A second part of Observations, censures, and confutations of divers errours in Mr. Hobbs his Leviathan beginning at the seventeenth chapter of that book. / By William Lucy, Bishop of S. David's.

CHAP. XX. SECT. VII. Mr. Hobbs his institution of a Common-wealth again examined and censured. The absurdity and evil con∣sequences of his doctrine.

WE pass now to his page 112. in the 7. line. Again, the consent of a Subject to Soveraign power, is con∣tained in these words, I authorise, or take upon me, all his actions. I have already and I think fully treated of the follies, weakness and wickedness of this imagination of his heretofore, which he makes the foundation of his whole Poli∣tiques. He proceeds; in which there is no restriction at all of his own former natural liberty. What an impious proposi∣tion is this? that he who had before affirmed, that man by nature had right to any goods, any life, any thing which conduced to his own contented life before a Common-wealth was instituted, hath now, by these words which institute and give form and being to his doctrine of a Common-wealth; these, not liberties only, but licenses, but abominations must not be abridged or restrained. But mark his reason—for (saith he) by allowing him to kill me, I am not bound to kill my self when he commands me. So that it seems, the au∣thorizing he speaks of is of the supremes actions, not his com∣mands; and then surely his former proposition is not good, men are restrained by nothing of the Soveraign commands, where his own interest is personally opposed to it. If this be not insufferable doctrine in any well governed Common-wealth, I know not what is; for by this any man may act any thing which may conduce to his contented living; nay,

what is more, he hath right to do it: and if so, what a condition would a Common-wealth be in? a King accord∣ing to his doctrine may without injustice kill any man which he thinks fit, and a subject hath right to kill him when he thinks it conduceth to his good; for naturally every man hath this right by his doctrine, and so cannot be supposed by any contract to part from his natural right; all this is evident out of the beginning of the 14. Chap. where he defines the right of nature thus, The right of nature, which writers com∣monly call jus naturale, is the liberty each man hath to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say of his own life; and consequent∣ly of doing any thing which in his own judgement, and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means to conduce thereto. And there is much more to this purpose, of which I have already treated in my notes upon that Chap. So that it is clear by his doctrine, That the constitution of a Common-wealth enables the Soveraign to act nothing by right, more than another man, because that constitution doth not restrain the right of nature, and the right of nature impowers every man to act any thing which shall appear to him for his particular advantage, by his Book: I shall treat no more of this now.