so

many fine Ships manned, or nearly so, then lay at Spithead, and would have afforded me the usual and necessary Supply of Fireships, Ten∣ders, Hospital and Store-Ships, instead of avoiding any Answer to my Request, that a Frigate might be added to my Squadron, to repeat Sig∣nals in case of meeting with the Enemy before I joined the Ships then in the Mediterranean?—But indeed I was positively assured before my Departure, from the highest Naval Authority, that the Enemy could not fit out more than six or seven Ships of the Line at most.

Under these unfavourable Circumstances, without such Intelligence of the Enemy's Force as could enable me to judge of it, determined to do my Duty, I took the Command of the Squadron, such as it was; many Ships foul, and one in particular, viz. the Intrepid, reported un∣fit for the Voyage. With these I proceeded as expeditiously as possible; and though it has been maliciously given out (yet not even pretended in my Charge) that I loitered at Portsmouth, I shall produce several Letters and Orders, which will incontestably prove that I departed thence the very first Moment I was enabled to sail.—Why the Admiral∣ty postponed this Service to others, made me wait, and manned my Ships the last, I must leave them to account for.

When arrived at Gibralter, I received certain Intelligence that a Descent was actually made on the Island of Minorca, that the Har∣bour and whole Island was in the Enemy's Possession, excepting the Castle of St. Philip, which was then besieged by a very considerable Force at Land, and the Siege covered by a strong Squadron at Sea, su∣perior to mine. Every Person there concluded the Place lost, and all Relief impracticable; and the Engineers were of Opinion, that is was absolutely impossible to land Men, even if the Sea had been open, and the Enemy had erected Batteries on the two Shores near the Entrance of the Harbour.

I must own there appeared to me no great Probability of preserving Minorca at this Time; but, however, have the Satisfaction to find that the Ministers at home, for once at least, agreed in Opinion with me, since the Moment Intelligence came that the Toulon Fleet was sailed, and the Troops landed upon the Island, there was not a Man who did not dispair of Minorca.

Hence I dispatched an Express with this Account, which was at first hushed up in Silence, afterwards represented (without, producing

it) as the desponding Letter of a Man who would not fight.—What Authority these Gentlemen had for this invidious Prophecy, I am yet at a Loss to account for, unless a declared Resolution in its Con∣tents to meet the French Fleet may be deemed a justifiable Foundation for it;—but the Letter has been laid before the Court.

It has also been given out, no Doubt with the same uniform ma∣licious Intention, to defame every Circumstance of my Conduct; that I made unnecessary Delays at Gibralter and this supposed to be solely on the account of watering.—I presume the Propriety, and indeed the Necessity will readily appear of furnishing the Fleet with a Sufficiency of Water and Provisions, which was proceeding upon an Expedition where the only Port capable of supplying it's Wants was known to be in the Enemy's Possession, and who by Intelligence appeared to be well supplied with all Kinds of Necessaries: this was not the Cause, but Effect of my Stay at this Place, and transacted during the Execu∣tion of other Affairs directed by my Instructions.—I arrived at Gibral∣ter the second of May Afternoon, and sailed thence the eighth in the Morning, a space of five Days only; in which Time I communica∣ted my Orders to the Governor relating to a Detachment from the Garrison, waited the Result of a Council of War held the 4th, then solicited a Reinforcement to supply the Deficiency of Men in Mr. Edgecumbe's Squadron, occasioned by the Loss of those who had been disembarked for the Succour of St. Philip's. A List of this Reinforce∣ment I received the 6th, and shipped them the 7th, which Day the Experiment arrived, the Portland and Dolphin two Days before: these with the rest of Mr. Edgecumbe's Squadron, were mann'd and equipped in the best Manner I was able; and without waiting to fully water the Ships, I sailed in the Morning of the 8th, though the Wind was Easterly, and arrived off Minorca the 19th.

Thus far, I will presume upon my Innocence; but why (it may be asked) was not Minorca at this Time relieved? I answer, because I was not sent Time enough to prevent the Enemy's landing, and that when I was sent, I was not strong enough to beat the Enemy's Fleet, and raise the Siege. Let others answer why I came so late, and why I came so weak, with a Force not calculated for such an Expe∣dition.—But after the Engagement, it may be said, I might have re∣attacked the Enemy, and landed the Succours: I might, indeed, have

done the first, with a Certainty almost of being defeated; I could not have done the last, though I had been victorious. Had I been defea∣ted, what Refuge would have been left for the shattered Fleet?—what Security for Gibralter; which must have been exposed to the ha∣zard of a sudden Siege, without a single Ship to defend it? and which Place was equally recommended to my Protection.

But it seems (such is the Fatality attending my Conduct) that I am even held blameable for calling a Council of War in so critical a Con∣juncture; yet when is Advice so necessary as on such an Occasion? I admit where Orders are positive to fight at all Events, and at all Hazards whatever, it is criminal to deliberate: but was I under any such Orders?—let my Instructions speak for me.— Is a Commander expected to fight in all Situations, and under all Disadvantages? sure∣ly all Extremes are culpable; and where nothing is to be gained, and all may be lost, Fighting becomes Presumptousness, Rashness or Phrenzy.—I therefore, beg Leave to recommend to your particular Consideration, the different Situation of the two Fleets at this Time; and shall refer you to the Minutes of a Council of War, held on board the Ra∣millies the 24th of May, already laid before the Court; and when you shall have duly weighed the Opinion of this Council, the Unanimity of its Members, and their Characters, what Apprehensions can I have of my Behaviour, on this Occasion, falling under your Censure, since it would necessarily imply their Guilt.

What I have now offered, being verified by the Testimony of the Witnesses, will, I flatter myself, be abundantly sufficient to exculpate me from the first general Charge; and that the Court will be of Opi∣nion,—That I never retarded from the Island 'till it was impracticable to make any further Attempt; and,—that the Place was not lost by me, who was too weak to save it; but by those who might have sent double the Force two Months earlier, and neglected it.

Yet permit me to complain, that in order to render me criminal in the Eyes of the People, the same authorized Paper before-mentioned, was likewise prostituted to mangle and curtail my Letter to the Admi∣ralty on this Occasion, and subscribed my Name to my own Defama∣tion.

I shall now proceed to the second Part of the Charge against me—that of Cowardice.—And tho' I have already taken up so much of your Time, shall make no Apology for your further Patience, as I am con∣vinced,

Gentlemen, your Impartiality will think no Indulgence too much, where the Life, and, what is still much more, the Honour of an Officer of my Rank in the Service is at Stake: I shall forbear to point out the Consequences to the Service in general, not to furnish even my Enemies with an Opportunity of construing it an Endeavour to bespeak a Partiality.

The 12th Article of War, is that, which provides a pro∣per Punishment for Cowardice, and runs in the following Words.—

Every Person in the Fleet, who thro' Cowardice, Negligence or Disaffection, shall in Time of Action withdraw, or keep back, or not come into the Fight or Engagement, or shall not do his utmost to take or destroy every Ship which it shall be his Duty to engage; and to assist and relieve all and every of his Majesty's Ships, or those of his Allies, which it shall be his Duty to assist and relieve, every such Person so offending and being convicted thereof by the Sentence of a Court Martial, shall suffer Death.

I would first beg leave to observe, that in order to bring any Person within the Peril of this Article, he must be convicted of Cowardice, Negligence or Disaffection; for tho' he should fail to engage or assist, &c. unless this failure apparently proceeds from one of these Causes, He is not Guilty.—Negligence cannot be taken in so large a Sense, as to mean every sort of Neglect and Omission, but such gross Negligence only, as evidently indicates Cowardice or Disaffection, such and such only can be Penal, and was intended to be made Capital, any other Construction might expose the bravest Man that ever commanded to the severest Penalties, since a single Error in Judgment might render him liable to the most capital Punishment.

By this Rule, I must desire, my Conduct may be judged; and if my Intentions appear to be good, and my Courage clear, I ought to stand Acquitted by all good Men, even though my Abilities should be deem∣ed Deficient.

And I must beg leave to observe, that this Article of my Charge can only relate to my Personal Courage and Conduct during the Action, and therefore any Disposition (admitting it could be corrected) can only be accounted an Error of Judgment.—I do not mention this to avoid en∣tering into that part of my Conduct, since I flatter myself that I shall be able to shew, considering the Circumstances, several Dispositions of the two Fleets, and unavoidable Accidents, that the whole as far

as could depend upon me, was conducted with that Propriety and Naval Military Skill which is requisite in a Commander in Chief—But the Court will please to remember, this is no part of the Charge against me.

Before I proceed to an Account of the Action, I must beg Leave to offer two Observations, and desire the Court never to lose Sight of them.

First, That Success must depend upon Execution as well as Dis∣position; and that no Commander of a particular Ship has a right to deviate from the established Discipline and Rules of the Navy, con∣tained in the fighting Instructions, and founded on Experience and just Observation; because if inferior Officers may judge for themselves, there is an End of all Discipline, and any Deviation from Orders, must tend to disturb and disconcert the Admiral's Plan, and throw the whole Fleet into Confusion.

Secondly, That as the French Fleet, superior in Force, waited the Attack, there was no Reason to apprehend they would avoid the En∣gagement; and therefore no Occasion to hazard a Disorder by crowd∣ing too much Sail, and making the Attack with Precipitation, contrary to the invariable Practice of every prudent, good or great Officer here∣tofore in similar Cases.

I shall now proceed, in as concise a Manner as I possibly can, to lay before the Court a faithful Narrative of the material Transactions of his Majesty's Fleet under my Command off the Island of Minorca, from the 19th of May 1756, to the 24th, both Days inclusive.

In the Morning at Day-light, on Wednesday the 19th of May, I arrived with the Fleet off the Island of Minorca; and was then about three or four Leagues distant from the Shore, the Wind fresh northerly.

Several Ships being at that Time considerably astern, in particular the Defiance, that had been separated from the Fleet, on Monday Evening before, by not being able to weather the Island of Cabrera, when the rest of the Fleet did; I made the Signals for the Captains of the Phoenix, Chesterfield and Dolphin; and sent these three Frigates ahead of the Fleet, under the Direction of Capt. Hervey of the Phoe∣nix; to whom at the same Time I gave a Letter for General Blake∣ney; which Letter, though it could not be delivered, I shall beg Leave to read, together with a Copy of my Orders to Captain Hervey.

Ramilies off Minorca, 19th May, 1756.

SIR,

I SEND you this by Capt. Hervey, of his Majesty's Ship Phoenix, who has my Orders to convey it to you, if possible, toge∣ther with the enclosed Packet, which he received at Leghorn.

I am extremely concerned to find that Capt. Edgecumbe has been obliged to retire to Gibraltar with the Ships under his command, and that the French are landed, and St. Philip's Castle is invested. As I flatter myself, had I fortunately been more timely in the Mediterra∣nean, that I should have been able to have prevented the Enemy's getting a Footing on the Island of Minorca.

I am to acquaint you, that General Stuart, Lord Effingham, and Colonel Cornwallis, with about thirty Officers, and some Recruits be∣longing to the different Regiments now in Garrison with you, are on board the Ships of the Squadron; and shall be glad to know, by the return of the Officer, what Place you will think proper to have them landed at.

The Royal Regiment of English Fuzilliers, commanded by Lord Robert Bertie, is likewise on board the Squadron, destined, agreeable to my Orders, to serve on board the Fleet in the Mediterranean, unless it should be thought necessary, upon Consultation with you, to land the Regiment for the Defence of Minorca: But I must also inform you, should the Fuzilliers be landed, as they are Part of the Ship's Com∣plements, the Marines having been ordered by the Lord's Commissioners of the Admiralty on board of other Ships at Portsmouth, to make room for them, that it will disable the Squadron from acting against that of the Enemy, which I am informed is cruizing off the Island. However, I shall gladly embrace every Opportunity of promoting his Majesty's Service in the most effectual Manner; and shall assist you, distress the Enemy, and defeat their Designs to the utmost of my Power.

Please to favour me with Information how I can be most effectually of Service to you and the Garrison; and believe me to be, with great Truth and Esteem,

SIR,

Your most obedient humble Servant, J. BYNG.

Lieut. General Blakeney. By the Hon. John Byng, Esq Admiral of the Blue Squadron, and Commander in Chief of his Majesty's Ships and Vessels employed in the Mediterranean.

YOU are hereby required and directed to proceed with his Ma∣jesty's Ship under your Command, together with the Chesterfield and Dolphin, (whose Captains have my Orders to put themselves under your Direction) off the Harbour's Mouth of Mahon, taking Care to make the Signals to me according to those you will receive herewith, and to use your utmost Endeavours to land the Packet for General Blakeney that accompanies this; as also to bring or send me his Answer thereto; you are to range the Coast along as near as pos∣sibly you can with Safety to his Majesty's Ships, from the Laire of Mahon to Cape Mola, and endeavour to make what Observations you can, of any Batteries or Posts the Enemy may be possessed of along the Shore, that may intercept the Communication between the Castle of St. Philip and his Majesty's Fleet; and you are also to employ the Ships with you, as you shall see most necessary to answer these Purposes, as well as to be very diligent in endeavouring to intercept any of the small Craft of the Island, which you are immediately to send to me, toge∣ther with all the People that shall be taken in them, for my having the earliest Intelligence of the Enemy's Situation on the Island; for which this shall be your Order.

Dated on board his Majesty's Ship Ramilies, off Minorca, this l9th May, 1756.

J. BYNG.

To The Hon. Augustus John Hervey, Commander of his Majesty's Ship Phoenix. By Command of the Admiral, George Lawrence.

For all the Purposes contained in this Order, and some others, I ap∣pointed Signals for the Captains of these Frigates to inform me of their Observations, without the Trouble and Delay of sending Boats.

About half an Hour after Nine, the Frigates having sailed ahead of the Fleet with a fresh Gale, and doubled the Laire of Mahon, fell into light Airs of Wind and Calms, under the Land.

About half an Hour after Ten,

The Fleet having also got round the Laire of Mahon with a fresh Gale, fell into light Airs of Wind and Calms; and with the Frigates about a Mile ahead, continued to stand on towards St. Philip's Castle,

and the Harbour's Mouth, with what Airs of Wind offered, until within the Distance of about three or four Miles.

At this Time we could see there was a frequent Exchange of Shot and Shells between the Garrison and the Enemy, who were firing upon the Castle, from several Batteries to the westward of the Castle, and to the eastward towards Cape Mola.

While the Fleet was standing on towards the Castle, Captain Hervey agreeable to my Directions made a private Signal to Captain Scrope of the Dolphin, who was left with the Garrison, and had kept the Dol∣phin's Barge with him, in hopes that Captain Scrope would come off to the Fleet, if it was possible.

It may be proper to explain, that each Ship in Mr. Edgecumbe's Squadron had a distinguishing Signal to give Notice on her, Approach, that it was such a Ship arrived; Capt. Hervey made the distinguishing Signal for the Phoenix, to give Notice that it was the Phoenix ap∣proaching; and at the same Time threw out a white Pendant at his Mizen Top Mast Head, the Signal to speak with Capt. Scrope, agree∣able to the Signals given out by Mr. Edgecumbe.

The Frigates had made the Signal for seeing Ships in the south-east Quarter; but between eleven and twelve, they were plainly discover∣ed to be the Enemy's Fleet, of which we counted sixteen Sail, at the Distance of about four or five Leagues, standing towards us.

The Enemy at this Time were undoubtedly Masters of the Har∣bour; the light Airs of Wind off the Land, and Calms, made it very uncertain what Time any of the Frigates could get near enough to the Castle to make proper Observations; and I apprehend it needless to explain to my Judges the Consequence of a Frigate's approaching Bat∣teries, or rather as many Guns as the Enemy are pleased to bring to bear, without Wind to keep her under Command. A Swell made the Phoenix on this Occasion in danger of being on Shore upon the Laire, and obliged Capt. Hervey to get his own, and other Ship's Boats ahead, to tow him off.

No Boat coming off from the Garrison, made it probable that no Boat could come off.

As the Enemy appeared to have Batteries on both Sides of the Cas∣tle, it was very improbable that the Frigates could not be able to cover the Passage of a Boat, with a Letter to the Sally-Port, much less the Passage of Boats carrying Troops.

Yet, supposing the Frigates had been sufficient, the Nearness of the Enemy's Fleet standing towards us, rendered it, as I conceive, impro∣per, upon the Brink of an Action, to deprive the Fleet of the Use and Assistance of any of the Frigates; but more especially of their Men, who were necessary to strengthen such Ships of the Line, as were most sickly, or badly manned.

Lord Robert Bertie's Regiment, and the Detachment of about two Hundred and seventy Men from the Garrison of Gibraltar, made up the Ship's Complements, and served in the Room of Marines.

Lord Robert Bertie's Regiment was intended to serve as Marines, as evidently appears by the Order to me from the Board of Admiral∣ty, directing the Fuziliers to serve in the Fleet, unless upon Consulta∣tion with the Governor, it should be thought necessary to land them: And likewise by their Lordship's Order to put the Marines on board other Ships at Spithead; therefore, landing them at this Juncture, had it been practicable, would, as I apprehend, have rendered the Fleet entirely unfit for Action.

All the Reinforcement then for the Garrison, that could possibly be spared from the Fleet, was about one hundred Officers and Recruits, which was, as it appeared to me, a very inconsiderable Reinforcement, and an insufficient reason for losing Time, and delaying to attack the Enemy's Fleet when in sight; more especially as there was very little, or rather no Probability of Success, from the Attempt to land them; and as those very Recruits, were in a great Measure necessary to a Fleet entering into Action, badly manned in general, and with three hun∣dred and seventy one Men sick on board the Line of Battle Ships, as may be seen by their weekly Accounts dated the 17th of May, which has been laid before the Court.

Thus Circumstanced, I conceive, no prudent Officer would have hesitated to conclude, that it was improper in every respect, to weaken his Majesty's Fleet, by landing Men before the Action, had it been practicable; and that the most immediately necessary Step was to attack the Enemy's Fleet, and try the Fortune of a Battle.

At half an Hour past Eleven;

I therefore made the Signal for calling in the Frigates, bore away for the Enemy, and made the general Signal to chase, continuing to stand towards the Enemy the remaining Part of that Day, with light Airs of Wind and Calms.

As Boats could easily pass from Ship to Ship, I made a Distribution of the Seamen from the Frigates, to strengthen the Line of Battle Ships, viz.

From the Phoenix	30 Men to the Revenge.
	20 to the Deptford.
From the Experiment	40 to the Captain.
	20 to the Lancaster.
From the Dolphin	20 to the Intrepid.
	20 to the Defiance.
	17 to the Portland.

And Captain Hervey acquainting me that the Phoenix long before had been reported at home unfit for Service; that he had sufficient Materials on board to fit her as well as the Time and Situation would permit as a Fireship, and could do it without prejudicing her as a Fri∣gate afterwards, if not made Use of; I gave him Orders to do it, and ordered the Schooner to attend and take out her Men, in case of her being ordered on Service as a Fireship.

About Six in the Afternoon,

A Breeze of Wind sprung up about South-west and by South, and both Fleets then about four Leagues distant continued to stand towards each other in the order of Battle.

About Seven,

The two Fleets were distant about two Leagues from each other when the Enemy tacked; the British Fleet at that Time stemming nearly for the Enemy's Van, who of course must have weathered us if both had stood on; I also hauled down the Signal for the Line, made the Signal to tack, and tacked nearly about the same Time.

The Enemy's Reasons for tacking were probably an Endeavour to preserve the Weather-gage, and as Night was near at hand, to avoid the Confusion of a Night Action, which no doubt would have ensued if both Fleets had continued to stand on.

It appeared to me also proper to avoid a Night Action, as from many Circumstances there was no Probability that the Enemy would decline coming to Action in the Day: and considering the Weather-gage of Consequence, if an Enemy has Fireships, which may occasion Disorder in a Fleet to leeward, even if they should fail in doing Ex∣ecution, and having no Reason to believe that the Enemy had not Fire∣ships,

I judged it most proper to stand in shore that Night, and take the Advantage of the Wind, usually off the Land in the Summer Sea∣son, the latter Part of the Nights and Mornings, to gain the Wind of the Enemy against the next Day, and therefore stood in shore until about half an Hour after Eleven, or near Twelve, and off the re∣maining Part of the Night.

Thursday the 20th,

In the Morning, the Wind about South West by South, a thick Haze prevented our seeing the Enemy's Fleet, and made it uncertain in what Quarter it was; but perceiving two Tartans with each a blue Flag at his Mast-head, in Appearance endeavouring to join the Fleet, as if they had mistook us for the Enemy, I made the Signal for the Princess Louisa to chase one in Hopes of procuring Intelligence, and made the Signal for the Rear Admiral to send Ships to chase the other, who sent the Captain and Defiance.

Chasing drew these Ships at a considerable Distance from the Fleet, the Captain and Defiance two or three Miles to leeward, and the Princess Louisa four or five Miles upon the lee Quarter, or rather a-stern; wherefore I was apprehensive of their being separated from the Fleet, and to prevent such a Separation, thought it necessary to tack about a quarter after Six, and stand towards them under an easy sail. About this Time the Princess Louisa made the Signal for seeing ten Sail in the North West Quarter, which for some Time I was in∣clined to believe was the Enemy's Fleet, that might have tacked to the North Westward again some Time in the Beginning of the Night.

The Defiance took the Tartan she chased, which had upwards of a hundred Soldiers on board with their Officers, part of six hundred em∣barked the Day before from the Enemy's Camp at St. Philip's, to reinforce their Fleet.

At Seven,

Or near about Seven, a Fleet was discovered in the South East Quarter, which proved to be the Enemy, and I made the Signal for calling in all the chasing Ships, which the Princess Louisa did not im∣mediately observe, but continued to chase; I fired several Guns from Time to Time, until she did observe the Signal, and made the Defi∣ance's Signal, who continued to lay by the Tartan Prize, taking out the Prisoners.

At Ten,

The chasing Ships appearing to be in a fair Way to rejoin the Fleet, I made the Signal to tack, and tacked to the South Eastward towards the Enemy.

At a Quarter after Ten,

I made the Signal for the Line of Battle a-head, at the Distance of two Cables Length asunder, and about half an Hour past Ten squared my Main Top Sail, that the Ships stationed a-head of me might the sooner get into their Stations.

About Ten Minutes after Eleven,

I made the Signal for the Line of Battle a-head, at the Distance of half a Cables Length asunder; and immediately after the Ships stati∣oned a-head of me having got into their Stations, I made the Signal to fill, and stand on, set Topgallant Sails, and crowded Sail to gain the Wind of the Enemy, who at this Time were standing to the North Westward in a Line of Battle a-head, and also crowding Sail.

At half an Hour past Twelve,

The Wind then favouring us a Point or more, the Enemy took in their Topgallant-Sails, and their Van bore away, and formed their Line to leeward; probably because their whole Line not being able to wea∣ther us, they otherwise would have run the Risque of being separated, and their Line cut by our Line.

About three Quarters after Twelve,

Our Van headed the Enemy about the Distance of two Miles to windward, and as soon as I headed them I kept away, the Wind nearly upon the Beam. The Enemy were twelve Ships in a strait Line of Battle a-head, and five Frigates to leeward, at this Time laying with their Main Top Sails Square from the Wind also, and under Steerage Way.

At One,

Or a little after, the chasing Ships got into their Stations, and our Line appeared to be regularly close, and well formed, the Enemy's Line more extended than ours.

Just before tacking I hauled up the Main Sail, and took in Top∣gallant Sails, apprehending a Crowd of Sail inconvenient, and improper to preserve Order, or to engage with, and unnecessary because the E∣nemy appeared to be waiting for us under Top-Sails, their Main Top-Sails square.

At half an Hour after One,

Our Van then stretched a little beyond the Enemy's Rear, to give room for leading down upon them, who having their Main Top-Sails Square, could not have fresh Way; I made the Signal for the Fleet to tack altogether; and soon after we tacked in that Manner, and kept in a Line on the other Tack.

At Two,

I made the Signal to lead to Starboard, with one Gun, and soon after another Gun, to put the leading Captain in mind of his Instruc∣tions, who I perceived did not steer away with the Enemy's leading Ship, agreeable to the 19th Article of the fighting Instructions, which directs.

If the Admiral and his Fleet have the Wind of the Enemy, and they have stretched themselves in a Line of Battle, the Van of the Admiral's Fleet is to steer with the Van of the Enemy's, and there to engage them.

About ten Minutes after Two,

Observing that the leading Ship did not steer away sufficiently, I bore away about two Points more than the Ships a-head of me; the Ships next a-head of me, bore down soon after into their Stations a-head.

Capt. Hervey of the Phoenix, appointed to repeat my Signals, ob∣serving that the Defiance, the leading Ship, did not comply properly with the Signal to lead to Starboard, repeated it several Times, in obedi∣ence to an Article in his additional fighting Instructions.

(Viz.)

If the Captains of the Frigates, which are appointed to repeat Signals, find the Signal not observed, they are to fire Guns until it is taken notice of.

About Twenty Minutes after Two,

It appeared to me, that the leading Ship did not steer down sufficient∣ly, and by that Means, was drawing the Van a-breast of the Enemy's Van, and altering the Disposition which I had made for attacking the Enemy, by steering down a slanting Course to avoid being raked; I therefore thought it necessary, to make the Signal to engage, to bring on the Action, and to empower the Ships to fire respectively as they got within a proper Distance.

Upon the Signal to engage, the leading Ship bore down more, as did the Van; in general; the Intrepid appeared to bear right down before the Wind, by which means she was exposed to be raked, and was dis∣abled by the Time she could begin to fire or very soon after; I also

steered away more, continuing the Signal for the Line of Battle a-head up, and with the Ships next a-head of me preserved a Line, and steer∣ed a proper slanting Course as the Circumstances appeared to me, to fall in with and engage the Enemy, who I observed had head-way.

The whole Van appeared to bear down more than the Rear Division, which I imagine must have been owing to some Ships in the Van being extended at greater Distances from each other than in the Rear, and of consequence being farther a-head with regard to the Enemy's Line, which laid them under a Necessity of taking that Method to get into Action with the Enemy.

At half an hour after Two,

The Enemy began to fire, all but the two sternmost Ships, who re∣served their Fire some little Time longer, but their Shot in general fell short throughout their Line.

About this Time I made the Signal for the Deptford to quit the Line, apprehending as she was one of the weakest Ships, that she would be of the most effectual Service as directed by that Signal. The first Article of the additional fighting Instructions, as given out to the Fleet by me at the Beginning of the Expedition. (Viz.)

In Case of meeting with a Squadron of the Enemy's Ships, that may be less in Number than the Squadron under my Command; if I would have any of the smallest Ships quit the Line, that those of the greatest Force may be opposed to the Enemy; I will put abroad the Signal for speaking with the Captain of any such Ship or Ships, as I would have leave the Line, and hoist a Flag striped yellow and white on the Flag-staff at the Fore Top Mast Head: Then the next Ships are to close up the Line; and those that have quitted the Line are to hold themselves in readiness to assist any Ship that may be disabled or hard press'd, or to take her Station if she is obliged to go out of the Line: In which Case the strongest Ship that is withdrawn from the Line, is strictly enjoined to supply the Place, and fill up the Va∣cancy.

Soon after the Enemy began to fire, their Shot reached the Ramillies, and passed through her Sails and Rigging; but I continued going down and reserving my Fire until I could get close to the Enemy, and I be∣lieve declared such my Intention at that Time.

About ten Minutes before three,

When the Enemy's Shot passed over the Ramillies, and through her Sails and Rigging, and several hulled her, some of the Seamen, as I have been informed since, out of impatience at receiving the Enemy's Fire without returning it, began to fire without Orders, as the Guns were kept pointed forwards on the Enemy in going down; others fol∣lowed the Example, on a Supposition that Orders were given.

I was displeased at firing so soon, contrary to my Intention, and I think expressed my Dissatisfaction; but being then within about half a Mile of the Enemy, with a fine Breeze; and apprehending that a very little Time would bring us down, and that it might prevent the Enemy from deliberately taking aim, and disabling the Ship before coming to close Action, I permitted the Fire to continue.

In the Time of firing, I think it was Lord Robert Bertie, who first observed it through the Smoke, and acquainted me, that one of our own Ships was close upon the Lee Bow, and that there was danger of firing into her, I immediately gave orders not to fire without seeing the Enemy's Colours, and to hale up the Fore Sail; and finding one Ship upon the Lee Bow, and another right a-head, both so close to us, with one or both Top-Sails a-back; I was under a Necessity without Hesi∣tation of luffing the Ship up so as to back the Top-Sails and avoid being immediately on Board of them.

And apprehending the Ships a-stern, might run on Board of us as we lay in a Cluster, partly hid by the Smoke; I also immediately made the Signal for the Fleet to brace to, the Rear to brace to first, and braced the Fore Top Sail sharp a-back, to back the Ramillies a-stern, and cast her Head to Leeward of the Princess Louisa and Tri∣dent, in order for the more immediately making Sail a-head again.

On Account of the Danger of firing upon our own Ships, all firing ceased at this Time, on Board the Ramillies, after about four or five Broadsides.

No Signal being appointed for the Rear only to brace to, laid me under a Necessity, on this Emergency of making the general Signal to brace to, the Ships in the Rear to brace to first; but this Signal was up so short a Time, that the Rear Admiral who according to the esta∣blished Practice of the Navy, repeated all other Signals, could not if he saw it, have time to repeat this, before it was haled down again, nor had Capt. Hervey in the Phoenix, who was appointed to repeat my

Signals, time to repeat it; neither did any Ships a-head of me not brought to before, bring to in obedience to it; because, apprehensive that the Ships a-head of me might bring to in Consequence of this Signal, and intending that the Ships might fill which by bringing to had obliged me to lay a-back, I was very solicitios to have the Signal made as soon as possible for the Fleet to fill and stand on, the Ships in the Van to fill first: And therefore,

About fiften or twenty Minutes after Three,

The Signal to brace to was haled down, while the Ramilies's Top Sails were a-back, and the Signal made for the Fleet to fill and stand on, the Ships in the Van to fill first. This was as soon as it could possibly be made after the Signal to brace to, and did not exceed six or eight Minutes.

And having discovered that the Stop was occasioned by the Revenge, and the Ships next a-head of me, bringing to or backing, instead of passing the Intrepide; who at this Time appeared unable to carry Sail, having lost her Fore Top Mast, and her Fore Sail a-back; and that by this Means there was a Separation between the Rear Admiral's Di∣vision and mine, I made the Signal for the Rear to make more Sail, and close the Line, almost at the same Time with the Signal to fill that these Ships might make Sail again and pass the Intrepide.

The Smoke occasioned by the Fire from the Ships upon the Lee Bow, as well as what had proceeded from the Ramillies, obstructed my seeing the Enemy's Conduct and Situation, about the Time of laying the Top Sails a-back. But the Smoke being cleared away, I observed that the Enemy were then under Sail, Fore Sail and Top Sails edging down from the Wind, three or four Ships of their Van going large, and the second Ship from the Rear, which the Fire from the Ramillies was principally directed at, going quartering with her Fore Sail, Fore Top Sail and Fore Top Gallant Sail sett, and her Main Top Sail Yard shot down upon the Cap.

At half an Hour after Three,

When the Ramillies was backed a-stern, and her Head cast to Lee∣ward of the Trident and Princess Louisa, I filled the Top Sails and set the Fore Sail; and observing that the sternmost Ship of the Enemy was separated from their Line, by the Ship a-head of her having bore away, I sent Lieutenant: Hamilton to Capt. Ward of the Culloden

with Orders to make what Sail he could out of the Line, and en∣deavour to cut her off.

Soon after this, shooting a-head to Leeward of the Trident and Princess Louisa, who were under their Top Sails, I ordered them to be hailed one after the other, as I shot up with them to make more Sail, which they did; and I immediately set my Main Sail, Jibb and Stay Sails.

About the same Time the Princess Louisa's Boat dropt on Board with a Letter from Captain Noel, acquainting me that he had lost a Leg, and desiring that an Officer might be sent to command the Ship. I immediately sent Captain Gough, then my first Lieutenant, with Di∣rections, in his Way, to carry my Orders to Captain Amherst of the Deptford, who was attending the Intrepide to take her Place in the Line; and I made the Chesterfield's Signal to attend and assist the In∣trepid then fallen a-stern out of her Station in the Line.

About Four,

Observing that the sternmost Ship of the Enemy, had shot up and joined their Line, the Culloden then abaft the lee Beam of the Ramil∣lies, at the Distance of about two Cables Length with Topgallant Sails set; I ordered Captain Ward to be hailed to get into his Station a∣gain, judging it improper, then, to continue my Order for him to pur∣sue the sternmost Ship of the Enemy, after she had rejoined.

The Enemy's Centre and Rear continued stretching a-head in a re∣gular Line, and edging down to rejoin the Ships that had bore away, some of which the French Admiral fired several Shot at; and they some Time afterwards haled up and joined him; and I observed that the French under Fore-sail and Top-sails very much outsailed us, who had also Main-sail, Jibb, and Stay-sails set. On this Occasion I could not help expressing my Concern to Capt. Gardiner, that I had not a few more Ships to enable me to make the general Signal to chase.

None of the Enemy's Ships appeared unfit for Action, or had any visible Damage in their Masts or Yards, but the Ship that had her Main Top-sail Yard shot down by the Fire from the Ramillies.

As they stretched a-head and edged down to rejoin the Ships that had bore away, they exchanged Fire with our Van, but at a very con∣siderable Distance, and their Shot seemed to fall short.

The Rear Admiral had lost his Main Top-sail Yard; and several

Ships of the Van appeared too much shattered to be able to pursue the Enemy; besides, the Intrepid totally disabled and dropt at a considera∣ble Distance a-stern and to windward of the Fleet, with the Chester∣field attending her.

After the Enemy bore away and made sail, as they so much outsail∣ed us, and a considerable Part of the Fleet was unable to pursue, I judged it improper to pursue with Part of the Fleet an Enemy superior at first, and still all of them fit for Action according to all Appearances.

And there appeared to me no further Possibility of bringing the E∣nemy to Action again as they declined it, without I had a sufficient Force and Superiority to enable me to make the general Signal to chace; therefore I stood on with my Division under Courses, Top∣sails, Jibb and Stay Sails, until we rejoined the Van Division.

And at half an Hour after Five I made the Signal to bring to, and brought to in order to repair the Damages of such Ships as had suffer∣ed in the Action.

The Enemy were then upon the lee Bow, distant about six or seven Miles, continuing to stand on to the northward, the Body of them still preserving their Order; and being rejoined by the Ships that had bore away, they seemed to be new forming their Line.

About Six,

Apprehending that the Enemy having observed the Situation of our disabled Ships, might take the Advantage, and tacking make an Attack in their Turn; I made the Signal for the Fleet to fill, and soon after the Signal to tack, and the Ships appointed to lead on the larboard Tack to continue to lead on the starboard Tack, in order to cover the disabled Ships, by placing my own Division that had suffered least in the Action in the Rear, and first opposed to the Enemy if they should make such an Attempt, and likewise prevent a farther Separation from the Intrepid and Chesterfield, at this Time about two Leagues upon the Weather Quarter of the Fleet.

About Seven,

Observing that few of the headmost Ships were as yet tacked, and that tacking in the Order of Battle would take up much Time, as Night was coming on, and there was no Night Signal provided for Ships that led on the Larboard Tack to continue to lead on the Star∣board Tack, I ordered the Signal for the Line to be hauled down, con∣tinuing

the Signal to tack up, that the whole Fleet might be able to tack before dark.

At the Close of Day the Enemy were at the Distance of three or four Leagues to the northward, continuing to stand on.

Soon after the Fleet was on the other Tack, I made the Night Sig∣nal to bring to, and the Fleet continued to lay to all Night in the Place of Action.

The 21st,

Moderate Weather, the latter Part light Airs of Wind and Calms, the Wind in the S. W. Quarter.—In the Morning the Enemy were seen in the N. W. Quarter from the Mast Heads of some of the Wea∣thermost Ships.—The Fleet continued to lay to, the Ships which had received Damages in the Action employed in refitting.—The Intrepid and Chesterfield having carried Sail all Night, and being out of Sight I ordered the Phoenix, Dolphin and Experiment to make Sail in dif∣ferent Quarters to look for them.—At Noon Cape Mola was by our Reckoning N. W. half N. Distance about nine Leagues.

The 22d,

Light Airs of Wind, easterly and hazey Weather, the Fleet con∣tinuing to lay to, the Ships that had received Damages employed in refitting.—I appointed Capt. Hervey to command the Defiance in the room of Capt. Andrews killed in the Action.

About Seven in the Morning,

Observing a Boat to the Windward of the Fleet, I sent the Schooner to tow her down, which proved to be the Lancaster's long Boat cut adrift during the Action.

About the same Time I gave out a new Line of Battle, having chan∣ged the Stations of some of the crippled Ships, and put two of them, viz. the Captain, and Defiance in my own Division, and the Revenge and Kingston in the Rear Admiral's Division in their Places.

About Nine,

The Dolphin having made a Stretch to the Southward to fetch, in∣to the Fleet, made the Signal for seeing the Intrepid and Chesterfield, and stood towards them in the S. W. Quarter.

At Eleven,

I made sail with the Fleet towards them.

In the Afternoon, upon Capt. Hervey's Representation that the De∣fiance

was very weakly manned, and but few Seamen, I sent a Mate from on board the Ramillies with thirty Seamen to assist in refitting her.

At Eight in the Evening,

Having joined the Intrepid and Chesterfield, I brought to with the Fleet, their Heads to the Northward.

The 23d,

The first Part of the Day, fresh Gales from the eastward and hazey, the middle and latter Part moderate, sometimes little Wind and Calms.

The Fleet laying to, the Ships that had received Damage in the Action refitting.

In the Morning I ordered the Officer of the Watch to view the Si∣tuation of the crippled Ships as they appeared to him, and minute down the Particulars, and to give me a Copy of it, which he did as follows.

The Captain with her Fore-Yard and Fore-Topmast down, no Main-Top-Gallant Mast up, and Main-topsail Yard unrigged, laying a-cross upon the Cap, and the Sail unbent,

The Defiance, with her Main-Yard, and Fore-top-gallant Mast down, Main-top sail furled, and Fore-top sail double reefed.

The Portland with her Fore Yard down, and Fore and Main-top sails down upon the Cap.

The Intrepid with jury-top Masts.

I ordered Surveys on the Damages received by the crippled Ships in the late Action, and on their Stores; and gave Capt. Lloyd an Or∣der to command the Princess Louisa during Capt. Noel's Illness, who had lost a Leg in the late Action; and Lieut. Gough an Order to com∣mand the Chesterfield during Capt. Lloyd's Absence.

About Six in the Evening;

Eight or Nine Sail of the Enemy were seen in the N. E. Ouarter; the Haze prevented our seeing the whole, or discerning clearly how they stood.

I ordered the Officer of the Watch to view the Situation of the lame Ships, and at the same Time to minute down the Particulars, and give me a Copy of it signed, which he did as follows:

The Defiance with her Main and Fore Yards down, her Fore Top Mast struck, and Main Top Sail furled.

The Captain with her Fore Yard and Top Mast down, and no Main Top-gallant Mast; her Main Top-sail Yard unrigged, and lying a-cross upon the Cap, and the Sail unbent.

The Portland with her Fore Yard down, and Fore and Main Top-sails upon the Cap.

The Intrepid with Jury Top Masts.

The Ships of the Fleet in this Situation, did not appear to me as yet in a Condition fit to attack or receive the Enemy; and, therefore, after having consulted with the Rear Admiral upon that Head, about half an Hour after Seven I wore with the Fleet, and stood under as easy Sail to the Southward for about four or five Miles.

The remaining Part of the Night, and next Morning it was calm.

On the 24th,

The Condition of the Fleet, and other Circumstances, making it appear to me necessary, and as it was agreeable to the Rear-Admiral's Opinion, I called a Council of War, the Subject of which, together with the Resolutions, have been already laid before this Court.

What I have now laid before you, to the best of my Knowledge, Observation and Judgment, is a true Account of the Disposition and Proceedings of his Majesty's Fleet during the six Days off Minorca, without any Exaggeration, false colouring, or Concealment, of the smallest Circumstance that can tend to give the Court any Information with Regard to the Proceedings of his Majesty's Fleet, or my own per∣sonal Conduct; nor am I conscious of having in a single Instance sa∣crificed Truth to Safety.

The greatest Part of this Narrative, if not the whole, has been pro∣ved, I hope, to the Satisfaction of this Court already; and, I presume, will appear consistent with, and a proper Execution of my Duty, con∣formable to the Rules of Prudence, the Art of War, and the establish∣ed Discipline of the Navy. But I must here beg Leave to remark a∣gain, that should any other Disposition for attacking the Enemy be thought more advantageous than that I made, yet it cannot come with∣in the Limits of my Charge. For should a Charge, depending upon Judgment in making the Disposition, be brought against a Commander in Chief—I believe I may venture to affirm, that should such Disci∣pline be once established, no Officer can be safe in taking upon him the Command of a Fleet.—It is evident, next to a Demonstration, there never yet was a Disposition for a Battle, either by Sea of Land, made by any Commanding Officer, whether successful or unsuccessful, which being minutely canvassed and examined, would not admit of some Amendment.

As the Evidence may seem defective, since there are no Witnesses to produce from the Captain or Princess Louisa, and but few from seve∣ral other Ships in the Fleet, many of them that will appear to be ne∣cessary, and no Doubt are so to my more full Justification; I beg Leave to lay before the Court my Letters to Mr. Clevland, Secretary of the Admiralty, earnestly requesting such Witnesses, together with his Answers: which Letters will serve to give the Court a Specimen of the unprecedented Oppression and Restriction of Privileges I have had to struggle with.

Greenwich Hospital, September 6, 1756.

SIR,

IN my Letter of Date the 4th of Aug. with a List of Evidence, I sent you the Names of all that occurred to my Memory then; but as I presume their Lordships will think it requisite that the Evidence ought not to be confined to any particular Number on so important an Occasion, where a strict and impartial Enquiry to come at the Truth is of the utmost Consequence; but ought to include as many Captains and other Officers as by their Situation on the Day of the late Action in the Mediterranean, are able to give the necessary Information. As I hear some Captains are going out to the Mediterranean, by whom I hope their Lordships will send Orders, I send you another List of Wit∣nesses that to me appear extremely necessary, presuming that their Lordships do not desire to restrain me in what may appear necessary for the Illustration of Truth, and for my Justification, in a Case where my Honour, my All is at Stake. I am sorry for want of knowing the Names, that I am obliged to distinguish many by their Offices, and the Spheres they acted in, the Day of the late Action; and am sensible of the Disadvantage of sending for Witnesses at random at such a Distance, without a Probability of knowing the Depth of their Knowledge, or their Observations, owing to my Consciousness of having duly dischar∣ged my Duty, and not knowing sooner what an Odious Light my Con∣duct was placed in here in England, by the Industry of some as yet invisible Persons who are indefatigable in propagating Falshoods to my Dishonour. I hope their Lordships will think my Request a very rea∣sonable one, and tho' such the Inconveniencies and Difficulties I am obliged to struggle with, yet my Conscience tells me I shall do well,

I am Sir, Your most humble Servant, J. BYNG.

John Clevland, Esq

A further List of Witnesses requested from the Mediterranean.

• Lieut. Taylor,
• Lieut. Peighin,
• Lieut. Cunningham,
• The Master Of the Captain, at the Time of Action.
• Lieut. Baker, late of the Defiance, now of the Hampton Court,
• Captain Durell, The Lieutenants and Master Of the Trident, at the Time of Action.
• Captain Cornwall, The Lieutenants and Master Of the Revenge, at the Time of Action.
• The Lieutenants and Master Of the Princess Louisa, at the Time of Action.
• The Master and Gunner Of the Culloden, at the Time of Action.
• Mr. John Mercer, Lieutenant,
• Mr. John Scott, Master Of the Deptford.
• Mr. William Hemmings,
• Mr. Daniel Pickering,
• Mr. William Babb,
• Mr. William Holland,
• Mr. James Cummins, Midshipmen of the Ramillies.
• Mr. John Irwin, Master of the Experi∣ment.

Admiralty-Office, Sept, 9th, 1756.

SIR,

I HAVE received and communicated to my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty your Letter of the 6th Instant, inclosing a further List of Witnesses which you desire may be sent for from the Mediter∣ranean, being Officers in his Majesty's Fleet there; and in return thereto am commanded by their Lordships to acquaint you, that as you lie under an Imputation of Misbehaviour, by means whereof the Honour and Interest of this Kingdom hath suffered in the most essential Manner, and stand committed to the Marshal of the High Court of Admiralty to answer for the same; their Lordships were desirous, in Justice to the Publick as well as Tenderness to yourself, to give you the earliest Opportunity of acquitting yourself, if possible, from so heavy a Charge; and therefore directed me, as appears by my Let∣ter of the 31st of July last, to give you an Intimation of their Inten∣tion to bring you to your Trial; their Lordships hoped, as there were then in England no fewer than twenty Officers who had served on board the Fleet under your Command; not one of whom had come or been sent for, upon the least Intimation or Knowledge of what Evi∣dence

he could give upon the Occasion; and as amongst them were se∣veral who must be presumed under a particular Bias (as far as Truth will permit) in your Favour, their Lordships thought you would have consi∣dered this Number of Officers of all Ranks, from different Parts of the Fleet, who from various Accidents had happened to come over, sufficient to clear up the Matter according to the Truth and Justice of the Case; and have desired an immediate Trial upon the Evidence now in England; but by your Letter of the 4th of August, you sent a List of thirty seven Witnesses as necessary to your Defence, twenty three of whom were then in the Mediterranean, their Lordships, tho' greatly surprised at the Number required, and well satisfied that they could not all be necessary; yet notwithstanding the Detriment which must arise to the public Service, by calling so many Persons home from the Fleet at this Time, and the long Delay of your Trial oc∣casioned thereby, they ordered me to acquaint you, by my Letter of the 12th of August, that all the Sea-Officers you had desired might be sent for, were ordered to be brought home in his Majesty's Ship Colchester; and that their Lordships had applied to the King for Leave for all the Land-Officers you had desired, to come at the same Time.

Under these Circumstances they cannot help expressing their Astonish∣ment at your Application of the 6th Instant, with a new List of no fewer than 31 Officers to be sent for, without the least Fact, Proof, or even Allegation to support this Request, or to excuse it's not being made before; their Lordships look upon it merely as a Scheme sug∣guested to you to delay your being brought to a Trial, which must be the necessary Consequence, if your Application should be complied with; by the same Means you may put off your Trial for ever; it is but applying for a new List every Month or six Weeks, and at last con∣cluding with a Desire that the whole Fleet may be brought home. Jus∣tice to a Person accused who may be innocent, requires that he should have a reasonable Opportunity of making and proving his Defence; this you have already had to the utmost of your own Desire, and been indulged to so great an Extent as may make an Example very danger∣ous to the Service and Discipline of the Navy; but Justice to the Pub∣lic requires that a Person accused, who certainly may be guilty, should not under the bare Pretence of desiring Means of Defence make his Trial absolutely impracticable.

I am therefore commanded by their Lordships to acquaint you, that so soon as the Witnesses already sent for shall come over, they intend to bring on your Trial, which they see no Reason to postpone any lon∣ger, barely on Account of the new Application made by your afore∣said Letter of the 6th Instant, and that you have laid no Grounds be∣fore their Lordships sufficient to induce them to give the least Coun∣tenance to so extraordinary an Attempt.

I am, SIR, Your most humble Servant, J. Clevland.

To the Hon. Admiral Byng.

Greenwich-Hospital, September 14, 1756.

SIR,

I Have received your Letter of the 9th Instant, in which your Manner of reasoning seems very extraordinary. I shall not comment upon that prejudging Expression of yours,

an Opportunity of acquitting myself, if possible,

it seems sufficiently to explain itself; but I cannot pass by unnoticed your

presuming several of the Witnesses now in England having a particular Biass, as far as Truth will per∣mit in my Favour.

Whence should that Biass arise? If from the Hopes of Reward, or Fear of Punishment: Rewards and Punishments are certainly in other Hands than mine.

And how great is my Astonishment at your mentioning their Lord∣ships Tenderness to me, and their Indulgence! Phrases I did not ex∣pect to meet with. Can being kept moving backward and forward from one Place of Confinement to another, for near three Weeks after my Arrival in England, so as to make it impossible for me to prepare any Thing relating to my Defence, be called by either of these Names? Or can my close Confinement at Greenwich, without suffering even my menial Servants to remain in the House after Dark, be called so? And I think I have a Right to complain of that Cruel Countenance and Belief, which seems to be given to a groundless Report, of my having attempted to make my Escape, and the rigid Orders given in Consequence of it, as if intented to confirm it; a Report so injurious to me, and so absolutely without Foundation; from which the Mar∣shal and Officers who have commanded the Guards here, as well as every private Centinal can fully vindicate me—And I cannot here

avoid observing, that all Charge of keeping me in Custody seems to be taken from the Marshal, and committed to the Governor of the Hos∣pital, by the Orders given in his Name, who seems diligent in distin∣guishing himself in the Service of his Country, by imposing upon me all the Indignities and Inconveniences that Power can enable him to do.

Had their Lordships, as you are pleased to say, intended me the earliest Opportunity of acquitting myself, it is very difficult to conceive why they were not pleased to communicate their Intentions of bringing me to a Trial, at the same Time, that I received their Orders to strike my Flag, and resign the Command of the Fleet in the Mediterranean to Sir Edward Hawke; that would have been doing me Justice, in giving me an Opportunity of considering my Conduct, and the Proof necessary to be given in support of it, at a Time when no conscious Guilt or Misconduct suggested to me, that I was to be arrested upon my Arrival in England, closely confined, and then brought to Trial; for surely no Person was to suppose that I was to look upon an Ex∣tract of an Enemy's Letter, and that Extract (if from a genuine Letter) a mere Gasconade and absolute Falshood, as sufficient to ground a Charge against me.

I must observe again, that in my Letter of the 4th of August, I mentioned particularly the Names of all that occurred to me then; nor is it Matter of Wonder that I could not at once think of all the Wit∣nesses necessary for my Defence. It would rather be Matter of Won∣der, restrained and distressed by all the Methods Power can impose, and personally disturbed Day and Night, if I had Immediately thought of all the Witnesses, or a sufficient Number capable of giving Testimony in my Behalf. But surely it can be no Cause of Astonishment, that accused of Crimes of the highest Nature, and conscious of my own In∣nocence, I should be desirous of producing all such Witnesses as appear to me necessary.

I must also observe, that I could not possibly know for what Purpose any of the Officers now in England came home; and therefore could have no Idea, that they were considered as the Witnesses necessary for my Defence. But if it was known to their Lordships, that these Gen∣tlemen came to England in order to prove me guilty of Misconduct, certainly I should have had the earliest Opportunity of bringing home my Witnesses. And if I had desired an immediate Trial upon my Ar∣rival

in England, as your Letter seems to intimate, I must have de∣sired it before I knew of any Charge, and without Witnesses to pro∣duce in my Defence.

What Fact, Proof, or Allegation their Lordships expected from me in support of my Request, is not easy to conceive; can any stronger be requisite, than that they are necessary Witnesses, and a List given within a reasonable Time, all Circumstances considered, and at a Time when there is proper Opportunity of sending for them, and of sending other Officers to supply their Places.—Giving in an additional List of Witnesses is not unprecedented, and the greater the Number examined, the more conspicuous must Guilt or Innocence appear. The Reason of their not being requested, or occurring to me as necessary sooner, is easily deduced from the unparallel'd Treatment and unprecedented Hardships, and Inconveniences that I have had to struggle with.

Far from delaying or attempting to render my Trial impracticable, I do assure you their Lordships cannot be more eager and sollicitous to have me brought to Trial than I am; but a Trial without the necessary Witnesses cannot be considered as any Trial at all; rather an Act of Power than an Act of Justice; and must be a Precedent much more dangerous than that hinted at in your Letter; and I cannot resign my just and legal Claim to call upon Witnesses that are necessary to vindi∣cate my Conduct, and make the Truth evident.

I am, SIR, Your most humble Servant, J. BYNG.

To the Hon. J. Clevland.

Justice to myself demands, and I hope will be thought a sufficient Apology, for that Freedom and Plainness becoming a Man in my Cir∣cumstances.—It is far from my Purpose to endeavour fixing any Blame or Imputation, even on my greatest Enemies, without Reason. But the Indignation and Resentment of an incensed Nation, is a Load much too heavy for me to bear, though it has been my Misfortune to struggle under it so long. And therefore I must entreat the Court to forgive my taking up some Part of their Time, in proving what may at first View seem unnecessary by the Nature of my Charge: That I may vindicate my Conduct to an incensed and deluded Nation, taught hi∣therto to look upon me as a principal Cause of the Publick's Misfor∣tune,

and as a Man guilty of the most odious of all military, and most contemptible of all civil Crimes.

No Symptom of Cowardice, that odious and capital Part of my Charge has hitherto appeared to the Court; and my Innocence, and conscious Discharge of my Duty, makes me confident that none will appear. Yet have I already suffered the severest Penalties that can be inflicted on it, being hung up in Effigy, traduced by Libels, tortured by Misrepresentations and Calumny, disgraced and superseded, upon no better Authority than the Gasconade of the French Admiral, arres∣ted and confined beyond the Example of former Times, treated like a Felon with every Indignity, and my Life pursued with the most inve∣terate Malice. But all this I have had Fortitude enough to despise, and treat with the Contempt it deserves, the Result of a Conscience clear of all Crimes.

I must now beg Leave to lay before the Court the Orders for dis∣charging the Marines, and for embarking Ld. Robert Bertie's Regi∣ment, which last points out the Destination and Service intended for his Lordship's Regiment; and also some Letters of Intelligence relating to the Enemy's Embarkation, Force of their Fleet, Reinforcement ex∣pected, and other Particulars.

I shall not trespass any longer on the Patience of the Court, having nothing farther to add, besides some Observations hereafter on the Evi∣dence, if the remaining Time will admit of it. But I fear it will re∣quire a much longer Time then I shall have to do it in, and a much abler hand than mine to discuss and digest Minutes of such a Nature, and of so great a Length: Therefore relying on the Candour and Abi∣lity of my Judges, as my only and proper Council, I must beg that they will be pleased to allow for my Defects and Omissions, and supply my want of more proper Talents to explain and support my Innocence.

Wednesday, January 26, 1757.

THE Court having now heard the Evidence on both Sides, toge∣ther with the Prisoner's Defence, and very maturely and tho∣roughly considered the same, they unanimously came to the following Thirty six Resolutions, viz.

1. Unanimously. It does not appear, that any unnecessary Delay was made by Admiral Byng, in the Proceedings of the Squadron under his

Command, from the Time of their Sailing, from St. Holens, on the 6th of April, to the Time of their Arrival off Minorca on the 19th of May.

2. Unanimously. It appears, That upon the Fleet's getting Sight of Minorca, on the Morning of the 19th of May; the Admiral detached three Frigates, (the Phoenix, Chesterfield, and Dolphin) a-head, with Orders to Capt. Hervey of the Phoenix, to endeavour to land a Letter from the Admiral to Lieutenant General Blakeney, and to make Obser∣vations of what Batteries or Forts the Enemy might be possessed of along the Shore.

3. Unanimously. It appears, That those Frigates got a-head of the Fleet, and in Shore, and the Phoenix close to the Lair of Mahan, and were endevouring to execute those Orders till they were called off between Eleven and Twelve o'Clock, by Signal from the Admiral, upon Discovery of the French Fleet in the South-East Quarter.

4. Unanimously. It appears, That the Fleet stood towards the Enemy the remaining Part of the Day, with Calms and little Winds, till they tackt in the Evening.

5. Unanimously. The Court are of opinion, That the Admiral pro∣ceeded properly, upon Discovery of the French Fleet, to stand towards them.

6. Unanimously. It appears, That Major General Stuart, Lord Ef∣fingham, and Col. Cornwallis, with about Thirty Officers, and some Recruits, amounting in the Whole to about One Hundred, belonging to the different Regiments in Garrison at St. Philip's, were on board Ships of the Squadron.

7. 12 Yeas, for all the Officers, I, for the General and Field Officers only.

The Court are of Opi∣nion, That as so great a Number, of Officers were on board the Fleet, belonging to the Garrison of St. Philip's, where they must necessarily be much wanted, the Admiral ought to have put them on board one of the Frigates he sent a-head, in order to have been land∣ed, if found practicable; and if not landed before he saw the French Fleet, he ought to have left the Frigate to have endeavoured to land them, notwithstanding he did see the Enemy's Fleet.

8. Unanimously. It appears, That from the Time of first seeing the French Fleet in the Morning of the 19th of May, till our Fleet weathered the French, about Noon of the 20th, the Admiral took proper

Measures to gain and keep the Wind of the Enemy, and to form and close the Line of Battle.

9. Unanimously. It appears, That the Van of our Fleet upon the Starboard Tack, stretched beyond the Rear of the Enemy's Fleet, and that our whole Fleet then tackt all together, by Signal; the Enemy's Fleet lying at the same Time to Leeward, in a Line of Battle a-head, on the Laboard Tack, under their Topsails, with their Main-top sails square.

10. Unanimously. It appears, That immediately after our Fleet was about upon the Larboard Tack, our Rear was considerably farther to Windward of the Enemy's Rear, than our Van was of their Van.

11. Unanimously. The Court are of Opinion, That when the British Fleet, on the Starboard Tack were stretched abreast, or about the Beam of the Enemy's Line, the Admiral should have tacked all together, and immediately have conducted it on a direct Course for the Enemy; the Van steering for the Enemy's Van, the Rear for their Rear, each Ship for her opposite Ship in the Enemy's Line, and under such a Sail as might have enabled the worst sailing Ship, under all her plain Sail, to preserve her Station.

12. Unanimously. It appears, That soon after the Fleet were upon the Larboard-Tack, the Admiral made Signals for leading two Points to Starboard, which brought the Wind upon or abaft the Beam; and the Ships continued that Course, nearly ahead of each other, till the Ad∣miral made the Signal for Battle.

13. Unanimously. It appears, that the Admiral made the Signal for, Battle, about Twenty Minutes after Two o'Clock.

14. Unanimously. It appears, That at the Time the Signal was made for Battle, the French Fleet were still lying to Leeward, with their Main-top-sails square, as before-mentioned, and that our Van was con∣siderably nearer to their Van, than our Rear was to their Rear.

15. Unanimously. It appears, That upon the Signal being made for Battle, the Ships of our Van Division; bore down properly, for the Ships opposed to them in the Enemy's Line, and engaged them, till the five headmost Ships of the Enemy, went away to Leeward, out of Gun Shot.

16. Unanimously. It appears, That the sternmost Ship of our Van Division, the Intrepid, having hauled up, and engaged about ten Mi∣nutes, or a Quarter of an Hour, lost her Fore-top-mast, a little before Three o'Clock.

17. Unanimously. It appears, That the Revenge, the headmost Ship of the Rear Division, bore down for the Ship opposed to her in the Enemy's Line, and that she brought up upon the Weather-Quarter of the Intripid, upon the Intripid's Foretop-mast going away; and that she quickly afterwards, upon the Intripid's setting her Fore-sail, bore down under the Intripid's Lee-Quarter, and brought up there.

18. Unanimously. It appears, That upon the Signal being made for Battle, and the Van putting before the Wind, the Admiral in the Ra∣milies, edged away some Points, and the Trident and Princess Louisa thereby becoming to Windward of him, the Admiral thereupon hauled up his Fore-sail, backed his Mizen-top-sails and endeavoured to back his Main-top-sail, to allow of their getting into their Stations, and con∣tinued in that Situation for five, six, or seven Minutes.

19. Unanimously. It is the Opinion of the Court, that the Admiral, after the Signal was made for Battle, separated the Rear from the Van Division, and retarded the Rear Division of the British Fleet from clo∣sing with, and engaging the Enemy, by his shortening Sail, by hauling up his Fore-sail, backing his Mizen-top-sail, and backing, or attempt∣ing to back his Main-top-sail, in order that the Trident and Princess Louisa, might get a-head again of the Ramilies.

20. Unanimously. It is the Opinion of the Court, That instead of shortening Sail, the Admiral ought to have m•••••• the Trident's and Princess Louisa's Signals to make more Sail; a•••• that he ought also to have set so much Sail himself, as would have enabled the Culloden (the worst sailing Ship in his Division) to have kept her Station with all her Plain Sail set, in order to have got down with as much Expedition as possible, to the Enemy; and thereby, have properly supported the Van Division.

21. Unanimously. It appears, That the Admiral, after shortening Sail, as beforementioned, again set his Fore-sail, and filled his Top-sails, and steered with the Wind abaft the Beam, a slanting Course towards the Enemy, under that Sail, 'till about Three o'Clock; when the Peo∣ple in the Ramilies, began to fire without Orders, at too great a Dis∣tance for engageing; but the Firing was continued by the Admiral's Directions.

22. Unanimously. It appears, That some little Time before this Firing began in the Ramillies, the Princess Louisa was seen from the

Ramillies, flung up in the Wind, with her Top-sail's shaking, and the Trident passing her to Leeward, the Trident being then a little upon the Weather-Bow of the Ramillies; and that the Revenge had been also seen to bring to, under the Intrepid's Lee-Quarter.

23. Unanimously. It appears, That when the Firing had been con∣tinued a little while in the Ramillies, an Alarm was given, of a Ship being close under her Lee-Bow, imagined to be one of our Ships, and which proved to be the Trident: That upon this Alarm, the Admiral immediately ordered the Helm to be put a Lee, the Fore-sail hauled up, and the Top-sails to be backed, and Firing to cease till the Men should see French Colours, and made the Signal for the Fleet to brace to, the Rear to brace to first, in order that the Ships astern, might not run on board him; but to prevent this Signal taking Effect upon the Ships a-head, he ordered it to be hauled down in a very few Minutes, and caused the Signal to be hoisted for the Fleet to fill and stand on, the Van to fill first.

24. Unanimously. It appears, That the Princess Louisa was also seen, about the same Time, with her Main-top-sail shivering, or aback, upon the Weather-Bow of the Ramillies.

25. Unanimously. The Court are of Opinion, That while the Ra∣millies was firing, in going-down, the Trident, and Ships immediately or ahead of the Ramillies, proved an Impediment to the Ramillies con∣tinuing to go down.

26. Unanimously. The Court are of Opinion, That the Admiral acted wrong, in directing the Firing of the Ramillies to be continued, before he had placed her at a proper Distance from the Enemy; as he there∣by not only threw away Shot uselesly but occasioned a Smoke, which prevented his seeing the Motions of the Enemy, and the Position of the Ships immediately ahead of the Ramillies.

27. Unanimously. It appears, That shortly after the hauling up the Fore-Sail, and backing the Top-sails, all Firing ceased on board the Ramillies.

28. Unanimously. It appears, That when the Smoke cleared up upon the Ramillies ceasing to fire, the Centre and Rear of the French Fleet had filled their Main-top-sails and set the Fore-sails.

29. Unanimously. It appears That the French Centre and Rear stood on, and as they came near the three then sternmost Ships of our

Van, gave them their Fire; that some of their Shot fell short, and some did the Defiance Damage; and then the French edged away to join their own Van, to Leeward.

30. Unanimously. It appears, That from the Time the Admiral first hauled up his Fore-sail, and backed his Top-sails to get clear of the Trident, to the Time of his filling, his Top-sails, and setting his Fore-sail again, was about Twenty Minutes.

31. Unanimously. It appears, That about the Time of the Admiral's filling, he made the Signal for the Rear of the Fleet to make more Sail and close the Line, caused the Princess Louisa and Trident to be hailed, to make Sail into their Stations, and then setting his Main-sail, Jib, and Stay-sails, passed to the Leeward of the Intrepid; ordered the Depford to take the Intrepid's Place in the Line, and the Chesterfield to take Care of the Intrepid, and standing on towards our Van, joined them a little after Five o'Clock in the Evening.

32. Unanimously. The Court are of Opinion, That after the Ships which had received Damage in the Action, were as much refitted as Circumstances would permit, the Admiral ought to have returned with the Squadron, off St. Philip's, and have endeavoured to open a Com∣munication with that Castle, and to have used every Means in his Power for its Relief, before he returned to Gibralter.

33. Unanimously. The Court are of Opinion, That Admiral Byng did not do his Utmost to relieve St. Philip's Castle, in the Island of Minorca, then besieged by the Forces of the French King.

34. Unanimously. The Court are of Opinion, That Admiral Byng, during the Engagement between his Majesty's Fleet under his Com∣mand, and the Fleet of the French King, on the 20th of May last; did not do his Utmost to take, seize and destroy, the Ships of the French King, which it was his Duty to have engaged, and to assist such, of His Majesty's Ships as were engaged in Fight with the French Ships, which it was his Duty to have assisted.

35. Unanimously. It appears, the Evidence of Lord Robert Bertie, Lieutenant Colonel Smith, Captain Gardiner, and by other Officers of the Ship, who were near the Person of the Admiral, that they did not perceive any Backwardness in the Admiral, during the Action, or any Marks of Fear or Confusion, either from his Countenance or Behavi∣our, but that he seemed to give his Orders coolly and distinctly, and did not seem wanting in personal Courage.

36. Unanimously. Resolved, That the Admiral appears, to fall under the following Part of the 12th Article of the Articles of War, TO WIT,—or shall not do his utmost to take or destroy every Ship which it shall be his Duty to engage; and to assist and relieve all and every of His Majesty's Ships which it shall be his Duty to assist and relieve.

On the Thursday following, being the 27th of January, the Court met again, and came to another Resolution, That, as the aforemention∣ed Article positively prescribed Death, without any Alternative left to the Discretion of the Court, under any Variation of Circumstances; he the said John Byng, be adjudged to be shot to Death, at such Time, and on board such Ship, as the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty should direct.

After which the Prisoner was sent for; and being brought into Court by the Marshal, the Sentence was pronounced.

But it appearing by the Evidence of the aforesaid Bertie, Smith, Gardner, and other Officers of the Admiral's Ship, that they saw no Backwardness in the Admiral during the Action: The Court did not believe his Misconduct arose either from Cowardice or Disaffection; and did therefore earnestly recommend him as a proper Object of Mercy.

Notwithstanding which, and the many Petitions presented in Behalf of the Admiral, by his Nephew George Lord Viscount Torrington, and others, a Warrant was issued the 16th Day of February, for his Execution to be on the 28th: But inasmuch as his Majesty was in∣formed, that a Member of the House of Commons, who was a Mem∣ber of the Court-Martial, which tried the said Admiral, had, in his Place, applied to the House, in Behalf of himself, and several other Members of the said Court, praying the Aid of Parliament to be re∣leased from the Oath of Secrecy imposod on Courts-Martial, in order to disclose the Grounds whereon Sentence of Death passed on the said Admiral, the Result of which Discovery, might shew the Sentence to be improper;—His Majesty had thought fit to respite the Execution of the same, until the 14th of March, in order that there might be an Opportunity of knowing by the separate Examination of the Mem∣bers of the said Court, upon Oath, what Ground there was for the Suggestion of his Sentence being improper.

During this Respite, on the 2d Day of March, a Message was sent by the House of Commons to the Lords of the Admiralty, with a Bill,

desiring their Concurrence, that the Members of the Court-Martial that sit upon Admiral Byng, might be released from their Oath of Secrecy.

In Consequence of which, the said Court-Martial were ordered to attend the House of Lords, and were examined separately; and as there was but three out of the Thirteen that desired the Act to pass, the other Ten being satisfied that the Verdict they had given, did not proceed from any Influence, but was from the Integrity of their Hearts, the only Verdict they could give; the Bill was unanimously thrown out of that Illustrious House. And,

We are assured, That one of the Officers of the Court-Martial, be∣ing asked by a noble Lord, Whether, if he was discharged from his Oath of Secrecy by an Act, if what he had then to say, could have any Tendency to the Service of the Public, or induce His Majesty to shew Mercy? To which he answered in the Negative: At the same Time, a brave Admiral said, That he had voted for his being shot, and would if he had been his Brother.

Being willing to clear up every Difficulty that may occur in the whole Extent of Mr. Byng's Case, and as he and his Friends have complained, that Justice has been denied him, by being refused the Liberty of sending for a second List of Witnesses, about a Month after he had applied for and obtained the first; it may be proper to shew the Nature of his Re∣quest in his own Words, in his Letter to the Secretary of the Admi∣ralty; together with some Remarks that have been made upon it.

GREENWICH-HOSPITAL, Oct. 17. 1756.

SIR,

I Have received your Letter of the 14th Instant, informing me that his Majesty's Ship Colchester, is on her Return Home with the Witnesses desired by my Letter of the 4th of August last, and cannot help ex∣pressing Surprize at their Lordships not having thought proper, sooner, nor even now to take Notice of my Letter, dated the 14th of September, wherein, in Answer to yours of the 9th, I gave farther explanatory Rea∣sons for requesting and claiming necessary Evidences, a List of whom I sent with my Letter of the 6th of the same Month.

My Case is very sufficiently hard, if indulged with every legal Advan∣tage; for I have too much Reason to believe my Prosecution is carried on by Persons, too powerful for me to contend against, whose Influence

must add great Weight to their Accusasions against me. In such a Situa∣tion their Lordships will forgive my insisting upon the Right of every common Subject, and that I may not be deprived of the Assistance of a single Witness that I think necessary for my Defence. It may perhaps be attended with Inconveniencies (as is alledged to put off my Trial;) but no Inconvenience can equal the Cruelty and Injustice in bringing a Man to his Trial upon Life and Death, who is denied the common Means of De∣fence; nor should their Lordships be much surprized that I made this Re∣quest no earlier than the 6th of September, for if they consider my Situ∣ation, when I gave in my first List under close Confinement, without the Opportunity of consulting Friends or Council, and almost ignorant of the Charge against me, they will rather wonder I was able at that Juncture, to do so much, than that I did no more.

If their Lordships had thought proper to curtail the List of Evidence, for any Reasons whatsoever, which I presume they have no Right to do; yet if my Charge regards my personal Conduct, surely they cannot with any Appearance of Justice or Impartiality deny me those Witnesses from the Ramillies, who were so near Eye-Witnesses to my Conduct: I cannot with∣draw my Claim to them; and therefore again send you annexed to this, the List of Witnesses wherein those who were on Board the Ramillies are particularly distinguished.

I must also repeat again, that a Trial without the necessary Witnesses, cannot be deemed an Act of Justice, but an Act of over-bearing Power, and, as such, protest against it.

It cannot be supposed, that a Person confined, oppressed and calumni∣ated, as I am, can possibly be desirous of postponing his Trial; but I must continue to desire to insist upon what I have a natural and legal Right to, JUSTICE, and as an Essential to it, the Witnesses necessary to my Defence.

I must desire your Answer, signifying their Lordships Intentions, and am,

Sir,

Your humble Servant, J. B.

Upon which Letter, a Writer to the Gentleman's Magazine makes this Observation, too material, he says, to be omitted, as it is a suffici∣ent Answer to the principal Grievance complained of by, Mr. Byng and his Advocates, I mean, the Denial of the second List of, Evidence, es∣pecially those Witnesses from the Ramillies, who were so near Eye-Wit∣nesses to his Conduct, which be declared could not be denied him with any

Appearance of Justice or Impartiality, and to which he could not with∣draw his Claim. If after this, on the Arrival of the Ramillies at Ports∣mouth, during Mr. Byng's Trial, when the-President of the Court-Mar∣tial acquainted him, that he might call any Witnesses on board her, it appears, as I am assured, that he declined doing it, with what View can one imagine this Application was made, and what becomes of the In∣vectives founded on the Refusal?

Various are the Arguments that have been offered to vindicate the Admiral's Conduct on this memorable Occasion; and it must be allow∣ed, they are very plausible. The Witnesses in general acquitted him of Delay, from his Departure from St. Helen's till he came before Mahon. His Precautions in sending three Frigates a-head to recon∣noitre the Harbour, and his calling them off on the Appearance of the Enemy, seems founded on Reason. It must likewise be allowed, that his disembarking his Soldiers for the Reinforcement of the Garrison, before the Battle, would have been impolitick, as it would have weak∣ened his Fleet, and made him less capable of encountering the Enemy. Nor is it less certain, that the sew Land Forces he had on Board were insufficient to save the Citadel, much less the Island. All this is grant∣ed: But let it be observed too, that the Admiral will never be made to suffer for that which was not in his Power to perform; and indeed his Advocates have not so much as touched upon the principal Part of the Charge against him, and of which be was found Guilty; namely, that he did not do his utmost to relieve St. Philip's Castle; that during the Engagement, he did not do his utmost to take, seize, and destroy the Enemy's Ships; nor did assist his Majesty's Ships in the Action, as he ought to have done.

Now, though it might be prudent in the Admiral not to weaken his Fleet, by sending away his Soldiers and Marines, for Relief of the Gar∣rison, before the Engagement, yet what hindered him afterwards, when the French fled, and did not return to renew the Fight in four Days that he staid there. That a Descent was practicable, was sufficiently proved by Lord Blakeney and Mr. Boyd. But not a Word of this in his Defence.

That he did not do his utmost to take, seize, and destroy the Enemy's Ships, is proved by the concurring Evidence of most of the Captains in the Fleet, who unanimously agree, that if he had set up more Sail, he

might as easily have gone down to the Enemy as did the Van. Why then did he not? Why did he throw his Sails a-back, and thereby stop his going down? Because, say his Advocates, he was then engaged with some French Ships, Yet Capt. Young, Capt. Cornwall, Capt. Ward, and others were of Opinions, that had the Admiral gone down with his Division, he would not only have prevented the Damage that was done the Van by the superior Fire of the Enemy, but in all Probability would have gained a complete Victory.

Nor did he assist his Majesty's Ships in Distress, as it was his Duty to have done. This was the Case of the Intrepid, who, had she not been relieved by Capt. Cornwall, must, in all Likelihood, have gone to the Bottom, or been taken by the Enemy; for no Signal was made by the Admiral, for removing her out of the Line, or for any other Ship to go to her Assistance.

From hence it appears, that the Condemnation of the Admiral was founded upon good Proof and sufficient Reasons. And though the Court acquitted him of Cowardice and Disaffection, yet his Neglects were such a notorious Breach of the 12th Article of War, that it seemed not in their Power, unless they would shut their Eyes against the clearest Evidence, to pass any other Sentence upon him than what they did.

When the Admiral was ordered into Court to receive his Sentence, he went with his Friend Mr. B—n, and in such full Expectation of being acquitted, that they had agreed to dine together. When they came on Board the St. George, one of the Court-Martial beckon'd the Gentleman aside, and told him, That as he believed the Admiral ex∣pected to be acquitted, he thought it might shock him less, to be ac∣quainted before he went in, that his Sentence would be Death. On his Friend's coming back to him, and looking disorder'd, the Admiral ask'd him, with some Warmth,

What is the Matter? Have they thrown a Slur upon me?

Sir, said his Friend, it is worse; your Sentence will be Death!

After a short Pause, he answered,

Well, if my Death will appease the Clamours of the People, in God's Name let them have it.

The Admiral heard his Sentence pronounc'd with great Composure; and as soon as it was finish'd, retir'd, without Reply, to his Confine∣ment on Shore, where a double Guard was set over him; but he was

soon after remov'd on Board the Monarque, where he was confin'd under a Captain's Guard.

Thus ended the Affairs of his Trial, while the Admiral was pre∣paring for his Dissolution; and the following Letter from Portsmouth, shews the Manner of his Execution.

Extract of a Letter from Portsmouth, March 15, 1757.

ORDERS being given for all the Men of War at Spithead, to send their Boats on Monday Morning, the 14th of March, with the Captain, and all the Officers of each Ship, accompanied by a Party of Marines in each Boat, under Arms, to attend the Execution of Mr, Byng; they, in Pursuance of that Order, rowed from Spithead, and made the Harbour a little after Eleven o'Clock, with the utmost Difficulty and Danger, it blowing a prodigious hard Gale, the Wind at W. N. W. and ebbing Water, it was the more difficult to get up so high as the Monarque lay, on board which Ship the Admiral suffered. Notwithstanding it blew so hard, and the Sea ran very high, and with great Violence, there was a prodigious Number of Boats round the Ships on the Outside of the Men of Wars Boats, which kept off all others. Not a Soul was suffered to be on Board except those belong∣ing to the Ship. But those Ships that lay any Way near her were greatly crouded with Spectators, all their Shrouds and Tops being full, altho' it was then difficult to see any Thing on board the Monarque. Mr. Byng walked out of the Great Cabbin to the Quarter-Deck, where he suffered on the Larboard Side, a few Minutes before 12 o'Clock accompanied by a Clergyman, who attended him during his Confine∣ment, and two Gentlemen his Relations. He was dressed in a light grey Coat, white Waistcoat, and white Stockings, and a large white Wig, and had in each Hand a white Handkerchief. He threw his Hat on the Deck, kneeled on it, tied one Handkerchief over his Eyes, and dropped the other as a Signal, on which a Volley from six Marines was fired, five of whose Bullets went through him, and he was, in an Instant no more. He insisted on not having any Thing before his Face, but was greatly pressed to it, being persuaded it was not otherwise de∣cent, and that the Marines might be intimidated from taking proper Aim. His coming out of the the Cabbin, which I particularly obser∣ved,

from die Stillness and Attention of all on board, could not be two Minutes to his Death. In short, he died with great Resolution and Composure, without the least Sign of Timidity, and the Moment the Muskets went off, there was a blue Pendant thrown out at the Fore∣topmast-head, which continued flying about five Minutes, and was then struck; on which all the Men of Wars Boats went off to repair on board their respective Ships.

The Ramillies, the Ship the Admiral had in the Mediterranean, was riding at her Moorings in the Harbour, and about Half an Hour before he suffered she broke her Mooring-Chain and only held by the Bridle, which is looked on as a wonderful Incident by People who do not consider the high Wind at that Time.

Inclosed you have a Copy of the Paper delivered by the Admiral just before his Death, which has been printed and given away here.

A Copy of a Paper, delivered by the Honourable Admiral Byng, to William Brough, Esq Marshal of the High Court of Admiralty; immediately before his Death, having first spoke as follows.

SIR,

These are my Thoughts on this Occasion; I give them to you, that you may authenticate them, and prevent any Thing spurious being pub∣lished that might tend to defame me; I have given a Copy to one of my Relations.

A few Moments will now deliver me from the virulent Persecution, and frustrate the farther Malice of my Enemies. Nor need I envy them a Life subject to the Sensations my Injuries, and the Injustice done me, must create. I am persuaded Justice will be done to my Re∣putation hereafter. The Manner and Cause of raising and keeping up the popular Clamour and Prejudice against me, will be seen through I shall be considered (as I perceive myself) a Victim, destined to divert the Indignation and Resentment of an injured and deluded People, from the proper Objects: My Enemies themselves, must even now, think me innocent. Happy for me, at this my last Moment, that I know

my own Innocence; and am conscious, that no Part of my Country's Misfortunes, can be owing to me. I heartily wish, that the shedding of my Blood, may contribute to the Happiness and Service of my Country; but cannot resign my just Claim to a faithful Discharge of my Duty, according to the best of my Judgment, and the utmost Ex∣ertion of my Ability, for his Majesty's Honour, and my Country's. Service. I am sorry that my Endeavours were not attended with more Success, and the Armament under my Command proved too weak to succeed in an Expedition of such Moment.

Truth has prevailed over Calumny and Falshood, and Justice has wiped off the ignominious Stain of my supposed Want of personal Courage, or Disaffection. My Heart acquits me of these Crimes. But who can be presumptously sure of his own Judgment? If my Crime is an Error in Judgment, or differing in Opinion from my Judge—and if yet, the Error of Judgment should be on their Side, God forgive them, as I do; and may the Distress of their Minds, and Uneasiness of their Consciences, which, in Justice to me, they have represented, be relieved, and subside, as my Resentment has done.

The supreme Judge sees all Hearts, and Motives, and to him I must submit the Justice of my Cause.

On board His Majesty's Ship Monarque, in Portsmouth Harbour, March 14, 1757.

J. Byng.

Portsmouth, March 22.

TO satisfy your Enquiry, as to the Ceremony used in the Execu∣tion of the late Admiral Byng, I am to acquaint you, that the Place where Offenders generally did by shooting is on the Forecastle; but he was so far indulged as to suffer on the Quarter-Deck.

Twelve o'Clock being the Time fixed for his Death, Capt. Mon∣tague looking at his Watch, acquainted him the Time was come. The Admiral returned for Answer, it wanted some Minutes, and he would stay to the last; however he soon come up with a becoming Steadiness, though there was a visible Trembling, as the Struggles of Nature can∣not be hid from an observing Eye. A white Neckcloth he tied over

his Eyes. A Canvas Cushion being laid, and upon that a green Velvet one, on which he kneeled, he gave the Signal for firing, by dropping a red and white Handkerchief. Nine Marines were appointed, six, to fire first, three kneeling and three standing; five Shot went through his Body into the Ship's Side, and so far, that they could not be bored out with a Gimblet, and one lay in his Body.—The Reason assigned for no Blood issuing is, that his Body was wrapped round with Cotton in such a curious Manner, as that not one Drop appeared.

He fell on his left Side, and made but one Shudder in the Agonies of Death, upon which a Cloak was thrown over him till the Coffin was ready to receive him, into which he was put, with all the Cloaths he had on except his Coat.

The Inscription on the Coffin is, The Hon. JOHN BYNG died March 14, 1757. aged 52.

The END.